MIND I N G N AT U R E 4 .

Humans,Nature,
andEthics
ByGREGORYE.KAEBNICK

ESSENTIALIST VERSUS EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVES

oes the idea of nature provide any kind

ofethicaltouchstonetoguideandtolimit
humanimpactsonecosystemsorthebio
chemicalbasisoflife?Anddoestheideaof
human nature similarly provide any kind of moral
structuretogovernouruseofbiotechnologicalmeans
to alter human beings? Many would say no to both
questionstooquickly,justasmanyotherswouldtoo
quickly say yes. I believe that we must take a more
complexandnuancedpositiononthesefundamental
questions. To argue against somethingsuch as hu
man applications of biotechnology for enhancement
of traitsbecause it will change human nature or is
unnatural implies that we know what human nature
is,whensurelyhumannatureisamorphousandslip
!"#$%&'%(")'*%+,"%-./0123'$%4/%!.55.56%-475%,28&5%5&
tureisonereasonthatattitudesaboutnaturecannot
beplausibleunlesstheyarelimitedandcomplicated.
Inthisessay,Iarguethatwemaynotneedtoknow
much about human nature to have moral concerns
aboutchangingitbymeansofbiotechnology.Neither
our conception of nature nor our conception of hu
manity need to beor can plausibly beessentialist
&5-%)'&'.1*%+4%&''&1,%84#&3%).65.01&51"%'4%',"%145-.
tionsofourhumanity,andtobewaryofthetechno
logicalmanipulationofit,wedonotnecessarilyneed
tospecifyexactlywhatitmeanstobehuman.Wedo
notneedtohaveafulltheoryofhumannatureinorder
tohavemoralconcernsaboutchangingit.
GREGORYE.KAEBNICK

9114#-.56% '4% 45"% .5:2"5'.&3% !,.34)4!,.1&3% '#&-.

tion,tounderstandhumannatureistograspthees
sence of what it is to be human. As typically under
stood,anessenceisthefundamentalbeingorreality
thataparticularthingembodies.Anessenceexplains
thetraitsthatathinghas.Itisnotreducibletothose
traits,howeveritisunchangingandtimeless.Anes
sencehasanexistenceofitsown,andindeeditis,in
a sense, more real than the items that partake of it.
Further,essencesareoftenheldtorelatethingsofdif
ferentkindstoeachother.Anessenceconnectsindi
vidualsintoalargerclassorkindallthemembersof
agivenkindshareanessence,andmembersofother
kindslackit.Accordingtoanancientlineageofschol
ars whose work draws on Aristotle, a kind is what it
isbyrationalnecessity.Itispartofthisviewthatthe
overall universe is rationally ordered and necessary,
andwecanunderstandtheorderandnecessityofthe
universe by grasping the essences that things in the
universeembody.
However, essentialism is not the only way of un
derstandingtheconceptofhumannature.Analter
native view, now salient in all postmodern thought
&5-%;"#$%).65.01&5'%.5%',"%(.4346.1&3%)1."51")<%.)%545=
teleological evolution, pioneered by Darwin. When
applied to the study of human beings, an evolution
aryviewmakesnoclaimfortherationalnecessityof
human nature, or for its immutability and timeless
nessnordoesitclaimthatanaccountofhumanna
turewillshowthathumannatureisrationallyrelated
totherestoftheuniverse.Thereneedalsobenore
quirement that what makes humans human is some
HUMANS, NATURE, AND ETHICS

