Professional Documents
Culture Documents
mayor minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P4,501.38, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same
amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253). In the service of the twelve penalties meted to Samson, the threefold
limit provided for in article 70 of the Revised Penal Code should be observed (People vs. Escares, 102 Phil. 677),
meaning that the maximum penalty that he should serve is three times the indeterminate sentence of twelve (12)
years to seventeen (17) years, the severest penalty imposed on him, or thirty-six (36) years to fifty-one (51) years
(see People vs. Peas, 68 Phil. 533). The maximum duration of his sentences should not exceed forty (40) years
(Penultimate par. of art. 70; People vs. Alisub, 69 Phil. 362; People vs. Concepcion, 59 Phil. 518, 68 Phil. 530 and
69 Phil. 58).
The estate of the late Licerio P. Sendaydiego is ordered to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the sum of
P57,048.23. Samson and the said estate are solitarily liable for the said indemnity (Art. 110, Revised Penal Code).
Samson should pay one-half of the costs. SO ORDERED.
2. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ROGELIO BAYOTAS Y CORDOVA
236 SCRA 239, September 2, 1994
Facts:
Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova, accused-appellant, was charged with rape before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City (Criminal
Case No. C-3217). He was convicted on June 19, 1991. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February
4, 1992, at the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy
secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering.
The Supreme Court dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal in a resolution dated May 20, 1992.
Issue:
Does death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability?
Held:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil
liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, the death of the accused prior to final
judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the
offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be
predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources
of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be
pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator
or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the privateoffended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil
liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article
1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.
The appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is dismissed with costs de oficio.
With regard to Beltrans argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his marriage be
declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void from the
beginning is not a defense.
8. Te v. Choa (Te v. CA)
G.R. 126746
Facts:
1
Arthur Te and Liliana Choa were married in civil rites on 1988 (Sept. 14). They did not live together after
marriage although they would meet each other regularly.
1989, Liliana gave birth to a girl. Thereafter, Arthur stopped visiting her.
1990 (May 20) Arthur contracted a second marriage while marriage with Liliana was subsisting.
Liliana filed bigamy case against Arthur and subsequently an administrative case (revocation of
engineering license for grossly immoral act) against Arthur and Julieta Santella (2 nd wife of Arthur)
RTC and Board rendered decision while the petition for annulment of first marriage was pending.
Issue: Marriage annulment case had to be resolved first before criminal and administrative case be rendered
judgment?
Held: NO.
1
P. v. Mendoza and P. v. Aragon ruling (no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a
marriage which is ab initio) was overturned.
Family Code Art. 40 is the prevailing rule: the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may not be invoked
for purposes of remarriage unless there is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared
otherwise in a judicial proceeding.
9. De Leon vs Mabanag
10. Tenebron vs CA
Tenebro v. CA, G.R. No. 150758. February 18, 2004
FACTS: Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. Tenebro
and Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro
informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro
showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage,
petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit
with Villareyes. On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda
Villegas. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed
married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter, Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her
husband. Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. Villegas countered that his marriage
with Villareyes cannot be proven as a fact there being no record of such. He further argued that his second marriage,
with Ancajas, has been declared void ab initio due to psychological incapacity. Hence he cannot be charged for
bigamy.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tenebro is guilty of bigamy.
HELD: Individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
criminally liable for bigamy notwithstanding the declaration of the second marriage as void ab initio on the ground
of psychological incapacity.
SEPARATE OPINION
VITUG, J.
Would the absolute nullity of either first or second marriage prior to its judicial declaration as being void, constitute
a valid defense in a criminal action for bigamy? Yes. Except for a void marriage on account of psychological
incapacityvoid marriages are inexistent from the very beginning, and no judicial decree is required to establish
their nullity. The complete nullity of a previously contracted marriage being void ab initio and legally inexistent can
outrightly be a defense in an indictment for bigamy. Strong reservation on the ruling that bigamy is still committed
though marriage is ab initio null and void (if marriage is contracted before th judicial declaration of its nullity).
Canon law-reconcile grounds for nullity of marriage. Reasons why except those due to psychological incapacity:
a) Breaches neither the essential nor the formal requisites of marriage
b) Other grounds are capable of relatively easy demonstration, psychological incapacity however, being a mental
state may not be so readily evident
c) It remains valid and binding until declared judicially as void
11. Sabandal vs Hon Tongco
honest in their dealings be it in their professional or private affairs. What is more, his failure to file his answer and
verified position paper despite extensions of time is a manifestation of his disrespect for judicial authorities. For his
acts, he was then sentenced to be suspended from practice for two years.
