CONSTI (OCT 7, 2014)

THE EXECUTIVE DEPARMENT

Under 1987 constitution the president and the vice-president

would have to be voted at large, meaning they have to be
voted by qualified voters throughout the country.
In fact under the ABSENTEE VOTERS ACT or RA 9189
even qualified Filipinos abroad may vote for president and
vice president together with the senators and the party-list
organizations,
The president and vice president would have to be elected
for a term of 6 years which shall commence at noon to June
30 next following there elections and they shall continue to
be in office 6 years or until noon of June, 6 years thereafter.
But what is primary importance is that under SEC 5 ART 18
1887 constitution, the president and vice president elected
during the February 7 ,1986 election, (we are referring of
course involving Cory and the Doi laurel as against Marcos
and Tolentino) would have to serve office until known of June
30, 1992 and that was for purposes of elections.
So far as Corazon Aquino and Doi laurel they serve office
for more than 6years, (swerte sila because we have the
transitory provision Sec 5 Art 18 under art. 1887
constitution)

PRESIDENT

And take note that under the 1987 constitution the president
shall not be eligible for ANY re-election. In fact we have a
provision to the end, that a person or the person who
succeeds as the vice president and who has serve as such
for a period of more than 4 years shall not be qualified for
election to the same position at any time.
So the president is not eligible for re-election or any Reelection for any election.
But what happened to Erap (Joseph Estrada)? Why was
Erap allowed to run?
But we have provision also that voluntary renunciation from
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an

interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term for
w/c he was elected.
And take note that Erap was not impeached, he rather
resigned as in the case of Estrada versus Arroyo . But why
he is allowed to run in the 1st place? Is it enough that there is
already an interruption in the continuity of the service? Now
if the president for example serves for a full term of 6 years
but he does run in immediately in the succeeding election, is
he qualified to run? In next forth coming election after having
rested for a period of 6 years, is he allowed to do that?
The answer is no, because as worded it is provided therein
that the president shall not be eligible for any Re- election
the word any is utter significance in that it presupposes or
would refer to any re-election , it doesnt have to be in the
next election or immediately succeeding elections.
In fact that is bolstered by the provision that a person who
has served as or who has succeeded as the president and
who has served as such for a period of more than 4 years
shall not be qualified to run for the same position at any time.
So given in the aboved mentioned that if a president has
already served for a period of 4 years is not eligible to for reelection, much more those who had served a full term of 6
years is not eligible for any reelection.
Again, what happened to erap?
Because when he ran there was a petition for his
disqualification, and the COMELEC ruled in favor of Erap,
and it should not come as a surprise, that it was the doing of
the Malacanan, because the sole presidential candidate for
the administration was only Gibo, and for the opposition we
have Noynoy, Villar, Erap, so probably the malacanan or
administration believed on the principle divide and rule, so it
would be better that the votes for the opposition would be
divided from among the opposition candidates.
So COMELEC did not disqualify Erap, and the petition for
certiorari was filed before the SC but for one reason or
another it was dismissed by sheer technicality. It was not
resolved on the merits, and again Id love to suspect that it
was the handy work of malacanan.
Had the case be decided by the SC on the merits of the
case, the decision would have been the opposite, because
the import of the prohibition imposed at Sec4 art7 is very

clear, that the president shall not be eligible for ANY reelection.
VICE PRESIDENT

The term of office of the VP is fixed at 6 years, but there

is a ________ provision at the end that he may be
allowed to run or seek for re-election, provided that the
VP shall not hold office for more than 2 consecutive
terms.
If the VP served for 2 consecutive terms then he rested
for 6 years, can he run again after 6 years?
Unfortunately for us, this question has not yet been
answered by our SC.
But take note that in so far as our president is concerned
there is this usage of the term any re-election whereas
there is no term of similar import was used in the case of
the VP.
But ____________ that under our constitution of course
one cannot serve as the VP for more than 2 consecutive
terms. Then we have a similar provision to the end that
voluntary renunciation of the office shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected.

WHO SHALL CANVASS THE VOTE FOR THE PRES. AND THE VP

The congress shall canvass the votes for the Pres. and the
VP
Under Sec4(4) art 7, clearly states that the returns for the
election of the Pres. And the VP as certified by the Board of
Canvassers of each province and cities would have to be
transmitted to congress and directed or addressed to the
Senate President and upon receipt of the canvass of the
Certificate of Canvass, the Senate Pres. not later than 30
days following the elections shall open the same in the
presence of the Senate and HOR in joint session. And he
shall proceed to verify now the authenticity and the due
execution of the COC and shall proceed to canvass the
votes for the Pres. and the VP.

And whoever garners the highest number of votes for the

Pres. and the VP would have to be declared as the Pres.
and VP as the case may be.
Take note that it is only congress which can proclaim the
winners in the presidential and the VP elections.
Macalintal vs COMELEC G.R. No. 157013 June 10,2003,
SC declared as void the provision under Sec18(5) of RA
9189 or the Absentee Voters Act , vesting powers upon the
COMELEC to make proclamation or partial proclamation of
the results of the Absentee Voters Act pertaining to the Pres.
and the VP. Because under the 1987 Constitution only the
Congress can proclaim the winner in the Pres. and VP
elections.

IN CASE OF A TIE

When there is a tie then Congress will have to choose the

Pres. or the VP as the case maybe. Upon a vote of majority
of all the members of both houses in joint session
assembled but voting separately.
Majority votes coming from the HOR and majority votes
coming from the Senate.
But what if majority from the HOR and Majority from the
Senate have different choice? Who declares the winner?
Then there would be another round of voting until such time
that they come up with the same choice or consensus.

Now no doubt that under the 1987 consti, the congress shall act as
the canvassers for the Presidential and Vice-Presidential elections, but
who would resolve any election contest involving the Pres. and the VP.

In the case of the Senate and the HOR , they have their
respective sect or the HRET as the case may be.
In the case of the Pres. and the VP, the SC sitting EN
BANC shall act as the sole judge involving the election
contests, involving the election returns and qualifications of
the Pres. and the VP.
In resolving such election contests , the SC will not apply the
rules of Civil procedures, because it has its own rules
governing disposition of cases involving election contests

between Presidential and V-Presidential candidates. Its not

to be governed by the rules of court.
The SC in hearing such case is acting as a Presidential
Electoral Tribunal, precisely; it is to be governed by separate
rules of procedure.
As whats held in the case of Tecson vs ______, the SC
would assume jurisdiction once there is already a winner that
is complained by Congress. Before that, any disqualification
case should be resolved or filed before the COMELEC. But
once the winner is already proclaimed then the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal shall assume jurisdiction over such
election contest.

Assuming, winners were already proclaimed. What could be done before the
President or the VP may validly assume their respective offices?

They can already assume office once they are already

proclaimed by Congress. Taking an oath, prescribed under
Sec5 Art 7.
Once the Pres. and the VP had already taken their
respective oath of office, then no doubt they will assume
their respective position.
Under Sec6 Art7, the Pres. will have his own official
residence. That is one of the privileges accorded to the
President (Malacanan)
One of the privileges by the Pres. and the VP is that their
salaries are fixed by law, which salaries may not be
decreased during their term of office.
Under Sec17 Art18, the annual gross salary of the President
is at 300,000 per annum, for the VP 240,000 per annum,
unless of course congress will provide for a higher salary.
But now I think Pnoy is receiving more than that because a
law is already enacted.
There is a prohibition regarding the diminution of the salaries
of the President or the VP during their term of office. But may
their salaries be increased? Their salaries may be increased
but any such increase may not take effect until after the
expiration of the term of the incumbent Pres. and VP.
Another privilege that the Pres. and VP are enjoying is
Immunity from Suits. But there is no particular provision in
the consti that expressly grants the Pres. and VP immunity

from suits for practical considerations. It could not be found

under the 1987 consti but it is decided already, rather a case
law. Decided that he may not be sued during his
incumbency.
As ordained in the case of Forbes vs Choco Choco
(hahhahahah) 16 PHIL 534, w/c was cited in the case of
Estrada v Arroyo.
Sec6 Art7,also prohibits the Pres. and the VP from receiving
any other form of emolument not only from the government
but from other sources.
Sec3(2) Art7 of the 1987 consti, the VP may be appointed by
the Pres as a member of the cabinet, and such appointment
is valid even w/o confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.
Are they entitled for the salaries as a cabinet member other
than the salaries that he is receiving as a VP? No, that
would amount to double compensation which is proscribed
or prohibited under Sec6 Art7.
As a rule the Pres. and the VP shall assume their respective
offices at the beginning of their respective terms.

VACANCY IN THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

Under the 1987 Constitution, there are 2 provisions dealing with
Presidential succession:
Sec7 Art7 which governs a situation where there is a
vacancy in the office of the President before or at the
beginning of his term.
Sec8 Art7 which deals with the situation where the vacancy
in the office of the President is during the term of office or
during the term of the Pres.
Take note that where no Pres. had been chosen yet but the VP
has already been and has already taken his oath , then, and in
such situation, the VP will become the acting Pres.

It happens when theres a tie, and the congress had not

yet decided who shall become the Pres.
Then at noon on June 30, the VP will become the acting
Pres. until such time that Pres. shall have already been
chosen and shall have been qualified.

Another situation, is when a Pres. shall not have been

Qualified or where no Pres. shall have qualified yet, then
in such situation, the VP which have been proclaimed
the winner and had already taken his oath may become
the acting Pres. Until such time that Pres. shall have
already been chosen and shall have been qualified.
--when the Pres. has already been chosen but is not
yet qualified (already proclaimed as the winner, but one
reason or another has failed to take his oath) e.g.
hospitalized, or Example Pnoy nag paopera pa(hair
transplant) hahhahahah.

HAVE BECOME PERMANENTLY DISABLED AT THE BEGINNING OF

THEIR TERM OF OFFICE

Vacancy before or at the beginning of the term

But if at the beginning of the term of office the President, the Pres. shall
have died or permanently disabled

The VP (fortunate enough) would already become the

permanent Pres.
o E.g. the president was already proclaimed as
the winner and took his oath, but after his oath,
he was bombed and died or permanently
disabled.

SPECIAL ELECTIONS?
When the situation is the Senate Pres. or the Speaker of the House
is acting as the President, neither one of them will become the permanent
President.

But who will become the VP, in the case maybe?

VACANCY IN THE OFFICE OF THE VP

Be filled up with Sec9 Art7, the Pres. who used to be the

VP would have to nominate any member of Congress to
become the VP, and the VP so appointed from among
the members of Congress will assume his office as the
VP the moment that his nomination is confirmed by a
vote of majority of all the members of both houses in
Congress in joint session assembled but voting
separately.
o But such nomination to be valid must be
confirmed by majority votes of all the members
of both houses voting separately.

NO PRESIDENT OR VP HAS BEEN CHOSEN YET OR VALIDLY

QUALIFIED OR WHERE BOTH OF THEM SHALL HAVE DIED OR SHALL

The Senate Pres. or in case of his incapacity the

Speaker of the House shall become the acting
President.
Under our Consti there is no such thing as acting VP.
There is no provision for an acting VP, otherwise if we
will allow the situation overacting na silang duha.
(hahhahah)
But for example the Senate Pres. And the Speaker of the
House are also permanently disabled, under Sec7 Art7,
Congress is mandated to enact a law to govern that
situation.

There shall be a SPECIAL ELECTION, and this SE will have to be

governed by Sec10 Art7, which in essence provides that, at 10
oclock of the 3rd day following the vacancy in the offices of the
Pres. and the VP, Congress shall convene without need of a ______
and within 7 days therefrom, Congress shall enact a law which shall
provide for special elections and such special election for the Pres.
and the VP shall not be conducted earlier than 45 days but not
later than 60 days following such call or following such convening of
Congress.
So there shall be SE, but take note that where the vacancies or
permanent vacancies in the offices of the Pres. and the VP, occurred
within 18 months immediately preceding the next Pres. Election,
then there shall be no more SE. during that time the Senate Pres.
or Speaker of the House shall continue as acting Pres.
Take note, that a law or a special law calling for SE is deemed
certified or deemed regarded as urgent, and as much as it is
considered as a certified bill, then the 3 separate readings in 3
separate days as well as the printing of copies thereof, prior to the
final and 3rd reading thereof, are _______.

The bill would eventually become a law even without the signature of
the Pres. , or after the 3rd reading, the bill will become a law w/o the
signature of the Pres.
And there shall be a SE and the appropriation for which shall be
charged as against any available fund.
So the provision under Sec25(4) Art6, special law should be
supported funds certified as available by the National Treasury is
likewise dispensed with.

Vacancy during the incumbency

Sec8 Art7, governs the situation when the vacancy in the

office of the Pres. shall have died, permanently disabled or
impeached or resigned during the incumbency of the Pres.,
then the VP will become the Pres. and shall serve the
remaining term of Pres.
So there will be movement again, where the VP shall
become the Pres., and as much as there will be vacancy in
the office of the VP, then we will have to apply again the
provision under Sec9, the Pres. who used to be the VP, will
have to nominate the VP from among the members of the
Congress, which would need confirmation by the majority
votes of all the members of both houses in joint session
assembled but voting separately.
But when both the Pres. and the VP have died, permanently
disabled, impeached or resigned during their incumbency
then in such situation the Senate president, or in his
incapacity the Speaker of the House shall become the acting
Pres.
o Assume only as Acting Pres.
o The Senate Pres. or the Speaker f the House shall
only become the permanent Pres. when they
participate in the SE that may be called for the
purpose and if elected as the next Pres. or the VP as
the case maybe. (under the Fair Elections Act)
o If the Senate Pres. or the Speaker of the House lost,
then will go back to their previous position.

OCTOBER 9, 2014

Normally, where there are permanent vacancies in the offices of the

President and Vice-President, there shall be a special election called for
the purpose. It shall be called by the Congress, and the bill calling for
such special election would become a law even without the signature of
the President after its approval at the third and final reading thereof. But
there shall be no more special election when the vacancies occur within
18 months prior to the next scheduled Presidential election (it would be a
waste of time, money, and effort).
Sec. 11, Article 7 -> Enumerates the other situations/circumstances
under which the Vice-President may become the acting President.
In Sec. 7, Art. 7, when the President shall have not be
chosen/qualified, then the Vice-President shall be the acting
President.
Under Sec. 11, Art. 7, other situations/circumstances when the VicePresident may become the Acting President:
o When the President transmits to the Senate President or the
Speaker of the House a written declaration that in the
meantime, he is unable to perform his functions and duties.
When that happens, the Vice-President becomes the acting
President until the President transmits a contrary
declaration.
o When majority of the cabinet members would transmit a
written declaration to the Senate President or Speaker of
the House that the President is unable, in the meantime, to
perform his duties and functions. Where that happens, the
Vice-President will become the Acting President of the
Republic. But if that declaration, as thus made by majority
of the cabinet members, is disputed by the President, as
when the President transmits a contrary declaration stating
that no incapacity exists, then the President shall reassume
his position. But if that declaration or revocation of the
President is rebutted by majority of the members of cabinet
within five (5) days from the time the President rebuts that
allegation, then the issue dealing with the capacity or
incapacity of the President shall be decided by Congress.
Where Congress is not in session, it shall convene without
need of call within 48 hours. If after ten (10) days from
receipt of the last declaration or twelve (12) days from the
time of convening of Congress, without need of call, it is
determined by two-thirds (2/3) vote of all the members of
both houses voting separately that the President is indeed
incapacitated to perform his functions, then the VicePresident will become the Acting President.

 Sec. 12, Article 7 -> mandates that the public should be properly
informed about the health or the serious illness of the President. It further
provides that the members of the cabinet in charge of national security
and foreign relations and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) shall not be denied access to the President.
This was incorporated under the 1987 Constitution to prevent the
recurrence of what happened during the time of Marcos where the
people were not properly informed about the actual health condition
of Marcos (at that time, it was said that Marcos had lupus).
During the time of Arroyo, the import of this provision was somehow
overstretched in the sense that it was disclosed to the public that
Gloria Arroyo underwent breast augmentation. (This is not within the
purview of Sec. 12, Article 7)
When we discussed Sec. 6, Article 7, we already discussed the privileges
given to the President and the Vice-President.
On the contrary, we have Sec. 13, Article 7 imposing some restrictions
on the President and Vice-President, including the Members of the
Cabinet, their assistants and deputies.
In that, among other things, the members of the so-called
Presidential family (President and Vice-President, including the
Members of the Cabinet, their assistants and deputies) are
prohibited, unless otherwise provided by the Constitution, from
holding any other office or employment.
Sec. 13, Article 7 does not contain any qualification as to what office
is that, suggesting, therefore, that the members of the Presidential
family are altogether prohibited from holding additional positions be it
in the government or in the private sector. It in this regard that the
limitation or restrictions imposed on the members of the Presidential
family differ from those imposed on the members of Congress.
Insofar as members of Congress are concerned, they are merely
prohibited from holding additional positions in the government (they
are not prohibited from holding additional positions from private
sectors). But this is not the rule as regards to the members of the
Presidential family, as they are prohibited altogether from holding
additional positions be it in the government or private sector, unless
otherwise provided by the Constitution.
o Such that in the case of the Vice-President, he/she may hold
additional positions as when the Vice-President is appointed
as a Member of the Cabinet pursuant to Sec. 3, par. 2,
Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution (falls under the exception).
o In the case of the Secretary of Justice, under Article 8 of the
1987 Constitution, he/she would also serve as ex officio
member of the Judicial and Bar Council (this is not prohibited
under Sec. 13, Article 7).

Not all additional positions which a public official or a member of the

Presidential family may hold is prohibited. This holds true if the
additional position is merely an extension of his primary office/duties,
as when a member of the Presidential family is designated to
perform additional functions.
o Just like in the case of the Secretary of Labor, he/she also
sits as a member of the Board of Directors of the Philippine
Economic Zone Authority (PEZA). This is not prohibited
under Sec. 13, Article 7 because the second position is
merely adjunct of the primary position being held by the
Secretary of Labor (which is merely a designated position).
o Similarly, in our jurisdiction, the Secretary of Transportation
and Communications sits also as an ex officio member of the
Board of Directors of the Philippine Ports Authority. (The
second position is merely a designated position, an added
function to be performed by the Secretary of Transportation
and Communications)
Under Sec. 13, Article 7, the Presidential family is likewise prohibited
from directly or indirectly practicing their profession.
o If a member of the Cabinet is a lawyer, he cannot practice
his profession as a lawyer. Unlike the members of the
Congress, where generally they are allowed to practice their
profession, except that where a member of Congress is a
lawyer, under Sec. 14, Article 6, he is prohibited from
personally appearing before the court, but he can sign
pleadings. As regards to members of Congress, they are not
altogether prohibited from practicing their profession. But as
regards to the members of the Presidential family, they are
altogether prohibited from practicing their profession, directly
or indirectly.
Likewise, the members of the Presidential families are prohibited
from engaging in any business.
o In this context, the restrictions imposed on them differ from
those imposed on Congress. Because under Sec. 12, Article
6, insofar as the members of Congress are concerned, they
are merely mandated to make a full disclosure of their
financial or business interests. The members of Congress
are not mandated to divest themselves of their financial
interests.
o But insofar as the members of the Presidential families, they
are mandated not to participate or not to have any business
interest.
But just like the members of Congress, the members of the
Presidential families, are altogether prohibited from having any
interest in any contract, privileges, or franchises granted by the

Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,

including government-owned or controlled corporations.
Far more important, Sec. 13, Article 7 prohibits what is known as
nepotism, in that it provides among others that the spouse of the
President and his relatives by affinity or consanguinity within the
fourth civil degree shall not be appointed as members of the various
Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as
Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of various
departments/bureaus or offices of the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.
o Take note that the restriction only applies only to any
appointment, such that if the spouse of the President is
elected to another office, then that is not covered by the
prohibition.

POWERS GIVEN TO THE PRESIDENT:

Military powers -> provided for under Sec. 18, Article 7 of the 1987
Constitution.
There, it is provided that the President of the Republic shall be the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
and he has the power to call out the AFP to suppress any lawless
violence, invasion, or rebellion.
o Even if the President has no military background, under Sec.
18, Article 7, he is the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP. This
is in furtherance of the provision under Sec. 3, Article 2
which provides that civilian authority is at all times over the
military.
o In the case of IBP vs. Zamora, we already learned that the
first sentence of Sec. 18, Article 7 deals with what is known
as the calling-out powers, meaning to say that the
President has the power to call out the AFP to suppress
lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. More or less,
according to the Supreme Court in this case, the President
has full discretionary powers to exercise the calling-out
powers.
Far more important, Sec. 18, Article 7 vests upon the President the
power to declare martial law and/or the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Habeas corpus is a special proceeding which is a remedy when a
person is illegally detained. Such that, a petition for habeas corpus is
to be filed so that the judge may issue a writ commanding the person
detaining somebody else to produce the warm body of the person so
detained. This is a remedy as against illegal detention and this is
governed by Rule 102 of the Rules of Court.
However, under Sec. 18, Article 7, what the President can suspend is
only the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The President cannot

prevent or suspend the filing of petitions for habeas corpus.

Likewise, the President cannot prevent/suspend the judge from
issuing the writ of habeas corpus if warranted. Only that, where the
President suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the
writ that the judge has issued may not be enforced in the meantime.
The President can only defer the enforcement of the writ by
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Martial law When the President declares martial law, he is not
given additional powers whatsoever. It is merely an act of informing
the public that he is already calling the AFP to prevent invasion or
rebellion, among others. But owing to our sad experience during the
time of Marcos, we cannot prevent ourselves but to fear whenever
there is declaration of martial law, although no new powers are given
to the President.
When the President declares martial law, such declaration need not
be effected throughout the Philippines. In that, the President may
only declare martial law effective on a particular area or part of the
Philippines, as what was obtained in the case of Declaration of
Martial Law in Maguindanao as in the aftermath of the Maguindanao
Massacre.
There are limitations imposed on the military powers of the
President, especially on his powers to declare martial law and/or
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Among other
things, such declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus may only be done when there is
invasion or rebellion and public safety requires it. In other words,
there are only two (2) grounds under which the President may
declare martial law:
1. When there is evasion or rebellion; and
2. Public safety requires it.
Another limitation imposed on these powers is that declaration of
martial law or suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus is only
good for sixty (60) days.
Another limitation imposed on these powers is that within 48 hours
following such declaration of martial law or suspension of the
privilege of habeas corpus, the President has to make a report to
Congress, either personally or in writing.
Congress is mandated to convene within 24 hours following such
declaration or suspension without need of call, because under Sec.
18, Article 7, Congress is given the power to revoke such declaration
of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus by
a vote of majority of all the members of Congress in joint session
assembled, voting jointly. Revocation by the Congress cannot be set
aside by the President. The President cannot veto the power of
Congress to revoke the declaration and/or suspension. But there is a
downside to this, because upon the initiative of the President by the

same number of votes, Congress may extend the effectivity of such

martial law or suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus and take
note that the Constitution does not prescribe a time limit for such
extension (until such time that the circumstances so warrant).
Far more important is that under Sec. 18, Article 7, the Supreme
Court is now vested with powers to review the sufficiency of the
factual basis for the declaration of martial law and/or suspension of
the privilege of habeas corpus upon a petition filed by any citizen. It
has to be decided within 30 days following the filing of such petition.
o Take note that in the past, there were conflicting decisions as
regards the power of the Supreme Court to review the
sufficiency or insufficiency of the factual basis for the
declaration of martial law, among others. . In the case of
Montenegro, the Supreme Court said that the Supreme
Court had no power to review the sufficiency of the factual
basis for the declaration of martial law. But in the case of
Lansang vs. Garcia, the Supreme Court ruled otherwise,
holding that it had the power, after all, to review factual basis
for the declaration of martial law. But in the subsequent
case, Garcia Padilla vs. Enrile, the Supreme Court reverted
its ruling in Montenegro case, contending that they had no
power to review the factual basis for the declaration of
martial law. But now, under Sec. 18, Article 7, it is clearly
stated therein that Supreme Court, after all, can now review
any petition filed by any citizen questioning the sufficiency or
insufficiency of factual basis for the declaration of martial law
and/or suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus. There
is now a relaxation on the rule of legal standing, in that any
such petition may be filed by any citizen, regardless if that
person or petitioner has not suffered any injury arising from
such declaration of martial law.
Sec. 18, Article 7 further provides that the declaration of martial law
will not suspend the efficacy or operation of the Constitution, much
less supplant the functioning of civil courts and/or legislative bodies.
It further provides that military courts, even during martial law, will
have no jurisdiction over the civilian, and that the declaration of
martial law does not carry with it the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus. There has to be a separate declaration
suspending the privilege of habeas corpus.
o So even during martial law, legislative bodies like Congress
and even local legislative bodies continue to function. They
cannot be dissolved by the President; after all, the President
is not given additional powers even during martial law.
o And what is important is that it is clearly provided now that
military courts, even during martial law, have no jurisdiction
over the civilian. Because in the past, during the time of

Marcos, military courts assumed jurisdiction over the civilian

as was ruled in the case of Aquino vs. Military Commission
No. 2. But in the case Olaguer vs. Military Commission No.
34, the Supreme Court decided that military tribunals would
have no jurisdiction over the civilians. But in the case of
Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff, the Supreme Court ruled that
pursuant to the military powers of the President, the
President can create military tribunals which could hear war
crimes, as was held in the case of Kuroda vs. Jalandoni.
Another limitation imposed on the powers of the President vested
under Sec. 18, Article 7 is that the suspension of the privilege of
habeas corpus applies only to persons judicially charged for rebellion
and/or any offenses inherent in or necessarily connected with
invasion.
o So even if there is declaration of suspension of the privilege
of habeas corpus and a person is arrested and charged for
murder, and he is illegally detained, then the suspension of
the privilege of habeas corpus would not be applicable.
Another limitation imposed on the powers of the President to declare
martial law and/or suspend the privilege of habeas corpus is that
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, persons who
are arrested should be judicially charged in court within three (3)
days following their arrest, otherwise they shall be released from
custody.
When the President declares martial law, persons suspected of
committing or participating in rebellion or invasion may be arrested
without a warrant because these offenses are considered as
continuing offenses, such that those guilty thereof, may be arrested
without a warrant of arrest because they may be considered as
having been arrested in flagrante delicto. But we have a requirement
under Sec. 18, Article 7, to the end that those arrested must be
judicially charged in court within three (3) days following their arrest,
otherwise they shall be released. And you may want to factor in the
provision under Sec. 13, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended, the right to bail is still guaranteed to the person, provided
that the offense is bailable.
Appointing powers of the President enshrined under Sec. 16, Article
7 of the 1987 Constitution.
Appointment is the process of selection made by (33:00 Consti
2)__________________ power of an individual who is to perform the
functions of an office. Generally, appointment may be categorized
into two:
o Permanent appointment is extended to a person who
possesses all the necessary qualifications, including the

requisite civil service eligibility, such that the person so

appointed enjoys what is known as security of tenure.
o Temporary appointment is extended to a person who
does not possess the necessary qualifications and/or the
requisite civil service eligibility, such that enjoy security of
tenure, in that he can be removed at will, even without
cause.
Designation vs. Appointment
o Appointment is a mode of filling up a vacant position in a
public office.
o Designation is the process of giving additional
duties/functions to a person or public officer who is already
appointed to an office.
o But there are instances whereby a person is merely
designated to perform a given office and he is to be
removed at will. In that context, there is similarity as
between designation and temporary appointment, in that
the person so appointed/designated may be removed at
will, without running afoul with what is known as security of
tenure.
The first sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7 provides, in essence, that
the President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. (Emphasis is made on the first sentence of Sec. 16).
Appointments which would need confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments:
o Appointments of heads of executive departments;
o Appointments of ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls;
o Appointments of the officers of the AFP from the rank of
colonel or naval captain;
o Appointments of officers whose appointments are vested in
the President by the Constitution and which would generally
need confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
(because there are also appointments which the President
may make pursuant to the 1987 Constitution but which
would not need confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments). (As regards to this category, the general
rule is that appointments of officials whose appointments are
vested in the President by the Constitution generally would
need confirmation by the Commission on Appointments)

Officials whom the President may appoint pursuant to

the Constitution and which appointments would need
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments:
Appointments of the Chairman and the Members of
the various Constitutional Commissions. Under
Article 9 of the 1987 Constitution, the appointment
of the Chairman and the Members of the various
Constitutional Commissions, like the Civil Service
Commission (CSC), Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), and Commission on Audit (COA),
would have to be made by the Presidents and such
appointments would need confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
Appointments of the regular members of the Judicial
and Bar Council (JBC) pursuant to Sec. 8, par. 2,
Article 8 of the 1987 Constitution. The regular
members of JBC include a representative coming
from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, a law
professor, a retired member or Justice of the
Supreme Court, and a member from the private
sector.
Appointment or previous appointment of sectoral
representatives pursuant to Sec. 7, Article 18 of the
1987 Constitution. (As was ruled in the case of
Quintos-Deles
vs.
Commission
on
Appointments, 177 SCRA 259)
o As an exception to the general rule (provision under the
1st sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7), there are positions which
would have to be filled up by the President, but which
appointments would not need confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments (because the Constitution
itself provides that these appointments would not need
confirmation):
Appointments by the President of the Justices of the
Supreme Court and the judges of the lower courts
pursuant to Sec. 9, Article 8 of the 1987
Constitution. Although these appointments are
vested to the President by the Constitution, but by
the express provision of Sec. 9, Article 8, said
appointments are exempted from the confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments.
Appointment of the Ombudsman and his Deputies
pursuant to Sec. 9, Article 11 of the 1987
Constitution.

Appointment of the Vice-President as a Member of

the Cabinet pursuant to Sec. 3, par. 2, Article 7 of
the 1987 Constitution.
The second sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7 further provides that the
President may also appoint other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, or those whom
he may be authorized by law to appoint. (No need of confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments)
o Appointments of Government officials whose appointments
are not otherwise provided by law;
Chairman or Commissioner of the Commission on
Human Rights. Sec. 17 of Article 13 of the 1987
Constitution created a Commission on Human
Rights, but it is silent as to who would appoint the
Chairman of CHR. Such that where the law is silent
or there is no law governing the appointment of the
Chairman/Commissioner of CHR, then pursuant to
the 2nd sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7, the President
can appoint the Chairman/Commissioner of CHR,
and any such appointment would not need
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
(As was ruled in the case of Bautista vs. Salonga,
172 SCRA 160)
o Appointment of officials whose appointments are vested in
the President by law (not by the Constitution, but by ordinary
law).
o Q: But what if the law vests upon the President the
appointing power of certain public officials and the law itself
requires that such appointment would need confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments? Would such appointment
need confirmation?
A: This was answered in the case of Calderon vs.
Carale, 208 SCRA 254. In that case, there was this
law, RA 6715 which amended the Labor Code,
providing for the appointments of the Commissioners
of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC). Under the Labor Code, as amended, the
President would have to appoint the Commissioners
of the NLRC. But the Labor Code itself, as amended,
provided that such appointment should be confirmed
by the Commission on Appointments. Calderon lost
the case before NLRC, and he questioned such
decision. It was invalid, according to him, because
the NLRC Commissioners were not confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, although appointed
by the President and the Labor Code required such

confirmation. But the Supreme Court ruled in the

NEGATIVE, because while the Labor Code itself
provided that the appointments of NLRC
Commissioners would need confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments, that requirement
would run counter to the provision under the 1st
sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7. Because as was ruled
in the case of Sarmiento vs. Mison, only those
appointments which would fall within the purview of
the 1st sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7 would need
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Any other appointments outside the scope of the 1st
sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7 would not need
confirmation. So, that law cannot amend the
provision under the 1st sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7
of the 1987 Constitution.
What is the significance of making a distinction between the
appointments made or to be made by the President pursuant to the
first sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7 vis--vis the second sentence of
Sec. 16, Article 7?
o As was ruled in the case of Sarmiento vs. Mison, the
appointments which the President may make pursuant to the
1st sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution,
would generally need confirmation or consent of the
Commission on Appointments. Whereas the appointments
which the President may make pursuant to the 2nd sentence
of Sec. 16, Article 7, would not need confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
Appointments may also be categorized as regular appointments
vis--vis ad-interim appointments.
Normally, the procedures/steps to be followed when it comes to
(regular) appointments made by the President:
1. Nomination. The President shall first nominate the person who
he wants to be appointed.
2. Confirmation. Such nomination would have to be confirmed by
the Commission on Appointments.
3. Commission. As soon as the nomination is confirmed, the
President will extend the appointment by the issuance of the
commission, which is the written appointment itself.
4. Acceptance. Acceptance by the person appointed, because
otherwise, no person may be compelled to render service. It
would amount to involuntary servitude.
o These steps would have to be followed when the President
would make appointments while Congress is in session.
Because under Sec. 19, Article 6, while Congress is in
session, the Commission on Appointments is likewise in

session. Where Congress is in recess, it follows just as

clearly that the Commission on Appointments is also in
recess. Where that happens, the President can still make an
appointment. This appointment is called ad-interim
appointment.
Q: Is ad-interim appointment valid?
o A: YES. Any ad-interim appointment made by the President
while Congress is in recess is valid until disapproved by the
Commission on Appointments once it already reconvenes or
when it is not acted upon favorably by the Commission on
Appointments until the adjournment of Congress (in that
case, the ad-interim appointment is deemed bypassed
53:16)
Regular appointment vs. Ad-interim appointment (Distinctions)
o Regular appointment is made while Congress is in session.
Whereas ad-interim appointment is made by the President
while Congress is in recess.
o In regular appointment, the confirmation is made way ahead
of the appointment. But in ad-interim appointment, the
appointment is made way ahead of the confirmation by the
Commission on Appointment.
o In regular appointment, once it is confirmed, then it shall
continue until the expiration of the term of the appointed
official, if a term is fixed by law. Whereas in respect to adinterim appointment, the same is valid until disapproved by
Congress or until the next adjournment of Congress, if the
same is not favorably acted upon.
Q: What will happen if the President makes an ad-interim
appointment while Congress is in recess and the same is bypassed
when the Commission on Appointments reconvenes? 54:40
o A: If the President makes an ad-interim appointment while
Congress is in recess, and the same is disapproved, the
appointed would no longer serve office. But if it is bypassed
or not acted upon and Congress adjourns, then he shall only
serve office until _55:14_________.
Assuming the President makes an ad-interim appointment while
Congress is in recess and the Commission on Appointments did not
approve nor disapprove. Then the official will only serve until
_55:39__________. Q: May he be re-appointed by the President
(?)?
o A: YES, after all the ad-interim appointment was not
disapproved. There was no decision made by the
Commission on Appointments. As was ruled in the case of
Matibag vs. Benipayo, GR No. 149036, April 2, 2002, the
person may be re-appointed by the President. After all the

appointment was not disapproved by the Commission on

Appointments.
Q: How about if the ad-interim appointment is disapproved by the
Commission on Appointments? May he be re-appointed to the same
position?
o A: NO, because there was already a disapproval. There was
already a decision that was made by the Commission on
Appointments. So that person, if his appointment is
disapproved, then he may not be re-appointed to the same
position. But he may be re-appointed to another position. He
may not be qualified to that position, but it does not follow
that he is disqualified to hold another position.
Instead of making or extending ad-interim appointment, the
President extends appointment of officials in an acting capacity (not
permanent capacity). Q: May the President appoint officials or
Cabinet officials in acting capacities? Is that allowed in our
jurisdiction?
o A: The answer is in the AFFIRMATIVE as was ruled in the
case of Pimentel vs. Ermita, GR No. 164978, October 13,
2005. The President may extend appointments of officials in
acting capacities, and that is perfectly allowed in our
jurisdiction.

Limitations imposed in the Appointing Powers of the President:

1. The provision imposed under Sec. 13, Article 7 dealing with
nepotism. He cannot appoint his spouse and relatives within the
fourth civil degree consanguinity or affinity.
2. The provision under Sec. 14, Article 7 which provides that the
appointments made by the Acting President shall remain valid,
unless revoked by the President within ninety (90 days) from his
assumption or re-assumption of office.
3. The provision under Sec. 15, Article 7 which provides that two (2)
months immediately before the next presidential elections and until
the expiration of his term, the Acting President or the President shall
not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein would prejudice public
service or endanger public safety. 1:00:40

October 14, 2014 (Ator)

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Section 1 Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that judicial power
shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as they be
created by law. Proceeding from that provision, we can safely reduce that
there is only 1 court that is created by the Constitution. And that is off course
the Supreme Court. Whereas the lower courts, are merely created by law in
that context we can say that they only Constitutional Court the one that is
being created under the Constitution is the SC and the other courts or the
lower courts are merely statutory courts. Statutory in the sense that they are
mere creatures of Congress. They are mere creatures of legislation as may
be enacted by Congress. And when you talk other courts, Im not referring to
the courts that you have in mind what I know is off course the CA, the
Sandiganbayan, the court of Camp Appeals, the CAS Appeals, the Regional
Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trials Courts in Cities,
Municipal Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. These are the lower
courts and you may want also to include Ceria Courts and Muslim. So when
you talk about other courts and lower courts, we are referring to these courts
other than SC which is created off course pursuant to the 1987 Constitution.
And when these provisions implied, that we can therefore say the hierarchy
of courts, the SC is the highest Court of the land and there is only one SC
that is why in the case of Vargas vs. Riorasa our SC is struck down the
provision under Section 20 of people courts act creating a special Court of
special SC to try collaboration cases because under Section 20 of peoples
Court Act, those justices of the SC in trying in collaboration cases would have
to inhibit during they were serving office during the Japanese occupation.
And there stand the President of the Republic was given the power to
appoint and ad-hoc members of the SC coming from CA and RTC. So it
would appeal, that here will be 2 SC the regular SC which could have tried
and decide ordinary cases and ad-hoc SC which would try collaboration
cases. For the reason that there is only 1 SC, in the case of Vargas vs.
Riorasa the SC struck down particular provisions under Section 20 of the
PEOPLEs COURTS ACT. Do you recall the commercial of Sharon Selecta
ayaw ko yong number 1 , Number 2 ang gusto ko the only 1. The SC is like
that there shall only be 1 Supreme Court. Now let us now proceed to the
qualifications of the members of the SC but before that you should bear in
mind, that there are now 15 Justices of the SC. We have 1 Chief Justice 4
Associated Justices of the SC and the SC shall be visited en-banc anytime
and its discretion it may set in Judicial 3, 5 and 7 members. And for the

members of the SC it is a requirement that they must be Natural Born

Filipinos. This is a requirement under Section VII, Paragraph 1 Article VII
1987 Constitution, providing among others that the Justices of the SC as well
Judges and Justices of the collegiate Courts. Like the Court of Appeals and
the Sandiganbayan should be Natural born Filipinos. And in so far as the
member of the SC, there is an additional requirement that they must be at
least 40 years old. So Atty. Torregosa is qualified to be a Justice in the SC.
So they must be at least 40 years old and they must be 15 years or more a
Judge on the lower court or must be engage in the practice of law. You recall
the case of Cayetano vs. Monsoon how did the SC define the practice of
law? Any activity which would involve off course the application of law and
Im going with the dissenting opinion by Justice Cruz when he said, that only
possible exception of the ponencia decision in that case is a lawyer who
notarized his income. There is hardly any activities who did not involve in the
practice of law or the application of law. If they would not pay on their
practices then they can be sue as estafa. So there is hardly any activity that
would involve in application of law and precisely in that context I say that the
dissenting opinion of Justice Cruz in that case of Cayetano vs. Monsoon is
sound. And what are the qualifications of the other members of the collegiate
Courts, CA and the Sandiganbayan. As required in Section VII, paragraph 1
of Article VIII they should be Natural born Filipinos and Congress may want
to provide for additional qualification. Then as for the Judges of the lower
courts, other than collegiate courts, RTC, MTC, MTCC among others
Congress is given the power to provide for their qualifications but there is a
minimum qualification that a Judge should be a Citizen of the Philippines and
the additional requirement that he should be member of the Philippines BAR.
So in other words, Judges on the lower courts other than collegiate courts
may not be natural born Filipino that it is enough that they are Citizens of the
Philippines. But as regards to the Justices of the SC and the Justices of the
other collegiate courts it is a requirement that they should be Natural Born
Filipinos. For the Justices of the SC it a requirement that they should be at
least engage in the practice of law for 15 years or more or a Judge of the
lower courts. But for one who wants to be become a Judge of the MTC it is
enough that he has been engage in the practice of law for 5 years and for the
Justices of the RTC it is enough that they must have been engage of
practice of law for a period of at least 10 years. But for the SC requirements
is 15 years or more as a Judge in the lower courts or 15 years or more in the
practice of law. And more important we have an additional requirement under
the 3rd paragraph of Section VII of Article VIII, provided to the end that
members of the Judiciary the Justices of the SC and the Judges of the lower
courts should be of proven in probity, competence, independence and

Integrity. But we do not know if this requirement is strictly followed. And you
take note under Section 9 Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution the Justices of
the SC and the Judges of lower courts are to be appointed by the President
of the Philippines from at least 3 nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar
Council for every vacancy. So for every vacant position in the Judiciary there
should be short list. Containing at least 3 nominees and this place has to be
prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council. And far more important, Section 9
of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that appointments of the
Justices of the SC and Judges of the lower courts as thus may made by the
President is exempt from the confirmation requirement by the Commission of
Appointment. And this is precisely to ensure the independence of the
Judiciary. So appointments of the Justices and Judges of the lower courts
would not need any conformation by Commission on Appointments. But you
have to take in consideration; the last sentence of the Section 4, paragraph 1
of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which provides that vacancy in the SC
should be filled up within 3 months from the occurrence thereof. Then the 2 nd
paragraph of Section IX, Article VIII also provides that the President shall
make appointments for Judges of the lower courts within 90 days from the
submission of the days. And ended of this bases that the SC in the case of
De Castro vs. JVC GR No. 191002 March 17, 2010 which where discuss
that our SC court upheld that it was valid the appointment of Chief Justice
Corona although it was failed within 2 months prior to the expiration of the
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo which ostensibly and exemption of the
SC under the provision imposed Section 15 of Article VII of the 1987
Constitution. But as we discuss earlier the ruling of the case in Corona is off
course contrary to the early pronouncement made by the SC in the case in
the matter of Valenzuela GR No. ____ Where the SC court said that
appointments in the Judiciary are no exception to the prohibition imposed
under Section XV, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution dealing with the
appointments power of the President. So it would appear that court that the
SC had already have abandoned the pronouncement in the case of Mateo
that it would now appear that the President may know appoint Justices in the
SC even within 2 months prior to the expiration of his/her terms of office. I
mentioned earlier that the President would have to appoint Justices of the SC
and Judges of the lower courts from the lease 3 nominees prepared by
Judicial and Bar Council. But what is this body called JBC (Judicial Body
Council) who are the members of this body? JBC has regular members and it
also has an ex-officio members. The ex-officio chairman of that body or
Council is the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the other ex-officio
members thereof our Secretary of Justice or representative of Congress.
Whereas the composing of the regular members of JBC off course are they

representative from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, a professor of law,

are retired Justice of the SC and the representative of the private sectors
which should be appointed by the President. And when we mentioned about
representation coming from Congress in the JBC this has already been
settled in the case of Chavez vs. JBC, Escudero and Tupas where in our
SC simply ruled that there shall only be one representative coming from
Congress. Because there was an issue as regards to misinterpretation in the
JBC from Congress, because in the past there were 2 representatives, 1
coming from the House of Rep. and the other one coming from the Senate.
But that was question by Chavez and Chavez was sustained by our SC in
the case that I mentioned. That in that according to the SC, that there should
only be one representation from the Congress because section 8, off course
paragraph 1 Article VIII of 1987 Constitution mentions only of a
representative from Congress as an ex-officio members of the Judicial and
Bar Council. As I mentioned earlier there shall me a regular members in the
JBC such us coming from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, professor of
law, retired Justice of the SC and a representative coming from private sector
who would be appointed by the President. The representative coming from
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines should serve office 4 years for law
professor shall serve from office for 3 years, the retired Justice of the SC
would serve office for 2 years and the one coming from the private sector
who will only be serving for 1 year. And they shall be appointed by the
President but this time around there has to be a confirmation by the
Commission of Appointments as provided for under section 8, paragraph 2
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. So judging from the composition of the
JBC you may observe that in the appointments of the Justices of the SC and
Judges of the lower courts there is still known as political influence. Why?
Diba we have our Secretary of Justice who is the ex-officio members of the
JBC and we have also a representative of Congress which no doubt is a
politician, and we have the regular members of the JBC who are all
appointed by the President. In fact, the terms of office in the regular member
of the JBC are unlimited that they may be re-appointed by the President. So
in the regard we can now for say that the appointment/appointments of
Justices of the SC and Judges of the lower courts are not totally devoid of
any political influence. So probably if you will become a member of CONCON
or member of Congress that you want to propose and amendment of this
particular provision. Provided that member of JBC would not have to
appointed or its members shall be appointed by the President. Well it is
enough perhaps, that the Justices of the SC would be appointed by the
President for at least nominees submitted by the JBC. That is to ensure what
is known as Checks and Balances but my personal opinion as regards to

the appointments of Judges of the lower courts it is better to live this task to
the Supreme Court. Because what is happening is that you cannot be
appointed as a Judge of the lower court without any political company. Even
if your name is already included on the short list you will not be appointed by
the President, if your nomination is not patch up by your Congressman. So it
is disregards that there should be an amendment to these particular
selections of process as regards to the appointments of Judges of the lower
courts to ensure, the JBC and independence of Judicial. Any wants of you
want to become a Congressman and may amend and propose the
Constitution. But what is the term of office of the Judicial? Is there any
particular limit? You take note that under section XI of Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution that members of the judiciary, the Justices of the SC and Judges
of lower courts are given what is known as security of tenure. And that they
shall serve off course until good behavior or until they shall have reach the
age of 70 which is regarded as mandatory act of paid or until such time that
they shall become incapacitated to perform their duties and functions. Such
as that a Judge for example, is still 60 years old but he is already suffering
from Alzheimers disease or Parkinsons disease then, even he does not
reach the retirement age of 70 so he can now be ask to relinquished his
position because of the provision under section 11, Article VIII of the 1987
Philippine Constitution. And you take note Justices of the SC may only be
remove by impeachment pursuant to the provision under section 2, Article XI
of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. No doubt that the Justices of the SC are
appointed by the President, the President cannot rather terminated their
services that in under section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
the Justices of the SC may only be removed by impeachment. But how about
the Justices of the lower courts? They are appointment by the President
whether they may be removed by the President. The answer is No! Because
the second sentence section XI of Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution made it clear that only the Supreme Court en-banc has the
power to discipline Judges or to dismiss them from service by a vote of
majority of the members thereof who actually took part of the deliberation of
the issue at the case who actually participated thereof. What are the chances
of the lower courts are no doubt appointed by the President. The President
cannot remove them from service because it is only the SC which is vested
the power to discipline or remote chances the Judges of the lower courts.
And the special Judges to be would have be off course voted by majority of
the members of the SC who actually deliberated on the issue took part on the
issue and who actually voted thereon. So Judges of the lower courts cannot
be removed from service by the President. In fact in the case of Fuentes vs.
office of the Ombudsman the SC ruled that the Ombudsman has no power

to investigate the Judges of the lower courts because it is only the SC which
is vested with the power to investigate, discipline and removed Judges of the
lower courts pursuant to section XI, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. But
how about there is a law the organizing the Judiciary may the Judges of the
lower courts be removed? As when Congress enacts a law providing for the
re-organization of the judicial resulting to the abolition of some palace and
Courts. Is this valid? Is this function of our jurisdiction? There were decisions
in the cases of Ocampo vs. Secretary of Justice and in the case of
Delaliana vs. Alba where in our Supreme Court has validly rule that, reorganization in the judiciary resulting in the abolition of the offices and palace
and some other lower courts would not be violative or what is known as
security of tenure. Because in those cases our SC ruled when you talk about
security of tenure presupposed an existence of office/offices. Such as that
where the offices our abolished then there is no security of tenure to speak
of. That was the ruling in the cases of Ocampo vs. Secretary of Justice and
in the case of Delaliana vs. Alba. But the applicability of the doctrine stated
on those cases is already doubtful. Because under the second paragraph,
Section 2 Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, there is now an expressed
provision to the end that no law shall be pass or re-organize to the judiciary if
it will undermine the security of tenure of its members. So it would now
appear, that any re-organization law which would result in the abolition
offices or palace of courts may already been attacked as invalid. The said
may be attacked as invalid, because of the expressed prohibition imposed
under the second paragraph of section 2, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
which is why I said that the doctrine that was stated in those cases in
Ocampo vs. Secretary of Justice and in the case of Delaliana vs. Alba is
of doubtful of recovery. In view of this expressed provision under the second
paragraph of section 2, Article VIII. Let us know proceed to the powers of
Judicial. We have that already in our discussion in judicial review that we
already learned that courts of law including the SC are vested with other
known as power of judicial review which is rather a component of judicial
power. Because the 2nd paragraph of section 1, Article VIII provides that
judicial power enclosed the duty of courts of law to settle actual controversy
involves rights which is formally enforceable, demandable and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction or any branch instrumentality of the government. So
no doubt, the SC and even lower courts are vested power also known as
judicial review. NOTE: we have already thoroughly discussed this judicial
review on our first week of class and its 4 requisites as well. And you have to
take its consideration also the provision of section 5, paragraph 1 of Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution which vests upon the SC or regional jurisdiction

over the cases enumerated therein. So other known as this power of judicial
review the SC is also vested under section 5, paragraph 1 Article VIII with
original jurisdiction involving cases which is affected by ambassadors, other
public ministers, consuls and over petitions of certiorari mandamus
prohibition, quo-warranto and habeas corpus. I say that the jurisdiction of the
SC involving these cases is original in the sense that petitions pertaining to
this cases may be file directly with the SC which is why it said that the
jurisdiction of the cases mentioned therein or under section 5, paragraph 1
Article VIII is exclusive. When you talk about jurisdiction it refers about the
authority of the court to take cognizance of the case. Original in the sense
that petitions pertaining to the cases mentioned therein maybe file directly
with the SC. But you take note as regards to the jurisdiction of the SC over
petitions of certiorari, mandamus prohibition, quo-warranto and habeas
corpus its jurisdiction is concurrent with lower courts like the CA and
Regional Trial Court.
OCTOBER 14, 2014 (Inez)
As regards to the jurisdiction of Supreme Court over petitions for
certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, its
jurisdiction is concurrent with lower courts like the Court of Appeals and
the Regional Trial Court. Due to the paramount importance of the case,
the abovementioned petitions may be filed directly with the Supreme
Court, but the Supreme Courts jurisdiction over such petitions is
concurrent or shared with CA and RTC.
Certiorari -> governed by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, wherein the
respondents are said to have acted beyond the ambit of their given
authority or that they acted with grave abuse of discretion.
Prohibition -> a petition governed by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
wherein the petitioner seeks to prohibit the performance of an act
which is patently illegal.
Mandamus -> the opposite of prohibition, wherein one compels the
performance of an act which ought to be performed by the
respondents.
Quo warranto -> involves claims pertaining to an office or position.
This may be an action that may be filed against a corporation for
abusing its charter.
Habeas corpus -> (as discussed in the powers of the President to
declare martial law and to suspend the writ of privilege of habeas
corpus)
The jurisdiction or authority conferred upon the Supreme Court pursuant
to Sec. 5, par. 1, Article 8 pertains to its original jurisdiction. Because

the subsequent paragraph thereof (Sec. 5, par. 2, Article 8), pertains to

the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Appellate in the sense
that the cases may originate from the lower courts, only that the
decisions of the lower courts may be reviewed by the Supreme Court,
being the final arbiter of these rules.
Sec. 5, par. 2, Article 8 vests upon the Supreme Court the power to
review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law
or the Rules of Court may provide, final decisions or orders of the lower
courts in the cases enumerated therein. The cases over which the
Supreme Court may exercise its appellate jurisdiction are as follows:
a. All cases wherein the validity of a treaty, international agreement,
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation,
orders, instructions, ordinances, or other regulations is in
issue/question. (In the case of Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, this was the legal basis that was cited by the Supreme
Court in stating that after all lower courts are equally covered by
what is known as judicial review. Only the decisions of the lower
courts may still be reviewed by the Supreme Court in the
exercise of the Supreme Courts appellate jurisdiction.)
b. All cases decided by the lower courts involving the validity or
legality of a tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty
imposed in relation thereto.
c. All cases wherein the jurisdiction of any lower court is in
question.
o Meaning to say, you are questioning the jurisdiction of
MTC over cases that are comissible by the RTC. These
matters may be brought to the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court.
d. All criminal cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua or higher.
o What is to be factored in is not the imposable penalty,
but the penalty that is actually imposed on the accused,
such that if the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or
higher, then this case come within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Take note that under
Sec. 3, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, where what is
imposed on the accused in a criminal case is reclusion
perpetua, then the accused has to file a notice of appeal
and such case shall be heard first by the Court of
Appeals.
o But where what is imposed is death penalty (supposing
that it is reinstated), there is automatic review of such
case, this time, not by the Supreme Court, but by the
Court of Appeals. Automatic review, in the sense that the
accused need not file a notice of appeal. A notice of

appeal is required only in criminal cases where the

imposable penalty is below death penalty. Otherwise, if
the accused, in a criminal case, does not file a notice of
appeal, then the conviction would already become final
and executory. But where what is imposed on the
accused is death penalty, there is automatic review (no
need to file notice of appeal).
But in the past, before the amendment of Sec.3(d) of
Rule 122, automatic review of criminal cases where the
penalty imposed is death should be done by the
Supreme Court. But in the case of People vs. Mateo,
GR No. 147678, July 7, 2004, the Supreme Court said
that any such criminal case must be reviewed first by the
Court of Appeals. (The accused has 2 chances at
obtaining a reversal of the conviction: 1] by the Court of
Appeals; and 2] by the Supreme Court.)
Pursuant to the ruling in the case of People vs. Mateo,
Sec. 3(d) of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court has already
been amended, in that automatic review of criminal
cases where the penalty imposed is death, should be
done first by the Court of Appeals, not necessarily by the
Supreme Court.

e. All cases where what is involved is purely a question of law.

o Appeal should be filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court
o Where what you are appealing involves a mix question
of fact and law, then appeal must be brought not with the
Supreme Court, but with the Court of Appeals. Because
only appeals where what is of issue is purely a question
of law, should be brought to the Supreme Court pursuant
to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Sec. 5, par. 2, subparagraphs a to e, Article 8 governs what is known
as appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Whereas Sec. 5, par.
1, Article 8 pertains to the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
Appeal, as a recourse, is not a matter of constitutional right. Appeal
is generally regarded as a statutory right, in that where Congress
provides that a decision would already become final and executory
without need of further review, then the said decision would
eventually become final and executory.
Insofar as those cases falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, Congress, however, is powerless to deprive the
Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over the cases enumerated under
Sec. 5, par. 2 & 1, as well as the other provisions or subparagraphs
of Sec. 5, Article 8.

Because we have a provision under Sec. 2, par. 1, Article 8

provided to the end that Congress has the power to define,
prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts, but it may
not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases
enumerated under Sec. 5, Article 8 of the 1987 Constitution
(because these cases are beyond the ambit of the powers of
Congress).
In fact, there is a provision under Sec. 30, Article 6 which provides
in essence that the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may
be increased, but such may be done with the prior consent or
concurrence of the Supreme Court. So if the Court of Appeals may
want to increase the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it
can do that but it has to ask prior consent and concurrence of the
Supreme Court. Without which, any such increase in the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is invalid.
A case in point is the case of Fabian vs. Desierto, GR no. 129742,
Sept. 16, 1998, where under Sec. 27 of RA 6770, otherwise known
as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in recent cases may be appealed further to the
Supreme Court under Rule 45. In this case, the Supreme Court
struck down that particular remedy because according to the
Supreme Court, it had the effect of increasing the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and such was done without the
prior consent or concurrence of the Supreme Court. It was not
consulted by Congress when Congress enacted Sec. 27 of RA 6770.
That only bolsters fact that if Congress would want to increase the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it has to ask the prior
consent or concurrence of the Supreme Court.

Under Sec. 5, par. 3. Article 8 ,the Supreme Court is vested with the
power to temporary assign judges to other places/stations of jurisdiction,
and provided however, that where such temporary assignment of judges
would exceed 6 (six) months, it needs the consent of the judges
concerned (the consent of the judges affected would have to be secured
by the Supreme Court).
Under Sec. 5, par. 4, Article 8, the Supreme Court is given the power to
change the venue or place of trial of cases, and that is to ensure an
orderly administration of justice.
Venue in criminal cases is jurisdictional, such that if the offense is
committed in Cebu City, trial of the case must be done in Cebu City.
But under Sec. 5, par. 4, the Supreme Court (and only the Supreme
Court) can transfer the venue of the trial of the cases involving
criminal cases, as well as civil cases. Because there are times
wherein the witnesses are afraid to come out if the case would have
to be tried in the place where the offense is committed. (Example is

the murder of a radio personality in Pagadian City. The case

happened in Pagadian City but was tried in Cebu City because the
witnesses were afraid to come out of the open. Upon request, the
Supreme Court ordered a change of venue.)
The Supreme Court, under Sec. 5, par. 5, Article 8, is vested with what is
known as rule-making power.
There, it is provided that the Supreme Court has the power to
prescribe rules for the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleadings, practice, procedures in all courts, as well as
admission to the practice of law or the Integrated Bar, and including
legal assistance to the underprivileged. That explains why it is only
the Supreme Court which would administer the Bar examination. (If
the Supreme Court does not want to hold Bar exams in Cebu City,
we cannot complain. You cannot go to Congress because it is only
the Supreme Court who is vested the power to prescribe rules for
admission to the practice of law.)
Pursuant to the rule-making power of the Supreme Court, it is the
Supreme Court which ordains what is known as the Rules of Court.
And pursuant to the rule-making power of the Supreme Court, the
Supreme Court what is known as the writ of amparo and the writ of
habeas data.
o Writ of amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, took effect on Oct.
24, 2007) -> This is of Mexican origin. This is a remedy
involving the desamperados or those who are politically
detained or those forced disappearances. Its difference with
the writ of habeas corpus is that in the latter, once the judge
issues the writ, but in enforcing the writ, the respondent
denies having custody of the person subject matter of the
writ of habeas corpus, then thats the end of the case, so the
writ may be returned to the court. In writ of amparo, the
judge, if the respondent denies having taken custody
another person, the judge may further issue or direct
normally the police officers to look/search for the missing
body of the person. But the writ of amparo, is normally
available only in forced disappearances, normally when the
respondents are officers of the government, especially police
enforcement agencies.
o Writ of habeas data (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, dated Feb. 2,
2008) -> This is a writ which may be availed of if you think
that your right to privacy is already being threatened by any
government agency (e.g. Ones movement is monitored,
surveillance cameras were installed in ones house) or your
co-respondents are being seized.

The rules on writ of amparo and writ of habeas data are

enacted by the Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-making
power enshrined under Sec. 5, par. 5, Article 8.
There are limitations imposed on the rule-making power of the
Supreme Court. In that, among others, it is required that any such
rules should be uniform for all courts belonging to the same grade,
and that any such rules should not diminish, impair, modify, or
increase substantive rights.
o That is why in the case of _49:19 Consti 3_______ vs.
Fructuoso, there was this case wherein the litigants asked
for a hearing by an assessor, that was pursuant to the
provision under Revised Charter of Manila. But the judge
denied such request because under the Rules of Court,
there is no such thing as trial by assessors. But the Supreme
Court, in that case, ruled that that was a substantive right,
such that the same may not be denied from a party litigant.
Because after all, the rule-making power of the Supreme
Court should not modify, diminish, or increase substantive
rights. It should only govern procedural matters.
Q: But what is your observation regarding the
Supreme Courts circular mandating judges to just
impose the penalty of fine in case of conviction in
__50:14 Consti 3_______ cases? Under __50:18
Consti 3_______, the judge may impose penalty of
imprisonment. But the Supreme Court came up with
a circular requiring judges to impose the penalty of
fine, instead of imprisonment, except where the
offender is a habitual offender or a recidivist, among
others. Does that not impair vested rights?
A: It would appear, but nobody questioned this
circular because that is favorable to the accused, but
it would impair vested rights insofar as the rights of
the private _50:56 Consti 3___________ parties.
Because take note that the Supreme Court cannot
modify, increase, or diminish substantive rights.
o

Sec. 5, par. 6, Article 8 -> empowers the Supreme Court to appoint the
officials and employees of the judiciary in accordance with Civil Service
Law.
It is not the President who would appoint the clerks or the other
personnel of the judiciary. They would have to be appointed by the
Supreme Court observing the rules and regulations of the Civil
Service Law.

 Sec. 6, Article 8 -> empowers the Supreme Court to have supervision

over all courts and the personnel thereof.
This provision has to be taken in tandem with Sec. 11 Article 8
vesting upon the Supreme Court the power to discipline and/or
remove judges.
Sec. 6 and Sec. 11 of Article 8 vests upon the Supreme Court the
power not only to supervise judges of the lower courts, but also to
discipline them and/or remove them from service if warranted. The
President cannot remove judges of the lower courts.
When we discussed Sec. 5, par. 1 & 2, Article 8, we mentioned that the
Supreme Court is vested with jurisdiction over cases: appellate
jurisdiction and original jurisdiction. But how does the Supreme Court
decide cases? What are cases that should be decided by the Supreme
Court en banc, meaning all the judges or justices thereof must
participate? Which cases may not be decided by the Supreme Court en
banc or which may only be decided by a division of the Supreme Court
(Because as it is now, we have three divisions of the Supreme Court
composed of five (5) members)?
These questions are answered under Sec. 4, par. 2, Article 8 of the
1987 Constitution, among others. In that, it is provided therein that
cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, or any such cases as may be decided by
the Supreme Court en banc pursuant to the Rules of Court, including
cases where the constitutionality, application, or operation of
presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances,
and other regulations, should be decided by the Supreme Court en
banc.
o These cases should be decided by the Supreme Court en
banc. Meaning to say, all the fifteen (15) justices of the
Supreme Court are generally required to deliberate on the
issue.
1:02:20

1:02:20 (Debb)
1. You take note however that Sec4(2) Art 8 provides that decisions of
the SC in those cases which should be heard En Banc may be had by
majority of the members of the SC who actually took part in the
deliberation in the issue in the case and who actually voted thereon, so it
is decide that all the 15 justices of the SC should deliberate on the issue.

2. But there are instances wherein not all the justices of the SC may be
able to participate as when, 1 for example is outside the country or
one is _1:03:04____ for example, and that is allowed,
3. Because what Sec4(2) Art8 requires is majority votes of the
members of the SC who actually took part in the deliberation of the
case and who actually voted thereon.
4.
a. As it is now we have 15 justices of the SC and for the SC En
Banc to validly conduct business, what is required is majority of
15 which is 8.
b. And what is majority of the quorum of 8? 5! So in other words a
vote of 5 members of the SC may be considered valid to dispose
of a case which has to be decided by the SC En Banc. Because
what is merely required is majority of the votes of the members
thereof who actually took part in the deliberation of the issue and
who actually voted thereon.
c. So a simple vote of 5 members of the SC may suffice to decide
the case which has to be decided En Banc.
4 Circumstances where a case would have to be decided by SC
En Banc (MOGAWAS SA EXAM)
1. But what would happen if there is a deadlock for example. VOTE
7-7-1 abstain, what would happen on the division? Theres a
division questioning the validity of the law.
o In that case under Sec7 of rule 56 of the
Rules of Court, the petition has to be
dismissed where there is a deadlock.
Those are the cases which among others should be decided by the
SC En Banc, conversely other cases not falling within the cases enumerated
on Se4(2) Art8, generally have to be decided by In Division of the SC.

But it is required therein that any such case which may heard by In
Division of the SC should be decided by majority of the votes of the
members who actually voted, members of the division, who actually
participated in the deliberation of the issue of the case and who
actually voted thereon.
But there is a caveat or a Proviso: In no case shall such decision
be reached without the concurrence of at least 3 members of
the division. (3 Divisions, composed of 5 members)
So if a case may be decided by a division, then the required
vote is majority of those who actually voted thereon, and who
actually took part in the deliberation of the case.
A. General rule: required vote is majority of those who actually voted
thereon, and who actually took part in the deliberation of the case
B. Added requirement: In no case shall such decision be reached
without the concurrence of at least 3 members of the division.

C. When the required concurrence of 3 members is not obtained then

the case should be decided already by the SC En Banc.
2. So if a case is referred to a division, and then the voting
thereon is 2-2-1 abstain, what could be the result? The case
will be referred En Banc. Generally, of course it has to be
decided by a division but the required vote is not obtained,
then in such situation the case would have to be referred to
and shall be decided by the SC En Banc. (another situation
where a case may be decided by SC En Banc)
3. And also where a case would involve an overturning of a
doctrinal precept, decide by the SC En Banc or a division
thereof, and then the case would have to be decided not by
In Division but by the SC En Banc. (another situation where
a case may be decided by SC En Banc)
4. And also cases involving dismissal of judges of the lower
courts would have to be decided by the SC En Banc
pursuant to Sec 11 Art 8.

The SC is indeed independent, in the sense that the judges of the

lower courts, justices of the SC, would have to be appointed by the
Pres. w/o the confirmation by the Comm. On Appointments, then the
SC may not be deprived of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in
Sec5 Art8.
Far more important there are still other provisions which ensure
the independence of the SC.
One such provision is Sec 10 Art 8, which provides that the salaries
of the members of the judiciary are fixed by law, and during their
continuance of their service or office, their salaries may not be
decreased.
And it is important to know that in the past, there were decisions that
were rendered by the SC ruling that the salaries of the Justices of
the SC and judges of the lower courts are exempted from
withholding tax. Because according to the SC in those cases:
Ocampo v Sec. of Justice, Perfecto v Mere and Endencia vs David.
The SC said that any such withholding of taxes will amount to in
diminution of the salaries of the judges and justices of the SC.
But in the later case: Nitafan vs Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
the SC had a 360 summersault. Because the salaries of the
President, VP and the salaries of the members of Congress were of
course not exempt from withholding taxes. That explains why Justice
Ingles cautioned the members of the CA from staging a protest
regarding the withholding of taxes of their allowances, precisely
Justice Ingles was referring to the ruling of the SC in the case of

Nitafan, after all their salaries are not exempt from Withholding
taxes.
Another provision which ensures the fiscal autonomy on the part of
the SC is Sec3 Art8, it is provided therein that the SC or Judiciary
enjoys financial/ fiscal autonomy. Fiscal Autonomy: that the Judiciary
has autonomy to raise its own sources of revenues, and this is in the
form of filing fees, docket fees, JDF etc., even if you file for a motion
for reconsideration, it be required to pay 100, additional 100 every
subsequent motion for reconsideration. And take note that filing fees
nowadays had already been increased by as much as 100%.
(judiciary enjoys its own fiscal autonomy, it can raise its own sources
of revenues)
Sc3 Art8 further provides that the appropriation for judiciary may not
be decreased by Congress below the amount that was appropriated
for the Judiciary for the previous year. So if the year are 2013-2014
and the judiciary are allotted are 2M, for the year 2014-2015 the
amount that should be allotted should not be lesser that amount,
because of the prohibition imposed under Sec3 Art8
Sec16 Art 8, the SC is mandated to submit a report to the Pres. and
to Congress within 30 days from the opening of the regular session
of Congress about its operations and activities, precisely, to guide
also the Pres. and the Congress in the preparation of the budget for
the judiciary.
Judiciary sometimes receives support from foreign government,
known as judicial reforms. We already have pilot courts, air
conditioned courts, unlike before.
Another provision which ensures autonomy of the SC or
independence of the SC is Sec12 Art 8, which provides that the
members of the Judiciary may not be designated to any agency
performing Quasi-judicial or Administrative functions. After all, the
main task of the Judiciary is to decide legal cases. That is the reason
why they cannot be designated to agencies performing Quasi-judicial
or Admin. Functions, otherwise they will also succumb to the
influence of the Pres. if they will allow such designation.

The requirements anent to rendition of decision by the SC and

lower courts:

Sec13 Art8, provides that conclusions of the SC in cases to be

decided by an En Banc or In Division, have to be reached by
consultation from among the members of the SC En Banc or In
Division before the case shall be raffled to a particular member
thereof for the writing of the opinion of the court. In other words
before a case is decided by the SC En Banc of In Division, there has

to be prior consultation first among the members of the SC En

Banc or In Division.
In other words the opinion or decision of the court normally, is written
by a judge or a justice, but that decision is written only after prior
consultations. Then there has to be a certification to be appended to
the decision, then that certification has to be signed by the Chief
Justice of the SC attested to the fact that prior consultations were
done prior to the writing of the opinion of the court.
o
Those who want to register their dissenting opinions or
separate concurring opinions may want to do it by writing
their own opinions also.
o But this attestation to be signed by the chief Justice of the
SC, attested the fact that prior consultation was had before
the writing of the opinion of the court is not necessary in
administrative cases to be decided by the SC. This is only
mandatory in respect to decisions in regular cases or
ordinary cases, not necessarily administrative cases.
Additional requirement, under Sec14 Art8, provided to the end of the
decision must distinctly set forth the facts and the law on which the
decision is based.
o So that if you want to file a Motion for Reconsideration
perhaps or an appeal where the decision is rendered by
lower courts, then you can assail or pinpoint the facts where
the court made an erroneous conclusion, as well as the laws
also/ the legal basis which you think are erroneous.
o Do not narrate all, what is required is there is a statement of
facts, there is more or less a summation of the facts or
arguments by each of the contending party.
In fact our own SC has this penchant of issuing Minute Resolution
(1 page decision) denying your petition for certiorari. Normally the
SC say that further scrutiny of the allegations in the petition, the court
finds no reversible error or grave abuse of discretion, and such
petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
Minute resolution is valid in our jurisdiction.
But when it comes to orders issued by lower courts: like an order
granting a motion for resetting or order turning the parties to file brief,
need it not contain the recital of facts and law, because after all its
just an interrogatory order, it not a decision on the merits. So that is
exempted on the requirement under Sec14.
And far more important we have the requirement under Sec15 Art8,
this prescribes the period for the revision of judgment. There it is
provided that In so far as the SC is concerned, then it is mandated to
resolve a case within 24 months from the time the same is submitted
for a decision, as for other Collegiate Courts like CA, it is mandated

to come up with a decision within 12 months and for the lower courts
3 months, reckoned from the day a case is submitted for a decision.
We can say that a case is submitted for a decision, if the last
pleadings required by the rules shall have been file already.
Normally, as regards to cases involving trial courts the last pleading
is the memorandum or the brief as may be required by the lower
courts. And take note that Sec15 Art8 is couched in mandatory
manner, decisions shall be rendered within 24 months, 12 months, 3
months as the case may be.
But on Marcelino v Cruz, these periods are merely directory and
not mandatory. Such that even after the lapse of the periods, the
courts concerned could still render a decision. However the judges of
the lower courts or Justice of the CA concerned may be subjected
to administrative liability.
The lapse would not invalidate the decision; it would not divest the
courts concerned of their jurisdiction over the case. And their salaries
may be withheld, and prohibited in hearing actual cases (somebody
else was designated by the SC to hear actual trial, and the judge
concerned is confined to chamber, because he was mandated to
dispose of the cases that were already ripe for decision).