Professional Documents
Culture Documents
ALAN S. BLINDER
ABSTRACT
Regressions explaning the wage rates of white males, black males, and
white females are used ta analyze the white-black wage differential among
men and the male-female wage differential among whites. A distinction is
drawn between reduced farm and structural wage equations, and bath
are estirnated. They are shawn to have very different implications for
analyzing the white-black and rnale-fernale wage differentials. When the
two sets of estimates are synthesized, they jointly imply that 70 percent of
the overall race differential and 100 percent of the overaU sex difIerentlal
are ultimately attributable ta discrimination of various sorts.
It is well known that, in the Amercan economy, whites earn much higher
wages than blacks and males eam substantially higher wages than females.
In view of the important role which inequality in wages plays in explaining
overall inequality of incames,1 iJ seems likely that the white-black and malefemale wage differentlals are major contributors ta the unequal distribution
of income in the United States. An understanding of these differentials,
therefore, is vitally important where quesons of incarne redistribution are
concerned.
The author s Assistant ProfessO! of Economies, Princeton University.
'"
1 owe a great deal to Robert E. HaU who fumished me with the data, assisted
wth camputational problems, and commented astutely on an earlier drait. l am
also indebted to Orley Ashenfelter, Yoram Ben-porath, Nicholas Barr, Ronald
Oaxaca, Ray Fair, A. P. Thirlwall, and a referee for ther he\pful comments.
Partial support under National Science Poundation Grant OS 32003X s gratefully acknowledged. [Manuscript received August 1972; accepted December
1972.}
Other research 1 have done suggests that roughly half of total incarne inequality,
as rneasured by the aini ratio, s attributable ta unequal wage rates. See [2J.
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in~
(1 )
Due to the sruaU samp!e sizes. no attempt was made to compare black males
with black fema!es or white females with black females.
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(3)
where the H 'superscript indicates the high-wage group (a1ways white males
in tbis study) and the L superscript indieates the low-wage group (alter~
nativdy, white females and black males in this study).
Given (2) and (3), it is a simple matter ta compute the portion of
the differential eXplained by the regression: I ; f3r Kr - I i f3;
and the
Xr
amount whieh is captured by the shift coefficient, f30 _ f3o. The latter is
typically attributed to discrimination (see, for example [14], ch. 5). How~
ever, we can carry our breakdown farther tban this. The explained part of
the differential COrnes from bath differences in the coefficients, f3f and f3;,
and differences in the average characteristics, J(H and XL. In particular:
(4) L...J,
"'.f3~xl!
- L...J1
""'"'.{3LX~=
'".{3H(XIf
_XL) + '".X L(f1'!_[3L)
1 1
1
1
L...J1
1
1
1
~1 1 1
1
Here the first sum is the value of the advantage in endowments possessed
by the high-wage group as evaluated by the high-wage group's wage equation. 3 The second sum is the difference between how ,the high-wage equation
would value the characteristics of the low-wage group and how the lowwage equati.on actually values them. For brevity, 1 shall say tharl: .the tint
sum is "attributable ta the endowments," while the second is "attributable
to the coefficients." Note that the latter sum, which exists only because the
3 Any such breakdown of wage differentials runs into obvious index-number problems. For example, 1 could equally we!l have evaluated the differences n endowments by using the low_wage equation, i.e., by calculating
L
-H
-L
=;f3H o
f3L0 +
~X~ (f3~-f3~)
1
~.(X~-X~)
1
(f1I!-f3.)
1
1
While we obviously cou!d label the first two terms as "attributable ta the coefficients," the interaction term has no obvious Interpretation. The breakdown
which 1 employ in the text, white in no sense theoretically "superior" to this, at
least has the advantage that each terrn has a ready economic interpretation.
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= pao
+ :I.. f3N:
1
X~1 - (PL0
2:.
f3L:1 X~)
=
1
-H
-L
I. flf(X; - Xi)
i
U
D
+U
For more details on the precise definitions of the variables employed here, and
a more thorough discussion of estimation problems, see the longer paper [11
upon which the present paper is based. It is available upon request.
