Professional Documents
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Judicial Power
Defined
Where Vested
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The Supreme Court
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Prohibitions
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Temporary Assignment of Judges
Change of Venue/Place of Trial
Appointment of Court Personnel
Administrative Supervision of Courts
Dismissal/Removal Powers
Contempt Powers
Other Powers
Decision-Making Process (En Banc/Division Cases); Stare Decisis
The Other Courts
Judicial Review
Defined
Functions
Requisites
Effects of Declaration of Unconstitutionality
Political Question
The Judicial and Bar Council
Composition
Function
Role of Congress in the Judicial Process; Limitations
Independence of the Judiciary
CASELIST:
Santiago, Jr. vs. Bautista, 32 SCRA 188
Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601, January 19, 1999
Javellana vs. Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 30
Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil 139
Aquino vs. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183
Almario vs. Alba, 127 SCRA 69
Sanidad vs. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333
Lopez vs. Roxas, 17 SCRA 756
Lina vs. Purisima, 82 SCRA 244
Jandusay vs. Court of Appeals, 172 SCRA 376
Maniago vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 674
Disomangcop vs. Datumanong, 444 SCRA 203
Salonga vs. Pano, 134 SCRA 438
Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987
People vs. Pilotin, 65 SCRA 635
Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, G.R. No. 113375, May 5, 1994
Tatad vs. Garcia, 243 SCRA 436
Republic vs. Hereda, 119 SCRA 411
Zaldivar vs. Gonzales, G.R. Nos. 79690-707, October 7, 1988
In Re: Edillon, 84 SCRA 554
In Re: Cunanan, 94 Phil 534
De Guzman vs. People, 119 SCRA 337
Nitafan vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 152 SCRA 284
De La Llana vs. Alba, 112 SCRA 294
Garcia vs. Macaraig, 39 SCRA 106
Legaspi vs. CSC, 150 SCRA 530
David vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001
Tanada vs. Cuenco, 103 Phil 1051
IBP vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000
Ople vs. Torres, 293 SCRA 141
Fabian vs. Desierto, 295 SCRA 470
Baker vs. Carr, 369 US 186
In Re: Manzano, 166 SCRA 246
1 SANTIAGO VS BAUTISTA
Posted by kaye lee on 10:22 PM
G.R. No. L-25024 March 30, 1970 [Judicial Power]
FACTS:
Teodoro Santiago, a grade 6 pupil, was adjudged 3rd honor. 2 days before his
graduation, Ted and his parents sought the invalidation of the ranking of the
honor students. They filed a Certiorari case against the principal and
teachers who composed the committee on rating honors.. Respondents filed a
MTD claiming that the action was improper, and even assuming it was proper,
the question has become academic (bc the graduation already proceeded.
They also argue that there was no GADALEJ on the part of the teachers since
the Committee on Ratings is not a tribunal, nor board, exercising judicial
functions, under Rule 65, certiorari is a remedy against judicial function
ISSUE: WoN judicial function be exercised in this case.
RULING:
A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers. The
exercise of judicial function is the doing of something in the nature of the
action of the court. In order for an action for certiorari to exist,
Test to determine whether a tribunal or board exercises judicial functions:
1) there must be specific controversy involving rights of persons brought
before a tribunal for hearing and determination.
2) that the tribunal must have the power and authority to pronounce judgment
and render a decision.
3) the tribunal must pertain to that branch of the sovereign which belongs to
the judiciary (or at least the not the legislative nor the executive)
It may be said that the exercise of judicial function is to determine what the
law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in
controversy.
Judicial power is defined:
The so-called Committee for Rating Honor Students are neither judicial nor
quasi-judicial bodies in the performance of its assigned task. It is necessary
that there be a LAW that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or
property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the
controversy ensuring there from is brought in turn, to the tribunal or board
clothed with power and authority to determine
2.
4.
5.
HELD:
PARTIES:
Petitioner: LEO ECHEGARAY
Respondents: SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL
FACTS:
On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner
Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The public respondent Justice
Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of the SC
not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the
power
of
the
executive
to
grant
reprieve.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on the execution of Echegaray despite
the fact that the finality of judgment has already been rendered that by
granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which
is an executive function.