26

MIND I N G N AT U R E 4 . 2

traitthatthemembersofotherspeciesentirelylack.
Typically,lookingattraitsallowsonetorecognizespe
cies,butthetraitsthatallowustorecognizehumans
ashumansmightbefoundinsomemeasureinother
animals. And ultimately, in an evolutionary account,
what really distinguishes species is not any claim
aboutwhattraitscharacterizethemembersofthespe
cies, but the causal story that can be told about how
the species appeared on the scene and how, through
reproduction,itpersists.
On an evolutionary view, then, human nature
does not refer to an unchanging essence. Instead, it
describes functions it tells us what the members of
thekindhappentobelike.Fromthisperspectivewe
shouldexpecttobetterunderstandhumannatureby
studying our taxonomic neighbors, as Mary Midgley
arguesinBeastandMan.Whatdistinguisheshuman
beingsfromotheranimalsistypicallyheldtobetheir
possession of various capacities related to cognition,
such as language, rationality, toolmaking, morality,
andculture,butthereisnoneedtoestablishthatany
ofthesecapacitiesarepossessedonlybyhumansin
deed,theevidenceismountingthattheyarecapacities
or extensions of capacities that animals also possess
in differing forms and degrees. At the same time, as
Midgley also emphasizes, we need not restrict our
selves to biology to learn about human nature. We
willhavetostudyhumanssociologicallyandanthro
pologically,asPaulEhrlichdoesin!"#$%&'$(")*+,&
Genes, Cultures, and the Human Prospect, in which
he argues that there is no unitary account of human
5&'2#"<% &5-% ',&'<% 6.;"5% ',"% ).65.01&51"% 4/% 123'2#"% .5%
humanwaysofliving,thereareinsteadmultiplehu
mannatures.
Moreover, the idea of human nature can refer
bothtohowindividualhumancapacitiesareacquired
andtogeneralclaimsabouthumancapacities.Human
bodiesandfacestendtolookacertainway,andthat
isafactofnature.Butthereisalsoasurprisingdegree
ofvariation,andthat,too,isafactofnature.Plainly,
',"#"% .)% 54% ).563"<% 4;"#&#1,.56% -"05.'.45% 4/% ?5&'2#"@%
that applies to all of the ways in which the term is
usedandalwaysshowsclearlywhatthecorrectusage
is. However,both inrejectingthe essentialist under
standing of human nature and in allocating only a
limitedroletoassertionsabouthumanspeciesnorms,
weshiftthefocusfromgeneralclaimsaboutwhathu
manbeingsareliketoarecognitionofdiversity,com
plexity, and individual variation. To do so is to give
up pretensions to a commanding knowledge of what
GREGORYE.KAEBNICK

humanbeingsarereallylike.
HUMAN NATURE AS THE BASIS FOR MORALITY

Themoralconcernspeoplehaveaboutmodifying
humannaturearealsovarious.Likethedifferentviews
aboutwhataconceptofhumannatureis,viewsabout
theconnectionbetweenhumannatureandmoralval
uecanhavediverseimplicationsforwhatoneknows
abouthumannature.
HereIwanttoconsidertheviewthattheconcept
of human nature represents the very foundation for
morality. This view implies that, if our understand
ing of human nature was erroneous or incomplete,
then many of our moral judgments would be unreli
able.Everyoneagreesthatanadequateunderstanding
ofhumannatureisnecessaryinordertoensurethat
moraljudgmentssquarewiththefactsontheground.
For example, if we recommend punishment because
webelievethatithelpspeoplerehabilitatethemselves,
butthatbeliefismistaken,thenourjudgmentsabout
!25.),8"5'%&#"%25#"3.&(3"*%>2#%;&32")%3"&-%'4%)!"1.01%
moral positions only in light of premises concerning
relevant facts. But if human nature is understood as
theverybasisformorality,thenourmoraljudgments
maybewrongnotonlyonfactualpremisesbutonval
ues premises as well.
Thus, to the extent we
Kassthinksthat
think we know what
thecosmosisratio
ourvaluesare,wemust
haveacommandofhu
nallyorderedthat
mannature.
humanshighestof
Leon Kass is often
thehigherorgan
thought to provide a
ismshavetheir
clear example of this
way of thinking about
properplaceinthe
the moral relevance of
overallorderand
human nature. Kass
thatunderstanding
himself explicitly de
nies this view.1 More
theirnatureisa
over, his method is not
matterofgaining
what one would expect
specialinsightinto
if this were his view.
largermysteries.
The natural method
for basing moral guid
&51"% -.#"1'3$% 45% ,28&5% 5&'2#"% 7423-% ("% 0#)'% '4% )"'%
outanaccountofhumannatureandthentoapplyit
as needed, but Kasss method is typically to start by
consideringquestionsofmeaning.Inachapterabout
thecreationofhumanembryosinthelaboratory,the
philosophical discussion begins with a section subti
HUMANS, NATURE, AND ETHICS

