Brokering Peace in

BROKERING PEACE IN THE SUDAN

Special Forces ofcers tackle unique advisory role in Darfur.

Story by Major Patrick J. Christian

As the world and regional security environments call increasingly for action under coalition
and intergovernmental auspices, an emerging advisory role is forming for the Army special-
operations community. In these roles, perhaps more than in any others, ARSOF Soldiers will
be called on to put all of their skills to the test. In these advisory roles, Soldiers will operate in
isolation, with few or no support personnel. They will have to work side by side with coalition
soldiers who do not speak their language and have no experience with their technology.
Often times, they will be called on not only to keep the peace, but to broker it.

ADVISORY DUTY The author and an Egyptian military observer with

members of the Sudans Justice and Equality Movement Army.
Sudan
BROKERING PEACE IN SUDAN
In August 2004, the author found
himself in just such a role when he de-
ployed to the Darfur region of Sudan as
part of a small joint-special-operations
advisory team dispatched there by the
commander of the Joint Special Opera-
tions Task Force Horn of Africa. The
team, deployed from Camp Lemonier,
Djibouti, consisted of a Navy SEAL
lieutenant commander, a Marine recon
major, and the author, an Army Spe-
cial Forces major. The team was tasked
to work as advisers to the African
Unions 12 military-observer teams,
or MILOBS, which were attempting
to negotiate a cease-fire with multiple
parties in the Sudans civil war.
A line of Arab militia came over a steep rise on their
camels and horses. A fierce battle erupted. Apparently, we
would not be staving off any attack today, so we returned
to our camp.
The mission was simple: to keep
the MILOBS collecting intelligence
on the conflict, as well as to gather
information relevant to the Global War
on Terrorism, or GWOT. The team had
Editors note: To further illustrate
Major Christians article, we have
included excerpts from his diary ac-
counts. Shown as comments on note
paper, they are not intended to provide
complete accounts of incidents, but
rather to convey the atmosphere of the
situation.
FORMING-UP Members of the Janjaweed mili-
tia mass for an attack on a village in Darfur.
to strike a balance between those two
missions while staying positioned be-
tween the warring parties as advisers
without getting killed in the process.
The mission originated when the
United States partnered with the
European Union, or EU, in an effort to
avoid a full-scale civil war in Sudan.
The coalition focus is on funding and
supporting the newly formed African
Union, or AU, in a role designed to
mediate between the Government of
Sudan, or GoS (which is primarily in
the control of the Northern Arab Su-
danese), and the armed rebel groups
in the Darfur region. The government-
supported militias were created when
the GoS armed a large number of
Arab nomadic civilians, known as the
Janjaweed, and encouraged them to
clear out the African Muslim tribes of
Darfur in a form of political/cultural
cleansing.
It is this cleansing that former Sec-
retary of State Colin Powell called the
genocide in Darfur. The AUs first step
in dealing with the issue was to medi-
ate a temporary cease-fire on April 8,
2004, to form and deploy MILOBS to
patrol Darfur, and to encourage the
warring parties to abide by the cease-
fire and to stay at the negotiating
table.
Initially, there were 12 AU MILOBS
teams, of five or six officers each,
spread out among the six largest pop-
ulation centers in western and south-
ern Darfur. Because of the warring
parties enduring distrust of both the
Arab League and the African Union,
the teams were mandated to have ei-
ther an EU or a U.S. adviser to ensure
impartiality and improve the reliability
of the observing and reporting.
The other members of the MILOBS
teams consisted of EU officers from
Italy, Hungary, Ireland, France, Eng-
land, Denmark and Norway. The Afri-
can Union officers hailed from South
Africa, Mozambique, Namibia, Congo,
Chad, Algeria, Nigeria, Kenya and
Ghana, and collectively they spoke a
dozen or so languages. Each team was
also staffed with an interpreter and
a military-officer representative from
each of the three parties involved in
the conflict: the GoS; the Justice and
Equality Movement Army, or JEM; and
the Sudan Liberation Movement Army,
or SLA. The officers of the JEM and
SLA are majors or lieutenant colonels.
While the teams primary mission
was to support the AUs MILOBS, a
secondary mission, gathering informa-
tion for the GWOT, was also vitally
important. Sudan was, and in many
respects still is, one of the most im- portantly, the difficulties that the mul- and operations there were four- or
portant safe havens for al-Qaeda and tinational unions (United Nations, EU, five-way conversations going on as the
Osama bin Laden. AU, Organization of American States MILOB team members translated for
The Muslim Brotherhood helped and NATO) face in operating, given the each other.
organize Sudans government as an vast differences in culture, language, In addition to the language difficul-
Islamic fundamentalist state. The calls doctrine and training among their ties, there are also problems caused by
to prayer from the minarets in Khar- member states. the lack of common military training.
toum are different from those in Saudi For example, on one MILOB team On one team, the Egyptian
Arabia, in that they mix the traditional there were seven majors hailing from officer attended
Allah Aqbar call with angry denun- various countries. The major from In-
ciations of U.S. foreign policy. Mozambique spoke Portuguese 1 Nov
The current president, Lieuten- and Spanish. The e
ant General Omar Hassan Ahmad major from the s a ra (in th
Ka tia
al-Bashir, is a moderate (by Sudanese Congo spoke v i l l a ge of Arab mili
r the ne o f on
standards) who occasionally cooper- French, while
n d e d nea wever, a li steep rise
la a n
ates with the U.S. and the internation- the Namib- s we ns), h
o over an Arabs i ns
Just a Mountai ed) came c
al community in countering terror- ian major spoke M a ra n j aw e e 3 0 0 Afr ing weapo
i
l t s
ism. On the other hand, the current English. The major Jebe
n a s the Ja orses. Som itary, spor ted past u
h il t
vice-president, Ali Asman Mohamded from Chad spoke (know mels and ian and m us age tro d at us in
a i l i o e f
Taha, leads factions that advocate Arabic and French, their
c
re s s of ci , and dub hem glanc e town o
v
d ie s ft t h
the spread of fundamentalist Islam while the Egyptian mixed us countr le. A few o assault on ickets
i o tt i r p Gs
through all parts of the country and major spoke Arabic of var to the ba ued in the lead rebel es and RP
te tin e i
region. and English, as did enrou y but con s away. Th f assault r were
si t e r e o I-8
It is in this complex and hostile the lieutenant colonels curio , 2 kilomet erce battl s of the M waved us
y ot y
environment that the MILOBS oper- from the JEM and the Moon up, and a nt, the pil ions as the of re.
ed oi ls ne
ate. They find that in order to get SLA. The Sudanese major open . At this p ed convu t of the li y attack
e d ic k o u an
information on the GWOT, they must spoke only Arabic, and the erupt lly in pan ter to get aving o
ica p st
be successful in brokering the peace author spoke English and pract the helico ld not be amp.
to o u rc
that the AU is seeking. Spanish. back ntly, we w ned to ou
re u r
The AU holds a charter to collect The lack of a common Appa nd we ret
y , a
information and intelligence under language was a major source toda
the cease-fire accords, but without of problems, as most inter-
training and guidance, its teams were views were conducted in Arabic
unable to do much more than wander and English. Officers who do not
around in the desert. Contributing speak either language must rely
to the chaotic movements of the AU on other officers for interpretation.
teams is the lack of communica- At any given time during planning
tion and technology available to its
members. There are some important
lessons to be learned here, most im-
 BROKERING PEACE IN SUDAN

fantry Officer Basic at Fort Benning, officers to convince them to use the training offered, but they did place
Ga. Within the AU team, he spoke the U.N./AU templates have been unsuc- U.S. officers under a microscope,
best English, understood U.N. and cessful. watching everything we did and said,
NATO doctrine and was often called on The lack of technology and coali- looking for inconsistencies. The EU
to translate between English and Ara- tion partners inability to use it is also officers did not face the same sort of
bic. Most of the other officers required a drawback in these types of mis- fascinated scrutiny that U.S. officers
constant encouragement to read their sions. The author deployed with the faced, and they would normally defer
U.N. military handbooks to learn how most advanced support in terms of to their U.S. officer peer.
to format reports, plan missions and electronics, staff training and op- Once a MILOB team is trained up
communicate effectively. One ongo- erational capabilities. Most U.S. first and well advised, they tend to yield
ing split was the insistence by officers lieutenants and captains have more significant relevant data and action-
from Islamic countries upon using a command and staff training and ex- able intelligence for both regional
religious header line that proclaimed perience than many other countries combatant commanders and national
the glory of Allah for all reports and majors and lieutenant colonels. For platforms. The authors two teams
plans. All attempts by other instance, the Mozambique produced significant results with
AU major had never had to more than 40 intelligence information

1 Nov operate a computer, and reports, of which more than 15 were

only the Egyptian officer graded as having high value by the
hold
a t io n w as put on could actually use the Defense Intelligence Agency.
v e s t ig ji e computer to type a While the information that the SF
-graves in n of Zelin
The mass Jebel M a ra t o w
ldiers a n d report. advisers gleaned was solid, even re-
h e n r e b els in the y c la im e d were so a la . A s a
e Without extensive
w
te d 1 8 people th ra l b u s s e s from Ny porting it to the higher U.S. commands
abdu c n seve Zelinji e training, none of the proved to be problematic, as the re-
ja w e e d t raveling o t c o m m is sioner of
foreign officers would porting channels were difficult at best.
Jan g o vernmen o f the
e , t h e o n n e l
respons ther all th
e pers
W FP, MSF, IR
C, have been able to use The U.S. advisory teams depended
re d t o g e n s (U N
gathe
m e n ta l o rganizatio A R E , e t c ) and told the GPSs provided solely upon encrypted satellite phones
n CHR, C
nongover r p , ICRC, UNH t h e soldiers a
nd to them for navigat- and jump or thumb drives to trans-
c y C o t h a t ing in the southern mit data and materials from the field
IMC, Mer y w e r e the reaso
n
d t h a t h e was
t th e cted, a n Libyan Desert. Most to prearranged collection points, and
them tha h a d b een abdu b d u c te es
ge r s 8 a of the foreign of- then on to regional and national mili-
Arab villa h o u r s t o get the 1 e r b e a b le to
m 48 long ficers were danger- tary channels outside of the country.
giving the t h a t , h e would no e e d w ho would
Afte r the Janja w ous behind the A lack of national and regional
returned. fe t y fr o m o m m u n it y
their sa rian c wheel of the team technical means caused operators in
guarantee e . S o t h e humanita . c a ll e d the
reveng nd the U .N vehicles, and the field to expend significant efforts
come for t h e U .N ., a
is brok e r in g t h e
help from dan, who
they required at increased risk to operate ad-hoc
called for io n in S u h e r e b e ls .
driving instruc- transmission/transport systems of of-
fr ic a n U nion Miss o v e r n m ent and t u s u p
A the g to pic k tion. Days ten time-sensitive data relevant to the
between elicopter
cease-re n M I- 8 h . O n c e in not spent on GWOT. Other constraints and limita-
A U s e n t a Ukrainia so lv e t h e problem
The to r e ed aid investigations tions faced in the transport of infor-
d y u s d own there z e n o r s o frighten c e
an o li or patrols were mation and materials included the
e , w e m e t with a d il ia r s to ries of po
Zelinji eir fam g from spent on driv- lack of cleared U.S. or EU personnel,
e r s w h o told us th r e fu g e es, stealin
wor k assing th e ing, comput- as well as the lack of bandwidth in
a n d h a r r a t e p e o ple. They
attacking e s e already
despe
m issioner a
nd ers, GPS and sending out reports, information and
in g th h e c o m e y
and rap r k t h reats that
t
t o t h e m, and th staff training. evidence that required analysis and
e d a ral ma d e
related th r ig a dier gene a v e , and how
All of the real-time feedback to the field teams.
m y b u ld le AU officers To overcome these difficulties and
Sudan Ar ll t h e m if they sho r U .N . h as
to te e AU o readily and achieve this success, personnel from
asked us , a n d w hether th w a y . We
v e s fully ac- the U.S. Department of States mis-
they can le
a
t th e m o ut of harm t h e b r ig adier
rs to ge e commis
sioner, cepted the sion in Khartoum and U.S. Defense
helicopte t w it h t h tr a t io n , a nd
ee dminis
reed to m
agSpecial h ie f of civil a at the
n e r a
Warfare
l, a nd t h e c
, a n d t he loss th
g e a lm rian
to bring c humanita
 TAKING NOTES Members of the AUs military-observer teams meet with the secretary general and military leaders of the JEM in Darfur, Sudan.
Department personnel at the the U.S.
base in Djibouti had to craft a support
plan. This was difficult, as the U.S.
Embassy in Khartoum was flanked by
a local Hamas headquarters and an
office of the Survivors of the Martyrs
reimbursement office that provides
money to families of suicide bombers
in Palestine and Iraq.
The U.S. Embassy is actually a
mission that has only recently opened,
and it operates on minimal staffing
without an accredited ambassador.
The mission staff continually works on
developing an aggressive evacuation
plan to be used if the country defaults
to the harder line Islamic radicals who
advocate increased fundamentalist
involvement in the government.
Just as the embassy staff planned
for evacuation, so, too, did the military
advisers. The advisers to the MILOBS
operated as isolated personnel in a
region crawling with armed factions,
as is often the case in advisory assign-
ments. The team carried all its survival
equipment on every mission and was
always prepared to enter into the es-
cape-and-evade mode, which basically
meant running for the Chad border.
Illustrating the requirement for
solid mission planning was the inci-
dent in which the AU received intel-
ligence that a non-Sudanese third
party was operating in Darfur with the
intent of abducting U.S. or EU officers
to sell to al-Qaeda operatives. It is
common knowledge among the AU and
rebel forces that al-Qaeda has robust
networks in Darfur. Al-Qaeda has
been very active there, and the team
received a continuous flow of informa-
tion on its activities.
Abductions, threats and hostile ac-
tion toward AU, U.S. and EU person-
nel were not limited to al-Qaeda. The
authors initial assignment in Darfur
was in Tine, Sudan, in the southern
Libyan Desert. Shortly after the author
left that first team, it was abducted by
one of the warring parties.
Besides the threat from outside
forces, the teams also faced the
uncertainty of the cease-fire and the
daily risk of crossfire. The cease-fire
was tenuous, as there was steady
fighting around Al Fashir, Kebka-
bia and Nyala, and sporadic fighting
around El Geniena, Ambarou and Bir
Furniwayah.
The GoS reinforced its military
and police battalions daily, but the
governments intent was not always
clear. The rebel groups claimed that
the GoS was preparing for an offensive
that would shatter the cease-fire and
could cause the MILOBS team mem-
bers to execute their escape-and-eva-
sion plans.
The JEM and SLA representatives
on the MILOBS teams constantly
pulled the U.S. and EU representa-
tives aside to show them documents
that they claimed were taken from
government offices. The documents
outlined the GoSs final solution to
the Darfur problem: the employment
of chemical weapons.
March-April 2006 13
BROKERING PEACE IN SUDAN

The military advisers were lightly

armed, carrying only a sidearm for
protection, as anything else makes
the warring factions uneasy. Rwan-
dan and Nigerian soldiers were on the
ground to keep the peace and provide
security for the MILOBS and other
parties within the country. These
soldiers, however, were excitable and
impulsive and proved dangerous when
the teams confronted the edgy war-
ring parties. More times than not, the
Rwandans and Nigerians were left to
guard the MILOBS sector base camp.
The authors teams patrol vehicle
came under fire by edgy participants
in the fighting, with at least one officer
receiving wounds.
The epidemiology of the region is
even more of a security factor than
the danger from civil war. When the
author arrived for his second Darfur
assignment, he found the teams living
in rented mud brick huts in an area
overflowing with desperate refugees.
Because of the rampant disease
SPECIAL DELIVERY Severely overloaded trucks carry supplies and humanitarian aid for refugees in Darfur
within the refugee population, both
teams in that sector were nearly non-
mission capable. Of the 18 military to provide medical care to the rebel hospital was almost medieval: Ampu-
observers on those two teams, nine forces. tation was the solution for a com-
tested positive for malaria and were The authors team spent several pound fracture when the bone was
bedridden. Three of the soldiers were days in the Jebel Mara Mountains exposed; surgery was done without
medially evacuated to either Khar- with the SLA rebels western brigade, anesthesia, and IV bags were being re-
toum or Addis Ababa. investigating Janjaweed attacks on vil- used. The acting doctors credentials
A significant number of MILOBS lages. Before the team went out, rebel were that he had once been a medi-
(including the author) eventually con- officers assigned to the team helped cal technician before the war. While
tracted malaria during the mission. load several rucksacks with medical providing the medical assistance had
The potential for large-scale epidemics supplies. The GoS officer assigned to the potential of causing problems
is high, as the High Commission for the team had previously objected to within the team, it garnered important
Refugees, the International Red Cross, providing medical assistance to the goodwill and often brought a wealth of
Doctors Without Borders and other rebels, so caution had to be exercised. information pertinent to the mission.
nongovernmental agencies are not up Upon its arrival in a village, the team U.S. Special Forces Soldiers will
to the task of dealing with so many would split up, ostensibly to cover increasingly be tapped for these new
people. more ground. In reality, the other and emerging missions. Their exper-
The sheer number of war casual- team members would ensure that the tise in operating in complex, sensitive
ties on both sides of the conflict has GoS officer was separated from the and dangerous environments holds
overburdened the medical support. author so that the medical supplies strategic national implications. As-
The GoS did not support the efforts could be delivered. signments of this nature provide valu-
of the NGOs or the MILOBS teams The hut the rebels were using as a able experience in working intimately

14 Special Warfare
 The pligh
t of the civ 30 Se
and each ilians here
day is a st r e mains pe
suering, ruggle of rilous,
starvation denial ab
cultures. In , and the d o u t is sues of
Ambarou eaths of fa
found 15-2 , 1 20 kilome m il ie s and
0 families ters east o
between living on f Tine, we
a governm the edge
battalion ent milita of existen
that we th r y brigade a ce
members ink is hea nd a polic
of the Jan vily stae e
routinely jaweed M d with for
attacked ilitia. The m e r
loot at wil by govern families a
l, adding m ent forces re
of loss an to the alre that rape
d destruc ady overw and
families fo tion. The helming s
r not leav r ebels con e n se
worst alte ing for SL demn the
rnative, th A or JEM te
AM Nabo e Chadian rritory, or
k or Baha refugee c the
and we p y. The fam amps of Ir
ass their p ilies beg fo ib a,
for Refug leas to th r assistan
ees or to e UN High C c e ,
this passin any NGO ommissio
g of inform w e come acr n
we began ation has oss. But e
passing in its conseq ven
Ambarou formation uences. A
families to on the pli fter
aid truck NGOs, a B ght of the
attempte ritish Save
was blow d to enter the Childr
n up by a th e Ambaro en
military-o deliberate u area an
bserver te ly placed d
explosion am arrive mine. Wh
, we foun d at the sce en our
aid worke d the veh ne of the
in September 2004. rs killed a icle ippe
body, a sa nd one bu d over, wit
vage repa rned over h two
least able y m ent for try 3 0 % o f
with warring factions in areas normal- Divisions 41st to help th ing to help his
parties ob emselves t h ose
ly denied or restricted to U.S. forces. Enhanced Infan- jected to . Evidently
a ssisting th , o n e
In preparation for more of these types try Brigade, the
conicted
with one ese familie of the
play in th o f the many s , as it
of advisory assignments, a class on 1st Corps and is despera political a
This was t te and vio gendas in
that type of advisory role should be the U.S. Army he second lent part o
the past t attack on f t he world.
included in the officer portion of the Cadet Com- hree mon an NGO in
occurred t h s. On July A mbarou in
Special Forces Qualification Course. mand before on an aid 19, a simil
vehicle, a a
being as- the shake
n NGO co nd with th r attack
mmunity is new attac
Major Patrick J. Christian is the signed to the will not so k,
ground operations officer in the Com- Joint Special
on try aga
in to
bined Joint Special Operations Task Opera-
Force-Arabian Peninsula. Commis- tions Task
sioned in Infantry in 1986, he served Force-Horn
three years as an Infantry platoon of Africa. Major Christian is a
leader before completing the Spe- graduate of the Command and Gen-
cial Forces Qualification Course and eral Staff Officer Course and holds a
rebranching to SF. As an SF officer, he bachelors degree from the University
served as detachment commander, bat- of South Florida.
talion S1 and battalion S3 in the 20th
SF Group. He later served with the U.S.
Southern Command, the 7th Infantry

March-April 2006 15