Professional Documents
Culture Documents
for
The Gran Comit de Cooperacin
Western Department of Caquet, Southern Colombia
Prepared by
Patrick J. Christian
School of Professional Studies
Gonzaga Jesuit University Spokane, Washington
April 9, 2007
Introduction
2
Gran Comit
Communications Survey Report
Table of Contents
Methodology 6
Communication Strategies
1). Overall Communication Strategies 8
2). External Communication Strategies 8
a. Channels of External Communication
b. Methods of External Communication
3). Internal Communication Strategies 11
Ethnographic Observations
Observing what was done 16
Internal Communication Performance
Forming Consensus: Protecting the Dairy Industry 17
External Communication Performance
Coordinating Action: Resettling La Union Peneya 18
References 22
Appendices
A. Security Services Survey Instrument 23
B. Intergovernmental Survey Instrument 24
C. Interagency Survey Instrument 25
D. Gran Comit Communication Survey Instrument 26
E. Gran Comit Survey Summary Diagram 27
F. Gran Comit bulletin 28
3
THE PURPOSE OF ORGANIZATIONAL COMMUNICATION AND THE GOALS OF THE GRAN
COMIT
4
Doncello by the Colombian Armed Forces Revolutionary Front (FARC). The action
by the insurgents occurred as a direct challenge to the legitimacy of the legal
governing structure.
The governing structures charged with dealing with this attack included 3
levels of government (Town, County & Department), supported by
national level military and police security services
assigned to the department of Caquet. Added to the
confusion was a national level social-service
coordinating agency (Accin Social) which leads a
number of public and private social security and nation building
programs in the area. Thus, the three main functional areas of governance trying
to respond to the challenges posed by the insurgency are as follows:
Security Services
Elected Governmental (State, County & Village)
Inter-Agency Social Security / Development (Public & Private)
As each agency within these groupings attempted to deal with the challenge to the
legitimacy of the Colombian state, organized disorder,
miscommunication and mismanagement worked
successfully to counteract their efforts. By the time of
the Nestle Plant bombing, several of the national and
international corporations began announcing their intent
to downsize or eliminate their operations in Caquet due to the
obstacles to successful legal operations.
The Gran Comit was thus borne out of an immediate requirement to
organize the efforts and operations of the many different organizations working
over and across each other with the best of intentions, but marginal effectiveness.
The Gran Comit continues to be an emerging virtual organization, whose
membership is composed of leaders or representatives of the participating
organizations. During the initial process of the ethnographic study, it became useful
to create models or caricatures of the groupings of organizations which were
attempting to work together.
5
The public commitment of this coordinating group poses an important
challenge to the Southern Block leadership of the FARC. If this Gran Comit is
successful (real or perceived) then FARC Inc will find itself with a diminishing
resource base from which to satisfy production, security and transportation demand
as well as safe havens from which to launch military operations.
The Gran Comit faces obstacles to its success based upon cultural resistance
to participation in non-hierarchical organizational structures characteristic of
modern interagency, intergovernmental, public-private partnerships. The cultural
dependence on hierarchy is deep rooted in their Spaniard Weltanschauung of the
individual as strong man as savior paradigm. This puts the leaders of the many
agencies at odds as they struggle for influence and control in the inter-
organizational process of cooperation.
Often, the key to success has been the careful selection of appropriate
attendees who do not conflict with the groups status quo, or lead to a competition
over who is in charge. Other barriers to success of government effectiveness are
the relative maturity of government employees versus the requirements of their
positions. In the complicated environment of war-torn southern Colombia,
seasoned, experienced government leaders would have a difficult time with the
interagency, intergovernmental challenges presented here.
6
such an inquiry. Ethnographic participant-observer studies were mixed with focus
group interviews to determine the pathways of organizational communication of the
Gran Comit.
1). Ethnographic Observations: The survey both began and ended with the
naturalistic observation of the various groupings and their interaction within the
Gran Comit. As a foreign advisor to this emerging organization, the survey author
assumed a participant-observer role which allowed for interviews and interaction in
order to collect stories, accounts, and explanations for the events and episodes
observed.