27

MIND I N G N AT U R E 4 . 2

tledTheMeaningoftheQuestion,andKassexplains
thathisorientationisthatbeforedecidingwhatto
do, one should try to understand the implications of
doingornotdoing.2Kassthenconnectsthese,notto
anaccountofhumannature,whichwouldoffervari
ousclaimsaboutwhathumansare,buttotheideaof
humanness, which is a
questionofhowwethink
ifbiotechnol
about ourselvesa topic
46$%1&5%).65.01&5'3$%
forpoetryasmuchasfor
changehumanca
science.
This method seems pabilitiesandlife
tocommitKassonlytoa
trajectoriesbutis
limited theory of human
nature. He is making notavailabletomost
people,thenitrisks
claimsaboutwhatisspe
ciestypical for humans, underminingour
but the claims do not
commonsenseof
amounttoacompleteac
count of what is human humanity[and]the
and what falls outside capacityforhuman
the category. Moreover,
sympathy.
manyoftheclaimsheof
fersareaboutsuchbasic
features of human lifesexual procreation, growing
old,andpassingawaythattheyencompassnotonly
allhumansbutallanimals.Kassstheoryisbestrebut
tednotbychallenginghistheoryofhumannaturebut
by challenging the claims he makes about its moral
relevance.
Nonetheless,thereareglimmersinKassswritings
ofagrandervision.Hehasatendency,forexample,to
speakbroadlyofhumannatureasakindoftouchstone
orguidinglightinthinkingaboutbiotechnology.Be
yondTherapy,areportfromthePresidentsCouncil
45% A.4"',.1)% &5-% ,"&;.3$% .5:2"51"-% ($% B&))<% &))"#')%
that only if there is a human givenness, or a given
humanness,thatisalsogoodandworthrespecting,.
..willthegivenserveasapositiveguideforchoos
ingwhattoalterandwhattoleavealone.3Also,itis
strikingthatKassreachesskepticalconclusionsabout
enhancement every time he considers it though the
methodiscasebycase,theunderlyingagendaisgen
eral. If human nature is not a straightforward moral
guide, it nonetheless provides something close to a
guide.Finally,thereisanundercurrentinKassswrit
ings of essentialism. Kass emphasizes the limits of
science and empiricism and the room, and need, for
alternative ways of apprehending human life. Our
current evolutionary orthodoxy, he notes, has, in
GREGORYE.KAEBNICK

fact,littletosayaboutthetrueoriginoflifeorabout
ultimate causes, not only of life but of all major bio
logicalnovelty.Itcannotaccountfortheemergenceof
higherorganisms.Weneedtoturn,Kasstellsus,to
unorthodoxbiologists,andinparticulartoAristotle,
who emphasized questions of being over becoming,
form over matter, purposiveness over moving parts,
andwholesoverpartsforwhomthesoulwasnotan
ethereal spirit or a ghostinthemachine but an im
manent and embodied principle of all vital activity
&5-%/4#%7,48%)1."51"%7&)%&%#"05"-%&5-%";"#=-""!"5
.56%#":"1'.45%45%',"%5&'2#")%&5-%1&2)")%4/%',"%(".56)%
manifesttousinordinaryexperience.4
Itishardtoreadsuchpassageswithoutconclud
ing that Kass thinks, at some level, that the cosmos
is rationally ordered that humanshighest of the
higher organismshave their proper place in the
overallorderandthatunderstandingtheirnatureis
not merely a matter of collecting observations about
whathumansarelike,butalsoofgainingspecialin
sightintolargermysteries.5Thesegranderambitions
fordeployingtheconceptsuggestacommitmenttoa
muchstrongertheoryofhumannaturethanKassever
attemptstoprovide.
HUMAN NATURE AS A CONDITION OF MORALITY

