NatRes Case Assignment

Ramel, Ezra

Susi v Razon, G.R. No. L-24066

December 9, 1925

On December 18, 1880, Nemesio Pinlac sold the land in question, then a fish pond,
tho Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza for the sum of P12, reserving the right to
repurchase the same. After eight years of possession Garcia and Mendoza sold it
Valentin Susi for the sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase it. Before the
execution of the deed of sale, Valentin Susi had already paid its price and sown
"bacawan" on said land, availing himself of the firewood gathered thereon, with the
proceeds of the sale of which he had paid the price of the property.
On September 13, 1913 Angela Razon commenced an action to recover possession
before the Cout of First Instance. The Court dismissed the complaint. Having failed
in her attempt to obtain possession of the land in question through the court, Razon
applied to the Director of Lands for the purchase thereof. Susi opposed the
application claiming possession of the land for 25 years. The Director of the Lands
overruled and sold the land to Razon. A certificate of title was issued to Razon and
required Susi to vacate the land but refused to do so.
Razon brought an action for forcible entry and detainer but was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. Susi then filed a complaint against Razon and Director of Lands before
the CFI contending that she is the sole and absolute owner. The Director of the
Lands, on the other hand, alleged that land in question was a property of the
Government of the United States under the administration and control of the
Philippine Islands before its sale to Angela Razon, which was made in accordance
with law. The CFI declared that Susi is entitled to the possession of the land.
When on August 15, 1914, Angela Razon applied for the purchase of said land,
Valentin Susi had already been in possession thereof personally and through his
predecessors for thirty-four years. And if it is taken into account that Nemesio Pinlac
had already made said land a fish pond when he sold it on December 18, 1880, it
can hardly be estimated when he began to possess and occupy it, the period of time
being so long that it is beyond the reach of memory.
Whether Susi is the sole and absolute owner of the parcel of land.
Held:
It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in possession of the
land in question openly, continuously, adversely, and publicly, personally and
through his predecessors, since the year 1880, that is, for about forty-five years.
And if it is taken into account that Nemesio Pinlac had already made said land a fish
pond when he sold it on December 18, 1880, it can hardly be estimated when he
began to possess and occupy it, the period of time being so long that it is beyond
the reach of memory

paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926 establishes that
there is presumption juris et de jure in favor of Susi. all the necessary requirements
for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and
physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural
land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July
26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of
Chapter VIII of said Act.
When Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already
acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the
Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued in order
that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is
sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction,
Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had
already ceased to be the public domain and had become private property, at least
by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands.
Discussion of Case in relation to the concept of Regalian Doctrine

Discussion of Case in relation to the concept of Regalian Doctrine

In order for a land of public domain to be converted to private land, all the
necessary requirements for a grant by the Government must be complied with.
In the case of Susi v Razon, Susi has been in possession of the land in question
openly, continuously, adversely, and publicly, personally and through his
predecessors, since the year 1880, that is, for about forty-five years. Susi had
therefore acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant and a grant of the
Government.
It follows that when the possession in the manner and period required by law were
complied with, the land ipso jure ceased to be the public domain and had become
private property. As to Susi, although there was no certificate of title was issued, it
was held that an application is sufficient in order that the grant may be sanctioned
by the Courts.
Moreover, the case also applied the ruling in Cario vs. Government of the
Philippine Islands (212 U. S., 449). It was held that a land can never be considered
to have been public land when the individuals has held it under a claim of
ownership since time immemorial. Taking into account the possession of Nemesio
Pinlac, who sold the land to Garcia and Mendoza and then purchased by Susi, his
possession can hardly be estimated when he began to possess and occupy it. The
period of time being so long, it is thus beyond the reach of memory.

. G.R. No. L-24066

December 9, 1925

VALENTIN SUSI, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANGELA RAZON and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, defendants. THE DIRECTOR OF
LANDS, appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Reyes for appellant.
Monico R. Mercado for appellee.

