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G.R. No.

189596, April 23, 2014

reconsider the assailed resolution considering the undisputed state of the accused who at the
time of the alleged commission is 73 years old.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Petitioner, v. TEODULO NANO ALAON, Respondent.


DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
We are urged in this Petition for Review on Certiorari to reverse the Decision1 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 103816 dated 25 March 2009, which annulled and set aside
the Resolution2 dated 18 March 2008 of petitioner Department of Justice (DOJ) in I.S. No.
2002-10728. The assailed Resolution: (1) set aside the Supplemental Resolution dated 16
December 2002 of the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Norte; and (2) directed the filing
of the corresponding Information for three (3) counts of rape against respondent Teodulo
Nano Alaon (Alaon).
The fairly simple facts follow.
Private complainant AAA3 filed a complaint against Alaon charging him with the crime of
rape occurring on three separate but successive occasions. The first incident transpired
sometime in October 2000, while she was picking guavas that had fallen from trees at a
construction site beside Alaons house in Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte. Alaon pulled AAA
towards a guava tree; removed her shorts and underwear and simultaneously undressed
himself; laid her on a bench and forcibly inserted his penis into her vagina.
Alaon denied the charges: AAAs family merely fabricated the charge in retaliation to their
eviction from the land which Alaon owned.
The Provincial Prosecution Office of Daet, Camarines Norte found probable cause to indict
Alaon for three (3) counts of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code in relation
to Republic Act No. 7610, The Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation
and Discrimination Act, docketed as I.S. No. 2002-10728.
Acting favorably on Alaons Motion for Reconsideration, the Provincial Prosecutor
downgraded the offense from rape to acts of lasciviousness, ratiocinating,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Going over the arguments presented in this case despite absence of comment from the
complainant, we posits (sic) that these grounds raised in said motion are all evidentiary in
character except as to the alleged physical impossibility on the part of the accused to commit
the crime as charged which merits further scrutiny. Guided by the decision in US v. Tan x x x
and People v. Domondon x x x, thus, a man who threw a girl 7-10 years old upon the floor,
placed his private parts upon or over hers, and remained in that position or made motions of
sexual intercourse, is guilty of acts of lasciviousness, undersigned was constrained to

WHEREFORE, considering the aforementioned and the absence of any other incriminating
evidence other than the passing statement of the victim, it is imperative to modify our
assailed resolution from rape to acts of lasciviousness which best suits (sic) the evidence at
hand.
Let an Information for Acts of Lascviousness be filed against accused recommending the
amount of P12,000.00 for his provisional liberty.4
Consequently, an Information against Alaon was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 64, Labo, Camarines Norte, docketed as Criminal Case No. 031021:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That in the afternoon of October, 2002 at Purok 2, Barangay Poblacion, Sta. Elena,
Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with lewd design and motivated by bestial lust, by means of force and
intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit an [sic] acts of
lasciviousness upon the person of AAA, 17 years old, against her will and to her damage.5
On 28 January 2003, then Secretary of Justice Simeon Datumanong (Secretary of Justice),
directed the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Norte to: (1) forward the entire records of
the case for automatic review, citing the interest of justice and pursuant to the residual
authority of the Secretary of Justice of supervision and control over the prosecutors of the
Department of Justice; and (2) defer the filing of the Information for acts of lasciviousness
against Alaon, or, in the event an Information has been filed in court, move for suspension of
proceedings against Alaon, in order not to render the automatic review moot and
academic.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Secretary of Justices directive was based on a letter of BBB, AAAs mother, narrating
what happened to AAA who is said to be suffering from an intellectual
disability.6chanrobleslaw
Forthwith, on 11 February 2003, the 3rd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, Carmel Josa Auro
Estrellado (Prosecutor Estrellado), sent a letter to Presiding Judge Leo Intia (Judge Intia)
requesting the withdrawal of the Information for Acts of Lasciviousness in compliance with
Secretary Simeon Datumanongs directive mistakenly assuming that Alaon filed a petition
for review before the Secretary of Justice.
On that same day, Judge Intia, for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, separately found
probable cause for the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness against Alaon. However, Judge Intia
took into consideration the contents of Prosecutor Estrellados letter and held in abeyance the
issuance of the warrant of arrest pending the resolution of the petition for review. Judge Intia

likewise directed Prosecutor Estrellado to submit a copy of the petition for review before the
trial court.

directive of the Provincial Prosecutor is tantamount to dereliction of duty which this court
shall not allow.

The next day, 12 February 2003, the RTC acting on the letter of Prosecutor Estrellado,
suspended the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 03-1021 in accordance with Section 11,
Rule 116 of the Rules of Court.

WHEREFORE, the Motion to Withdraw Appearance is hereby DENIED.

On 26 February 2003, Prosecutor Estrellado filed an Explanation/Manifestation clarifying


that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Taking cue from the RTCs latest Order, Prosecutor Estrellado filed a Motion to Suspend
Proceedings which Alaon opposed.

xxxx
The undersigned erred in concluding that a petition for review was filed by the accused as
indeed, the accused never did;

On 31 July 2003, the RTC issued an Order denying the Motion to Suspend Proceedings,
ruling that the grounds for suspension listed in Section 11, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court are
wanting. The RTC likewise set pre-trial of the case on 27 August 2003.

The undersigned realized such honest mistake only when the mother of the victim in this
case appeared before her on 24 February 2003 as it was at this time that she was informed
that there actually was no formal petition for review filed by said complainant. According to
her, she simply asked for the assistance of the Department of Justice Central Office to review
the Supplemental Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor in modifying the previous
resolution issued thereon and in changing the designation of the offense from Rape to Acts of
Lasciviousness.7

Trial of the case ensued.

Alarmed, Alaon filed a Manifestation with Urgent Motion to Set Case for Arraignment with a
prayer to lift the RTCs suspension of proceedings and to immediately set the case for
arraignment in accordance with an accuseds right to speedy trial.
The RTC issued an Order: (1) granting Alaons motion and setting the case for arraignment;
and (2) confirming the earlier finding of judicial probable cause against Alaon for the crime
of Acts of Lasciviousness.
During arraignment on 11 June 2003, Alaon entered a plea of not guilty.
Apparently confused, Prosecutor Estrellado, on the following day, 12 June 2003, filed a
motion to withdraw appearance, insisting that the case remained pending review by the
Secretary of Justice and as such, has been directed to withdraw appearance from the case.
On 25 June 2003, the RTC issued an Order denying Prosecutor Estrellados
motion:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The grounds relied upon by the 3rd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Carmel Josa Estrellado is
not a valid ground for withdrawing her appearance as Public Prosecutor in this case. If it is
true that there is a pending petition for review filed with the Department of Justice,
suspension of the proceedings of this case is the proper recourse in accordance with Sec. 11,
Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, not withdrawal of appearance. x x x
The withdrawal of appearance by Assistant Prosecutor Carmel Josa Estrellado upon the

Furnish copy of this order also to the Secretary of Justice, Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong.8

On 18 March 2008, with the propriety of the offense charged still at issue within the
prosecution, specifically the DOJ, then Undersecretary of the DOJ, Ernesto Pineda, issued
the previously adverted to Resolution, setting aside the downgrading of the crime charged
against Alaon from rape to acts of lasciviousness. The DOJ reinstated the previous charge of
rape against Alaon and directed the filing of an Information against him for three (3) counts
of rape in relation to Republic Act No. 7610.
Alaon thus filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing the Resolution
of the DOJ for being issued in grave abuse of discretion.
On 25 March 2009, the appellate court granted Alaons petition and annulled the Resolution
of the DOJ, finding grave abuse of discretion in its issuance. The Court of Appeals
ratiocinated that while the Secretary of Justice had the power to review resolutions or
decision of provincial or city prosecutors or the Chief State Prosecutor, review must be done
within the parameters set forth in the 2000 National Prosecution Service Rules on Appeal.9
For the Court of Appeals, BBBs letter clearly did not comply with the requirements for
taking an appeal by way of petition for review from the prosecutors resolution of a criminal
case at the preliminary investigation stage. More importantly, the accused, Alaon, in this
case, was deprived of his right to procedural due process, as he was not given the
opportunity to be heard by filing a comment or opposition thereto. Ultimately, the Court of
Appeals held that in treating the letter-request as an appeal from the Provincial Prosecutors
Supplemental Resolution, and in issuing the assailed Resolution directing the filing of the
corresponding information for three (3) counts of rape against [Alaon] on the basis thereof,
the DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

The DOJ ascribes grave error


that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

in

the

appellate

courts decision

and

posits

Unless a different meaning is explicitly provided in the specific law governing the
relationship of particular agencies, the word control shall encompass supervision and
control as defined in this paragraph.