Another way of
thinking about the
moral relevance of hu
man nature is to see it
asalogicalrequirement
of (human) moral
ity. Francis Fukuyama
takes this approach.
Fukuyama is also the
clearest case of some
oneopposedtoenhanc
ing human nature who
rests the argument on
an overarching theory
ofhumannature.Fuku
yama famously claims
that human nature is
the sum of the behav
ior and characteristics
that are typical of the
human species, aris
ingfromgeneticratherthanenvironmentalfactors.6
Thus, humans are distinguished by an overall set of
traits,ratherthanbyanyonetraitFukuyamadoesnot

certainwaysof
usingenhancement
leadtoanimbalance
intwosortsofrela
tionshipstohuman
natureanaccept
ingrelationship,in
whichweseenature
asagift,andaper
fectionistrelation
ship,inwhichwe
strivetoimproveit.
Theidealistohold
theseintensionwith
eachother

HUMANS, NATURE, AND ETHICS

28

MIND I N G N AT U R E 4 . 2

attemptacompletelist.Infact,thesetwouldhaveto
be somewhat indeterminate, if only because any at
tempt to specify fundamental facts tends to be in
determinate.Further,thesetwillconsistofrangesof
'#&.')% #&',"#% ',&5% !#"1.)"3$% )!"1.0"-% '#&.')*% A"1&2)"%
traitsareafunctionofenvironmentalaswellasgenet
icfactors,thesetoftraits
arisingfromgeneticfac
Thepointofgifted
tors will be unstable
nessisthatwedo
normal human height,
for example, can change notknowexactly
overthegenerationsdue whattoexpectin
tochangesindiet.None
humannature,so
theless,outofthisoverall
generalunderstandingof weshouldfoster
anopennesstothe
the range of traits pos
sible given the human unbidden.
genomeemergeswhatis
distinctively human, which Fukuyama calls the hu
man essence or Factor X. This is not itself a trait
butanemergentpropertythatdependsontheentirety
of human traits. Thus, though Fukuyama holds that
,28&5% 5&'2#"% .)% -"05&(3"<% ,"% -4")% 54'% ,43-% ',&'% 7"%
caneasilyarticulatehumannature:
If what gives us dignity and a moral status
higher than that of other living creatures is
relatedtothefactthatwearecomplexwholes
rather than the sum of simple parts, then it
is clear that there is no simple answer to the
question,WhatisFactorX?Thatis,FactorX
cannotbereducedtothepossessionofmoral
choice, or reason, or language, or sociability,
or sentience, or emotions, or consciousness,
oranyotherqualitythathasbeenputforthas
a ground for human dignity. It is all of these
qualities coming together in a human whole
thatmakeupFactorX.7
Fukuyamasproblemwithenhancementtechnolo
giesisthatifweshifthumannaturebeyondthepale
of the traits that our genes make possible, then we
willdisruptourunderstandingofhumandignityand,
therefore, of human rights. Given his understanding
of the human essence as emergent from the over
allsetofhumantraits,Fukuyamamaintainsabroad
opposition to enhancement. What is it we want to
protect from any future advances in biotechnology?
The answer is, we want to protect the full range of
ourcomplex,evolvednaturesagainstattemptsatself
GREGORYE.KAEBNICK

