Suntay vs. Suntay GR No.

132524 December 29,

1998
Suntay vs. Suntay GR No. 132524
FACTS:
Petitioner Federico is the oppositor to respondent Isabels Petition for Letters of
Administration over the estate of Cristina A. Suntay who had died without leaving a will. The
decedent is the wife of Federico and the grandmother of Isabel. Isabels father Emilio, had
predeceased his mother Cristina.
The marriage of Isabels parents had previously been declared by the CFI as null and void.
Federico anchors his opposition on this fact, alleging based on Art. 992 of the CC, that Isabel has no
right to succeed by right of representation as she is an illegitimate child.
The trial court had denied Federicos Motion to Dismiss, hence this petition for certiorari.
Federico contends that, inter alia, that the dispositive portion of the the decision declaring the
marriage of Isabels parents null and void be upheld.
ISSUE:
In case of conflict between the body of the decision and the dispostive portion thereof, which should
prevail?
Related thereto, was the marriage of Isabels parents a case of a void or voidable marriage?
Whether or not Isabel is an legitimate child?
HELD:
Petition dismissed
Art. 10 of the Civil Code states that in case of doubt in the interpretation and application of laws, it is
presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. This is also applicable and
binding upon courts in relation to its judgment. While the dispositive portion of the CFI decision states
that the marriage be declared null and void, the body had shown that the legal basis was par. 3 Art.
85 of the Civil Code, which was in effect at the time.
Art. 85 enumerates the causes for which a marriage may be annulled. As such the conflict between
the body and the dispositive portion of the decision may be reconcilable as noted by the Supreme
Court. The fundamental distinction between void and voidable marriages is that void marriage is
deemed never to have taken place at all. The effects of void marriages, with respect to property
relations of the spouses are provided for under Article 144 of the Civil Code. Children born of such
marriages who are called natural children by legal fiction have the same status, rights and obligations
as acknowledged natural children under Article 89 irrespective of whether or not the parties to the void
marriage are in good faith or in bad faith. On the other hand, a voidable marriage, is considered valid
and produces all its civil effects, until it is set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action
for annulment. Juridically, the
annulment of a marriage dissolves the special contract as if it had never been entered into but the law
makes express provisions to prevent the effects of the marriage from being totally wiped out.
The status of children born in voidable marriages is governed by the second paragraph of Article 89
which provides that:
Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered
legitimate; and children conceived thereafter shall have the same status, rights and obligations as
acknowledged natural children, and are also called natural children by legal fiction. In view thereof,
the status of Isabel would be covered by the second paragraph of Article 89 of the Civil Code which
provides that children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be
considered legitimate.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 183053

June 16, 2010

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF CRISTINA AGUINALDO-SUNTAY; EMILIO

A.M. SUNTAY III,Petitioner,
vs.
ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Unlike Pope Alexander VI1 who, faced with the impasse between Spain and Portugal, deftly and
literally divided the exploration, or more appropriately, the riches of the New World by issuing the
Inter Caetera,2 we are confronted with the difficult, albeit, all too familiar tale of another family
imbroglio over the estate of a decedent.3
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 74949,4 reversing the decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117M-95.5
Before anything else, we disentangle the facts.
On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina), married to Dr. Federico
Suntay (Federico), died intestate. In 1979, their only son, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (Emilio I),
predeceased both Cristina and Federico. At the time of her death, Cristina was survived by her
husband, Federico, and several grandchildren, including herein petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay
III (Emilio III) and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay.
During his lifetime, Emilio I was married to Isabel Cojuangco, and they begot three children,
namely: herein respondent, Isabel; Margarita; and Emilio II, all surnamed Cojuangco-Suntay.
Emilio Is marriage to Isabel Cojuangco was subsequently annulled. Thereafter, Emilio I had two
children out of wedlock, Emilio III and Nenita Suntay Taedo (Nenita), by two different women,
Concepcion Mendoza and Isabel Santos, respectively.
Despite the illegitimate status of Emilio III, he was reared ever since he was a mere baby,
nine months old, by the spouses Federico and Cristina and was an acknowledged natural
child of Emilio I. Nenita is an acknowledged natural child of Emilio I and was likewise brought up
by the spouses Federico and Cristina.
As previously adverted to, the marriage between Emilio I and Isabel was
annulled.6 Consequently, respondent and her siblings Margarita and Emilio II, lived with their
mother on Balete Drive, Quezon City, separately from their father and paternal grandparents.
Parenthetically, after the death of Emilio I, Federico filed a petition for visitation rights over his
grandchildren: respondent Isabel, Margarita, and Emilio II. Although the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court in Quezon City granted the petition and allowed Federico one hour of visitation
monthly, initially reduced to thirty minutes, it was altogether stopped because of a manifestation