15. Spouses Yu vs. PCIB
CITATION: GR No. 147902, March 17, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioners Vicente Yu and Demetria Lee-Yu mortgaged their title, interest, and participation over several parcels of
land located in Dagupan City and Quezon City, in favor of the Philippine Commercial International Bank,
respondent and highest bidder, as security for the payment of a loan.
As petitioners failed to pay the loan and the interest and penalties due thereon, respondent filed petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage on the Dagupan City properties on July 21, 1998. City Sheriff issued
notice of extra-judicial sale on August 3, 1998 scheduling the auction sale on September 10, 1998.
Certificate of Sale was issued on September 14, 1998 in favor of respondent, the highest bidder. The sale was
registered with the Registry of Deeds in Dagupan City on October 1, 1998. After two months before the expiration
of the redemption period, respondent filed an ex-parte petition for writ of possession before RTC of Dagupan.
Petitioners complaint on annulment of certificate of sale and motion to dismiss and to strike out testimony of
Rodante Manuel was denied by said RTC. Motion for reconsideration was then filed on February 14, 2000 arguing
that the complaint on annulment of certificate of sale is a prejudicial issue to the filed ex-parte petition for writ of
possession, the resolution of which is determinative of propriety of the issuance of a Writ of Possession.
ISSUE: Whether prejudicial question exist in a civil case for annulment of a certificate of sale and a petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession.
HELD:
Supreme Court held that no prejudicial question can arise from the existence of a civil case for annulment of a
certificate of sale and a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession in a special proceeding since the two cases
are both civil in nature which can proceed separately and take their own direction independently of each other.
A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It generally comes into play in a
situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue that must
be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because issue raised in civil action would be
determinative de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in a criminal case.
16. Wong Jan Realty vs Espanol
Francisco Magestrado loaned a sum of money from Elena M. Librojo. As security for the said load,
Magestrado executed a mortgage in favor Librojo. The said title to the property was surrendered to Librojo.
Private respondent Elena M. Librojo filed a criminal complaint 3 for perjury against petitioner with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.
After the filing of petitioners counter-affidavit and the appended pleadings, the Office of the City
Prosecutor recommended the filing of an information for perjury against petitioner. Thus, Assistant City
Prosecutor Josephine Z. Fernandez filed an information for perjury against petitioner with the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City.
-
Magestrado executed an Affidavit of Loss before Notary Public falsely alleging that he lost Owners
Duplicate Certificate of TCT No. N-173163, which document was used in support of a Petition For
Issuance of New Owners Duplicate Copy of Certificate of Title and filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, to which said Magestrado signed and swore on its verification,
The said accused knowing fully well that the allegations in the said affidavit and petition are false, the
truth of the matter being that the property subject of Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-173163 was
mortgaged to complainant Elena M. Librojo as collateral for a loan in the amount of P 758,134.42 and
as a consequence of which said title to the property was surrendered by him to the said complainant by
virtue of said loan,
The case was raffled to the MeTC of Quezon City, Branch 43 entitled, "People of the Philippines v.
Francisco Magestrado."
Magestrado filed a motion5 for suspension of proceedings based on a prejudicial question. Petitioner
alleged that Civil Case No. Q-98-34349, a case for recovery of a sum of money pending before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 84, and Civil Case No. Q-98- 34308, a case for
Cancellation of Mortgage, Delivery of Title and Damages, pending before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch
77, must be resolved first before Criminal Case No. 90721 may proceed since the issues in the said civil
cases are similar or intimately related to the issues raised in the criminal action.
MeTC-Branch 43 issued an Order 6 denying petitioners motion for suspension of proceedings. Hence, the
trial of this case shall proceed as previously scheduled on July 19 and August 2, 1993 at 8:30 in the
morning.
A motion7 for reconsideration was filed by Magestrado but was denied by the MeTC.
Aggrieved, Magestrado filed a Petition for Certiorari 9 under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, with a
prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 83, on the
ground that MeTC Judge Billy J. Apalit committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in denying his motion to suspend the proceedings in Criminal Case.
RTC-Branch 83 dismissed the petition and denied the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, reasoning that there is no prejudicial question involved as to warrant the suspension of the
criminal action to await the outcome of the civil cases.
10
Again, Magestrado filed a motion for reconsideration11 but this was denied by RTC- Branch 83.
11 Dissatisfied, Magestrado filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari 13 under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court, Petitioner alleged that RTC Judge Estrella T. Estrada committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the Petition for Certiorari
12 The Court of Appeals dismissed14 the Petition on the ground that petitioners remedy should have been an
appeal from the dismissal by RTC-Branch 83 of his Petition for Certiorari in Q-99-39358. The Court of
Appeals ruled that:
Issue: Whether or not this instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is the correct and appropriate remedy?
We rule negatively.
The resolution or dismissal in special civil actions, as in the instant petition, may be appealed x x x under Section
10, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and not by petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the same rules.
13 The Court of Appeals denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration16 in a Resolution17 dated 3 May 2001.
14 Magestrado comes before the Supreme Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court raising the following issues:
HELD:
The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father serves as admission of paternity and the other letters are sufficient to
connect the admission with the child carried by Antonia. The mere requirement is that the writing shall be
indubitable.
The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous possession of the status of a natural child;
and the period in this case was long enough to reveal the father's resolution to admit the status.
Supreme Court held that they agree with the trial court in refusing to provide damages to Antonia Loanco for
supposed breach of promise to marry since action on this has no standing in civil law. Furthermore, there is no proof
upon which a judgment could be based requiring the defendant to recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco.
Finally, SC found no necessity to modify the judgment as to the amount of maintenance allowed to Ismael Loanco in
the amount of P50 pesos per month. They likewise pointed out that it is only the trial court who has jurisdiction to
modify the order as to the amount of pension.
21. Geluz vs CA
Geluz vs CA
CITATION: 2 SCRA 801
FACTS:
Nita Villanueva, the wife of Oscar lazo, respondent, came to know Antonio Geluz, the petitioner and physician,
through her aunt Paula Yambot. Nita became pregnant some time in 1950 before she and Oscar were legally
married. As advised by her aunt and to conceal it from her parents, she decided to have it aborted by Geluz. She
had her pregnancy aborted again on October 1953 since she found it inconvenient as she was employed at
COMELEC. After two years, on February 21, 1955, she again became pregnant and was accompanied by her sister
Purificacion and the latters daughter Lucida at Geluz clinic at Carriedo and P. Gomez Street. Oscar at this time
was in the province of Cagayan campaigning for his election to the provincial board. He doesnt have any idea nor
given his consent on the abortion.
ISSUE: Whether husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages from the
physician who caused the same.
HELD:
The Supreme Court believed that the minimum award fixed at P3,000 for the death of a person does not cover cases
of an unborn fetus that is not endowed with personality which trial court and Court of Appeals predicated.
Both trial court and CA wasnt able to find any basis for an award of moral damages evidently because Oscars
indifference to the previous abortions of Nita clearly indicates he was unconcerned with the frustration of his
parental affections. Instead of filing an administrative or criminal case against Geluz, he turned his wifes
indiscretion to personal profit and filed a civil action for damages of which not only he but, including his wife would
be the beneficiaries. It shows that hes after obtaining a large money payment since he sued Geluz for P50,000
damages and P3,000 attorneys fees that serves as indemnity claim, which under the circumstances was clearly
exaggerated.
22. Limjuco vs Pedro Fragante
CITATION: 45 OG No. 9, p.397
FACTS:
Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a certificate of public convenience to install
and maintain an ice plant in San Juan Rizal. His intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed
service. The Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public convenience to Intestate Estate of the
deceased, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper
court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate the said plant. Petitioner claims that the granting of
certificate applied to the estate is a contravention of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the estate of Fragante may be extended an artificial judicial personality.
HELD:
The estate of Fragante could be extended an artificial judicial personality because under the Civil Code, estate of a
dead person could be considered as artificial juridical person for the purpose of the settlement and distribution of his
properties. It should be noted that the exercise of juridical administration includes those rights and fulfillment of
obligation of Fragante which survived after his death. One of those surviving rights involved the pending
application for public convenience before the Public Service Commission.
Supreme Court is of the opinion that for the purposes of the prosecution of said case No. 4572 of the Public Service
Commission to its final conclusion, both the personality and citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante must be deemed
extended, within the meaning and intent of the Public Service Act, as amended, in harmony with the constitution: it
is so adjudged and decreed.