84-.01&'.45*@8Inotherwords,itisnotonlylanguage
andrationalitybutalsotheentiresetofbehavioraland
physicalcharacteristicsthatconcernsFukuyama.
I believe that the core problem with Fukuyamas
argumentisthatheattachesvalueprimarilytohuman
species norms, with the added complication that he
seesthenormsasestablishedgenetically.Wehaveto
("%&(3"%'4%"528"#&'"%',"%'#&.')%7"%82)'%7&'1,<%0C%',".#%
appropriateranges,andsortoutthegeneticcontribu
tiontothem.Butgettingahandleonallthisandthen
sortingoutthegeneticversustheenvironmentalcon
tributionstothetraitswechoosetotrackhasproven
-./0123'*% 954',"#% 7"&D% )!4'% .)% E2D2$&8&F)% :.#'&'.45%
withessentialism.Hisbroadandstringentsetoftraits
',&'%),423-%54'%("%6"5"'.1&33$%84-.0"-%&8425')%'4%&5%
&''"8!'%'4%-"05"%-"1.).;"3$%7,&'%/&33)%.5'4%',"%,28&5%
categoryandwhatfallsoutside.Butthiswillgivesome
perplexing results.9 It may imply, for example, that
ShaquilleONeal,whoseheightiscertainlyanomalous,
isnotfullyhuman.Fukuyamaisawareofthisdanger,
andhetakespainstoemphasizethattraitsvarygreatly
andthatgeneenvironmentinteractionscanshiftthe
entirerangeoftraitsovertime.Inthatcase,however,
enhancementthatdoesnotbumpapersonbeyondthe
rangeofnormalitymightbeunobjectionable,anden
hancement that shifts someone outside the range of
normalitymightnotalwaysmakehumandignityand
humanrightsinapplicable.Enhancementwouldseem
to pose a problem only when it occurs often enough
and dramatically enough to pull apart the statistical
curves that describe normal ranges of human traits.
Itisbroadsocialtrendsthatwearereallyconcerned
about,notindividuals.
A nonessentialist version of Fukuyamas general
approach seems possible. Paul Lauritzen argues that
./% (.4'"1,54346$% 1&5% ).65.01&5'3$% 1,&56"% ,28&5% 1&
pabilities and life trajectories but is not available to
most people, then it risksunderminingourcommon
senseofhumanity,whichcouldunderminethecapac
ityforhumansympathy.10Thestartingpointforthis
thoughtisthathumanidentityisboundupwithhu
manbiology,suchthatanewbiologymightgiverise
toanewpsychology.Anewpsychologywouldlead,in
turn,toanewethics.Inparticular,worriesLauritzen,
it would challenge our conception of human rights.
The most persuasive account of human rights, he
writes,isframedinrelationtothenotionofastable
humannature.Thefear,then,isthatbiotechnology
will change the speciestypical characteristics shared
byallhumans.Ifthathappens,andifrightsaretiedto
HUMANS, NATURE, AND ETHICS

29

MIND I N G N AT U R E 4 . 2

aconceptionofhumannaturethatisinturnrootedin
a biological reality, then biotechnology threatens the
verybasisofhumanmoralityasweknowit.
In Lauritzens view, then, it is critical to human
moralitythatthereisastablehumannatureandthat
humansallrecognizethatthereisastablehumanmo
rality. Lauritzen is not concerned with determining
whatisinsideandwhatisoutsidethehumancatego
ry.Hispointisonlythatwemusthavesomeabilityto
describeimportanthumancharacteristicsthatpeople
ofdifferentraces,ethnicities,sexes,andnationalities
shareinroughlythesamemeasure.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HUMANS AND NATURE

954',"#%7&$%4/%&#62.56%/4#%',"%84#&3%).65.01&51"%
ofhumannatureistoarguethatacertainkindofre
3&'.45),.!%'4%.'%.)%84#&33$%).65.01&5'*%G.1,&"3%H&5-"3%
andJrgenHabermasexemplifythisapproach.San
del argues that a certain relationship to human na
tureisbothvaluedinitselfandvitalforvariousthings
thatwevalueinhumansociety,andHabermasclaims
thatacertainrelationshiptohumannatureisvitalfor
equalmembershipinthemoralcommunity.