VILLA-REAL, J.:
This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga by a complaint filed by
Valentin Susi against Angela Razon and the Director of Lands, praying for judgment: (a) Declaring
plaintiff the sole and absolute owner of the parcel of land described in the second paragraph of the
complaint; (b) annulling the sale made by the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, on the
ground that the land is a private property; (c) ordering the cancellation of the certificate of title issued
to said Angela Razon; and (d) sentencing the latter to pay plaintiff the sum of P500 as damages, with
the costs.
(razon) For his answer to the complaint, the Director of Lands denied each and every allegation
contained therein and, as special defense, alleged that the land in question was a property of the
Government of the United States under the administration and control of the Philippine Islands
before its sale to Angela Razon, which was made in accordance with law.
After trial, whereat evidence was introduced by both parties, the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
rendered judgment declaring the plaintiff entitled to the possession of the land, annulling the sale
made by the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, and ordering the cancellation of the
certificate of title issued to her, with the costs against Angela Razon. From this judgment the Director
of Lands took this appeal (ed the decision of CFI), assigning thereto the following errors, to wit: (1)
The holding that the judgment rendered in a prior case between the plaintiff and defendant Angela
Razon on the parcel of land in question is controlling in this action; (2) the holding that plaintiff is
entitled to recover the possession of said parcel of land; the annulment of the sale made by the
Director of Lands to Angela Razon; and the ordering that the certificate of title issued by the register
of deeds of the Province of Pampanga to Angela Razon by virtue of said sale be cancelled; and (3)
the denial of the motion for new trial filed by the Director of Lands.
The evidence shows that on December 18, 1880, Nemesio Pinlac sold the land in question, then a
fish pond, tho Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza for the sum of P12, reserving the right to
repurchase the same (Exhibit B). After having been in possession thereof for about eight years, and
the fish pond having been destroyed, Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, on September 5, 1899,
sold it to Valentin Susi for the sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase it (Exhibit A). Before the
execution of the deed of sale, Valentin Susi had already paid its price and sown "bacawan" on said
land, availing himself of the firewood gathered thereon, with the proceeds of the sale of which he
had paid the price of the property. The possession and occupation of the land in question, first, by
Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, and then by Valentin Susi has been open, continuous,
adverse and public, without any interruption, except during the revolution, or disturbance, except
when Angela Razon, on September 13, 1913, commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga to recover the possession of said land (Exhibit C), wherein after considering the evidence

introduced at the trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of Valentin Susi and against Angela
Razon, dismissing the complaint (Exhibit E). Having failed in her attempt to obtain possession of the
land in question through the court, Angela Razon applied to the Director of Lands for the purchase
thereof on August 15, 1914 (Exhibit C). Having learned of said application, Valentin Susi filed and
opposition thereto on December 6, 1915, asserting his possession of the land for twenty-five years
(Exhibit P). After making the proper administrative investigation, the Director of Lands overruled the
opposition of Valentin Susi and sold the land to Angela Razon. By virtue of said grant the register of
deeds of Pampanga, on August 31, 1921, issued the proper certificate of title to Angela Razon.
Armed with said document, Angela Razon required Valentin Susi to vacate the land in question, and
as he refused to do so, she brought and action for forcible entry and detainer in the justice of the
peace court of Guagua, Pampanga, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the case being one
of title to real property (Exhibit F and M). Valentin Susi then brought this action.
With these facts in view, we shall proceed to consider the questions raised by the appellant in his
assignments of error.
lawphi1.net

It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in possession of the land in
question openly, continuously, adversely, and publicly, personally and through his predecessors,
since the year 1880, that is, for about forty-five years. While the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga against Angela Razon in the forcible entry case does not affect the Director of
Lands, yet it is controlling as to Angela Razon and rebuts her claim that she had been in possession
thereof. When on August 15, 1914, Angela Razon applied for the purchase of said land, Valentin
Susi had already been in possession thereof personally and through his predecessors for thirty-four
years. And if it is taken into account that Nemesio Pinlac had already made said land a fish pond
when he sold it on December 18, 1880, it can hardly be estimated when he began to possess and
occupy it, the period of time being so long that it is beyond the reach of memory. These being the
facts, the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Cario vs.
Government of the Philippine Islands (212 U. S., 449 1), is applicable here. In favor of Valentin Susi,
there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act
No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government
were complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and through his
predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and
publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of
Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi
had already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government,
for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be
sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of
Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the
State, it had already ceased to be the public domain and had become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling
the land in question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no
longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did
not thereby acquire any right.
The Director of Lands contends that the land in question being of the public domain, the plaintiffappellee cannot maintain an action to recover possession thereof.
lawphi1.net