This observation permitted the survey researcher to frame the Gran Comit
and its actions in the historical and psychological culture from which it emerged.
This historical/cultural/sociological framework permitted the development of key
questions, problems, and issues to pursue through observations and interactions
with the members.
The development of this modeling of historical/cultural/sociological
framework also allowed for the introduction of similar organizations in the national
or international community to the membership for comparison and contrast of their
performance.
2). Focus Group Interviews: In order to drill down to underlying beliefs and
attitudes which affect the success or failure of the Gran Comit, the survey
expanded upon the modeling above and extended the use of graphical
communication surveys to obtain clarification and confirmation of the initial
ethnographic studies. The use of graphical interface survey tools eliminated the
built in biases of humor, sarcasm and innuendo during the communication survey
process.
An example of this process was organizing pre-meetings of the Gran Comit
for each of the three groupings in order to help them determine their common
understandings and positions on the greater interaction demanded by the Gran
Comit, as well as discuss resource base issues and their own internal sub-group
relationship. During these sub-group pre-meetings, the survey researcher was able
7
to use the graphical interface diagrams to solicit opinions and attitudes on the
relationships, communication techniques & relative success within and without the
sub-groups.
The use of focus groups to identify opinions and attitudes had the potential
for biasing during group conversations. Our concern for this biasing was
ameliorated during the initial ethnographic study however, as most of the members
would disagree just to disagree. Thus, if the survey (during a focus group session)
found agreement, then it was probably genuine.
Communication Strategies
1). Overall Communication Strategies.
In large part, the simplest purpose of the Gran Comit is to communicate
across boundaries. These boundaries are both cultural and legal distinctions.
These boundaries constitute social and governmental safeguards for the Colombian
system which distribute both power and responsibility for producing, protecting and
propagating an interrelated set of Colombian Social Identities. Without the Gran
Comit, the system would continue to inhibit the reduction of social conflict.
In this sense, the Gran Comit is a microcosm of Colombian life in western
Caquet. Logically, if this Comit cannot communicate across its own legal and
cultural boundaries, then neither will the society it represents, and the civil conflict
will continue for additional generations. The strategy of creating the Gran Comit is
to teach Colombian society to communicate internally and externally so as to
develop common understandings of how things are, why they are that way, and
what to do about it. Put another way, as a reflection of the society from which it is
drawn, the Comit must learn to create, sustain and manage a shared meaning of
Colombian society.
From each member back to their respective agency The Gran Comit
organization is an amalgamation of representatives from 3 levels of
8
government, including police, military and a host of aid and humanitarian
agencies, plus private sector trade, business and industry groups and non-
governmental organizations, both local, national and international which
operate in the Department of Caquet, Southern Colombia. Each
participatory agency sends one or more members for the monthly meetings
and any sub-committee meetings held regarding more specific topics in
greater detail.
From the Gran Comit to each member agency/organization/ level of
government The decisions agreed to can have a tremendous effect on the
life or structure of those organizations participating. Decisions to merge
functions or activities can alter the composition of participating agencies or
organizations causing institutional stress or non-compliance.
From the Gran Comit to each sector of the population
(business/professional/farmer) At its zenith, the Gran Comit will be closely
watched for leanings towards or favoring one group over another. Thus,
each step taken by the group will have interpretations of its intentions or
motives towards the many sub-cultural groups which make up its
constituency. Each sub-cultural group will use all the types of
communication listed below to determine the legitimacy of the actions or
direction of the Gran Comit.
From the Gran Comit to the Insurgency threatening to undermine the
democracy As the Gran Comit progresses into maturity, the Southern
Block of the Colombian Armed Revolutionary Front (FARC) (which is fighting
for an independent portion of Colombias territory with which to establish an
international narcotics trade protected by the legitimacy of a sovereign state)
will use its assessment of the Gran Comit potential for success in
determining its attack strategy to prevent major losses in its recruiting,
resource, mobility or financial base of operations.