I.
THE DOJ SECRETARY MAY MOTU PROPIO REVIEW THE RESOLUTION OF A
PROSECUTOR EVEN IN THE ABSENSE OF AN APPEAL OR A PETITION FOR
REVIEW BEING FILED BY ANY AGGRIEVED PARTY; AND,
II.
[ALAON] WAS CHARGED WITH KNOWLEDGE OF THE PENDENCY OF THE
PRIVATE COMPLAINANTS MOTHERS APPEAL BEFORE THE DOJ, HENCE, HE
CANNOT COMPLAIN THAT HE WAS NOT GIVEN NOTICE OF THE SAME AND THE
OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD.10
We are not persuaded. However, we cannot accept in its entirety the reasons behind the
finding of the appellate court.
Initially, we note that the DOJ and even Alaon did not apprise this Court about the status of
Criminal Case No. 03-1021 before the RTC. As we shall hereafter dispose of the matter
before us, we see no reason to order that the trial that had begun be held in abeyance.
The Secretary of Justice did not abuse his discretion when he acted on the letter request of
BBB, the mother of the victim, AAA.
There is no quarrel about the Secretary of Justices power of review over the actions of his
subordinates, specifically public prosecutors. This power of review is encompassed in the
Secretary of Justices authority of supervision and control over the bureaus, offices, and
agencies under him, subject only to specified guidelines.11chanrobleslaw
Chapter 7, section 38, paragraph 1 of Executive Order No. 292 or The Administrative Code
of 1987, defines the administrative relationship that is supervision and
control:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In Noblejas v. Judge Salas,12 we defined control as the power (of the department head) to
alter, modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of
his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. The power of
control implies the right of the President (and, naturally, of his alter ego) to interfere in the
exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the national
government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers.
Founded on the power of supervision and control over his subordinates, we do not find abuse
of discretion, much more grave abuse of discretion, by the Secretary of Justice when he took
cognizance of BBBs letter and treated it as a petition for review from the provincial
prosecutors resolution. It cannot be said that in this case, there was an absence of a petition
for review. There was in fact an appeal from the prosecutors resolution, although not as
described in the National Prosecution Service Rules on Appeal. There was, tersely put, an
appeal that the Secretary of Justice had ample power to act upon. In fact, the Secretary of
Justice acted on the letter request of BBB. What was done was not a motu propio review.
Nonetheless, we agree with the appellate courts holding that Alaon was deprived of his right
to procedural due process, as he was not given an opportunity to be heard on the letter-appeal
of private complainants mother.
The conduct of preliminary investigation is subject to the requirements of both substantive
and procedural due process. Preliminary investigation is considered as a judicial proceeding
wherein the prosecutor or investigating officer, by the nature of his functions, acts as a quasijudicial officer.13 Even at the stage of petition for review before the Secretary of Justice, the
requirements for substantive and procedural due process do not abate.
The DOJ makes much of the fact that Alaon ostensibly knew of BBBs appeal to the
Secretary of Justice.

SECTION 38. Definition of Administrative Relationships. Unless otherwise expressly


stated in the Code or in other laws defining the special relationships of particular agencies,
administrative
relationships
shall
be
categorized
and
defined
as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

This assertion of the DOJ cannot equate to compliance with procedural due process. To begin
with, Prosecutor Estrellado mistakenly thought that Alaon had filed a petition for review. The
confusion got clarified only after Judge Intia required the prosecutor to submit a copy of the
petition for review. Thereafter, Alaon also made a manifestation raising the error in the
prosecutors assertion, and moved for the lifting of the suspension of proceedings and setting
the arraignment of the case.

(1) Supervision and Control. Supervision and control shall include authority to act
directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate;
direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or
modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units; determine priorities in the
execution of plans and programs; and prescribe standards, guidelines, plans and programs.

What Alaon eventually learned is that the records of I.S. No. 2002-10728 were with the
Secretary of Justice for his review. Alaon cannot be charged with notice that the Secretary of
Justice had treated the letter of BBB as a petition for review. Notice in this case, as a function
of an opportunity to be heard, a component of procedural due process, was not met. Once the
Secretary of Justice decided to treat the letter of BBB as an appeal, he should have required

Alaon to comment thereon. Even if the letter did not comply with the requirements for an
appeal under the 2000 National Prosecution Service Rules on Appeal, indeed, precisely for
such reason, the Secretary of Justice was duty-bound, as the one hearing the case, to afford
Alaon, respondent therein, an opportunity to be heard to satisfy procedural due process. On
this score, the DOJ abused its discretion when it rode roughshod over Alaons rights as it
accommodated private complainant.
With our holding that the Secretary of Justice acted in excess of jurisdiction when he failed
to afford Alaon an opportunity to be heard on private complainants letter which he deemed
as a petition for review, we affirm the appellate courts issuance of the special writ of
certiorari, annulling the 18 March 2008 Resolution of the DOJ.
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court requires the concurrence of two elements for the
issuance of a writ of certiorari: (1) that a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (2) there is no appeal, nor
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In this case, the propriety of the charge against Alaon for Acts of Lasciviousness has already
been judicially confirmed by the trial court when it found probable cause for the issuance of
a warrant of arrest.14chanrobleslaw
However, even with the trial courts judicial confirmation of a prima facie case against Alaon
for the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness and its apparent authority and jurisdiction to hear and
dispose of the case as it sees fit, we still do not find a plain, speedy and adequate remedy
under the ordinary course of law which Alaon could have availed of against the 18 March
2008 Resolution of the DOJ.
We are not unaware of the point raised by the Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of the
DOJ, that the disposition of the case, whether a dismissal or continuance, or the withdrawal
and substitution of the Information to one charging three (3) counts of rape against Alaon,
rests on the sole discretion of the trial court. The intimation, of course, is that Alaon should
have availed of the remedies within the trial proceedings and not before the DOJ.
Crespo v. Judge Mogul,15 and
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

succeeding

jurisprudence

thereafter,

teach

us

The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court
any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests
in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of
the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose
his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case
before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A
motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has
theoption to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the

arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.16
(Emphasis supplied).
While there are possible remedies available to Alaon before the trial court, these are not
necessarily plain, speedy and adequate remedies. For one, Alaon will have to await action by
the handling prosecutor before he can file the pleading corresponding thereto. The fact
remains that the 18 March 2008 Resolution of the DOJ containing specific directives upon
the Provincial Prosecutor: (1) to file an Information against Alaon for three (3) counts of rape
in relation to Republic Act 7610; (2) with the entire records of the case forwarded to him for
appropriate action; and (3) to report the action taken thereon within ten (10) days from
receipt thereof, would still stand if not for the writ of certiorari issued by the appellate court.
Tainted as it is with grave abuse of discretion resulting from a denial of due process, the
questioned resolution should not hamper the exercise of the trial court of its mandated
jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 103816 annulling and setting aside the 18 March 2008 Resolution of petitioner
Department of Justice in I.S. No. 2002-10728 is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 201644

September 24, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,


vs.
JOSE C. GO and AIDA C. DELA ROSA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated September 28, 2011
and the Resolution3 dated April 1 7, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
108319 which reversed and set aside the Orders dated December 10, 20084 and February 12,
20095 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42 (RTC) in Crim. Case Nos. 00-1
86069-7 5, and dismissed the charges against respondents Jose C. Go (Go) and Aida C. Dela
Rosa (Dela Rosa) on the ground that their constitutional right to speedy trial has been
violated.
The Facts
On September 28, 2000, seven (7) Informations stemming from a criminal complaint
instituted by private complainant Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation(PDIC) were
filed beforethe RTC against various accused, including Go and Dela Rosa (respondents),6
charging them of Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents for allegedly
defrauding Orient Commercial Banking Corporation of the amount of P159,000,000.00.7
After numerous postponements, respondents were finally arraigned on November 13, 2001
and trial on the merits then ensued.8
However, the trial of the case was marred by a series of postponements/cancellation of
hearings caused mainly by the prosecution,9 resulting in its inability to finish its presentation
of evidence despite the lapse of almost five (5) years.10 This prompted respondents to file,
on December 11, 2007, a Motion to Dismiss11 for failure to prosecute and for violation of
their right to speedy trial,12 claiming that the prosecution was afforded all the opportunity to
complete and terminate its case, but still to no avail.

