Federallawrequiresreportingonsomeformsofsurveillance

Eachyearsince1997,theAdministrativeOfficeoftheUSCourtshascompiledandpublishedadetailed
reportonthenumberoflawenforcementwiretapsandotherelectronicinterceptsthatoccurred,atthe
stateandfederallevel,inthepreviousyear.Thereportisextraordinaryinitshighqualityianddetail,
revealingthenumberofwiretapsrequestedandapprovedonacity/countyscale,thekindof
interception(phone,computer,pager,fax),thenumberofpeoplewhosecommunicationswere
intercepted,thenumberofinterceptedmessages,thenumberofarrestsandconvictionsthatresulted
fromtheinterception,andthefinancialcostofthewiretap.Notablymissingfromthereportarethe
namesofthetelecommunicationscarriersthatreceivedandcompliedwiththerequests.

Likewise,eachyear,theDepartmentofJusticeisrequiredtosubmitseveralsurveillancerelatedreports
toCongress.Likethewiretapreport,noneofthesereportsincludeanyinformationaboutthe
companiesthatreceivetheorders.Thesereportsare:

1. Areportregardingtheuseofpenregistersandtrap&tracedevicesbyfederallawenforcement
agencies.ii
2. Areportdetailingthenumberofemergencydisclosuresofthecontentsofcommunicationsto
theDepartmentofJusticebyInternetServiceProviders,pursuanttoUSC2702(b)(8).iii
3. AreportdetailingthenumberofapplicationsmadebytheGovernmenttoconductelectronic
surveillanceand/orphysicalsearchesundertheForeignIntelligenceSurveillanceAct,Section
215requestsforbusinessrecordsandtangiblethingsforforeignintelligencepurposes,and
nationalsecurityletterssentbytheFederalBureauofInvestigation.iv

Mostfederalsurveillancestatisticsareflawed

Unfortunately,theDOJreportslackthedetail,scopeandqualityoftheWiretapReportssubmittedby
theUSCourts,andareeachflawedinnumerousways.

Thepenregisterandtrapandtracereportsareparticularlyflawed:

1. TheyonlyapplytofederalordersobtainedbytheDepartmentofJustice.Stateandlocaluseof
penregisters(whicharelikelyfargreaterinnumber)arenotreported.
2. Between1999and2003,theDepartmentofJusticefailedtocomplywiththerequirementthat
thereportbesubmittedtoCongresseachyear.Instead,19992003datawasprovidedto
Congressinasingle"documentdump,"whichsubmittedfiveyearsofreportsinNovember
2004.vInOctober2009,theDepartmentofJusticesentanotherdocumentdumptoCongress,
thistimeprovidingthereportsfor20042008.vi
3. Inaddition,whenthereportshaveeventuallybeenprovidedtoCongress,thedocumentsfailed
toincludealloftheinformationthatthePenRegisterActrequirestobesharedwithlawmakers.
 Thedocumentsdonotdetailtheoffensesforwhichthepenregisterandtrapandtraceorders
wereobtained,asrequiredby18U.S.C.3126(2).Furthermore,thedocumentsdonotidentify
thedistrictorbranchofficeoftheagenciesthatsubmittedthepenregisterrequests,
informationrequiredby18U.S.C.3126(8).vii
4. Thereportsarenotmadepublicbydefault,contrarytoCongressionalintent.viiiThereportsthat
arecurrentlypublicareasaresultofFreedomofInformationActrequestsfiledbyprivacy
activists.

Similarly,theemergencyrequestreportsarepracticallyworthless,listingonlytherequestsmadeatthe
federallevelandnotlocalorstatelevel.Theyalsoonlycoveremergencyrequestsforcontent,butnot
thelikelyfarmorenumerousemergencyrequestsfornoncontentandaccountinformation.Thus,
althoughVerizonreceivesover25,000emergencyrequestsperyearfromgovernmentagencies,the
reportcompiledbytheDepartmentofJustice(coveringemergencyrequeststoallcarriersandISPs)
revealslessthan20requestsperyear.

Finally,theFISA,Section215andnationalsecurityletterreportsprovidelittleusefulinformation,as
theydonotlistthenumberofindividualsorconnectionsmonitored.ix

Surveillancestatisticshelptoinformthepublicdebateofsurveillancepolicy

Inspiteoftheirmanyflaws,theexistingsurveillancereportsarestilluseful,andprovideacademics,
privacyactivistsandthoseinCongresswithapartialsenseofthescaleofmodernsurveillance,atleast
atthefederallevel.