5 For information on the survey techniques, collection, and processing of the
data, see [131.
6 For example, use of eamings data instead of wage rates can seriously bias esti_
mates of the real rates of rerum to education. Suppose, for example, that wages
depend on education and labor supply depends on wages. Then, estimating the
effect of education on e.afnngs will over- or underestimate the impact on wage.
rale.s according as the tabor supply curve is normal or backward-bending.
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The Michigan data have only a minimal advantage over ,the SEO in ,this
respect: ,the latter calculates the average wage eamed in the week previous
to the survey, while the fonner computes the average wage over the preceding year (1967). A more important advantage is that the Michigan data
provide a rich set of variables pertaining ta the individual's famiIy background. These enable us to estimate a meaningful reduced-fonn equation
which explains the wage rate ooly on the basis of characteristics which are
truly exogenous ta the individuai (such as his father's education). The SEO
is a much poorer source of family background data. 7 A third advantage of
the Michigan data is its superior treatment of union membership'-an important detenninant of earnlngs. The SEO follows Coosus procedures in
asking ouly Mngovernment workers whether or not they are members of a
union; thus govemment workers must be cither eliminated or treated as
nonrnembers. Since gnvernment employees generally earn higher wages
than private nonunion workers, the latter procedure would bias downward
the estimated union-nonunion differential. 8 The Michigan survey asked the
union membership question of every household head. Finally, the SRC
tape offers data on ,the length of time each individual has worked fOor his
present employer, thus giving us a direct measure of at least one part of the
individual's total work experience.
Of course, there are sorne seriaus shortcomings of these data as compared, say, with the SEO. Most important is the small sample size, which
makes the standard errors regrettably large in many cases. White the R 2 s
fram my wage equations are quite comparable to those obtained with the
SEO, the standard errars of individual coefficients are far larger. For this
reason the inierences drawn in Sections lU and IV are very tentative. 9
Pinally, the Michigan tape lacks information on the industry of employment, a variable often deemed ta be an important detenninanrt of wages. 10
To sharpen the estimates, 1 have selected a subsample from the SRC
tape for use in my wage regressions. First, ta elimina,te household heads
who may still be acquiring formaI education, 1 dropped from the sample aU
households whose heads we younger than age 25. Also dropped from
7
8
10
Recent work by Samuel BowJes suggests that this may be a serious omission, but
Bowles's work utili.zes income as the dependent variable. See [51.
My thanks ta Orley Ashenfelter for pointing this out ta me. This may be one
reason why the studies cited above 19, 4, 11, 10] ail find smaller union-nonunion
differentials than those reported here.
However, the procedures used to analyze the sex and race wage differentials
automatically give lower weight to the coefficients with larger standard errors.
Sa the analysis in Sections III and IV below may be more accurate than the
regression coefficients given in the Appendix.
Like many other data banks, the SRC panel study also lacks an ability variable.
However, some recent work by Gintis [7] and Griliches and Mason [8] suggests
that this may not be an important omission.
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consideration were hausehold heads who were neither black nar white or
wha did not work for money in 1967.
l have argued above that the proper dependent variable in equations
(2) and (3) is the hourly wage rateY But what of the independent variables? This, of course, depends on one's (tac~t or explLcit) madel of microeconomic wage determination. Most previous studies have been content to
list certain obvious oorrelates of wages and estimate the resulting regression
by ordinary least squares. But correlation does not imply causation, and if
we are interested in the latter, we ought to specify a more precise mode!.
The structural model whlch underlies the present study is the following:
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11 )
+ UI
+ U2
+ 14
+ U4
+ U5
+ U6
+ U7
where w is the hourly wage; Ed is a vector of six educational dummy variables; Dcc is a Set of eight dummes for occupation; J is a dummy for vocational training; M is 1 for members of unions and 0 otherwise; V is 1 for
veterans and 0 otherwisej T is a set of six dummies for tenure on the present
job; B is a set of 13 family-background variables; Z is a set of other exogenous variables; and t, g, h, k, l, m, and n are alllinear functions. In this
model, w, Ed, Dcc, I, M, V, and T are taken ,ta be endogenous, while B
and Z are exogenous. The elements of Z which enter the wage equation
with nonzero coefficients are age, health, residence, and local labor market
conditions.