If, as above stated, the land, the possession of which is in dispute, had already become, by
operation of law, private property of the plaintiff, there lacking only the judicial sanction of his title,
Valentin Susi has the right to bring an action to recover possession thereof and hold it.
For the foregoing, and no error having been found in the judgment appealed from, the same is
hereby affirmed in all its parts, without special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

E. McDaniel v G. Apacible (Sec. of Agriculture and Natural Resources) and

J. Cuisia
G.R. No. L-17597

February 7, 1922

Facts:
On June 7, 1916, petitioner McDaniel entered upon and located three petroleum
placer mineral claims , on an unoccupied public land in the municipality of San
Narciso, Province of Tayabas. He has remained in open and continuous possession of
said three mineral placer claims. In 1918, McDaniel drilled five wells and discovered
petroleum on each of the said three claims.
On June 18, 1921, respondent Cuisia applied to respondent Apacible for a lease of a
parcel of said petroleum land. Upon the filing of application for lease, McDaniel
protested to Apaciple against the inclusion in the lease. However, Apacible denied
the protest.
McDaniel contends that Act No. 2932 is void and unconstitutional because it
petitioner of his property without due process of law and without compensation. Act
No. 2932 declares that lands containing petroleum oil on which mineral claims have
been validly located and held, and upon which discoveries of petroleum oil have
been made are open to lease.
Apacible demurred the petition and contends that his acts complained of are in
conformity with the authority given by Act NO 2932.
Act No. 2932 provides that "all public lands containing petroleum, etc., on which no
patent, at the date this Act takes effect (August 31, 1920), has been issued, are
hereby withdrawn from sale and are declared to be free and open to exploration,
location, and lease," with a preference, however, in favor of those who had
therefore filed claims for such lands. Also, "all public lands containing petroleum,
etc., are hereby withdrawn from sale and are declared to be free and open to
exploration, location and lease," without any preference to any claim or right which
citizens of the Philippine Islands or the United States had therefore acquired in any
public lands, and that the only right left to them is one of "preference," and that
even the preference was limited for a period of six months from the 31st day of
August, 1920.
McDaniel contends (in a cited case) that the owner of a perfected valid
appropriation of public mineral lands is entitled to the exclusive possession and
enjoyment against every one, including the Government itself. Where there is a

valid and perfected location of a mining claim, the area becomes segregated from
the public domain and the property of the locator. Also, A valid and subsisting
location of mineral land, made and kept up in accordance with the provisions of the
statutes of the United States, has the effect of a grant by the United States of the
present and exclusive possession of the lands located, and this exclusive right of
possession and enjoyment continues during the entire life of the location. There is
no provision for, no suggestion of, a prior termination thereof. (Gwillim vs.
Donnellan, 115 U.S., 45; Clipper Mining Co. vs. Eli Mining and Land Co., 194 U.S.,
220.)
Issue:
Whether McDaniel acquired property right in said mineral claims.
Held:
There is no pretense in the present case that the petitioner has not complied with
all the requirements of the law in making the location of the mineral placer claims
in question, or that the claims in question were ever abandoned or forfeited by him.
The respondents may claim, however, that inasmuch as a patent has not been
issued to the petitioner, he has acquired no property right in said mineral claims.
But the Supreme Court of the United States, in the cases of Union Oil Co. vs. Smith
(249 U.S., 337), and St. Louis Mining and Milling Co. vs. Montana Mining Co. (171
U.S., 650), held that even without a patent, the possessory right of a locator after
discovery of minerals upon the claim is a property right in the fullest sense.
The discovery of minerals in the ground by one who has a valid mineral location
perfects his claim and his location not only against third person, but also against
the Government. A mining claim perfected under the law is property in the highest
sense of that term, which may be sold and conveyed, and will pass by descent, and
is not therefore subject to the disposal of the Government.
The moment the locator discovered a valuable mineral deposit on the lands located,
and perfected his location in accordance with law, the power of the United States
Government to deprive him of the exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment
of the located claim was gone, the lands had become mineral lands and they were
exempted from lands that could be granted to any other person.
In the case at bar, McDaniel had discovered petroleum oil therein and acquired a
property right in such claims. Thus, Act No. 2932 is unconstitutional and void
because it deprives him of such right and without due process of law.
Discussion of Case in relation to the concept of Regalian Doctrine
The case of McDaniel v Apacible, G.R. No. L-17597 deals about the possessory rights
as to the possession of mineral land.
Generally, possession of mineral land, no matter how long, does not confer
possessory rights. This was the ruling in the case of Atok-Big Wedge Mining Co. v.
Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 71.