filed by respondent Isabel, articulating her sentiments on the unwanted visits of her
grandparents.
Significantly, Federico, after the death of his spouse, Cristina, or on September 27, 1993,
adopted their illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita.7
1avvphi1

On October 26, 1995, respondent filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in
her favor, containing the following allegations:
[A]t the time of [the decedents] death, [she] was a resident of the Municipality of Hagonoy,
Province of Bulacan; that the [decedent] left an estate of real and personal properties, with a
probable gross value of P29,000,000.00; that the names, ages and residences of the surviving
heirs of the [decedent] are: (1) Federico C. Suntay, 89 years old, surviving spouse and a resident
of x x x; (2) Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay, 36 years old, legitimate granddaughter and a resident of x
x x; (3) Margarita Cojuangco-Suntay, 39 years old, legitimate granddaughter and a resident of x x
x; and (4) Emilio Cojuangco-Suntay, 35 years old, legitimate grandson and a resident of x x x;
and that as far as [respondent] knew, the decedent left no debts or obligation at the time of her
death.8
Disavowing the allegations in the petition of his grandchild, respondent Isabel, Federico filed his
opposition on December 21, 1995, alleging, among others, that:
[B]eing the surviving spouse of Cristina, he is capable of administering her estate and he
should be the one appointed as its administrator; that as part owner of the mass of conjugal
properties left by Cristina, he must be accorded legal preference in the administration thereof;
that Isabel and her family had been alienated from their grandparents for more than thirty (30)
years; that the enumeration of heirs in the petition was incomplete as it did not mention the other
children of his son[,] namely: Emilio III and Nenita S. Taedo; that he is better situated to protect
the integrity of the estate of Cristina as even before the death of his wife[,] he was already the
one who managed their conjugal properties; that the probable value of the estate as stated in the
petition was grossly overstated (sic); and that Isabels allegation that some of the properties are
in the hands of usurpers is untrue.9
Meanwhile, after a failed attempt by the parties to settle the proceedings amicably, Federico filed
a Manifestation dated March 13, 1999, nominating his adopted son, Emilio III, as administrator of
the decedents estate on his behalf, in the event he would be adjudged as the one with a better
right to the letters of administration.
Subsequently, the trial court granted Emilio IIIs Motion for Leave to Intervene considering his
interest in the outcome of the case. Emilio III filed his Opposition-In-Intervention, which
essentially echoed the allegations in his grandfathers opposition, alleging that Federico, or in his
stead, Emilio III, was better equipped than respondent to administer and manage the estate of
the decedent, Cristina. Additionally, Emilio III averred his own qualifications that: "[he] is presently
engaged in aquaculture and banking; he was trained by the decedent to work in his early age by
involving him in the activities of the Emilio Aguinaldo Foundation which was established in 1979
in memory of her grandmothers father; the significant work experiences outside the family group
are included in his curriculum vitae; he was employed by the oppositor [Federico] after his
graduation in college with management degree at F.C.E. Corporations and Hagonoy Rural Bank;
x x x."10
In the course of the proceedings, on November 13, 2000, Federico died.
After the testimonies of both parties witnesses were heard and evidence on their respective
allegations were adduced, the trial court rendered a decision on November 9, 2001, appointing
herein petitioner, Emilio III, as administrator of decedent Cristinas intestate estate, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the petition of Isabel Cojuangco[-]Suntay is DENIED and the