Sandels argument for worrying about en

hancement is broad ranging, and in places he
seems to develop arguments that follow conse
quentialistlines.Hisprimaryargument,though,
isthatcertainwaysofusingenhancementleadto
animbalanceintwosortsofrelationshipstohu
mannatureanacceptingrelationship,inwhich
we see nature as a gift, and a perfectionist rela
tionship,inwhichwestrivetoimproveit.Theide
alistoholdtheseintensionwitheachother,but
"5,&51"8"5'% !2),")% 2)% &7&$% /#48% ',"% 0#)'% &5-%
toward the second. Widespread use of enhance
mentwouldrepresenttheonesidedtriumphof
willfulnessovergiftedness,ofdominionoverrev
erence,ofmoldingoverbeholding.11
Sandelgoesontosaywhylosingtheethicofgift
edness would be unfortunate. Losing the ethic of
giftedness would undermine three key features of
our moral landscapehumility, responsibility, and
solidarity.Thisclaimcouldbeunderstoodasacon
sequentialist pointif we lose these key constraints
onourbehavior,manypeoplewillendupworseoff
oritmightbeunderstoodaspointingoutconceptual
implicationsif we lose these aspects of the moral
landscape,wecouldnotbutfeelthatasahugeloss.
Sandelplainlyhopes,though,thatmanyofhisreaders
willfeelthelossofgiftednessitselfalreadyasaloss.
GREGORYE.KAEBNICK

Itispartlytoshowtheimportoflosinggiftednessit
selfthathetriestoshowhowitisboundupinsports
and in parenthood, such that if we lose the ethic of
giftedness,thensportsandparenthoodwillbedimin
ishedthedrivetobanishcontingencyandtomaster
themysteryofbirthdiminishesthedesigningparent
and corrupts parenting as a social practice governed
bynormsofunconditionallove.12Sandelsargument
isnotlimitedtosportsandparenthood,howeverhe
intends these discussions to exemplify a larger point
aboutgiftedness.
Formypurposes,theimportantpointisthatSan
del can speak of the human relationship to bodily
nature without making any overarching claim about
humannatureitself,otherthanthatthetraitspeople
havedependonthebodiestheyhave,andthattradi
tionallypeoplehaveacquiredtheirbodiesand,there
fore,theirtraitsthroughcontingentprocessesrather
thanthroughdesign.Thepointofgiftednessisthatwe
donotknowexactlywhattoexpectinhumannature,
soweshouldfosterwhatSandel,borrowingfromWil
liam May, calls an openness to the unbidden. But
suchclaimsfallwellshortofatheoryofhumannature.
Contingency is also critical in Habermass case
against enhancement. We are able to live together
in communities and
engage each other as
Moralviewsabout
equals because we all
humannature,even
sharesomesortofpri
or ethical selfunder
ifwidelyshared,
standingan under
mightnotbethe
standingofwhoweare
kindofthingwe
that makes it possible
thinksuitablefor
for us to see ourselves
as ethically free and
legalenforcement.
morallyequalbeings.13
Perhapsthemoral
The critical element in
attitudetowardhu
this selfunderstanding
mannatureisakind isanawarenessthatwe
ofidealoneholdsfor are embodied and that
ourbodiesareourown,
therelationshipbe
inthesensethatwedo
tweenhumansand
not acquire them from
other people they are
nature.
products of fate or na
tureratherthanofothermembersofthecommunity.
Inshort,thecontingentnatureofapersonstraitsis
aconditionofbeingonesownpersonofhavingau
tonomy,havinguniqueworth,andbeingamemberof
equalstandinginthemoralcommunity.Wemustbe
HUMANS, NATURE, AND ETHICS