However, in the case of McDaniel v Apacible, supra, when petitioner McDaniel had
located, held and perfected his location of the mineral lands and actually discovered
petroleum oil, he had acquired a property rights in the mineral claims. The moment
the locator discovered a valuable mineral deposit on the lands located, and
perfected his location in accordance with law, the power of the United States
Government to deprive him of the exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment
of the located claim was gone, the lands had become mineral lands and they were
exempted from lands that could be granted to any other person.
The decision, based from the facts of the case, therefore diminished the concept of
Regalian Doctrine. This is because when a mining claim has been perfected, it gives
the effect of removing the land from the public domain.

G.R. No. L-17597

February 7, 1922

E. W. McDANIEL, petitioner,
vs.
Honorable GALICANO APACIBLE, Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources of the
Philippine Islands, and
JUAN CUISIA, respondents.
Ross & Lawrence for petitioner.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for respondents.
JOHNSON, J.:
This is an original action commenced in the Supreme Court for the writ of prohibition. Its purpose is
to prohibit the respondent Honorable Galicano Apacible, as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, from granting a lease of a parcel of petroleum land located in the municipality of San
Narciso, of the Province of Tayabas, Philippine Islands, which parcel of land is particularly described
in paragraph 6 of the petition. To the petition the respondent Galicano Apacible demurred. The
respondent Juan Cuisia neither demurred nor answered.
The facts upon which the petition is based are admitted and may be stated as follows:
1. That on or about the 7th day of June, 1916, the petitioner entered upon and located, in
accordance with the provisions of Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, as well as the provisions
of Act No. 624 of the Philippine Commission, three petroleum placer mineral claims, each of
an area of 64 hectares, on an unoccupied public land in the municipality of San Narciso,
Province of Tayabas, Philippine Islands;
2. That on or about the 15th day of July, 1916, the plaintiff recorded in the office of the mining
recorder in the municipality of Lucena, Province of Tayabas, Philippine Islands, notices of
location of the aforesaid three placer claims under the names of "Maglihi No. 1," "Maglihi No.
2," and "Maglihi No. 3;"

3. That the plaintiff, at all times since the 7th day of June, 1916, has remained in open and
continuous possession of said three mineral placer claims;
4. That plaintiff, in the year 1917 and in each year thereafter, performed not less than two
hundred pesos (P200) worth of labor on each of the said three mineral claims;
5. That in the year 1918 plaintiff drilled five wells on the said three mineral claims, and by
means of such wells in the said year (1918) made discoveries of petroleum on each of the
said three claims;
6. That on or about the 18th day of June, 1921, the respondent Juan Cuisia made application
to the respondent Galicano Apacible, as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
under the provisions of Act No. 2932 of the Philippine Legislature, for a lease of a parcel of
petroleum land in the municipality of San Narciso, Province of Tayabas, Philippine Islands,
which said parcel of land included within its boundaries the three said mineral claims "Maglihi
No. 1," "Maglihi No. 2," and "Maglihi No. 3," which said three mineral placer claims had
therefore been located as above indicated and held by the plaintiff as above described;
7. That upon the filing of the said application for lease, as described in the paragraph
immediately preceding, by the said Juan Cuisia, the petitioner herein protested in writing to
the respondent Galicano Apacible against the inclusion in the said lease of the said three
mineral claims "Maglihi No. 1," "Maglihi No. 2," and "Maglihi No. 3," located and held by him
as above recited;
8. That the respondent Galicano Apacible, as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, did on or about the 9th day of March, 1921, deny petitioner's said protest; and
9. That the plaintiff is informed and believed, and upon that information and belief averred,
that the respondent Galicano Apacible, as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
under and by virtue of the supposed authority of Act No. 2932, is about to grant the
application for the said lease of the respondent Juan Cuisia, and to place him (Juan Cuisia)
in possession of the said three mineral claims located and held by the petitioner.
Upon the foregoing facts the petitioner contends that said Act No. 2932, in so far as it purports to
declare open to lease, lands containing petroleum oil on which mineral claims have been validly
located and held, and upon which discoveries of petroleum oil have been made, is void and
unconstitutional, in that it deprives the petitioner of his property without due process of law and
without compensation, and that the defendant Galicano Apacible, as Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, is without jurisdiction to lease to the respondent Juan Cuisia the following
mineral claims "Maglihi No. 1," "Maglihi No. 2," and "Maglihi No. 3," and prays that the writ of
prohibition be issued out of this court, directing and prohibiting the respondent Galicano Apacible to
desist from issuing the lease of the mineral placer claims herein mentioned.
The respondent Galicano Apacible, as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, in support of
his demurrer, contends: (a) That the acts complained of are in conformity with the authority given by
Act No. 2932; (b) that the petitioner has no vested right in the three mineral claims; and (c) that the
demurrer puts squarely in issue the constitutionality of Act No. 2932.

