TodayisMonday,November07,2016

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
ENBANC
G.R.No.200903July22,2014
KALIPUNAN NG DAMAY ANG MAHIBIRAP, INC., represented by its VicePresident, CARLITO BADION,
CORAZON DE JESUS HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, represented by its President, ARNOLD REPIQUE,
FERNANDO SEVILLA as President of Samahang Pamata sa Kapatirang Kr.istiyano, ESTRELIETA
BAGASBAS,JOCYLOPEZ,ELVIRAVIDOL,andDELIAFRAYRES,Petitioners,
vs.
JESSIEROBREDO,inhiscapacityasSecretary,DepartmentofInteriorandLocalGovernment,Hon.GUIA
GOMEZ,inhercapacityasMAYOROFTHECITY.OFSANJUAN,Hon.HERBERTBAUTISTA,inhiscapacity
astheMAYOROFQUEZONCITY,Hon.JOHNREYTIANGCO,inhiscapacityasMAYOROFNAVOTASCITY,
andtheGENERALMANAGERoftheNATIONALHOUSINGAUTHORITY,Respondents.
DECISION
BRION,J.:
This is a petition for prohibition and mandamus to enjoin the public respondents from evicting the individual
petitioners as well as the petitionerassociations members from their dwellings in the cities of San Juan, Navotas
andQuezonwithoutanycourtorder,andtocompeltherespondentstoaffordthemjudicialprocesspriortoevictions
and demolitions. The petition primarily seeks to declare asunconstitutional Section 28 (a) and (b) of Republic Act
No. 7279 (RA 7279), otherwise known as Urban Development Housing Act, which authorizes evictions and
demolitionsundercertaincircumstanceswithoutanycourtorder.
TheFactualAntecedents
The members of petitioners Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap, Inc. and Corazon de Jesus Homeowners
Associationaswellastheindividualpetitioners,FernandoSevilla,EstrelietaBagasbas,JocyLopez,ElviraVidoland
Delia Frayres, were/are occupying parcels of land owned by and located in the cities of San Juan, Navotas and
Quezon (collectively, the LGUs1). These LGUs sent the petitioners notices of eviction and demolition pursuant to
Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 in order to give way to the implementation and construction of infrastructure
projects2intheareasillegallyoccupiedbythepetitioners.3
Section28(a)and(b)ofRA7279authorizeevictionsanddemolitionswithoutanycourtorderwhen:(1)personsor
entitiesoccupydangerareassuchasesteros,railroadtracks,garbagedumps,riverbanks,shorelines,waterways,
andotherpublicplacessuchassidewalks,roads,parks,andplaygroundsand(2)personsorentitiesoccupyareas
wheregovernmentinfrastructureprojectswithavailablefundingareabouttobeimplemented.
ThePetition
OnMarch23,2012,thepetitionersdirectlyfiledapetitionforprohibitionandmandamusbeforetheCourt,seekingto
compel the Secretary of Interior and Local Government, et al. (the public respondents)to first secure an eviction
and/ordemolitionorderfromthecourtpriortotheirimplementationofSection28(a)and(b)ofRA7279.
The petitioners justify their directrecourse before this Court by generally averring that they have no plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.4 They also posit that the respondents gravely abused their
discretion in implementing Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 which are patently unconstitutional. They likewise
insistthattheystandtobedirectlyinjuredbytherespondentsthreatsofevictionsanddemolitions.Inthealternative,
they contend that the transcendental public importance of the issues raised in this case clothes them with legal
standing.5