30

MIND I N G N AT U R E 4 . 2

abletoassumethatweactandjudgeinpropriaper
sonathatitisourownvoicespeakingandnoother.14
Habermasworriesthatthisassumptionisatriskif
achildknowsthatshehasbeengeneticallyenhanced
byherparents,forthentheparentsgoalsarepresent
directlyinherbody.Theprocessesofchildrearingand
socializationmayalsoimposetheparentsgoalsonthe
child,but thechild caninprinciple reject these, and
Habermassupposesthatsuchgoalswillnotbepres
entinthechildsbodyinthesameway.Ofcourse,the
childmightacceptherparentsgoalsasherown,and
ifshedoes,shewillnotfeeldeprivedofherownvoice.
Butbecausewecannotbesurethatchildrensandpar
entsgoalswillharmonize,geneticallyenhancingchil
dren jeopardizes a precondition for the moral self
understandingofautonomousactors.Thus,parents
shouldapproachparenthoodwithanexpectationof
theunexpected.15
Whether either Sandels or Habermass concerns
areultimatelypersuasivedependsonpursuingmoral
andpoliticalquestionsthatliebeyondthescopeofthis
essay.Sandelsargumentcouldbeunderstoodsimply
as identifying and defending a personal moral ideal,
one that many people share and that Sandel wants
torecommend,butthathewouldnotseektoenforce
through public policy. Habermas, however, must be
aimingatpublicpolicy.Towronglypreventsomepeo
plefromjoiningthemoralcommunityistocommita
graveinjusticethatmustbeopposedbylaw.
Both positions rest on claims about human na
turethataremodestanddefensible.Neitherismak
inganyclaimsabouthumanbeingsessentialnature.
Nor are they arguing that a normal human range of
traitsiswhatwevalue.Rather,itistherelationshipof
eachpersontohisorherownnaturethatSandeland
Habermasareconcernedabout.
ThekeypointHabermaswantstomakeisthatto
beapersonistoexistinabodythatisonesownand
isnotthedirectedcreationofotherpeople(orofthe
communityasawhole).Thebodiesoffreeandequal
persons do not incorporate the intentions of other
membersofthecommunity.Toestablishthisconcern
andperspective,Habermasneednotthoroughlycata
loguethetraitsthatmakeuphumannature,norcome
up with a -*.%/(/0%& of human nature that sets out a
criterionforthosetraits.Further,Habermassempha
sisoncontingencydoesnotimplythathumannature
.)%0C"-*%I'%8.6,'%.5-""-%1,&56"<%(2'%',"%1,&56"%82)'%
itself be contingent. Natural evolution seems accept
able, for example. The constraint Habermas would
GREGORYE.KAEBNICK

imposeisonlyonhowthechangeoccurssomemem
bersofthecommunityshouldnotbeabletodeliber
atelyinterveneinthebodiesofothermembers.
The complexity of the genes contribution to ac
tualhumanlifemayqualifyHabermassandSandels
concerns about modifying children. Parents success
at using genetic technologies to make their children
turnoutonewayratherthananotherislikelytovary
greatly,dependingonwhattraitstheyhaveinmindfor
theirchildren,anditmaywellbethatamajorityofthe
traits parents would want to produce lie beyond ge
neticcontrol.Itdoesnottakecompletesuccessatcon
trollingatraittoraiseconcerns,however.Completely
controllingatraitmightbethelimitcase.Habermas
would be troubled if an intervention falls short but
leaves a lasting reminder for the child, on the child,
of what the parents wanted the child to be. Sandels
74##$%',&'%',"%1,.3-%.)%54'%#"6&#-"-%'4%&%)2/01."5'%-"
greeasagiftdependsontheparentsattitudes,which
(Sandelsupposes)dependinpartonparentscapacity
tocarryouttheirownplans.Butparentsmightfailto
regardachildasagifteventhoughtheyhavelittleor
noabilitytomodifythechildsgiventraits.
If concerns about genetic interventions are ex
plained in terms of parents attitudes and childrens
selfunderstanding,thenplainlythereisnosharpline
demarcating genetic from environmental interven
tions. To the degree that an environmental change
leavesapermanentreminderoftheparentsownin
tentions for the child (consider surgery to Western
ize the eyes of an Asian child adopted by Western
parents), it ought to generate both Habermass and
Sandelsconcernseverybitasmuchasitwouldifac
complished through genetic intervention. The genes
arenotspecialrepositoriesofvalue.Thepointisrath
er that the relationship in which we stand to human
nature(s),andtothenaturesofourchildren,isamat
terofhumanvalue.
CONCLUSION