Act No. 2932 was approved on the 31st day of August, 1920. Section 1 provides that "all public
lands containing petroleum or other mineral oils and gas, on which no patent, at the date this Act
takes effect, has been issued, are hereby withdrawn from sale and are declared to be free and open
to exploration, location and lease," etc. Said section further provides, "that parties having heretofore
filed claims for any lands containing said minerals, shall be given preference to lease their respective
claims, provided they file a petition to that effect within six months from the date of the approval of
this Act."
Section 2 provides that "all such lands (public lands) may be leased by the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources in the manner and subject to the rules prescribed by the Council of State."
It will be noted from the provisions of said Act No. 2932 that "all public lands containing petroleum,
etc., on which no patent, at the date this Act takes effect (August 31, 1920), has been issued, are
hereby withdrawn from sale and are declared to be free and open to exploration, location, and
lease," with a preference, however, in favor of those who had therefore filed claims for such lands. It
will be further noted, from the provisions of said Act, that "all public lands containing petroleum, etc.,
are hereby withdrawn from sale and are declared to be free and open to exploration, location and
lease," without any preference to any claim or right which citizens of the Philippine Islands or the
United States had therefore acquired in any public lands, and that the only right left to them is one of
"preference," and that even the preference was limited for a period of six months from the 31st day
of August, 1920.
The petitioner contends, that, having located and held, and having discovered petroleum oil upon the
said claims prior to the 31st day of August, 1920, he had acquired a property right in his three
claims; and that said Act No. 2932 had deprived him of that right without due process of law, in
contravention of paragraph 1 of section 3 of Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, and that said Act
was therefore unconstitutional and void. In support of the contention the petitioner cites many
authorities.
Mr. Lindlay, one of the highest authorities on Mining Law, has discussed extensively the question
now before us. (Lindlay on Mines, vol. I, sections 322, 539.)
The general rule is that a perfected, valid appropriation of public mineral lands operates as
a withdrawal of the tract from the body of the public domain, and so long as such appropriation
remains valid and subsisting, the land covered thereby is deemed private property. A mining claim
perfected under the law is property in the highest sense, which may be sold and conveyed and will
pass by descent. It has the effect of a grant (patent) by the United States of the right of present and
exclusive possession of the lands located. And even though the locator may obtain a patent to such
lands, his patent adds but little to his security. (18 Ruling Case Law, p. 1152 and cases cited.)
The owner of a perfected valid appropriation of public mineral lands is entitled to the exclusive
possession and enjoyment against every one, including the Government itself. Where there is a valid
and perfected location of a mining claim, the area becomes segregated from the public domain and
the property of the locator.
It was said by the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon, "The Government itself cannot abridge the
rights of the miner to a perfected valid location of public mineral land. The Government may not
destroy the locator's right by withdrawing the land from entry or placing it in a state of reservation."
(Belk vs. Meagher, 104 U.S., 279; Sullivan vs. Iron Silver Mining Co., 143 U.S., 431.)