While every reader can doubtless quarrel with some detail of this
specificatLon, the twQo most important features are relatively noncantroversial. Presumably, no one would wish ta exclude from the structural wage
equation any of the variables which 1 have inc1uded (though other investigators have added variables to the above list). The dichotomizatian of
variables intD endogenous and exagenous sets may quire sorne comment,
however, as it is rather novel in this context. In !/he intuitive model 1 have
in mind, each individual is presented with endowments nf hurnan and nonhuman capitals and at sorne point in his life-cycle, jointly decides how far
he wishes to pursue his formal education and ta what occupational strata he
aspires. Thus Ed and Occ, the two chief determinants of the wage rate, are
endogenous and simultaneously determined. This seems very much in the
11
Like most other nvestigators, 1 have actually used the natural logarithm of the
wage rate as the dependent variable.
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1 have presented and discussed the results of estimating equation (9), the equation for union membership, in [3].
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One question not considere.d in Section 1 was the choice of the control group.
For example, if a persan can fall into one of eight mutually exclusive and exhaustive occupational categories, then we have eght possible ways to choose
seven dummy variables to enter into the regression. My choices for the control
group are ail indicated in the Appendix. But a question arises as ta whether a
different choice of the control group would have altered my decompositions of
the wage differentials.
While it is difficult ta prove that this holds in an arbitrary regression using a
set of K qualitative variabLes with Ill(. classes in each, one can show that in the
simplest case of a single dichotomous classificatory variable, the choice of the
control group does not matter. Prao!: In this simple case, equations (2) and (3)
be.c.ome~
f3~ + f3~X~ +
(2')
(3')
Uf
y",
if group 2 is the control group. Under the alternative choice they WGuid be:
(2")
y~
,
(3")
My procedure is to divide the overaIl differential,
fi - f i
-L
yH _ l'L,
into
-fi-L
fi
f32
-fi
(X 2
-L
+ X 2; ;:;::.
1 for aIll we
And !rom the standard formula ror the estimated slope coefficients, we can show:
Sa Ez ;:;::. Et' and our dichotomization of the wage differential s the same for
either choCe or the control group.
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TABLE 1
STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF TH" WHITE-BLACK WAGE DlFFBRBNTIAL FOR MALES
Causal Factor
Age
Amount
Attributable
5.1%
-3.6
19.8
2.[
Aunount
Attributable
to
Endowments.
-0.7%
5.[
14.5
0.2
10.3
-0.4
0.5
-0.5
-0.[
0.5
0.3
0.7
AJnount
Attributable
to
Coefficients.
5.8%
-8.7
5.3
1.8
-8.9
-5.3
-2.5
-0.1
-0.6
0.5
-2.0
-36.9
C = -51.5%
Region of residence
Education
Vocational training
[A
Occupation
Union membership
-5.7
-2.0
Veteran status
-0.6
Healtb
-0.7
Local labor market conditions
Geographical mobility
0.9
Seasonal employment
-1.7
-36.2
Length of time on job
-21.1 %
Subtotal
E= +30.7%
Shift coefficient
u= +71.9%
Total
R= +50.8%
D = C U = 20.4%
Notes: A + sign indicates advantage for whites; a
sign ndicates advantage for
blacks. Components may not add ta totals due ta rounding.
sult is that the regression (ignoring the constant) actually accounts for a
21.1 percent differential in favo, of blacks. That is ta say, if black males
kept their current socioeconomic traits (including their less advantageus
distributions of education and occupation), and kept the same wage equatian as they now have but were given the shift coefficient nf the whites, they
would eam 21.1 percent more than white males. The .table also shows that
a 30.7 percent differential (about 60 percent of the total) can be attributed
to blacks' inferior endowments, in the sense that black wages would average
30.7 percent less than white wages if the former were given the entire white
wage equation. Closer examination reveals that the main reason why the
regression caUs for higher wages for blacks is that they gain more by having
seniority in their present jobs. The regression coeffidents in the Appendix
further show that just about all of this difference is accounted for by the
large gain in wages which accrues to black males from being in an occupation where tenure on .the job is applicable (as opposed to the self-employed
who were the control group). If this were ignored, :the regression (ignoring
the corutant) would predict a 15.8 percent advantage for whites, a rather
smaU difference.
Foremost among the factors contributing to the white maIe wage advantage is education, and the breakdown shows that most of this is due to
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the fact that whites have more education rather than to the hlgher rates of
return on education wbich whites also receive. The other main advantage
for white men is the more concave age-wage profile, a fact that bas been
noted in many studies of age-earnings profiles as we.Jl. Whites apparently
gain more than blacks from experience in the labor force, and therefore
they exhibit a more pronounced life-cycle pattern of wages.
Aside from tenure on the job, the most important factors favoring
black males are union membership and geographical distribution across
regions of the country. While blacks and whites are about equally likely ta
be union members, blacks gain much more from being in a union. The
regression coefficients show an average union-nonunion differenrtial of 39
percent for black males and 23 percent for white males. Bath of these are
larger than the ditferentials which have been estimated from the SEO (see
[9,4, Il, 10D. How much of tbis discrepancy is due to the superior data
on union membership (see above), how much is due ta omission of relevant variables fom the regression, and how much is due ta the absence of
interaction terms which allow the union-nonuruon ditferential to vary across
occupations 14 is an open question. However, the fact that Stafford's estimates [12], which used Survey Research Center data, are among the highest
obtained ta date lends SOrne credence ta the notion that differences in the
conceptual basis of the data may weIl he the reason for the high differentials.
As te the regional distribution, the fact that blacks are more heavily concentrated in the South (a disadvantage) s more than balanced by their
higher coefficients for each region (as compared ta the North Central
region which is the control group).
Interestingly, the distribution of workers across occupations-at least
at this relatively coarse levelof disaggregation--contributed oruy negligibly
ta the white-black differential. This would appear to fly in the face of casual
empirical observation, but in fact it does not. Decomposition of the meagre
1.4 percent occupational di:fferential in favor of whites reveals that the
superior white occupational distribution actually accounts for a substantial
10.3 percent wage advantage, most of which s neutralized by higher co14
Boskin [4], p. 470, suggests that ignonng the interactions between occupation
and union membership (Le., tuat unionnonunion differentia!s differ across occupations) resu!ts in a serious ove(eslimafe of the average unionnonunion differentia!. However, as Orley Mhenfeiter points out ta me, his reasoning 13 tlawed.
The figures in his Table 2 for union differentials in eaeh occupation ignore the
geographical area-union interactions which slso appear in his regressions. That
is, to his estimated uniannonunion differentials for eaeh occupation in Table 2
one shauld add the average (over an regions) of the union differential in that
occupation. That would (almost) always result in higher union differentials than
he presents. Indee.d, it is difficult ta see how a weighted average of the unionnonunion differentials (weighted by occupation) could differ much from the
overall average differentia! in the sample.
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TABLE 2
REDUCED l'ORM ANALYSIS OF THE WHITE-BLACK WAGE OlFFERENTlAL FOR MALES
Causal Factor
Age
Amount
Attributable
83,6%
Amouot
Attributable
to
Endowments
1.1%
8.8
0.5
Amouot
Attributable
to
Coefficients
84.7%
-9.6
5.1
8.7
16.9
-7.7
0.1
-6.6
3.9
-3.4
C = +92.2%
Regioo of residence
-0.8
Parents' incorne
5.6
Father's educaion
12.3
3.6
Place where grew up
-0.7
16.2
-6.6
Number of siblings
1.2
Health
-{J.9
-1.0
-6.4
Local labor market conditions
0.3
Geographical mobility
6.8
2.9
Seasonal employment
-2.5
0.8
Subtotal
E::::+15.2%
+107.4%
Shift coefficient
U:::: -56.7%
Total
R= +50.7%
D=C+U=35.5%
NOIes: A + sign indicates advantage for whites; a
sign indicates advantage for
blacks. Camponents May nat add to totals due ta rounding.
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Duncan [6], pp. 84 110. Specifically, his sarop1e was black versus nonblack males
aged 25-64 yeats who were in the experienced labor force and whose fathers
did not work on farms.
16 This groups "number of siblings" with the familybackground variables, as l do.
Duncan takes this to be an endogenous variable instead.
17 Of course, 1 have many exogenous variables aside from family background and
more endogenous variables than just education and occupation.
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TABLE 3
STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF THE MALE-FEMALE WAGE DlFFERENTiAL FOR WH/TES
Amount
Attributable
Amount
Attributable
Causal Factor
Ag,
87.5%
Region of residence
-0.9
Education
21.3
-3.5
Vocational training
-4.1
Occupation
Union membership
3.3
Veteran status
1.6
Health
2.0
Local Jabor market conditions
12.2
-0.9
Geographical mobility
Seasonal empLoyment
0.1
-4.7
Length of me on job
Subtotal
113.8%
Shift coefficient
U=-68.0%
Total
Note.s: A
R= 45.8%
Amount
Attributable
(0
(0
Endowments
0.2%
0.2
Coefficients
-0.4
-0.1
5.1
3.9
1.6
0.0
0.1
0.5
0.0
4.7
E = 15.7%
87.3%
-1.1
21.7
-3.4
-9.1
-{J.6
o
1.9
12.1
-1.3
0.1
-9.4
C=98.1%
D =C+ U= 30.1%
+ sign
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This last remark ought to be discounted heavily since our dummy variables are
very imperfect indices of local laboT market conditions.
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TABLE 4
RRDueED FORM ANALYSIS OF MALE-FEMALE WAGE DIFFERENTIAL FOR WHfTES
Amount
Amount
Attributable
Attributable
to
to
Coefficients
Endowments
1.0%
131.5%
4,4
0,4
-4.7
-0.7
-1.0
-8.5
-2.6
-12.2
-0.1
3.5
-0.1
0.6
15.5
0.0
2.S
1.3
0.1
0.6
E = -0.3%
c= 132.0%
Amount
Causal Factor
Attributable
Ag,
132.5%
Region of residence
4.S
Parents' income
-5.4
Father's education
-9.5
Place of birth
-14.8
3,4
Number of siblings
Health
0.6
Locallabor market conditions
15.5
Geographical mobility
4.1
0.6
Seasonal employment
Subtotal
131.7%
Shift coefficient
U= 86.2%
Total
R= 45.4%
D = C + U = 45.8%
Notes: A + sign indicates an advantage for males; a sign indicates an advantage
for femalell. Numbers may not add to totals due to rounding,
REFERENCES
1. A. S. Blinder. "Estimating a Micro Wage Equation: Pitfalls and Some Provisional Estimates." Princeton University Econometrie Research Program.
Research Memorandum No. 131, November 1971.
2. - - - . Towards an Economie Theory of Incarne Distribution. Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, forthcoming 1974.
3. - - - . "Who Joins Unions?" Princeton University Industrial Relations
Section, Working Paper No. 36, February 1972.
4. M. J. Boskin. "Unions and Relative Real Wages." American Economie Review 62 (June 1972): 466-72.
5. S. Bowles. "Schooling and Inequality frorn Generation to Generation."
Journal of Political Economy 80:2 (May-June 1972): S219-51.
6. O. D. Duncan. "Inheritance of Poverty or Inheritance of Race?" In On
Understanding Poverty, ed. D. P. Moynihan. New York: Basic Books, 1968.