Opposition[-]in[-]Intervention is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay, III is hereby appointed administrator of the estate
of the decedent Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay, who shall enter upon the execution of his trust upon
the filing of a bond in the amount of P200,000.00, conditioned as follows:
(1) To make and return within three (3) months, a true and complete inventory;
(2) To administer the estate and to pay and discharge all debts, legatees, and charge on
the same, or dividends thereon;
(3) To render a true and just account within one (1) year, and at any other time when
required by the court, and
(4) To perform all orders of the Court.
Once the said bond is approved by the court, let Letters of Administration be issued in his favor.
SO ORDERED.11
Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal before the CA, which reversed and set aside the decision
of the RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III, and appointed respondent
as administratrix of the intestate estate of the decedent, Cristina, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the assailed decision dated November 9, 2001 of
Branch 78, Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan in SPC No. 117-M-95 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and the letters of administration issued by the said court to Emilio A.M. Suntay III, if
any, are consequently revoked. Petitioner Isabel Cojuangco[-]Suntay is hereby appointed
administratrix of the intestate estate of Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay. Let letters of administration be
issued in her favor upon her filing of a bond in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand
(P200,000.00) Pesos.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.12
The motion for reconsideration of Emilio III having been denied, he appeals by certiorari to this
Court, raising the following issues:
A. IN THE APPOINTMENT OF AN ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE UNDER SECTION 6 OF
RULE 78 OF THE RULES OF COURT, WHETHER ARTICLE 992 OF THE CIVIL CODE
APPLIES; and
B. UNDER THE UNDISPUTED FACTS WHERE HEREIN PETITIONER WAS REARED BY THE
DECEDENT AND HER SPOUSE SINCE INFANCY, WHETHER ARTICLE 992 OF THE NEW
CIVIL CODE APPLIES SO AS TO BAR HIM FROM BEING APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR OF
THE DECEDENTS ESTATE.13
In ruling against the petition of herein respondent, the RTC ratiocinated, thus:
Evidence objectively assessed and carefully evaluated, both testimonial and documentary, the
court opines that it is to the best interest of the estate of the decedent and all claimants thereto,
that the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay III, be appointed administrator of the estate in the aboveentitled special proceedings.