HELD:
No. Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the source of
power of the President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and
remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. The provision,
however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the
enforcement
of
their
decisions
after
their
finality.
The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life
of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is
no
higher
right
than
the
right
to
life.
For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can
protect the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the
principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of our
government.
3.
Javellana v. The Executive Secretary
Constitutional Law. Political Law. Ratification Cases. Date of effectivity of
the 1973 Constitution.
4. Aquino v. Enrile
Constitutional Law. Political Law. Powers of the President.
Aquino v. Enrile
59 SCRA 183
FACTS:
The cases are all petitions for habeas corpus, the petitioners having been
arrested and detained by the military by virtue of Proclamation 1081. The
petitioners were arrested and held pursuant to General Order No.2 of the
President "for being participants or for having given aid and comfort in the
conspiracy to seize political and state power in the country and to take over
the Government by force..." General Order No. 2 was issued by the President
in the exercise of the power he assumed by virtue of Proclamation 1081
placing the entire country under martial law.
ISSUES:
FACTS:
On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed a prohibition case to restrain
respondents from implementing any of the provisions of the proposed
constitution not found in the present constitution. Javellana maintained that
the respondents are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing
proposed constitution and that the president is without power to proclaim the
ratification of the constitution. Similar actions were filed by Vidal Tan,
Gerardo Roxas, among others. Petitioners pray for the nullification of
Proclamation 1102 (Citizens Assemblies) and any order, decree, and
proclamation which are similar in objective.
ISSUES:
1.
2.
Was the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention
ratified validly in compliance to applicable laws?
3.
HELD:
5 Justices held that the issue is a political question, hence, not subject to
judicial inquiry, while 4 Justices held that the issue is a justiciable one.
However, any inquiry by this Court in the present cases into the constitutional
sufficiency of the factual bases for the proclamation of martial law has
become moot and academic. Implicit in the state of martial law is the
suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus with respect to persons
arrested or detained for acts related to the basic objective of the
proclamation, which is to suppress invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or to
safeguard public safety against imminent danger thereof. The preservation of
society and national survival takes precedence. The proclamation of martial
law automatically suspends the privilege of the writ as to the persons referred
to in this case
Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936
5.
Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936
I.
THE FACTS
Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath
of office as member of the National Assembly of the
Commonwealth Government. On December 3, 1935, the National
Assembly passed a resolution confirming the election of those
who have not been subject of an election protest prior to the
adoption of the said resolution.
II.
THE ISSUE
filed
against
notwithstanding
the
the
election
previous
of
the
confirmation
petitioner
of
such
6. Sanidad v. COMELEC
Constitutional Law. Political Law. Plebiscite Cases.
SANIDAD
73
SCRA
Ponente:
VS
333;
October
Martin,
12,
COMELEC
1976
J
FACTS:
On September 27, 1976, Pablo Sanidad and Pablito Sanidad
petitioned for prohibition with preliminary injunction to enjoin
COMELEC from holding and conducting the Referendum
Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect PD
Nos. 991 and 1033, as well as PD. 1031. Petitioners contend that
the president has no power to propose amendments to the new
constitution, as such, the referendum plebiscite has no legal basis.
ISSUE:
1.
Is
the
case
2. Does the president have authority
Constitution?
3. Is the submission to the people of the
time
frame
allowed
sufficient
at
bar
justiciable?
to propose amendments to the
proposed amendments within the
and
proper
submission?
HELD:
The issue of whether the President can assume the power of a constituent
assembly is a justiciable question since it is not the wisdom but the
constitutional authority of the president to perform such act is in question.
The president has the authority to propose amendments as the governmental
powers are generally concentrated to the president in times of crisis. The time
for deliberation of the referendum-plebiscite questions, 3 weeks, is not too
short especially since the questions are issues of the day and the people have
been living with them since the proclamation of martial law.