7. H. Gints, "Education, Technology and the Characteristics of Worker Productivity." Amercan Economie Review 61 (May 1971): 269-79.
8. Z. Griliches and W. M. Mason. "Education, Incorne and Ability." Journal
of PoUtica/ Economy 80:2 (May-June 1972): S74-103.
9, R. E, Hall. "Wages, Incorne and Hours of Work in the V.S. Labor Force,"
In Labor Supply and Incame Maintenance, eds. G. Cain and H. Watts.
Chicago: Markham, 1973.
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451
10. M. D. Hurd. "Changes in Wage Rates Between 1959 and 1967." Review of
Economies and Statistics (May 1971): 189-99.
11. R. Oaxaca. "Sex Discrimination in Wages." In Discrimination in Labor
Markets, eds. O. Ashenfe1ter and A. Rees. Princeton, N.J.: Prnceton
University Press, forthcoming 1973.
12. F. Stafford. "Concentration and Labor Earnings: Comment." American
Economie Review 58 (March 1968): 174-80.
13. Survey Research Center, University of Michigan. A Panel Study of Incarne
Dynamics: Study Design, Procedures, Available Data: 1968-1970 Interviewing Years (Waves I-Ill). Ann Arbor: The Center, 1970.
14. L. C. Thurow. Poverty and Discrimination. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1969.
15. F. B. Weisskoff. "'Women's Place' in the Labor Market." American Economie Review 62 (May 1972): 161-66.
16. H. ZeUner. "Discrimination Against Women, Occupational Segregation and
the Relative Wage." American Economie Review 62 (May 1972): 157-160.
APPENDIX
Tables A-l and A-2Iist, respectively, the structural and reduced-form wage
regressions upon which the analysls in Sections III and IV is base<!. C0efficients are presented oruy for white males, black males, and white females.
Results from estima-ting wage equations for black females and for the
pooled sample, with race and sex entering as dummy variables only, are
reported in the expanded version of this paper. lll
19
TABLE A-1
(Standard Errors)
(Dependent Variable: Natural Log of Wage)
White
Black
Independent Variable
Males
MM"
Constant
4.86
4.14
(.20)
(.45)
.0271
.0296
Ag'
(.0078)
(.0195)
(Age) 2
-.00029
-.00038
(.00008)
(.00022)
Region
Northeast
.061
.144
(.038)
(.107)
North Central
0
0
STRUCTURAL COEFFICIENTS
White
Females
5.54
(.64)
-.0110
(.0240)
.00009
(.00026)
.109
(.108)
0
452
Black
Males
Females
South
-.107
(.038)
West
-,OIl
-.013
(.088)
.189
-.090
(.106)
-.006
(.042)
(.117)
(.113)
Law unemployment
-.024
High unemployment
.014
(.054)
-.168
(.097)
-,207
(.068)
.315
(.109)
-.246
(.031)
-,095
(.051)
,025
(.030)
.016
(.043 )
-.056
.032
(.100)
.230
(.162)
-.119
(.053)
-.081
(,038)
.004
(.103)
-.227
(.082)
.049
(,074)
-.183
(.131)
-.189
0
-,015
(.065)
.175
(.063 )
Independent Variable
White
Locallabor market
Low wage
.0lO
High wage
(.041)
.073
(,046)
GeographcaI mobility
Moved for job
Sick recently
Education
0-5 years
6-8 yeaTS
9-11 years
-.013
(.050)
Sorne college
College graduate
Advanced degree
Occupation
Professional. technical
(.151)
.231
(.122)
.203
(.136)
(,135)
-.030
(.140)
.084
(.040)
.155
(.042)
.212
(.059)
.164
(,070)
.110
(.075)
.012
(.115)
.136
(,259)
.248
(.323 )
0
.179
(,227)
,247
(.128)
.022
(,109)
.187
(,119)
-.109
(.180)
.241
(,218)
.049
(.053 )
.159
(.174)
(.332)
0
.075
(,065)
,133
(.043 )
12 years
(.070)
.088
(.083 )
(.098)
-.255
.130
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R'
s.e.
N
White
Males
Black
Males
White
Females
.124
(.049)
-.395
(.069)
-.085
(.049)
0
-.162
(.040)
-.333
(.053 )
-.719
(.076)
.228
(.032)
.029
(.028)
-.050
(.038)
.031
(.032)
.567
(.344)
-.019
(.214)
.011
(.115)
0
-.193
(.067)
-.123
(.067)
-1.051
(.213 )
.393
(.056)
.099
(.053)
.050
(.057)
-.069
(.061)
.133
(.354)
-.290
(.412)
-.024
(.305)
0
.014
(.309)
-.263
(.305)
0
-.085
(.065)
.025
(.069)
.020
(.060)
.056
(.045)
.078
(.041)
.081
(.044)
0
.393
(.139)
-.103
.122
(.089)
.020
(.073 )
-.001
(.068)
.082
(.081)
0
-.027
(.237)
.047
(.146)
-.075
(.129)
.189
(.119)
.024
(.[[0)
.125
(.151)
.498
.437
1239
.467
.466
467
.449
.465
[94
(.lO[)
.276
(.122)
-.055
(.107)
.147
(.085)
Note: Tne coefficients for education and tenure..on-the-job variables are increments
from advancing from one category ta the next higher one.
454
THE
JOURNAL
OF
HUMAN
RESOURCES
TABLE A-2
(Standard Errors)
(Dependent Variable; Natural Log of Wage)
Variable
Constant
Age
White
Males
Black
Males
White
Females
4.75
(.22)
.0427
5.32
(.45)
.0110
(.0200)
-.0002
(.0002)
5.62
(.59)
-.0160
(.0250)
.00014
(.00027)
.130
(.119)
-.007
(.117)
(.0093 )
(Age) 2
-.00047
(.00010)
Region
Northeast
.080
(.050)
North Central
South
w"',
Local tabor market
Low unemployment
-.205
(.065)
-.024
(.053)
-.099
.015
(.040)
(.101)
.198
(.124)
High unemployment
-.087
Low wage
(.060)
.18
(.050)
.150
(.060)
-.082
(.104)
-.226
(.077)
.159
(.057)
(.118)
Higb wage
Geographcal moblty
Moved for job
.134
-.109
(.074)
.059
(.053 )
(.088)
-.201
(.066)
-.176
(.048)
-.028
(.062)
-.136
(.046)
-.018
.144
(.036)
Refused to move for job
Health mpedments
Obvious disfigurement
Sorne work limitation
Sck recently
Seasonal employment
Siblings
Number if
.400
-.003
(.009)
(.111)
-.216
(.090)
-.018
(.080)
.032
(.063 )
.013
(.013)
o
-.235
(.158)
-.104
(.120)
-.249
(.102)
-.319
(.159)
.369
(.132)
.165
(.141 )
.034
(.105)
.218
(.167)
-.189
(.131)
-.231
(.138)
-.053
(.149)
-.177
(.110)
-.012
(.023 )
Blinder
455
R'
s.e.
N
White
Males
Black
Males
White
Females
-.071
(.059)
.050
(.074 )
-.153
(.157)
0
.090
(.055)
.163
(.067)
-.015
(.080)
-.143
(.095)
.228
(.125)
.082
(.176)
0
-.015
(.061)
-.055
(.125)
.109
(.171 )
.303
(.392)
.016
(0410)
0
.166
(.153)
.161
(.160)
-.012
(.186)
.178
(.244)
.282
(.276)
-.874
(.356)
-.012
(.036)
.060
(.054)
-.075
(.075 )
.033
(.107)
.136
(.092)
.041
(.111)
.045
(.059)
-.214
(.040)
.099
(.040)
-.177
(.090)
-.112
(.064)
-.017
C060)
.070
(.155)
.063
(.107)
.222
(.093 )
.200
.550
1239
.329
.516
467
.335
.500
194