Moral views about human nature, even if widely

shared,mightnotbethekindofthingwethinksuit
ableforlegalenforcement.Perhapsthemoralattitude
towardhumannatureisakindofidealoneholdsfor
therelationshipbetweenhumansandnature.Itmight
besimilarinwaystosomeidealswehaveforrelation
shipsbetweenhumans,suchasthatapersontendsto
treatotherswithwarmthorgenerosity.Suchanideal
wouldnotissueinbluntpronouncementsthatsome
thingisrightorwrong,permissibleorimpermissible.
HUMANS, NATURE, AND ETHICS

31

MIND I N G N AT U R E 4 . 2

Forapersonwhoholdsit,itwouldbeactionguiding,
and that person might think better of other people
whodemonstrateitindeed,wemightstillthinkitan
important feature of the moral lifebut at the same
time, we would not expect everybody to have it, and
wewouldstopwellshortofthinkingthatpeoplewho
lackitaretothatdegreeimmoral.Theyjustdonotlive
uptoastandardwesetforourselves.
J"#,&!)<% '44<% ',.)% 6.;")% 45"% 05&3% #"&)45% ',&'% 45"%
neednothaveafulltheoryofhumannaturetohave
moralqualmsaboutalteringit.Ifalibertyrestricting
governmentpolicyon,say,researchintohumanclon
ingrestsonclaimsabouthumannature,thenthere
quirementthatthoseclaimsbepubliclyaccessibleand
assessableraisesthebarforwhateverwemightclaim

about human nature. A publicly enforceable moral

standard would require a convergence of opinion
abouthumannature,acollectiveweighingandsifting.
Apersonalmoralstandardcanbebasedononesown
considered assessments, and perhaps even on ones
ownbestguesses.

Gregory E. Kaebnick is research scholar at The Hastings Center and

editor of the Hastings Center Report. This essay is drawn from a
longer study entitled Human Nature without Theory, in The Ideal
of Nature: Debates about Biotechnology and the Environment, ed.
Gregory Kaebnick (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press,
2011), pp. 49-70.

NOTES
1

L.R.Kass,1/2*3&1/4*)(53&$%-&(6*&7*2*%+*&02&7/8%/(5,&96*&:6$;;*%8*&20)&</0*(6/=+

(SanFrancisco,CA:EncounterBooks,2004),296.
2

Kass,Life,Liberty,andtheDefenseofDignity,85.

PresidentsCouncilonBioethics,<*50%-&96*)$>5,&</0(*=6%0;085&$%-&(6*&?")+"/(&

ofHappiness(Washington,DC:PresidentsCouncilonBioethics,2003),289.
4

Kass,Life,Liberty,andtheDefenseofDignity,288,294.

Kass,Life,Liberty,andtheDefenseofDignity,296.Kassemphasizestheimpor

tanceofmysterieshere.
6

F.Fukuyama,@")&?0+(6"#$%&A"(")*,&:0%+*B"*%=*+&02&(6*&</0(*=6%0;085&C*D0;"

tion(NewYork:Farrar,Straus&Giroux,2002),130.
7

Fukuyama,OurPosthumanFuture,171.

Fukuyama,OurPosthumanFuture,172.

Cf.N.Agar,1/4*)$;&E"8*%/=+,&F%&7*2*%=*&02&!"#$%&E%6$%=*#*%(,(Oxford,U.K.:

Blackwell,2004).
10

P.Lauritzen,StemCells,Biotechnology,andHumanRights:Implicationsfora

PosthumanFuture,HastingsCenterReport35,no.2(2005):2533.
11

M.Sandel,96*&:$+*&$8$/%+(&?*)2*=(/0%,&E(6/=+&/%&(6*&G8*&02&H*%*(/=&E%8/%**)/%8

(Cambridge,MA:BelknapPressofHarvardUniversityPress,2007),85.
12

Sandel,TheCaseagainstPerfection,8283.

13

J.Habermas,TheFutureofHumanNature(Cambridge,U.K.:PolityPress,inas

sociationwithBlackwell,2003),3841.
14

Habermas,TheFutureofHumanNature,57.

15

Habermas,TheFutureofHumanNature,63,58.

GREGORYE.KAEBNICK

HUMANS, NATURE, AND ETHICS

32