A valid and subsisting location of mineral land, made and kept up in accordance with the provisions
of the statutes of the United States, has the effect of a grant by the United States of the present and
exclusive possession of the lands located, and this exclusive right of possession and enjoyment
continues during the entire life of the location. There is no provision for, no suggestion of, a prior
termination thereof. (Gwillim vs. Donnellan, 115 U.S., 45; Clipper Mining Co. vs. Eli Mining and Land
Co., 194 U.S., 220.)
There is no pretense in the present case that the petitioner has not complied with all the
requirements of the law in making the location of the mineral placer claims in question, or that the
claims in question were ever abandoned or forfeited by him. The respondents may claim, however,
that inasmuch as a patent has not been issued to the petitioner, he has acquired no property right in
said mineral claims. But the Supreme Court of the United States, in the cases of Union Oil Co. vs.
Smith (249 U.S., 337), and St. Louis Mining and Milling Co. vs. Montana Mining Co. (171 U.S., 650),
held that even without a patent, the possessory right of a locator after discovery of minerals upon the
claim is a property right in the fullest sense, unaffected by the fact that the paramount title to the land
is in the United States. There is no conflict in the rulings of the Court upon that question. With one
voice they affirm that when the right to a patent exists, the full equitable title has passed to the
purchaser or to the locator with all the benefits, immunities, and burdens of ownership, and that no
third party can acquire from the Government any interest as against him. (Manuel vs. Wulff, 152
U.S., 504, and cases cited.)
Even without a patent, the possessory right of a qualified locator after discovery of minerals upon the
claim is a property right in the fullest sense, unaffected by the fact that the paramount title to the land
is in the Government, and it is capable of transfer by conveyance, inheritance, or devise. (Union Oil
Co. vs. Smith, 249 U.S., 337; Forbes vs. Jarcey, 94 U.S., 762; Belk vs. Meagher, 104 U.S., 279; Del
Monte Mining Co. vs. Last Chance Mining Co., 171 U.S., 55; Elver vs. Wood, 208 U.S., 226, 232.)
Actual and continuous occupation of a valid mining location, based upon discovery, is not essential
to the preservation of the possessory right. The right is lost only by abandonment as by
nonperformance of the annual labor required. (Union Oil Co. vs. Smith, 249 U.S., 337; Farrell vs.
Lockhart, 210 U.S., 142; Bradford vs. Morrison, 212 U.S., 389.)
The discovery of minerals in the ground by one who has a valid mineral location perfects his claim
and his location not only against third person, but also against the Government. A mining claim
perfected under the law is property in the highest sense of that term, which may be sold and
conveyed, and will pass by descent, and is not therefore subject to the disposal of the Government.
(Belk vs. Meagher, 104 U.S., 279, 283; Sullivan vs. Iron Silver Mining Co., 143 U.S., 431;
Consolidated Mutual Oil Co. vs. United States, 245 Fed. Rep., 521; Van Ness vs. Rooney, 160 Cal.,
131, 136, 137.)
The moment the locator discovered a valuable mineral deposit on the lands located, and perfected
his location in accordance with law, the power of the United States Government to deprive him of the
exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment of the located claim was gone, the lands had
become mineral lands and they were exempted from lands that could be granted to any other
person. The reservations of public lands cannot be made so as to include prior mineral perfected
locations; and, of course, if a valid mining location is made upon public lands afterward included in a
reservation, such inclusion or reservation does not affect the validity of the former location. By such
location and perfection, the land located is segregated from the public domain even as against the

Government. (Union Oil Co. vs. Smith, 249 U.S., 337; Van Ness vs. Rooney, 160 Cal., 131; 27 Cyc.,
546.)
From all of the foregoing arguments and authorities we must conclude that, inasmuch as the
petitioner had located, held and perfected his location of the mineral lands in question, and had
actually discovered petroleum oil therein, he had acquired a property right in said claims; that said
Act No. 2932, which deprives him of such right, without due process of law, is in conflict with section
3 of the Jones Law, and is therefore unconstitutional and void. Therefore the demurrer herein is
hereby overruled, and it is hereby ordered and decreed that, unless the respondents answer the
petition herein within a period of five days from notice hereof, that a final judgment be entered,
granting the remedy prayed for in the petition. So ordered.

U.S. Supreme Court

Reavis v. Fianza, 215 U.S. 16 (1909)
Reavis v. Fianza
No. 16
Argued April 26, 27, 1909
Decided November 1, 1909
215 U.S. 16
APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
Syllabus
This Court has jurisdiction of this case, for, even if the requisite amount is not involved,
the meaning and effect of a provision of the Philippine Organic Act of July 1, 1902, c.
1369, 32 Stats. 691, is involved.
The provision of 45 of the Organic Act of the Philippine Islands relating to title to mines
by prescription refers to conditions as they were before the United States came into
power and had in view the natives of the islands and intention to do them liberal justice.
Courts are justified in dealing liberally with natives of the Philippines in dealing with
evidence of possession. Carino v. Insular Government, 212 U. S. 449.
The limitation of size of mining claims in 22 of the Philippine Organic Act applies only
to claims located after the passage of that act.

