G.R. No.

115932

January 25, 1995

THE SPOUSES JOSE B. TIONGCO and LETICIA M. TIONGCO, petitioners,

vs.
HON. SEVERIANO C. AGUILAR, Judge, RTC, Branch 35, Iloilo City, and the Spouses
WILFREDO and LORENA AGUIRRE, respondents.

RESOLUTION

DAVIDE, J.:

In the resolution of 26 September 1994, this Court required ATTY. JOSE B.

TIONGCO, as counsel for the petitioners, to show cause why he should not be
dealt with administratively for the violation of Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility considering:

. . . the insinuation of counsel for the petitioners that this Court did not read the
petition as borne out by the following statement:

". . . Truly, it is hard to imagine that this Honorable Court had read the petition
and the annexes attached thereto and hold that the same has "failed to
sufficiently show that the respondent Court had committed a grave abuse of
discretion in rendering the questioned judgment". . .

which, as earlier noted, is unfounded and malicious, and considering further his
use of intemperate language in the petition, as exemplified by his
characterization of the decision of the respondent Judge as having been "crafted
in order to fool the winning party"; as a "hypocritical judgment in plaintiffs'
favor"; one "you could have sworn it was the Devil who dictated it"; or one with
"perfidious character," although the petitioners as plaintiffs therein and who were
the prevailing party in the decision did not appeal therefrom; and by his charge
that the respondent Judge was "a bit confused with that confusion which is the
natural product of having been born, nurtured and brought up amongst the

crowded surroundings of the non-propertied class; In fact, His Honor, Respondent

Judge, the Honorable Severino O. Aguilar had not owned any real property until
March 5, 1974 when his Honor was already either Public-Prosecutor or RTC Judge;
in one scale of the balance, a 311 square meter lot, 6 houses from the
Provincial Road, about 6 kilometers from the Iloilo City Hall of Justice, and, in the
other scale, His Honor's brand-new car, impeccable attire, and dignified "mien";
and his charge that the respondent Judge has "joined the defendants and their
counsel in a scheme to unlawfully deprive petitioners of the possession and fruits
of their property for the duration of appeal"; and with respect to the Order of 30
May 1994, by describing the respondent Judge as a "liar," "perjurer," or
"blasphemer."

In his 2-page Compliance, dated 11 October 1994, he alleges that:

If the undersigned has called anyone a "liar" "thief" "perfidious" and

"blasphemer" it is because he is in fact a liar, thief, perfidious and blasphemer;
"this Honorable [sic] First Division, however, forget, that the undersigned alsp
[sic] called him a "robber" (Petition, pp. 13 bottom; 14 bottom), a "rotten
manipulator" (Petition, p. 11 line 26) and "abetter" of graft and shady deals
(Petition, p. 12 bottom, p. 13 top); On the other hand, if the undersigned called
anybody "cross-eyed," it must be because he is indeed cross-eyed particularly
when he sees but five (5) letters in an eight (8) letter-word; Indeed, it must be a
lousy Code of Professional Responsibility and therefore stands in dire need of
amendment which punishes lawyer who truthfully expose incompetent and
corrupt judges before this Honorable Supreme Court; It is therefore, respectfully
submitted, that for all his pains, the undersigned does not deserve or is entitled
to the honors of being dealt with administratively or otherwise.

and prays:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the undersigned respectfully prays of this

Honorable Supreme Court, that it forebear from turning the undersigned into a
martyr to his principles.

Yet, he added the following:

WITH THE UNDERSIGNED'S RESPECTFUL APOLOGIES AND UNDYING LOVE

(Constitution, Preamble, 66 word).

It must at once be noted that Atty. Tiongco did not at all show cause why he
should not be dealt with administratively for violation of Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility in view of his unfounded and malicious insinuation
that this Court did not at all read the petition in this case before it concluded that
the petition failed to sufficiently show that the respondent court had committed a
grave abuse of discretion. Moreover, while he tried to justify as true his
descriptions of the respondent judge as a "liar," "thief." perfidious," and
"blasphemer" he did not offer any excuse for his use of the rest of the
intemperate words enumerated in the resolution. Worse, feeling obviously
frustrated at the incompleteness of the Court's enumeration of the intemperate
words or phrases, he volunteered to point out that in addition to those so
enumerated, he also called the respondent judge a "robber," "rotten
manipulator," "abettor" of graft and corruption, and "cross-eyed."

Atty. Tiongco's Compliance is unsatisfactory and is entirely unacceptable for the

following reasons: first, he impliedly admitted the falsity of his insinuation that
this Court did not read the petition' second, except as to the words "liar," "thief,"
"perfidious'" and "blasphemer," he failed to address squarely the other
intemperate words and phrases enumerated in the resolution of 26 September
1994, which failure amounts to an admission of their intemperateness; third, he
did not indicate the circumstances upon which his defense of truth lies; and,
fourth, he miserably failed to show the relevance of the harsh words and phrase
to his petition.

We do not then hesitate to rule that by falsely and maliciously insinuating that
this Court did not at all read the petition in this case, Atty. Tiongco not only
exhibited his gross disrespect to and contempt for this Court and exposed his plot
to discredit the Members of the First Division of the Court and put them to public
contempt or ridicule; he, as well, charged them with the violation of their solemn
duty to render justice, thereby creating or promoting distrust in judicial
administration which could have the effect of "encouraging discontent which, in
many cases, is the source of disorder, thus undermining the foundation on which
rests the bulwark called judicial power to which those who are aggrieved turn for
protection and relief" (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724 [1953]).

In using in the petition in this case intemperate and scurrilous words and phrases
against the respondent judge which are obviously uncalled for and entirely
irrelevant to the petition and whose glaring falsity is easily demonstrated by the
respondent judge's decision if favor of Atty. Tiongco and his wife in their case for
recovery of possession and damages, and by the dismissal of the instant petition
for failure of the petitioners to sufficiently show that the respondent judge
committed grave abuse of discretion, Atty. Tiongco has equally shown his

disrespect to and contempt for the respondent judge, thereby diminishing public
confidence in the latter and eventually, in the judiciary, or sowing mistrust in the
administration of justice.

Consequently, Atty. Tiongco has made a strong case for a serious violation of
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which reads as follows:

CANON 11 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO

THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR
CONDUCT BY OTHERS.

This duty is closely entwined with his vow in the lawyer's oath "to conduct
himself as a lawyer with all good fidelity to the courts"; his duty under Section 20
(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court "[t]o observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts of justice and judicial officers"; and his duty under the first canon of
the Canons Professional Ethics "to maintain towards the courts a respectful
attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for
the maintenance of its incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance
of its supreme importance."

In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer (20 SCRA 441, 444 [1967]), this Court said:

By now, a lawyer's duties to the Court had become commonplace. Really, there
could hardly be any valid excuse for lapses in the observance thereof. Section
20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells out one such
duty: "To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and
judicial officers." As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces
that "[i]t is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful
attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for
the maintenance of its supreme importance." That same canon, as a corollary,
makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against "unjust
criticism and clamor." And more. The attorney's oath solemnly binds him to
conduct that should be "with all good fidelity . . . to the courts." Worth
remembering is that the duty of an attorney to the courts "can only be
maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office
which he is bound to uphold." [Lualhati vs. Albert, 57 Phil. 86, 92].

We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment. That is
his privilege. And, he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it.

That is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed
to harden into a belief that he may attack court's decision in words calculated to
jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. He
should give due allowance to the fact that judges are but men; and men are
encompassed by error, fettered by fallibility.

Expounding further on the lawyer's duty to the courts, this Court, in Surigao
Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel (31 SCRA 1, 16-17 [1970]), stated:

A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or
agency to advance the ends of justice." [People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 60 A.L.R.
851, 855]. His duty is to uphold the dignity and the authority of the courts to
which he owes fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the administration in the
administration of justice." [In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, 602]. faith in the courts a
lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice "is
disastrous to the continuity of the government and to the attainment of the
liberties of the people." [Malcolm legal and Judicial Ethics, 1949 ed., p. 160]. Thus
has it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and
moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and
regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice."
[People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572, 580]. (See also In re: Rafael C. Climaco, 55 SCRA
107 [1974]).

It does not, however, follow that just because a lawyer is an officer of the court,
he cannot criticize the courts. That is his right as a citizen, and it is even his duty
as an officer of the court to avail of such right. Thus, In Re: Almacen (31 SCRA
562, 579-580 [1970]), this Court explicitly declared:

Hence, as a citizen and as an officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to
exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law
may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the
official conduct of the judge, which would not expose him to legal animadversion
as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am dec. 657, 665).

"Above all others, the members of the bar have the best opportunity to become
conversant with the character and efficiency of out judges. No class is less likely
to abuse the privilege, or no other class has as great an interest in the
preservation of an able and upright bench." (State Board of Examiners in Law vs.
Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 216).

To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is
to seal the lips of those in the best position to give advice and who might
consider it their duty to speak disparagingly. "Under such a rule," so far as the
bar is concerned, "the merits of a sitting judge may be rehearsed, but as to his
demerits there must be profound silence. (State vs. Circuit Court (72 N.W. 196)).

Nevertheless, such a right is not without limit. For, as this Court warned in
Almacen:

But it is a cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and
shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists
between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the
judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation
of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to
disciplinary action.

xxx

xxx

xxx

The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to

the orderly administration of justice. hence, in the assertion of their client's
rights, lawyers even those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein
up their tempers.

Elsewise stated, the right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the freedom of

speech and of expression in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, must be
exercised responsibly, for every right carries with it a corresponding obligation.
Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with responsibility. In
Zaldivar vs. Gonzales (166 SCRA 316, 353-354 [1988]), it was held:

Respondent Gonzales is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free spe ech.

No one seeks to deny him that right, least of all this Court. What respondent
seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all
constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs an
occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally
important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the
maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration justice.
There is no antimony between free expression and the integrity of the system of
administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom of
expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and

orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of viable
independent institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general
community.