Forexample,thewiretapreportdocumentsthesignificantdeclineofelectronicsurveillanceorders
(whicharerequiredtointerceptInternettraffic,computer,pagersandfaxmachines),fromnearly700
peryearin1998,tolessthan10eachin2006,2007and2008.xSimilarly,thenumberofwiretaps
involvingfixedlocationshasdeclinedastheuseofmobilecommunications,includingtextmessaging
fromcellulartelephones,hasbecomeincreasinglywidespread.In2009,atotalof96percent(2,276
wiretaps)ofallauthorizedwiretapswereforportabledevices.xiFinally,thereportsrevealoneofthe
lesserknownsideeffectsofthewarondrugs:theexpansionofthesurveillancestate.Thus,86percent
ofallwiretapsinvolveadruginvestigation.

Thepenregisterreportsalsodocumentthesignificantgrowthintheuseofpenregisterandtrap&
tracesovertheyears6,976penregistersand3898trapandtraceorderswereobtainedbyfederal
agenciesin2004,comparedtothe11,126penregistersand9773trapandtraceordersobtainedin
2008.xiiThereportsrevealtheextenttowhichtheuseofthesesurveillancetechniquesdwarfsthe
numberofwiretaps.Forexample,in2008,Federalagentsused54timesmorepenregistersandtrap&
tracesthanintercepts.Perhapsthiswasbecauseeachofthe386Federalinterceptorders(describedas
superwarrantsbysomeexpertsxiii)obtainedin2008hadtobethoroughlyevaluatedandthen
approvedbyajudge,whilethe20,899penregistersandtrap&tracerequestsonlyreceivedacursory
reviewatbest.xiv
Thepublishedstatisticsarealsoextremelyusefulatdebunkingoverblownandhyperbolicclaimsbylaw
enforcementofficialsandsomelegislators,whohaverepeatedlyoverstatedparticularthreatsinorder
tojustifythepassageofdraconiannewsurveillanceauthorities.Forexample,overthepasttwo
decades,highlevelfederalofficialshaverepeatedlypaintedencryptiontechnologyasademonthatwill
thwartthegovernmentsabilitytoengageinlegitimateinvestigations.xvThemotivationfortheirclaims
hasbeenadesiretoseekthepassageofmandatorykeyescrowlegislation,andcompanionstatutes
banningtheuseofencryptionwithoutsuchbackdoors.xvi

In2000,SenatorsLeahyandHatchsuccessfullyamendedthewiretapreportingrequirementstoalso
includestatisticsonthenumberofinterceptordersinwhichencryptionwasencounteredandwhether
suchencryptionpreventedlawenforcementfromobtainingtheplaintextofcommunications
interceptedpursuanttosuchorder.xviiSpeakingontheSenatefloorinsupportofhisamendment,
SenatorLeahyarguedthatcompilingthestatisticswouldbeafarmorereliablebasisthananecdotal
evidenceonwhichtoassesslawenforcementneedsandmakesensiblepolicyinthisarea.

Sincetheencryptionreportingrequirementwasaddedin2000,therehavebeenatotalof91instances
inwhichencryptionwasencounteredduringafederalorstatewiretap,andnotasingleinstancein
whichtheencryptionpreventedlawenforcementofficialsfromobtainingtheplaintextof
communicationsintercepted.Furthermore,overthepast4years,thenumberofinstancesinwhich
encryptionwasencounteredhasplungedtolessthan2casesperyear.xviiiThetotalsforeachyear
presentedinthetablebelow.

Year Stateandfederalwiretapsin Wiretapswhereencryptionprevented

whichencryptionwas officialsobtainingplaintextof
encountered communications
2000 22 0
2001 34 0
2002 16 0
2003 1 0
2004 2 0
2005 13 0
2006 0 0
2007 0 0
2008 2 0
2009 1 0

Statisticsnamingcompaniesanddetailingtheirassistancewithcertain
activitiescouldhelptocreateamarketforsurveillanceprivacy

Boththecurrentlyreleasedofficialsurveillancestatistics,aswellasthestatisticsvoluntarilyprovidedby
companiesdolittletoenableconsumers(andtheirproxies,suchaspublicinterestgroupsandthe
media)todeterminewhichcompaniesarethemostprivacyprotecting.

Forexample,Verizonreceived88,000governmentrequestsin2006,whileGooglereceived3,000
requestsfromtheUSgovernmentduringsixmonthsof2009.DoesthismeanthatVerizonisaworse
companyforprivacy,orabetterone?Itisimpossibletoknow.Missingfromthesenumbersaredetails
onthenumberofrequeststhateachcompanyrefusedtocomplywith,theamountofdatathatwas
eventuallydisclosed,andthenumberofcustomerswhosedatawasdelivered.

Inordertostimulateamarketforeffectivecorporateresistancetogovernmentsurveillance,public
statisticsneedtodocumentactivitiesandpoliciesoverwhichthecarriersandprovidersactuallyhave
somedegreeofcontrol.

Specifically,meaningfulinformationandstatisticswouldinclude:

1. Thenumberofemergencyrequeststhecompanyreceived,inwhichnosubpoena,courtorder
orotherlegalprocesswassubmitted.
2. Thenumberofemergencyrequeststhatthecompanyrejected,andthenumberitcomplied
with.
3. Thenumberofinstancesinwhichthecompanyrefusedtocomplywithademandfor
information,andwenttocourttoquashtheorder.
4. Thekindofinformationsought(prospective/realtime,orhistorical).Intheeventthatlogsor
otherstoredinformationissought,theageoftheinformationdisclosedtothegovernmentfor
eachrequest.
5. Thenumberofinstancesinwhichthecompanyhadnothingusefultodeliver,duetodata
deletionpolicies,ortheuseofencryptioninwhichitdoesnothavethekey.

Fixingthesurveillancestats

Overthelastdecade,CongresshaslargelyfailedtoprotectAmericansfromtheincreasinggazeoflaw
enforcementandintelligenceagencies.Timeandtimeagain,thegovernmentsauthorityhasbeen
expanded,andtheevidentiarythresholdrequiredtogetaccesstosensitivedatahasbeenlowered.In
onerareinstancewheremanyinCongressbelievedtheywerestrengtheningprivacyprotections,the
statutorychangewaslaterrevealedtohaveactuallyexpandedtheDepartmentofJusticesabilitytoget
data.xix

Becauseofthistrend,IholdtheratherpessimisticviewthatCongressisunlikelytopassanylegislation
restrictinglawenforcementandintelligenceagenciesaccesstocitizensprivatedata,orthatisintended
toencouragecompaniestosaynotogovernmentrequests.However,Congressdoeshaveaprettygood
recordinsuccessfullypassinglegislationtoincreasetransparencyovercertainsurveillanceactivities.xx
Althoughtherearenumerousflawsintheexistingsurveillancereportingrequirements,whichI
describedabove,itisnotunreasonabletoimagineCongressattemptingtofixtheseflaws,ifjusttobe
abletobetterperformitsoversightresponsibilities.Assuch,Inowpresentseveralspecificlegislative
proposalsthatwouldsignificantlyenhancethestatutorysurveillancereportingrequirements.

Penregisterandtrapandtracereports

First,Congressshouldmakethepenregister/trap&tracereportingrequirementsapplytostateand
localuseofthesesurveillancetechniques,justastheWiretapReportalreadycoversnonfederal
electronicandtelephoneintercepts.xxi

Second,penregisterandtrap&traceordersaresealedforeverbydefault,xxiiandasaresult,mostcases
remainsealedforever.xxiiiThisisincontrasttothedelayednoticeprovisionsforrequestsforstored
communicationsmadepursuantto18USC2703(d),whichcanbedelayedfor90days(andthiscanbe
repeatedlyextended).Congressshouldmodifythepenregisterstatutetomirrorthedelayednotice
provisionsspecified18USC2705,sothatthesealontheseorderseventually,andnaturallyexpire.That
is,thedefaultshouldbeforeventualtransparency,ratherthanperpetualsecrecy.

Third,responsibilityforcreatingandpublishingthesereportsshouldbetransferredtothe
AdministrativeOfficeoftheUSCourts,sincetheDepartmentofJusticehasprovenitselftobegrossly
incompetentinmeetingthestatutoryreportingrequirementsbothbynotincludingtherequireddata,
andbysubmittingtheannualreportsonlyonceeveryfiveyears.

Emergencyrequestreportsrequiredby18USC2702(b)(8)

First,thesereportsshouldincluderequestsmadebystateandlocalauthorities,whichsubmitseveral
ordersofmagnitudemorerequestsperyear.xxiv

Second,thereportsshouldalsoapplytoemergencyrequestsforrecordsorothernoncontent
informationmadepursuantto18USC2702(c)(4),inadditiontotherequestsforcontentpursuantto18
USC2702(b)(8)thatarecurrentlyrecorded.

Third,thereportsshouldincludethenumberofrequests,andnotjustthenumberofinstancesinwhich
thegovernmentreceivedinformationinresponsetoanemergencyrequest.Thatis,thereportshould
clearlyindicatethenumberofinstancesinwhichcompaniesrefusedtoprovidetheinformationsought.

Newreportingrequirements

Congressshouldrequirethemandatoryreportingofstatisticsregardingthecompelleddisclosureof
customerrecordsandcommunications(bothcontentandnoncontent).Thiswouldapplytothe
disclosureoffinancialrecords,creditcardtransactions,storedemailmessages,instantmessages,
documentsstoredinthecloud,geolocationinformation(historicalandprospective,regardlessofthe
legalprocessusedtoobtainit),searchenginerecords,IPaddressandotheraccesslogs,andsubscriber
information.Thisinformationiscurrentlynotreportedatall,andlikelyconsistsofhundredsof
thousandsofrequestsperyear.

Finally,Congressshouldrequirethatwherepossible,thenamesofthecompaniesthatreceiveand
respondtoordersbedocumentedinthereports.WhilealloftheotherreportingfixesIhavesuggested
wouldimprovetheextenttowhichCongress,andpublicunderstandthescaleofcertainsurveillance
activities,withoutbeingabletocomparethedegreetowhichindividualcompaniesreceiveandrespond
totheserequests,thepublicwillbeunabletodeterminehowprivacypreserving(orprogovernment)
theirprovideris.

i
TheAOhasdoneanexcellentjobofpreparingthewiretapreports.StatementbySenatorLeahy,CONTINUED
REPORTINGOFINTERCEPTEDWIRE,ORAL,ANDELECTRONICCOMMUNICATIONSACT(SenateDecember03,
1999),availableathttp://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi
bin/getpage.cgi?dbname=1999_record&page=S15228&position=all
ii
TheAttorneyGeneralshallannuallyreporttoCongressonthenumberofpenregisterordersandordersfortrap
andtracedevicesappliedforbylawenforcementagenciesoftheDepartmentofJustice.18U.S.C.3126(2009).
iii
Onanannualbasis,theAttorneyGeneralshallsubmittotheCommitteeontheJudiciaryoftheHouseof
RepresentativesandtheCommitteeontheJudiciaryoftheSenateareportcontainingthenumberofaccounts
fromwhichtheDepartmentofJusticehasreceivedvoluntarydisclosuresundersubsection(b)(8);andasummary
ofthebasisfordisclosureinthoseinstanceswherevoluntarydisclosuresundersubsection(b)(8)weremadeto
theDepartmentofJustice;andtheinvestigationpertainingtothosedisclosureswasclosedwithoutthefilingof
criminalcharges.18USC2702(d).
iv
Seesections107and502oftheForeignIntelligenceSurveillanceActof1978(the"Act"),asamended,50U.S.C.
1801etseq.,andsection118ofUSAPATRIOTImprovementandReauthorizationActof2005,Pub.L.No.109177
(2006).
v
LetterfromWilliamMoschella,AssistantAttorneyGeneral,toCongressmanJohnConyers,Jr,etal.,Nov.3,2004
availableathttp://paulschwartz.net/pdf/penregisterreport.pdf
vi
LetterfromRonaldWeich,AssistantAttorneyGeneral,toCongressmanJohnConyers,Jr,etal.,October29,2009.
Onfilewithauthor.
vii
http://epic.org/privacy/wiretap/ltr_pen_trap_leahy_final.pdfatpage3.
viii
Inthisway,theCongressandthepublicwillbeinformedofthosejurisdictionsusingthissurveillance
techniqueinformationwhichiscurrentlynotincludedintheAttorneyGeneralsannualreports.Statementof
SenatorLeahy,http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=f:s236is.txt.pdf
ix
AJusticeDepartmentofficialattributedthedropofftotherecentchangesinthelawandcautionedagainst
drawinginferencesbasedonthenumbersalone.ThenumberofForeignIntelligenceSurveillanceActapplications
submittedtotheForeignIntelligenceSurveillanceCourtdecreasedin2008andagainin2009duetosignificant
changesinthelegalauthoritiesthatgovernFISAsurveillancespecifically,theenactmentoftheFISA
AmendmentsActin2008andshiftingoperationaldemands,butthefluctuationinthenumberofapplications

doesnotinanywayreflectachangeincoverage,theofficialsaid.http://www.mainjustice.com/2010/05/07/fisa
applicationsdippedagainin2009/
WilliamMoschella,formerPrincipalAssociateDeputyAttorneyGeneralintheBushadministration,saidthe2008
amendmentseliminatedtheneedforFISAwarrantsinsomeinstances
x
Thisismostlikelyduetothefactthatcellphonesandtextmessageserviceshavelargelyreplacedpagers.Cell
phoneinterceptsarereportedaswireintercepts,whereaspagerinterceptsarereportedaselectronicintercepts.
xi
Seehttp://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/WiretapReports/2009/2009Wiretaptext.pdf
xii
See:http://files.spyingstats.com/prtt/DOJpenregisters20042008.pdf
xiii
http://intelligence.senate.gov/050419/kerr.pdf
xiv
See18U.S.C.3123(a)(1).Thecourtwillnotconductan"independentjudicialinquiryintotheveracityofthe
attestedfacts."InreApplicationofUnitedStates,846F.Supp.1555,1559(M.D.Fla.1994).SeealsoUnitedStates
v.Fregoso,60F.3d1314,1320(8thCir.1995)("Thejudicialroleinapprovinguseoftrapandtracedevicesis
ministerialinnature.")
xv
JanetReno,Clinton'sattorneygeneral,saidinSeptember1999thatthenewregulationsstruckareasonable
balancebetweenprivacyandsecurity.Whenstoppingaterroristattackorseekingtorecoverakidnappedchild,
encounteringencryptionmaymeanthedifferencebetweensuccessandcatastrophicfailures.
ThefourhijackedairplanesandthedisasterstheycreatedhaveabruptlyreturnedthedebateonCapitolHillto
whereitwasyearsago,whenFBIDirectorLouisFreehspentmuchofhistimetellinganyonewhowouldlistenthat
terroristswereusingencryptionandCongressshouldapproverestrictionsondomesticuse.Wearevery
concerned,asthiscommitteeis,abouttheencryptionsituation,particularlyasitrelatestofightingcrimeand
fightingterrorism,FreehtoldtheSenateJudiciarycommitteeinSeptember1998.NotjustbinLaden,butmany
otherpeoplewhoworkagainstusintheareaofterrorism,arebecomingsophisticatedenoughtoequip
themselveswithencryptiondevices.Headded:Webelievethatanunrestrictedproliferationofproductswithout
anykindofcourtaccessandlawenforcementaccess,willharmus,andmakethefightagainstterrorismmuch
moredifficult.http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/2001/09/46816
xvi
"Justiceshouldgoaheadnowandseekalegislativefixtothedigitaltelephonyproblem,andallpartiesshould
preparetofollowthroughontheencryptionprobleminaboutayear.Successwithdigitaltelephonywilllockin
onemajorobjective;wewillhaveabeachheadwecanexploitfortheencryptionfix;andtheencryptionaccess
optionscanbedevelopedmorethoroughlyinthemeantimehttp://epic.org/privacy/wiretap/calea/Scowcroft.gif
InafloorspeechonThursday,Sen.JuddGregg(RNewHampshire)calledforaglobalprohibitiononencryption
productswithoutbackdoorsforgovernmentsurveillance.Thisissomethingthatweneedinternational
cooperationonandweneedtohavemovementoninordertogettheinformationthatallowsustoanticipate
andpreventwhatoccurredinNewYorkandinWashington,Greggsaid.Gregg,theGOP'schiefdeputywhip,
predictedthatwithoutsucharequirement,thequantumleapthathasoccurredinthecapacitytoencrypt
informationwillfrustratetheU.S.government'seffortstopreservethesafetyofAmericans.
http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/2001/09/46816;Seegenerally,ARTICLE:THEMETAPHORISTHEKEY:
CRYPTOGRAPHY,THECLIPPERCHIP,ANDTHECONSTITUTION,MichaelFroomkin,JANUARY,1995,143U.Pa.L.
Rev.709.
xvii
PublicLaw106197amended18U.S.C.2519(2)(b)in2001torequirethatreportingshouldreflectthenumber
ofwiretapapplicationsgrantedinwhichencryptionwasencounteredandwhethersuchencryptionpreventedlaw
enforcementofficialsfromobtainingtheplaintextofthecommunicationsinterceptedpursuanttothecourt
orders

Encryptiontechnologyiscriticaltoprotectsensitivecomputerandonlineinformation.Yet,thesametechnology
poseschallengestolawenforcementwhenitisexploitedbycriminalstohideevidenceorthefruitsofcriminal
activities.AreportbytheU.S.WorkingGrouponOrganizedCrimetitled,EncryptionandEvolvingTechnologies:
ToolsofOrganizedCrimeandTerrorism,releasedin1997,collectedanecdotalcasestudiesontheuseof
encryptioninfurtheranceofcriminalactivitiesinordertoestimatethefutureimpactofencryptiononlaw
enforcement.Thereportnotedtheneedforanongoingstudyoftheaffectofencryptionandotherinformation
technologiesoninvestigations,prosecutions,andintelligenceoperations.Aspartofthisstudy,adatabaseofcase
informationfromfederalandlocallawenforcementandintelligenceagenciesshouldbeestablishedand

maintained.Addingarequirementthatreportsbefurnishedonthenumberofoccasionswhenencryptionis
encounteredbylawenforcementisafarmorereliablebasisthananecdotalevidenceonwhichtoassesslaw
enforcementneedsandmakesensiblepolicyinthisarea.See:http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi
bin/getpage.cgi?dbname=1999_record&page=S15228&position=all
xviii
In2009,encryptionwasencounteredduringonestatewiretap,butdidnotpreventofficialsfromobtainingthe
plaintextofthecommunications.
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/WiretapReports/2009/2009Wiretaptext.pdf
In2008,twoinstanceswerereportedofencryptionsencounteredduringstatewiretaps;neitherprevented
officialsfromobtainingtheplaintextofthecommunications.
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/WiretapReports/2008/2008WTText.pdf
In2007,noinstanceswerereportedofencryptionencounteredduringanyfederalorstatewiretap.
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/WiretapReports/2007/2007WTText.pdf
In2006,noinstanceswerereportedofencryptionencounteredduringanyfederalorstatewiretap.
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/WiretapReports/2006/2006WT.pdf
In2005,noinstanceswerereportedofencryptionsbeingencounteredduringafederalwiretap.State
jurisdictionsreported13instancesinwhichencryptionwasencounteredinwiretapsterminatedin2005;however,
innoneoftheseinstancesdidtheencryptionpreventlawenforcementofficialsfromobtainingtheplaintextof
communicationsintercepted.http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/WiretapReports/2005/WTText.pdf
In2004,twoinstanceswerereportedofencryptionsbeingencounteredonwiretaps.Onefederaljurisdictionand
onestatejurisdictioneachreportedthatencryptionwasencounteredinawiretapterminatedin2004;however,in
bothcases,theencryptionwasreportedtohavenotpreventedlawenforcementofficialsfromobtainingtheplain
textofcommunicationsintercepted.
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/WiretapReports/2004/2004WireTap.pdf
In2003,noinstanceswerereportedofencryptionsbeingencounteredonfederalwiretaps.Onestatejurisdiction
reportedthatencryptionwasencounteredinawiretapterminatedin2003;however,theencryptionwasreported
tohavenotpreventedlawenforcementofficialsfromobtainingtheplaintextofcommunicationsintercepted.
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/WiretapReports/2003/2003WireTap.pdf
Encryptionwasreportedtohavebeenencounteredin16wiretapsterminatedin2002andin18wiretaps
terminatedincalendaryear2001orearlierbutreportedforthefirsttimein2002;however,innoneofthesecases
wasencryptionreportedtohavepreventedlawenforcementofficialsfromobtainingtheplaintextof
communicationsintercepted.http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/WiretapReports/2002/2002wttxt.pdf
Encryptionwasreportedtohavebeenencounteredin16wiretapsterminatedin2001;however,innoneofthese
caseswasencryptionreportedtohavepreventedlawenforcementofficialsfromobtainingtheplaintextof
communicationsintercepted.http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/WiretapReports/2001/2001wttxt.pdf
In2000,encryptionwasreportedtohavebeenencounteredin22wiretaps;however,innoneofthesecaseswas
encryptionreportedtohavepreventedlawenforcementofficialsfromobtainingtheplaintextof
communicationsintercepted.
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/WiretapReports/2000/2000wttxt.pdf
xix
TheUSAPATRIOTReauthorizationandImprovementActof2005(actuallypassedin2006)madeanumberof
changestoPatriotsurveillancepowers,amongthemaprovisionrequiringspecialhighlevelauthorization
beforecertaincategoriesofsensitiverecordscouldbeobtainedunderFISAsbusinessrecordsprovision,
usuallyreferredtoasSection215.Theveryslightcontemporarydiscussionofthischangeseemstohave
universallytakenforgrantedthatthiswasanaddedlimitationonintelligencepowers.Thelegalanalysis
providedbythenonpartisanCongressionalResearchServicecharacterizedtheseasenhancedprocedural
protectionsInfact,theeffectofthischangewastoenableaccesstomanyoftheserecordsforthefirst
time.See:http://www.juliansanchez.com/2010/03/15/oversighttheaterandsecretlaw/
xx
Section804oftheImplementingRecommendationsofthe9/11CommissionActof2007,Pub.L.11053,entitled
theFederalAgencyDataMiningReportingActrequiresthatfederalagenciesusingordevelopingdatamining
programstosubmitdetailedreportstoCongressabouttheirprograms.
TheUSAPATRIOTImprovementandReauthorizationActrequired:directstheAttorneyGeneraltosubmitto
Congressanannualreportregardingtheuseofsection215authority(Section106(h)).Section106AoftheAct

