1. Philippine British Assurance Co. Inc. vs. IAC [G.R. No. L-72005.

May 29, 1987]

FACTS:
[P]rivate respondent Sycwin Coating & Wires, Inc., filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money
against Varian Industrial Corporation before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. During the
pendency of the suit, private respondent succeeded in attaching some of the properties of Varian
Industrial Corporation upon the posting of a supersedeas bond. The latter in turn posted a counterbond
in the sum of P1,400,000.00 thru petitioner Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc., so the attached
properties were released. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Sycwin. Varian Industrial
Corporation appealed the decision to the respondent Court. Sycwin then filed a petition for execution
pending appeal against the properties of Varian in respondent Court. The respondent Court granted the
petition of Sycwin. Varian, thru its insurer and petitioner herein, raised the issue to the Supreme Court.
A temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from enforcing the order complaint of was
issued.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an order of execution pending appeal of any judgment maybe enforced on the
counterbond of the petitioner.
HELD:
YES. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit and the restraining order dissolved with costs against
petitioner.
RATIO:
It is well recognized rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Ubi
lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. The rule, founded on logic, is a corollary of the
principle that general words and phrases in a statute should ordinarily be accorded their natural and
general significance. The rule requires that a general term or phrase should not be reduced into parts
and one part distinguished from the other so as to justify its exclusion from the operation of the law. In
other words, there should be no distinction in the application of a statute where none is indicated. For
courts are not authorized to distinguish where the law makes no distinction. They should instead
administer the law not as they think it ought to be but as they find it and without regard to
consequences.
The rule therefore, is that the counterbond to lift attachment that is issued in accordance with the
provisions of Section 5, Rule 57, of the Rules of Court, shall be charged with the payment of any
judgment that is returned unsatisfied. It covers not only a final and executory judgment but also the
execution of a judgment pending appeal.

2. Banco de Oro Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Equitable Banking Corp. [G.R. No. 74917.
January 20, 1988]
24MAR
FACTS
Equitable Bank drew six crossed managers check payable to certain member establishments of Visa
Card. Subsequently, the checks were deposited with Banco De Oro (BDO) to the credit of its depositor.
Following normal procedures and after stamping at the back of the checks the usual
endorsements,BDOsent the checks for clearing through the Philippine Clearing House Corporation
(PCHC). Accordingly, Equitable Banking paid the checks; its clearing account was debited for the value
of the checks and BDOs clearing account was credited for the same amount. Thereafter, Equitable
Banking discovered that the endorsements appearing at the back of the checks and purporting to be
that of the payees were forged and/or unauthorized or otherwise belong to persons other than the
payees.Equitable Banking presented the checks directly to BDO for the purpose of claiming
reimbursement from the latter. However, BDO refused to accept such direct presentation and to
reimburse Equitable Banking for the value of the checks.
ISSUES
(a) Whether or not BDO is estopped from claiming that checks under consideration are non-negotiable
instruments.

(b) Whether or not BDO can escape liability by reasons of forgery.

(c) Whether or not only negotiable checks are within the jurisdiction of PCHC.

RULING
(a) YES. BDO having stamped its guarantee of all prior endorsements and/or lack of endorsements is
now estopped from claiming that the checks under consideration are not negotiable instruments. The
checks were accepted for deposit by the petitioner stamping thereon its guarantee, in order that it can
clear the said checks with the respondent bank. By such deliberate and positive attitude of the
petitioner it has for all legal intents and purposes treated the said cheeks as negotiable instruments
and accordingly assumed the warranty of the endorser when it stamped its guarantee of prior
endorsements at the back of the checks. It led the said respondent to believe that it was acting as
endorser of the checks and on the strength of this guarantee said respondent cleared the checks in
question and credited the account of the petitioner. Petitioner is now barred from taking an opposite
posture by claiming that the disputed checks are not negotiable instrument.
(b) NO. A commercial bank cannot escape the liability of an endorser of a check and which may turn
out to be a forged endorsement. Whenever any bank treats the signature at the back of the checks as
endorsements and thus logically guarantees the same as such there can be no doubt said bank has
considered the checks as negotiable.The collecting bank or last endorser generally suffers the loss
because it has the duty to ascertain the genuineness of all prior endorsements considering that the act
of presenting the check for payment to the drawee is an assertion that the party making the
presentment has done its duty to ascertain the genuineness of the endorsements.
(c) NO. PCHCs jurisdiction is not limited to negotiable checks only. The term check as used in the said
Articles of Incorporation of PCHC can only connote checks in general use in commercial and business
activities. Thus, no distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus. Checks are used
between banks and bankers and their customers, and are designed to facilitate banking operations. It
is of the essence to be payable on demand, because the contract between the banker and the
customer is that the money is needed on demand.

3.

4. People vs Nazario

Facts:
Eusebio Nazario was charged in violation of refusal and failure to pay his municipal taxes amounting to
Php 362.62 because of his fishpond operation provided under Ordinance 4, Series of 1955, as
amended. He is a resident of Sta. Mesa Manila and just leases a fishpond located at Pagbilao, Quezon
with the Philippine Fisheries Commission. The years in question of failure to pay was for 1964, 1965,
and 1966. Nazario did not pay because he was not sure if he was covered under the ordinance. He was
found
guilty
thus
this
petition.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Ordinance 4, Series of 1955, as amended null and void for being ambiguous and
uncertain
2. Whether or not the ordinance was unconstitutional for being ex post facto
Held:
1. No, the coverage of the ordinance covers him as the actual operator of the fishpond thus he comes
with the term Manager. He was the one who spent money in developing and maintaining it, so
despite only leasing it from the national government, the latter does not get any profit as it goes only
to Nazario. The dates of payment are also clearly stated Beginnin and taking effect from 1964 if the
fishpond
started
operating
in
1964.
2. No, it is not ex post facto. Ordinance 4 was enacted in 1955 so it cant be that the amendment
under Ordinance 12 is being made to apply retroactively. Also, the act of non-payment has been made
punishable since 1955 so it means Ordinance 12 is not imposing a retroactive penalty

The appeal is DISMISSED with cost against the appellant.

5. Manila Lodge No. 176 v. Court of Appeals

FACTS:
The Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1306 which authorized the City of Manila to reclaim a
portion of Manila Bay. The reclaimed area was to form part of the Luneta extension. The act provided
that the reclaimed area shall be the property of the City of Manila, and the city is authorized to set
aside a tract of the reclaimed land for a hotel site and to lease or to sell the same. Later, the City of
Manila conveyed a portion of the reclaimed area to Petitioner. Then Petitioner sold the land, together
with all the improvements, to the Tarlac Development Corporation (TDC).
ISSUE:
W/N the subject property was patrimonial property of the City of Manila.
HELD:
The petitions were denied for lack of merit. The court found it necessary to analyze all the provisions of
Act No. 1360, as amended, in order to unravel the legislative intent. The grant made by Act No. 1360
of the reclaimed land to the City of Manila is a grant of a public nature. Such grants have always
been strictly construed against the grantee because it is a gratuitous donation of public money or
resources, which resulted in an unfair advantage to the grantee. In the case at bar, the area reclaimed
would be filled at the expense of the Insular Government and without cost to the City of Manila. Hence,
the letter of the statute should be narrowed to exclude matters which, if included, would defeat the
policy of legislation.

6. Baranda vs. Gustilo

GR No. 81163 September 26, 1988
FACTS: A parcel of land designated as Lot No. 4517 of the Cadastral Survey of Sta. Barbara, Iloilo
covered by original certificate of title no. 6406 is the land subject of the dispute between petitioner
(Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia) and respondents(Gregorio Perez, Maria Gotera and Susan
Silao). Both parties claimed ownership and possession over the said land. However during the trial, it
was found that the transfer certificate of title held by respondents was fraudulently acquired. So the
transfer certificate of title was ordered to be put in the name of petitioners. In compliance with the
order or the RTC, the Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso annotated the order declaring TCT T25772 null and void, cancelled the same and issued new certificate of titles in the name of petitioners.
However, by reason of a separate case pending in the Court of Appeals, a notice of lis pendens was
annotated in the new certificate of title. This prompted the petitioners to move for the cancellation of
the notice of lis pendens in the new certificates. Judge Tito Gustilo then ordered the Acting Register of
Deeds for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens but the Acting Register of Deeds filed a motion
for reconsideration invoking Sec 77 of PD 1529.
ISSUE: What is the nature of the duty of the Register of Deeds to annotate or annul a notice of lis
pendens in a Torrens certificate of title?
HELD: Judge Gustilo abused his discretion in sustaining the Acting Register of Deeds stand that the
notice of lis pendens cannot be cancelled on the ground of pendency of the case in the Court of
Appeals. The function of the Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds,
encumbrances, instrument and the like is ministerial in nature. The acting register of deeds did not
have any legal standing to file a motionfor reconsideration of the Judges Order directing him to cancel
the notice of lis pendens. Sec. 10 of PD 1529 states that: It shall be the duty of the register of deeds
to immediately register an instrument presented for registration dealing with real or
personal property which complies with all the requisites for registration.
If the instrument is not registerable, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and in form the
presentor or such denial in writing, stating the ground and reasons therefore, and advising him of his
right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Sec 117 of this decree. On the other hand, Sec 117 of
PD 117 states that: When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken
or memoranda to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage or other instrument presented to him
for registration or where any party in interest does not agree with the action taken by the Register
of Deeds with reference to any such instrument, the question shall be submitted to the Commission of
Land Registration by the Register of Deeds, or by the party in interest through the Register of Deeds.

7. TAADA VS. TUVERA

136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)
FACTS:
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle
that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ
of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementations and administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending
that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid
and enforceable.
HELD:
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if
the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the
general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as
citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim
ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a
citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette.
The word shall therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be
enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be
given substance and validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of
due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general
application which have not been published have no force and effect.

TAADA VS. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued
that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise as when the
decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not
as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.
HELD:
The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement
of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the
legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its
previous publication.

Laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all
laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law
without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or
as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve
if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the
public as a whole.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed
by the legislature.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the
content of the law.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and
not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon
the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.
The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.
J. Cruz:
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with
their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as
binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full
disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot
faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

8. Caltex vs. Palomar

G.R. No. L-19650

September 29, 1966

CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC vs. ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE POSTMASTER
GENERAL

FACTS:
In 1960, Caltex launched their "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest", which called for participants to estimate
the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specified
period.Participants were not required consideration nor pay a fee. No purchase of Caltex products were
also required to be made. Entry forms were to be made available upon request at each Caltex station
where a sealed can would be provided for the deposit of accomplished entry stubs.

Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for publicizing the contest
but also for the transmission of communications relative thereto, representations were made by Caltex
with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for mailing, having in view the Antilottery provisions of the Revised Administrative Code. Postmaster General Enrico Palomar denied the
request, arguing that the said contest violated the provisions of the law on subject. CALTEX sought
judicial intervention wherein the trial court ruled in its favor. Respondent Palomar appealed, posing the
same argument that the said contest violated the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law.

Issue:
Whether or not the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" fell on the purview of the prohibitive provisions of
the Postal Law.

HELD:
The Postal Law does not allow any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or
of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind".
The Court held that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" by CALTEX is not a lottery nor a gift
enterprise but rather a gratuitous distribution of property by chance, which the law does not prohibit.
The term "lottery" extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance, such as policy
playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling. The three
essential elements of a lottery are: First, consideration; second, prize; and third, chance. The contest in
question, lacking the element of consideration, cannot be deemed al lottery. The rules of the contest
made no mention of a valuable consideration of some kind being paid directly or indirectly for the
chance to draw a prize. The term gift enterprise also could not embrace the scheme at bar. As
already noted, there is no sale of anything to which the chance offered is attached as an inducement
to the purchaser. The contest is open to all qualified contestants irrespective of whether or not they
buy the appellee's products.
By virtue of noscitur a sociis which Opinion 217 aforesaid also relied upon although only insofar as
the element of chance is concerned it is only logical that the term under a construction should be
accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the word associated
therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also must the term "gift
enterprise" be so construed. Significantly, there is not in the law the slightest indication of any intent
to eliminate that element of consideration from the "gift enterprise" therein included.

9. AMELITO R. MUTUC vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. L-32717 November 26, 1970
FACTS:
Petitioner Mutuc was a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention. He filed a special civil
action against the respondent COMELEC when the latter informed him through a telegram that his
certificate of candidacy was given due course but he was prohibited from using jingles in his mobile
units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers. The petitioner accorded the order to be
violative of his constitutional right to freedom of speech. COMELEC justified its prohibition on the
premise that the Constitutional Convention act provided that it is unlawful for the candidates to
purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens,
lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts,
hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin. COMELEC contended
that the jingle or the recorded or taped voice of the singer used by petitioner was a tangible
propaganda material and was, under the above statute, subject to confiscation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the usage of the jingle by the petitioner form part of the prohibition invoked by the
COMELEC.
HELD:
The Court held that the general words following any enumeration being applicable only to things of
the same kind or class as those specifically referred to. The COMELECs contention that a candidates
jingle form part of the prohibition, categorized under the phrase and the like, could not merit the
courts approval by principle of Ejusdem Generis. It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in
the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a
favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution.
Furthermore, the COMELEC failed to observe construction of the statute which should be in consonance
to the express terms of the constitution. The intent of the COMELEC for the prohibition may be
laudable but it should not be sought at the cost of the candidates constitutional rights.

10. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. Social Security Commission

Case No. 263
G.R. No. L-15045 (January 20, 1961)
Chapter V, Page 221, Footnote No.175
FACTS:
Petitioner filed with Respondent Commission a request that Catholic Charities, and all religious and
charitable institutions and/or organizations, which are directly or indirectly, wholly or partially,
operated by the Roman Archbishop of Manila be exempted from compulsory coverage of RA 1161,
otherwise known as the Social Security Law of 1954.
Petitioner contends that the term employer as defined in the law should following the principle of
ejusdem generis--- be limited to those who carry on undertakings or activities which have the element
of profit or gain, or which are pursued for profit or gain, because the phrase activity of any kind in
the definition is preceded by the words any trade, business, industry, undertaking.
ISSUE:
W/N the rule of ejusdem generis can be applied in this case.
HELD:
No. The rule of ejusdem generis applies only where there is uncertainty. It is not controlling where the
plain purpose and intent of the Legislature would thereby be hindered and defeated. The definition of
the term employer is sufficiently comprehensive as to include religious and charitable institutions or
entities not organized for profit. This is made more evident by the fact that it contains an exception in
which said institutions or entities are not included.