ThepetitionersarguethatSection28(a)and(b)ofRA7279offendtheirconstitutionalrighttodueprocessbecause
theywarrantevictionsanddemolitionswithoutanycourtorder.TheypointoutthatSection6,Article3ofthe1987
Constitutionexpresslyprohibitstheimpairmentoflibertyofabodeunlessthereisacourtorder.Moreover,Section
28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 violate their right to adequate housing, a universal right recognized in Article 25 of
Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights and Section 2 (a) of RA 7279. The petitioners further complain that the
respondentshadpreviouslyconductedevictionsanddemolitionsinaviolentmanner,contrarytoSection10,Article
13ofthe1987Constitution.6
TheRespondentsCase
A.ThePositionoftheMayorofNavotas
The Mayor of Navotas prays for the outright dismissal of the petition for its serious procedural defects. First, the
petitionersignoredthehierarchyofcourtswhentheydirectlyfiledaRule65petitionbeforetheCourt.7Second,the
petitionersincorrectlyavailedthemselvesofapetitionforprohibitionandmandamusinassailingtheconstitutionality
ofSection28(a)and(b)ofRA7279.AccordingtotheMayorofNavotas,theofficeofawritofprohibitionismerely
topreventthepublicrespondentsusurpationofpowerorimproperassumptionofjurisdiction.Ontheotherhand,a
writofmandamusonlycommandsthepublicrespondenttoperformhisministerialfunctions.Third,thepetitioners
failedtoparticularlystatethegraveabuseofdiscretionthattheMayorofNavotasallegedlycommitted.Fourth,the
petitiondoesnotpresentanyjusticiablecontroversysincetheCityofNavotashadalreadysuccessfullyevictedthe
petitioners in San Roque, Navotas on November 28, 2011. Fifth, the petition was filed out of time since the
petitionerswerepersonallynotifiedoftheintendedevictionanddemolitiononSeptember23,2011.8
The Mayor argues that Section 10, Article 13 of the 1987 Constitution allows evictions and demolitions to
beconductedevenwithoutacourtorderprovidedtheyaredoneinaccordancewiththelawandinajustandhumane
manner.Accordingtohim,RA7279ispreciselythelawreferredtobySection10,Article13ofthe1987Constitution.
The Mayor also disputes the petitioners claim that RA 7279 does notafford the informal settlers procedural due
processpriortoevictionsanddemolitions.HepointsoutthatSection28ofRA7279anditsimplementingrulesand
regulations(IRR)mandatethattheaffectedpersonsorentitiesshallbegivennoticeatleastthirty(30)dayspriorto
the date of eviction or demolition. The respondents are likewise required to consult with the duly designated
representativesoftheaffectedfamiliesandcommunitieswithrespecttotheirrelocation.Hefurtherassertsthathis
faithful implementation of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279, which are presumed to be constitutional, cannotbe
equated to grave abuse of discretion. Lastly, the Mayor of Navotas insists that the petitioners invocation of their
righttofreelychoosetheirabodeismisplacedsincetheyhavenovestedrighttooccupypropertiesthattheydonot
own.9
B.ThePositionoftheMayorofSanJuan
The Mayor of San Juan similarly argues that the petitioners improperly availed themselves of a petition for
prohibition and mandamus before the Court. She contends thatshe performed neither judicial nor ministerial
functions in implementing RA 7279, the enabling law of Section 10, Article 13 of the 1987 Constitution. She also
maintains that the petition has been rendered moot and academic by the successful eviction of some of the
petitionersinPinaglabanan,CorazondeJesus,SanJuan.TheMayorofSanJuanfurtherstressesthatSection28
(a)and(b)ofRA7279alreadylaydowntheprocedureinevictinginformalsettlersinajustandhumanemanner.10
C.ThePositionoftheMayorofQuezon
The Mayor of Quezon City holds that the petitioners premature invocation of the Courts power of judicial review
andtheirviolationoftheprincipleofhierarchyofcourtsarefataltotheircauseofaction.Moreover,thepetitioners
failedtosubstantiatethematerialallegationsinthepetition.Headditionallyarguesthathisfaithfulimplementationof
RA 7279, which the legislature enacted inthe exercise of police power, does not amount to grave abuse of
discretion.11
D.ThePositionoftheSecretaryofInteriorandLocalGovernment
andtheGeneralManageroftheNationalHousingAuthority
TheSecretaryofInteriorandLocalGovernmentandtheNationalHousingAuthority(NHA)GeneralManageradopt
theMayorofNavotaspositionthatthepetitionisprocedurallyinfirm.Theyfurtherarguethatthelibertyofabodeis
not illimitable and does not include the right to encroach upon other person properties. They also reiterate that
Section28ofRA7279providessufficientsafeguardsinensuringthatevictionsanddemolitionsarecarriedoutina
justandhumanemanner.12
TheIssues
Thiscasepresentstousthefollowingissues:

(1)Whetherthepetitionshouldbedismissedforseriousproceduraldefectsand
(a)Whetherthepetitionersviolatedtheprincipleofhierarchyofcourts
(b)Whetherthepetitionerscorrectlyavailedthemselvesofapetitionforprohibitionandmandamus
(2) Whether Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 are violative of Sections 1 and 6, Article 3 of the 1987
Constitution.
TheCourtsRuling
Wedismissthepetition.
ThepetitionersviolatedtheprincipleofhierarchyofcourtswhentheydirectlyfiledthepetitionbeforetheCourt.
ThepetitionershaveundulydisregardedthehierarchyofcourtsbycomingdirectlytotheCourtwiththeirpetitionfor
prohibitionandmandamus.ThepetitionersappeartohaveforgottenthattheSupremeCourtisacourtoflastresort,
notacourtoffirstinstance.Thehierarchyofcourtsshouldserveasageneraldeterminantoftheappropriateforum
forRule65petitions.TheconcurrenceofjurisdictionamongtheSupremeCourt,CourtofAppealsandtheRegional
TrialCourtstoissuewritsofcertiorari,prohibition,mandamus,quowarranto,habeascorpusandinjunctiondoesnot
give the petitioners the unrestricted freedom of choice of forum. By directly filing Rule 65 petitions before us, the
petitionershaveundulytaxedtheCourtstimeandattentionwhicharebetterdevotedtomatterswithinourexclusive
jurisdiction. Worse, the petitioners only contributed to the overcrowding of the Court's docket. We also wish to
emphasizethatthetrialcourtisbetterequippedtoresolvecasesofthisnaturesincethisCourtisnotatrieroffacts
anddoesnotnormallyundertakeanexaminationofthecontendingpartiesevidence.13
Thepetitionerswronglyavailedthemselvesofapetitionforprohibitionandmandamus.
Wecannotalsoignorethepetitionersglaringerrorinusingapetitionforprohibitionandmandamusinthecurrent
case.
The petitioners seem to have forgotten that a writ of prohibition only lies against the tribunal, corporation, board,
officerorpersonsexerciseofjudicial,quasijudicialorministerialfunctions.14Weissueawritofprohibitiontoafford
theaggrievedpartyareliefagainsttherespondentsusurpationorgraveabuseofjurisdictionorpower.15
On the other hand, a petition for mandamus is merely directed against the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or
personwhounlawfullyneglectstheperformanceofanactwhichthelawenjoinsasadutyresultingfromanoffice,
trust or station or who unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such
otherisentitled.16Thus,awritofmandamuswillonlyissuetocompelanofficertoperformaministerialduty.Itwill
not control a public officers exercise of discretion as where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercisehis
judgmentinreferencetoanymannerinwhichheisrequiredtoactpreciselybecauseitishisjudgmentthatistobe
exercised,notthatofthecourt.17
Inthepresentcase,thepetitionersseektoprohibittherespondentsfromimplementingSection28(a)and(b)ofRA
7279withoutapriorcourtorderofevictionand/ordemolition.Inrelationtothis,paragraph1,Section28ofRA7279
provides:
Sec. 28. Eviction and Demolition. Eviction or demolition as a practice shall be discouraged. Eviction or
demolition,however,maybeallowedunderthefollowingsituations:
(a) When persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps,
riverbanks,shorelines,waterways,andotherpublicplacessuchassidewalks,roads,parks,andplaygrounds
(b)Whengovernmentinfrastructureprojectswithavailablefundingareabouttobeimplementedor
(c)Whenthereisacourtorderforevictionanddemolition.(emphasisandunderlineours)
A reading of this provision clearly shows that the acts complained of are beyond the scope of a petition for
prohibition and mandamus. The use of the permissive word "may" implies that the public respondents have
discretionwhentheirdutytoexecuteevictionsand/ordemolitionsshallbeperformed.Wherethewordsofastatute
are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation.18
Consequently,thetimewhenthepublicrespondentsshallcarryoutevictionsand/ordemolitionsunderSection28
(a), (b), and (c) of RA 7279 is merely discretionary, and not ministerial, judicial or quasijudicial. The duty is