Dissatisfied, the prosecution moved for reconsideration15 which, in an Order16 dated


December 10, 2008, was granted by the RTC in the interest of justice, thus resulting in the
reinstatement of the criminal cases against respondents.
This time, it was the respondents who moved for reconsideration17 which was, however,
denied by the RTC in an Order18 dated February 12, 2009. This prompted them to file a
petition for certiorari19 before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 108319. A copy of said
petition was served, however, only on the private complainant, i.e., the PDIC,20 and not the
People of the Philippines (the People), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), as
it was not evenimpleaded as party to the case.21
The Proceedings Before the CA
In a Decision22 dated September 28, 2011,the CA, without first ordering the respondents to
implead the People, annulled and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC, and consequently
dismissed the criminal cases against respondents.23
It ruled that the prosecutions prolonged delay in presenting its witnesses and exhibits, and in
filing its formal offer of evidence was vexatious, capricious, and oppressive to
respondents,24 thereby violating their right to speedy trial. It further held that double
jeopardy had already attached in favor of respondents, considering that the criminal cases
against them were dismissed due to violation of the right to speedy trial.25
Aggrieved, the PDIC moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied by the CA in a
Resolution26 dated April 17, 2012.
On May 2, 2012, the PDIC transmitted copies of the aforesaid CA Decision and Resolution
to the OSG.27 Thereafter, or on June 18, 2012, the OSG filed the instant petition,28 imputing
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA in giving due course to respondents certiorari
petition and proceeding to decide the case. It contends, among others, that the People the
petitioner in this case was neither impleaded nor served a copy of said petition, thereby
violating its right to due process of law and rendering the CA without any authority or
jurisdiction to promulgate its issuances reversing the RTC Orders and dismissing the criminal
cases pending before it.29
The Issue Before the Court

The RTC Ruling


In an Omnibus Order13 dated January 9, 2008, the RTC dismissed the criminal cases, ruling
that the respondents right to speedy trial was violated as they were compelled to wait for
five (5) years without the prosecution completing its presentation of evidence due to its
neglect.14

The central issue to resolve is whether or not the criminal cases against respondents were
properly dismissed by the CA on certiorari, without the People, as represented by the OSG,
having been impleaded.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is meritorious.

Respondents certioraripetition in CA-G.R. SP No. 108319 that sought the dismissal of the
criminal cases against them should not have been resolved by the CA, without the People,as
represented by the OSG, having first been impleaded. This stems from the recognition that
the People is an indispensable party to the proceedings.
In Vda. de Manguerra v. Risos, where the petition for certiorarifiled with the [CA] failed to
implead the People of the Philippines as an indispensable party, the Court held:
It is undisputed that in their petition for certiorari before the CA, respondents failed to
implead the People of the Philippines as a party thereto. Because of this, the petition was
obviously defective. As provided in Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, all criminal actions are prosecuted under the direction and control of the public
prosecutor. Therefore, it behooved the petitioners (respondents herein) to implead the People
of the Philippines asrespondent in the CA case to enable the Solicitor General to comment on
the petition.30
While the failure to implead an indispensable party is not per sea ground for the dismissal of
an action, considering that said party may still be added by order of the court,on motion of
the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/orsuch times as are just,31 it
remains essential as it is jurisdictional that any indispensable party be impleaded in the
proceedings before the court renders judgment. This is because the absence of such
indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of
authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. As explained in
Lotte Phil. Co., Inc. v. Dela Cruz:32
An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had
of an action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of
indispensable parties is mandatory. The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest
the court with jurisdiction, which is "the authority to hear and determine a cause, the right to
act in a case." Thus, without the presence of indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding,
judgment of a court cannot attain real finality. The absence of an indispensable party renders
all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authorityto act, not only as to the
absent parties but even as to those present.33
In this case, it is evident that the CA proceeded to render judgment, i.e., the September 28,
2011 Decision and April 17, 2012 Resolution, without an indispensable party, i.e., the
People, having been imp leaded. Thus, in light of the foregoing discussion, these issuances
should be set aside and the case be remanded to the said court. Consequently, the CA is
directed to (a) reinstate respondents' certiorari petition, and ( b) order said respondents to
implead the People as a party to the proceedings and thereby furnish its counsel, the OSG, a
copy of the aforementioned pleading. That being said, there would be no need to touch on the
other issues herein raised.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 28, 2011 and the
Resolution dated April 1 7, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 108319

are hereby SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the CA under the parameters abovestated.

[G.R. No. 126210. March 9, 2000]


CRISTINA PEREZ, petitioner, vs. HAGONOY RURAL BANK, INC., and HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. lex
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
which annulled and set aside an Order[2] issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malolos, Bulacan. The assailed Order denied the motion for reconsideration filed by private
respondent Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc. of an order allowing the amendment of the
information in Criminal Case No. 1604-M-94[3] to exclude petitioner Cristina Perez as one
of the accused therein.
The following facts are undisputed:
Private respondent Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc. owns the Hagonoy Money Shop which
employed petitioner Cristina O. Perez as Officer-In-Charge, Cashier and Teller, Alberto S.
Fabian as Bookkeeper, and Cristina Medina and Milagros Martin as Solicitors/Field
Managers. Jksm
For the period starting August 3, 1992 up to December 5, 1993, the Laya, Manabat, Salgado
and Company, an independent management, consultancy and accounting firm, conducted an
audit of the financial affairs of the Hagonoy Money Shop. The auditing firm found anomalies
in more or less twenty-eight (28) savings accounts consisting of withdrawals which were
recorded in the subsidiary ledgers of the money shop but not in the passbooks which were in
the possession of the depositors. Although these withdrawals were supported by withdrawal
slips, the signatures appearing thereon were noticeably different from the sample signatures
written by the bona fide depositors in their specimen signature cards and/or in the subsidiary
ledgers. The audit also revealed that to cover-up the anomalous withdrawals, fake deposits
were recorded in the money shops subsidiary ledgers whenever the remaining balance in a
particular savings account was depleted below the amount of legitimate withdrawals made
by a depositor. All in all, the anomalous withdrawals amounted to P879,727.08.[4]
The anomalies unearthed by the auditing firm prompted the private respondent to file an
affidavit-complaint for estafa against the aforementioned employees of the money shop and
two outsiders, Susan Jordan and Brigida Mangahas.[5] On February 18, 1994, Acting
Provincial Prosecutor, Jesus Y. Manarang (hereinafter "prosecutor"), issued a resolution
finding prima facie evidence that the petitioner and her co-employees, Alberto Fabian,
Cristina Medina and Milagros Martin had committed the crime of estafa thru falsification of
commercial documents, and recommending the filing of the corresponding information

against them with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan. The charges against
Susan Jordan and Brigida Mangahas were, however, dismissed.[6]Chief
Aggrieved by the said resolution, petitioner filed a petition for review with the Secretary of
Justice praying for the dismissal of the charges against her. On the other hand, private
respondent moved for a reconsideration of the portion of the same resolution dismissing the
complaint against Susan Jordan.[7]
In a resolution dated April 19, 1994, the prosecutor granted private respondents motion for
reconsideration.[8] Hence, on April 27, 1994, an information for estafa thru falsification of
commercial documents was filed against herein petitioner, Alberto Fabian, Milagros Martin,
Cristina Medina and Susan Jordan, and docketed as Criminal Case No. 1604-M-94 in Branch
9 of the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan.[9]
On September 23, 1994, then Secretary of Justice, Franklin M. Drilon, issued Resolution No.
696, series of 1994 ordering the prosecutor to cause the dismissal of the information against
herein petitioner on the ground of insufficient evidence.[10] The private respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration of the order of the Secretary of Justice, which motion, however,
was denied with finality by the latter.[11]Esmsc
Meanwhile, pursuant to the said directive of the Secretary of Justice, the prosecutor filed a
motion in the RTC praying for the dismissal of the case against herein petitioner and the
admission of an amended information excluding petitioner as one of the accused in Criminal
Case No. 1604-M-94.[12] On January 13, 1995, presiding Judge D. Roy A. Masadao of the
said court granted the said motion. Private respondent assailed the dismissal of the case
against the petitioner in a motion for reconsideration filed in the RTC. However, the trial
court denied the said motion in an Order dated February 21, 1995 after finding that the
private respondent, as private complainant, had no legal personality to question the dismissal
of the criminal charges against the petitioner.[13]
Alleging that Judge Masadao had issued the said order with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, private respondent filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of
preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals. On February 23, 1996, the Court of
Appeals rendered a decision annulling and setting aside the assailed Order of February 21,
1995 and directing Judge Masadao to resolve with dispatch the private respondents motion
for reconsideration on the basis of its merit or lack thereof.[14]
Hence, this petition assigning the following errors to the Court of Appeals: Esmmis
"1. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE FAILURE OF THE TRIAL JUDGE TO
SQUARELY RULE UPON THE MERITS OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT BANKS
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE FEBRUARY 21, 1995 ORDER OF THE
TRIAL JUDGE ALLOWING THE AMENDMENT OF THE INFORMATION WHICH

EXCLUDED THE HEREIN PETITIONER FROM THE SAID INFORMATION [WAS


WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION], THUS OVERLOOKING AMPLE JURISPRUDENCE IN SUPPORT OF
THE TRIAL JUDGES ORDER.
"2. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT FINDING
THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE CANNOT BE COMPELLED TO RULE ON THE MERITS OF
A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF AN OFFENDED PARTY OF THE TRIAL
JUDGES ORDER ALLOWING THE AMENDMENT OF THE INFORMATION AFTER
FINDING THAT THE SAID OFFENDED PARTY HAS NO LEGAL PERSONALITY TO
FILE SUCH MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.
"3. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING
THAT THERE WAS JUSTIFICATION FOR THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE ON
PETITION FOR REVIEW TO ORDER THE PROSECUTOR TO CAUSE THE
DISMISSAL OF THE INFORMATION IN COURT AGAINST THE ACCUSEDPETITIONER WHICH IN EFFECT ALLOWED THE AMENDMENT OF THE
INFORMATION EXCLUDING THE ACCUSED FROM THE INFORMATION. Es-mso
"4. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE DISPOSED OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT BANKS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IN A CAVALIER
FASHION. Ms-esm
"5. THERE WAS SUFFICIENT AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO WARRANT THE
EXCLUSION OF THE PETITIONER-ACCUSED FROM THE CRIMINAL
INFORMATION."[15]

x x xE-xsm
WHEREFORE. Your resolution is partly reversed. You are directed to cause the dismissal of
the information if any, filed against respondent Cristina Perez in the above-entitled case and
report on the action taken therein within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
"2. That pursuant to the said resolution, an amended information is (sic) hereto attached
excluding Cristina Perez is well in order and copy of said amended information is hereto
attached.
"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the case insofar as respondent Cristina Perez
be dismissed and the amended information be admitted."[16]
The Order granting the above quoted motion states in its entirety that:
"O R D E RKy-le
"Finding no legal impediment to the same, the motion filed by Public Prosecutor Jesus Y.
Manarang seeking the amendment of the Information is hereby GRANTED, and the
Amended Information attached thereto is hereby ADMITTED to form part of the record of
the above-entitled case.
"By the foregoing token, the warrant of arrest already issued is hereby recalled and rendered
ineffective with respect only to accused CRISTINA PEREZ.
"SO ORDERED."[17]

Succinctly put, the issues in the instant case are: first, whether or not Judge Masadao,
presiding judge of RTC Branch 9, Malolos, Bulacan, committed grave abuse of discretion in
granting the prosecutors motion to dismiss the criminal case against petitioner without an
independent assessment of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence against the latter;
second, whether or not the private respondent, as private complainant, in a criminal case has
the legal personality to question the dismissal by the trial judge of the criminal charges
against herein petitioner upon the motion filed by the prosecutor; and third, whether or not
the dismissal of the charges against the petitioner is warranted by the evidence at hand.

The above quoted Order allowing the amendment of the information to exclude petitioner
therefrom effectively dismissed the criminal case against the latter. That the trial judge did
not make an independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case is apparent from
the foregoing order. Judge Masadaos reliance on the prosecutors averment that the Secretary
of Justice had recommended the dismissal of the case against the petitioner was, to say the
least, an abdication of the trial courts duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case, in
blatant violation of this Courts pronouncement in Crespo v. Mogul[18] as reiterated in the
later case of Martinez v. Court of Appeals,[19] to wit: Ky-calr

First. Judge Masadao acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the prosecutors motion
to dismiss the criminal charges against the petitioner on the basis solely of the
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.

"In other words, the grant of the motion to dismiss was based upon considerations other than
the judges own personal individual conviction that there was no case against the accused.
Whether to approve or disapprove the stand taken by the prosecution is not the exercise of
discretion required in cases like this. The trial judge must himself be convinced that there
was indeed no sufficient evidence against the accused, and this conclusion can be arrived at
only after an assessment of the evidence in the possession of the prosecution. What was
imperatively required was the trial judges own assessment of such evidence, it not being

In moving for the dismissal of the case against the petitioner, the prosecutor averred:
"1. That on October 18, 1994 (sic) he was in receipt of a resolution dated September 23,
1994 from the Secretary of Justice, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

sufficient for the valid and proper exercise of judicial discretion merely to accept the
prosecutions word for its supposed insufficiency.
"As aptly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, in failing to make an independent
finding of the merits of the case and merely anchoring the dismissal on the revised position
of the prosecution, the trial judge relinquished the discretion he was duty bound to exercise.
In effect, it was the prosecution, through the Department of Justice which decided what to do
and not the court which was reduced to a mere rubber stamp in violation of the ruling in
Crespo v. Mogul."[20]Calr-ky
Petitioner contends that the doctrine laid down by this Court in Martinez v. Court of
Appeals[21] is not applicable to the instant case for several reasons. First, in the Martinez
case, the private offended party was deprived of due process as he was not furnished with a
copy of the prosecutions motion to dismiss, whereas in this case, not only was the private
respondent furnished a copy of the motion to dismiss, it was also given an opportunity to file
its comment thereon. Second, in the case at bar, the Solicitor General adopts the view that the
trial judge acted correctly in granting the motion to dismiss while in Martinez v. Court of
Appeals,[22] the Solicitor General recommended the setting aside of the order granting the
motion to dismiss. Finally, the dismissal of the criminal case against the accused in Martinez
v. Court of Appeals[23] was based solely on the findings of the Acting Secretary of Justice.
On the other hand, at the time Judge Masadao granted the motion to dismiss the criminal
case against the petitioner, he already had before him the affidavit-complaint of private
respondent, the resolution of the prosecutor finding probable cause against the employees of
the money shop, the prosecutors motion to dismiss the case against the petitioner, the private
respondents comment and supplemental comment to the latter, and the position papers of the
petitioner and the private respondent.[24]
Petitioners arguments are not convincing. Me-sm
A perusal of the Martinez case reveals that the opinion of this Court finding the dismissal of
the case against the accused erroneous was not predicated on the violation of the private
offended partys right to due process nor on the recommendation of the Solicitor General. In
fact, we categorically stated therein that the "fault or error tainting the order of dismissal of
the lower court consists in its failure to observe procedural due process and to exercise its
discretion properly and judiciously."[25] The first part refers to the fact that the private
offended party was not afforded his day in court while the latter pertains to the failure of the
judge to make an independent assessment of the evidence or lack thereof against the accused.
Otherwise stated, the first is not the rationale behind the latter declaration. S-l-x
Furthermore, petitioners asseveration that as the records of the case were already before
Judge Masadao, it can be safely assumed that he had studied them and thereafter agreed with
the prosecution that the evidence did not support the earlier finding of probable cause against
the petitioner. This is non sequitur and is simply belied by the order that nonchalantly granted
the motion to dismiss. Moreover, Judge Masadao categorically declined to pass upon the
merits of the private respondents motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the criminal

case against the petitioner, and chose to summarily deny the same on the ground of the
private respondents lack of personality to revive the criminal charges against the petitioner.
[26]
Second. The private respondent, as private complainant, had legal personality to assail the
dismissal of the criminal case against the petitioner on the ground that the order of dismissal
was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Sc-slx
In the case of Dela Rosa v. Court of Appeals,[27] we held that:
"In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be
filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private
offended party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case
so he may file such special civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent
court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, the complainant should not bring the action in
the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in (the) name of the
said complainant."[28]
Thus, while it is only the Solicitor General that may bring or defend actions on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or State in criminal proceedings pending
in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals,[29] the private offended party retains the
right to bring a special civil action for certiorari in his own name in criminal proceedings
before the courts of law. Sl-xsc
Furthermore, our ruling in the case of Dee v. Court of Appeals[30] allowing the private
offended party to file a special civil action for certiorari to assail the order of the trial judge
granting the motion to dismiss upon the directive of the Secretary of Justice is apropos. We
held therein that although the correct procedure would have been to appeal the
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice to the Office of the President, the said remedy
was unavailable to the private offended party as the penalty involved was neither reclusion
perpetua nor death.[31] Hence, as no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law was available to the private offended party, filing of the petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was proper.[32]Sl-xm-is
It follows, therefore, that if the private respondent in this case may file a special civil action
for certiorari, then with more reason does it have legal personality to move for a
reconsideration of the order of the trial court dismissing the criminal charges against the
petitioner. In fact, as a general rule, a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for
reconsideration is first filed before the respondent tribunal, to allow it an opportunity to
correct its assigned errors.[33]