From the Gran Comit to the population represented as a whole The Gran
Comit is a vehicle of Colombian Society and Governance, established with
purpose to defend and build society to a level which eliminates armed
political and social challenges to the Colombian society. The populace in
9
general will use the overall communication (both the communication of
actions and words) of the Gran Comit as an indicator of the relative
legitimacy of the government and the society it supports and defends.
Formal announcements under the name of the Gran Comit a rare method
of communication given that the primary purpose of this organization is
coordination and integration of efforts. Still, formal announcements would
normally be information beyond dispute by all legal entities operating in the
society.
Formal Gran Comit bulletin / newsletter as a newly emergent
organization, the membership of the Gran Comit decided that they needed a
forum to communicate new ideas in advance of monthly meetings as well as
past progress and future agendas. The Gran Comit bulletin provides a
professional forum for pictures and words showing success or outlining
challenges. Members of the Gran Comit volunteer to staff the bulletin and
solicit articles of interest each month. (an example of the bulletin is included
as Appendix F)
Press Conferences because of the ongoing war, and its everyday impact on
society, every monthly conference ends with a press conference which is an
easy way for journalists to find 30-40 representatives of public and private
organizations at one location and grill them about the future of Southern
Colombian society in a war zone.
Rumors and leaks of sensitive information long considered an integral part
of public communication, attempts by Comit members or blocks of members
to influence the internal debate by leaking information to the public for an
expected reaction one way or another occurs especially around sensitive
issues.
Evolving structure and membership of the organization As the Gran Comit
evolves in its membership and the predominant locations in which it is held,
observers will interpret these often subtle changes as evidence of the
direction of the Comit. At times, this communication of direction can be
10
more clarifying than any other communication by the Comit, and can even
signal future direction to the members themselves long before they have
gained consensus in their internal meetings.
Levels of attendance and quantity / quality of decisions, agreements and
plans created Observers of the Comit will watch carefully for signs of a
faltering effort by the level of attendance, number of monthly meetings
cancelled or postponed to signify the importance of the organization. Key
organizational leaders who lose interest in the Comit may signal a
diminishing importance in that interagency process and cause smaller less
influential groups to abandon it as well given their relative lack of available
organizational resources.
b. During the period in between their monthly meetings, much of the real
work was done as individual members met, built consensus during face to face
meetings, negotiated over future agendas, alignments of the committee, make up
of sub-committees, etc. So for instance, pursuing an invitation to the World Bank
versus the USAID might mean that a new airport would be asked for (helping the
flower growing industry) as opposed to USAID building new highways to be used for
11
the dairy farmers and military / police security. Methods of communication in
between meetings include the newly created newsletter, email for those that have
it, the ubiquitous cellular telephone and personal visits.
12
and amongst the sub-groups, orientation group and the Gran Comit.
Determining the success in building consensus for interpreting
problems and developing solutions across legal and cultural
boundaries.
13
o Focus is on capturing and killing the insurgents who are enemies
external to the state.
Intergovernmental Subgroup
o Legitimacy of Governance
o Growth of domestic society, concentrating on economic and
public infrastructure
o Order & Loyalty
o Cultural acclimatization & accommodation within competing sub-
cultures
o Focus is on growth & legitimacy as a means of rehabilitating the
insurgents who are enemies internal to the state.
Interagency Subgroup
o Stability of society with emphasis on social infrastructure
o Alleviation of hunger & poverty
o Diminishment of unemployment
o Growth of economy
o Human rights
o Focus is on social development and insurgents are indicators of
poor social, cultural & economic conditions
14
namely the root social causes which fueled support and recruits to the insurgency.
The intergovernmental group was most often torn between supporting both
concepts, as they understood that their first reason for existence was to control
domestic violence.
This then, led to the surveys focus on the quality of communications and the
groups ability to create a common shared understanding of the challenges they
were facing. In their text, Strategic Organizational Communication, Charles Conrad
and Marshal Poole write that there is a key tension within cultural strategies of
organizing (p.178). These three subgroups to the Gran Comit constitute an
organization of cultures which must be successfully managed to bring about their
necessary cooperation. Central to this cooperation is creating shared meaning and
communication of a common world view regarding social life and its economic,
governance and security components.