Proscribed then are, inter alia, the use of unnecessary language which
jeopardizes high esteem in courts, creates or promotes distrust in judicial
administration (Rheem, supra), or tends necessarily to undermine the confidence
of the people in the integrity of the members of this Court and to degrade the
administration of justice by this Court (In re: Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 [1949]); or of
offensive and abusive language (In re: Rafael Climaco, 55 SCRA 107 [1974]); or
abrasive and offensive language (Yangson vs. Salandanan, 68 SCRA 42 [1975]);
or of disrespectful, offensive, manifestly baseless, and malicious statements in
pleadings or in a letter addressed to the judge (Baja vs. Macando, 158 SCRA 391
[1988], citing the resolution of 19 January 1988 in Phil. Public Schools Teachers
Association vs. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 76180, and Ceniza vs. Sebastian, 130 SCRA
295 [1984]); or of disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled-for remarks (Sangalang
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 177 SCRA 87 [1989]).
That Atty. Tiongco had exceeded the bounds of decency and propriety in making
the false and malicious insinuation against this Court, particularly the Members of
the First Division, and the scurrilous characterizations of the respondent judge is,
indeed, all too obvious. Such could only come from anger, if not hate, after he
was not given what he wanted. Anger or hate could only come from one who
"seems to be of that frame of mind whereby he considers as in accordance with
law and justice whatever he believes to be right in his own opinion and as
contrary to law and justice whatever does not accord with his views" (Montecillo
vs. Gica, 60 SCRA 234, 238 [1974]). When such anger or hate is coupled with
haughtiness or arrogance as when he even pointed out other intemperate words
in his petition which this Court failed to incorporate in the resolution of 26
September 1994, and with seething sarcasm as when he prays that this Court
"forebear[s] from turning . . . [him] into a martyr to his principles" and ends up
his Compliance with the "RESPECTFUL APOLOGIES AND UNDYING LOVE"
(Constitution Preamble, 66th word), "nothing more can extenuate his liability
for gross violation of Canon 11 of the Code of professional Responsibility and his
other duties entwined therewith as earlier adverted to.
WHEREFORE, for such violation, ATTY. JOSE B. TIONGCO is hereby ordered to pay
a Fine of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) and WARNED that the commission
of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more money.
Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the record of Atty. Jose B. Tiongco in
this Court.

[A.C. - CBD No. 471. June 10, 1999]

LT. LAMBERTO P. VILLAFLOR, complainant, vs. ALVIN T. SARITA, respondent.

RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:

This administrative case originated from a sworn affidavit-complaint[1] dated 14

March 1997, filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Commission
on Bar Discipline, by Lt. Lamberto P. Villaflor seeking the disbarment of Atty. Alvin
T. Sarita for disregarding the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) issued by the
Court of Appeals in relation to the case entitled Lamberto Villaflor vs. Biyaya
Corporation, et al.[2] now pending with the same court.

Respondent Atty. Alvin T. Sarita is the counsel of Biyaya Corporation, the plaintiff
in the ejectment case[3] filed against complainant Lt. Lamberto P. Villaflor before
the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 53, of Kalookan City. Metropolitan Trial Court
Judge Romanito A. Amatong decided the ejectment case in favor of Biyaya
Corporation. Complainant appealed this decision to the Regional Trial Court of
Kalookan City, Branch 131,[4] which affirmed the decision of the MTC. Not
satisfied with the decision of the RTC, complainant brought the case on appeal
before the Court of Appeals which was docketed as CA G.R No. 50623.[5] Losing
no time, complainant also filed with the Court of Appeals an Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order to prevent the
impending demolition of his family home.

In a Resolution dated 27 December 1996, the Court of Appeals granted the

prayer for a TRO, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, let a restraining order forthwith issue against

defendants-appellees including the public respondent Judge or Sheriff or any
person under him from evicting and demolishing the family house of the movant,
pending appeal. x x x
SO ORDERED.
The TRO was specifically addressed to, and personally served on, the Presiding
Judge of RTC, Branch 131, Kalookan City; the Sheriff/Deputy Sheriff, RTC Branch
131, Kalookan City; Atty. Alvin T. Sarita; and Atty. Romeo F. Barza.[6] Despite the
TRO issued by the Court of Appeals, respondent on 8 January 1997, filed before
the MTC an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Implementation and/or Enforcement of
the Writ of Demolition[7] which had already been issued by the trial court as
early as 12 August 1996. In his motion which is quoted hereunder, respondent
stated the reason why he did not heed the TRO:

1. That last January 7, 1997, plaintiff received a Resolution dated December 27,
1996 from the Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals granting the issuance
of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO).
2. A close scrutiny of the afore-said Resolution including the Notice of Resolution
and the Temporary Restraining Order show that it was directed to the Honorable
Presiding Judge (Honorable Antonio J. Fineza) of the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City, Branch 131 and to the assigned (deputy) sheriff thereon and NOT
to this Honorable Court and its deputy sheriff.
3. The only conclusion therefrom is that the Honorable Metropolitan Trial Court is
not restrained nor prohibited from enforcing and/or implementing its judicial
process such as the subject writ of demolition.
XXX

On 9 January 1997, Judge Amatong granted the motion of respondent and issued
an order[8] for the implementation of the writ of demolition. The demolition order
was actually carried out the next day, or on 10 January 1997, by the deputy
sheriff of the lower court.[9]

In response to the situation, complainant filed before the Court of Appeals an

action for Indirect Contempt against respondent, Biyaya Corporation, Judge
Amatong, And the Register of Deeds of Kalookan City.

The Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 20 February 1997, found respondent
and his co-defendants, Judge Amatong and Biyaya Corporation, guilty of indirect
contempt. The dispositive portion of the resolution states:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions, defendants-appellees

Biyaya Corporation and MTC Judge Ramonito Amatong, and their counsel, Atty.
Alvin Sarita are hereby adjudged GUILTY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT as they are
hereby fined to pay the amount of P30,000.00 each, as per SC Administrative
Circular No. 22-95, amending Section 6, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, with a
warning that repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.
Atty. Alvin Sarita is likewise REPRIMANDED for his contemptuous or improvident
act despite receipt of Our Restraining Order, without prejudice to any further
administrative sanction the injured party may seek in the proper forum.
Describing the unfortunate behavior of respondent, the Court of Appeals said:

Specifically, the Court is convinced that Atty. Alvin Sarita should answer for
contempt of court for misleading if not deceiving the defendant-appellee MTC
Judge into doing a precipitate act of implementing the writ of demolition of
appellants family house which is restrained by this Court, or for making false
allegations that led his clients to commit a contemptuous act. (Cu Unjieng vs.
Mitchell, 58 Phil. 476.) His misinterpretation of the resolution is no defense
otherwise, all lawyers can effectively avoid restraining orders of the higher court
by arguing around the bush.[10]
The Court of Appeals also granted the prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction and ordered Biyaya Corporation and Judge
Amatong to immediately restore the demolished family house of complainant or,
return to him the estimated value of the same.

Thereafter, complainant filed a case for disbarment against respondent before

the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. The commissioner[11] assigned to
investigate the case issued an order[12] dated 3 September 1997, directing
respondent to file his answer or comment to the complaint. The period of time
allotted to answer the complaint lapsed without respondent submitting his
comment. On 8 December 1997, an order[13] was issued by the investigating
commissioner requiring the parties to attend the hearing of the case on 10
February 1998. Respondent failed to appear therein. The hearing was postponed
and reset to 6 March 1998. A notice of hearing[14] was sent to respondent but
again he failed to attend the proceeding. After giving respondent enough
opportunity to face the charges against him, which the latter did not avail, the
case was submitted for resolution on 6 March 1998.[15]

The commissioners report dated 10 September 1998, recommending the

disbarment of Atty. Alvin T. Sarita stated in part:

As clearly established in the resolution of the Honorable Thirteenth Division of the

Court of Appeals in its disquisition on his culpability, Atty, Sarita is liable not only
for deliberately misleading if not deceiving the defendant-appellee MTC Judge
into violating the appellate courts restraining order, but also for making false
allegations that led his clients to commit a contemptuous act;
As a member of the Bar, Atty. Sarita is mandated by his oath to obey the laws as
well as the duly constituted authorities therein and not to do any falsehood nor
consent to the doing of any in court;
In filing his urgent ex-parte motion to implement the writ of demolition issued
against the residence of the complainant, Atty. Sarita was well-aware that what

he was seeking to do was specifically restrained by the court of Appeals in no

uncertain terms. Even if we were inclined, in a gesture of utmost liberality, to
hold for Atty. Saritas (sic) and resolve any doubts in his favor, we are simply
overwhelmed by the thought that as a lawyer, Atty. Sarita knew quite well or
must have known quite well that what he was asking for in his motion was
violative not only of an order from the second highest court but more personally
was violative of his own oath as a lawyer;
The findings of the Court of Appeals says it all. What all the more moves the
undersigned to recommend the ultimate penalty of disbarment against Atty. Alvin
T. Sarita is the evident, even palpable disdain, in which he clearly holds this Office
in particular, and the Integrated Bar in general. Nowhere is this disdain more felt
than in Atty. Saritas deliberate and pointed refusal, not only to file an Answer to
the complaint against him but also his unjustified refusal to appear before this
Office despite repeated notices. It appears that Atty. Sarita is beyond caring for
whatever sanctions this Office may recommend against him. Surely, he cannot
turn his back on the possibility that the complainants prayer may be granted
given the seriousness of his (Saritas) misdeeds. But then, considering that Atty.
Sarita has no compunctions about misleading a judge of the Metropolitan Trial
Court into disregarding and violating an order from the Court of Appeals, it is no
surprise that he would ignore the Commission on Bar Discipline;
We recommend for the disbarment of Atty. Alvin T. Sarita.
In its 4 December 1998 Resolution, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt
the findings of the investigating commissioner, to wit:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the aboveentitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, Respondent Atty. Alvin T. Sarita is DISBARRED from the
practice of law.
The facts and evidence obtaining in this case clearly reveal respondents failure to
live up to his duties as a member of the Bar in accordance with the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the Lawyers Oath and Section 20 (b), Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court, thus warranting disciplinary sanction.

As an officer of the court, it is the duty of a lawyer to uphold the dignity and
authority of the court, to which he owes fidelity, according to the oath he has
taken. It is his foremost responsibility to observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts of justice and judicial officers.[16] The highest form of respect to the
judicial authority is shown by a lawyers obedience to court orders and processes.

Atty. Alvin T. Sarita committed an immeasurable disservice to the judicial system

when he openly defied the TRO issued by the Court of Appeals. By such act, he
deliberately disregarded or ignored his solemn oath to conduct himself as a
lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion, with all good
fidelity to the courts. He neglected his duties to observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts of justice and judicial officers,[17] and to act with candor,
fairness and good faith to the courts.[18]

Moreover, even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the TRO issued by the Court
of Appeals was ambiguous in its phraseology, respondent should have carried out
the intent and the spirit of the said TRO rather than choose to be narrowly
technical in interpreting and implementing the same. In De Leon vs. Torres,[19]
this Court said:

We desire to call attention to the fact that courts orders, however erroneous they
may be, must be respected, especially by the bar or the lawyers who are
themselves officers of the courts. Court orders are to be respected not because
the judges who issue them should be respected, but because of the respect and
consideration that should be extended to the judicial branch of the Government.
This is absolutely essential if our Government is to be a government of laws and
not of men. Respect must be had not because of the incumbents to the positions,
but because of the authority that vests in them. Disrespect to judicial incumbents
is disrespect to that branch of the Government to which they belong, as well as to
the State which has instituted the judicial system.
Not only did respondent disobey the order of the Court of Appeals, he also misled
the trial court judge into issuing the order to implement the writ of demolition
which led to the destruction of the family home of complainant. In doing so,
respondent violated his oath of office and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not do any
falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court. Surely, such conduct of
respondent is starkly unbecoming of an officer of the court.

Respondents behavior also exhibited his reckless and unfeeling attitude towards
the complainant. By disobeying the TRO issued by the Court of Appeals, he
inflicted deep physical and moral injury upon complainant and his family by
making them homeless. Obviously, it did not matter to him whether complainant
and his family would still have a place to stay as long as he won the case for his
client. We would like to emphasize that a lawyers responsibility to protect and
advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled
by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other party.[20] Respondent
failed to live up to this expectation.

We find the complaint against respondent fully substantiated by the evidence.

However, we believe that the penalty of disbarment imposed by the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is too severe and, hereby
reduce it to suspension for two (2) years from the practice of law.[21]

ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Alvin T. Sarita is hereby SUSPENDED for two (2)
years from the practice of law and from the enjoyment of all rights and privileges
appurtenant to membership in the Philippine Bar, effective immediately.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and all courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.

MARCOS V. PRIETO,
Complainant,

- versus -

ATTY. OSCAR B. CORPUZ and JUDGE FERDINAND A. FE,

Respondents.

A.C. No. 6517

Present:

PANGANIBAN, CJ
Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

Promulgated:

December 6, 2006
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

RESOLUTION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is an administrative complaint filed by Atty. Marcos V. Prieto, against

respondent Judge Ferdinand A. Fe, both as a member of the bar and bench, and
respondent Atty. Oscar B. Corpuz as a member of the bar, for dishonesty, serious
misconduct prejudicial to the integrity and dignity of the Judiciary under Section
27, Rule 138 and Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court relative to the
latters actuations in the handling of Civil Case No. 1081-BG entitled, Yolanda M.
Roque v. Atty. Marcos V. Prieto, et al. and Civil Case No. 1518-BG entitled, Yolanda
Marquez Roque v. Atty. Marcos V. Prieto, et al.

Complainant implies that not only did the respondent lawyer had free access to
the records of Civil Case No. 1081-BG through the help of respondent Judge, he
was also given the liberty to copy what perhaps would help him in his quest to
win the case.

Invoking the principle of res ipsa loquitor, complainant objects to the fact that
Civil Case No. 1518-BG was raffled to the respondent Judge, who was the former
counsel of the plaintiff therein in Civil Case No. 1081-BG. Another reason for his
objection is that, allegedly, some paragraphs in the complaint in Civil Case No.
1518-BG were obviously copied from Civil Case No. 1081-BG wherein the
complaint was prepared by respondent Judge in his capacity as then lawyer of
herein complainant (plaintiff therein). Complainant claims that the foregoing
constitute misconduct which imply malice or wrongful intent, not just mere errors
of judgment. He insists that the fact that respondent Judge will try the case upon
a complaint in which the plaintiff was his former client and which complaint was
copied from the complaint he himself prepared does not speak well of his
intention as to the disposition of the case.

Complainant maintains that the act of respondent Judge in allowing the

respondent lawyer to copy the complaint in Civil Case No. 1081-BG and to
present it to court as the latters work does violence to Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a judge should be the
embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. Complainant also
asserts that in placing his signature in the complaint not written by him,
respondent lawyer committed deceit, which serves as a ground for his
disbarment.

In a Resolution dated 28 September 2005, the Second Division of this Court

referred the instant administrative case to Court of Appeals Justice Josefina G.
Salonga for investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days
from receipt thereof.

Pursuant thereto, Justice Salonga set the case for hearing on 13 December 2005,
and directed the complainant and the respondents, and their witnesses, if any, to
appear before her and to submit documents relevant to the complaint.

During the scheduled hearing, the complainant and the respondent Judge, after
the marking and offering of their respective documentary evidence, manifested
that they would not be adducing any further evidence. Upon their motion, they

were given a period of thirty (30) days within which to simultaneously file their
Memoranda, after which the case will be deemed submitted for resolution.

On 13 December 2005, complainant filed his Memorandum. The respondent

judge, on the other hand, filed his Memorandum on 18 January 2006 while the
respondent lawyer filed his Memorandum on 20 January 2006.

In her report, Justice Salonga summarized the facts as follows:

In October 1992, Salud Andrada Marquez (Marquez) mortgaged six (6) parcels of
land to the Rural Bank of Luna, La Union, Inc., one of which is a parcel of land
with an area of Twenty Two Thousand Five Hundred Ninety Nine Square Meters
(22,599 sq. meters) located at Calumbaya, Bauang, La Union covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. FP-15344 under a Free Patent granted on 5 July
1989.

Failing to pay her debt, the bank foreclosed the mortgage. On 2 August 1993, the
mortgaged properties were sold at public auction the highest bidder of which was
the petitioner. Consequently, OCT No. FP-15344 was cancelled and in lieu thereof,
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-40223 was issued in the name of the
petitioner.

In the meantime, petitioner, through his attorneys-in-fact Antonio O. Prieto and

Monette O. Prieto, mortgaged the aforesaid properties to Far East Bank and Trust
Company.

Seeking the nullification of the mortgaged and the consequent transfer of the
mortgaged properties in the name of the petitioner, Roque, Marquez daughter,
filed a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 1081-BG with the RTC Branch 67, for
Declaration of Nullity of Contracts with Damages against said petitioner, the Rural
Bank of Luna, La Union, Inc. and Far East Bank and Trust Company. Respondent
judge, then a practicing lawyer, was retained by Roque as her counsel of record
in said case and was the one who drafted said complaint.

On 18 August 2000, the RTC Branch 67, through then Presiding Judge Jose G.
Pineda, issued an order dismissing the case on the ground that Roque was not a
real party in interest since her right of action has still to ripen upon the death of
her mother.

On 8 November 2001, respondent judge was appointed as the presiding judge of

RTC Branch 67. By reason of his appointment, he completely severed all his
professional relationships with his clients, including Roque, and turned over or
relinquished all case records of his office to said clients.

Upon the demise of Marquez on 9 August 2002, Roque, who had now acquired by
way of succession her mothers right of action to pursue the annulment of
contracts executed over the property formerly covered by OCT No. 15344,
engaged the legal services of respondent lawyer.

Thus, on 5 January 2004, respondent lawyer, as Roques counsel, filed a complaint

for Declaration of Nullity of Contracts, Reconveyance of Property, and Damages
against petitioner, his attorneys-in-fact Antonio O. Prieto and Monette O. Prieto,
the Rural Bank of Luna, La Union, Inc. and Far East Bank and Trust Company, Inc.,
now merged with the Bank of the Philippine Islands, before the Regional Trial
Court of Bauang, La Union.

On 7 January 2004, the case, docketed as Civil Case No. 1518-BG, was raffled to
the respondent judge. On 8 January 2004, RTC Branch 67, through Atty. Jeovannie
C. Ordoo, its Branch Clerk of Court, issued summons to the defendants. The
summons and copy of the complaint was duly served upon the petitioner on 20
January 2004.

Going over the individual case folders of the newly raffled cases to his court,
respondent judge came across Civil Case No. 1518-BG and discovered that the
plaintiff therein was Roque, his former client. Immediately, without going over the
allegations of the complaint, the respondent judge issued an Order dated 23
January 2004 inhibiting himself from the case and ordered that the record of said
case be transferred to the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union, Branch 33
(RTC Branch 33).

On 27 January 2004, the Branch Clerk of Court of RTC Branch 67 transmitted the
entire record of Civil Case No. 1518-BG to RTC Branch 33 through its Clerk of
Court, Atty. Richard T. Domingo, which was duly received by the latter.

On 30 January 2004, petitioner separately filed with the RTC Branch 67, an
Objection to Competency and his Answer to the Complaint. Since the records

thereof were already transmitted to RTC Branch 33, RTC Branch 67s Branch Clerk
of Court had said pleadings forwarded thereto. Since then, the proceedings in
Civil Case No. 1518-BG have been conducted by RTC Branch 33.

In an Order dated 22 April 2004, after the parties therein filed their Answers and
the issues having been joined, Presiding Judge Rose Mary R. Molina-Alim of RTC
Branch 33 set the case for pre-trial conference and ordered the submission of the
parties respective pre-trial briefs.

On 24 May 2004, petitioner filed with the RTC Branch 33 an Amended Answer
together with the Authority given by his co-defendants Antonio O. Prieto and
Monette O. Prieto, in his favor to appear for and in their behalf, and their Pre-Trial
Brief.

In a Resolution dated 28 September 2005, the Second Division of the Supreme

Court referred the instant administrative case to the undersigned for
investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from receipt
thereof. A copy of the said Resolution was received by the undersigned on 18
November 2005.

Pursuant thereto, in an Order promulgated on 21 November 2005, the

undersigned set the case for hearing on 13 December 2005 directing the
petitioner and the respondents, and their witnesses, if any, to appear before her
and to submit documents relevant to the complaint.

During the scheduled hearing, the petitioner and the respondent judge, after the
marking and offering of their respective documentary evidence, manifested that
they will not be adducing any further evidence. Upon their motion, they were
given a period thirty (30) days within which to simultaneously file their
Memoranda, after which the case will be deemed submitted for resolution.

On 13 December 2005, petitioner filed his Memorandum. The respondent judge,

on the other hand, filed his Memorandum on 18 January 2006 while the
respondent lawyer filed his Memorandum on 20 January 2006.

In her report, Justice Salonga recommended the dismissal of the complaint

against respondents, and that complainant be admonished for filing the frivolous
complaint.

A reading of the records of this case clearly shows that the present administrative
case is unfounded, as it is devoid of factual and legal basis. Stripped of all its
verbosity, petitioners allegations in support of his complaint against the
respondents should be treated for what they really are, mere allegations founded
on speculation and conjecture. In this connection, it must be stressed that in
administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that the respondents committed
the act complained of rests on the complainant. Failing in this, the complaint
must be dismissed.

First off, the allegation of the petitioner to the effect that the respondent lawyer,
through the intervention and assistance of the respondent judge, had free access
to the court records Civil Case No. 1081-BG fails to find evidentiary support.
Without more, petitioner deduced that the court records of Civil Case No. 1081BG were made available to the respondent lawyer at the instance of the
respondent judge simply because relevant and substantial portions of the
complaint filed by the latter were re-written and adopted in Civil Case No. 1518BG. Bare and conclusory as it is, the said allegation deserves scant consideration.

Emphatically, the mere fact that respondent lawyer had adopted relevant and
substantial portions of the complaint filed by the respondent judge does not in
any way bespeak of any illegal or unethical practice on his part.

For one, the respondent lawyer could have easily read and gained access to the
case record of Civil Case No. 1081-BG. As can be gleaned from the records,
respondent judge had already turned over and relinquished his case records of
Civil Case No. 1081-BG to Roque after his appointment to the bench on 8
November 2001. Since she intended to re-file the case against petitioner, it is
expected, if not necessary, for Roque to give the records of the previously
dismissed complaint to her newly retained counsel. What is more apparent is the
right of Roque and the respondent lawyer, as her retained counsel, to request
access to the court records for their reproduction or certification.

For another, a perusal of the complaints separately and successively filed by the
respondent judge and the respondent lawyer belies petitioners claim that the
latter merely copied, verbatim or otherwise, the original complaint. True, some
allegations contained therein were substantially retained by respondent lawyer.

However, these allegations are essential and crucial to the cause of action of
Roque against the petitioner. Aside from the fact that there is hardly a number of
ways to construct a sentence, petitioner cannot plausibly claim that respondent
lawyer is legally restrained from retaining or rewriting sentences earlier
constructed by the respondent judge.

More importantly, petitioners assertion that respondent judge allowed the

respondent lawyer to copy the complaint in Civil Case No. 1081-BG is unfounded.
Aside from the petitioners mere say so, there is not even an iota of evidence to
support this assertion. It is all too obvious that there is a dearth of evidence that
would in any way prove petitioners accusation against the respondents.

In the same vein, petitioners inference that respondent judge intended to try Civil
Case No. 1518-BG is a blatant fabrication. The records of the case refute this.
Reading his petition, it is evident that petitioner cunningly attempted to mislead
this court to believe that respondent judge is still conducting the proceedings in
Civil Case No. 1518-BG and had refused to inhibit himself therefrom. His intent to
deceive this court to achieve his end to vex and harass the respondents is
undeniable.

As asserted by the respondent judge, petitioner cannot feign ignorance in this

regard. He is well aware that the respondent judge already issued an Order dated
23 January 2004 inhibiting himself from the case and ordering the transmission of
the record of said case to the RTC Branch 33. In fact, petitioner has been actively
participating in the proceedings of said case before the RTC Branch 33 prior to
the institution of the instant administrative case as he had already filed several
pleadings therewith.

If truth be told, the allegations in the instant petition was ingeniously written to
deliberately and maliciously withhold and suppress the fact that the respondent
judge had already inhibited himself from taking cognizance of Civil Case No.
1518-BG and that the records thereof had in fact been transmitted to RTC Branch
33.

All told, it cannot be gainsaid that the instant administrative case in itself is
frivolous, calculated merely to harass, annoy, and cast groundless suspicions on
the integrity and reputation of both the respondents. The only piece of evidence
that the petitioner has offered in support of his claim is his bare assertions, which
certainly deserves scant consideration. It must be emphasized that a mere
charge or allegation of wrongdoing does not suffice. Accusation is not

synonymous with guilt. There must always be sufficient evidence to support the
charge. This brings to the fore the application of the age-old but familiar rule that
he who alleges must prove his allegations.

Counter-Petition Against the Petitioner

Adopting the above-findings made in the petition against the respondents, there
is merit in the separate counter-petitions filed by the latter to hold the petitioner
administratively liable for filing an unfounded and frivolous suit.

As already stated, petitioners allegations in support of his complaint against the

respondents are baseless, as they are mere allegations founded on pure
speculation and conjecture. Sans evidence, his petition was purposely written to
mislead the Court and cast a doubt on the integrity and dignity of the
respondents. Petitioner made the said administrative case as a vehicle to unduly
harass or otherwise prejudice the respondents. Worse, in selfishly satisfying his
own desire to vex the respondents, he had tarnished the integrity of the entire
judiciary and the bar.

For this reason, the petitioner should be cited in contempt, as what the Supreme
Court had pronounced in the recent case of Galman Cruz vs. Alio-Hormachuelos.
Said the Court:

Verily, this Court is once again called upon to reiterate that, although the Court
will never tolerate or condone any act, conduct or omission that would violate the
norm of public accountability or diminish the peoples faith in the judiciary,
neither will it hesitate to shield those under its employ from unfounded suits that
only serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice.

The eloquent words of the late Justice Conrado V. Sanchez in Rheem of the
Philippines vs. Ferrer are enlightening:

By now, a lawyers duties to the Court have become commonplace. Really, there
could hardly be any valid excuse for lapses in the observance thereof. Section
20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells out one such
duty: To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial
officers. As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that it is
the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Court a respectful attitude, not for

the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the
maintenance of its supreme importance. That same canon, as corollary, makes it
peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against unjust criticism
and clamor. And more, the attorneys oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that
should be with all good fidelityto the courts. Worth remembering is that the duty
of an attorney to the courts can only be maintained by rendering no service
involving any disrespect to the judicial office which he is bound to uphold.

We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment. That is
his privilege. And, he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others lack of it.
That is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed
to harden into a belief that he may attack a courts decision in words calculated to
jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. He
should give due allowance to the fact that judges are but men; and men are
encompassed by error, fettered by fallibility.

In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel, Justice Sanchez further

elucidated:

A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is. like the court itself, an instrument or
agency to advance the ends of justice. His duty is to uphold the dignity and
authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice. Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. For,
to undermine the judicial edifice is disastrous to the continuity of government
and to the attainment of the liberties of the people. Thus has it been said of a
lawyer that as an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build
and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so
essential to the proper administration of justice.

Petitioners unfounded imputations against respondents are malicious and offend

the dignity of the entire judiciary. Scandalous as his bare allegations are, the fact
that petitioner maliciously insinuated that the respondent judge allowed access
to and assisted the respondent lawyer in the filing of his complaint desecrates
and mocks the integrity of the judiciary. Equally insolent is petitioners baseless
postulations that the respondent judge refused to inhibit himself from Civil Case
No. 1518-BG purposely to give leverage to his former client and her lawyer.

Moreover, in filing a frivolous suit against his opposing counsel, petitioner

violated Canons 8 and 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
mandates that all lawyers must conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness, and

candor towards their colleagues and should avoid harassing tactics against
opposing counsel and commands all lawyers to observe the rules of procedure
and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.

We have reviewed the records, and after careful consideration thereof, we find
the conclusions of fact and the recommendations of the Investigator in the
above-quoted report to be well-taken and fully supported by the evidence on
record, except for the penalty imposed on complainant.

Atty. Marcos V. Prieto must be sanctioned for filing this unfounded complaint.
Although no person should be penalized for the exercise of the right to litigate,
however, this right must be exercised in good faith.[1]

As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper

administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing frivolous
petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary.

A lawyer is part of the machinery in the administration of justice. Like the court
itself, he is an instrument to advance its ends the speedy, efficient, impartial,
correct and inexpensive adjudication of cases and the prompt satisfaction of final
judgments. A lawyer should not only help attain these objectives but should
likewise avoid unethical or improper practices that impede, obstruct or prevent
their realization, charged as he is with the primary task of assisting in the speedy
and efficient administration of justice.[2] Canon 12[3] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility promulgated on 21 June 1988 is very explicit that lawyers must
exert every effort and consider it their duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.

The practice of law is a sacred and noble profession. It is limited to persons of

good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified.
The right does not only presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal standing and
attainment, but also the exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and
partaking of the nature of a public trust.[4] Thus, a lawyer should not use his
knowledge of law as an instrument to harass a party nor to misuse judicial
processes, as the same constitutes serious transgression of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.[5] We cannot countenance complainants act of
misleading this Court into believing that respondent judge was still conducting
the proceedings in Civil Case No. 1518-BG. What is evident is that even
complainant was well aware of respondent judges inhibition therefrom. The

respondent judge, in fact, issued an Order dated 23 January 2004 inhibiting

himself from the case.

In Retuya v. Gorduiz,[6] respondent-lawyer was suspended for six (6) months for
filing a groundless suit against a former client in order to harass and embarrass
her. In the case of Arnaldo v. Suarin,[7] complainant Atty. Arnaldo was fined
P5,000.00 for filing frivolous complaint. In this case, which we find analogous to
Arnaldo, we hold that a fine of P5,000.00 will suffice.

ACCORDINGLY, the above-quoted report of Justice Salonga is APPROVED with

modification as to the penalty imposed on complainant Atty. Marcos V. Prieto.
Respondents Judge Ferdinand A. Fe and Atty. Oscar B. Corpuz are exonerated and
the administrative complaint against them is DISMISSED. Complainant Atty.
Marcos V. Prieto is FINED P5,000.00 for filing frivolous suit with a STERN WARNING
that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

JOHN SIY LIM, A.C. No. 5653

Complainant,
Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus- AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO,* JJ.

ATTY. CARMELITO A. Promulgated:

MONTANO,
Respondent. February 27, 2006
x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Atty. Carmelito A. Montano stands charged with gross misconduct relative to his
filing of Civil Case No. C-19928 entitled Spouses Tomas See Tuazon and Natividad
See Deecho v. John Siy Lim and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City.[1]

It appears that complainant John Siy Lim was the defendant in Civil Case No. C14542 for reformation of contract, quieting of title, with damages, then pending
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 131.[2] The subject
of the dispute was a 650-square meter conjugal lot along A. del Mundo Street, 7th
Avenue, Caloocan City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 860. After
trial, the RTC ruled in favor of defendant (complainant herein), and declared that
the deed of sale the parties executed on July 15, 1987 was an absolute and
unconditional conveyance of subject property by the plaintiff in favor of such
defendant. On motion for reconsideration, however, the trial court reversed itself
and declared that the sale was in fact an equitable mortgage. It thus ordered the
cancellation of TCT No. 152621 and the reinstatement of the previous title on the
subject property.

The complainant appealed the case to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R.
CV No. 40167. In its Decision dated March 31, 1995, the appellate court reversed
the ruling of the RTC, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the appealed Order dated November 16, 1992, is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and the original Decision of the trial court, dated December 2,
1991, hereby REINSTATED, with the modification that plaintiff-appellee is ordered
to pay defendant-appellant the sum of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos a month
as reasonable rental for the use and occupation of Apartment No. 161 from July
15, 1988 until the premises shall have been vacated and possession thereof
peacefully turned over to defendant-appellant.

The counterclaim for attorneys fees of defendant-appellant is DENIED. There is no

clear showing that the action taken by plaintiff-appellee was done in bad faith.
There should be no penalty on the right to litigate.[3]

The aggrieved party elevated the matter to this Court, and the petition was
docketed as G.R. No. 119794. On October 3, 2000, the Court affirmed the ruling

of the CA and denied the petition.[4] Entry of judgment was made of record on
October 3, 2000.[5]

On January 4, 2002, respondent filed a Notice of Appearance[6] as counsel of

Tomas See Tuazon (the losing party) in the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch 131 in
Civil Case No. C-14542. On January 7, 2002, he filed, in behalf of his client, a
Motion to Comply to [sic] Decision without Writ,[7] worded as follows:
1. Plaintiff is aware that pursuant to the decision of the court, as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, the decision on the present case had
already become final and executory.

2. In order to avoid undue inconvenience on the part of herein defendant, plaintiff

shall voluntarily settle the money judgment as stated in the decision sought to be
enforced.

3. The plaintiff will be filing Eight Hundred Ten Thousand (P810,000.00) Pesos,
equivalent to 162 months of rent as per decision and the same to be covered by
supersedeas bond issued by a reliable insurance company to answer for said
obligation.

4. Every month starting February 15, 2002, plaintiff shall deposit to the court the
amount of P5,000.00 as monthly rent.[8]

On the same date, respondent, in behalf of his clients (the spouses Tomas See
Tuazon) filed the Complaint[9] for nullity of TCT and other documents,
reconveyance, maintenance of physical possession before the RTC of Caloocan
City, eventually raffled to Branch 121 thereof (Civil Case No. C-19928).

Meantime, on February 19, 2002, Judge Luisito C. Sardillo of Branch 126[10]

issued an Order[11] in Civil Case No. C-14542 granting the Motion for Execution
with Manifestation earlier filed by the prevailing party (complainant herein), and
denying for lack of merit, the Motion to Comply to [sic] Decision without Writ filed
by respondent counsel.

This prompted the complainant to file the instant complaint for disbarment
against respondent. In his Complaint-Affidavit[12] dated March 20, 2002,
complainant alleged that respondent filed the complaint in Civil Case No. C19928 out of malice, pointing out that it involves the same parties, the same
causes of action and relief prayed for as that of Civil Case No. C-14542. Thus, the
complainant prayed that the respondent be disbarred and/or suspended from the
practice of law for his gross misconduct, on the following allegation:

6. Evidently, I have been subjected to harassment by the antics of the

respondent in filing a recycled case docketed as Civil Case No. C-19928 on
January 07, 2002. Respondent is guilty in abetting the conduct of his clients, Sps.
Tuazon. He has clearly violated his lawyers oath not to promote or sue
groundless, false or unlawful suits among others. Instead of counseling his clients
to abide and obey the decision of our Supreme Court, the final arbiter of all
controversies and disputes, he is showing disrespect to a final and executory
decision of our court.[13]

In his Comment,[14] respondent denied the allegations against him. While he

admitted that he filed Civil Case No. C-19928 as counsel for the plaintiff therein,
he claimed that it was not filed with malicious intent. Moreover, while the new
case involved the same party, it was for a different cause of action and relief,
and, as such, the principle of res judicata did not apply. He further explained that
the complaint in Civil Case No. C-14542 was for declaratory relief or reformation
of instrument, while Civil Case No. 19928 was for annulment of title. He accepted
the case based on his professional appreciation that his client had a good case.

In his Reply,[15] the complainant stressed that the respondent was guilty of
forum shopping; Civil Case No. C-19928 was nothing but a revival of the old
complaint; and the lame excuse of the respondent that the present case is an
action in rem while the other case is an action in personam did not merit
consideration.

On November 25, 2002, the Court resolved to refer the matter to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.[16]

On September 1, 2003, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline assigned the case
to Commissioner Salvador L. Pea. Only the counsel for the respondent appeared
at the mandatory conference held on September 30, 2003. Finding that there
were no factual issues in the case, Commissioner Pea terminated the mandatory

conference and ordered the parties to submit their respective verified Position
Papers, and, thereafter, considered the case submitted for resolution.

The case was re-assigned to Commissioner Doroteo B. Aguila who submitted his
Report and Recommendation dated May 9, 2005, finding the respondent guilty of
misconduct. It was recommended that respondent be meted a two months
suspension from the practice of law.

According to the Investigating Commissioner, the elements of res judicata are

present in this case as to bar the filing of Civil Case No. C-19928 since (a) the
judgment in Civil Case No. C-14542, upholding the validity of the absolute deed
of sale, had attained finality; (b) the court which rendered the decision had the
required jurisdiction; and (c) the disposition of the case was a judgment on the
merits.

On October 22, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline issued Resolution No. XVII-2005-108, adopting said Report and
Recommendation with the modification that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for six (6) months.

We agree that respondent is administratively liable.

In this case, it is clear that respondent is guilty of forum shopping. By his own
admission, he was aware that Civil Case No. C-14542 was already final and
executory when he filed the second case (Civil Case No. C-19928). His allegation
that he was not the original counsel of his clients and that when he filed the
subsequent case for nullity of TCT, his motive was to protect the rights of his
clients whom he believed were not properly addressed in the prior case for
reformation and quieting of title, deserves scant consideration. As a responsible
member of the bar, he should have explained the effect of such final and
executory decision on his clients rights, instead of encouraging them to file
another case involving the same property and asserting the same rights.

The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same
parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for
the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. It exists when, as a result of an
adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another, or
when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same
cause to increase the chances of obtaining a favorable decision. An important

factor in determining its existence is the vexation caused to the courts and the
parties-litigants by the filing of similar cases to claim substantially the same
reliefs.[17] Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are
present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in
another.[18] Thus, the following requisites should concur:

(a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in
both actions, (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts, and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is
such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which
party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. x x
x[19]

The fact that the parties in the first and second cases are not identical will not
prevent the application of the principle of res judicata. Mere substantial identity
of parties, or a community of interests between a party in the first case and a
party in the subsequent case, even if the latter was not impleaded in the first
case, is sufficient.[20] Moreover, a party cannot, by varying the form of action or
adopting a different method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the
principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated
between the same parties or their privies.[21] This was what respondent resorted
to in order to give some semblance of merit to the complaint for annulment of
title. He should have realized that

the ruling of the Court in Tuazon v. Court of Appeals[22] effectively determined

with finality the rights and obligations of the parties under the questioned deed
of sale.

A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client but not at the expense of truth
and the administration of justice.[23] The filing of multiple petitions constitutes
abuse of the Courts processes and improper conduct that tends to impede,
obstruct and degrade the administration of justice and will be punished as
contempt of court. Needless to state, the lawyer who files such multiple or
repetitious petitions (which obviously delays the execution of a final and
executory judgment) subjects himself to disciplinary action for incompetence (for
not knowing any better) or for willful violation of his duties as an attorney to act
with all good fidelity to the courts, and to maintain only such actions as appear to
him to be just and are consistent with truth and honor. [24]

The filing of another action concerning the same subject matter, in violation of
the doctrine of res judicata, runs contrary to Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which requires a lawyer to exert every effort and consider it his
duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. By his
actuations, respondent also violated Rule 12.02[25] and Rule 12.04[26] of the
Code, as well as a lawyers mandate to delay no man for money or malice.[27]

Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in the
administration of justice. Any conduct which tends to delay, impede or obstruct
the administration of justice contravenes such lawyers duty. Indeed, the Court
has time and again warned not to resort to forum shopping for this practice clogs
the court dockets.[28]
While we rule that the respondent should be sanctioned for his actions, we also
note that the power to disbar should be exercised with great caution, to be
imposed only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing
and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the
bar. Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser penalty could
accomplish the end desired.[29]

WHEREFORE, for violating Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,

respondent Atty. Carmelito A. Montano is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
a period of six (6) months. He is STERNLY WARNED that any future violation of his
duties as a lawyer will be dealt with more severely. This Decision is immediately
executory. Atty. Montano is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of receipt of
this decision.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 3294

February 17, 1993

MARIO S. MARIVELES, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ODILON C. MALLARI, respondent.
Rodolfo B. Ta-asan for complainant.

PER CURIAM:

On January 11, 1989, Mario S. Mariveles of Davao City filed an administrative

complaint against his former counsel, Attorney Odilon C. Mallari, whose legal
services he had engaged in 1984 to handle his defense in Criminal Case No. 6608
of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City where he was charged with violation of
B.P. Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.

After an adverse decision was rendered on December 26, 1986, Mariveles

instructed Attorney Mallari to appeal the trial court's decision to the Court of
Appeals, which the respondent did.

However, in the Court of Appeals, despite numerous extensions of time, totalling

245 days, which he obtained from the Court, Attorney Mallari failed to file the
appellant's brief, resulting in the dismissal of the appeal.

Complainant discovered his lawyer's desertion only when he was subpoenaed by

the trial court to appear before it for the execution of the decision which had
become final.

Through new counsel, complainant filed a Petition for Reinstatement of Appeal,

Cancellation of Entry of Judgment and Admission of Appellant's Brief in CA-G.R.
CR No. 04482, but it was denied by the appellate court.

He sought relief in this court (G.R. No. 85964, "Mario S. Mariveles vs. Court of
Appeal, et al.") which, on March 13, 1989, granted his petition, ordered the Court
of Appeals to cancel the entry of judgment in CA-G.R. CR No. 04482, reinstate the
appeal, and admit the appellant's brief filed by his new counsel. The Court said:

It is true that the failure of counsel to file brief for the appellant which led to the
dismissal of the appeal does not necessarily warrant the reinstatement thereof.
However, where the negligence of counsel is so great that the rights of accused
are prejudiced and he is prevented from presenting his defense, especially where
the appellant raises issues which place in serious doubt the correctness of the
trial court's judgment of conviction, the aforesaid rule must not be rigidly applied
to avoid a miscarriage of justice. These teachings of jurisprudence are present in
the case at bar.

On the first aspect, the failure of petitioner's former counsel to file the brief, for
reasons unknown and without any cause imputable to petitioner, amounted to
deliberate abandonment of his client's interest and justifies reinstatement with
consequent due consideration of petitioner's appeal through a new counsel. (pp.
106-107, Rollo).

On February 15, 1989, the administrative complaint was referred to the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.

The IBP's Committee on Bar Discipline investigated the complaint and held
hearings. On March 3, 1992, it submitted to this Court a report/resolution finding:

In sum, what was committed by the respondent is a blatant violation of our Code
of Professional Responsibility.

xxx

xxx

xxx

Rule 12.03 A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file
pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same
or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.

Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Suffice it to state that a lawyer has no business practicing his profession if in the
course of that practice, he will eventually wreck and destroy the future and
reputation of his client and thus disgrace the law profession. The last thing that
his peers in the law profession and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines would do
is to disrobe a member of the profession, for he has worked for the attainment of
his career burning the midnight oil throughout school and passing the bar. The
undersigned, however, could not find any mitigating circumstances to
recommend a lighter penalty. Disbarment is the only recourse to remove a rotten
apple if only to instill and maintain the respect and confidence of all and sundry
to the noble profession. (pp. 249-250, Rollo)

The Court concurs with the above observations. The respondent demonstrated
not only appalling indifference and lack of responsibility to the courts and his
client but also a shameless disregard for his duties as a lawyer. He is unfit for
membership in this noble profession.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Attorney Odilon C. Mallari guilty of
abandonment and dereliction of duty toward his client and hereby orders him
DISBARRED from the legal profession and to immediately cease and desist from
the practice of law. Let the Office of the Court Administrator and the Executive
Judges of the Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh and Twelfth Judicial Regions, be furnished
with copies of this resolution for dissemination to all the courts in those regions.
SO ORDERED.

[A. C. No. 2841. July 3, 2002]

RE: ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 44 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH IV,
TAGBILARAN CITY, AGAINST ATTY. SAMUEL C. OCCEA.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:

Membership in the bar is in the category of a mandate to public service of the

highest order. A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is
clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary
duty is the advancement of the quest for truth and justice, for which he has
sworn to be a fearless crusader.[1] These were the eloquent words of the late
Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro in exalting the sacred and honorable legal
profession. But he laments the pathetic and deplorable fact that, many a law
practitioner, forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his
exalted position as an officer of the court, has allowed himself to become an
instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for
concord and a conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the
conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral
justice, a mercenary purveying the benefits of his enlightened advocacy in direct
proportion to a litigants financial posture instead of a faithful friend of the courts
in the dispensation of equal justice to rich and poor alike.[2] Here, Atty. Samuel C.
Occea, as later shown by his disgraceful and outrageous conduct, is one such
lawyer who has become an apostate to his exalted position as an officer of the
court. He thus deserves to be weeded out from the legal profession to protect its
sanctity and nobility.

This administrative case stemmed from the settlement of the estate of testator
William C. Ogan which has since been pending in the Court of First Instance (CFI),
now Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4, Tagbilaran City, docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 423. In 1976, Judge Fernando S. Ruiz took over the case from
Judge Paulino S. Marquez who, in turn, inherited it from Judge Antonio Beldia.
Noting that the proceedings have been pending for thirteen (13) years, Judge
Ruiz then inquired into the principal causes of the delay. He found out, as will be
shown later in detail, that Atty. Samuel C. Occea caused the delay by disobeying
lawful court orders and by willfully prolonging the litigation through his various
maneuvers, in gross violation of his oath as a lawyer that he will not willingly sue
any groundless, false, or unlawful suit, or delay any mans cause for money or
malice.

Going back to Special Proceedings No. 423, under the terms of the Last Will and
Testament of the late William C. Ogan, his residuary estate was divided among
his seven children. One of them, Necitas Ogan-Occea, was named in the will as
executrix of the estate. As such, she retained her husband, Atty. Samuel C.
Occea, as her lawyer.

The estate consists of bank deposits, securities (both here and in the United
States of America), and real estate in Cebu City and in Ohio, U.S.A. The deceased
left no debt. Thus, the settlement of the estate should have been simple and
speedy. However, since the death of the testator on February 1, 1963, the
settlement of his estate has not yet been terminated owing largely to the dilatory
tactics of Atty. Occea.

Looking into the causes of the delay, Judge Ruiz learned that the executrix,
Necitas Ogan-Occea, filed a project of partition on August 4, 1967. On September
22, 1967, the probate court approved the project except certain portions. The
executrix then interposed an appeal. In view of the delay caused by the
pendency of the appeal, the other heirs filed several motions praying that the
estates remaining P250,000.00 cash as well as its shares of stocks in the
Philippines and in the United States be distributed among all the heirs. The
executrix, through her husband Atty. Occea, vehemently opposed the motions,
asserting that the P250,000.00 cash had already been earmarked for her
husbands attorneys fee and other expenses, and that the shares of stocks could
not be distributed among the heirs because the stock certificates were not in her
possession. The dispute between the executrix, on the one hand, and the other
heirs, on the other, which delayed the proceedings, centered mainly on the
P250,000.00 cash and the shares of stocks.

Records also show that the executrix, through Atty. Occea, interposed numerous
appeals from the orders of the probate court. For their part, the heirs repeatedly
prayed in their motions for the release of the shares of stocks and the remaining
cash. But the executrix and Atty. Occea opposed the same, thus prolonging the
proceedings. In CA-GR No. 48716-R (December, 1974), the Court of Appeals, in
remanding the case to the probate court, had this to say:

It is, however, earnestly hoped, and the parties are urged, to settle their
differences with the view to closing the estate which has been pending since
1963. The executrix, the heirs, and the lawyers, are reminded that the
prolongation of administrative proceedings can only benefit the executor or
administrator or the counsels for the contending parties. It always results in the
diminution of the share of each of the heirs because the estate is burdened with
the expenses of the administration proceedings, the heir must have to pay
attorneys fee and the longer the proceedings the bigger the attorneys fee.[3]

Obviously, the main causes of the delay in the probate proceedings were Atty.
Occeas claim for attorneys fee in the amount of P250,000.00 and the executrixs
refusal, through her husband, to account for the shares of stocks belonging to the
estate which, according to her, were not in her possession. The other heirs could
not accept that explanation because as executrix, she was charged with the
responsibility of collecting all the assets of the estate.

Thus, on August 8, 1977, Judge Ruiz issued an order directing the executrix to
comment why the securities were not in her possession. She filed her comment,
through her husband, that some Philippine and American securities were not in
her possession. To determine which securities were in her possession, Judge Ruiz
on October 22, 1977, issued an order requiring her to submit within 30 days the
latest inventory of all the securities of the estate. However, she failed to comply
with the order. Judge Ruiz then issued another order on February 6, 1978,
directing her to take possession of all certificates of stocks or their replacements
belonging to the estate and to make an up-to-date inventory thereof with a
statement of their nature and their value. Again, she did not comply with the
order.

Determined to block the release of the P250,000.00 to the heirs, the executrix,
through Atty. Occea, appealed the numerous interlocutory orders of the probate
court to the Court of Appeals, hence, adding to the delay. Because of the
propensity of the executrix, through Atty. Occea, to elevate interlocutory orders
to the Court of Appeals, Judge Ruiz issued an order on June 16, 1978 directing her
to refrain from instituting any action or proceeding without first informing the

court. The executrix and her husband disobeyed this order. In fact, he filed six
cases with the Court of Appeals and one with this Court.

On August 15, 1979, Judge Ruiz issued an order authorizing Nancy Ogan-Gibson,
one of the heirs, to go to Vinton County, Ohio, U.S.A., to take proper action on the
five parcels of land owned by the estate and to submit a report to the probate
court. To provide money for the purpose, the court ordered the executrix to
release to Nancy Ogan-Gibson the sum of $1,000.00 from the estate fund, the
same to be liquidated with supporting receipts upon her submission of her report
on or before September 30, 1979. The executrix assailed the order before the
Court of Appeals in a petition for prohibition and certiorari, docketed therein as
CA-G. R. No. SP-10326. Dismissing the petition on January 13, 1981 for lack of
merit, the Court of Appeals said:

Indeed it is surprising why petitioner as executrix should oppose such an order of

the court which is and would be for the benefit of the estate and the heirs. All the
other heirs completely agreed with what the trial court did. xxx

Thus, rather than accuse respondent judge of grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the questioned orders he should be complimented in finding ways and means of
promptly and expeditiously determining the assets of the estate to be ultimately
distributed among the heirs.

On May 12, 1981, Judge Ruiz cited the executrix for contempt of court for her
failure to obey the orders of October 22, 1977, December 8, 1977, February 6,
1978 and October 16, 1979 and directed her to report to the court which
securities were and were not in her possession and to give the reason therefor.

On February 11, 1982, the executrix and Atty. Occea were held in contempt of
court and fined P250.00 each for disobeying the court order of August 15, 1979
requiring the executrix to release $1,000.00 to Nancy Ogan-Gibson. Both were
given the chance to explain their failure to comply with the order, but they did
not submit any explanation. On January 13, 1981, this order was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. SP-10326. It bears emphasis that this incident
delayed the proceedings for four (4) years.

On October 16, 1979, the probate court issued an order requiring the executrix to
distribute immediately among the heirs all the shares of stocks of the estate in
the Batangas-Laguna Transportation Co., the Masonic Hall, Inc. and the Motor

Service Co.; to report her compliance within 10 days from notice; and within the
same period, to file a written report to the court stating (a) what other certificates
of stocks belonging to the estate are in her possession; and (b) which certificates
of stocks are not with her, giving the reasons therefor. Again, the executrix and
her husband, Atty. Occea, did not comply with the said order. The probate court
thus ordered her to explain why she should not be punished for contempt of
court. After several postponements at her instance and that of her husband, the
incident was set for hearing on April 20, 1981. But neither of them appeared,
thus delaying the proceedings for about a year and a half. Finding the executrix
unfaithful in the performance of her duties, the probate court, on May 12, 1981,
adjudged her in contempt of court.

Forthwith, Atty. Occea and his wife, filed with the then CFI of Davao City, Civil
Case No. 14456 for damages (P200,000.00 as moral damages and expenses of
litigation) against Judge Ruiz. But, on October 13, 1981, the court dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit.

After the dismissal of Civil Case No. 14456, Atty. Occea filed with the Tanodbayan
a letter-complaint against Judge Ruiz, charging him with knowingly rendering
unjust interlocutory orders, in that without prior notice and hearing, he punished
the executrix for indirect contempt of court and censured her for non-compliance
with the probate courts order of October 16, 1979. For lack of merit, Atty. Occeas
complaint was dismissed by then Tanodbayan Bernardo P. Fernandez in a
Resolution dated November 19, 1984.

On November 13, 1979, Atty. Occea filed with this Court Administrative Case No.
2345-CFI against Judge Ruiz for gross inefficiency and dishonesty. In a Resolution
dated October 11, 1982, this Court dismissed the complaint for failure of Atty.
Occea to substantiate his charges during the investigation.

Unhappy with what Judge Ruiz stated in his comment on the said administrative
complaint, Atty. Occea and his wife filed with the CFI of Davao City Civil Case No.
14957 for damages against the former. The couple alleged that they suffered
damages upon reading the judges comment filed with the Supreme Court. On
June 11, 1982, the CFI dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action, the
comment being an absolutely privileged communication.

By filing the said civil actions, criminal charge, and administrative complaints,
found to be groundless, Atty. Occea further delayed with malice the probate
proceedings and inflicted hardship and pain upon Judge Ruiz.

More telling is the fact that by deliberately delaying the proceedings, Atty. Occea
has inflicted greater harm to the other heirs, with the executrix herself as his
willing partner.

From the start of the testate proceedings in 1963, no less than 13 petitions were
filed with this Court and the Court of Appeals by Atty. Occea, questioning the
interlocutory orders of the probate court. But most, if not all, were without merit.

Aside from Judge Ruiz, his predecessor, the late Judge Antonio Beldia, in the same
probate proceedings, was also harassed by Atty. Occea with groundless
administrative charges and suits, both criminal and civil. These cases, while
pending, were then utilized by Atty. Occea in securing restraining orders from the
Court of Appeals or as grounds for the judges inhibition.

Pursuant to Section 28, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court providing inter alia
that the CFI may suspend an attorney from the practice of law for cause, Judge
Ruiz, on May 26, 1982, filed with the same probate court Administrative Case No.
44 charging Atty. Occea with gross misconduct, violation of his oath as a lawyer
and willful disobedience of lawful court orders. Instead of filing an answer, he
submitted a motion praying for the inhibition of Judge Ruiz. This motion was
denied. Atty. Occea was then directed to file his answer within 15 days from
notice which was extended to another 15 days upon his motion. Still, he did not
file an answer. What he submitted was a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack
of jurisdiction. But it was denied for lack of merit.

Administrative Case No. 44 was set for hearing on December 2 and 3, 1982,
morning and afternoon. Upon Atty. Occeas motion, he was given an extension of
15 days from November 3, 1982 within which to file his answer. However, he did
not comply. Neither did he appear during the hearing.

Eventually, further hearing of the case was suspended when this Court issued a
temporary restraining order in G. R. No. 62453, Samuel Occea vs. District Judge
Fernando S. Ruiz, CFI-4, Bohol for prohibition. However, on August 15, 1983, this
Court dismissed Atty. Occeas petition for lack of merit. The hearing of the
administrative case was set on January 30 and 31, 1984, but again, he did not
appear.

The hearing was reset but once more, Atty. Occea failed to appear. Upon his
telegraphic request, the hearing was reset on December 13 and 14, 1984. On
December 7, 1984, he filed his Answer and Motion for Referral to the Solicitor
General or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. His motion was denied. The
hearing was reset on May 8 and 9, 1985. Upon another telegraphic request of
Atty. Occea, the hearing was postponed to August 14 and 15, 1985. Again, he did
not appear. Thus, in its order of August 15, 1985, the probate court considered
his failure to appear as a waiver of his right to present evidence.[4]

On November 14, 1985, based on the evidence presented ex parte, showing that
Atty. Occea has abused, misused and overused the judicial system,[5] Judge Ruiz
rendered a decision suspending[6] him from the practice of law for three (3)
years. The decision[7] unfolded a long list of his administrative offenses, thus:

Willful disobedience of lawful orders of the court;

gross misconduct in office

During the probate proceedings, respondent Occea, on behalf of his wife

executrix, filed with the Court of Appeals six (6) cases; and with the Supreme
Court one (1) case, assailing the order of the probate court directing the said
executrix to provide Nancy Ogan, authorized to determine the assets of the
estate in the U.S., $1,000.00 to be taken from the estate; and the order ordering
the same executrix to report to the probate court the securities belonging to the
estate. Atty. Occeas refusal to obey the said orders and elevating the same to the
higher courts unnecessarily delayed the probate proceedings.

II

Wittingly or willingly promoted or sued groundless

suits and gave aid or consent to the same; delayed
persons for money or malice

Respondent, together with his wife, filed against the judge of the probate court
two actions for damages which were both dismissed for lack of merit and lack of

cause of action. Respondent also filed with the Tanodbayan a letter-complaint

charging the judge of the probate court with knowingly rendering unjust
interlocutory orders. The complaint was likewise dismissed for lack of merit.
Respondent also filed with this Court an administrative complaint which was
again dismissed for failure of respondent to substantiate the charge.

By filing the above-cited civil actions for damages, administrative complaint and
criminal charge which were found to be groundless and unsubstantiated,
respondent unduly delayed the settlement of the estate proceedings by
harassing Judge Ruiz who had to spend time, effort and money to defend himself
against said frivolous and unmeritorious cases.

In fact, respondents propensity to file groundless administrative charges, as well

as civil and criminal suits, harassed not only Judge Ruiz but also the previous
judges who handled the case. As a measure of self defense, these judges were
compelled to prepare and file pleadings or comments thereby using time which
could have been devoted to expediting the closure of the estate proceedings.

Finally, since the start of the testate proceedings in 1963, no less than 13
petitions were filed with the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals questioning
the interlocutory orders of the probate court. Most, if not all of these petitions,
were determined to be groundless and without merit.

III

Disobeying the laws

Respondent violated his lawyers oath of office by flagrantly disobeying the clear
provision of Rule 140, Section 6, Revised Rules of Court, entitled Charges Against
Judges of First Instance, which reads as follows:

Sec. 6. Confidential - Proceedings against judges of first instance shall be private

and confidential.

During the pendency of the administrative complaint (Adm. Matter No. 23345CFI, Exh. Z) filed by respondent against Judge Ruiz in the Supreme Court, he
violated the private and confidential nature thereof three (3) times, to wit:

1. On April 1, 1980, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
prohibition and certiorari, entitled Estate of William C. Ogan, et al. vs. Hon.
Fernando S. Ruiz, et al., CA-G.R. No. SP-10604, questioning an interlocutory order
of the probate court (No. 2, Exh. V) to which he attached as Annex AW a complete
copy of his aforesaid administrative complaint against Judge Ruiz albeit the same
is completely immaterial to the issue raised in said petition.

2. In another petition for prohibition and certiorari, entitled Estate of William C.

Ogan, et al. vs. Hon. Fernando S. Ruiz, et al., CA-G.R. No. SP-13162 (No. 4, Exh.
V), impugning an interlocutory order of the probate court, he attached as Annex
C thereof a true and complete copy of the said administrative complaint although
not relevant to the question therein raised; and

3. On March 29, 1982, when respondent filed a letter-criminal complaint with the
Tanodbayan (Exh. Y), he also attached as Annex A thereof a true and complete
copy of said administrative complaint against Judge Ruiz even if said
administrative complaint is not germane to the charge (Page 2, No. 1, Exh. Y).

By repeatedly violating said provision of the Rules of Court, respondent, as an

officer of the court, put to naught one of the principal purposes thereof which is
to protect the personal and professional reputation of judges from the baseless
charges of disgruntled, vindictive and irresponsible clients, litigants and counsels
(In re Abistado, 57 Phil. 668; Murillo vs. Superable, Adm. Case No. 341, March 23,
1960; Moran, Rules of Court, 1963 Ed., Vol. VI, page 260). Respondent committed
gross misconduct in office and has not conducted himself as a lawyer according
to the best of his knowledge and discretion.

IV

Did falsehood and consented to the

doing of same in court.

In his complaint for damages against Judge Ruiz (Civil Case No. 14456 (Exh. W),
respondent alleged in paragraph IV-7b thereof (Exh. W-1) that his wife-executrix
Necitas Ogan Occea was held in contempt and censured, without any hearing, for
not obeying the probate courts order of October 16, 1979 (Exh. N).

However, the records of the Ogan estate proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. 423) would
show that in the order of February 26, 1980, the probate court directed said
executrix to explain within 5 days from notice why she should not be cited for
contempt (Exh. O). In the order of April 8, 1980, the contempt charge was set for
hearing on June 23, 1980, at 9:00 oclock in the morning (Exh. P) but was reset to
October 22, 1980 after the lifting of the restraining order of the Court of Appeals
(Exh. Q). This was again reset to April 20, 1981, subsequent to the denial by the
Supreme Court of the respondents petition for review impugning the Court of
Appeals decision. As stated in the order of May 12, 1981, page 2, paragraph 3
(Exh. R), copies of the order setting the hearing of the contempt charge on said
date (April 20, 1981) were received by the respondent and his wife-executrix on
March 24, 1981. On the date of the hearing, neither the executrix nor respondent
appeared. The following day (April 21, 1981), the court received executrixs
motion for postponement of the hearing, which was denied for lack of merit.
Subsequently, the order of May 12, 1981 (Exh. R) was rendered holding the
executrix in contempt and penalized with censure.

In fine, there was hearing with notice but the executrix and her counsel did not
attend.

Meanwhile, respondent once more, committed falsehood when he subsequently

alleged under oath in his letter-complaint to the Tanodbayan, dated March 29,
1982, against Judge Ruiz (Exh. Y) that without prior notice and without any
hearing, Judge Ruiz adjudged executrix Necitas Ogan Occea guilty of contempt
and censuring her (page 2, paragraph 2, Exh. Y-2; page 5, paragraph 9b, Exh. Y3).

Furthermore, in order to avoid complying with the probate court order of August
15, 1979 (Exh. C), directing said executrix to remit immediately the sum of
$1,000.00 to her co-heir Nancy Ogan-Gibson with which to meet whatever
necessary expenses that she might incur in inquiring into the status of the 5
parcels of land owned by the estate at Vinton County, Ohio, U.S.A., respondent
and his wife-executrix committed falsehood when they stated in their petition
filed with the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-10326 that the said order was
issued without hearing and thus a violation of procedural due process. The Court
of Appeals, in its decision which has become final (Exh. E), confirmed this
falsehood when it held that the petitioner-executrix was not deprived of her right

to be heard when the respondent judge issued the two orders in question (Page
6, Exh. E).

In accordance with the provisions of Section 29, Rule 138[8] and Section 9, Rule
139[9] of the Revised Rules of Court, Judge Ruiz, on November 26, 1985,
transmitted to this Court a certified true copy of the order of suspension and a
full statement of facts.[10]

On February 11, 1986, this Court, upon Atty. Occeas motion, restrained Judge Ruiz
from enforcing his decision of November 14, 1985. The case then has remained
pending so that on May 30, 1989, this Court issued an Order[11] requiring the
parties to move in the premises, by informing the Court about the status of the
decision or order suspending Atty. Samuel C. Occea from the practice of law,
Judge Ruiz particularly indicating if he still pursues the instant case, within ten
(10) days from notice.

On June 2, 1989, Judge Ruiz filed a comment that he has been waiting for this
Courts action on his decision suspending Atty. Occea.

On August 25, 1989, Atty. Occea filed an Explanation and Motion praying that the
case be referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation and
recommendation. This Court denied the motion and instead referred the case to
Atty. Emilio Rebueno (now deceased), then Bar Confidant, for evaluation, report
and recommendation. After going over the records, he recommended that the
temporary restraining order enjoining Judge Fernando S. Ruiz from enforcing the
decision dated November 14, 1985 suspending Atty. Samuel C. Occea from the
practice of law for a period of three years be forthwith LIFTED, and that Atty.
Samuel C. Occea be DISBARRED from the practice of law for grave violation of his
oath of office as attorney; likewise, that his name be DROPPED from the roll of
attorneys.

We sustain the evaluation, report and recommendation of the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the same being supported by the facts on record.

Indeed, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct showing any
fault or deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.[12]
His guilt, however, cannot be presumed.[13] It must indicate the dubious
character of the acts done, as well as the motivation thereof. Furthermore, a
disbarred lawyer must have been given full opportunity upon reasonable notice

to answer the charges against him, produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to
be heard by himself and counsel.[14] All these requirements have been complied
with in the case at hand.

In fact, it was Atty. Occea who did not bother at all to appear in the hearing of the
administrative case against him which was postponed by Judge Ruiz so many
times so that he could be accorded the full measure of due process. The court a
quo, therefore, appropriately proceeded to hear the case ex parte as Atty. Occea
deliberately failed to appear and answer the accusations against him.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a member of
the Bar may be disbarred or suspended by this Court for any (1) deceit, (2)
malpractice, (3) gross misconduct in office, (4) grossly immoral conduct, (5)
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, (6) violation of the lawyers oath,
(7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, and for (8) willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so. Not only did Atty.
Occea commit deceit, malpractice, grossly immoral conduct and willful
disobedience to a superior court. Beyond these transgressions, he violated the
lawyers oath whereby he imposed upon himself the following duties, thus:

I, __________________,of __________________,do
(place of birth)
solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I
will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the
duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willing promote or sue any groundless,
false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for
money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my
knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the court as to my
clients; and I impose upon myself these voluntary obligations without any mental
reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.

As shown by the records, Atty. Occea gravely violated his oath of office in his
handling of Special Proceedings No. 423. The facts of the case succinctly show
that through his atrocious maneuvers, he successfully delayed the disposition of
the case for the last thirty-eight (38) years, causing untold hurt and prejudice, not
only to the heirs, but also to Judges Ruiz and Beldia who heard the case. For
respondents part and that of his wife, such prolonged litigation obviously
benefited them. As aptly declared by the Court of Appeals, the delay can only
benefit the executor or administrator and the longer the proceedings, the bigger

the attorneys fees. But the more tragic reality is the fact that Atty. Occea has
caused a mockery of the judicial proceedings and inflicted injury to the
administration of justice through his deceitful, dishonest, unlawful and grossly
immoral conduct. Indeed, he abused beyond measure his privilege to practice
law.

This Court has held that a lawyer should not abuse his right of recourse to the
courts for the purpose of arguing a cause that had been repeatedly rebuffed.
Neither should he use his knowledge of law as an instrument to harass a party
nor to misuse judicial processes, as the same constitutes serious transgression of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. For while he owes fidelity to the cause of
his client, it should not be at the expense of truth and the administration of
justice.[15]

The practice of law is a sacred and noble profession. It is a special privilege

bestowed only upon those who are competent intellectually, academically and
morally.[16] A lawyer must at all times conduct himself, especially in his dealings
with his clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner
beyond reproach.[17] He must faithfully perform his duties to society, to the bar,
to the courts and to his clients. A violation of the high standards of the legal
profession subjects the lawyer to administrative sanctions by this Court which
includes suspension and disbarment.

Clearly, Atty. Occeas conduct has made him unfit to remain in the legal profession
even for a single moment.

It is a time-honored rule that good moral character is not only a condition

precedent to admission to the practice of law. Its continued possession is also
essential for remaining in the legal profession.[18] Atty. Occea has definitely
fallen below the moral bar when he engaged in deceitful, dishonest, unlawful and
grossly immoral acts. This Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of
integrity and good moral character as part of a lawyers equipment in the practice
of his profession,[19] because it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants for
the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of the Bar betrays
their trust and confidence.[20] Thus, for his serious administrative offenses,
punishable under Section 27 of Rule 138, Atty. Occea deserves the ultimate
penalty, that of expulsion from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers.

WHEREFORE, ATTY. SAMUEL C. OCCEA is DISBARRED from the practice of law. His
name is STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and all courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.