Under 28 of the Philippine Organic Act, a valid location could not be made if the land
was occupied by one who was already in possession before the United States came
into power, and the claim of one locating under those conditions does not constitute an
adverse claim under 45 of that act.
A right to an instrument that will confer a title in a thing is a right to the thing itself, and a
statutory right to apply for a patent to mining lands is a right that equity will specifically
enforce.
Although, if seasonably taken, an objection to the form of remedy might be sustained,
after trial on the merits, it comes too late.
7 Phil. 610 affirmed.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Page 215 U. S. 21
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a bill in equity, brought by the appellees to restrain the appellant from setting up
title to certain gold mines in the Province of Benguet, or interfering with the same, and
to obtain an account of the gold heretofore taken from the mines. The trial court
rendered a judgment or decree granting an injunction as prayed. Exceptions were taken
on the grounds that the findings of fact were against the weight of evidence, and that
the judgment was against the law. The Supreme Court reexamined the evidence, and
affirmed the decree below. Then the case was brought here by appeal.
The appellees make a preliminary argument against the jurisdiction of this Court, while
the appellant asks us to reexamine the evidence, and to reverse the decree on the facts
as well as the law. We cannot accede to either of these contentions. We are of opinion
that this Court has jurisdiction. For, if the affidavits of value should be held to apply to
the whole of Reavis' claims, and not to only that part of them that are in controversy
here, still, a statute of the United States,
Page 215 U. S. 22
namely, a section of the organic act ( 45, concerning mining titles in the Philippines), is
"involved," within the meaning of 10 of the same act, which determines the jurisdiction
of this Court. Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369. 32 Stat. 691, 695. The meaning and effect of
that section are in question, and our construction even has some bearing upon our
opinion that the findings of the two courts below should not be reopened. For, apart from
the general rule prevailing in such cases, De la Rama v. De la Rama, 201 U. S.
303, 201 U. S. 309, we shall refer to the law for special reasons why those findings
should not be disturbed in a case like this.

The appellees are Igorrots, and it is found that, for fifty years, and probably for many
more, Fianza and his ancestors have held possession of these mines. He now claims
title under the Philippine Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, 45, 32 Stat. 691. This section
reads as follows:
"That where such person or association, they and their grantors, have held and worked
their claims for a period equal to the time prescribed by the statute of limitations of the
Philippine Islands, evidence of such possession and working of the claims for such
period shall be sufficient to establish a right to a patent thereto under this act, in the
absence of any adverse claim; but nothing in this act shall be deemed to impair any lien
which may have attached in any way whatever prior to the issuance of a patent."
It is not disputed that this section applies to possession maintained for a sufficient time
before and until the statute went into effect. See Soper v. Lawrence Brothers Co., 201
U. S. 359. The period of prescription at that time was ten years. Code of Procedure in
Civil Actions, August 7, 1901, No.190, 40; 1 Pub.Laws of Phil.Comm. 378, 384.
Therefore, as the United States had not had the sovereignty of the Philippines for ten
years, the section, notwithstanding its similarity to Rev.Stat. 2332, must be taken to
refer to the conditions as they were before the United States had come into power.
Especially must it be supposed to have had in view the natives of
Page 215 U. S. 23
the islands, and to have intended to do liberal justice to them. By 16, their occupancy
of public lands is respected and made to confer rights. In dealing with an Igorrot of the
Province of Benguet, it would be absurd to expect technical niceties, and the courts
below were quite justified in their liberal mode of dealing with the evidence of
possession and the possibly rather gradual settling of the precise boundaries of the
appellees' claim. See Carino v. Insular Government, 212 U. S. 449. At all events, they
found that the appellees and their ancestors had held the claim and worked it to the
exclusion of all others down to the bringing of this suit, and that the boundaries were as
shown in a plan that was filed and seems to have been put in evidence before the trial
came to an end.
It cannot be said that there was no evidence of the facts found, for the plaintiff Fianza
testified in terms that his grandfather and father had owned the mines in question, and
that he and the other appellees owned them in their turn; that they had all worked the
mines, that no one else had claimed them, and that the appellant had interfered with his
possession, and, when he put up a sign, had torn it down. No doubt his working of the
mines was slight and superficial according to our notions, and the possession may not
have been sharply asserted as it would have been with us, whether from Igorrot habits
or from the absence of legal title under Spanish law. But it sufficiently appears that the
appellee's family had held the place in Igorrot fashion, and to deny them possession in
favor of Western intruders probably would be to say that the natives had no rights under
the section that an American was bound to respect. Whatever vagueness there may
have been in the boundaries, it is plain that the appellant attempted to locate a claim

within them, and Fianza testified that the plan to which we have referred followed the
boundaries that his father showed to him. It is said that the claim is larger than is
allowed by 22. But the limitation of that section applies only to claims "located after the
passage of this act."
It is to be assumed, then, that the appellees and their ancestors
Page 215 U. S. 24
had held possession and had worked their claims for much more than the period
required by 45 before the moment when the statute went into effect. It is to be
assumed that the possession and working continued down to within two months of that
moment. But the appellant says that he entered and staked his claims before that time,
and then was in possession of them. On this ground, as well as others that are disposed
of by the findings below, he contends that there was an adverse claim within the
meaning of the act. But the ground in question was not unoccupied, and therefore he
could not make a valid claim under 28. See also Act of March 2, 1901, c. 803, 31 Stat.
895, 910. He refiled a location in October, 1902, but he did not and could not make the
required affidavit because of the prior occupation, and at that date, Fianza was within
the act unless he already had been deprived of its benefits. Moreover, it is found that
Fianza's possession continued down to the bringing of this suit. This is justified by the
evidence, and is not contradicted by the bill. The bill, to be sure, alleges that Reavis, in
1900, illegally entered and deprived the appellees of their mines, and that he still
continues to maintain his unjust claim. But further on it alleges that, in the spring of
1902, Reavis was directed by the Governor of Benguet not to molest the appellees; that
he then waited in Manila, and, after the promulgation of the law, "again entered," set
stakes, and filed a notice of location. So that the bill does not mean that he was
continuously in possession, or that he was in possession when the law took effect. We
are of opinion that there was no adverse claim that would have prevented the appellees
from getting a patent under 45. See Belk v. Meagher, 104 U. S. 279, 104 U. S.
284; Altoona Quicksilver Mining Co. v. Integral Quicksilver Mining Co., 114 Cal. 100,
105.See also McCowan v. Maclay, 16 Mont. 234, 239-240.
It is suggested that the possession of Fianza was not under a claim of title, since he
could have no title under Spanish law. But whatever may be the construction of
Rev.Stat. 2332, the corresponding 45 of the Philippine Act cannot be taken
Page 215 U. S. 25
to adopt from the local law any other requirement as to the possession than the length
of time for which it must be maintained. Otherwise, in view of the Spanish and American
law before July 1, 1902, no rights could be acquired, and the section would be empty
words, whereas, as we have said before, another section of the act, 16, still further
shows the intention of Congress to respect native occupation of public lands.

Again, it is urged that the section, of itself, confers no right other than to apply for a
patent. But a right to an instrument that will confer a title in a thing is a right to have the
thing. That is to say, it is a right of the kind that equity specifically enforces. It may or
may not be true that, if the objection had been taken at the outset, the plaintiffs would
have been turned over to another remedy, and left to apply for a patent; but, after a trial
on the merits, the objection comes too late. See Perego v. Dodge, 163 U. S. 160, 163
U. S. 164; Reynes v. Dumont, 130 U. S. 354, 130 U. S. 395.
Some objections were taken to the exclusion of evidence. But, apart from the fact that
they do not appear to have been saved in the exceptions taken to the supreme court
and irrespective of its admissibility, the evidence offered could not have affected the
result. An inquiry of Fianza whether he claimed the mines mentioned in the suit or those
measured by the surveyor who made the plan to which we have referred was met by
the allowance of an amendment, claiming according to the plan. A question to another
of the plaintiffs whether she saw any Igorrots working for Reavis would have brought out
nothing not admitted by the bill, that Reavis did, for a time, intrude upon the mines in
suit. Upon the whole case, we are of opinion that no sufficient ground is shown for
reversing the decree, and it is affirmed.
Decree affirmed.

Reavis v. Fianza, 215 U.S. 16 (1909)

Facts:
FIanza and his Igorot ancestors had been in
Issue:
Held: