In a few hours, they would have been ready to move the drilling rig off location so that a

completion rig could move on. At about 10:00 p.m., the rig unexpectedly began to shake and a
loud surging noise was accompanied by natural gas, drilling mud and sea water that shot high
above the floor of the drill ship. The gas exploded and the rig was engulfed in flames. A second
explosion followed and the electricity went out. Eleven men died instantly and 115 others rushed
to the lifeboats or jumped into the Gulf of Mexico. This all happened so fast that those who died
probably had no time to understand what was happening. Two days later, the Deepwater Horizon
sank to the bottom of the Gulf of Mexico, and oil has been spilling into the Gulf at rates of at least
5,000 barrels per day since then(there are 42 gallons in a barrel).

Small diameter hole obstructed dirt circulation. The 18,300-foot, 400-ton casing string had a
5,800-foot lower portion with a 7-inch diameter. Most of the hole over this portion of casing had a
9.875 inch diameter. However, the lowest 180 feet of 7-inch casing with 4 equally spaced
centralizers were squeezed into an 8.5-inch hole with only 56 feet of rathole clearance (space
between the lower end of the casing string and the bottom of the drilled hole). Compressed
sediment and granular infill in the 0.75-inch wide annulus (Halliburtons best practices document
recommends 1.5 to 2-inch annular gap tolerance) most probably explains the need for a muchhigher-than-normal pressure of 3142 psi to liquefy it (in the ninth attempt) and allow mud to
circulate. The unexpectedly high pressure and subsequent lower-than-specified mud flow led to
problems 2 and 3.
2. Valves to prevent cement backflow did not close. Weatherfords Auto-Fill float collar, which
includes two flapper-type check valves, was installed at Macondo 180 ft above the reamer shoe
at casing bottom. The valves are held open by a 2-inch diameter auto-fill tube to allow the casing
to automatically fill with mud while it is lowered down the well. BPs casing installation procedure
stated: "slowly increase (mud) pump rates greater than 8 bpm to convert the float equipment (500 - 700 psi) per Weatherford recommendation". As the flow rate drag force during circulation
and cementing was only around 30% of that required, the auto-fill tube was almost certainly not
ejected and the flapper valves never closed. Some evidence suggests that personnel on the
Deepwater Horizon mistakenly believed that the high pressure needed to establish mud
circulation had converted the float collar.
3. Cementing inadequate. Cementing proceeded a) without flushing the annulus around the shoe
track at sufficiently high rate and duration to ensure full circumferential removal of compressed
sediment and good distribution of cement, and b) without converting the float collar to activate its
two check valves to prevent cement backflow. Cement quality and strength may have been
reduced by contamination on its way down the casing, or by mixing with lower density mud in the
rathole. There was no cementing evaluation log at Macondo, which may have shown it to be
inadequate.
4. Pressure test wrongly interpreted. Drill pipe was run to 8,367 ft ready for mud displacement.
During the "negative pressure test", for which there was no detailed procedure, no flow from the
kill line was accepted and 1,400 psi on the drill pipe was ignored.
5. Rising oil and gas not monitored. While displacing the mud with seawater, reservoir fluids rising
up the casing should have been detected by water inflow and mud outflow monitoring before
arrival of hydrocarbons at the rig floor, but no reasonably accurate outflow versus inflow
observations were made.

6. Fail-safe on seabed wellhead was unable to close. After uncontrolled arrival of oil and
gas at the rig floor, the blind-shear rams in the BOP stack failed to close due to the
presence of off-centre drill pipe.

7. Studies of vegetation death and accelerated marsh erosion following Deepwater

Horizon oil spill have shown that both of these impacts (or injuries, when assessing
natural resource damages) can be related to the percent of oiling on the stems of
marsh vegetation.[56][57] Spatial quantification of these injuries thus relies on
estimates of how many kilometers of shoreline fell into each of the four stem oiling
categories on which these injury determinations were based (0-10%, 10-50%, 5090%, 90-100%). The total length of the Louisiana coastline under mainland
herbaceous marsh that was oiled was estimated to be 1,161 km, with 29% (334 km)
falling into the two upper classes of stem oiling (i.e. > 50% stem oiling). [58]
8. The Health consequences of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill are health effects
related to the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon offshore drilling rig in the Gulf of
Mexico on April 20, 2010. An oil discharge continued for 84 days, resulting in the
largest oil spill in the history of the petroleum industry, estimated at approximately
206 million gallons (4.9 million barrels). The spill exposed thousands of area
residents and cleanup workers to risks associated with oil fumes, particulate matter
from controlled burns, volatile organic compounds (VOCs), polycylic aromatic
hydrocarbons (PAHs), and heavy metals.[1]
9. The spill was also notable for the volume of Corexit oil dispersant used to help
disperse the oil. Although EPA-approved, at the time of its use no toxicology

studies had been done. In 2011, a toxicology study was done and it
reported 57 chemicals in the ingredients including chemicals associated
with cancer, skin irritation from rashes to burns, eye irritation, potential
respiratory toxins or irritants; and kidney toxins