providesfortheInspectorGeneraloftheDepartmentofJusticetoconductacomprehensiveaudittodetermine
theeffectiveness,andidentifyanyabuses,concerningtheuseofsection215authority,forcalendaryears2002
2006.Inaddition,theAttorneyGeneralmustsubmitareportsemiannuallyonallNSLrequestsmadeunderthe
FairCreditReportingAct.TheAttorneyGeneralisalsoinstructedtosubmittoCongressanannualreport
describingthetotalnumberofrequestsmadebytheDepartmentofJusticeundertheNSLstatutes.Thisreportis
tobeunclassified,inordertopermitpublicscrutiny.See:http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33332.pdf
PublicLaw106197amended18U.S.C.2519(2)(b)in2001torequirethatreportingshouldreflectthenumberof
wiretapapplicationsgrantedinwhichencryptionwasencounteredandwhethersuchencryptionpreventedlaw
enforcementofficialsfromobtainingtheplaintextofthecommunicationsinterceptedpursuanttothecourt
orders.ItalsorequirestheAttorneyGeneraltoreporttoCongressontheidentity,includingthedistrict,ofthe
agencymakingthepenregisterandtrapandtraceapplicationsandthepersonauthorizingtheorder.
xxi
Seegenerally:18USC2519,requiringreportingbyalljudges,principalprosecutingattorneyofaState,andthe
principalprosecutingattorneyforanypoliticalsubdivisionofaState.
xxii
ThePen/TrapStatutedirectsthattheordersbesealeduntilotherwiseorderedbythecourt,butleavesthe
durationofthesealingordertothediscretionofthecourt.18U.S.C.A.3123(d)(1).
xxiii
Whatissurprisingisthat,outof4,234electronicsurveillanceordersissuedfrom1995to2007,atotalof3,877
(91.6%)remainundersealtothisday.Thepercentagejumpsevenhigherifoneexcludesthe348orderswhich
werenotsealedtobeginwith.Thus,outof3,886ordersinitiallysealeduntilfurtherorderofthecourt,99.8%
arestillsecrettodaylongafterthecriminalinvestigationwasclosed.See:
http://www.fclr.org/fclr/articles/html/2009/jmffedctslrev5.pdf
xxiv
Forexample,ofthe88,000lawfulrequestsanddemandsVerizonreceivedfromfederal,stateandlocalofficials
in2006,25,000ofthemwererequestsforemergencyassistance.Ofthese25,000,just300requestswerefromthe
federalgovernment.