Based on the evidence and demeanor of the parties in court, [respondents immediate] family
and that of the decedent are apparently estranged. The root cause of which, is not for this court
to ascertain nor is this the right time and the proper forum to dwell upon. What matters most at
this time is the welfare of the estate of the decedent in the light of such unfortunate and bitter
estrangement.
The Court honestly believes that to appoint the petitioner would go against the wishes of the
decedent who raised [Emilio III] from infancy in her home in Baguio City as her own child.
Certainly, it would go against the wishes of the surviving spouse x x x who nominated [Emilio III]
for appointment as administrator.
As between [respondent] and the oppositor [Federico], the latter is accorded preference as the
surviving spouse under Sec 6(a), Rule 78, Rules of Court. On the basis of such preference, he
vigorously opposed the appointment of the petitioner and instead nominated [Emilio III], his
grandchild and adopted child. Such nomination, absent any valid and justifiable reason, should
not be imperiously set aside and insouciantly ignored, even after the oppositor [Federico] has
passed away, in order to give effect to the order of preference mandated by law. Moreover, from
the viewpoint of the estate, the nomination of [Emilio III] appear[s] intrinsically meritorious. For
the benefit of the estate and its claimants, creditors, as well as heirs, the administrator should be
one who is prepared, academically and by experience, for the demands and responsibilities of
the position. While [respondent], a practicing physician, is not unqualified, it is clear to the court
that when it comes to management of real estate and the processing and payment of debts,
[Emilio III], a businessman with an established track record as a manager has a decided edge
and therefore, is in a position to better handle the preservation of the estate. 14
In marked contrast, the CA zeroed in on Emilio IIIs status as an illegitimate child of Emilio I and,
thus, barred from representing his deceased father in the estate of the latters legitimate mother,
the decedent. On the whole, the CA pronounced that Emilio III, who was merely nominated by
Federico, and which nomination hinged upon the latters appointment as administrator of the
decedents estate, cannot be appointed as the administrator of the decedents estate for the
following reasons:15
1. The appointment of Emilio III was subject to a suspensive condition, i.e., Federicos
appointment as administrator of the estate, he being the surviving spouse of Cristina, the
decedent. The death of Federico before his appointment as administrator of Cristinas
estate rendered his nomination of Emilio III inoperative;
2. As between the legitimate offspring (respondent) and illegitimate offspring (Emilio III) of
decedents son, Emilio I, respondent is preferred, being the "next of kin" referred to by
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, and entitled to share in the distribution of
Cristinas estate as an heir;
3. Jurisprudence has consistently held that Article 99216 of the Civil Code bars the
illegitimate child from inheriting ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of
his father or mother. Thus, Emilio III, who is barred from inheriting from his grandmother,
cannot be preferred over respondent in the administration of the estate of their
grandmother, the decedent; and
4. Contrary to the RTCs finding, respondent is as much competent as Emilio III to
administer and manage the subject estate for she possesses none of the disqualifications
specified in Section 1,17 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court.
The pivotal issue in this case turns on who, as between Emilio III and respondent, is better
qualified to act as administrator of the decedents estate.