In support of her position, petitioner invokes our ruling in Caes v. Intermediate Appellate
Court[34] which, as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, is not applicable to the
case at bar. We quote with approval the Court of Appeals incisive opinion on this matter:
"For one, Caes is a prosecution for illegal possession of firearms and marijuana, conviction
for which would not entail any civil liability on the part of the accused. Here, the very nature
of the offense charged, to wit: estafa thru falsification of commercial documents,
immediately connotes damages for which the accused may be held civilly liable in case of
conviction. x x x. M-issdaa

determination, as the case may be, of probable cause was done without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction. This is
onsistent with the general rule that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained or stayed
byInjunction, preliminary or final.[36] There are, however, exceptions[37] to this rule, none
of which are obtaining in the case now before us. Scl-aw

"For another there is no immediate and direct offended party in Caes. It was a simple case of
violation of special laws where no particular person or individual stands as a victim of the
offense charged. Such is not the situation in the case at bench. For here, the anomalous
abstraction of funds in the petitioners money shop directly and immediately inflicts financial
damage to the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

"Then, too, in Caes, at stake is the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial. There,
accused Joel B. Caes was a detention prisoner but the trial could not proceed because the
prosecution witnesses repeatedly failed to appear, resulting in numerous postponements and
resettings which lasted for more than one year. After the case was provisionally dismissed on
motion of the prosecution, a prosecution witness whose non-appearance in court was the
very cause for the dismissal, filed a motion to revive, which was granted by the trial judge. In
vitiating the order of the revival, the Supreme Court did rule, among other things, that said
witness has no personality to file the motion as only the prosecuting fiscal could. At the same
time, however, the High Court stressed the right of the accused to a speedy trial and ruled as
permanent the prior dismissal of the case even as the lower court termed is as merely
"provisional". x x x. Sd-aad-sc
"x x x x x x x x x.
"Finally, it must be emphasized herein that unlike in Caes where the prosecution witness who
filed the motion to revive could have easily asked the public prosecutor himself to file said
motion, here, such an alternative is simply unthinkable for the simple reason that the public
prosecutor, albeit originally for the inclusion of the herein private respondent in the
information, was the very one who filed the amended information upon the direction of his
superior, the Secretary of Justice. In short, while there does not exist a conflict of position
between the prosecution witness and the public prosecutor in Caes, the present case presents
the sad spectacle of an offended party very much anxious to prosecute an accused but the
public prosecutor who must have shared the same interest, had to move for the exclusion of
said accused because he was ordered by his boss."[35]
Third. This Court cannot pass upon the sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence against
the petitioner. Rtc-spped
As a general rule, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this Court. Our duty
in an appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether the executive or judicial

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
February 23, 1996 in CA-G.R. SP No. 36742 is hereby AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 166414, October 22, 2014


GODOFREDO ENRILE AND DR. FREDERICK ENRILE, Petitioners, v. HON.
DANILO A. MANALASTAS (AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF MALOLOS BULACAN, BR. VII), HON. ERANIO G. CEDILLO, SR., (AS
PRESIDING JUDGE, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF MEYCAUAYAN, BULACAN,
BR. 1) AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The remedy against the denial of a motion to quash is for the movant accused to enter a plea,
go to trial, and should the decision be adverse, reiterate on appeal from the final judgment
and assign as error the denial of the motion to quash. The denial, being an interlocutory
order, is not appealable, and may not be the subject of a petition for certiorari because of the
availability of other remedies in the ordinary course of law.

physical injuries, being necessarily related to the case of frustrated homicide still pending in
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, should not be governed by the Rules on Summary
Procedure.6 On November 11, 2003, the MTC denied the petitioners motion for
reconsideration because the grounds of the motion had already been discussed and passed
upon in the resolution sought to be reconsidered; and because the cases were governed by the
Rules on Summary Procedure, which prohibited the motion for reconsideration.7 Thereafter,
the petitioners presented a manifestation with motion to quash and a motion for the
deferment of the arraignment.8
On February 11, 2004, the MTC denied the motion to quash, and ruled that the cases for less
serious physical injuries were covered by the rules on ordinary procedure; and reiterated the
arraignment previously scheduled on March 15, 2004.9 It explained its denial of the motion
to quash in the following terms, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx
As to the Motion to Quash, this Court cannot give due course to said motion. A perusal of the
records shows that the grounds and/or issues raised therein are matters of defense that can be
fully ventilated in a full blown trial on the merits.

Antecedents
Petitioners Godofredo Enrile and Dr. Frederick Enrile come to the Court on appeal, seeking
to reverse and undo the adverse resolutions promulgated on August 31, 20041 and December
21, 2004,2 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) respectively dismissed their petition for
certiorari and prohibition (assailing the dismissal of their petition for certiorari by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 7, in Malolos, Bulacan, presided by RTC Judge Danilo
A. Manalastas, to assail the denial of their motions to quash the two informations charging
them with less serious physical injuries by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Meycauayan,
Bulacan), and denied their motion for reconsideration anent such dismissal.
The mauling incident involving neighbors that transpired on January 18, 2003 outside the
house of the petitioners in St. Francis Subdivision, Barangay Pandayan, Meycauayan
Bulacan gave rise to the issue subject of this appeal. Claiming themselves to be the victims in
that mauling, Josefina Guinto Morano,3 Rommel Morano and Perla Beltran Morano charged
the petitioners and one Alfredo Enrile4 in the MTC with frustrated homicide (victim being
Rommel) in Criminal Case No. 03-275; with less serious physical injuries (victim being
Josefina) in Criminal Case No. 03-276; and with less serious physical injuries (victim being
Perla) in Criminal Case No. 03-277, all of the MTC of Meycauayan, Bulacan on August 8,
2003 after the parties submitted their respective affidavits, the MTC issued its joint
resolution,5 whereby it found probable cause against the petitioners for less serious physical
injuries in Criminal Case No. 03-276 and Criminal Case No. 03-277, and set their
arraignment on September 8, 2003. On August 19, 2003, the petitioners moved for the
reconsideration of the joint resolution, arguing that the complainants had not presented proof
of their having been given medical attention lasting 10 days or longer, thereby rendering their
charges of less serious physical injuries dismissible; and that the two cases for less serious

Accordingly, Criminal Cases Nos. 03-276 and 03-277 both for Less Serious Physical Injuries
are hereby ordered tried under the ordinary procedure.
The Motion to Quash is hereby DENIED for reasons aforestated.
Meanwhile, set these cases for arraignment on March 15, 2004 as previously scheduled.
SO ORDERED.10
Still, the petitioners sought reconsideration of the denial of the motion to quash, but the MTC
denied their motion on March 25, 2004.11
Unsatisfied, the petitioners commenced a special civil action for certiorari assailing the order
dated February 11, 2004 denying their motion to quash, and the order dated March 25, 2004
denying their motion for reconsideration. The special civil action for certiorari was assigned
to Branch 7, presided by RTC Judge Manalastas.
On May 25, 2004, the RTC Judge Manalastas dismissed the petition for certiorari
because:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As could be gleaned from the order of the public respondent dated February 11, 2004, the
issues raised in the motion to quash are matters of defense that could only be threshed out in
a full blown trial on the merits. Indeed, proof of the actual healing period of the alleged
injuries of the private complainants could only be established in the trial of the cases filed
against herein petitioners by means of competent evidence x x x. On the other hand, this

court is likewise not in a position, not being a trier of fact insofar as the instant petition is
concerned, to rule on the issue as to whether or not there was probable cause to prosecute the
petitioners for the alleged less physical injuries with which they stand charged. x x x.
All things considered, it would be premature to dismiss, the subject criminal cases filed
against the herein petitioners when the basis thereof could be determined only after trial on
the merits. x x x.12
The petitioners moved for the reconsideration, but the RTC denied their motion on July 9,
2004.13
The petitioners next went to the CA via a petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the
orders issued by the RTC on May 25, 2004 and July 9, 2004, averring grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC. They urged the
dismissal of the criminal cases on the same grounds they advanced in the RTC.
However, on August 31, 2004, the CA promulgated its assailed resolution dismissing the
petition for certiorari and prohibition for being the wrong remedy, the proper remedy being
an appeal; and ruling that they should have filed their notice of appeal on or before August
18, 2004 due to their receiving the order of July 9, 2004 on August 3, 2004.14
On December 21, 2004, the CA denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration.15
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioners submit that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE TRIAL
COURTS RULING DENYING THE PETITIONERS' MOTION TO QUASH THE
COMPLAINTS DESPITE THE CLEAR AND PATENT SHOWING THAT BOTH
COMPLAINTS, ON THEIR FACE, LACKED ONE OF THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF
THE ALLEGED CRIME OF LESS SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE
INJURIES SUSTAINED BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANTS WERE NOT
PERPETRATED BY THE PETITIONERS.16
Ruling of the Court
The CA did not commit any reversible errors.

Firstly, considering that the certiorari case in the RTC was an original action, the dismissal of
the petition for certiorari on May 25, 2004, and the denial of the motion for reconsideration
on July 9, 2004, were in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. As such, the orders were
final by reason of their completely disposing of the case, leaving nothing more to be done by
the RTC.17 The proper recourse for the petitioners should be an appeal by notice of
appeal,18 taken within 15 days from notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration.19
Yet, the petitioners chose to assail the dismissal by the RTC through petitions for certiorari
and prohibition in the CA, instead of appealing by notice of appeal. Such choice was patently
erroneous and impermissible, because certiorari and prohibition, being extraordinary reliefs
to address jurisdictional errors of a lower court, were not available to them. Worthy to stress
is that the RTC dismissed the petition for certiorari upon its finding that the MTC did not
gravely abuse its discretion in denying the petitioners motion to quash. In its view, the RTC
considered the denial of the motion to quash correct, for it would be premature and
unfounded for the MTC to dismiss the criminal cases against the petitioners upon the
supposed failure by the complainants to prove the period of their incapacity or of the medical
attendance for them. Indeed, the time and the occasion to establish the duration of the
incapacity or medical attendance would only be at the trial on the merits.
Secondly, the motion to quash is the mode by which an accused, before entering his plea,
challenges the complaint or information for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for
defects apparent on its face.20 Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court enumerates the
grounds for the quashal of the complaint or information, as follows: (a) the facts charged do
not constitute an offense; (b) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense
charged; (c) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused; (d)
the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so; (e) the complaint or
information does not conform substantially to the prescribed form; (f) more than one offense
is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law; (g) the
criminal action or liability has been extinguished; (h) the complaint or information contains
averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and (i) the accused
has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him
was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
According to Section 6,21 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the complaint or information is
sufficient if it states the names of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the
statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where
the offense was committed. The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the
averments in a complaint or information is, therefore, whether the facts alleged therein, if
hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of the offense.22
By alleging in their motion to quash that both complaints should be dismissed for lack of one
of the essential elements of less serious physical injuries, the petitioners were averring that
the facts charged did not constitute offenses. To meet the test of sufficiency, therefore, it is

necessary to refer to the law defining the offense charged, which, in this case, is Article 265
of the Revised Penal Code, which pertinently states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Article 265. Less serious physical injuries Any person who shall inflict upon another
physical injuries x x x which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor for ten days or
more, or shall require medical assistance for the same period, shall be guilty of less serious
physical injuries and shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor.
x x x x.
Based on the law, the elements of the crime of less serious physical injuries are, namely: (1)
that the offender inflicted physical injuries upon another; and (2) that the physical injuries
inflicted either incapacitated the victim for labor for 10 days or more, or the injuries required
medical assistance for more than 10 days.
Were the elements of the crime sufficiently averred in the complaints? To answer this query,
the Court refers to the averments of the complaints themselves, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Criminal Case No. 03-276
That on the 18th day of January 2003, at around 7:30 in the evening more or less, in Brgy.
Pandayan (St. Francis Subd.), Municipality of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan, Republic
of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named
accused motivated by anger by conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with another
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and strike the face of
one JOSEFINA GUINTO MORAO, thereby inflicting upon his (sic) physical injuries that
will require a period of 10 to 12 days barring healing and will incapacitate his customary
labor for the same period of time attached Medical Certificate (sic).
CONTRARY TO LAW.23
Criminal Case No. 03-277
That on the 18th day of January 2003, at around 7:30 in the evening more or less, in Brgy.
Pandayan (St. Francis Subd.), Municipality of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan, Republic
of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above named
accused MOTIVATED by anger did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and right and give hitting her head against pavement of one PERLA
BELTRAN MORAO inflicting the latter physical injuries and will require Medical
Attendance for a period of 12 to 15 days barring unforeseen complication as per Medical
Certificate hereto attached.
CONTRARY TO LAW.24

The aforequoted complaints bear out that the elements of less serious physical injuries were
specifically averred therein. The complaint in Criminal Case No. 03-276 stated that: (a) the
petitioners wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and strike the face of one
JOSEFINA GUINTO MORAO; and (b) the petitioners inflicted physical injuries upon the
complainant that will require a period of 10 to 12 days barring healing and will incapacitate
his customary labor for the same period of time; while that in Criminal Case No. 03-277
alleged that: (a) the petitioners wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and right
and give hitting her head against pavement of one PERLA BELTRAN MORAO; and (b)
the petitioners inflicted upon the complainant physical injuries [that] will require Medical
Attendance for a period of 12 to 15 days barring unforeseen complication.
In the context of Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court,25cralawred the complaints
sufficiently charged the petitioners with less serious physical injuries. Indeed, the complaints
only needed to aver the ultimate facts constituting the offense, not the details of why and
how the illegal acts allegedly amounted to undue injury or damage, for such matters, being
evidentiary, were appropriate for the trial. Hence, the complaints were not quashable.
In challenging the sufficiency of the complaints, the petitioners insist that the complaints
do not provide any evidence/s that would tend to establish and to show that the medical
attendance rendered on private complainants actually and in fact lasted for a period
exceeding ten (10) days; and the medical certificates attached merely stated that the
probable disability period of healing is 10 to 12 days, for Josefina G. Morano, and, 12-15
days, for Perla B. Morano, hence, the findings of the healing periods were merely
speculations, surmises and conjectures. They insist that the private complainants should
have presented medical certificates that would show the number of days rendered for
medication considering that they filed their complaint on March 15, 2003 or about two (2)
months after the alleged incident.26
The petitioners insistence is utterly bereft of merit.
As the MTC and RTC rightly held, the presentation of the medical certificates to prove the
duration of the victims need for medical attendance or of their incapacity should take place
only at the trial, not before or during the preliminary investigation. According to Cinco v.
Sandiganbayan,27 the preliminary investigation, which is the occasion for the submission of
the parties respective affidavits, counter-affidavits and evidence to buttress their separate
allegations, is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering whether a
person may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the prosecutor to prepare the
information.28 It is not yet a trial on the merits, for its only purpose is to determine whether a
crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is
guilty thereof.29 The scope of the investigation does not approximate that of a trial before
the court; hence, what is required is only that the evidence be sufficient to establish probable
cause that the accused committed the crime charged, not that all reasonable doubt of the guilt
of the accused be removed.30

We further agree with the RTCs observation that the issues raised in the motion to quash
are matters of defense that could only be threshed out in a full blown trial on the merits.
Indeed, proof of actual healing period of the alleged injuries of the private complainant could
only be established in the trial of the cases filed against herein petitioners by means of
competent evidence, and to grant the main prayer of the instant petition for the dismissal of
the criminal cases against them for less serious physical injuries is to prevent the trial court
to hear and receive evidence in connection with said cases and to render judgments thereon.
x x x All things considered, it would be premature to dismiss the subject criminal cases filed
against the herein petitioners when the basis thereof could be determined only after trial of
the merits.31
And, lastly, in opting to still assail the denial of the motion to quash by the MTC by bringing
the special civil action for certiorari in the RTC, the petitioners deliberately disregarded the
fundamental conditions for initiating the special civil action for certiorari. These conditions
were, firstly, the petitioners must show that the respondent trial court lacked jurisdiction or
exceeded it, or gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and,
secondly, because the denial was interlocutory, they must show that there was no plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.32
The petitioners disregard of the fundamental conditions precluded the success of their
recourse. To start with, the petitioners did not show that the MTC had no jurisdiction, or
exceeded its jurisdiction in denying the motion to quash, or gravely abused its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in its denial. That showing was the door that
would have opened the way to their success with the recourse. Yet, the door remained
unopened to them because the denial by the MTC of the motion to quash was procedurally
and substantively correct because the duration of the physical incapacity or medical
attendance should be dealt with only during the trial on the merits, not at the early stage of
dealing with and resolving the motion to quash. As to the second condition, the fact that the
denial was interlocutory, not a final order, signified that the MTC did not yet completely
terminate its proceedings in the criminal cases. The proper recourse of the petitioners was to
enter their pleas as the accused, go to trial in the MTC, and should the decision of the MTC
be adverse to them in the end, reiterate the issue on their appeal from the judgment and
assign as error the unwarranted denial of their motion to quash.33Certiorari was not available
to them in the RTC because they had an appeal, or another plain, speedy or adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the
resolutions promulgated on August 31, 2004 and December 21, 2004; and ORDERS the
petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

G.R. No. 171222, February 18, 2015


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. LTSG. DOMINADOR BAYABOS,
LTJG. MANNY G. FERRER, LTJG. RONALD G. MAGSINO, LTJG. GERRY P.
DOCTOR, ENS. DOMINADOR B. OPERIO, JR., AND THE HON.
SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
[G.R. No. 174786]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. RADM VIRGINIO R. ARIS, LTJG.
KRUZALDO G. MABBORANG, ENS. DENNIS S. VELASCO, AND THE HON.
SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, C.J.:
While this Court has recently faced questions on the criminal liability of fraternity members
for hazing, this case presents novel questions on the extent of liability of schools and school
authorities under Republic Act No. 8049, or the Anti-Hazing Law.
The responsibility given to an academic institution for the welfare of its students has been
characterized by law and judicial doctrine as a form of special parental authority and
responsibility.1 This responsibility has been amplified by the enactment of the Anti-Hazing
Law, in that the failure by school authorities to take any action to prevent the offenses as
provided by the law exposes them to criminal liability as accomplices in the criminal acts.
Thus, the institution and its officers cannot stand idly by in the face of patently criminal acts
committed within their sphere of responsibility. They bear the commensurate duty to ensure
that the crimes covered by the Anti-Hazing Law are not committed.

Complete the mandatory Indoctrination and Orientation Period,4 which was set from 2
May to 1 June 2001.5 Balidoy died on 3 May 2001.6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) probed the death of Balidoy. After months of
investigation, it forwarded its findings7 to the provincial prosecutor of Zambales for the
preliminary investigation and possible criminal prosecution of those involved in the
orientation and indoctrination of the PMMA Class of 2005.8 Subsequently, the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor of Zambales issued a Resolution9 finding probable cause to charge the
following as principals to the crime of hazing: Aldwin Alvarez (Alvarez), Leotharius C.
Montez (Montez), Rudence G. Reyes (Reyes), and Jed Nicholas S. Simpas (Simpas)
collectively, Alvarez et al. A criminal case against Alvarez et al. was then filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales (RTCZambales).
The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor also endorsed to the Deputy Ombudsman for the
Military the finding of probable cause to charge the following school authorities as
accomplices to hazing: Rear Admiral (RADM) Virginio R. Aris (Aris), Lieutenant Senior
Grade (LTSG.) Dominador D. Bayabos (Bayabos), Lieutenant Junior Grade (LTJG.) Gerry P.
Doctor (Doctor), LTJG. Manny Ferrer (Ferrer), LTJG. Kruzaldo Mabborang (Mabborang),
LTJG. Ronald G. Magsino (Magsino), Ensign (ENS.) Dennis Velasco (Velasco), and ENS.
Dominador Operio (Operio) collectively, respondents. The Ombudsman Investigator
agreed with the findings of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor. The matter was thus ordered
re-docketed for the purpose of conducting the proper administrative proceedings against
respondents for grave misconduct and abuse of authority.10 The Office of the Special
Prosecutor eventually filed with the Sandiganbayan a criminal case charging respondents as
accomplices to the crime of hazing.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Meanwhile, the RTCZambales issued an Order dismissing the Information against the
principal accused, Alvarez et al.12 The Order was later entered in the Book of Entries of
Judgment.

The Case Background

Bayabos, Ferrer, Magsino, Doctor, and Operio (collectively, Bayabos et al.) filed a Motion to
Quash the Information.13 They argued that the Information did not contain all the essential
elements of the offense. They also pointed out that there was no allegation that the purported
act had been made a prerequisite for admission to the PMMA, especially considering that the
victim had already been accepted in the academy. Moreover, they stressed that there was no
averment in the Information that the PMMA was a fraternity, a sorority, or an organization.
Also underscored was the absence in the Information of any assertion that the alleged hazing
was not part of the physical, mental, and psychological testing and training procedure and
practices to determine and enhance the physical, mental and psychological fitness of
prospective regular members. Furthermore, they emphasized that there was no allegation
that they were given prior written notice of the hazing and that they had permitted the
activity.

Fernando C. Balidoy, Jr. (Balidoy) was admitted as a probationary midshipman at the


PMMA.3 In order to reach active status, all new entrants were required to successfully

As a final point, Bayabos et al. argued that the case against the principal accused had already
been dismissed with finality by the RTC. There being no more principals with whom they

It was within this legal framework that the school authorities of the Philippine Merchant
Marine Academy (PMMA) were criminally charged before the Sandiganbayan as
accomplices to hazing under the Anti-Hazing Law. Before they were arraigned, the
Sandiganbayan quashed2 the Information against them on the basis of the dismissal of the
criminal case against the principal accused and, the failure to include in the Information the
material averments required by the Anti-Hazing Law.
Consequently, this Petition was filed before this Court questioning the Sandiganbayans
quashal of the Information.

could have cooperated in the execution of the offense, they asserted that the case against
them must be dismissed.

surrendered or were arrested, or whether the Order of Arrest21 was recalled prior to the
dismissal of the case.

The Special Prosecutor opposed14 the motion of Bayabos et al. He insisted that the
Information alleged the material facts that would sufficiently establish the presence of the
essential ingredients of the crime of accomplice to hazing. He also stressed that there was
nothing in the law requiring that the principals must be prosecuted first before a case could
be filed against the accomplices. The Comment/Opposition of the Special Prosecutor was,
however, silent on the issue of whether the Information contained an allegation that the
supposed hazing had been made a prerequisite for admission to the PMMA, and whether the
academy was considered an organization within the meaning of the Anti-Hazing Law.

Aggrieved, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Special Prosecutor, filed with this
Court on 13 March 2006 a Petition assailing SB Resolution I and, on 16 October 2006,
another Petition challenging SB Resolution II.

Six days before Bayabos et al. were set to be arraigned,15 the Sandiganbayan issued the
assailed Resolution (SB Resolution I) quashing the Information and dismissing the criminal
case against them. According to the court, the fact that the charge against the principal
accused Alvarez et al. was dismissed with finality favorably carried with it the indictment
against those charged as accomplices, whose criminal responsibility was subordinate to that
of the former. It stressed that before there can be an accomplice, there must be a principal by
direct participation, the latter being the originator of the criminal design. In this case, as there
were no principal perpetrators to speak of, necessarily, there was no one else with whom they
could have cooperated in the execution of the crime of hazing. In view of the dismissal of the
case against the principals, the court ruled that the Information charging Bayabos et al. as
accomplices could no longer stand on its own.
In any event, the Sandiganbayan found that the Information charged no offense, and that the
allegations therein were mere conclusions of law. It also stressed that there was no averment
that the alleged hazing was not part of the physical, mental and psychological testing and
training procedure and practices to determine and enhance the physical, mental and
psychological fitness of prospective regular members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), pursuant to Section 1 of the
law.16 It must be noted, though, that the Sandiganbayan did not make any categorical
determination that the PMMA was considered an organization within the meaning of the
Anti-Hazing Law.
Six months after the Sandiganbayan issued its Resolution dismissing the criminal case
against Bayabos et al., the accused Velasco surrendered and then filed his own Motion to
Quash,17 adopting the grounds raised by that court. His arraignment was set on 14 August
2006.18 However, on 3 August 2006, the Sandiganbayan issued another Resolution (SB
Resolution II) dismissing the case against him. According to the court, since Velasco was
similarly situated as Bayabos et al., the Information against him must likewise be quashed in
light of the reasoning laid out in SB Resolution I. In the same Resolution, the Sandiganbayan
ex proprio motu dismissed the case against Aris and Mabborang (collectively, Velasco et al.),
explaining that they, too, had been charged under the same Information for the same
offense.19 It is unclear from the records20 whether the accused Aris and Mabborang

The Issues
The Special Prosecutor asks this Court to address a number of legal issues. After a thorough
evaluation of the Petitions, however, we cull the threshold issues needing to be addressed by
this Court as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Whether the prosecution of respondents for the crime of accomplice to hazing can proceed in
spite of the dismissal with finality of the case against the principal accused
Whether the Information filed against respondents contains all the material averments for the
prosecution of the crime of accomplice to hazing under the Anti-Hazing Law
Our Ruling
With regard to the first issue, we agree with petitioner that the Sandiganbayan erred when it
dismissed outright the case against respondents, on the sole ground that the case against the
purported principals had already been dismissed. It is a settled rule that the case against those
charged as accomplices is not ipso facto dismissed in the absence of trial of the purported
principals; the dismissal of the case against the latter; or even the latters acquittal, especially
when the occurrence of the crime has in fact been established.22 In People v. Rafael,23 the
Supreme Court En Banc reasoned thus: The corresponding responsibilities of the principal,
accomplice, and accessory are distinct from each other. As long as the commission of the
offense can be duly established in evidence, the determination of the liability of the
accomplice or accessory can proceed independently of that of the principal. Accordingly, so
long as the commission of the crime can be duly proven, the trial of those charged as
accomplices to determine their criminal liability can proceed independently of that of the
alleged principal.24chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
We note in the present case that Bayabos et al. merely presented the Order of Entry of
Judgment25 dismissing the case against Alvarez et al. Nowhere is it mentioned in the order
that the case was dismissed against the alleged principals, because no crime had been
committed. In fact, it does not cite the trial courts reason for dismissing the case. Hence, the
Sandiganbayan committed an error when it simply relied on the Order of Entry of Judgment
without so much as scrutinizing the reason for the dismissal of the case against the purported
principals.
Nonetheless, as will be discussed below, we affirm the quashal of the Information against
respondents.

Section 14, Article III of the Constitution, recognizes the right of the accused to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against them. As a manifestation of this
constitutional right, the Rules of Court requires that the information charging persons with an
offense be sufficient. One of the key components of a sufficient information is the
statement of the acts or omissions constituting the offense charged, subject of the
complaint.26 The information must also be crafted in a language ordinary and concise
enough to enable persons of common understanding to know the offense being charged
against them.27 This approach is intended to allow them to suitably prepare for their defense,
as they are presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts constituting the offense
they have purportedly committed.28 The information need not be in the same kind of
language used in the law relied upon.29chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
At any time before entering a plea, an accused may assail the information filed with the court
based on the grounds enumerated in Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, one of which
is the claim that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. In assessing whether an
information must be quashed on that ground, the basic test30 is to determine if the facts
averred would establish the presence of the essential elements of the crime as defined in the
law. The information is examined without consideration of the truth or veracity of the claims
therein, as these are more properly proven or controverted during the trial. In the appraisal of
the information, matters aliunde are not taken into account.
We
quote
the
pertinent
provision
of
the
Anti-Hazing
Law
as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 1. Hazing, as used in this Act, is an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for
admission into membership in a fraternity, sorority or organization by placing the recruit,
neophyte or applicant in some embarrassing or humiliating situations such as forcing him to
do menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks or activities or otherwise subjecting him to
physical or psychological suffering or injury.
The term organization shall include any club or the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
Philippine National Police, Philippine Military Academy, or officer and cadet corp of the
Citizen's Military Training and Citizen's Army Training. The physical, mental and
psychological testing and training procedure and practices to determine and enhance the
physical, mental and psychological fitness of prospective regular members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police as approved by the Secretary of
National Defense and the National Police Commission duly recommended by the Chief of
Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Director General of the Philippine National
Police shall not be considered as hazing for the purposes of this Act.
Sec. 4. x x x x.
The school authorities including faculty members who consent to the hazing or who have
actual knowledge thereof, but failed to take any action to prevent the same from occurring
shall be punished as accomplices for the acts of hazing committed by the perpetrators.
(Emphasis supplied)

The crime of hazing is thus committed when the following essential elements are established:
(1) a person is placed in some embarrassing or humiliating situation or subjected to physical
or psychological suffering or injury; and (2) these acts were employed as a prerequisite for
the persons admission or entry into an organization. In the crime of hazing, the crucial
ingredient distinguishing it from the crimes against persons defined under Title Eight of the
Revised Penal Code is the infliction by a person of physical or psychological suffering on
another in furtherance of the latters admission or entry into an organization.
In the case of school authorities and faculty members who have had no direct participation in
the act, they may nonetheless be charged as accomplices if it is shown that (1) hazing, as
established by the above elements, occurred; (2) the accused are school authorities or faculty
members; and (3) they consented to or failed to take preventive action against hazing in spite
actual knowledge thereof.
First, we reject the contention of respondents that PMMA should not be considered an
organization. Under the Anti-Hazing Law, the breadth of the term organization includes but
is not limited to groups, teams, fraternities, sororities, citizen army training corps,
educational institutions, clubs, societies, cooperatives, companies, partnerships, corporations,
the PNP, and the AFP.31 Attached to the Department of Transportation and
Communications,32 the PMMA is a government-owned educational institution33 established
for the primary purpose of producing efficient and well-trained merchant marine officers.34
Clearly, it is included in the term organization within the meaning of the law.
We also disagree with the Sandiganbayan ruling that the quashal of the Information was
warranted for failure to allege that the purported acts were not covered by the exemption
relating to the duly recommended and approved testing and training procedure and
practices for prospective regular members of the AFP and the PNP. This exemption is an
affirmative defense in, not an essential element of, the crime of accomplice to hazing. It is an
assertion that must be properly claimed by the accused, not by the prosecution. The reason
for this rule is that the accused carry the burden of proof in establishing by clear and
convincing evidence that they have satisfied the requirements thereof.35 Thus, the
prosecutions failure to point out in the Information that the exception is inapplicable would
not justify the quashal of that Information.
Nevertheless, we find albeit for a different reason that the Motion to Quash must be
granted, as the Information does not include all the material facts constituting the crime of
accomplice to hazing. The Information charging respondents reads as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The undersigned Assistant Special Prosecutor, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby
accuses [RADM] Virginio R. Aris, [LTSG.] Dominador D. BAYABOS, [LTJG.] Manny G.
Ferrer, [LTJG.] Ronald G. Magsino, [LTJG.] Kruzaldo G. Mabborang, [LTJG.] Gerry P.
Doctor, [ENS.] Dominador B. Operio, Jr., and [ENS.] Dennis S. Velasco, as accomplices for
Violation
of
R.A.
8049
(Anti-Hazing
Law),
committed
as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

That during the period from the 2nd of May 2001 up to the 3rd of May 2001, inside the
campus of the Philippine Merchant Marine Academy (PMMA), in the Municipality of San
Narciso, Province of Zambales, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court accused RADM Virginio R. Aris, President of PMMA with [Salary Grade (SG) 29];
LTSG. Dominador D. BAYABOS, Commandant of the Cadets; (LTJG.) Manny G. Ferrer, 1st
Batallion Officer; LTJG. Ronald G. Magsino, Security Officer; LTJG. Kruzaldo G.
Mabborang, 2nd Battalion Officer; LTJG. Gerry P. Doctor, Batl. Mast.; ENS. Dominador B.
Operio, Jr., 1st Battalion Company Officer; and ENS. Dennis S. Velasco, Mess Officer, all
public officers, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, committing the
offense in relation to office and while in the performance of their duties as such public
officers being the school authorities and/or faculty members did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally, consent or have actual knowledge of the hazing perpetrated by the
principal accused, all First Class Midshipmen, against probationary midshipman
FERNANDO BALIDOy, JR. during the schools Indoctrination and Orientation; and, fail to
take any action to prevent the occurrence of the hazing and the infliction of psychological
and physical injuries against said FERNANDO BALIDOy, JR. thereby causing the
instantaneous death of the latter, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said
FERNANDO BALIDOy, JR.36
As can be gleaned from the above, the indictment merely states that psychological pain and
physical injuries were inflicted on the victim. There is no allegation that the purported acts
were employed as a prerequisite for admission or entry into the organization. Failure to aver
this crucial ingredient would prevent the successful prosecution of the criminal responsibility
of the accused, either as principal or as accomplice, for the crime of hazing. Plain reference
to a technical term37 in this case, hazing is insufficient and incomplete, as it is but a
characterization of the acts allegedly committed and thus a mere conclusion of law. Section
6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, expressly states that the information must include, inter
alia, both the designation of the offense given by the statute and the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense. The Special Prosecutors belated argument38 in
his Petition before this Court that the successful completion of the indoctrination and
orientation program was used as a prerequisite for continued admission to the academy i.e.,
attainment of active midshipman status does not cure this defect in the Information. Thus,
the Information must be quashed, as the ultimate facts it presents do not constitute the crime
of accomplice to hazing.
Finally, we reject the Special Prosecutors claim that the Sandiganbayan should just have
ordered the filing of another information or the correction of the defect by amendment,
instead of dismissing the case outright.39 Indeed, Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court,
provides that if a motion to quash is based on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense, the court shall give the prosecution a chance to correct the defect by
amendment. However, the provision also states that if the prosecution fails to make the
amendment, the motion shall be granted. Here, we point out that the Special Prosecutor
insisted in his Comment on the Motion to Quash40 that there was no defect in the
Information. Neither has he filed a new information after the motion was sustained, pursuant
to Section 5, Rule 117. Thus, the Sandiganbayan was correct in ordering the quashal of the
Information and the eventual dismissal of the case.

This does not mean, however, that the Special Prosecutor is now precluded from filing
another information. Section 6, Rule 117, specifically states that an order sustaining a motion
to quash would not bar another prosecution. That is, of course, unless respondents are able to
prove that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished, or that double jeopardy has
already attached.
Given the foregoing, the Court no longer sees the necessity to pass upon the other issues
raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 171222 is hereby DENIED
and the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 174786, DISMISSED. The dismissal of the case in
Sandiganbayan Resolutions dated 27 January 2006 and 3 August 2006 in Criminal Case No.
28339 are thus AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

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