7.
the government of a land reform program and a social reform program) to the
people for ratification or rejection on the ground that there has been no fair
and proper submission following the doctrine laid down in Tolentino v.
COMELEC.
However, unlike in the case of Tolentino vs COMELEC, Almario et al do not
seek to prohibit the holding of the plebiscite but only ask for more time for the
people to study the meaning and implications of the said
questions/proposals until the nature and effect of the proposals are fairly and
properly submitted to the electorate.
ISSUE: Whether or not Questions 3 and 4 can be presented to the people on
a later date.
HELD: No. This is a political question. The necessity, expediency, and
wisdom of the proposed amendments are beyond the power of the courts to
adjudicate. Precisely, whether or not grant of public land and urban land
reform are unwise or improvident or whether or not the proposed
amendments are unnecessary is a matter which only the people can decide.
The questions are presented for their determination.
Assuming that a member or some members of the Supreme Court may find
undesirable any additional mode of disposing of public land or an urban land
reform program, the remedy is to vote NO in the plebiscite but not to
substitute his or their aversion to the proposed amendments by denying to the
millions of voters an opportunity to express their own likes or dislikes.
Further, Almario et al have failed to make out a case that the average voter
does not know the meaning of grant of public land or of urban land
reform
Petitioner Ruben Maniago was the owner of shuttle buses which were used int
ransporting employees of the Texas Instruments, (Phils.), Inc. from Baguio
City proper to itsplant site at the Export Processing Authority. In 1990, one
of his buses figured in a vehicularaccident with a passenger jeepney owned by
private respondent Alfredo Boado. As a resultof the accident, a criminal case
for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property andmultiple physical
injuries against petitioners driver, Herminio Andaya. A month later, a
civilcase for damages was filed by private respondent Boado against petitione
r Maniago.Petitioner moved for the suspension of the proceedings in the civil
case against him, citingthe pendency of the criminal case against his driver
and because no reservation of the rightto bring it (civil case) separately had
been made in the criminal case. But the lower courtdenied petitioners motion
on the ground that pursuant to the Civil Code, the action couldproceed
independently of the criminal action.
8.
Mendoza, J.
Facts:
Issue:
whether or not despite the absence of reservation, private respondent maynon
etheless bring an action for damages against petitioner under the following
provisions of the Civil Code:Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there beingfault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault ornegligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties,is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176
is demandable not only forones own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one isresponsible.
Held:
No. The right to bring an action for damages under the Civil Code must be
reservedas required by Rule 111, 1, otherwise it should be dismissed. To
begin with, 1 quite clearlyrequires that a reservation must be made to
institute separately all civil actions for therecovery of civil liability, otherwise
they will be deemed to have been instituted with thecriminal case. Such civil
actions are not limited to those which arise from the offensecharged. In
other words the right of the injured party to sue separately for the recovery
of the civil liability whether arising from crimes (
ex delicto
) or from
quasi delict
under
Art.
2176of the Civil Code must be reserved
otherwise they will be deemed instituted with thecriminal action.On the basis
of Rule 111, 1-3, a civil action for the recovery of civil liability is, as
ageneral rule, impliedly instituted with the criminal action, except only (1)
when such actionarising from the same act or omission, which is the subject
of the criminal action, is waived;(2) the right to bring it separately is reserved
or (3) such action has been instituted prior tothe criminal action. Even if an
action has not been reserved or it was brought before theinstitution of the
criminal case, the acquittal of the accused will not bar recovery of
civilliability unless the acquittal is based on a finding that the act from which
the civil liabilitymight arise did not exist because of Art. 29 of the Civil Code
10.
sALONGA vs PAO
2. Yes. Despite the SCs dismissal of the petition due to the cases moot and
academic nature, it has on several occasions rendered elaborate decisions in
similar cases where mootness was clearly apparent.
The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling
constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic
function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by
constitutional guarantees.
In dela Camara vs Enage (41 SCRA 1), the court ruled that:
The fact that the case is moot and academic should not preclude this
Tribunal from setting forth in language clear and unmistakable, the obligation
of fidelity on the part of lower court judges to the unequivocal command of
the Constitution that excessive bail shall not be required.
In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the Cultural Center of
the Philippines could validly be created through an executive order was
mooted by Presidential Decree No. 15, the Centers new charter pursuant to
the Presidents legislative powers under martial law. Nevertheless, the Court
discussed the constitutional mandate on the preservation and development of
Filipino culture for national Identity. (Article XV, Section 9, Paragraph 2 of
the Constitution).
In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183), the fact that
the petition was moot and academic did not prevent this Court in the exercise
of its symbolic function from promulgating one of the most voluminous
decisions ever printed in the Reports.
11. CASE DIGEST : Restituto Ynot Vs IAC
G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987 RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER,
INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE
REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV,
ILOILO
CITY,
respondents.
On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat
from Masbate to Iloilo when the same was confiscated by the police station
commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. 626-A. A case
was filed by the petitioner questioning the constitutionality of executive order
and the recovery of the carabaos. After considering the merits of the case, the
confiscation was sustained and the court declined to rule on the
constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed the decision to the
Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling of RTC.
Issue:
Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?
Ruling:
The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to justify
EO 626-A amending EO 626 in asic rule prohibiting the slaughter of
carabaos except under certain conditions. The supreme court said that The
reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought
to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing the Supreme Court do not
see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can
prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed
anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously,
retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there,
any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill
them there
The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act
defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed
punishment, which was carried out forthright. Due process was not properly
observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the
police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had
filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00.
The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving
him a chance to be heard, thus denying due process.
12.
KilosBayan v Guingona G.R. No. 113375. May 5, 1994.
Facts:
On 21 October 1993, the Office of the President announced that it had given
the respondent PGMC the go-signal to operate the country's on-line lottery
system and that the corresponding implementing contract would be submitted
not later than 8 November 1993 "for final clearance and approval by the
Chief Executive."
1.7
The Lessor shall be selected based on its technical expertise,
hardware and software capability, maintenance support, and financial
resources. The Development Plan shall have a substantial bearing on the
choice of the Lessor. The Lessor shall be a domestic corporation, with at least
sixty percent (60%) of its shares owned by Filipino shareholders. . .
1.8 Upon expiration of the lease, the Facilities shall be owned by PCSO
without any additional consideration. 3
The actual lessor in this case is the PCSO and the subject matter thereof is
its franchise to hold and conduct lotteries since it is, in reality, the PGMC
which operates and manages the on-line lottery system for a period of eight
years.
FACTS:
DOTC planned to construct a light railway transit line along EDSA, a major
thoroughfare inMetropolitan Manila, which shall traverse the cities of Pasay,
Quezon, Mandaluyong andMakati
c) Under Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, a less than 60%
Filipino-owned and/or controlled corporation, like the PGMC, is disqualified
from operating a public service, like the said telecommunications system; and
d) Respondent PGMC is not authorized by its charter and under the
Foreign Investment Act (R.A. No. 7042) to install, establish and operate the
on-line Lotto and telecommunications systems."
Considering the above citizenship requirement, the PGMC claims that the
Berjaya Group "undertook to reduce its equity stakes in PGMC to 40%," by
selling 35% out of the original 75% foreign stockholdings to local investors.
Issue: In the deliberation on this case on 26 April 1994, the issues are
regarding:
(a) the locus standi of the petitioners, and
(b) the legality and validity of the Contract of Lease in the light of Section
1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO
from holding and conducting lotteries "in collaboration, association or joint
venture with any person, association, company or entity, whether domestic or
foreign."
Held: Requirement of standing was waived by the Court. (a)
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the
challenged Contract of Lease executed on 17 December 1993 by respondent
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and respondent Philippine
Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) is hereby DECLARED contrary
to law and invalid.
While a franchise is needed tooperate these facilities to serve the public, they
do not by themselves constitute a publicutility. What constitutes a public
utility is not their ownership but their use to serve thepublic.
Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act,
in 1952. The title of the law was, An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar
Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955.
Sec. 11, Art. XII of the Const.: No franchise, certificate or any other form of
authorizationfor the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to
citizens of the Philippines orto corporations or associations organized under
the laws of the Philippines at least sixtyper centum of whose capital is owned
by such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificateor authorization be
exclusive character or for a longer period than fifty years.
1946-195170%
1952 .71%
1953..72%
1954..73%
1955..74%
Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.
Section 2 of the Act provided that A bar candidate who obtained a grade of
75% in any subject shall be deemed to have already passed that subject and
the grade/grades shall be included in the computation of the general average
in subsequent bar examinations.
ISSUE:
Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.
RULING:
Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being
embraced in the title of the Act. As per its title, the Act should affect only the
bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar examinations. Section2 establishes a
permanent system for an indefinite time. It was also struck down for allowing
partial passing, thus failing to take account of the fact that laws and
jurisprudence are not stationary.
As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional,
while that for 1953 to 1955 was declared in force and effect. The portion that
was stricken down was based under the following reasons:
1.
The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who
flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952 had inadequate preparation due
to the fact that this was very close to the end of World War II;
2.
3.
4.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Edillon should be reinstated as member of the bar.
HELD:
YES.
RATIO:
Admission to the bar is a privilege burdened with condition. Failure to abide
entails loss of such privilege. Considered in addition was the two (2) years
Atty. Edillon was barred to practice law, and the dictum of Justice Malcolm
in Villavicencio v. Lukban that the power to discipline, especially if
amounting to disbarment, should be exercised in a preservative and not on the
vindictive principle. After contrition on the part of the petitioner, the court
finds reinstatement in order.
15. IN RE CUNANAN (CASE DIGEST)
IN RE CUNANAN
94 PHIL. 534
FACTS:
As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster
enough votes to declare it void. Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take
effect in 1953. Hence, it will not revoke existing Supreme Court resolutions
denying admission to the bar of an petitioner. The same may also rationally
fall within the power to Congress to alter, supplement or modify rules of
admission to the practice of law.
16. Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. Nos. 79690-707 October 7,1988]
FACTS:
Petitioner filed Resolution including Motion to Cite in Contempt Special
Prosecutor (formerly Tanodbayan) Raul M. Gonzalez. Gonzalez in: (1) having
caused the filing of the information against petitioner in criminal case before
the Sandiganbayan, and (2) issuing certain allegedly contemptuous
statements to the media in relation to the proceedings in where respondent is
claiming that he is acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman. A Resolution from the
Supreme Court required respondent to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt and/or subjected to administrative sanctions for
February 28, 1971, Macaraig was not able to assume the duties and functions
of a judge due to the fact that his Court Room can not be properly established
due to problems as to location and as to appropriations to make his Court up
and running. When Macaraig realized that it would be some time before he
could actually preside over his court, he applied for an extended leave
(during the 16 years he had worked in the Department of Justice, he had, due
to pressure of duties, never gone on extended leave, resulting in his forfeiting
all the leave benefits he had earned beyond the maximum ten months allowed
by the law). The Secretary of Justice, however, convinced Macaraig to forego
his leave and instead to assist the Secretary, without being extended a formal
detail, whenever he was not busy attending to the needs of his court.
Paz Garcia on the other hand filed a complaint alleging that Macaraig is
incompetent, dishonest and has acted in violation of his oath as a judge.
Garcia said that Macaraig has not submitted the progress of his Courts as
required by law. And that Macaraig has received salaries as a judge while he
is fully aware that he has not been performing the duties of a judge. Also
questioned was the fact that a member of the judiciary is helping the the DOJ,
a department of the executive oi charge of prosecution of cases.
ISSUE: Whether or not Macaraig has acted with incompetence and
dishonesty as Judge.
HELD: No. Macaraigs inability to perform his judicial duties under the
circumstances mentioned above does not constitute incompetence.
Macaraig was, like every lawyer who gets his first appointment to the bench,
eager to assume his judicial duties and rid himself of the stigma of being a
judge without a sala, but forces and circumstances beyond his control
prevented him from discharging his judicial duties.
On the other hand, none of these is to be taken as meaning that the Court
looks with favor at the practice of long standing, to be sure, of judges being
detailed in the DOJ to assist the Secretary even if it were only in connection
with his work of exercising administrative authority over the courts. The line
between what a judge may do and what he may not do in collaborating or
working with other offices or officers under the other great departments of the
government must always be kept clear and jealously observed, lest the
principle of separation of powers on which our government rests by mandate
of the people thru the Constitution be gradually eroded by practices
purportedly motivated by good intentions in the interest of the public service.
ISSUE: Whether or not members of the Judiciary are exempt from income
taxes.
HELD:
19.
No. The salaries of members of the Judiciary are subject to the general
income tax applied to all taxpayers. Although such intent was somehow and
inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of the 1987 Constitution, the
deliberations of the1986 Constitutional Commission negate the contention
that the intent of the framers is to revert to the original concept of nondiminution of salaries of judicial officers. Justices and judges are not only
the citizens whose income has been reduced in accepting service in
government and yet subject to income tax. Such is true also of Cabinet
members and all other employees.
They submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as
judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries,
contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
mandating that during their continuance in office, their salary shall not be
decreased," even as it is anathema to the Ideal of an independent judiciary
envisioned in and by said Constitution."
18.
20.
David v Arroyo
entitled to judicial protection. However, the court does not liberally declare
statutes as invalid although they may be abused and misabused and may
afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of application. The validity of a
statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its
efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a particular
case. The Court ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as
it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees, taking into
consideration that legislative power is vested only in congress. The Court
partly grants the petitions. PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it allows the
President to call the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However,
commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence are
declared unconstitutional. Such proclamation does not also authorize the
President to take over privately-owned public utilities or business affected
with public interest without prior legislation. General Order No. 5 is
constitutional as it is a standard on how the AFP and PNP would implement
PP1017, but portion where acts of terrorism has not been defined and
punishable by congress is held unconstitutional.
Furthermore, the following acts of the government were held
unconstitutional: warrantless arrestof the petitioner, dispersal and
warrantless arrests of rallyists in the absence of proof that saidpetitioners
were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, or
violatingBP 800; imposition of media standards and any form of prior
restraint on the press, as well as warrantless search of the Tribune Offices
and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other materials.
21. Legaspi v CSC 150 SCRA 530 (1987)
Facts:
The petitioner invokes his constitutional right to information on matters of
public concern in a special civil action for mandamus against the CSC
pertaining to the information of civil service eligibilities of certain persons
employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. The standing
of the petitioner was challenged by the Solicitor General of being devoid of
legal right to be informed of the civil service eligibilities of government
employees for failure of petitioner to provide actual interest to secure the
information sought.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner may invoke his constitutional right to
information
in
the
case
at
bar.
Held: The court held that when the question is one of public right and the
object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the
people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose
instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal
or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen
and as such interested in the execution of the laws. The Constitution provides
the guarantee of adopting policy of full public disclosure subject to
reasonable conditions prescribed by law as in regulation in the manner of
examining the public records by the government agency in custody thereof.
But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern
is not absolute. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc.,
are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second
sentence). The law may therefore exempt certain types of information from
public scrutiny, such as those affecting national security.
The court delves into determining whether the information sought for by the
petitioner is of public interest. All appointments in the Civil Service
Commission are made according to merit and fitness while a public office is a
public trust. Public employees therefore are accountable to the people even as
to their eligibilities to their positions in the government. The court also noted
that the information on the result of the CSC eligibility examination is
released to the public therefore the request of petitioner is one that is not
unusual or unreasonable. The public, through any citizen, has the right to
verify the civil eligibilities of any person occupying government positions.
22.
Estrada v Sandiganbayan/ G.R. No. 148560/ November 19, 2001
Bellosillo J.
Facts
:Petitioner calls for the Court to subject RA 7080(An Act defining and
Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) to the crucible of constitutionality for
reasons that the act:
is vague
dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions
abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes punishable under the Revised
Penal Code
Issue:
Is the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being vague?
Does the Plunder law require less evidence proving the predicate crimes of
plunder thus violates the rights of the accused to due process (specifically
Section 4 proposing that "it shall not be necessary to prove each and every
criminal act done by the accused to establish beyond reasonable doubt
a pattern of over or criminal acts inidcative of theoverall lawful scheme or
conspiracy)?
Petitioner has
miserably failed
to show that the Plunder Law is unconstitutional due to itsvagueness.-"...the
Plunder Law contains
ascertainable
standards and
well-defined
parameterswhich would enable the accused to determine the nature of
his violation. Section 2 issufficiently explicit in its description of the
acts, conduct and conditionsrequired or forbidden, and prescribes the
elements of the crime with reasonablecertainty and particularity."
1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can
exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are
complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case;
(2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional
question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.
2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian
supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes
permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The
participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is
appropriately circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct and manage
the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the
necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to these
soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military
authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the
Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the
police force. Neither does it amount to an insidious incursion of the
military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI
of the Constitution.
24.
ISSUE:
1. WoN the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the
armed forces is subject to judicial review.
2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate
the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military.
RULING:
HELD: No. The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that the issue is a
justiciable question. The term Political Question connotes what it means in
ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure.
In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The Supreme Court is
not being asked by Taada to decide upon the official acts of Senate. The
issue being raised by Taada was whether or not the elections of the 5 NP
members to the SET are valid which is a judicial question. Note that the SET
is a separate and independent body from the Senate which does not perform
legislative acts.
FACTS:
The nomination of the last two members (who would fill in the supposed seat
of the minority members) must not come from the majority party. In this case,
the Chairman of the SET, apparently already appointed members that would
fill in the minority seats (even though those will come from the majority
party). This is still valid provided the majority members of the SET (referring
to those legally sitting) concurred with the Chairman. Besides, the SET may
set its own rules in situations like this provided such rules comply with the
Constitution.
25.
ISSUE:
Whether the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is an unconstitutional usurpation of the
power of Congress to legislate
.RULING:Legislative power is the authority to make laws, and to alter
and repeal them. The Constitution has vested this power in the Congress. The
grant of
legislative
power
to
Congress
is broad,
general,
and comprehensive. Any power deemed to be legislativeby usage and
tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitutionhas
lodged it elsewhere.The executive power, on the other hand, is vested in the
President. It is generallydefined as the power to enforce and administer the
laws. It is the power of carrying thelaws into practical operation
and enforcing their due observance. As head of theExecutive Department, the
President is the Chief Executive. He represents thegovernment as a whole and
sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials andemployees of
his department. He has control over the executive department, bureausand
offices. Corollary to the power of control, the President also has the
duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general
peace and publicorder. Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus
and offices under hiscontrol to enable him to discharge his duties
effectively. Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying polic
ies and enforcingorders as determined by proper governmental organs. It
enables the President to fix auniform standard of administrative efficiency
and check the official conduct of hisagents. To this end, he can issue
administrative orders, rules and regulations.From these precepts, the Court
holds that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is notappropriate to be
covered by an administrative order
27. Baker v. Carr
Facts
Charles Baker (P) was a resident of Shelby County, Tennessee. Baker filed
suit against Joe Carr, the Secretary of State of Tennessee. Bakers complaint
alleged that the Tennessee legislature had not redrawn its legislative districts
since 1901, in violation of the Tennessee State Constitution which required
redistricting according to the federal census every 10 years. Baker, who lived
in an urban part of the state, asserted that the demographics of the state had
changed shifting a greater proportion of the population to the cities, thereby
diluting his vote in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Baker sought an injunction prohibiting further elections, and sought the
remedy of reapportionment or at-large elections. The district court denied
relief on the grounds that the issue of redistricting posed a political question
and would therefore not be heard by the court.
Issues
1.
2.
2.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.