This key tension between the subgroups was self identified by each of the
groups as they debated their competing agendas. Many of the participants related
during the focus sessions that they were unsure of the other groups intentions or
stated abilities to follow through with commitments. At one point, citing poor
communications quality, members of the security sub-group attempted to exclude
the Gran Comit to elected officials from the Department and Municipalities. They
explained their reasons in private that the politicians just talk too much, and take
up all the committees time
with public policy speeches.
Finally, they succeeded in
creating and enforcing time
limits upon the general
membership, where
everyone was restricted to
questions or answers not
more than one minute in
length. This appeared to
rectify the problem.
15
ETHNOGRAPHIC OBSERVATIONS
Observing what was done
Eisenberg & Goodall write that [w]hat people say and do are the substance of who
they are (p.369) within the Gran Comit, and thus what is said and done is central
to this survey. As the models above and below illustrate, there are similarities and
general working arrangements within each grouping of agencies, but there is no
generally agreed upon method for interacting between the groups. The Gran Comit
was designed to serve as an
institutional forum for
identifying problems and
solutions, ongoing
collaboration and
cooperation and as an
engine for the growth of
society. Each of the three
main groupings of
participants (security
services, intergovernmental,
& interagencies) would
contribute to the whole in a manner different than the others. More importantly,
each grouping understands the insurgency from a different perspective and offers
solutions to it vastly different in their scope and approach.
As a participant observer of many of the full and sub-group meetings, I was
able to observe the strengths & areas of opportunity within the three sub-groups
and the Gran Comit. The various focus group sessions illustrated much of how the
Gran Comit operates by illustrating the attitudes and perceptions of its member
components.
The groups demonstrated a natural affinity for operating in their sub-groups
where their understanding of the world about them was not subjected to question.
The intergovernmental group appeared to demonstrate a gender bias with respect
to which other sub-group they most agreed with. Males seemed to better
16
understand the requirement for the security services definition of success than that
of the interagency. Female members of the intergovernmental sub-group more
often gravitated to the interagencys definition of success, and were more likely to
cross attend meetings based upon gender preference of the other sub-groups in the
Gran Comit.
The work of the organization is focused on internal communication within the
membership as it forms consensus on overarching goals and objectives which lead
to the termination of conflict. For those areas that consensus is reached, the Gran
Comit then acts as a coordinating body which provides multi-agency direction to
achieve a common purpose. Thus, the success of the Gran Comit as vehicle for
shared communication can be observed in how effectively it accomplishes these two
functions. Over the past two months, two major issues have dominated the
attention of the Gran Comit; the FARC attack upon the dairy industry and the
resettlement of La Union Peneya. The former involves an as of yet unsuccessful
attempt at forming internal consensus on defining the problem and supporting
solutions, and the latter involves supervising an agreed upon strategy for resettling
and rebuilding a partially destroyed village.
17
members perspectives become critical to reaching consensus. As shown in the
models, the nature of the insurgency is understood differently by each of the major
groups, with the security and interagency teams occupying opposite poles of
understanding. The intergovernmental team is split between the two, and many
meetings are hopelessly mired in communication disagreement.
On the surface the discussion is easy. The insurgents are attacking the dairy
system to drive the farmers out of the milk production business and into the
business of producing coca base, the first step in the illicit production of cocaine. All
three sub-groups of the Gran Comit agree this is a bad thing and something must
be done. It is at this point that the agreement ends, and cultural biases take control
of the communications process. The security services blame the dairy farmers for
not resisting despite the threats against them. The intergovernmental sub-group
sees its voter base eroding, and is on the fence with action that may hurt or help
the farmers. The interagency sub-group (which includes the chamber of commerce,
dairy farmer associations and other banking and business concerns) senses
impending disaster as the multi-national companies are looking at relocating to
other departments better protected by the overall governmental services and
cooperation.
Until the Gran Comit can construct a shared meaning of the problem, its
causes and solutions, no resolution is forth-coming outside of a presidential edict
from the capital city of Bogota, which may yet happen with American political
intervention. The American advisory team to Colombia would take such action
reluctantly, and only as a last resort, as doing so marginalizes the shared
production of meaning already constructed by the many groups of the Gran Comit.
18
The village of La Union Peneya (formerly of
approximately 2000 inhabitants) in western Caquet
was abandoned in January of 2004 when
government troops from the 12th Brigade and
FARC Forces fought for control of the
town. During fierce fighting between
government forces and insurgents
using the town as a base of support
and operations, significant portions of
the town sustained damage including
the hospital clinic, church, both the elementary and high schools as well as many of
the residents homes. As the fighting grew, the inhabitants (led by the towns
catholic priest) who were not active members of the FARC insurgency relocated to
homes of relatives in nearby villages and municipalities. After eliminating FARC
resistance in the Municipality of Montanita where La Union Peneya is located, the
military forces assigned there established a company sized outpost in the hills
overlooking the town. For the next three and half years, the village of Union Peneya
remained abandoned as it lay; guarded by government forces. There was never
any evidence of looting by government forces, but the town suffered serious
deterioration over the years with no one to maintain it. This past January 2007, the
Gran Comit began supervising the return of the towns inhabitants.
The first returnees arrived in La Union Peneya in a two day extravaganza
where a host of Federal, Department, and Municipal agencies as well as Colombian
Military and Police forces provided a wide range of services such as Orthodontic and
dental care, medical diagnostic and vaccinations, clothing and shoe repair, haircuts,
child nutritional supplements, and of course, typical Colombian entertainment with
the 6th Division Band & Musical Group.
The real communications and coordination test occurred during 8 hours of
hard negotiating between members of the Gran Comit coordinating team led by
the Governor of Caquet and President Uribes Accin Social director supported by
the representatives from all major participants of the Comit. In an atmosphere
that ranged from conciliatory to accusatory, the parties argued the relative merits
19
of the suffering and hardship endured against the backdrop of scarce funding,
limited resources and the ever present threat of hunger and attacks by the FARCs
15th Front which operates in the area.
Having first framed the issue confronting them with the resettlement of La
Union Peneya, and developing a shared understanding of what was possible, they
Gran Comit negotiating team was able to work with remarkable agility as they
organized the return, coordinated for basic services and negotiated with the
returnees to balance self interest with the greater public interest. The Gran Comit
now fields several sub-committees to continue the process of resettling the town.
Some of these sub-committees involve settling land titling of homes and farms,
establishing cooperatives of female heads of households, obtaining lines of credit
for newly formed farm cooperatives, etc. For each sub-committee, the Gran Comit
selects members who fulfill the basic roles to complete the internal-to-external
communication cycle of issue definition, solution development, and project
supervision.
20
unable to articulate successfully to the general populace the selfless service
performed by the vast majority of public and private service leaders in the
Department of Caquet. This communication failure has tremendous consequences
for the future success of the Gran Comit. Even as the Comit continues to plan
greater services and capital outlays of public and private infrastructure support,
complaints from villagers unfamiliar with participatory democracy inflame tensions
between the Comit members who take personal affront at the desperate
accusations of corruption and or incompetence by a war weary public.
21
REFERENCES
Palmer, P.J. (1998). Leading from within. In L.C. Spears (Ed.), Insights on
leadership: Service, stewardship, spirit, and servant-leadership (pp. 197-
208). New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons.
Pelias, R.J. & Pineau, E.L., (1994). Organizational Performance: Playing the
Field. Retrieved April 1, 2007, from
http://jesuitnet.blackboard.com/webapps/portal/frameset.jsp?tab=courses&url=/bi
n/common/course.pl?course_id=_517_1
22
APPENDIX A (Security Services Survey Instrument)
Appendix B (Intergovernmental Survey Instrument)
24
Appendix C (Interagency Survey Instrument)
25
Appendix D (Gran Comit Communication Survey Instrument)
26
Appendix E (Gran Comit Survey Summary Diagram)
27
Appendix F (Gran Comit bulletin)