We cannot subscribe to the appellate courts ruling excluding Emilio III in the administration of
the decedents undivided estate. Mistakenly, the CA glosses over several undisputed facts and
circumstances:
1. The underlying philosophy of our law on intestate succession is to give preference to
the wishes and presumed will of the decedent, absent a valid and effective will;
2. The basis for Article 992 of the Civil Code, referred to as the iron curtain bar rule, 18 is
quite the opposite scenario in the facts obtaining herein for the actual relationship
between Federico and Cristina, on one hand, and Emilio III, on the other, was akin to the
normal relationship of legitimate relatives;
3. Emilio III was reared from infancy by the decedent, Cristina, and her husband,
Federico, who both acknowledged him as their grandchild;
4. Federico claimed half of the properties included in the estate of the decedent, Cristina,
as forming part of their conjugal partnership of gains during the subsistence of their
marriage;
5. Cristinas properties forming part of her estate are still commingled with that of her
husband, Federico, because her share in the conjugal partnership, albeit terminated
upon her death, remains undetermined and unliquidated; and
6. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to share in the distribution of
the latters estate as a direct heir, one degree from Federico, not simply representing his
deceased illegitimate father, Emilio I.
From the foregoing, it is patently clear that the CA erred in excluding Emilio III from the
administration of the decedents estate. As Federicos adopted son, Emilio IIIs interest in the
estate of Cristina is as much apparent to this Court as the interest therein of respondent,
considering that the CA even declared that "under the law, [Federico], being the surviving
spouse, would have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the
decedent, aside from his share in the conjugal partnership." Thus, we are puzzled why the CA
resorted to a strained legal reasoning Emilio IIIs nomination was subject to a suspensive
condition and rendered inoperative by reason of Federicos death wholly inapplicable to the
case at bar.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists the order of preference in the appointment of an
administrator of an estate:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the
will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a
person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of
kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person
selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin,
neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to
request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or
more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such
other person as the court may select.
However, the order of preference is not absolute for it depends on the attendant facts and
circumstances of each case.19 Jurisprudence has long held that the selection of an
administrator lies in the sound discretion of the trial court.20 In the main, the attendant facts
and circumstances of this case necessitate, at the least, a joint administration by both
respondent and Emilio III of their grandmothers, Cristinas, estate.
In the case of Uy v. Court of Appeals,21 we upheld the appointment by the trial court of a coadministration between the decedents son and the decedents brother, who was likewise a
creditor of the decedents estate. In the same vein, we declared in Delgado Vda. de De la Rosa
v. Heirs of Marciana Rustia Vda. de Damian22 that:
[i]n the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the
estate of the one to be appointed. The order of preference does not rule out the
appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases where justice and equity demand that
opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estates, a situation
which obtains here.
Similarly, the subject estate in this case calls to the succession other putative heirs, including
another illegitimate grandchild of Cristina and Federico, Nenita Taedo, but who was likewise
adopted by Federico, and the two (2) siblings of respondent Isabel, Margarita and Emilio II. In all,
considering the conflicting claims of the putative heirs, and the unliquidated conjugal partnership
of Cristina and Federico which forms part of their respective estates, we are impelled to move in
only one direction, i.e., joint administration of the subject estate.
One final note. Counsel for petitioner meticulously argues that Article 992 of the Civil Code, the
successional bar between the legitimate and illegitimate relatives of a decedent, does not apply
in this instance where facts indubitably demonstrate the contrary Emilio III, an illegitimate
grandchild of the decedent, was actually treated by the decedent and her husband as their own
son, reared from infancy, educated and trained in their businesses, and eventually legally
adopted by decedents husband, the original oppositor to respondents petition for letters of
administration.
We are not unmindful of the critiques of civilists of a conflict and a lacuna in the law concerning
the bone of contention that is Article 992 of the Civil Code, beginning with the eminent Justice
J.B.L. Reyes:
In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was admitted only within the
legitimate family; so much so that Article 943 of that Code prescribed that an illegitimate child can
not inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father and mother. The
Civil Code of the Philippines apparently adhered to this principle since it reproduced Article 943
of the Spanish Code in its own Art. 992, but with fine inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990,
995 and 998) our Code allows the hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to pass to his own
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. So that while Art. 992 prevents the illegitimate
issue of a legitimate child from representing him in the intestate succession of the grandparent,
the illegitimates of an illegitimate child can now do so. This difference being indefensible and
unwarranted, in the future revision of the Civil Code we shall have to make a choice and decide
either that the illegitimate issue enjoys in all cases the right of representation, in which case Art.
992 must be suppressed; or contrariwise maintain said article and modify Articles 995 and 998.
The first solution would be more in accord with an enlightened attitude vis--vis illegitimate
children.23
Manresa explains the basis for the rules on intestate succession:

The law [of intestacy] is founded on the presumed will of the deceased Love, it is said, first
descends, then ascends, and, finally, spreads sideways. Thus, the law first calls the
descendants, then the ascendants, and finally the collaterals, always preferring those closer in
degree to those of remoter degrees, on the assumption that the deceased would have done so
had he manifested his last will Lastly, in default of anyone called to succession or bound to the
decedent by ties of blood or affection, it is in accordance with his presumed will that his property
be given to charitable or educational institutions, and thus contribute to the welfare of humanity.24
Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect the basis of intestate succession,
i.e., love first descends, for the decedent, Cristina, did not distinguish between her legitimate and
illegitimate grandchildren. Neither did her husband, Federico, who, in fact, legally raised the
status of Emilio III from an illegitimate grandchild to that of a legitimate child. The peculiar
circumstances of this case, painstakingly pointed out by counsel for petitioner, overthrow the
legal presumption in Article 992 of the Civil Code that there exist animosity and antagonism
between legitimate and illegitimate descendants of a deceased.
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that judicial restraint impels us to refrain from making a final
declaration of heirship and distributing the presumptive shares of the parties in the estates of
Cristina and Federico, considering that the question on who will administer the properties of the
long deceased couple has yet to be settled.
Our holding in Capistrano v. Nadurata25 on the same issue remains good law:
[T]he declaration of heirs made by the lower court is premature, although the evidence
sufficiently shows who are entitled to succeed the deceased. The estate had hardly been
judicially opened, and the proceeding has not as yet reached the stage of distribution of the
estate which must come after the inheritance is liquidated.
Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court does not depart from the foregoing admonition:
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue is made. x x x. If there is a controversy before the
court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to
which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in
ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned has
been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be
fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court
directs.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 74949 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Letters of Administration over the estate of decedent
Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall issue to both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III and respondent
Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment by each of a bond to be set by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial
Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan is likewise directed to make a determination and to declare
the heirs of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay according to the actual factual milieu as proven
by the parties, and all other persons with legal interest in the subject estate. It is further directed
to settle the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ*

Associate Justice
AT T E S TAT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation,
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes
Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Jose C. Mendoza per Special Order No.
842 dated June 3, 2010.
*

Formerly Cardinal Rodrigo Borgia, before ascending to the religious title of Pope and
assuming the name Alexander VI.
1

The Papal Bull which drew a longitudinal line (one hundred leagues west of the Azores
and Cape Verde Islands) and bestowed all non-Christian lands west thereof to Spain,
and east of the line to Portugal.
2

In The Family, a book with a factual core on the Borgia family of 15th Century Rome,
Mario Puzo recounts that the ostensibly fair and just papal ruling actually favored Spain
and placed Portugal at a disadvantage because papal intervention and arbitration of the
matter was made at the behest of King Ferdinand of Spain. More importantly, Pope
Alexander VI was originally a Catalan who, at the start of his career as a cleric in Italy,
conveniently changed his name from the Spanish "Borja" to the Italian "Borgia" to gain
acceptance and credibility as an authentic Roman clergy.
3

Penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon, with Associate Justices Martin S.

Villarama, Jr. (now a member of this Court) and Noel G. Tijam, concurring; rollo, pp. 2032.
4

Penned by Judge Gregorio S. Sampaga; rollo, pp. 35-60.

Rollo, p. 43.

Id. at 137-138.

Id. at 35.

Id. at 21-22.

10

Id. at 58.

11

Id. at 60.

12

Id. at 31-32.

13

Memorandum of petitioner; id. at 195.

14

Rollo, pp. 59-60.

15

Id. at 25-31.

Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in
the same manner from the illegitimate child.
16

Sec.1. Who are incompetent to serve as executors or administrators. No person is

competent to serve as executor or administrator who:
17

(a) Is a minor;
(b) Is not a resident of the Philippines; and
(c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of the trust by reason
of drunkenness, improvidence, or want of understanding or integrity, or by reason
of conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude.
Called as such because the law does not recognize the natural tie of blood and is
based on the presumed intervening antagonism and incompatibility between the
legitimate and illegitimate family of a deceased. See Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
G.R. No. L-66574, June 17, 1987, 150 SCRA 645.
18

See Uy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 167979, March 16, 2006, 484 SCRA 699; Gabriel
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101512, August 7, 1992, 212 SCRA 413; Capistrano v.
Nadurata, 46 Phil. 726 (1922).
19

See Uy v. Court of Appeals, supra; Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, supra; Capistrano v.

Nadurata, supra.
20

21

Supra note 19.

22

G.R. No. 155733, January 27, 2006, 480 SCRA 334, 360. (Citations omitted.)

Reflections on the Reform of Hereditary Succession, JOURNAL of the Integrated Bar of

the Philippines, First Quarter (1976), Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 40-41; cited in Diaz v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, G.R. No. 66574, February 21, 1990, 182 SCRA 427, 434; and Diaz v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, supra note 18, at 651.
23

24

Cited in BALANE, Jottings and Jurisprudence (1998), p. 368.

25

Supra note at 19, at 728.