discretionaryifthelawimposesadutyuponapublicofficerandgiveshimtherighttodecidewhenthedutyshallbe
performed.
In contrast, a ministerial duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts,in a
prescribedmanner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own
judgmentupontheproprietyorimproprietyoftheactdone.19
Ontheotherhand,bothjudicialandquasijudicialfunctionsinvolvethedeterminationofwhatthelawis,andwhat
thelegalrightsofthecontendingpartiesare,withrespecttothematterincontroversyand,onthebasisthereofand
thefactsobtaining,theadjudicationoftheirrespectiverights.20
TheresolutionoftheconstitutionalityofSection28(a)and(b)ofRA7279isnotthelismotaofthecase.
EvenifwetreatthepresentpetitionasoneforcertiorarisinceitassailstheconstitutionalityofSection28(a)and(b)
of RA 7279, the petition must necessarily fail for failure to show the essential requisites that would warrant the
Courtsexerciseofjudicialreview.Itisarulefirmlyentrenchedinourjurisprudencethatthecourtswillnotdetermine
the constitutionality of a law unless the following requisites are present: (1) the existence of an actual case or
controversyinvolvingaconflictoflegalrightssusceptibleofjudicialdetermination(2)theexistenceofpersonaland
substantialinterestonthepartofthepartyraisingtheconstitutionalquestion(3)recoursetojudicialreviewismade
attheearliestopportunityand(4)theresolutionoftheconstitutionalquestionmustbenecessarytothedecisionof
thecase.21
SaveforthepetitionpertainingtotheCityofQuezonsthreatofevictionanddemolition,thiscasenolongerpresents
ajusticiablecontroversywithrespecttotheMayorsofNavotasandSanJuan.WetakenoteoftheCommentsof
theseMayorswhoallegedthattheyhadalreadysuccessfullyevictedtheconcernedpetitionersintheirrespective
citiesatthetimeofthefilingofthepetition.
WhatfurtherconstrainsthisCourtfromtouchingontheissueofconstitutionalityisthefactthatthisissueisnotthe
lis mota of this case. Lis motaliterally means "the cause of the suit or action" it is rooted in the principle of
separation of powers and is thus merely an offshoot of the presumption of validity accorded the executive and
legislativeactsofourcoequalbranchesofthegovernment.
Thismeansthatthepetitionerwhoclaimstheunconstitutionalityofalawhastheburdenofshowingfirstthatthe
casecannotberesolvedunlessthedispositionoftheconstitutionalquestionthatheraisedisunavoidable.Ifthereis
some other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the question of
constitutionalityshouldbeavoided.22Thus,tojustifythenullificationofalaw,theremustbeaclearandunequivocal
breachoftheConstitution,andnotonethatisdoubtful,speculativeorargumentative.23
Wecarefullyreadthepetitionsandweconcludethattheyfailtocompellinglyshowthenecessityofexaminingthe
constitutionality of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 in the light of Sections 1 and 6, Article 3 of the 1987
Constitution.24InMagkalasv.NHA,25thisCourthadalreadyruledonthevalidityofevictionsanddemolitionswithout
anycourtorder.Inthatcase,weaffirmedthevalidityofSection2ofPresidentialDecreeNo.1472whichauthorizes
theNHAtosummarilyejectallinformalsettlerscoloniesongovernmentresettlementprojectsaswellasanyillegal
occupantinanyhomelot,apartmentordwellingunitownedoradministeredbytheNHA.Inthatcase,weheldthat
Caridad Magkalas illegal possession of the property should not hinder the NHAs development of Bagong Barrio
Urban Bliss Project. We further stated that demolitions and evictions may be validly carried out even without a
judicialorderinthefollowinginstances:(1)whenthepropertyinvolvedisanexpropriatedpropertyxxxpursuantto
Section1ofP.D.No.1315
(2) when there are squatters on government resettlement projects and illegal occupants in any homelot,
apartmentordwellingunitownedoradministeredbytheNHApursuanttoSection2ofP.D.No.1472
(3) when persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps,
riverbanks,shorelines,waterwaysandotherpublicplacessuchassidewalks,roads,parksandplaygrounds,
pursuanttoSection28(a)ofR.A.No.7279
(4)whengovernmentinfrastructureprojectswithavailablefundingareabouttobeimplementedpursuantto
Section28(b)ofR.A.No.7279.26(emphasisours)
WenotethatSection10,Article13ofthe1987Constitutionprovidesthaturbanorruralpoordwellersshallnotbe
evictednortheirdwellingdemolished,exceptinaccordancewithlawandinajustandhumanemanner.Paragraph1,
Section28ofRA7279allowssummaryevictionsanddemolitionincaseswherepersonsorentitiesoccupydanger
areasandwhenpersonsorentitiesoccupyareaswheregovernmentinfrastructureprojectswithavailablefunding
areabouttobeimplemented.

Toensurethatevictionsanddemolitionsareconductedinajustandhumanemanner,paragraph2,Section28of
RA7279commandsthepublicrespondentstocomplywiththefollowingprescribedprocedureinexecutingeviction
and/ordemolitionorders:
Intheexecutionofevictionordemolitionordersinvolvingunderprivilegedandhomelesscitizens,thefollowingshall
bemandatory:
(1) Notice upon the effected persons orentities at least thirty (30) days prior to the date of eviction or
demolition
(2) Adequate consultations on the matter of settlement with the duly designated representatives of the
familiestoberesettledandtheaffectedcommunitiesintheareaswheretheyaretoberelocated
(3)Presenceoflocalgovernmentofficialsortheirrepresentativesduringevictionordemolition
(4)Properidentificationofallpersonstakingpartinthedemolition
(5)ExecutionofevictionordemolitiononlyduringregularofficehoursfromMondaystoFridaysandduring
goodweather,unlesstheaffectedfamiliesconsentotherwise
(6) No use of heavy equipment for demolition except for structures that are permanent and of concrete
materials
(7) Proper uniforms for members ofthe Philippine National Police who shall occupy the first line of law
enforcementandobserveproperdisturbancecontrolproceduresand
(8)Adequaterelocation,whethertemporaryorpermanent:Provided,however,Thatincasesofevictionand
demolition pursuant to a court order involving underprivileged and homeless citizens, relocation shall be
undertakenbythelocalgovernmentunitconcernedandtheNationalHousingAuthoritywiththeassistanceof
other government agencies within fortyfive (45) days from service of notice of final judgment by the court,
afterwhichperiodthesaidordershallbeexecuted:Provided,further,Thatshouldrelocationnotbepossible
within the said period, financial assistance in the amount equivalent to the prevailing minimum daily wage
multiplied by sixty (60) days shall be extended to the affected families by the local government unit
concerned.
This Department of the Interior and Local Government and the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating
Councilshalljointlypromulgatethenecessaryrulesandregulationstocarryouttheaboveprovision.
Lastly, the petitioners failed to substantiate their allegations that the public respondents gravely abused their
discretioninimplementingSection28(a)and(b)ofRA7279.Instead,theymerelyimputedjurisdictionalabuseto
thepublicrespondentsthroughgeneralavermentsintheirpleading,butwithoutanybasistosupporttheirclaim.
ThisispreciselythereasonwhywefrownuponthedirectfilingofRule65petitionsbeforetheCourt. Tothepointof
beingrepetitive,we(xxxsourcetextmissing)
1wphi1

Lastly, the petitioners failed to substantiate their allegations that the public respondents gravely abused their
discretioninimplementingSection28(a)and(b)ofRA7279.Instead,theymerelyimputedjurisdictionalabuseto
thepublicrespondentsthroughgeneralavermentsintheirpleading,butwithoutanybasistosupporttheirclaim.
ThisispreciselythereasonwhywefrownuponthedirectfilingofRule65petitionsbeforetheCourt.Tothepointof
beingrepetitive,weemphasizethatwearenottrieroffactsandthisapplieswithgreaterforcetoRule65petitions
whichareoriginalandindependentactions.Tojustifyjudicialintrusionintowhatisfundamentallythedomainofthe
executive department, the petitioners must establish facts that are necessarily linked to the jurisdictional problem
theypresentedinthiscase,i.e.,whetherthepublicrespondentsexercisedtheirpowerinanarbitraryanddespotic
mannerbyreasonofpassionorpersonalhostilityinimplementingSection28(a)and(b)ofRA7279.
Sincethepetitionersfailedtoestablishthatthepublicrespondents'allegedabuseofdiscretionwassopatentand
grossastoamounttoanevasionortoaunilateralrefusaltoperformthedutyenjoinedortoactincontemplationof
law,thispetitionmustnecessarilyfail.27
WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,weherebyDISMISSthepetitionforitsseriousproceduraldefects.Nocosts.
SOORDERED.

ARTUROD.BRION
AssociateJustice
WECONCUR:
MARIALOURDESP.A.SERENO
ChiefJustice
ANTONIOT.CARPIO
AssociateJustice
ChiefJustice

PRESBITEROJ.VELASCO,JR.
AssociateJustice

TERESITAJ.LEONARDODECASTRO
AssociateJustice

DIOSDADOM.PERALTA
AssociateJustice

LUCASP.BERSAMIN
AssociateJustice

MARIANOC.DELCASTILLO
AssociateJustice

MARTINS.VILLARAMA,JR.
AssociateJustice

JOSEPORTUGALPEREZ
AssociateJustice

(Onleave)
JOSECATRALMENDOZA
AssociateJustice

BIENVENIDOL.REYES
AssociateJustice

ESTELAM.PERLASBERNABE
AssociateJustice

MARVICMARIOVICTORF.LEONEN
AssociateJustice

CERTIFICATION
PursuanttoSection13,ArticleVIIIoftheConstitution,IcertifythattheconclusionsintheaboveDecisionhadbeen
reachedinconsultationbeforethecasewasassignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourt.
MARIALOURDESP.A.SERENO
ChiefJustice

Footnotes
1

Localgovernmentunits.

Suchastheconstructionofcityhall,roadsandpublicschool.(SeeAnnexesDtoF,and1to3).

Rollo,pp.1011andAnnexesDtoG.

Id.at4.

Id.at67,1011.

Id.at1318.

MayorTiangcosCommenttothePetition,p.7.

Id.at45.

Id.at810.

10

MayorGomezCommenttothePetition,pp.58.

11

MayorBautistasCommenttothePetition,pp.26.

12

DILGSecretaryandtheGeneralManageroftheNHAsCommenttothePetition,pp.1349.

13

Baez,Jr.v.Concepcion,G.R.No.159508,August29,2012,679SCRA237Dacudaov.SecretaryRaul
Gonzales,G.R.No.188056,January8,2013,688SCRA109,115118.
14

RULESOFCOURT,Rule65,Section2.

15

Davidv.Rivera,464Phil.1006,10171018(2004).

16

RULESOFCOURT,Rule65,Section3.

17

Marcelo,Jr.v.Villordon,G.R.No.173081,December15,2010,638SCRA557,564565.

18

PhilippineAmusementandGamingCorporationv.PhilippineGamingJurisdiction,Incorporated,604Phil.
547,553(2009).
19

Espiridion v. Court of Appeals, 523 Phil. 664, 668 (2006), citing Codilla, Sr. v. de Venecia, 442 Phil. 139
(2002).
20

Doranv.Lucson,Jr.,534Phil.198,204205(2006).

21

Macasianov.NationalHousingAuthority,G.R.No.107921,July1,1993,224SCRA236,242.

22

Liban v. Gordon, G. R. No. 175352, January 18, 2011, 639 SCRA 709 and General v. Urro, G.R. No.
191560,March29,2011,646SCRA567.
23

Betoy v. Board of Directors, G.R. Nos. 15655657, October 4, 2011, 658 SCRA 420, 451452, citing
Gerochiv.DepartmentofEnergy,G.R.No.159796,July17,2007,527SCRA696.
24

Section1,Article3ofthe1987Constitutionprovides:
Nopersonshallbedeprivedoflife,liberty,orpropertywithoutdueprocessoflaw,norshallanyperson
bedeniedtheequalprotectionofthelaws.
Section6,Article3ofthe1987Constitutionprovides:
Section6.Thelibertyofabodeandofchangingthesamewithinthelimitsprescribedbylawshallnot
beimpairedexceptuponlawfulorderofthecourt.Neithershalltherighttotravelbeimpairedexceptin
theinterestofnationalsecurity,publicsafety,orpublichealth,asmaybeprovidedbylaw.

25

G.R.No.138823,587Phil.152,161(2008).

26

Id.at167168.

27

UnileverPhilippines,Inc.v.Tan,G.R.No.179367,January29,2014.

TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation