G.R. No.

L-24693

July 31, 1967

ERMITA-MALATE
HOTEL
AND
MOTEL
OPERATORS
ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR INC. and GO
CHIU, petitioners-appellees,
vs.
THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, respondentappellant.
VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.

Panganiban, Abad and Associates Law Office for respondent-appellant.

J. M. Aruego, Tenchavez and Associates for intervenor-appellee.
FERNANDO, J.:
The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower
court in an action for prohibition is whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the
City of Manila is violative of the due process clause. The lower court
held that it is and adjudged it "unconstitutional, and, therefore, null
and void." For reasons to be more specifically set forth, such judgment
must be reversed, there being a failure of the requisite showing to
sustain an attack against its validity.
The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed on
July 5, 1963 by the petitioners, Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
Operators Association, one of its members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and a
certain Go Chiu, who is "the president and general manager of the
second petitioner" against the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila
who was sued in his capacity as such "charged with the general power
and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the
necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such
ordinances." (par. 1). It was alleged that the petitioner non-stock
corporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection of the
interest of its eighteen (18) members "operating hotels and motels,
characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national
and city authorities, regularly paying taxes, employing and giving
livelihood to not less than 2,500 person and representing an
investment of more than P3 million."1 (par. 2). It was then alleged that
on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted
Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then ViceMayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time acting as Mayor of the
City of Manila. (par. 3).
After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set
forth in detail. There was the assertion of its being beyond the powers
of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar as it would
regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of the City
of Manila or in any other law, no reference is made to motels; that
Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for
being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar as it would
impose P6,000.00 fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00
for second class motels; that the provision in the same section which
would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from
entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or
other quarter to any person or persons without his filling up the
prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all times and in his
presence, wherein the surname, given name and middle name, the
date of birth, the address, the occupation, the sex, the nationality, the
length of stay and the number of companions in the room, if any, with
the name, relationship, age and sex would be specified, with data
furnished as to his residence certificate as well as his passport number,
if any, coupled with a certification that a person signing such form has
personally filled it up and affixed his signature in the presence of such
owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative, with such
registration forms and records kept and bound together, it also being
provided that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and
lodging houses would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor,
or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives is
unconstitutional and void again on due process grounds, not only for
being arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also for being vague,

indefinite and uncertain, and likewise for the alleged invasion of the
right to privacy and the guaranty against self-incrimination; that
Section 2 of the challenged ordinance classifying motels into two
classes and requiring the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in
first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or,
restaurant and laundry similarly offends against the due process clause
for being arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive, a conclusion which
applies to the portion of the ordinance requiring second class motels to
have a dining room; that the provision of Section 2 of the challenged
ordinance prohibiting a person less than 18 years old from being
accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn
unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making it
unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative of such establishments to lease any room or portion
thereof more than twice every 24 hours, runs counter to the due
process guaranty for lack of certainty and for its unreasonable,
arbitrary and oppressive character; and that insofar as the penalty
provided for in Section 4 of the challenged ordinance for a subsequent
conviction would, cause the automatic cancellation of the license of the
offended party, in effect causing the destruction of the business and
loss of its investments, there is once again a transgression of the due
process clause.
There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a
final judgment declaring the above ordinance null and void and
unenforceable. The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of
preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to refrain from
enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963.
In the a answer filed on August 3, 1963, there was an admission of the
personal circumstances regarding the respondent Mayor and of the
fact that petitioners are licensed to engage in the hotel or motel
business in the City of Manila, of the provisions of the cited Ordinance
but a denial of its alleged nullity, whether on statutory or constitutional
grounds. After setting forth that the petition did fail to state a cause of
action and that the challenged ordinance bears a reasonable relation,
to a proper purpose, which is to curb immorality, a valid and proper
exercise of the police power and that only the guests or customers not
before the court could complain of the alleged invasion of the right to
privacy and the guaranty against self incrimination, with the assertion
that the issuance of the preliminary injunction ex parte was contrary to
law, respondent Mayor prayed for, its dissolution and the dismissal of
the petition.
Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, there was submitted
a stipulation of facts dated September 28, 1964, which reads:
1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
Operators Association, Inc. and Hotel del Mar Inc. are duly
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines,
both with offices in the City of Manila, while the petitioner
Go Chin is the president and general manager of Hotel del
Mar Inc., and the intervenor Victor Alabanza is a resident of
Baguio City, all having the capacity to sue and be sued;
2. That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and
incumbent City Mayor and chief executive of the City of
Manila charged with the general power and duty to enforce
ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary
orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such
ordinances;
3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in the
business of operating hotels and motels in Malate and Ermita
districts in Manila;
4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of
Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, which was approved on
June 14, 1963, by Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, then the
acting City Mayor of Manila, in the absence of the
respondent regular City Mayor, amending sections 661, 662,

668-a, 668-b and 669 of the compilation of the ordinances

of the City of Manila besides inserting therein three new
sections. This ordinance is similar to the one vetoed by the
respondent Mayor (Annex A) for the reasons stated in its 4th
Indorsement dated February 15, 1963 (Annex B);
5. That the explanatory note signed by then Councilor
Herminio Astorga was submitted with the proposed
ordinance (now Ordinance 4760) to the Municipal Board,
copy of which is attached hereto as Annex C;
6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual income
of P101,904.05 from license fees paid by the 105 hotels and
motels (including herein petitioners) operating in the City of
Manila.1wph1.t
Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on January 22, 1965,
wherein stress was laid on the presumption of the validity of the
challenged ordinance, the burden of showing its lack of conformity to
the Constitution resting on the party who assails it, citing not only U.S.
v. Salaveria, but likewise applicable American authorities. Such a
memorandum likewise refuted point by point the arguments advanced
by petitioners against its validity. Then barely two weeks later, on
February 4, 1965, the memorandum for petitioners was filed
reiterating in detail what was set forth in the petition, with citations of
what they considered to be applicable American authorities and
praying for a judgment declaring the challenged ordinance "null and
void and unenforceable" and making permanent the writ of preliminary
injunction issued.
After referring to the motels and hotels, which are members of the
petitioners association, and referring to the alleged constitutional
questions raised by the party, the lower court observed: "The only
remaining issue here being purely a question of law, the parties, with
the nod of the Court, agreed to file memoranda and thereafter, to
submit the case for decision of the Court." It does appear obvious then
that without any evidence submitted by the parties, the decision
passed upon the alleged infirmity on constitutional grounds of the
challenged ordinance, dismissing as is undoubtedly right and proper
the untenable objection on the alleged lack of authority of the City of
Manila to regulate motels, and came to the conclusion that "the
challenged Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila, would be
unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void." It made permanent the
preliminary injunction issued against respondent Mayor and his agents
"to restrain him from enforcing the ordinance in question." Hence this
appeal.
As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed. A decent
regard for constitutional doctrines of a fundamental character ought to
have admonished the lower court against such a sweeping
condemnation of the challenged ordinance. Its decision cannot be
allowed to stand, consistently with what has hitherto been the
accepted standards of constitutional adjudication, in both procedural
and substantive aspects.
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of
any evidence to offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a
challenged statute or ordinance. As was expressed categorically by
Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity x x x . The
action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set
aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar
with the necessities of their particular municipality and with all the
facts and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate
action. The local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in
effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well being
of the people x x x . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside
legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or
property rights under the guise of police regulation.2
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of
validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless

the statute or ordinance is void on its face which is not the case here.
The principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the leading
case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,3 where the
American Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and
succinctly summed up the matter thus: The statute here questioned
deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We
are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of
regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff
of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition
the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption of
constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual
foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such factual
foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the
matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption
of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set
aside.
Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the
ordinance is fatally defective as being repugnant to the due process
clause of the Constitution. The mantle of protection associated with
the due process guaranty does not cover petitioners. This particular
manifestation of a police power measure being specifically aimed to
safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation of nullity
resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of
substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow
the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as
the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of
powers,4 extending as it does "to all the great public needs."5 It would
be, to paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very
purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be
deprived of its competence to promote public health, public morals,
public safety and the genera welfare.6 Negatively put, police power is
"that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to
prohibit all that is hurt full to the comfort, safety, and welfare of
society.7
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely
enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. The
explanatory note of the Councilor Herminio Astorga included as annex
to the stipulation of facts, speaks of the alarming increase in the rate
of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great
part to the existence of motels, which "provide a necessary
atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus become
the "ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers." The challenged
ordinance then proposes to check the clandestine harboring of
transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these
transients and guests to fill up a registration form, prepared for the
purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by introducing
several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy
that characterizes the registration of transients and guests." Moreover,
the increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage
"establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than
legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city
government." It would appear therefore that the stipulation of facts,
far from sustaining any attack against the validity of the ordinance,
argues eloquently for it.
It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably stamped with the
seal of its approval, ordinances punishing vagrancy and classifying a
pimp or procurer as a vagrant;8 provide a license tax for and regulating
the maintenance or operation of public dance halls;9 prohibiting
gambling;10 prohibiting jueteng;11 and monte;12 prohibiting playing of
panguingui on days other than Sundays or legal holidays;13 prohibiting
the operation of pinball machines;14 and prohibiting any person from
keeping, conducting or maintaining an opium joint or visiting a place
where opium is smoked or otherwise used,15 all of which are intended
to protect public morals.
On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or local,
primarily rest the exercise of the police power, which, it cannot be too
often emphasized, is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the
health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the

people. In view of the requirements of due process, equal protection

and other applicable constitutional guaranties however, the exercise of
such police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of
any person is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police
power may be considered as either capricious, whimsical, unjust or
unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of any other
applicable constitutional guaranty may call for correction by the courts.
We are thus led to considering the insistent, almost shrill tone, in
which the objection is raised to the question of due process.16 There is
no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes
though a standard to which the governmental action should conform in
order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate
case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process which must
exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free the
challenged ordinance, or any governmental action for that matter,
from the imputation of legal infirmity sufficient to spell its doom? It is
responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates
of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness
avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to
paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result
in sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official action
marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly it has been identified as
freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea
of fair play.17 It exacts fealty "to those strivings for justice" and judges
the act of officialdom of whatever branch "in the light of reason drawn
from considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions of
legal and political thought."18 It is not a narrow or "technical
conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances,"19 decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close
and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our
society."20 Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or
pedantically in slavery to form or phrases.21
It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance
enacted precisely to meet what a municipal lawmaking body considers
an evil of rather serious proportion an arbitrary and capricious exercise
of authority. It would seem that what should be deemed unreasonable
and what would amount to an abdication of the power to govern is
inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration of the state of public
morals. To be more specific, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila
felt the need for a remedial measure. It provided it with the enactment
of the challenged ordinance. A strong case must be found in the
records, and, as has been set forth, none is even attempted here to
attach to an ordinance of such character the taint of nullity for an
alleged failure to meet the due process requirement. Nor does it lend
any semblance even of deceptive plausibility to petitioners' indictment
of Ordinance No. 4760 on due process grounds to single out such
features as the increased fees for motels and hotels, the curtailment of
the area of freedom to contract, and, in certain particulars, its alleged
vagueness.
Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees
provided for by the challenged ordinance for hotels and motels, 150%
for the former and over 200% for the latter, first-class motels being
required to pay a P6,000 annual fee and second-class motels, P4,500
yearly. It has been the settled law however, as far back as 1922 that
municipal license fees could be classified into those imposed for
regulating occupations or regular enterprises, for the regulation or
restriction of non-useful occupations or enterprises and for revenue
purposes only.22 As was explained more in detail in the above Cu
Unjieng case: (2) Licenses for non-useful occupations are also
incidental to the police power and the right to exact a fee may be
implied from the power to license and regulate, but in fixing amount of
the license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a much wider
discretion in this class of cases than in the former, and aside from
applying the well-known legal principle that municipal ordinances must
not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a
general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. The desirability
of imposing restraint upon the number of persons who might
otherwise engage in non-useful enterprises is, of course, generally an
important factor in the determination of the amount of this kind of
license fee. Hence license fees clearly in the nature of privilege taxes

for revenue have frequently been upheld, especially in of licenses for

the sale of liquors. In fact, in the latter cases the fees have rarely been
declared unreasonable.23
Moreover in the equally leading case of Lutz v. Araneta24 this Court
affirmed the doctrine earlier announced by the American Supreme
Court that taxation may be made to implement the state's police
power. Only the other day, this Court had occasion to affirm that the
broad taxing authority conferred by the Local Autonomy Act of 1959 to
cities and municipalities is sufficiently plenary to cover a wide range of
subjects with the only limitation that the tax so levied is for public
purposes, just and uniform.25
As a matter of fact, even without reference to the wide latitude
enjoyed by the City of Manila in imposing licenses for revenue, it has
been explicitly held in one case that "much discretion is given to
municipal corporations in determining the amount," here the license
fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely
as a police power measure.26 The discussion of this particular matter
may fitly close with this pertinent citation from another decision of
significance: "It is urged on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellees that the
enforcement of the ordinance could deprive them of their lawful
occupation and means of livelihood because they can not rent stalls in
the public markets. But it appears that plaintiffs are also dealers in
refrigerated or cold storage meat, the sale of which outside the city
markets under certain conditions is permitted x x x . And surely, the
mere fact, that some individuals in the community may be deprived of
their present business or a particular mode of earning a living cannot
prevent the exercise of the police power. As was said in a case,
persons licensed to pursue occupations which may in the public need
and interest be affected by the exercise of the police power embark in
these occupations subject to the disadvantages which may result from
the legal exercise of that power."27
Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the
challenged ordinance makes it unlawful for the owner, manager,
keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel, lodging
house, tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent room or portion
thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all
cases full payment shall be charged, call for a different conclusion.
Again, such a limitation cannot be viewed as a transgression against
the command of due process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary.
Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for the immoral or
illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, according to the
explanatory note, are being devoted. How could it then be arbitrary or
oppressive when there appears a correspondence between the
undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the legislative
attempt at correction. Moreover, petitioners cannot be unaware that
every regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty which as
pointed out by Justice Malcolm cannot be absolute. Thus: "One
thought which runs through all these different conceptions of liberty is
plainly apparent. It is this: 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is
not license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is
restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good
of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man
can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled
license. The right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable
restraint by general law for the common good x x x The liberty of the
citizen may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the
public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the
police power."28
A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: "Public welfare,
then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in
order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal
liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and
property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in
order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state
x x x To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the
individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a
misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority
because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be

made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into
slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and
authority in his mind through education and personal discipline, so that
there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace
and order and happiness for all.29
It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court nullifying
legislation because of undue deprivation of freedom to
contract, People v. Pomar,30 no longer "retains its virtuality as a living
principle. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to
the assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in
contractual relations affected with public interest.31 What may be
stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the
mind or the person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts
is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed
affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of
regulatory measure is wider.32 How justify then the allegation of a
denial of due process?
Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on another due
process ground by invoking the principles of vagueness or uncertainty.
It would appear from a recital in the petition itself that what seems to
be the gravamen of the alleged grievance is that the provisions are too
detailed and specific rather than vague or uncertain. Petitioners,
however, point to the requirement that a guest should give the name,
relationship, age and sex of the companion or companions as
indefinite and uncertain in view of the necessity for determining
whether the companion or companions referred to are those arriving
with the customer or guest at the time of the registry or entering the
room With him at about the same time or coming at any indefinite
time later to join him; a proviso in one of its sections which cast doubt
as to whether the maintenance of a restaurant in a motel is dependent
upon the discretion of its owners or operators; another proviso which
from their standpoint would require a guess as to whether the "full
rate of payment" to be charged for every such lease thereof means a
full day's or merely a half-day's rate. It may be asked, do these
allegations suffice to render the ordinance void on its face for alleged
vagueness or uncertainty? To ask the question is to answer it.
From Connally v. General Construction Co.33 to Adderley v.
Florida,34 the principle has been consistently upheld that what makes a
statute susceptible to such a charge is an enactment either forbidding
or requiring the doing of an act that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. Is this
the situation before us? A citation from Justice Holmes would prove
illuminating: "We agree to all the generalities about not supplying
criminal laws with what they omit but there is no canon against using
common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously
mean."35
That is all then that this case presents. As it stands, with all due
allowance for the arguments pressed with such vigor and
determination, the attack against the validity of the challenged
ordinance cannot be considered a success. Far from it. Respect for
constitutional law principles so uniformly held and so uninterruptedly
adhered to by this Court compels a reversal of the appealed decision.
Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the
injunction issued lifted forthwith. With costs.
Facts:
The petitioners filed a petition for prohibition against Ordinance No.
4760 for being violative of the due process clause, contending that
said ordinance is not only arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive
but also vague, indefinite and uncer tain, a nd likewise
allege the invas ion of the right to privac y and the guaranty
against self-incrimination.
Ordinanc e
No. 4760
prop oses
to c heck
the c la ndes tine harboring of tra nsie nts and guests of these
establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a
registration form, prepared for the purp ose, in a lob by open to
public view a t a ll times , a nd by introd ucing se ve ral other

amend atory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that

characterizes the registration of transients and guests."Moreover, the
increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage
"establishments of the kind from o p e r a t i n g f o r p u r p o s e
other than legal" and at the same time, to
i n c r e a s e " t h e i n c o m e o f t h e c i t y government."
The lower court ruled in favor of the petitioners. Hence, the appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not Ordinance No. 4760 is unconstitutional
Held:
No. The mantle of pr otec tion associated with the d ue
process g uar anty d oes not cover p etitioners . T his
particular ma nifes tation of a polic e power measure being
specifica lly aimed to sa feg uard p ublic morals is immune
from such
imputa tion
of nullity
r esting
p urely
on conjec ture a nd unsup por ted b y a nything of s ubstanc e.
To hold otherwis e would be to unduly res tr ict and na rr ow
the scop e of polic e power which has been properly characterized
as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers,
extending as it does "to all the great public needs."
It would be, to paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the
very purpose of the state if it could be deprived or a llowed
itself to be depr ived of its competenc e to pr omote p ub lic
hea lth, pub lic morals, public safety and the general welfare.
Negatively put, police power is that inherent and plenary p ower in
the State whic h enab les it to prohibit a ll that is hur t full to
the c omfor t, s afety, a nd welfare of society.
On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or local,
primarily rest the exercise of the police power, whic h, it ca nnot
be too often emp hasized, is the p ower to p rescr ibe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order,
safety and general welfare of the people.
In view of the requirements of due process, equal protection and other
applicable constitutional guaranties however, the exercise of such
police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any
person is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police
power may be considered as either capricious, whimsical, unjust or
unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of any
other applicable constitutional guaranty may call for correction by the
courts.
The Court reversed the judgment of the lower court and lifted the
injunction on the Ordinance in question.
Liberty is a b lessing without which life is a mis er y, but
liberty s hould not be ma de to prevail over authority because
then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to
prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery.

G.R. No. L-5060

January 26, 1910

THEUNITEDSTATESvs.LUIS TORIBIO
CARSON, J.:
The evidence of record fully sustains the findings of the trial court that
the appellant slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered for human
consumption, the carabao described in the information, without a
permit from the municipal treasure of the municipality wherein it was
slaughtered, in violation of the provisions of sections 30 and 33 of Act
No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter
of large cattle.
It appears that in the town of Carmen, in the Province of Bohol,
wherein the animal was slaughtered there is no municipal
slaughterhouse, and counsel for appellant contends that under such
circumstances the provisions of Act No. 1147 do not prohibit nor
penalize the slaughter of large cattle without a permit of the municipal
treasure. Sections 30, 31, 32, and 33 of the Act are as follows:
SEC. 30. No large cattle shall be slaughtered or killed for
food at the municipal slaughterhouse except upon permit
secured from the municipal treasure. Before issuing the
permit for the slaughter of large cattle for human
consumption, the municipal treasurer shall require for
branded cattle the production of the original certificate of
ownership and certificates of transfer showing title in the
person applying for the permit, and for unbranded cattle
such evidence as may satisfy said treasurer as to the
ownership of the animals for which permit to slaughter has
been requested.
SEC. 31. No permit to slaughter has been carabaos shall be
granted by the municipal treasurer unless such animals are
unfit for agricultural work or for draft purposes, and in no
event shall a permit be given to slaughter for food any
animal of any kind which is not fit for human consumption.
SEC. 32. The municipal treasurer shall keep a record of all
permits for slaughter issued by him, and such record shall
show the name and residence of the owner, and the class,
sex, age, brands, knots of radiated hair commonly know as
remolinos or cowlicks, and other marks of identification of
the animal for the slaughter of which permit is issued and
the date on which such permit is issued. Names of owners
shall be alphabetically arranged in the record, together with
date of permit.
A copy of the record of permits granted for slaughter shall
be forwarded monthly to the provincial treasurer, who shall
file and properly index the same under the name of the
owner, together with date of permit.
SEC. 33. Any person slaughtering or causing to be
slaughtered for human consumption or killing for food at the
municipal slaughterhouse any large cattle except upon
permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, shall be
punished by a fine of not less than ten nor more than five
hundred pesos, Philippine currency, or by imprisonment for
not less than one month nor more than six months, or by
both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the
court.
It is contended that the proper construction of the language of these
provisions limits the prohibition contained in section 30 and the penalty
imposed in section 33 to cases (1) of slaughter of large cattle for
human consumption in a municipal slaughter without a permit duly
secured from the municipal treasurer, and (2) cases of killing of large
cattle for food in a municipal slaughterhouse without a permit duly

secured from the municipal treasurer; and it is urged that the

municipality of Carmen not being provided with a municipal
slaughterhouse, neither the prohibition nor the penalty is applicable to
cases of slaughter of large cattle without a permit in that municipality.
We are of opinion, however, that the prohibition contained in section
30 refers (1) to the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption,
anywhere, without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer,
and (2) expressly and specifically to the killing for food of large cattle
at a municipal slaughterhouse without such permit; and that the
penalty provided in section 33 applies generally to the slaughter of
large cattle for human consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly
secured from the municipal treasurer, and specifically to the killing for
food of large cattle at a municipal slaughterhouse without such permit.
It may be admitted at once, that the pertinent language of those
sections taken by itself and examined apart from the context fairly
admits of two constructions: one whereby the phrase "at the municipal
slaughterhouse" may be taken as limiting and restricting both the word
"slaughtered" and the words "killed for food" in section 30, and the
words "slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human
consumption" and the words "killing for food" in section 33; and the
other whereby the phrase "at the municipal slaughterhouse" may be
taken as limiting and restricting merely the words "killed for food" and
"killing for food" as used in those sections. But upon a reading of the
whole Act, and keeping in mind the manifest and expressed purpose
and object of its enactment, it is very clear that the latter construction
is that which should be adopted.
The Act primarily seeks to protect the "large cattle" of the Philippine
Islands against theft and to make easy the recovery and return of such
cattle to their proper owners when lost, strayed, or stolen. To this end
it provides an elaborate and compulsory system for the separate
branding and registry of ownership of all such cattle throughout the
Islands, whereby owners are enabled readily and easily to establish
their title; it prohibits and invalidates all transfers of large cattle
unaccompanied by certificates of transfer issued by the proper officer
in the municipality where the contract of sale is made; and it provides
also for the disposition of thieves or persons unlawfully in possession,
so as to protect the rights of the true owners. All this, manifestly, in
order to make it difficult for any one but the rightful owner of such
cattle to retain them in his possession or to dispose of them to others.
But the usefulness of this elaborate and compulsory system of
identification, resting as it does on the official registry of the brands
and marks on each separate animal throughout the Islands, would be
largely impaired, if not totally destroyed, if such animals were requiring
proof of ownership and the production of certificates of registry by the
person slaughtering or causing them to be slaughtered, and this
especially if the animals were slaughtered privately or in a clandestine
manner outside of a municipal slaughterhouse. Hence, as it would
appear, sections 30 and 33 prohibit and penalize the slaughter for
human consumption or killing for food at a municipal slaughterhouse
of such animals without a permit issued by the municipal treasurer,
and section 32 provides for the keeping of detailed records of all such
permits in the office of the municipal and also of the provincial
treasurer.
If, however, the construction be placed on these sections which is
contended for by the appellant, it will readily be seen that all these
carefully worked out provisions for the registry and record of the
brands and marks of identification of all large cattle in the Islands
would prove in large part abortion, since thieves and persons
unlawfully in possession of such cattle, and naturally would, evade the
provisions of the law by slaughtering them outside of municipal
slaughterhouses, and thus enjoy the fruits of their wrongdoing without
exposing themselves to the danger of detection incident to the
bringing of the animals to the public slaughterhouse, where the brands
and other identification marks might be scrutinized and proof of
ownership required.
Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more
constructions, that construction should be adopted which will most

tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote
the object for which the statute was enacted, and a construction
should be rejected which would tend to render abortive other
provisions of the statute and to defeat the object which the legislator
sought to attain by its enactment. We are of opinion, therefore, that
sections 30 and 33 of the Act prohibit and penalize the slaughtering or
causing to be slaughtered for human consumption of large cattle at
any place without the permit provided for in section 30.
It is not essential that an explanation be found for the express
prohibition in these sections of the "killing for food at a municipal
slaughterhouse" of such animals, despite the fact that this prohibition
is clearly included in the general prohibition of the slaughter of such
animals for human consumption anywhere; but it is not improbable
that the requirement for the issue of a permit in such cases was
expressly and specifically mentioned out of superabundance of
precaution, and to avoid all possibility of misunderstanding in the
event that some of the municipalities should be disposed to modify or
vary the general provisions of the law by the passage of local
ordinances or regulations for the control of municipal slaughterhouse.
Similar reasoning applied to the specific provisions of section 31 of the
Act leads to the same conclusion. One of the secondary purposes of
the law, as set out in that section, is to prevent the slaughter for food
of carabaos fit for agricultural and draft purposes, and of all animals
unfit for human consumption. A construction which would limit the
prohibitions and penalties prescribed in the statute to the killing of
such animals in municipal slaughterhouses, leaving unprohibited and
unpenalized their slaughter outside of such establishments, so
manifestly tends to defeat the purpose and object of the legislator,
that unless imperatively demanded by the language of the statute it
should be rejected; and, as we have already indicated, the language of
the statute is clearly susceptible of the construction which we have
placed upon it, which tends to make effective the provisions of this as
well as all the other sections of the Act.
It appears that the defendant did in fact apply for a permit to
slaughter his carabao, and that it was denied him on the ground that
the animal was not unfit "for agricultural work or for draft purposes."
Counsel for appellant contends that the statute, in so far as it
undertakes to penalize the slaughter of carabaos for human
consumption as food, without first obtaining a permit which can not be
procured in the event that the animal is not unfit "for agricultural work
or draft purposes," is unconstitutional and in violation of the terms of
section 5 of the Philippine Bill (Act of Congress, July 1, 1902), which
provides that "no law shall be enacted which shall deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."
It is not quite clear from the argument of counsel whether his
contention is that this provision of the statute constitutes a taking of
property for public use in the exercise of the right of eminent
domain without providing for the compensation of the owners, or that
it is an undue and unauthorized exercise of the police power of the
State. But whatever may be the basis of his contention, we are of
opinion, appropriating, with necessary modifications understood, the
language of that great jurist, Chief Justice Shaw (in the case of
Com. vs. Tewksbury, 11 Met., 55, where the question involved was the
constitutionality of a statute prohibiting and penalizing the taking or
carrying away by any person, including the owner, of any stones,
gravel, or sand, from any of the beaches in the town of Chesea,) that
the law in question "is not a taking of the property for public use,
within the meaning of the constitution, but is a just and legitimate
exercise of the power of the legislature to regulate and restrain such
particular use of the property as would be inconsistent with or
injurious to the rights of the public. All property is acquired and held
under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to injure the
equal rights of others or greatly impair the public rights and interest of
the community."
It may be conceded that the benificial use and exclusive enjoyment of
the property of all carabao owners in these Islands is to a greater or
less degree interfered with by the provisions of the statute; and that,

without inquiring what quantum of interest thus passes from the

owners of such cattle, it is an interest the deprivation of which detracts
from their right and authority, and in some degree interferes with their
exclusive possession and control of their property, so that if the
regulations in question were enacted for purely private purpose, the
statute, in so far as these regulations are concerned, would be a
violation of the provisions of the Philippine Bill relied on be appellant;
but we are satisfied that it is not such a taking, such an interference
with the right and title of the owners, as is involved in the exercise by
the State of the right of eminent domain, so as to entitle these owners
to compensation, and that it is no more than "a just restrain of an
injurious private use of the property, which the legislature had
authority to impose."
In the case of Com. vs. Alger (7 Cush., 53, 84), wherein the doctrine
laid down in Com. vs. Tewksbury (supra) was reviewed and affirmed,
the same eminent jurist who wrote the former opinion, in
distinguishing the exercise of the right of eminent domain from the
exercise of the sovereign police powers of the State, said:
We think it is settled principle, growing out of the nature of
well-ordered civil society, that every holder of property,
however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it
under the implied liability that his use of it may be so
regulated that is shall not be injurious to the equal
enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment
of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the
community. . . . Rights of property, like all other social and
conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable
limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from
being injurious, and to such reasonable restrain and
regulations establish by law, as the legislature, under the
governing and controlling power vested in them by the
constitution, may think necessary and expedient.
This is very different from the right of eminent domain, the
right of a government to take and appropriate private
property to public use, whenever the public exigency
requires it; which can be done only on condition of providing
a reasonable compensation therefor. The power we allude to
is rather the police power, the power vested in the
legislature by the constitution, to make, ordain, and
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws,
statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without,
not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be
for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the
subjects of the same.
It is much easier to perceive and realize the existence and
sources of this power than to mark its boundaries or
prescribe limits to its exercise.
Applying these principles, we are opinion that the restrain placed by
the law on the slaughter for human consumption of carabaos fit for
agricultural work and draft purpose is not an appropriation of property
interests to a "public use," and is not, therefore, within the principle of
the exercise by the State of the right of eminent domain. It is fact a
mere restriction or limitation upon a private use, which the legislature
deemed to be determental to the public welfare. And we think that an
examination of the general provisions of the statute in relation to the
public interest which it seeks to safeguard and the public necessities
for which it provides, leaves no room for doubt that the limitations and
restraints imposed upon the exercise of rights of ownership by the
particular provisions of the statute under consideration were imposed
not for private purposes but, strictly, in the promotion of the "general
welfare" and "the public interest" in the exercise of the sovereign
police power which every State possesses for the general public
welfare and which "reaches to every species of property within the
commonwealth."

For several years prior to the enactment of the statute a virulent

contagious or infectious disease had threatened the total extinction of
carabaos in these Islands, in many sections sweeping away seventy,
eighty, and in some cases as much as ninety and even one hundred
per cent of these animals. Agriculture being the principal occupation of
the people, and the carabao being the work animal almost exclusively
in use in the fields as well as for draft purposes, the ravages of the
disease with which they were infected struck an almost vital blow at
the material welfare of the country. large areas of productive land lay
waste for years, and the production of rice, the staple food of the
inhabitants of the Islands, fell off to such an extent that the
impoverished people were compelled to spend many millions of pesos
in its importation, notwithstanding the fact that with sufficient work
animals to cultivate the fields the arable rice lands of the country could
easily be made to produce a supply more that sufficient for its own
needs. The drain upon the resources of the Islands was such that
famine soon began to make itself felt, hope sank in the breast of the
people, and in many provinces the energies of the breadwinners
seemed to be paralyzed by the apparently hopeless struggle for
existence with which they were confronted.
To meet these conditions, large sums of money were expended by the
Government in relieving the immediate needs of the starving people,
three millions of dollars were voted by the Congress of the United
States as a relief or famine fund, public works were undertaken to
furnish employment in the provinces where the need was most
pressing, and every effort made to alleviate the suffering incident to
the widespread failure of the crops throughout the Islands, due in
large measure to the lack of animals fit for agricultural work and draft
purposes.
Such measures, however, could only temporarily relieve the situation,
because in an agricultural community material progress and
permanent prosperity could hardly be hoped for in the absence of the
work animals upon which such a community must necessarily rely for
the cultivation of the fields and the transportation of the products of
the fields to market. Accordingly efforts were made by the Government
to increase the supply of these animals by importation, but, as appears
from the official reports on this subject, hope for the future depended
largely on the conservation of those animals which had been spared
from the ravages of the diseased, and their redistribution throughout
the Islands where the need for them was greatest.
At large expense, the services of experts were employed, with a view
to the discovery and applications of preventive and curative remedies,
and it is hoped that these measures have proved in some degree
successful in protecting the present inadequate supply of large cattle,
and that the gradual increase and redistribution of these animals
throughout the Archipelago, in response to the operation of the laws of
supply and demand, will ultimately results in practically relieving those
sections which suffered most by the loss of their work animals.
As was to be expected under such conditions, the price of carabaos
rapidly increase from the three to five fold or more, and it may fairly
be presumed that even if the conservative measures now adopted
prove entirely successful, the scant supply will keep the price of these
animals at a high figure until the natural increase shall have more
nearly equalized the supply to the demand.
Coincident with and probably intimately connected with this sudden
rise in the price of cattle, the crime of cattle stealing became extremely
prevalent throughout the Islands, necessitating the enactment of a
special law penalizing with the severest penalties the theft of carabaos
and other personal property by roving bands; and it must be assumed
from the legislative authority found that the general welfare of the
Islands necessitated the enactment of special and somewhat
burdensome provisions for the branding and registration of large
cattle, and supervision and restriction of their slaughter for food. It will
hardly be questioned that the provisions of the statute touching the
branding and registration of such cattle, and prohibiting and penalizing
the slaughter of diseased cattle for food were enacted in the due and
proper exercise of the police power of the State; and we are of opinion

that, under all the circumstances, the provision of the statute

prohibiting and penalizing the slaughter for human consumption of
carabaos fit for work were in like manner enacted in the due and
proper exercise of that power, justified by the exigent necessities of
existing conditions, and the right of the State to protect itself against
the overwhelming disaster incident to the further reduction of the
supply of animals fit for agricultural work or draft purposes.
It is, we think, a fact of common knowledge in these Islands, and
disclosed by the official reports and records of the administrative and
legislative departments of the Government, that not merely the
material welfare and future prosperity of this agricultural community
were threatened by the ravages of the disease which swept away the
work animals during the years prior to the enactment of the law under
consideration, but that the very life and existence of the inhabitants of
these Islands as a civilized people would be more or less imperiled by
the continued destruction of large cattle by disease or otherwise.
Confronted by such conditions, there can be no doubt of the right of
the Legislature to adopt reasonable measures for the preservation of
work animals, even to the extent of prohibiting and penalizing what
would, under ordinary conditions, be a perfectly legitimate and proper
exercise of rights of ownership and control of the private property of
the citizen. The police power rests upon necessity and the right of selfprotection and if ever the invasion of private property by police
regulation can be justified, we think that the reasonable restriction
placed upon the use of carabaos by the provision of the law under
discussion must be held to be authorized as a reasonable and proper
exercise of that power.
As stated by Mr. Justice Brown in his opinion in the case of Lawton vs.
Steele (152 U.S., 133, 136):
The extent and limits of what is known as the police power
have been a fruitful subject of discussion in the appellate
courts of nearly every State in the Union. It is universally
conceded to include everything essential to the public safely,
health, and morals, and to justify the destruction or
abatement, by summary proceedings, of whatever may be
regarded as a public nuisance. Under this power it has been
held that the State may order the destruction of a house
falling to decay or otherwise endangering the lives of
passers-by; the demolition of such as are in the path of a
conflagration; the slaughter of diseased cattle; the
destruction of decayed or unwholesome food; the prohibition
of wooden buildings in cities; the regulation of railways and
other means of public conveyance, and of interments in
burial grounds; the restriction of objectionable trades to
certain localities; the compulsary vaccination of children; the
confinement of the insane or those afficted with contagious
deceases; the restraint of vagrants, beggars, and habitual
drunkards; the suppression of obscene publications and
houses of ill fame; and the prohibition of gambling houses
and places where intoxicating liquors are sold. Beyond this,

however, the State may interfere wherever the public

interests demand it, and in this particular a large discretion
is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine, not only
what the interests of the public require, but what measures
are necessary for the protection of such interests.
(Barbier vs. Connolly, 113 U. S., 27; Kidd vs. Pearson, 128
U. S., 1.) To justify the State in thus interposing its authority
in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those
of a particular class, require such interference; and, second,
that the means are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise of
protecting the public interests, arbitrarily interfere with
private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary
restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other words, its
determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police
powers is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the
supervision of the court.

From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the
provisions of the statute under consideration was required by "the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class;" and that the prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos
for human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for
agricultural work or draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary"
limitation on private ownership, to protect the community from the
loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident
owners, tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to
enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive
power of the community may be measurably and dangerously
affected.

that the provision of the statute in question being a proper exercise of

that power is not in violation of the terms of section 5 of the Philippine
Bill, which provide that "no law shall be enacted which shall deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law," a
provision which itself is adopted from the Constitution of the United
States, and is found in substance in the constitution of most if not all
of the States of the Union.

Chief Justice Redfield, in Thorpe vs. Rutland & Burlington R. R. Co. (27
Vt., 140), said (p. 149) that by this "general police power of the State,
persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and
burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity
of the State; of the perfect right in the legislature to do which no
question ever was, or, upon acknowledge and general principles, ever
can be made, so far as natural persons are concerned."

Facts: Respondent Toribio is an owner of carabao, residing in the town

of Carmen in the province of Bohol. The trial court of Bohol found that
the respondent slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered a carabao
without a permit from the municipal treasurer of the municipality
wherein it was slaughtered, in violation of Sections 30 and 33 of Act
No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter
of Large Cattle. The act prohibits the slaughter of large cattle fit for
agricultural work or other draft purposes for human consumption.

And Cooley in his "Constitutional Limitations" (6th ed., p. 738) says:

The respondent counters by stating that what the Act is (1) prohibiting
is the slaughter of large cattle in the municipal slaughter house without
a permit given by the municipal treasurer. Furthermore, he contends
that the municipality of Carmen has no slaughter house and that he
slaughtered his carabao in his dwelling, (2) the act constitutes a taking
of property for public use in the exercise of the right of eminent
domain without providing for the compensation of owners, and it is an
undue and unauthorized exercise of police power of the state for it
deprives them of the enjoyment of their private property.

It would be quite impossible to enumerate all the instances

in which the police power is or may be exercised, because
the various cases in which the exercise by one individual of
his rights may conflict with a similar exercise by others, or
may be detrimental to the public order or safety, are infinite
in number and in variety. And there are other cases where it
becomes necessary for the public authorities to interfere
with the control by individuals of their property, and even to
destroy it, where the owners themselves have fully observed
all their duties to their fellows and to the State, but where,
nevertheless, some controlling public necessity demands the
interference or destruction. A strong instance of this
description is where it becomes necessary to take, use, or
destroy the private property of individuals to prevent the
spreading of a fire, the ravages of a pestilence, the advance
of a hostile army, or any other great public calamity. Here
the individual is in no degree in fault, but his interest must
yield to that "necessity" which "knows no law." The
establishment of limits within the denser portions of cities
and villages within which buildings constructed of
inflammable materials shall not be erected or repaired may
also, in some cases, be equivalent to a destruction of private
property; but regulations for this purpose have been
sustained notwithstanding this result. Wharf lines may also
be established for the general good, even though they
prevent the owners of water-fronts from building out on soil
which constitutes private property. And, whenever the
legislature deem it necessary to the protection of a harbor to
forbid the removal of stones, gravel, or sand from the
beach, they may establish regulations to that effect under
penalties, and make them applicable to the owners of the
soil equally with other persons. Such regulations are only "a
just restraint of an injurious use of property, which the
legislature have authority" to impose.
So a particular use of property may sometimes be forbidden,
where, by a change of circumstances, and without the fault
of the power, that which was once lawful, proper, and
unobjectionable has now become a public nuisance,
endangering the public health or the public safety. Milldams
are sometimes destroyed upon this grounds; and
churchyards which prove, in the advance of urban
population, to be detrimental to the public health, or in
danger of becoming so, are liable to be closed against
further use for cemetery purposes.
These citations from some of the highest judicial and text-book
authorities in the United States clearly indicate the wide scope and
extent which has there been given to the doctrine us in our opinion

The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial

court should be affirmed with the costs of this instance against the
appellant. So ordered.

Issue: Whether or not Act. No. 1147, regulating the registration,

branding and slaughter of large cattle, is an undue and unauthorized
exercise
of
police
power.
Held:

It is a valid exercise of police power of the state.

Facts: The Supreme court Said sections 30 and 33 of the Act prohibit
and penalize the slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human
consumption of large cattle at any place without the permit provided
for
in
section
30
Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more
constructions, that construction should be adopted which will most
tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote
the object for which the statute was enacted, and a construction
should be rejected which would tend to render abortive other
provisions of the statute and to defeat the object which the legislator
sought
to
attain
by
its
enactment
The Supreme Court also said that if they will follow the contention of
Toribio
it
will
defeat
the
purpose
of
the
law.
The police power rests upon necessity and the right of self-protection
and if ever the invasion of private property by police regulation can be
justified, The Supreme Court think that the reasonable restriction
placed upon the use of carabaos by the provision of the law under
discussion must be held to be authorized as a reasonable and proper
exercise
of
that
power.
The Supreme Court cited events that happen in the Philippines like an
epidemic that wiped 70-100% of the population of carabaos.. The
Supreme Court also said that these animals are vested with public
interest for they are fundamental use for the production of crops.
These reasons satisfy the requesites of a valid exercise of police power
The Supreme court finally said that article 1147 is not an exercise of
the inherent power of eminent domain. The said law does not
constitute the taking of caraboes for public purpose; it just serve as a
mere regulation for the consumption of these private properties for the
protection of general welfare and public interest.

G.R. No. 27484

September 1, 1927

ANGELLORENZO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF HEALTH, respondent-appelle.
MALCOLM, J.:
The purpose of this appeal is to induce the court to set aside the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila sustaining the law
authorizing the segregation of lepers, and denying the petition
for habeas corpus, by requiring the trial court to receive evidence to
determine if leprosy is or is not a contagious disease.
The petition for the writ of habeas corpus was in the usual form.
Therein it was admitted that the applicant was a leper. It was,
however, alleged that his confinement in the San Lazaro Hospital in
the City of Manila was in violation of his constitutional rights. The
further allegation was made that leprosy is not an infectious disease.
The return of the writ stated that the leper was confined in the San
Lazaro Hospital in conformity with the provisions of section 1058 of the
Administrative Code. But to this was appended, for some unknown
reason, the averment that each and every fact of the petition not
otherwise admitted by the return was denied. Although counsel for the
appellant makes mention of the form which the return of the writ
of habeas corpus took, so as not to complicate matters unnecessarily,
we prefer to give attention only to so much of the return as is
contemplated by law and to disregard the rest as surplusage. The
petitioner not having traversed the return, the only issue is whether
the facts stated in the return as a matter of law authorized the
restraint (Code of Civil Procedure, chap. XXVI; Code of Criminal
Procedure, secs. 77 et seq.).
The Philippine law pertaining to the segregation of lepers is found in
article XV of chapter 37 of the Administrative Code. Codal section 1058
empowers the Director of Health and his authorized agents "to cause
to be apprehended, and detained, isolated, or confined, all leprous
persons in the Philippine Islands. "In amplification of this portion of the
law are found provisions relating to arrest of suspected lepers, medical
inspection and diagnostic procedure, confirmation of diagnosis by
bacteriological methods, establishment of hospitals, detention camps,
and a leper colony, etc.
In its simplest aspects, therefore, we have this situation presented: A
leper confined in the San Lazaro Hospital by the health authorities in
conformity with law, but with counsel for the leper contending that the
said law is unconstitutional, and advancing as the basis for that
contention the theory to be substantiated by proof that human beings
are not incurable with leprosy, and that the disease may not be
communicated by contact.
Section 1058 of the Administrative Code was enacted by the legislative
body in the legitimate exercise of the police power which extends to
the preservation of the public health. It was place on the statute books
in recognition of leprosy as a grave health problem. The methods
provided for the control of leprosy plainly constitute due process of
law. The assumption must be that if evidence was required to establish
the necessity for the law, that it was before the legislature when the
act was passed. In the case of a statute purporting the have been
enacted in the interest of the public health, all questions relating to the
determination of matters of fact are for the legislature. If there is
probable basis for sustaining the conclusion reached, its findings are
not subject to judicial review. Debatable questions are for the
Legislature to decide. The courts do not sit to resolve the merits of
conflicting theories. (1 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., pp.
379, 380; R. C. L., pp. 111 et seq.; Jacobson vs. Massachusetts
[1904], 197 U. S., 11 Segregation of Lepers [1884], V Hawaiian, 162;
People vs. Durston [N. Y.] [1890], 7 L. R. A., 715; Blue vs. Beach
[Ind.] [1900], 50 L. R. A., 64; Nelson vs. Minneapolis [Minn.] [1910],
29 L. R. A., N. S., 260.)

Judicial notice will be taken of the fact that leprosy is commonly

believed to be an infectious disease tending to cause one afflicted with
it to be shunned and excluded from society, and that compulsory
segregation of lepers as a means of preventing the spread of the
disease of supported by high scientific authority (See Osler and
McCrea, The Principles and Practice of Medicine, 9th ed., p. 153.)
Upon this view, laws for the segregation of lepers have been provided
the world over. Similarly, the local legislature has regarded leprosy as
a contagious disease and has authorized measures to control the
dread scourge. To that forum must the petitioner go to reopen the
question. We are frank to say that it would require a much stronger
case than the one at bar for us to sanction admitting the testimony of
expert or other witnesses to show that a law of this character may
possibly violate some constitutional provision.
For more reasons than one, we think that Judge Concepcion took
exactly the correct stand in deciding this test case, and that
consequently his decision should be upheld.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.
Summary

of

the

Case:

The statute empowering the Director of Health and his authorized

agents to cause to be apprehended, and detained, isolated, or
confined, all leprous persons in the Philippine Islands was enacted by
the Legislative body in the legitimate exercise of the police power
which
extends
to
the
preservation
of
public
health.
The petitioner and appellant, Angel Lorenzo is a leprous person and is
confined in the San Lazaro Hospital in the City of Manila. He made an
appeal to induce the court to set aside the judgment of the Court of
the First Instance of Manila sustaining the law authorizing the
segregation of lepers. Lorenzo alleged that his confinement in the San
Lazaro Hospital was in violation of Constitutional rights and alleged
that
leprosy
is
not
an
infectious
disease.
Relation
to
Article
3:
Section 1: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection
of
laws.
I pity Angel Lorenzo for having leprosy. However, the law enacted was
for the public safety and not just to make lepers an outcast of society.
Petitioner claims that his constitutional rights were violated and I
believe that he was referring to the deprivation of liberty. It is true that
he is deprived of liberty but he is deprived with due process of law. His
confinement and treatments is a compensation for his freedom. It
should be taken as an advantage for him. He is helping the country so
as the citizens wont be infected of leprosy and helping his self to get
proper
treatment
and
attention
to
his
illness.
As discussed in class, there are two types of due processes, the
substantive and procedural. In this case, his confinement is part of the
procedural due process. He is isolated, but in exchange, he is treated.
So, there is no violation of the petitioners constitutional rights. The
judgment
was
affirmed.
On the grounds that Leprosy is not a contagious disease. People in the
past used to think that only by touching a leper, or by having contact,
one would get infected but it isnt really true. The bacteria that causes
leprosy is a weak disease-causing agent, as to be compared from other
contagious disease. And it was till the mid 19th century that the 1st
effective drug was discovered. So, the mystery of Leprosy still clouded
the minds of the people in the time of Lorenzo, thats why the law was
enacted because it was believed to be a very grave threat to the public

health. Unlike the AH1N1 virus, wherein the modes of transmission are
really known, the people infected with the virus voluntarily isolated and
quarantined themselves. In this case, the petitioner could not really
defend himself in saying that it is not a highly contagious disease
because the facts about this disease were not yet very well known.
Thats why the law was taken as a necessary measure to prevent the
spread of the disease which was believed to be highly contagious.

G.R. No. 80508 January 30, 1990

EDDIE GUAZON,
vs.
MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA,
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction to prohibit
the military and police officers represented by public respondents from
conducting "Areal Target Zonings" or "Saturation Drives" in Metro
Manila.
The forty one (41) petitioners state that they are all of legal age, bona
fide residents of Metro Manila and taxpayers and leaders in their
respective communities. They maintain that they have a common or
general interest in the preservation of the rule of law, protection of
their human rights and the reign of peace and order in their
communities. They claim to represent "the citizens of Metro Manila
who have similar interests and are so numerous that it is impracticable
to bring them all before this Court."
The public respondents, represented by the Solicitor General, oppose
the petition contending inter alia that petitioners lack standing to file
the instant petition for they are not the proper parties to institute the
action.
According to the petitioners, the following "saturation drives" were
conducted in Metro Manila:
1. March 5, 1987 at about 9:30 PM in Tindalo, Kagitingan, and
Magdalena Streets, Tondo, Manila.
2. June l9, 1987 at about l0:00 PM in Mata Street, Panday Pira
Extension and San Sebastian Street, Tondo, Manila.

According to the petitioners, the "areal target zonings" or saturation

drives" are in critical areas pinpointed by the military and police as
places where the subversives are hiding. The arrests range from seven
(7) persons during the July 20 saturation drive in Bangkusay, Tondo to
one thousand five hundred (1,500) allegedly apprehended on
November 3 during the drive at Lower Maricaban, Pasay City. The
petitioners claim that the saturation drives follow a common pattern of
human rights abuses. In all these drives, it is alleged that the following
were committed:
1. Having no specific target house in mind, in the
dead of the night or early morning hours, police
and military units without any search warrant or
warrant of arrest cordon an area of more than one
residence and sometimes whole barangay or areas
of barangay in Metro Manila. Most of them are in
civilian clothes and without nameplates or
identification cards.
2. These raiders rudely rouse residents from their
sleep by banging on the walls and windows of
their homes, shouting, kicking their doors open
(destroying some in the process), and then
ordering the residents within to come out of their
respective residences.
3. The residents at the point of high-powered
guns are herded like cows, the men are ordered to
strip down to their briefs and examined for tattoo
marks and other imagined marks.
4. While the examination of the bodies of the men
are being conducted by the raiders, some of the
members of the raiding team force their way into
each and every house within the cordoned off
area and then proceed to conduct search of the
said houses without civilian witnesses from the
neighborhood.

3. July 20, 1987 at about 8:00 AM in Bangkusay Street, Tondo, Manila.

4. August 11 to l3, 1987 between 11:00 PM and 2:00 AM in six blocks
along Aroma Beach up to Happy Land, Magsaysay Village, Tondo,
Manila.
5. August 19, 1987 at 9:00 PM in Herbosa Extension, Quirino Street,
and Pacheco Street, Tondo, Manila.
6. August 28, 1987 at l0:30 PM, in Block 34, Dagat-dagatan Navotas,
Metro Manila.
7. August 30, 1987 at 9:30 PM at Paraiso Extension, Magsaysay
Village, Tondo, Manila.
8. October 12, 1987 at 12:00 midnight in Apelo Cruz Compound,
Quezon City.
9. October 17, 1987 at 11:00 PM in Quirino Street, Tondo, Manila.
10. October 23, 1987 at 2:30 A.M. in Sun Valley Drive, Manila
International Airport, Pasay City.
11. November 1, 1987 at 4:00 A.M. in Cordillera Street, Sta. Mesa,
Manila.
12. November 3, 1987 at 5:00 A.M. in Lower Maricaban, Pasay City,
Metro Manila.

5. In many instances, many residents have

complained that the raiders ransack their homes,
tossing about the residents' belongings without
total regard for their value. In several instances,
walls are destroyed, ceilings are damaged in the
raiders' illegal effort to 'fish' for incriminating
evidence.
6. Some victims of these illegal operations have
complained with increasing frequency that their
money and valuables have disappeared after the
said operations.
7. All men and some women who respond to these
illegal and unwelcome intrusions are arrested on
the spot and hauled off to waiting vehicles that
take them to detention centers where they are
interrogated and 'verified.' These arrests are all
conducted without any warrants of arrest duly
issued by a judge, nor under the conditions that
will authorize warrantless arrest. Some hooded
men are used to fingerpoint suspected
subversives.
8. In some instances, arrested persons are
released after the expiration of the period wherein
they can be legally detained without any charge at
all. In other instances, some arrested persons are
released without charge after a few days of
arbitrary detention.

9. The raiders almost always brandish their

weapons and point them at the residents during
these illegal operations.
10. Many have also reported incidents of on-thespotbeatings, maulings and maltreatment.
11. Those who are detained for further
'verification' by the raiders are subjected to mental
and physical torture to extract confessions and
tactical information. (Rollo, pp. 2-4)
The public respondents stress two points in their Comment which was
also adopted as their Memorandum after the petition was given due
course.
First, the respondents have legal authority to conduct saturation
drives. And second, they allege that the accusations of the petitioners
about a deliberate disregard for human rights are total lies.
Insofar as the legal basis for saturation drives is concerned, the
respondents cite Article VII, Section 17 of the Constitution which
provides:
The President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus and offices. He

shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

(Emphasis supplied )

They also cite Section 18 of the same Article which provides:

The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of
all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. ...
There can be no question that under ordinary circumstances, the
police action of the nature described by the petitioners would be illegal
and blantantly violative of the express guarantees of the Bill of Rights.
If the military and the police must conduct concerted campaigns to
flush out and catch criminal elements, such drives must be consistent
with the constitutional and statutory rights of all the people affected by
such actions.
There is, of course, nothing in the Constitution which denies the
authority of the Chief Executive, invoked by the Solicitor General, to
order police actions to stop unabated criminality, rising lawlessness,
and alarming communist activities. The Constitution grants to
Government the power to seek and cripple subversive movements
which would bring down constituted authority and substitute a regime
where individual liberties are suppressed as a matter of policy in the
name of security of the State. However, all police actions are governed
by the limitations of the Bill of Rights. The Government cannot adopt
the same reprehensible methods of authoritarian systems both of the
right and of the left, the enlargement of whose spheres of influence it
is trying hard to suppress. Our democratic institutions may still be
fragile but they are not in the least bit strengthened through violations
of the constitutional protections which are their distinguishing features.
In Roan v. Gonzales (145 SCRA 687; 690-691 [1986]), the Court
stated:
One of the most precious rights of the citizen in a
free society is the right to be left alone in the
privacy of his own house. That right has ancient
roots, dating back through the mists of history to
the mighty English kings in their fortresses of
power. Even then, the lowly subject had his own

castle where he was monarch of all he surveyed.

This was his humble cottage from which he could
bar his sovereign lord and all the forces of the
Crown.
That right has endured through the ages albeit
only in a few libertarian regimes. Their number,
regrettably, continues to dwindle against the
onslaughts of authoritarianism. We are among the
fortunate few, able again to enjoy this right after
the ordeal of the past despotism. We must cherish
and protect it all the more now because it is like a
prodigal son returning.
That right is guaranteed in the following provisions
of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution:
SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall not be violated,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law,
after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
xxx xxx xxx
Only last year, the Court again issued this reminder in 20th Century
Fox Film Corporation v. Court of Appeals (164 SCRA 655; 660- 661
[1988]):
This constitutional right protects a citizen against
wanton and unreasonable invasion of his privacy
and liberty as to his person, papers and effects.
We have explained in the case of People vs.
Burgos (144 SCRA 1) citing Villanueva v.
Querubin (48 SCRA 345) why the right is so
important:
It is deference to one's personality that lies at the
core of this right, but it could be also looked upon
as a recognition of a constitutionally protected
area, primarily one's home, but not necessarily
thereto confined. (Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385
US 293 [1966]) What is sought to be guarded is a
man's prerogative to choose who is allowed entry
to his residence. In that haven of refuge, his
individuality can assert itself not only in the choice
of who shall be welcome but likewise in the kind
of objects he wants around him. There the state,
however powerful, does not as such have access
except under the circumstances above noted, for
in the traditional formulation, his house, however
humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any
unwarranted intrusion by government, which is
called upon to refrain from any invasion of his
dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life.
(Cf. Schmerber v. California, 384 US 757 [1966],
Brennan J. and Boyd v. United States, 11 6 630
[1886]). In the same vein, Landynski in his
authoritative work (Search and Seizure and the
Supreme Court [1966]), could fitly characterize
constitutional right as the embodiment of a
spiritual concept: the belief that to value the
privacy of home and person and to afford its
constitutional protection against the long reach of

government is no less than to value human

dignity, and that his privacy must not be disturbed
except in case of overriding social need, and then
only under stringent procedural safeguards. (ibid,
p. 74.)
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Rochin v.
California, (342 US 165; 96 L. Ed. 183 [1952]) emphasizes clearly that
police actions should not be characterized by methods that offend a
sense of justice. The court ruled:
Applying these general considerations to the
circumstances of the present case, we are
compelled to conclude that the proceedings by
which this conviction was obtained do more than
offend some fastidious squeamishness or private
sentimentalism about combatting crime too
energetically. This is conduct that shocks the
conscience. Illegally breaking into the privacy of
the petitioner, the struggle to open his mouth and
remove what was there, the forcible extraction of
his stomach's contents this course of proceeding
by agents of government to obtain evidence is
bound to offend even hardened sensibilities. They
are methods too close to the rack and the screw
to permit of constitutional differentiation.
It is significant that it is not the police action perse which is
impermissible and which should be prohibited. Rather, it is the
procedure used or in the words of the court, methods which "offend
even hardened sensibilities." In Breithaupt v. Abram (352 US 432, 1 L.
Ed. 2nd 448 [1957]), the same court validated the use of evidence, in
this case blood samples involuntarily taken from the petitioner, where
there was nothing brutal or offensive in the taking. The Court stated:
Basically the distinction rests on the fact that there
is nothing 'brutal' or 'offensive' in the taking of a
sample of blood when done, as in this case, under
the protective eye of a physician. To be sure, the
driver here was unconscious when the blood was
taken, but the absence of conscious consent,
without more, does not necessarily render the
taking a violation of a constitutional light; and
certainly the rest was administered here would not
be considered offensive by even the most delicate.
Furthermore, due process is not measured by the
yardstick of personal reaction or the
sphygmogram of the most sensitive person, but by
that whole community sense of 'decency and
fairness that has been woven by common
experience into the fabric of acceptable conduct....

The Solicitor General argues:

This a complete lie.
Just the contrary, they had been conducted with
due regard to human rights. Not only that, they
were intelligently and carefully planned months
ahead of the actual operation. They were
executed in coordination with barangay officials
who pleaded with their constituents to submit
themselves voluntarily for character and personal
verification. Local and foreign correspondents,
who had joined these operations, witnessed and
recorded the events that transpired relative
thereto. (After Operation Reports: November 5,
1987, Annex 12; November 20, 1987, Annex 13;
November 24, 1987, Annex 14). That is why in all
the drives so far conducted, the alleged victims
who numbered thousands had not themselves
complained.
In her speech during turn-over rites on January
26, 1987 at Camp Aguinaldo, President Aquino
branded all accusations of deliberate disregard for
human rights as 'total lies'. Here are excerpts from
her strongest speech yet in support of the military:

All accusations of a deliberate disregard for human

rights have been shown- up to be total lies.
...To our soldiers, let me say go out and fight,
fight with every assurance that I will stand by you
through thick and thin to share the blame, defend
your actions, mourn the losses and enjoy with you
the final victory that I am certain will be ours.
You and I will see this through together.
I've sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution.
We have wasted enough time answering their
barkings for it is still a long way to lasting peace. .
. . The dangers and hardships to our men in the
field are great enough as it is without having them
distracted by tills worthless carping at their backs.

Our counter-insurgency policy remains the same:

economic development to pull out the roots-and
military operations to slash the growth of the
insurgency.

The individual's right to immunity from such invasion of his body was
considered as "far outweighed by the value of its deterrent effect" on
the evil sought to be avoided by the police action.

The answer to terror is force now.

It is clear, therefore, that the nature of the affirmative relief hinges

closely on the determination of the exact facts surrounding a particular
case.

Only feats of arms can buy us the time needed to

make our economic and social initiatives bear fruit.
. . Now that the extreme Right has been
defeated, I expect greater vigor in the prosecution

The violations of human rights alleged by the petitioners are serious. If

an orderly procedure ascertains their truth, not only a writ of
prohibition but criminal prosecutions would immediately issue as a
matter of course. A persistent pattern of wholesale and gross abuse of
civil liberties, as alleged in the petition, has no place in civilized
society.
On the other hand, according to the respondents, the statements
made by the petitioners are a complete lie.

of the war against the communist

insurgency, even as we continue to watch our

backs against attacks from the Right. (Philippine

Star, January 27, 1988, p. 1, Annex 15; emphasis
supplied)
Viewed in the light of President Aquino's
observation on the matter, it can be said that
petitioners misrepresent as human rights
violations the military and police's zealous
vigilance over the people's right to live in peace
and safety. (Rollo, pp. 36-38)

Herein lies the problem of the Court. We can only guess the truth.
Everything before us consists of allegations. According to the
petitioners, more than 3,407 persons were arrested in the saturation
drives covered by the petition. No estimates are given for the drives in
Block 34, Dagat-dagatan, Navotas; Apelo Cruz Compound, Pasig; and
Sun Valley Drive near the Manila International Airport area. Not one of
the several thousand persons treated in the illegal and inhuman
manner described by the petitioners appears as a petitioner or has
come before a trial court to present the kind of evidence admissible in
courts of justice. Moreover, there must have been tens of thousands of
nearby residents who were inconvenienced in addition to the several
thousand allegedly arrested. None of those arrested has apparently
been charged and none of those affected has apparently complained.
A particularly intriguing aspect of the Solicitor General's comments is
the statement that local and foreign co-respondents actually joined the
saturation drives and witnessed and recorded the events. In other
words, the activities sought to be completely proscribed were in full
view of media. The sight of hooded men allegedly being used to
fingerpoint suspected subversives would have been good television
copy. If true, this was probably effected away from the ubiquitous eye
of the TV cameras or, as the Solicitor General contends, the allegation
is a "complete lie."
The latest attempt to stage a coup d'etat where several thousand
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines sought to overthrow
the present Government introduces another aspect of the problem and
illustrates quite clearly why those directly affected by human rights
violations should be the ones to institute court actions and why
evidence of what actually transpired should first be developed before
petitions are filed with this Court.
Where there is large scale mutiny or actual rebellion, the police or
military may go in force to the combat areas, enter affected residences
or buildings, round up suspected rebels and otherwise quell the mutiny
or rebellion without having to secure search warrants and without
violating the Bill of Rights. This is exactly what happened in the White
Plains Subdivision and the commercial center of Makati during the first
week of December, 1989.
The areal target zonings in this petition were intended to flush out
subversives and criminal elements particularly because of the blatant
assassinations of public officers and police officials by elements
supposedly coddled by the communities where the "drives" were
conducted.
It is clear from the pleadings of both petitioners and respondents,
however, that there was no rebellion or criminal activity similar to that
of the attempted coup d' etats. There appears to have been no
impediment to securing search warrants or warrants of arrest before
any houses were searched or individuals roused from sleep were
arrested. There is no strong showing that the objectives sought to be
attained by the "areal zoning" could not be achieved even as the rights
of squatter and low income families are fully protected.
Where a violation of human rights specifically guaranteed by the
Constitution is involved, it is the duty of the court to stop the
transgression and state where even the awesome power of the state
may not encroach upon the rights of the individual. It is the duty of
the court to take remedial action even in cases such as the present
petition where the petitioners do not complain that they were victims
of the police actions, where no names of any of the thousands of
alleged victims are given, and where the prayer is a general one to
stop all police "saturation drives," as long as the Court is convinced
that the event actually happened.
The Court believes it highly probable that some violations were
actually committed. This is so inspite of the alleged pleas of barangay
officials for the thousands of residents "to submit themselves
voluntarily for character and personal verification." We cannot imagine
police actions of the magnitude described in the petitions and admitted

by the respondents, being undertaken without some undisciplined

soldiers and policemen committing certain abuses. However, the
remedy is not to stop all police actions, including the essential and
legitimate ones. We see nothing wrong in police making their presence
visibly felt in troubled areas. Police cannot respond to riots or violent
demonstrations if they do not move in sufficient numbers. A show of
force is sometimes necessary as long as the rights of people are
protected and not violated. A blanket prohibition such as that sought
by the petitioners would limit all police actions to one on one
confrontations where search warrants and warrants of arrests against
specific individuals are easily procured. Anarchy may reign if the
military and the police decide to sit down in their offices because all
concerted drives where a show of force is present are totally
prohibited.
The remedy is not an original action for prohibition brought through a
taxpayers' suit. Where not one victim complains and not one violator is
properly charged, the problem is not initially for the Supreme Court. It
is basically one for the executive departments and for trial courts. Well
meaning citizens with only second hand knowledge of the events
cannot keep on indiscriminately tossing problems of the executive, the
military, and the police to the Supreme Court as if we are the
repository of all remedies for all evils. The rules of constitutional
litigation have been evolved for an orderly procedure in the vindication
of rights. They should be followed. If our policy makers sustain the
contention of the military and the police that occasional saturation
drives are essential to maintain the stability of government and to
insure peace and order, clear policy guidelines on the behavior of
soldiers and policemen must not only be evolved, they should also be
enforced. A method of pinpointing human rights abuses and identifying
violators is necessary.
The problem is appropriate for the Commission on Human Rights. A
high level conference should bring together the heads of the
Department of Justice, Department of National Defense and the
operating heads of affected agencies and institutions to devise
procedures for the prevention of abuses.
Under the circumstances of this taxpayers' suit, there is no erring
soldier or policeman whom we can order prosecuted. In the absence of
clear facts ascertained through an orderly procedure, no permanent
relief can be given at this time. Further investigation of the petitioners'
charges and a hard look by administration officials at the policy
implications of the prayed for blanket prohibition are also warranted.
In the meantime and in the face of a prima facie showing that some
abuses were probably committed and could be committed during
future police actions, we have to temporarily restrain the alleged
banging on walls, the kicking in of doors, the herding of half-naked
men to assembly areas for examination of tattoo marks, the violation
of residences even if these are humble shanties of squatters, and the
other alleged acts which are shocking to the conscience.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial
Courts of Manila, Malabon, and Pasay City where the petitioners may
present evidence supporting their allegations and where specific erring
parties may be pinpointed and prosecuted.
Copies of this decision are likewise forwarded to the Commission on
Human Rights, the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of National
Defense, and the Commanding General PC-INP for the drawing up and
enforcement of clear guidelines to govern police actions intended to
abate riots and civil disturbances, flush out criminal elements, and
subdue terrorist activities.
In the meantime, the acts violative of human rights alleged by the
petitioners as committed during the police actions are ENJOINED until
such time as permanent rules to govern such actions are promulgated.
SO ORDERED.

Facts: The 41 petitioners alleged that the "saturation drive" or "aerial

target zoning" that were conducted in their place (Tondo Manila) were
unconstitutional. They alleged that there is no specific target house to
be search and that there is no search warrant or warrant of arrest
served. Most of the policemen are in their civilian clothes and
without nameplates or identification cards. The residents were rudely
rouse from their sleep by banging on the walls and windows of their
houses. The residents were at the point of high-powered guns and
herded like cows. Men were ordered to strip down to their briefs for
the police to examine their tattoo marks. The residents complained
that they're homes were ransacked, tossing their belongings and
destroying their valuables. Some of their money and valuables had
disappeared after the operation. The residents also reported incidents
of maulings, spot-beatings and maltreatment. Those who were
detained also suffered mental and physical torture to extract
confessions and tactical informations. The respondents said that such
accusations were all lies. Respondents contends that the
Constitution grants to government the power to seek and cripple
subversive movements for the maintenance of peace in the state. The
aerial target zoning were intended to flush out subversives and
criminal elements coddled by the communities were the said drives
were conducted. They said that they have intelligently and carefully
planned months ahead for the actual operation and that local and
foreign media joined the operation to witness and record such event.
Issue: Whether or Not the saturation drive committed consisted of
violation
of
human
rights.

Held: It is not the police action per se which should be prohibited

rather it is the procedure used or the methods which "offend even
hardened sensibilities" .Based on the facts stated by the parties, it
appears to have been no impediment to securing search warrants or
warrants of arrest before any houses were searched or individuals
roused from sleep were arrested. There is no showing that the
objectives sought to be attained by the "aerial zoning" could not be
achieved even as th rights of the squatters and low income families are
fully protected. However, the remedy should not be brought by a
tazpaer suit where not one victim complaints and not one violator is
properly charged. In the circumstances of this taxpayers' suit, there is
no erring soldier or policeman whom the court can order prosecuted.
In the absence of clear facts no permanent relief can be given.
In the meantime where there is showing that some abuses were
committed, the court temporary restraint the alleged violations which
are shocking to the senses. Petition is remanded to the RTC of Manila.

ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ [101 PHIL 1155; L-7995; 31 MAY 1957]

Facts: Republic Act 1180

or
commonly
known
as
An Act to Regulate the Retail Business was passed. The said law
provides for a prohibition against foreigners as well as corporations
owned by foreigners from engaging from retail trade in our country.
This was protested by the petitioner in this case. According to him, the
said law violates the international and treaty of the Philippines
therefore
it
is
unconstitutional.
Specifically,
the
Treaty
of Amitybetween the Philippines and China was violated according to
him.

Issue: Whether or Not Republic Act 1180 is a valid exercise of police

power.

Held: According to the Court, RA 1180 is a valid exercise of police

power. It was also then provided that police power can not be
bargained away through the medium of a treaty or a contract. The
Court also provided that RA 1180 was enacted to remedy a real and
actual danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and
control. If ever the law infringes upon the said treaty, the latter is
always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law and
the same may never curtain or restrict the scope of the police power of
the state.

HELD: The law is a valid exercise of police power and it does not deny
the aliens the equal protection of the laws. There are real and actual,
positive and fundamental differences between an alien and a citizen,
which fully justify the legislative classification adopted.
RATIO:
The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality among
residents. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike,
under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred
and
liabilities
enforced.
The classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one
class
are
treated
alike.
The difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis
for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power.
Official statistics point out to the ever-increasing dominance and
control by alien of the retail trade. It is this domination and control
that is the legislatures target in the enactment of the Act.
The mere fact of alienage is the root cause of the distinction between
the alien and the national as a trader. The alien is naturally lacking in
that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for the Phil. where he temporarily
stays and makes his living. The alien owes no allegiance or loyalty to
the State, and the State cannot rely on him/her in times of crisis or
emergency.

FACTS:
The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail
Business). Its purpose was to prevent persons who are not citizens of
the Phil. from having a stranglehold upon the peoples economic life.

While the citizen holds his life, his person and his property subject to
the needs of the country, the alien may become the potential enemy
of
the
State.

The alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and
the people on whom he makes his profit. Through the illegitimate use
of pernicious designs and practices, the alien now enjoys a
monopolistic control on the nations economy endangering the national
security in times of crisis and emergency.

a prohibition against aliens and against associations,

partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned
by Filipinos, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade

aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May 15,

1954 are allowed to continue their business, unless their licenses are
forfeited in accordance with law, until their death or voluntary
retirement. In case of juridical persons, ten years after the approval of
the Act or until the expiration of term.
Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were exempted from
this Act.

provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the retail

business for violation of the laws on nationalization, economic control
weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade,
commerce and industry.

provision against the establishment or opening by aliens

actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches
of retail business
Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien residents,
corporations and partnerships affected by the Act, filed an action to
declare it unconstitutional for the ff: reasons:
1.
it denies to alien residents the equal protection of
the laws and deprives them of their liberty and property
without due process
2.

the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title

3.
the Act violates international and treaty
obligations
4.
the provisions of the Act against the transmission
by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession
ISSUE: WON the Act deprives the aliens of the equal protection of the
laws.

G.R. No. L-34915 June 24, 1983

CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF
QUEZON CITY, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII; HIMLAYANG
PILIPINO, INC., respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review which seeks the reversal of the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII declaring Section 9 of
Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, of the Quezon City Council null and void.
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "ORDINANCE
REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION
OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND
WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING
PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF" provides:
Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of
the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for
charity burial of deceased persons who are
paupers and have been residents of Quezon City
for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be
determined by competent City Authorities. The
area so designated shall immediately be
developed and should be open for operation not
later than six months from the date of approval of
the application.
For several years, the aforequoted section of the Ordinance was not
enforced by city authorities but seven years after the enactment of the
ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed the following resolution:

RESOLVED by the council of Quezon assembled, to

request, as it does hereby request the City
Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further selling
and/or transaction of memorial park lots in
Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed
to donate the required 6% space intended for
paupers burial.

Pursuant to this petition, the Quezon City Engineer notified respondent

Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section 9 of Ordinance No.
6118, S-64 would be enforced
Respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing with the Court of First
Instance of Rizal Branch XVIII at Quezon City, a petition for
declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
injunction (Sp. Proc. No. Q-16002) seeking to annul Section 9 of the
Ordinance in question The respondent alleged that the same is
contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local
Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code.
There being no issue of fact and the questions raised being purely
legal both petitioners and respondent agreed to the rendition of a
judgment on the pleadings. The respondent court, therefore, rendered
the decision declaring Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 null and
void.
A motion for reconsideration having been denied, the City Government
and City Council filed the instant petition.
Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent's property is a valid
and reasonable exercise of police power and that the land is taken for
a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. They
further argue that the Quezon City Council is authorized under its

charter, in the exercise of local police power, " to make such further
ordinances and resolutions not repugnant to law as may be necessary
to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by
this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for
the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals,
peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the city and the
inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein."
On the other hand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contends that
the taking or confiscation of property is obvious because the
questioned ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property
such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives
the owner of all beneficial use of his property.
The respondent also stresses that the general welfare clause is not
available as a source of power for the taking of the property in this
case because it refers to "the power of promoting the public welfare by
restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property." The
respondent points out that if an owner is deprived of his property
outright under the State's police power, the property is generally not
taken for public use but is urgently and summarily destroyed in order
to promote the general welfare. The respondent cites the case of a
nuisance per se or the destruction of a house to prevent the spread of
a conflagration.
We find the stand of the private respondent as well as the decision of
the respondent Judge to be well-founded. We quote with approval the
lower court's ruling which declared null and void Section 9 of the
questioned city ordinance:
The issue is: Is Section 9 of the ordinance in
question a valid exercise of the police power?
An examination of the Charter of Quezon City
(Rep. Act No. 537), does not reveal any provision
that would justify the ordinance in question except
the provision granting police power to the City.
Section 9 cannot be justified under the power
granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the license fee,
and regulatesuch other business, trades, and
occupation as may be established or practised in
the City.' (Subsections 'C', Sec. 12, R.A. 537).
The power to regulate does not include the power
to prohibit (People vs. Esguerra, 81 PhiL 33, Vega
vs. Municipal Board of Iloilo, L-6765, May 12,
1954; 39 N.J. Law, 70, Mich. 396). A fortiori, the
power to regulate does not include the power to
confiscate. The ordinance in question not only
confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a
memorial park cemetery, because under Section
13 of said ordinance, 'Violation of the provision
thereof is punishable with a fine and/or
imprisonment and that upon conviction thereof the
permit to operate and maintain a private cemetery
shall be revoked or cancelled.' The confiscatory
clause and the penal provision in effect deter one
from operating a memorial park cemetery. Neither
can the ordinance in question be justified under
sub- section "t", Section 12 of Republic Act 537
which authorizes the City Council to'prohibit the burial of the dead
within the center of
population of the city and
provide for their burial in such
proper place and in such
manner as the council may
determine, subject to the
provisions of the general law
regulating burial grounds and

cemeteries and governing

funerals and disposal of the
dead.' (Sub-sec. (t), Sec. 12,
Rep. Act No. 537).
There is nothing in the above provision which
authorizes confiscation or as euphemistically
termed by the respondents, 'donation'
We now come to the question whether or not
Section 9 of the ordinance in question is a valid
exercise of police power. The police power of
Quezon City is defined in sub-section 00, Sec. 12,
Rep. Act 537 which reads as follows:
(00) To make such further
ordinance and regulations not
repugnant to law as may be
necessary to carry into effect
and discharge the powers and
duties conferred by this act
and such as it shall deem
necessary and proper to
provide for the health and
safety, promote, the
prosperity, improve the
morals, peace, good order,
comfort and convenience of
the city and the inhabitants
thereof, and for the protection
of property therein; and
enforce obedience thereto
with such lawful fines or
penalties as the City Council
may prescribe under the
provisions of subsection (jj) of
this section.
We start the discussion with a restatement of
certain basic principles. Occupying the forefront in
the bill of rights is the provision which states that
'no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law' (Art. Ill,
Section 1 subparagraph 1, Constitution).
On the other hand, there are three inherent
powers of government by which the state
interferes with the property rights, namely-. (1)
police power, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation.
These are said to exist independently of the
Constitution as necessary attributes of
sovereignty.
Police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of
promoting the public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property' (Quoted
in Political Law by Tanada and Carreon, V-11, p.
50). It is usually exerted in order to merely
regulate the use and enjoyment of property of the
owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it
is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in
order to promote the general welfare. In police
power, the owner does not recover from the
government for injury sustained in consequence
thereof (12 C.J. 623). It has been said that police
power is the most essential of government
powers, at times the most insistent, and always
one of the least limitable of the powers of
government (Ruby vs. Provincial Board, 39 PhiL
660; Ichong vs. Hernandez, 1,7995, May 31,
1957). This power embraces the whole system of

public regulation (U.S. vs. Linsuya Fan, 10 PhiL

104). The Supreme Court has said that police
power is so far-reaching in scope that it has
almost become impossible to limit its sweep. As it
derives its existence from the very existence of the
state itself, it does not need to be expressed or
defined in its scope. Being coextensive with selfpreservation and survival itself, it is the most
positive and active of all governmental processes,
the most essential insistent and illimitable
Especially it is so under the modern democratic
framework where the demands of society and
nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable
proportions. The field and scope of police power
have become almost boundless, just as the fields
of public interest and public welfare have become
almost all embracing and have transcended
human foresight. Since the Courts cannot foresee
the needs and demands of public interest and
welfare, they cannot delimit beforehand the extent
or scope of the police power by which and through
which the state seeks to attain or achieve public
interest and welfare. (Ichong vs. Hernandez, L7995, May 31, 1957).
The police power being the most active power of
the government and the due process clause being
the broadest station on governmental power, the
conflict between this power of government and
the due process clause of the Constitution is
oftentimes inevitable.
It will be seen from the foregoing authorities that
police power is usually exercised in the form of
mere regulation or restriction in the use of liberty
or property for the promotion of the general
welfare. It does not involve the taking or
confiscation of property with the exception of a
few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate
private property in order to destroy it for the
purpose of protecting the peace and order and of
promoting the general welfare as for instance, the
confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such
as opium and firearms.
It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance
No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a
mere police regulation but an outright
confiscation. It deprives a person of his private
property without due process of law, nay, even
without compensation.
In sustaining the decision of the respondent court, we are not
unmindful of the heavy burden shouldered by whoever challenges the
validity of duly enacted legislation whether national or local As early as
1913, this Court ruled in Case v. Board of Health (24 PhiL 250) that
the courts resolve every presumption in favor of validity and, more so,
where the ma corporation asserts that the ordinance was enacted to
promote the common good and general welfare.
In the leading case of Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators
Association Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila (20 SCRA 849) the Court
speaking through the then Associate Justice and now Chief Justice
Enrique M. Fernando stated
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a
decision is the a of any evidence to offset the
presumption of validity that attaches to a statute
or ordinance. As was expressed categorically by
Justice Malcolm 'The presumption is all in favor of
validity. ... The action of the elected

representatives of the people cannot be lightly set

aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of
things, be familiar with the necessities of their
particular ... municipality and with all the facts and
lances which surround the subject and necessitate
action. The local legislative body, by enacting the
ordinance, has in effect given notice that the
regulations are essential to the well-being of the
people. ... The Judiciary should not lightly set
aside legislative action when there is not a clear
invasion of personal or property rights under the
guise of police regulation. (U.S. v. Salaveria
(1918], 39 Phil. 102, at p. 111. There was an
affirmation of the presumption of validity of
municipal ordinance as announced in the leading
Salaveria decision in Ebona v. Daet, [1950]85 Phil.
369.)
We have likewise considered the principles earlier
stated in Case v. Board of Health supra :
... Under the provisions of municipal charters
which are known as the general welfare clauses, a
city, by virtue of its police power, may adopt
ordinances to the peace, safety, health, morals
and the best and highest interests of the
municipality. It is a well-settled principle, growing
out of the nature of well-ordered and society, that
every holder of property, however absolute and
may be his title, holds it under the implied liability
that his use of it shall not be injurious to the equal
enjoyment of others having an equal right to the
enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the
rights of the community. An property in the state
is held subject to its general regulations, which are
necessary to the common good and general
welfare. Rights of property, like all other social
and conventional rights, are subject to such
reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall
prevent them from being injurious, and to such
reasonable restraints and regulations, established
by law, as the legislature, under the governing
and controlling power vested in them by the
constitution, may think necessary and expedient.
The state, under the police power, is possessed
with plenary power to deal with all matters
relating to the general health, morals, and safety
of the people, so long as it does not contravene
any positive inhibition of the organic law and
providing that such power is not exercised in such
a manner as to justify the interference of the
courts to prevent positive wrong and oppression.
but find them not applicable to the facts of this case.
There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least
six (6) percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity
burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health,
morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The
ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area
from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the
municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public
cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private
cemeteries.
The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private
cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the
Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to
prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the
city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the
provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries.
When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides

in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for

the burial of the dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed
by law or ordinance" it simply authorizes the city to provide its own
city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct
public cemeteries. This has been the law and practise in the past. It
continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of
just compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from laws
and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain
areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from
the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of
public safety, health, and convenience are very clear from said
requirements which are intended to insure the development of
communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. The
beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the
subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to home-owners.
As a matter of fact, the petitioners rely solely on the general welfare
clause or on implied powers of the municipal corporation, not on any
express provision of law as statutory basis of their exercise of power.
The clause has always received broad and liberal interpretation but we
cannot stretch it to cover this particular taking. Moreover, the
questioned ordinance was passed after Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. had
incorporated. received necessary licenses and permits and commenced
operating. The sequestration of six percent of the cemetery cannot
even be considered as having been impliedly acknowledged by the
private respondent when it accepted the permits to commence
operations.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. The
decision of the respondent court is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
FACTS: Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 provides for the
appropriation of 6% of memorial parks for charity burial of the
paupers. Himlayang Pilipino, Inc (HPI), did not appropriate the 6%
requirement. Seven years after, the Quezon City council issued a
resolution to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial
park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to
donate the required 6% space.
ISSUE: Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the
police power?

RULING: No. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation

of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are
charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or
maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the
burden to private cemeteries. (Thus, even if it is an eminent domain, it
would not have been the proper measure to promote general welfare
in this case) Police power is usually exercised in the form of mere
regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or property for the
promotion of general health, morals, safety of the people and more so,
the general welfare. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of
property with the exception of a few cases where there is a necessity
to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of
protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general welfare
as for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such
as opium and firearms

YNOT vs IAC
FACTS:In 1980 President Marcos amended Executive Order No. 626-A
which orders that nocarabao and carabeef shall be transported from
one province to another; such violation shall besubject to confiscation
and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to
charitableinstitutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of
the National Meat InspectionCommission may see fit for the carabeef
and to deserving farmers through dispersal as theDirector of Animal
Industry may see fit in the case of the carabaos.On January 13, 1984,
Petitioners 6 carabaos were confiscated by the police
stationcommander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for having been
transported from Masbate to Iloilo inviolation of EO 626-A. He issued a
writ for replevin
, challenging the constitutionality of saidEO. The trial court sustained
the confiscation of the animals and declined to rule on the validityof
the law on the ground that it lacked authority to do so. Its decision
was affirmed by the IAC.Hence, this petition for review filed by
Petitioner.ISSUE:Whether or not police power is properly
enforcedHELD: NO. The protection of the general welfare is the
particular function of the police power which both restraints and is
restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the
power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the
promotion of thegeneral welfare. As long as the activity or the
property has some relevance to the public welfare,its regulation under
the police power is not only proper but necessary. In the case at bar,
E.O.626-A has the same lawful subject as the original executive order
(E.O. 626 as cited in Toribiocase) but NOT the same lawful method.
The reasonable connection between the means employedand the
purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing.
The challengedmeasure is an invalid exercise of the police power
because the method employed to conserve thecarabaos is not
reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive.

G.R. No. L-42571-72 July 25, 1983

VICENTE DE LA CRUZ, RENATO ALIPIO, JOSE TORRES III,
LEONCIO CORPUZ, TERESITA CALOT, ROSALIA FERNANDEZ,
ELIZABETH VELASCO, NANETTE VILLANUEVA, HONORATO
BUENAVENTURA, RUBEN DE CASTRO, VICENTE ROXAS,
RICARDO DAMIAN, DOMDINO ROMDINA, ANGELINA
OBLIGACION, CONRADO GREGORIO, TEODORO REYES, LYDIA
ATRACTIVO, NAPOLEON MENDOZA, PERFECTO GUMATAY,
ANDRES SABANGAN, ROSITA DURAN, SOCORRO BERNARDEZ,
and PEDRO GABRIEL, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE EDGARDO L. PARAS, MATIAS RAMIREZ as
the Municipal Mayor, MARIO MENDOZA as the Municipal ViceMayor, and THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF BOCAUE,
BULACAN, respondents.

Federico N. Alday for petitioners.

Dakila F. Castro for respondents.

Ordinance shall be punishable by imprisonment not exceeding three

(3) months or a fine not exceeding P200.00 or both at the discretion of
the Court. If the offense is committed by a juridical entity, the person
charged with the management and/or operation thereof shall be liable
for the penalty provided herein. Section 6. Separability Clause. If,
for any reason, any section or provision of this Ordinance is held
unconstitutional or invalid, no other section or provision hereof shall be
affected thereby. Section 7. Repealing Clause. All ordinance,
resolutions, circulars, memoranda or parts thereof that are inconsistent
with the provisions of this Ordinance are hereby repealed. Section 8.
Effectivity. This Ordinance shall take effect immediately upon its
approval; provided, however, that operators of night clubs, cabarets
and dance halls now in operation including professional hostesses,
hospitality girls and professional dancers are given a period of thirty
days from the approval hereof within which to wind up their
businesses and comply with the provisions of this Ordinance." 4
On November 5, 1975, two cases for prohibition with preliminary
injunction were filed with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. 5 The
grounds alleged follow:
1. Ordinance No. 84 is null and void as a municipality has no authority
to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling.

FERNANDO, C.J.:
The crucial question posed by this certiorari proceeding is whether or
not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan, represented by
respondents, 1 can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the
operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such
clubs employing hostesses. It is contended that the ordinance assailed
as invalid is tainted with nullity, the municipality being devoid of power
to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling, petitioners at the
same time alleging that their rights to due process and equal
protection of the laws were violated as the licenses previously given to
them was in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing. 2
The assailed ordinance 3 is worded as follows: "Section 1. Title of
Ordinance. This Ordinance shall be known and may be cited as the
[Prohibition and Closure Ordinance] of Bocaue, Bulacan. Section 2.
Definitions of Terms (a) 'Night Club' shall include any place or
establishment selling to the public food or drinks where customers are
allowed to dance. (b) 'Cabaret' or 'Dance Hall' shall include any place
or establishment where dancing is permitted to the public and where
professional hostesses or hospitality girls and professional dancers are
employed. (c) 'Professional hostesses' or 'hospitality girls' shall include
any woman employed by any of the establishments herein defined to
entertain guests and customers at their table or to dance with them.
(d) 'Professional dancer' shall include any woman who dances at any
of the establishments herein defined for a fee or remuneration paid
directly or indirectly by the operator or by the persons she dances
with. (e) 'Operator' shall include the owner, manager, administrator or
any person who operates and is responsible for the operation of any
night club, cabaret or dance hall. Section 3. Prohibition in the
Issuance and Renewal of Licenses, Permits. Being the principal
cause in the decadence of morality and because of their other adverse
effects on this community as explained above, no operator of night
clubs, cabarets or dance halls shall henceforth be issued
permits/licenses to operate within the jurisdiction of the municipality
and no license/permit shall be issued to any professional hostess,
hospitality girls and professional dancer for employment in any of the
aforementioned establishments. The prohibition in the issuance of
licenses/permits to said persons and operators of said establishments
shall include prohibition in the renewal thereof. Section 4.
Revocation of Permits and Licenses. The licenses and permits issued
to operators of night clubs, cabarets or dance halls which are now in
operation including permits issued to professional hostesses,
hospitality girls and professional dancers are hereby revoked upon the
expiration of the thirty-day period given them as provided in Section 8
hereof and thenceforth, the operation of these establishments within
the jurisdiction of the municipality shall be illegal. Section 5. Penalty
in case of violation. Violation of any of the provisions of this

2. Ordinance No. 84 is violative of the petitioners' right to due process

and the equal protection of the law, as the license previously given to
petitioners was in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing. 3. That
under Presidential Decree No. 189, as amended, by Presidential
Decree No. 259, the power to license and regulate tourist-oriented
businesses including night clubs, has been transferred to the
Department of Tourism." 6 The cases were assigned to respondent
Judge, now Associate Justice Paras of the Intermediate Appellate
Court, who issued a restraining order on November 7, 1975. The
answers were thereafter filed. It was therein alleged: " 1. That the
Municipal Council is authorized by law not only to regulate but to
prohibit the establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs
invoking Section 2243 of the RAC, CA 601, Republic Acts Nos. 938, 978
and 1224. 2. The Ordinance No. 84 is not violative of petitioners' right
to due process and the equal protection of the law, since property
rights are subordinate to public interests. 3. That Presidential Decree
No. 189, as amended, did not deprive Municipal Councils of their
jurisdiction to regulate or prohibit night clubs." 7 There was the
admission of the following facts as having been established: "l. That
petitioners Vicente de la Cruz, et al. in Civil Case No. 4755-M had been
previously issued licenses by the Municipal Mayor of Bocaue-petitioner
Jose Torres III, since 1958; petitioner Vicente de la Cruz, since 1960;
petitioner Renato Alipio, since 1961 and petitioner Leoncio Corpuz,
since 1972; 2. That petitioners had invested large sums of money in
their businesses; 3. That the night clubs are well-lighted and have no
partitions, the tables being near each other; 4. That the petitioners
owners/operators of these clubs do not allow the hospitality girls
therein to engage in immoral acts and to go out with customers; 5.
That these hospitality girls are made to go through periodic medical
check-ups and not one of them is suffering from any venereal disease
and that those who fail to submit to a medical check-up or those who
are found to be infected with venereal disease are not allowed to
work; 6. That the crime rate there is better than in other parts of
Bocaue or in other towns of Bulacan." 8 Then came on January 15,
1976 the decision upholding the constitutionality and validity of
Ordinance No. 84 and dismissing the cases. Hence this petition for
certiorari by way of appeal.
In an exhaustive as well as scholarly opinion, the lower court
dismissed the petitions. Its rationale is set forth in the opening
paragraph thus: "Those who lust cannot last. This in essence is why
the Municipality of Bocaue, Province of Bulacan, stigmatized as it has
been by innuendos of sexual titillation and fearful of what the
awesome future holds for it, had no alternative except to order thru its
legislative machinery, and even at the risk of partial economic
dislocation, the closure of its night clubs and/or cabarets. This in
essence is also why this Court, obedient to the mandates of good
government, and cognizant of the categorical imperatives of the

current legal and social revolution, hereby [upholds] in the name of

police power the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 84,
Series of 1975, of the Municipal Council of Bocaue, Bulacan. The
restraining orders heretofore issued in these two cases are therefore
hereby rifted, effective the first day of February, 1976, the purpose of
the grace period being to enable the petitioners herein to apply to the
proper appellate tribunals for any contemplated redress." 9 This Court
is, however, unable to agree with such a conclusion and for reasons
herein set forth, holds that reliance on the police power is insufficient
to justify the enactment of the assailed ordinance. It must be declared
null and void.
1. Police power is granted to municipal corporations in general terms
as follows: "General power of council to enact ordinances and make
regulations. - The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and
make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to
carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it
by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the
health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace,
good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the
inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein." 10 It is
practically a reproduction of the former Section 39 of Municipal
Code. 11An ordinance enacted by virtue thereof, according to Justice
Moreland, speaking for the Court in the leading case of United States
v. Abendan 12 "is valid, unless it contravenes the fundamental law of
the Philippine Islands, or an Act of the Philippine Legislature, or unless
it is against public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial,
discriminating, or in derogation of common right. Where the power to
legislate upon a given subject, and the mode of its exercise and the
details of such legislation are not prescribed, the ordinance passed
pursuant thereto must be a reasonable exercise of the power, or it will
be pronounced invalid." 13 In another leading case, United States v.
Salaveria, 14 the ponente this time being Justice Malcolm, where the
present Administrative Code provision was applied, it was stated by
this Court: "The general welfare clause has two branches: One branch
attaches itself to the main trunk of municipal authority, and relates to
such ordinances and regulations as may be necessary to carry into
effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the
municipal council by law. With this class we are not here directly
concerned. The second branch of the clause is much more
independent of the specific functions of the council which are
enumerated by law. It authorizes such ordinances as shall seem
necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote
the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and
convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for
the protection of property therein.' It is a general rule that ordinances
passed by virtue of the implied power found in the general welfare
clause must be reasonable, consonant with the general powersand
purposes of the corporation, and not inconsistent with the laws or
policy of the State." 15 If night clubs were merely then regulated and
not prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test of
validity. In the two leading cases above set forth, this Court had
stressed reasonableness, consonant with the general powers and
purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the
laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping
exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the term
reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and
desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass
too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by
overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been
attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute
prohibition. The admonition in Salaveria should be heeded: "The
Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is
not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of
police regulation." 16 It is clear that in the guise of a police regulation,
there was in this instance a clear invasion of personal or property
rights, personal in the case of those individuals desirous of patronizing
those night clubs and property in terms of the investments made and
salaries to be earned by those therein employed.
2. The decision now under review refers to Republic Act No. 938 as
amended. 17 It was originally enacted on June 20, 1953. It is entitled:
"AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS

THE POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE

AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN
THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS.' 18 Its first section
insofar as pertinent reads: "The municipal or city board or council of
each chartered city shall have the power to regulate by ordinance the
establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs, cabarets,
dancing schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys,
billiard pools, and other similar places of amusement within its
territorial jurisdiction: ... " 19 Then on May 21, 1954, the first section
was amended to include not merely "the power to regulate, but
likewise "Prohibit ... " 20 The title, however, remained the same. It is
worded exactly as Republic Act No. 938. It is to be admitted that as
thus amended, if only the above portion of the Act were considered, a
municipal council may go as far as to prohibit the operation of night
clubs. If that were all, then the appealed decision is not devoid of
support in law. That is not all, however. The title was not in any way
altered. It was not changed one whit. The exact wording was followed.
The power granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition. There is
thus support for the view advanced by petitioners that to construe
Republic Act No. 938 as allowing the prohibition of the operation of
night clubs would give rise to a constitutional question. The
Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof. " 21Since there is no
dispute as the title limits the power to regulating, not prohibiting, it
would result in the statute being invalid if, as was done by the
Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of a night club was prohibited.
There is a wide gap between the exercise of a regulatory power "to
provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the
morals, 22 in the language of the Administrative Code, such
competence extending to all "the great public needs, 23 to quote from
Holmes, and to interdict any calling, occupation, or enterprise. In
accordance with the well-settled principle of constitutional construction
that between two possible interpretations by one of which it will be
free from constitutional infirmity and by the other tainted by such
grave defect, the former is to be preferred. A construction that would
save rather than one that would affix the seal of doom certainly
commends itself. We have done so before We do so again. 24
3. There is reinforcement to the conclusion reached by virtue of a
specific provision of the recently-enacted Local Government
Code. 25 The general welfare clause, a reiteration of the Administrative
Code provision, is set forth in the first paragraph of Section 149
defining the powers and duties of the sangguniang bayan. It read as
follows: "(a) Enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may
be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred
upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide
for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and
order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general
welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the
protection of property therein; ..." 26 There are in addition provisions
that may have a bearing on the question now before this Court. Thus
the sangguniang bayan shall "(rr) Regulate cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses and lodging houses,
except travel agencies, tourist guides, tourist transports, hotels,
resorts, de luxe restaurants, and tourist inns of international standards
which shall remain under the licensing and regulatory power of the
Ministry of Tourism which shall exercise such authority without
infringing on the taxing or regulatory powers of the municipality; (ss)
Regulate public dancing schools, public dance halls, and sauna baths
or massage parlors; (tt) Regulate the establishment and operation of
billiard pools, theatrical performances, circuses and other forms of
entertainment; ..." 27 It is clear that municipal corporations cannot
prohibit the operation of night clubs. They may be regulated, but not
prevented from carrying on their business. It would be, therefore, an
exercise in futility if the decision under review were sustained. All that
petitioners would have to do is to apply once more for licenses to
operate night clubs. A refusal to grant licenses, because no such
businesses could legally open, would be subject to judicial correction.
That is to comply with the legislative will to allow the operation and
continued existence of night clubs subject to appropriate regulations.
In the meanwhile, to compel petitioners to close their establishments,
the necessary result of an affirmance, would amount to no more than
a temporary termination of their business. During such time, their
employees would undergo a period of deprivation. Certainly, if such an

undesirable outcome can be avoided, it should be. The law should not
be susceptible to the reproach that it displays less than sympathetic
concern for the plight of those who, under a mistaken appreciation of
a municipal power, were thus left without employment. Such a
deplorable consequence is to be avoided. If it were not thus, then the
element of arbitrariness enters the picture. That is to pay less, very
much less, than full deference to the due process clause with its
mandate of fairness and reasonableness.
4. The conclusion reached by this Court is not to be interpreted as a
retreat from its resolute stand sustaining police power legislation to
promote public morals. The commitment to such an Ideal forbids such
a backward step. Legislation of that character is deserving of the
fullest sympathy from the judiciary. Accordingly, the judiciary has not
been hesitant to lend the weight of its support to measures that can
be characterized as falling within that aspect of the police power.
Reference is made by respondents to Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila. 28 There is a
misapprehension as to what was decided by this Court. That was a
regulatory measure. Necessarily, there was no valid objection on due
process or equal protection grounds. It did not prohibit motels. It
merely regulated the mode in which it may conduct business in order
precisely to put an end to practices which could encourage vice and
immorality. This is an entirely different case. What was involved is a
measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise of
an assumed power to prohibit. Moreover, while it was pointed out in
the aforesaid Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association,
Inc. decision that there must be a factual foundation of invalidity, it
was likewise made clear that there is no need to satisfy such a
requirement if a statute were void on its face. That it certainly is if the
power to enact such ordinance is at the most dubious and under the
present Local Government Code non-existent.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the decision of the
lower court dated January 15, 1976 reversed, set aside, and nullied.
Ordinance No. 84, Series of 1975 of the Municipality of Bocaue is
declared void and unconstitutional. The temporary restraining order
issued by this Court is hereby made permanent. No costs.

Vicente De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the
constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition and
Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the said
Ordinance violates their right to engage in a lawful business for the
said ordinance would close out their business. That the hospitality girls
they employed are healthy and are not allowed to go out with
customers. Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier issued
against Ord. 84 after due hearing declaring that Ord 84. is
constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads AN ACT
GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER
TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND
OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR
RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS. Paras ruled that the
prohibition is a valid exercise of police power to promote general
welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing that they were deprived of
due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can,
prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs,
and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses
pursuant to Ord 84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938.
HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then
regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would
pass the test of validity. SC had stressed reasonableness, consonant
with the general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as
well as consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It cannot be
said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue
could qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering
public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a
measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the
ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose
sought to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable
restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title
of the Ordinance, Bocaue should and can only regulate not prohibit the
business of cabarets.

Didipio Earth Savers Multipurpose Association et al vs DENR

Sec Elisea Gozun et al
In 1987, Cory rolled out EO 279 w/c empowered DENR to stipulate
with foreign companies when it comes to either technical or financial
large scale exploration or mining. In 1995, Ramos signed into law RA
7942 or the Philippine Mining Act. In 1994, Ramos already signed an
FTAA with Arimco Mining Co, an Australian company. The FTAA
authorized AMC (later CAMC) to explore 37,000 ha of land in Quirino
and N. Vizcaya including Brgy Didipio. After the passage of the law,
DENR rolled out its implementing RRs. Didipio petitioned to have the
law and the RR to be annulled as it is unconstitutional and it
constitutes unlawful taking of property. In seeking to nullify Rep. Act
No. 7942 and its implementing rules DAO 96-40 as unconstitutional,
petitioners set their sight on Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and
Section 107 of DAO 96-40 which they claim allow the unlawful and
unjust taking of private property for private purpose in contradiction
with Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandating that
private property shall not be taken except for public use and the
corresponding payment of just compensation. They assert that public
respondent DENR, through the Mining Act and its Implementing Rules
and Regulations, cannot, on its own, permit entry into a private
property and allow taking of land without payment of just
compensation.
Traversing petitioners assertion, public respondents argue that Section
76 is not a taking provision but a valid exercise of the police power
and by virtue of which, the state may prescribe regulations to promote
the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety and general
welfare of the people. This government regulation involves the
adjustment of rights for the public good and that this adjustment
curtails some potential for the use or economic exploitation of private
property. Public respondents concluded that to require compensation
in all such circumstances would compel the government to regulate by
purchase.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7942 and the DENR RRs are valid.
HELD: The SC ruled against Didipio. The SC noted the requisites of
eminent domain. They are;
(1) the expropriator must enter a private property;(2) the entry must
be for more than a momentary period. (3) the entry must be under
warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted
to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously
affected;(5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in
such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial
enjoyment of the property.
In the case at bar, Didipio failed to show that the law is invalid. Indeed
there is taking involved but it is not w/o just compensation. Sec 76 of
RA 7942 provides for just compensation as well as section 107 of the
DENR RR. To wit,
Section 76. xxx Provided, that any damage to the property of the
surface owner, occupant, or concessionaire as a consequence of such
operations shall be properly compensated as may be provided for in
the implementing rules and regulations.
Section 107. Compensation of the Surface Owner and Occupant- Any
damage done to the property of the surface owners, occupant, or
concessionaire thereof as a consequence of the mining operations or
as a result of the construction or installation of the infrastructure
mentioned in 104 above shall be properly and justly compensated.

Further, mining is a public policy and the government can invoke

eminent domain to exercise entry, acquisition and use of private lands.

Taxicab Operators vs Board of Transportation

Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a
domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators, who are grantees
of Certificates of Public Convenience to operate taxicabs within the City
of Manila and to any other place in Luzon accessible to vehicular
traffic.

On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation (BOT)

issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 which reads:

SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of Old and Dilapidated Taxis

On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT,

docketed as Case No. 80-7553, seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42 or to
stop its implementation; to allow the registration and operation in
1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as
those of earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at the
time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation.
ISSUES:
A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum
circulars in accord with the manner required by Presidential Decree No.
101, thereby safeguarding the petitioners constitutional right to
procedural due process?
B.
Granting arguendo, that respondents did comply with the
procedural requirements imposed by Presidential Decree No. 101,
would the implementation and enforcement of the assailed
memorandum circulars violate the petitioners constitutional rights to.
(1) Equal protection of the law;
(2) Substantive due process; and
(3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and
standard?

HELD
As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT
Circular, the overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the
riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The
State, in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general
welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort,
safety and welfare of society. It may also regulate property rights. In
the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando the necessities
imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental
authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly
assert that their interests are disregarded.

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, vs HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, et al

2.Police Power

G.R. No. 157036. June 9, 2004

At any rate, assuming that petitioners PTCFOR constitutes a property

right protected by theConstitution,

Facts:
Petition for prohibition and injunction seeking to enjoin the
implementation of the Guidelines inthe Implementation of the Ban on
the Carrying of Firearms Outside of Residence (Guidelines)issued by
respondent Hermogenes E. Ebdane, Jr., Chief of the Philippine National
Police (PNP).Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed gun owner to
whom a PTCFOR has been issued,requested the DILG to reconsider
the implementation of the assailed Guidelines. However, hisrequest
was denied. Thus, he filed the present petition impleading public
respondents Ebdane, asChief of PNP; Alberto G. Romulo, as Executive
Secretary; and Gerry L. Barias, as Chief of thePNP-Firearms and
Explosives Division.

the same cannot be considered as absolute as to be placed beyond the

reachof the States police power. All property in the state is held
subject to its generalregulations, necessary to the common good and
general welfare.
The Court laid down the test to determine the validity of a police
measure, thus:(1)The interests of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class,require the exercise of the police
power; and(2)The means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purposeand not unduly oppressive upon
individuals.

Issues:
1.whether respondent Ebdane is authorized to issue the assailed
Guidelines;

It is apparent from the assailed Guidelines that

2.whether the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is a valid exercise of

police power?;

the basis for its issuance was the need forpeace and order in the
society.

Ruling:
1.Authority of the PNP Chief
It is true that under our constitutional system, the powers of
government are distributedamong three coordinate and substantially
independent departments: the legislative, theexecutive and the
judiciary. Each has exclusive cognizance of the matters within its
jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.The power to make
laws the legislative power is vested in Congress. Any attempt
toabdicate the power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle that
delegata potestas non potest delegari delegated power may not
be delegated.The rule which forbids the delegation of legislative
power,
however, is not absolute andinflexible. It admits of exceptions
. An exception sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the
legislative body to delegate its licensing power to certain persons,
municipalcorporations, towns, boards, councils, commissions,
commissioners, auditors, bureaus anddirectors. Such licensing power
includes the power to promulgate necessary rules andregulations.Act
No. 1780 delegated upon the Governor-General (now the President)
the authority (1) toapprove or disapprove applications of any person
for a license to deal in firearms or to possess the same for personal
protection, hunting and other lawful purposes; and (2) torevoke such
license any time. Further, it authorized him to issue regulations which
he maydeem necessary for the proper enforcement of the Act.By
virtue of Republic Act No. 6975, the PNP absorbed the Philippine
Constabulary (PC).Consequently,
the PNP Chief succeeded the Chief of the Constabulary and,
therefore,assumed the latters licensing authority.
Section 24 thereof specifies, as one of PNPs powers, the issuance of
licenses for the possession of firearms and explosives in
accordancewith law. This is in conjunction with the PNP Chiefs power
to issue detailed implementing policies and instructions on such
matters as may be necessary to effectively carry out thefunctions,
powers and duties of the PNP.

Owing to the proliferation of crimes, particularly thosecommitted by

the New Peoples Army (NPA), which tends to disturb the peace of
thecommunity, President Arroyo deemed it best to impose a
nationwide gun ban. Undeniably,the motivating factor in the issuance
of the assailed Guidelines is the interest of the public ingeneral.The
only question that can then arise is
whether the means employed are appropriate andreasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and are not
undulyoppressive
. In the instant case,
the assailed Guidelines do not entirely prohibit possessionof firearms.
What they proscribe is merely the carrying of firearms outside of
residence
. However, those who wish to carry their firearms outside of their
residences mayre-apply for a new PTCFOR. This is a reasonable
regulation. If the carrying of firearms isregulated, necessarily, crime
incidents will be curtailed. Criminals carry their weapon to huntfor their
victims; they do not wait in the comfort of their homes. With the
revocation of allPTCFOR, it would be difficult for criminals to roam
around with their guns. On the other hand, it would be easier for the
PNP to apprehend them.The petition is hereby DISMISSED.

G.R. No. 115044 January 27, 1995

HON. ALFREDO S. LIM, in his capacity as Mayor of Manila, and
the City of Manila, petitioners,
vs.
HON. FELIPE G. PACQUING, as Judge, branch 40, Regional
Trial Court of Manila and ASSOCIATED
CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 117263 January 27, 1995
TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR. and DOMINADOR R.
CEPEDA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. VETINO REYES and ASSOCIATED DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.

PADILLA, J.:
These two (2) cases which are inter-related actually involve simple
issues. if these issues have apparently become complicated, it is not by
reason of their nature because of the events and dramatis
personae involved.
The petition in G.R. No. 115044 was dismissed by the First Division of
this Court on 01 September 1994 based on a finding that there was
"no abuse of discretion, much less lack of or excess of jurisdiction, on
the part of respondent judge [Pacquing]", in issuing the questioned
orders. Judge Pacquing had earlier issued in Civil Case No. 88-45660,
RTC of Manila, Branch 40, the following orders which were assailed by
the Mayor of the City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim, in said G.R. No.
115044:
a. order dated 28 March 1994 directing Manila
mayor Alfredo S. Lim to issue the permit/license to
operate the jai-alai in favor of Associated
Development Corporation (ADC).
b. order dated 11 April 1994 directing mayor Lim
to explain why he should not be cited for
contempt for non-compliance with the order dated
28 March 1994.
c. order dated 20 April 1994 reiterating the
previous order directing Mayor Lim to immediately
issue thepermit/license to Associated Development
Corporation (ADC).
The order dated 28 march 1994 was in turn issued upon motion by
ADC for execution of a final judgment rendered on 9 September 1988
which ordered the Manila Mayor to immediately issue to ADC
the permit/license to operate the jai-alai in Manila, under Manila
Ordinance No. 7065.
On 13 September 1994, petitioner Guingona (as executive secretary)
issued a directive to then chairman of the Games and Amusements
Board (GAB) Francisco R. Sumulong, jr. to hold in abeyance the grant
of authority, or if any had been issued, to withdraw such grant of
authority, to Associated Development Corporation to operate the jaialai in the City of Manila, until the following legal questions are
properly resolved:
1. Whether P.D. 771 which revoked all existing
Jai-Alai franchisers issued by local governments as
of 20 August 1975 is unconstitutional.

2. Assuming that the City of Manila had the power

on 7 September 1971 to issue a Jai-Alai franchise
to Associated Development Corporation, whether
the franchise granted is valied considering that the
franchise has no duration, and appears to be
granted in perpetuity.
3. Whether the City of Manila had the power to
issue a Jai-Alai franchise to Associated
Development Corporation on 7 September 1971 in
view of executive Order No. 392 dated 1 January
1951 which transferred from local governments to
the Games and Amusements Board the power to
regulate Jai-Alai. 1
On 15 September 1994, respondent Associated Development
Corporation (ADC) filed a petition for prohibition, mandamus,
injunction and damages with prayer for temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila against petitioner Guingona and then GAB chairman Sumulong,
docketed as Civil Case No. 94-71656, seeking to prevent GAB from
withdrawing the provisional authority that had earlier been granted to
ADC. On the same day, the RTC of Manila, Branch 4, through presiding
Judge Vetino Reyes, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
GAB from withdrawing ADC's provisional authority. This temporary
restraining order was converted into a writ of preliminary injunction
upon ADC's posting of a bond in the amount of P2,000,000.00. 2
Subsequently, also in G.R. No. 115044, the Republic of the Philippines,
through the Games and Amusements Board, filed a "Motion for
Intervention; for Leave to File a Motion for reconsideration in
Intervention; and to Refer the case to the Court En Banc" and later a
"Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration-inIntervention and to Admit Attached Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration-in-Intervention".
In an En Banc Resolution dated 20 September 1994, this Court
referred G.R. No. 115044 to the Court En Bancand required the
respondents therein to comment on the aforementioned motions.
Meanwhile, Judge Reyes on 19 October 1994 issued another order,
this time, granting ADC a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
against Guingona and GAB to compel them to issue in favor of ADC the
authority to operate jai-alai.
Guingona, as executive secretary, and Dominador Cepeda, Jr. as the
new GAB chairman, then filed the petition in G.R. No. 117263 assailing
the abovementioned orders of respondent Judge Vetino Reyes.
On 25 October 1994, in G.R. No. 117263, this Court granted
petitioner's motion for leave to file supplemental petition and to admit
attached supplemental petition with urgent prayer for restraining
order. The Court further required respondents to file their comment on
the petition and supplemental petition with urgent prayer for
restraining order. The Court likewise set the case and all incidents
thereof for hearing on 10 November 1994.
At the hearing on 10 November 1994, the issues to be resolved were
formulated by the Court as follows:
1. whether or not intervention by the Republic of
the Philippines at this stage of the proceedings is
proper;
2. assuming such intervention is proper, whether
or not the Associated Development Corporation
has a valid and subsisting franchise to maintain
and operate the jai-alai;

3. whether or not there was grave abuse of

discretion committed by respondent Judge Reyes
in issuing the aforementioned temporary
restraining order (later writ of preliminary
injunction); and

The time-honored doctrine is that all laws (PD No. 771 included) are
presumed valid and constitutional until or unless otherwise ruled by
this Court. Not only this; Article XVIII Section 3 of the Constitution
states:
Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive
orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and
other executive issuances not inconsistent with
this Constitution shall remain operative until
amended, repealed or revoked.

4. whether or not there was grave abuse of

discretion committed by respondent Judge Reyes
in issuing the aforementioned writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction.
On the issue of the propriety of the intervention by the Republic of the
Philippines, a question was raised during the hearing on 10 November
1994 as to whether intervention in G.R. No. 115044 was the proper
remedy for the national government to take in questioning the
existence of a valid ADC franchise to operate the jai-alai or whether a
separate action for quo warranto under Section 2, Rule 66 of the Rules
of Court was the proper remedy.
We need not belabor this issue since counsel for respondent ADC
agreed to the suggestion that this Court once and for all settle all
substantive issues raised by the parties in these cases. Moreover, this
Court can consider the petition filed in G.R. No. 117263 as one for quo
warranto which is within the original jurisdiction of the Court under
section 5(1), Article VIII of the Constitution. 3
On the propriety of intervention by the Republic, however, it will be
recalled that this Court in Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals (93
SCRA 238) allowed intervention even beyond the period prescribed in
Section 2 Rule 12 of the Rules of Court. The Court ruled in said case
that a denial of the motions for intervention would "lead the Court to
commit an act of injustice to the movants, to their successor-ininterest and to all purchasers for value and in good faith and thereby
open the door to fraud, falsehood and misrepresentation, should
intervenors' claim be proven to be true."
In the present case, the resulting injustice and injury, should the
national government's allegations be proven correct, are manifest,
since the latter has squarely questioned the very existence of a valid
franchise to maintain and operate the jai-alai (which is a gambling
operation) in favor of ADC. As will be more extensively discussed later,
the national government contends that Manila Ordinance No. 7065
which purported to grant to ADC a franchise to conduct jai-alai
operations is void and ultra vires since Republic Act No. 954, approved
on 20 June 1953, or very much earlier than said Ordinance No. 7065,
the latter approved 7 September 1971, in Section 4 thereof, requires
a legislative franchise, not a municipal franchise, for the operation of
jai-alai. Additionally, the national government argues that even
assuming, arguendo, that the abovementioned ordinance is valid,
ADC's franchise was nonetheless effectively revoked by Presidential
decree No. 771, issued on 20 August 1975, Sec. 3 of which expressly
revoked all existing franchises and permits to operate all forms of
gambling facilities (including the jai-alai) issued by local governments.
On the other hand, ADC's position is that Ordinance No. 7065 was
validly enacted by the City of Manila pursuant to its delegated powers
under it charter, Republic Act No. 409. ADC also squarely assails the
constitutionality of PD No. 771 as violative of the equal protection and
non-impairment clauses of the Constitution. In this connection, counsel
for ADC contends that this Court should really rule on the validity of PD
No. 771 to be able to determine whether ADC continues to possess a
valid franchise.
It will undoubtedly be a grave injustice to both parties in this case if
this Court were to shirk from ruling on the issue of constitutionality of
PD No. 771. Such issue has, in our view, become the very lis mota in
resolving the present controversy, in view of ADC's insistence that it
was granted a valid and legal franchise by Ordinance No. 7065 to
operate the jai-alai.

There is nothing on record to show or even suggest that PD No. 771

has been repealed, altered or amended by any subsequent law or
presidential issuance (when the executive still exercised legislative
powers).
Neither can it be tenably stated that the issue of the continued
existence of ADC's franchise by reason of the unconstitutionality of PD
No. 771 was settled in G.R. No. 115044, for the decision of the Court's
First Division in said case, aside from not being final, cannot have the
effect of nullifying PD No. 771 as unconstitutional, since only the
Court En Banc has that power under Article VIII, Section 4(2) of the
Constitution. 4
And on the question of whether or not the government
is estopped from contesting ADC's possession of a valid franchise, the
well-settled rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the
mistakes or errors, if any, of its officials or agents (Republic v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 209 SCRA 90)
Consequently, in the light of the foregoing expostulation, we conclude
that the republic (in contra distinction to the City of Manila) may be
allowed to intervene in G.R. No. 115044. The Republic is intervening in
G.R. No. 115044 in the exercise, not of its business or proprietary
functions, but in the exercise of its governmental functions to protect
public morals and promote the general welfare.
II
Anent the question of whether ADC has a valid franchise to operate
the Jai-Alai de Manila, a statement of the pertinent laws is in order.
1. The Charter of the City of Manila was enacted by Congress on 18
June 1949. Section 18 thereof provides:
Sec. 18. Legislative Powers. The Municipal
Board shall have the following legislative powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(jj) To tax, license, permit and regulate wagers or
betting by the public on boxing, sipa, bowling,
billiards, pools, horse and dog races, cockpits, jaialai, roller or ice-skating on any sporting or
athletic contests, as well as grant exclusive rights
to establishments for this purpose,
notwithstanding any existing law to the contrary.
2. On 1 January 1951, Executive Order No. 392 was issued transferring
the authority to regulate jai-alais from local government to the Games
and Amusements Board (GAB).
3. On 20 June 1953, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 954, entitled
"An Act to Prohibit With Horse Races and Basque Pelota Games (JaiAlai), And To Prescribe Penalties For Its Violation". The provisions of
Republic Act No. 954 relating to jai-alai are as follows:

Sec. 4. No person, or group of persons other than

the operator or maintainer of a fronton with
legislative franchise to conduct basque pelota
games (Jai-alai), shall offer, to take or
arrange bets on any basque pelota game or event,
or maintain or use a totalizator or other device,
method or system to bet or gamble on any basque
pelota game or event. (emphasis supplied).
Sec. 5. No person, operator or maintainer of a
fronton with legislative franchise to conduct
basque pelota games shall offer, take, or arrange
bets on any basque pelota game or event, or
maintain or use a totalizator or other device,
method or system to bet or gamble on any basque
pelota game or event outside the place, enclosure,
or fronton where the basque pelota game is held.
(emphasis supplied).
4. On 07 September 1971, however, the Municipal Board of Manila
nonetheless passed Ordinance No. 7065 entitled "An Ordinance
Authorizing the Mayor To Allow And Permit The Associated
Development Corporation To Establish, Maintain And Operate A Jai-Alai
In The City Of Manila, Under Certain Terms And Conditions And For
Other Purposes."
5. On 20 August 1975, Presidential Decree No. 771 was issued by then
President Marcos. The decree, entitled "Revoking All Powers and
Authority of Local Government(s) To Grant Franchise, License or
Permit And Regulate Wagers Or Betting By The Public On Horse And
Dog Races, Jai-Alai Or Basque Pelota, And Other Forms Of
Gambling", in Section 3 thereof, expressly revoked all existing
franchises and permits issued by local governments.
6. On 16 October 1975, Presidential Decree No. 810, entitled "An Act
granting The Philippine Jai-Alai And Amusement Corporation A
Franchise To Operate, Construct And Maintain A Fronton For Basque
Pelota And Similar Games of Skill In THE Greater Manila Area," was
promulgated.
7 On 08 May 1987, then President Aquino, by virtue of Article XVIII,
Section 6, of the Constitution, which allowed the incumbent legislative
powers until the first Congress was convened, issued Executive Order
No. 169 expressly repealing PD 810 and revoking and cancelling the
franchise granted to the Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement
Corporation.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 117263 argue that Republic Act No. 954
effectively removed the power of the Municipal Board of Manila to
grant franchises for gambling operations. It is argued that the term
"legislative franchise" in Rep. Act No. 954 is used to refer to franchises
issued by Congress.
On the other hand, ADC contends that Republic Act N. 409 (Manila
Chapter) gives legislative powers to the Municipal Board to grant
franchises, and since Republic Act No. 954 does not specifically qualify
the word "legislative" as referring exclusively to Congress, then Rep.
Act No. 954 did not remove the power of the Municipal Board under
Section 18(jj) of Republic Act No. 409 and consequently it was within
the power of the City of Manila to allow ADC to operate the jai-alai in
the City of Manila.
On this point, the government counter-argues that the term
"legislative powers" is used in Rep. Act No. 409 merely to distinguish
the powers under Section 18 of the law from the other powers of the
Municipal Board, but that the term "legislative franchise" in Rep. Act
No. 954 refers to a franchise granted solely by Congress.
Further, the government argues that Executive Order No. 392 dated
01 January 1951 transferred even the power to regulate Jai-Alai from

the local governments to the Games and Amusements Board (GAB), a

national government agency.
It is worthy of note that neither of the authorities relied upon by ADC
to support its alleged possession of a valid franchise, namely the
Charter of the City of Manila (Rep. Act No. 409) and Manila Ordinance
No. 7065 uses the word "franchise". Rep. Act No. 409 empowers the
Municipal Board of Manila to "tax, license, permit and regulatewagers
or betting" and to "grant exclusive rights to establishments", while
Ordinance No. 7065 authorized the Manila City Mayor to "allow and
permit" ADC to operate jai-alai facilities in the City of Manila.
It is clear from the foregoing that Congress did not delegate to the City
of Manila the power "to franchise" wagers or betting, including the jaialai, but retained for itself such power "to franchise". What Congress
delegated to the City of Manila in Rep. Act No. 409, with respect to
wagers or betting, was the power to "license, permit, or regulate"
which therefore means that a license or permit issued by the City of
Manila to operate a wager or betting activity, such as the jai-alai where
bets are accepted, would not amount to something meaningful
UNLESS the holder of the permit or license was also FRANCHISED by
the national government to so operate. Moreover, even this power to
license, permit, or regulate wagers or betting on jai-alai was removed
from local governments, including the City of Manila, and transferred
to the GAB on 1 January 1951 by Executive Order No. 392. The net
result is that the authority to grant franchises for the operation of jaialai frontons is in Congress, while the regulatory function is vested in
the GAB.
In relation, therefore, to the facts of this case, since ADC has no
franchise from Congress to operate the jai-alai, it may not so operate
even if its has a license or permit from the City Mayor to operate the
jai-alai in the City of Manila.
It cannot be overlooked, in this connection, that the Revised Penal
Code punishes gambling and betting under Articles 195 to 199 thereof.
Gambling is thus generally prohibited by law, unless another law is
enacted by Congress expressly exempting or excluding certain forms
of gambling from the reach of criminal law. Among these form the
reach of criminal law. Among these forms of gambling allowed by
special law are the horse races authorized by Republic Acts Nos. 309
and 983 and gambling casinos authorized under Presidential Decree
No. 1869.
While jai-alai as a sport is not illegal per se, the accepting of bets or
wagers on the results of jai-alai games is undoubtedly gambling and,
therefore, a criminal offense punishable under Articles 195-199 of the
Revised Penal Code, unless it is shown that a later or special law had
been passed allowing it. ADC has not shown any such special law.
Republic Act No. 409 (the Revised Charter of the City of Manila) which
was enacted by Congress on 18 June 1949 gave the Municipal Board
certain delegated legislative powers under Section 18. A perusal of the
powers enumerated under Section 18 shows that these powers are
basically regulatory in nature. 5 The regulatory nature of these powers
finds support not only in the plain words of the enumerations under
Section 28 but also in this Court's ruling in People v. Vera (65 Phil. 56).
In Vera, this Court declared that a law which gives the Provincial Board
the discretion to determine whether or not a law of general application
(such as, the Probation law-Act No. 4221) would or would not be
operative within the province, is unconstitutional for being an undue
delegation of legislative power.
From the ruling in Vera, it would be logical to conclude that, if ADC's
arguments were to prevail, this Court would likewise declare Section
18(jj) of the Revised Charter of Manila unconstitutional for the power it
would delegate to the Municipal Board of Manila would give the latter
the absolute and unlimited discretion to render the penal code
provisions on gambling inapplicable or inoperative to persons or

entities issued permits to operate gambling establishments in the City

of Manila.
We need not go to this extent, however, since the rule is that laws
must be presumed valid, constitutional and in harmony with other
laws. Thus, the relevant provisions of Rep. Acts Nos. 409 and 954 and
Ordinance No. 7065 should be taken together and it should then be
clear that the legislative powers of the Municipal Board should be
understood to be regulatory in nature and that Republic Act No. 954
should be understood to refer to congressional franchises, as a
necessity for the operation of jai-alai.
We need not, however, again belabor this issue further since the task
at hand which will ultimately, and with finality, decide the issues in this
case is to determine whether PD No. 771 validly revoked ADC's
franchise to operate the jai-alai, assuming (without conceding) that it
indeed possessed such franchise under Ordinance No. 7065.
ADC argues that PD No. 771 is unconstitutional for being violative of
the equal protection and non-impairment provisions of the
Constitution. On the other hand, the government contends that PD No.
771 is a valid exercise of the inherent police power of the State.
The police power has been described as the least limitable of the
inherent powers of the State. It is based on the ancient doctrine
salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme
law.) In the early case of Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro (39 Phil.
660), this Court through Mr. Justice George A. Malcolm stated thus:
The police power of the State . . . is a power coextensive with self-protection, and is not inaptly
termed the "law of overruling necessity." It may
be said to be that inherent and plenary power in
the State which enables it to prohibit all things
hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of
society. Carried onward by the current of
legislation, the judiciary rarely attempts to dam
the onrushing power of legislative discretion,
provided the purposes of the law do not go
beyond the great principles that mean security for
the public welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere
with the right of the individual.
In the matter of PD No. 771, the purpose of the law is clearly stated in
the "whereas clause" as follows:
WHEREAS, it has been reported that in spite of
the current drive of our law enforcement agencies
against vices and illegal gambling, these social ills
are still prevalent in many areas of the country;
WHEREAS, there is need to consolidate all the
efforts of the government to eradicate and
minimize vices and other forms of social ills in
pursuance of the social and economic
development program under the new society;
WHEREAS, in order to effectively control and
regulate wagers or betting by the public on horse
and dog races, jai-alai and other forms of
gambling there is a necessity to transfer the
issuance of permit and/or franchise from local
government to the National Government.
It cannot be argued that the control and regulation of gambling do not
promote public morals and welfare. Gambling is essentially
antagonistic and self-reliance. It breeds indolence and erodes the
value of good, honest and hard work. It is, as very aptly stated by PD
No. 771, a vice and a social ill which government must minimize (if not
eradicate) in pursuit of social and economic development.

In Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corporation (20 July 1994, G.R. No.

111097), this Court stated thru Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz:
In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislative
power may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it
without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of
gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it
may consider sufficient. Thus, it has
prohibited jueteng and monte but permits
lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In making
such choices, Congress has consulted its own
wisdom, which this Court has no authority to
review, much less reverse. Well has it been said
that courts do not sit to resolve the merits of
conflicting theories. That is the prerogative of the
political departments. It is settled that questions
regarding wisdom, morality and practicability of
statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but
may be resolved only by the executive and
legislative departments, to which the function
belongs in our scheme of government. (Emphasis
supplied)
Talks regarding the supposed vanishing line
between right and privilege in American constitutional law has no
relevance in the context of these cases since the reference there is to
economic regulations. On the other hand, jai-alai is not a mere
economic activity which the law seeks to regulate. It is essentially
gambling and whether it should be permitted and, if so, under what
conditions are questions primarily for the lawmaking authority to
determine, talking into account national and local interests. Here, it is
the police power of the State that is paramount.
ADC questions the motive for the issuance of PD Nos. 771. Clearly,
however, this Court cannot look into allegations that PD No. 771 was
enacted to benefit a select group which was later given authority to
operate the jai-alai under PD No. 810. The examination of legislative
motivation is generally prohibited. (Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217,
29 L. Ed. 2d 438 [1971] per Black, J.) There is, the first place, absolute

lack of evidence to support ADC's allegation of improper motivation in

the issuance of PD No. 771. In the second place, as already averred,
this Court cannot go behind the expressed and proclaimed purposes of
PD No. 771, which are reasonable and even laudable.
It should also be remembered that PD No. 771 provides that
the national government can subsequently grant franchises "upon
proper application and verification of the qualifications of the
applicant." ADC has not alleged that it filed an application for a
franchise with the national government subsequent to the enactment
of PD No. 771; thus, the allegations abovementioned (of preference to
a select group) are based on conjectures, speculations and imagined
biases which do not warrant the consideration of this Court.
On the other hand, it is noteworthy that while then president Aquino
issued Executive Order No. 169 revoking PD No. 810 (which granted a
franchise to a Marcos-crony to operate the jai-alai), she did not scrap
or repeal PD No. 771 which had revoked all franchises to operate jaialais issued by local governments, thereby re-affirming the
government policy that franchises to operate jai-alais are for the
national government (not local governments) to consider and approve.
On the alleged violation of the non-impairment and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution, it should be remembered that a franchise
is not in the strict sense a simple contract but rather it is more
importantly, a mere privilege specially in matters which are within the
government's power to regulate and even prohibit through the
exercise of the police power. Thus, a gambling franchise is always
subject to the exercise of police power for the public welfare.
In RCPI v. NTC (150 SCRA 450), we held that:

A franchise started out as a "royal privilege or (a)

branch of the King's prerogative, subsisting in the
hands of a subject." This definition was given by
Finch, adopted by Blackstone, and accepted by
every authority since . . . Today, a franchise being
merely a privilege emanating from the sovereign
power of the state and owing its existence to a
grant, is subject to regulation by the state itself by
virtue of its police power through its administrative
agencies.
There is a stronger reason for holding ADC's permit to be a mere
privilege because jai-alai, when played for bets, is pure and simple
gambling. To analogize a gambling franchise for the operation of a
public utility, such as public transportation company, is to trivialize the
great historic origin of this branch of royal privilege.
As earlier noted, ADC has not alleged ever applying for a franchise
under the provisions of PD No. 771. and yet, the purpose of PD No.
771 is quite clear from its provisions, i.e., to give to the national
government the exclusive power to grant gambling franchises. Thus,
all franchises then existing were revoked but were made subject to
reissuance by the national government upon compliance by the
applicant with government-set qualifications and requirements.
There was no violation by PD No. 771 of the equal protection clause
since the decree revoked all franchises issued by local governments
without qualification or exception. ADC cannot allege violation of the
equal protection clause simply because it was the only one affected by
the decree, for as correctly pointed out by the government, ADC was
not singled out when all jai-alai franchises were revoked. Besides, it is
too late in the day for ADC to seek redress for alleged violation of its
constitutional rights for it could have raised these issues as early as
1975, almost twenty 920) years ago.
Finally, we do not agree that Section 3 of PD No. 771 and the
requirement of a legislative franchise in Republic Act No. 954 are
"riders" to the two 92) laws and are violative of the rule that laws
should embrace one subject which shall be expressed in the title, as
argued by ADC. In Cordero v. Cabatuando (6 SCRA 418), this Court
ruled that the requirement under the constitution that all laws should
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title is
sufficiently met if the title is comprehensive enough reasonably to
include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, without
expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for
the accomplishing of the objective.
III
On the issue of whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion
committed by respondent Judge Reyes in issuing the temporary
restraining order (later converted to a writ of preliminary injunction)
and the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, we hold and rule
there was.
Section 3, Rule 58 of the rules of Court provides for the grounds for
the issuance of a preliminary injunction. While ADC could allege these
grounds, respondent judge should have taken judicial notice of
Republic Act No. 954 and PD 771, under Section 1 rule 129 of the
Rules of court. These laws negate the existence of any legal right on
the part of ADC to the reliefs it sought so as to justify the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction. since PD No. 771 and Republic Act No.
954 are presumed valid and constitutional until ruled otherwise by the
Supreme Court after due hearing, ADC was not entitled to the writs
issued and consequently there was grave abuse of discretion in issuing
them.
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, judgment is hereby rendered:

Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) vs. CA

[G.R. No. 93891 March 11, 1991]
Facts: Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing Corporation is involved in
bleaching, rinsing and dyeing textiles with untreated wastewater which
were being discharged directly into a canal leading to the adjacent
Tullahan-Tinejeros River. On September 22, 1988, petitioner Pollution
Adjudication Board issued an ex parte Order based on 2 findings made
on Solar Textile Finishing Corportions plant, directing Solar
immediately to cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution
source installations as they were clearly in violation of Section 8 of
Presidential Decree No. 984 (Pollution Control Law) and Section 103 of
its Implementing Rules and Regulations and the 1982 Effluent
Regulations. Solar then filed a motion for reconsideration which was
granted by the Pollution Adjudication Board for a temporary operation.
However, Solar went to the RTC for certiorari and preliminary
injunction against the Board but the same was dismissed. On appeal,
the CA reversed the Order of dismissal of the trial court and remanded
the case for further proceedings. Petitioner Board claims that under
P.D. No. 984, Section 7(a), it has legal authority to issue ex parte
orders to suspend the operations of an establishment when there is
prima facie evidence that such establishment is discharging effluents
or wastewater, the pollution level of which exceeds the maximum
permissible standards set by the NPCC (now, the Board). Solar, on the
other hand, contends that under the Board's own rules and
regulations, an ex parte order may issue only if the effluents
discharged pose an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or
welfare, or to animal and plant life" and argued that there were no
findings that Solar's wastewater discharged posed such a threat.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Pollution Adjudication Board has legal
authority to issue the Order and Writ of Execution against Solar Textile
Finishing Corporation. YES. RULING: Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984
authorized petitioner Board to issue ex parte cease and desist orders
under the following circumstances
: (a)
Public Hearing
....
Provided , That
whenever the Commission finds prima facie evidence that the
discharged sewage or wastes are of immediate threat to life, public
health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life, or exceeds the
allowable standards set by the Commission, the Commissioner may
issue an ex-parte order directing the discontinuance of the same or the
temporary suspension or cessation of operation of the establishment
or person generating such sewage or wastes
without the necessity of a prior public hearing
.
The said ex-parte order shall be immediately executory
and shall remain in force until said establishment or person prevents or
abates the said pollution within the allowable standards or modified or
nullified by a competent court. The Court found that the Order and
Writ of Execution issued by petitioner Board were entirely within its
lawful authority Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law
and regulations in situations like in this case. The relevant pollution
control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and

promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to

protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the
public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly
designated as the police power. It is a constitutional commonplace
that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the
necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved,
through the exercise of police power. Hence, the trial court did not err
when it dismissed Solar's petition for certiorari. It follows that the
proper remedy was an appeal from the trial court to the Court of
Appeals, as Solar did in fact appeal. The Court gave due course on the
Petition for Review and the Decision of the Court of Appeals and its
Resolution were set aside. The Order of petitioner Board and the Writ
of Execution, as well as the decision of the trial court were reinstated,
without prejudice to the right of Solar to contest the correctness of the
basis of the Board's Order and Writ of Execution at a public hearing
before the Board

G.R. No. 78164

July 31, 1987

TERESITA TABLARIN, MA, LUZ CIRIACO, MA NIMFA B.

ROVIRA, EVANGELINA S. LABAO, in their behalf and in behalf
of applicants for admission into the Medical Colleges during
the school year 1987-88 and future years who have not taken
or successfully hurdled tile National Medical Admission Test
(NMAT). petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE ANGELINA S. GUTIERREZ, Presiding
Judge of Branch XXXVII of the Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Judicial Region with seat at Manila, THE
HONORABLE SECRETARY LOURDES QUISUMBING, in her
capacity as Chairman of the BOARD OF MEDICAL EDUCATION,
and THE CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT
(CEM), respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine
for the school year 1987-1988. However, the petitioners either did not
take or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission Test
(NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education, one of the public
respondents, and administered by the private respondent, the Center
for Educational Measurement (CEM).
On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment
and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction. The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary
of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and
the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a)
and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No.
52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the
taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates
of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications
for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled
on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing on the petition for
issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said petition
on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as
previously scheduled.
Petitioners accordingly filed this Special Civil Action for certiorari with
this Court to set aside the Order of the respondent judge denying the
petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946,
known as the "Medical Act of 1959" defines its basic objectives in the
following manner:
Section 1. Objectives. This Act provides for and shall
govern (a) the standardization and regulation of medical
education (b) the examination for registration of physicians;
and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of the
practice of medicine in the Philippines. (Underscoring
supplied)
The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education
which is composed of (a) the Secretary of Education, Culture and
Sports or his duly authorized representative, as Chairman; (b) the
Secretary of Health or his duly authorized representative; (c) the
Director of Higher Education or his duly authorized representative; (d)
the Chairman of the Medical Board or his duly authorized
representative; (e) a representative of the Philippine Medical
Association; (f) the Dean of the College of Medicine, University of the
Philippines; (g) a representative of the Council of Deans of Philippine
Medical Schools; and (h) a representative of the Association of
Philippine Medical Colleges, as members. The functions of the Board of
Medical Education specified in Section 5 of the statute include the
following:

(a) To determine and prescribe equirements for admission

into a recognized college of medicine;

(b) To determine and prescribe requirements for minimum

physical facilities of colleges of medicine, to wit: buildings,
including hospitals, equipment and supplies, apparatus,
instruments, appliances, laboratories, bed capacity for
instruction purposes, operating and delivery rooms, facilities
for outpatient services, and others, used for didactic and
practical instruction in accordance with modern trends;
(c) To determine and prescribe the minimum number and
minimum qualifications of teaching personnel, including
student-teachers ratio;
(d) To determine and prescribe the minimum required
curriculum leading to the degree of Doctor of Medicine;
(e) To authorize the implementation of experimental medical
curriculum in a medical school that has exceptional faculty
and instrumental facilities. Such an experimental curriculum
may prescribe admission and graduation requirements other
than those prescribed in this Act; Provided, That only
exceptional students shall be enrolled in the experimental
curriculum;
(f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a

medical school and keep a register of those issued said

certificate; and to collect from said applicants the amount of
twenty-five pesos each which shall accrue to the operating
fund of the Board of Medical Education;
(g) To select, determine and approve hospitals or some
departments of the hospitals for training which comply with
the minimum specific physical facilities as provided in
subparagraph (b) hereof; and
(h) To promulgate and prescribe and enforce the necessary

rules and regulations for the proper implementation of the

foregoing functions. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to
medical schools:

Admission requirements. The medical college may admit

any student who has not been convicted by any court of
competent jurisdiction of any offense involving moral
turpitude and who presents (a) a record of completion of a
bachelor's degree in science or arts; (b) a certificate of

eligibility for entrance to a medical school from the Board of

Medical Education; (c) a certificate of good moral character

issued by two former professors in the college of liberal arts;

and (d) birth certificate. Nothing in this act shall be
construed to inhibit any college of medicine from
establishing, in addition to the preceding, other entrance
requirements that may be deemed admissible.
xxx

xxx

x x x (Emphasis supplied)

MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education,
Culture and Sports and dated 23 August 1985, established a uniform
admission test called the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as
an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for
admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with the
school year 1986-1987. This Order goes on to state that:
2. The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an

instrument toward upgrading the selection of applicants for

admission into the medical schools and its calculated to

improve the quality of medical education in the country. The

cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the
scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every year by the
Board of Medical Education after consultation with the
Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating

of each applicant, together with the other admission

requirements as presently called for under existing rules,
shall serve as a basis for the issuance of the prescribed
certificate of elegibility for admission into the medical
colleges.
3. Subject to the prior approval of the Board of Medical
Education, each medical college may give other tests for

applicants who have been issued a corresponding certificate

of eligibility for admission that will yield information on other
aspects of the applicant's personality to complement the
information derived from the NMAT.
xxx

xxx

xxx

8. No applicant shall be issued the requisite Certificate of

Eligibility for Admission (CEA), or admitted for enrollment as

first year student in any medical college, beginning the
school year, 1986-87, without the required NMAT
qualification as called for under this Order. (Underscoring
supplied)

Pursuant to MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, the private respondent

Center conducted NMATs for entrance to medical colleges during the
school year 1986-1987. In December 1986 and in April 1987,
respondent Center conducted the NMATs for admission to medical
colleges during the school year 1987.1988.1avvphi1
Petitioners raise the question of whether or not a writ of preliminary
injunction may be issued to enjoin the enforcement of Section 5 (a)
and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No.
52, s. 1985, pending resolution of the issue of constitutionality of the
assailed statute and administrative order. We regard this issue as
entirely peripheral in nature. It scarcely needs documentation that a
court would issue a writ of preliminary injunction only when the
petitioner assailing a statute or administrative order has made out a
case of unconstitutionality strong enough to overcome, in the mind of
the judge, the presumption of constitutionality, aside from showing a
clear legal right to the remedy sought. The fundamental issue is of
course the constitutionality of the statute or order assailed.
1. The petitioners invoke a number of provisions of the 1987
Constitution which are, in their assertion, violated by the continued
implementation of Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act 2381, as
amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985. The provisions invoked
read as follows:
(a) Article 11, Section 11: "The state values the dignity of
every human person and guarantees full respect of human
rights. "
(b) ArticleII, Section l3: "The State recognizes the vital role
of the youth in nation building and shall promote and protect
their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well
being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and
nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and
civic affairs."
(c) Article II, Section 17: "The State shall give priority to
education, science and technology, arts, culture and sports
to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social
progress and to promote total human liberation and
development. "

(d) Article XIV, Section l: "The State shall protect and

promote the right of all citizens to quality education at all
levels and take appropriate steps to make such education
accessible to all. "
(e) Article XIV, Section 5 (3): "Every citizen has a right to
select a profession or course of study, subject to fair,
reasonable and equitable admission and academic
requirements."
Article II of the 1987 Constitution sets forth in its second half certain
"State policies" which the government is enjoined to pursue and
promote. The petitioners here have not seriously undertaken to
demonstrate to what extent or in what manner the statute and the
administrative order they assail collide with the State policies
embodied in Sections 11, 13 and 17. They have not, in other words,
discharged the burden of proof which lies upon them. This burden is
heavy enough where the constitutional provision invoked is relatively
specific, rather than abstract, in character and cast in behavioral or
operational terms. That burden of proof becomes of necessity heavier
where the constitutional provision invoked is cast, as the second
portion of Article II is cast, in language descriptive of basic policies, or
more precisely, of basic objectives of State policy and therefore highly
generalized in tenor. The petitioners have not made their case, even
a prima facie case, and we are not compelled to speculate and to
imagine how the legislation and regulation impugned as
unconstitutional could possibly offend the constitutional provisions
pointed to by the petitioners.
Turning to Article XIV, Section 1, of the 1987 Constitution, we note
that once more petitioners have failed to demonstrate that the statute
and regulation they assail in fact clash with that provision. On the
contrary we may note-in anticipation of discussion infra that the
statute and the regulation which petitioners attack are in fact designed
to promote "quality education" at the level of professional schools.
When one reads Section 1 in relation to Section 5 (3) of Article XIV as
one must one cannot but note that the latter phrase of Section 1 is not
to be read with absolute literalness. The State is not really enjoined to
take appropriate steps to make quality education " accessible
to all who might for any number of reasons wish to enroll in a
professional school but rather merely to make such education
accessible to all who qualify under "fair, reasonable and equitable

admission and academic requirements. "

2. In the trial court, petitioners had made the argument that Section 5
(a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, offend against the
constitutional principle which forbids the undue delegation of
legislative power, by failing to establish the necessary standard to be
followed by the delegate, the Board of Medical Education. The general
principle of non-delegation of legislative power, which both flows from
the reinforces the more fundamental rule of the separation and
allocation of powers among the three great departments of
government,1 must be applied with circumspection in respect of
statutes which like the Medical Act of 1959, deal with subjects as
obviously complex and technical as medical education and the practice
of medicine in our present day world. Mr. Justice Laurel stressed this
point 47 years ago in Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. vs. The
Public Service Commission:2
One thing, however, is apparent in the development of the
principle of separation of powers and that is that the maxim
of delegatus non potest delegare or delegate potestas non
potest delegare, adopted this practice (Delegibus et
Consuetudiniis Anglia edited by G.E. Woodbine, Yale
University Press, 1922, Vol. 2, p. 167) but which is also
recognized in principle in the Roman Law (d. 17.18.3) has

been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern

government, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits
of the principle of "subordinate legislation," not only in the
United States and England but in practically all modern
governments. (People vs. Rosenthal and Osmena [68 Phil.
318, 1939]. Accordingly, with the growing complexity of

modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of

governmental regulation and the increased difficulty of
administering the laws, there is a constantly growing
tendency toward the delegation of greater power by the
legislature, and toward the approval of the practice by the
courts." 3
The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule
making authority by an administrative agency like the Board of Medical
Education are necessarily broad and highly abstract. As explained by
then Mr. Justice Fernando in Edu v. Ericta4
The standard may be either expressed or implied. If the
former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The

standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically.

It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act
considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the
legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be
attained as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon the
roads. 5
We believe and so hold that the necessary standards are set forth in
Section 1 of the 1959 Medical Act: "the standardization and regulation
of medical education" and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same Act, the
body of the statute itself, and that these considered together are
sufficient compliance with the requirements of the non-delegation
principle.
3. The petitioners also urge that the NMAT prescribed in MECS Order
No. 52, s. 1985, is an "unfair, unreasonable and inequitable
requirement," which results in a denial of due process. Again,
petitioners have failed to specify just what factors or features of the
NMAT render it "unfair" and "unreasonable" or "inequitable." They
appear to suggest that passing the NMAT is an unnecessary
requirement when added on top of the admission requirements set out
in Section 7 of the Medical Act of 1959, and other admission
requirements established by internal regulations of the various medical
schools, public or private. Petitioners arguments thus appear to relate
to utility and wisdom or desirability of the NMAT requirement. But
constitutionality is essentially a question of power or authority: this
Court has neither commission or competence to pass upon questions
of the desirability or wisdom or utility of legislation or administrative
regulation. Those questions must be address to the political
departments of the government not to the courts.
There is another reason why the petitioners' arguments must fail: the
legislative and administrative provisions impugned by them constitute,
to the mind of the Court, a valid exercise of the police power of the
state. The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive
and non-waivable power and authority of the sovereign to secure and
promote an the important interests and needs in a word, the public
order of the general community.6 An important component of that
public order is the health and physical safety and well being of the
population, the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate
objective of governmental effort and regulation.7
Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there
is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the
NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one hand,
and the securing of the health and safety of the general community,
on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached
by recalling that the regulation of the practice of medicine in all its
branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of
protecting the health and safety of the public.8 That the power to
regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to
regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice
medicine, is also well recognized. thus, legislation and administrative
regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take
and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized
as valid exercises of governmental power.9 Similarly, the establishment
of minimum medical educational requirements i.e., the completion

of prescribed courses in a recognized medical school for admission

to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate

exercise of the regulatory authority of the state.10 What we have
before us in the instant case is closely related: the regulation of access
to medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted earlier,
articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of
the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical
schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student
body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in
the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of
limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the
aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The
need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in
our professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular,
in the current stage of our social and economic development, are
widely known.
We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission
test like the NMAT as a means for achieving its stated objective of
"upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and
of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country." Given
the widespread use today of such admission tests in, for instance,
medical schools in the United States of America (the Medical College
Admission Test [MCAT]11 and quite probably in other countries with far
more developed educational resources than our own, and taking into
account the failure or inability of the petitioners to even attempt to
prove otherwise, we are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably
related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation
in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the
public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and
ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds
for disease or trauma.
4. Petitioners have contended, finally, that MECS Order No. 52, s.
1985, is in conflict with the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
More specifically, petitioners assert that that portion of the MECS
Order which provides that

the cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the

scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every-year by the
Board of Medical 11 Education after consultation with the
Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. (Emphasis
supplied)

infringes the requirements of equal protection. They assert, in other

words, that students seeking admission during a given school year,
e.g., 1987-1988, when subjected to a different cutoff score than that
established for an, e.g., earlier school year, are discriminated against
and that this renders the MECS Order "arbitrary and capricious." The
force of this argument is more apparent than real. Different cutoff
scores for different school years may be dictated by differing
conditions obtaining during those years. Thus, the appropriate cutoff
score for a given year may be a function of such factors as the number
of students who have reached the cutoff score established the
preceding year; the number of places available in medical schools
during the current year; the average score attained during the current
year; the level of difficulty of the test given during the current year,
and so forth. To establish a permanent and immutable cutoff score
regardless of changes in circumstances from year to year, may wen
result in an unreasonable rigidity. The above language in MECS Order
No. 52, far from being arbitrary or capricious, leaves the Board of
Medical Education with the measure of flexibility needed to meet
circumstances as they change.
We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum
scores therein as a condition for admission to medical schools in the
Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional imposition.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of
the respondent trial court denying the petition for a writ of preliminary
injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED
Facts:
The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture
and Sports, theBoard of Medical Education and the Center for
Educational Measurement from enforcingSection 5 (a) and (f) of
Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of
1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the taking and passing
of the NMAT as acondition for securing certificates of eligibility for
admission, from proceeding with acceptingapplications for taking the
NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April1987
and in the future. The trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987.
The NMAT wasconducted and administered as previously
scheduled.Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224
and 5946, known as the "MedicalAct of 1959" defines its basic
objectives in the following manner:"SECTION 1. Objectives.

This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the standardization
andregulation of medical education; (b) the examination for
registration of physicians; and (c) thesupervision, control and
regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines."The statute,
among other things, created a Board of Medical Education. Its
functions asspecified in Section 5 of the statute include the
following:"(a) To determine and prescribe requirements for admission
into a recognized college of medicine;x x x(f) To accept applications
for certification for admission to a medical school and keep a registerof
those issued said certificate; and to collect from said applicants the
amount of twenty-fivepesos each which shall accrue to the operating
fu
nd of the Board of Medical Education;
Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to
medical schools:"Admission requirements.

The medical college may admit any student who has not been
convicted by any court of competent jurisdiction of any offense
involving moral turpitude andwho presents (a) a record of completion
of a bachelor's degree in science or arts; (b) acertificate of eligibility
for entrance to a medical school from the Board of Medical
Education;(c) a certificate of good moral character issued by two
former professors in the college of liberalarts; and (d) birth certificate.
Nothing in this act shall be construed to inhibit any college of medicine
from establishing, in addition to the preceding, other entrance
requirements that may
be deemed admissible.
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education,
Culture and Sports anddated 23 August 1985, established a uniform
admission test called the National MedicalAdmission Test (NMAT) as an
additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibilityfor
admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with the
school year 1986-1987. This Order goes on to state that: "2. The
NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as aninstrument toward
upgrading the selection of applicants for admission into the medical
schoolsand its calculated to improve the quality of medical education in
the country. The cutoff scorefor the successful applicants, based on
the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every yearby the Board

of Medical Education after consultation with the Association of

Philippine MedicalColleges. The NMAT rating of each applicant,
together with the other admission requirementsas presently called for
under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the issuance of
theprescribed certificate of eligibility for admission into the medical
colleges.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as
amended, and MECSOrder No. 52, s. 1985 are constitutional.
Held:
Yes. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain
minimum scorestherein as a condition for admission to medical schools
in the Philippines, do not constitute anunconstitutional imposition.The
police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and nonwaivable power andauthority of the sovereign to secure and promote
all the important interests and needs

in aword, the public order

of the general community. An important component of that public

order is the health and physical safety and well being of the
population, the securing of whichno one can deny is a legitimate
objective of governmental effort and regulation. Perhaps theonly issue
that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable
relation betweenthe prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for
admission to medical school on the onehand, and the securing of the
health and safety of the general community, on the other hand.This
question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the
regulation of thepractice of medicine in all its branches has long been
recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety
of the public.MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 articulates the rationale of
regulation of this type: theimprovement of the professional and
technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, byupgrading the
quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools.
Thatupgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission,
selectivity consisting, amongother things, of limiting admission to
those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude formedical
studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and
the difficultiesof maintaining, high standards in our professional
schools in general, and medical schools inparticular, in the current
stage of our social and economic development, are widely known.
Webelieve that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission
test like the NMAT as ameans for achieving its stated objective of
"upgrading the selection of applicants into [our]medical schools" and
of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country. We
areentitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing
of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end,
it is useful to recall, is the protection of thepublic from the potentially
deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who
wouldundertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or
trauma.WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and the
Order of the respondent trialcourt denying the petition for a writ of
preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs againstpetitioners

Facts: The petitioners seek admission into colleges or schools of

medicine. However the petitioners either did not take or did not
successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT).
Republic Act 2382 as amended by R.A. 4224 and 5946, known as the
Medical Act of 1959 created, among others, the Board of Medical
Education (BME) whose functions include "to determine and prescribe
requirements for admission into a recognized college of medicine"
(Sec. 5 (a). Section 7 of the same Act requires from applicants to
present a certificate of eligibility for entrance (cea) to medical school
from the BME. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then
Minister of Education, Culture and Sports, established a uniform
admission test called National Medical Admission Test as additional
requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility.

Petitioners then filed with the RTC a petition for Declaratory Judgment
and Prohibition with a prayer Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Sec. of educ, BME from
enforcing Sec. 5(a) and (f) of R.A. 4224 and MECS Order no. 2 and
from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as condition for
securing (cea).

Issue: Whether or not Sec. 5(a) and (f) of R.A. 4224 and MECS Order
no. 2 violate the constitution as they prescribe an unfair, unreasonable
and inequitable requirement

Held: The legislative and administrative provisions impugned in this

case constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state.

Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there
is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the
NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one hand,
and the securing of the health and safety of the general community,
on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached
by recalling that the regulation of the practice of medicine in all its
branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of
protecting the health and safety of the public. That the power to
regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to
regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice
medicine, is also well recognized. Thus, legislation and administrative
regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take
and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized
as valid exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the establishment
of minimum medical educational requirements-i.e., the completion of
prescribed courses in a recognized medical school-for admission to the
medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of
the regulatory authority of the state. What we have before us in the
instant case is closely related: the regulation of access to medical
schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, articulates the rationale of
regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and
technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the
quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools.
That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission,
selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to
those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical
studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and
the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional

schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current

state of our social and economic development, are widely known.

The Court believes that the government is entitled to prescribe an

admission test like the NMAT as a means of achieving its stated
objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical
schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the
country."

Valentin Tio vs Videogram Regulatory Boar

151 SCRA 208 Political Law The Embrace of Only One Subject by
a Bill
Delegation of Power Delegation to Administrative Bodies
In 1985, Presidential Dedree No. 1987 entitled An Act Creating the
Videogram Regulatory Board was enacted which gave broad powers
to the VRB to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. The said
law sought to minimize the economic effects of piracy. There was a
need to regulate the sale of videograms as it has adverse effects to
the movie industry. The proliferation of videograms has significantly
lessened the revenue being acquired from the movie industry, and that
such loss may be recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Section 10
of the PD imposes a 30% tax on the gross receipts payable to the
LGUs.
In 1986, Valentin Tio assailed the said PD as he averred that it is
unconstitutional on the following grounds:
1. Section 10 thereof, which imposed the 30% tax on gross receipts, is
a rider and is not germane to the subject matter of the law.
2. There is also undue delegation of legislative power to the VRB, an
administrative body, because the law allowed the VRB to deputize,
upon its discretion, other government agencies to assist the VRB in
enforcing the said PD.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Valentin Tios arguments are correct.
HELD: No.
1. The Constitutional requirement that every bill shall embrace only
one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof is sufficiently
complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the
general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. In the case at bar,
the questioned provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the PD,
which is the regulation of the video industry through the VRB as
expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor
foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is
simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered
throughout the PD.
2. There is no undue delegation of legislative powers to the VRB. VRB
is not being tasked to legislate. What was conferred to the VRB was
the authority or discretion to seek assistance in the execution,
enforcement, and implementation of the law. Besides, in the very
language of the decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit such
assistance is for a fixed and limited period with the deputized
agencies concerned being subject to the direction and control of the
[VRB].
DECISION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This petition was filed on September 1, 1986 by petitioner on his own
behalf and purportedly on behalf of other videogram operators
adversely affected. It assails the constitutionality of Presidential Decree
No. 1987 entitled An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board
with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry
(hereinafter briefly referred to as the BOARD). The Decree was
promulgated on October 5, 1985 and took effect on April 10, 1986,

fifteen (15) days after completion of its publication in the Official

Gazette.
On November 5, 1985, a month after the promulgation of the
abovementioned decree, Presidential Decree No. 1994 amended the
National Internal Revenue Code providing, inter alia:
SEC. 134. Video Tapes. There shall be collected on each processed
video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an
annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or
imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax.
On October 23, 1986, the Greater Manila Theaters Association,
Integrated Movie Producers, Importers and Distributors Association of
the Philippines, and Philippine Motion Pictures Producers Association,
hereinafter collectively referred to as the Intervenors, were permitted
by the Court to intervene in the case, over petitioners opposition,
upon the allegations that intervention was necessary for the complete
protection of their rights and that their survival and very existence is
threatened by the unregulated proliferation of film piracy. The
Intervenors were thereafter allowed to file their Comment in
Intervention.
The rationale behind the enactment of the DECREE, is set out in its
preambular clauses as follows:
1. WHEREAS, the proliferation and unregulated circulation of
videograms including, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or
any technical improvement or variation thereof, have greatly
prejudiced the operations of moviehouses and theaters, and have
caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least forty
percent (40%) and a tremendous drop in the collection of sales,
contractors specific, amusement and other taxes, thereby resulting in
substantial losses estimated at P450 Million annually in government
revenues;
2. WHEREAS, videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around
P600 Million per annum from rentals, sales and disposition of
videograms, and such earnings have not been subjected to tax,
thereby depriving the Government of approximately P180 Million in
taxes each year;
3. WHEREAS, the unregulated activities of videogram establishments
have also affected the viability of the movie industry, particularly the
more than 1,200 movie houses and theaters throughout the country,
and occasioned industry-wide displacement and unemployment due to
the shutdown of numerous moviehouses and theaters;
4. WHEREAS, in order to ensure national economic recovery, it is
imperative for the Government to create an environment conducive to
growth and development of all business industries, including the movie
industry which has an accumulated investment of about P3 Billion;
5. WHEREAS, proper taxation of the activities of videogram
establishments will not only alleviate the dire financial condition of the
movie industry upon which more than 75,000 families and 500,000
workers depend for their livelihood, but also provide an additional
source of revenue for the Government, and at the same time
rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of videograms;
6. WHEREAS, the rampant and unregulated showing of obscene
videogram features constitutes a clear and present danger to the
moral and spiritual well-being of the youth, and impairs the mandate
of the Constitution for the State to support the rearing of the youth for

civic efficiency and the development of moral character and promote

their physical, intellectual, and social well-being;
7. WHEREAS, civic-minded citizens and groups have called for remedial
measures to curb these blatant malpractices which have flaunted our
censorship and copyright laws;
8. WHEREAS, in the face of these grave emergencies corroding the
moral values of the people and betraying the national economic
recovery program, bold emergency measures must be adopted with
dispatch; (Numbering of paragraphs supplied).
Petitioners attack on the constitutionality of the DECREE rests on the
following grounds:

1. Section 10 thereof, which imposes a tax of 30% on the gross

receipts payable to the local government is a RIDER and the same is
not germane to the subject matter thereof;
2. The tax imposed is harsh, confiscatory, oppressive and/or in
unlawful restraint of trade in violation of the due process clause of the
Constitution;
3. There is no factual nor legal basis for the exercise by the President
of the vast powers conferred upon him by Amendment No. 6;
4. There is undue delegation of power and authority;
5. The Decree is an ex-post facto law; and
6. There is over regulation of the video industry as if it were a
nuisance, which it is not.
We shall consider the foregoing objections in seriatim.
1. The Constitutional requirement that every bill shall embrace only
one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof 1 is
sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to
include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. It is not
necessary that the title express each and every end that the statute
wishes to accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the
statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed
in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to
the general subject and title. 2 An act having a single general subject,
indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter
how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or
foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance
of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out
the general object. 3 The rule also is that the constitutional
requirement as to the title of a bill should not be so narrowly
construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. 4 It should
be given practical rather than technical construction. 5

(50%) shall accrue to the municipality where the tax is collected;

PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be shared
equally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila
Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the
DECREE, which is the regulation of the video industry through the
Videogram Regulatory Board as expressed in its title. The tax provision
is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As
a tool for regulation 6 it is simply one of the regulatory and control
mechanisms scattered throughout the DECREE. The express purpose
of the DECREE to include taxation of the video industry in order to
regulate and rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of
videograms is evident from Preambles 2 and 5, supra. Those
preambles explain the motives of the lawmaker in presenting the
measure. The title of the DECREE, which is the creation of the
Videogram Regulatory Board, is comprehensive enough to include the
purposes expressed in its Preamble and reasonably covers all its
provisions. It is unnecessary to express all those objectives in the title
or that the latter be an index to the body of the DECREE. 7
2. Petitioner also submits that the thirty percent (30%) tax imposed is
harsh and oppressive, confiscatory, and in restraint of trade. However,
it is beyond serious question that a tax does not cease to be valid
merely because it regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters the
activities taxed. 8 The power to impose taxes is one so unlimited in
force and so searching in extent, that the courts scarcely venture to
declare that it is subject to any restrictions whatever, except such as
rest in the discretion of the authority which exercises it. 9 In imposing
a tax, the legislature acts upon its constituents. This is, in general, a
sufficient security against erroneous and oppressive taxation. 10
The tax imposed by the DECREE is not only a regulatory but also a
revenue measure prompted by the realization that earnings of
videogram establishments of around P600 million per annum have not
been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of an
additional source of revenue. It is an end-user tax, imposed on
retailers for every videogram they make available for public viewing. It
is similar to the 30% amusement tax imposed or borne by the movie
industry which the theater-owners pay to the government, but which is
passed on to the entire cost of the admission ticket, thus shifting the
tax burden on the buying or the viewing public. It is a tax that is
imposed uniformly on all videogram operators.
The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed
primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry,
particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of
intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video
tapes. And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect the
movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.

Tested by the foregoing criteria, petitioners contention that the tax

provision of the DECREE is a rider is without merit. That section reads,
inter alia:

The public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the motive which
impelled the legislature to impose the tax was to favor one industry
over another. 11

Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms.

Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the province
shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price or
rental rate, as the case may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a
videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture or
audiovisual program. Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax
collected shall accrue to the province, and the other fifty percent

It is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the

subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that inequities
which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation or
exemption infringe no constitutional limitation. 12 Taxation has been
made the implement of the states police power.13

At bottom, the rate of tax is a matter better addressed to the taxing

legislature.
3. Petitioner argues that there was no legal nor factual basis for the
promulgation of the DECREE by the former President under
Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution providing that whenever
in the judgment of the President , there exists a grave emergency or
a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang
Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act
adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires
immediate action, he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the
necessary decrees, orders, or letters of instructions, which shall form
part of the law of the land.
In refutation, the Intervenors and the Solicitor Generals Office aver
that the 8th whereas clause sufficiently summarizes the justification
in that grave emergencies corroding the moral values of the people
and betraying the national economic recovery program necessitated
bold emergency measures to be adopted with dispatch. Whatever the
reasons in the judgment of the then President, considering that the
issue of the validity of the exercise of legislative power under the said
Amendment still pends resolution in several other cases, we reserve
resolution of the question raised at the proper time.
4. Neither can it be successfully argued that the DECREE contains an
undue delegation of legislative power. The grant in Section 11 of the
DECREE of authority to the BOARD to solicit the direct assistance of
other agencies and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed
and limited period, the heads or personnel of such agencies and units
to perform enforcement functions for the Board is not a delegation of
the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or
discretion as to its execution, enforcement, and implementation. The
true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law,
which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and
conferring authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised
under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the
latter, no valid objection can be made. 14 Besides, in the very
language of the decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit such
assistance is for a fixed and limited period with the deputized
agencies concerned being subject to the direction and control of the
BOARD. That the grant of such authority might be the source of graft
and corruption would not stigmatize the DECREE as unconstitutional.
Should the eventuality occur, the aggrieved parties will not be without
adequate remedy in law.
5. The DECREE is not violative of the ex post facto principle. An ex
post facto law is, among other categories, one which alters the legal
rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different
testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the
offense. It is petitioners position that Section 15 of the DECREE in
providing that:
All videogram establishments in the Philippines are hereby given a
period of forty-five (45) days after the effectivity of this Decree within
which to register with and secure a permit from the BOARD to engage
in the videogram business and to register with the BOARD all their
inventories of videograms, including videotapes, discs, cassettes or
other technical improvements or variations thereof, before they could
be sold, leased, or otherwise disposed of. Thereafter any videogram
found in the possession of any person engaged in the videogram
business without the required proof of registration by the BOARD, shall
be prima facie evidence of violation of the Decree, whether the
possession of such videogram be for private showing and/or public
exhibition.

raises immediately a prima facie evidence of violation of the DECREE

when the required proof of registration of any videogram cannot be
presented and thus partakes of the nature of an ex post facto law.
The argument is untenable. As this Court held in the recent case of
Vallarta vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 15
it is now well settled that there is no constitutional objection to the
passage of a law providing that the presumption of innocence may be
overcome by a contrary presumption founded upon the experience of
human conduct, and enacting what evidence shall be sufficient to
overcome such presumption of innocence (People vs. Mingoa, 92 Phil.
856 [1953] at 858-59, citing 1 COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 639-641). And the legislature may
enact that when certain facts have been proved that they shall be
prima facie evidence of the existence of the guilt of the accused and
shift the burden of proof provided there be a rational connection
between the facts proved and the ultimate facts presumed so that the
inference of the one from proof of the others is not unreasonable and
arbitrary because of lack of connection between the two in common
experience. 16

Applied to the challenged provision, there is no question that there is a

rational connection between the fact proved, which is non-registration,
and the ultimate fact presumed which is violation of the DECREE,
besides the fact that the prima facie presumption of violation of the
DECREE attaches only after a forty-five-day period counted from its
effectivity and is, therefore, neither retrospective in character.
6. We do not share petitioners fears that the video industry is being
over-regulated and being eased out of existence as if it were a
nuisance. Being a relatively new industry, the need for its regulation
was apparent. While the underlying objective of the DECREE is to
protect the moribund movie industry, there is no question that public
welfare is at bottom of its enactment, considering the unfair
competition posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of the moral
fiber of the viewing public brought about by the availability of
unclassified and unreviewed video tapes containing pornographic films
and films with brutally violent sequences; and losses in government
revenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention the
fact that the activities of video establishments are virtually untaxed
since mere payment of Mayors permit and municipal license fees are
required to engage in business. 17
The enactment of the Decree since April 10, 1986 has not brought
about the demise of the video industry. On the contrary, video
establishments are seen to have proliferated in many places
notwithstanding the 30% tax imposed.
In the last analysis, what petitioner basically questions is the necessity,
wisdom and expediency of the DECREE. These considerations,
however, are primarily and exclusively a matter of legislative concern.
Only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action
taken, may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid. This is as it
ought to be. The principle of separation of powers has in the main
wisely allocated the respective authority of each department and
confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. There would then be
intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the
discretion of a coordinate branch, the judiciary would substitute its
own. If there be adherence to the rule of law, as there ought to be,
the last offender should be courts of justice, to which rightly litigants
submit their controversy precisely to maintain unimpaired the

supremacy of legal norms and prescriptions. The attack on the validity

of the challenged provision likewise insofar as there may be objections,
even if valid and cogent on its wisdom cannot be sustained. 18
In fine, petitioner has not overcome the presumption of validity which
attaches to a challenged statute. We find no clear violation of the
Constitution which would justify us in pronouncing Presidential Decree
No. 1987 as unconstitutional and void.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED

G.R. No. L-50908 January 31, 1984

MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA and ENRIQUE D.
BAUTISTA, petitioners,
vs.
ALFREDO L. JUINIO, ROMEO F. EDU and FIDEL V.
RAMOS, respondents.

Mary Concepcion Bautista for and in his own behalf.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

FERNANDO, C.J.:
The validity of an energy conservation measure, Letter of Instruction
No. 869, issued on May 31, 1979 the response to the protracted oil
crisis that dates back to 1974 is put in issue in this prohibition
proceeding filed by petitioners, spouses Mary Concepcion Bautista and
Enrique D. Bautista, for being allegedly violative of the due process
and equal protection guarantees 1 of the Constitution. The use of
private motor vehicles with H and EH plates on week-ends and
holidays was banned from "[12:00] a.m. Saturday morning to 5:00
a.m. Monday morning, or 1:00 a.m. of the holiday to 5:00 a.m. of the
day after the holiday." 2 Motor vehicles of the following classifications
are exempted: (a) S (Service); (b) T (Truck); (e) DPL (Diplomatic); (d)
CC (Consular Corps); (e) TC (Tourist Cars). 3 Pursuant thereto,
respondent Alfredo L. Juinio, then Minister of Public Works,
Transportation and Communications and respondent Romeo P. Edu,
then Commissioner of Land Transportation Commission issued on June
11, 1979, Memorandum Circular No. 39, which imposed "the penalties
of fine, confiscation of vehicle and cancellation of registration on
owners of the above-specified vehicles" found violating such Letter of
Instruction. 4 It was then alleged by petitioners that "while the
purpose for the issuance of the LOI 869 is laudable, to wit, energy
conservation, the provision banning the use of H and EH [vehicles] is
unfair, discriminatory, [amounting to an] arbitrary classification" and
thus in contravention of the equal protection clause. 5 Moreover, for
them, such Letter of Instruction is a denial of due process, more
specifically, "of their right to use and enjoy their private property and
of their freedom to travel and hold family gatherings, reunions and
outings on week-ends and holidays," inviting attention to the fact that
others not included in the ban enjoying "unrestricted freedom." 6 It
would follow, so they contend that Memorandum Circular No. 39
imposing penalties of fine, confiscation of the vehicle and cancellation
of license is likewise unconstitutional, for being violative of the doctrine
of "undue delegation of legislative power." 7 It is to be noted that such
Memorandum Circular does not impose the penalty of confiscation but
merely that of impounding, fine, and for the third offense that of
cancellation of certificate of registration and for the rest of the year or
for ninety days whichever is longer.
This Court gave due course to the petition requiring respondent to
answer. There was admission of the facts as substantially alleged
except, as previously noted, that the ban starts at 12:00 a.m. rather
than 1:00 a.m. of a Saturday or of a holiday and as to the mention of
a Willy's Kaiser jeep being registered in the name of a certain Teresita
Urbina, about which respondents had no knowledge. There was a
denial of the allegations that the classification of vehicles into heavy H
and extra heavy (EH) on the other hand and light and bantam on the
other hand was violative of equal protection and the regulation as to
the use of the former cars on the dates specified a transgression of
due process. The answer likewise denied that there was an undue
delegation of legislative power, reference being made to the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code. 8 There was also a procedural
objection raised, namely, that what is sought amounts at most to an
advisory opinion rather than an ajudication of a case or controversy.

Petitioners filed a motion to be allowed to reply to the answer. It was

granted. The reply, considering its exhaustive character serving as its
memorandum, stressed anew what it emphasized as the arbitrary,
unreasonable, and oppressive aspects of the challenged Letter of
Instruction and Memorandum Circular No. 39. It disputed what it
characterized as an "erroneous and arbitrary presumption that heavy
car owners unnecessarily use and therefore waste gasoline whenever
they drive their cars on week-ends and holidays;" 9 it stigmatized the
ban as defeating its "avowed purpose in the case of the affluent who
own not only heavy limousines but also many small cars [as] they may
be compelled to use at least two small cars;" 10 referred to the high
cost of taxis or other public transports for those "not able to afford
expensive small cars [possibly] only one heavy and possible old
model;" 11 cited the case of "many eight cylinder vehicles which
because of their weight have been registered as light but in fact
consume more or as much gasoline as the banned vehicles." 12 Their
conclusion is that "the ban imposed, in result and effect is class
legislation." 13
The parties were required to submit memoranda. Respondents did so
but not petitioners. They relied on their reply to the answer as
noted, a rather comprehensive pleading. For reasons to be set forth,
this Court holds that the petition cannot prosper.
1. First as to the procedural objection. In the memorandum for
respondents, one of the issues raised was whether "the power of
judicial review may be invoked considering the inadequacy of the
record and the highly abstract and academic questions raised by the
petitioners." 14 It is inaccurate to say that the record is inadequate. It
does not admit of doubt that the ban applies to petitioners who are
"the registered owners of an eight cylinder 1969 Buick, and the
vendees of a six cylinder Willy's kaiser jeep, which are both classified
as heavy or H." 15 To that extent, therefore, the enforcement of the
assailed Letter of Instruction will amount to a deprivation of what
otherwise would be a valid exercise of a property right. Thus they fall
squarely within "the unchallenged rule" as to who may raise a
constitutional question, namely, to quote the language of Justice
Laurel in the leading case of People v. Vera, 16 "that the person who
impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct
injury as a result of its enforcement. 17 Moreover, that rule has been
considerably relaxed. 18 The question then is neither abstract nor
academic as contended by respondents.
2. There is, however, this formidable obstacle that confronts
petitioners. What they seek is for this Court to hold that a Letter of
Instruction, a regulatory measure precisely enacted to cope with the
serious and grave problem of energy conservation, is void on its face.
Such a task is rendered unusually difficult by what has been referred
to by Justice Laurel in the leading case of Angara v. Electoral
Commission 19 as the "presumption of constitutionality" and by the
same jurist in the case of People v. Vera 20 in slightly different words
"a presumption that such an act falls within constitutional limitations."
There is need then for a factual foundation of invalidity. In the
language of Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operations Association, Inc.
v. City Mayor or Manila: "It admits of no doubt therefore that there
being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is
unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face, which
is not the case here. The principle has been nowhere better expressed
than in the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire
Insurance Co., where the American Supreme Court through Justice
Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the matter thus: 'The
statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of
the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that
the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence
deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of
fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character,
the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of
some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute.' " 21
3. It is true, of course, that there may be instances where a police
power measure may, because of its arbitrary, oppressive or unjust

character, be held offensive to the due process clause and, therefore,

may, when challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding, be declared
void on its face. This is not one of them. A recital of the whereas
clauses of the Letter of Instruction makes it clear. Thus: "[Whereas],
developments in the international petroleum supply situation continue
to follow a trend of limited production and spiralling prices thereby
precluding the possibility of immediate relief in supplies within the
foreseeable future; [Whereas], the uncertainty of fuel supply
availability underscores a compelling need for the adoption of positive
measures designed to insure the viability of the country's economy and
sustain its developmental growth; [Whereas], to cushion the effect of
increasing oil prices and avoid fuel supply disruptions, it is imperative
to adopt a program directed towards the judicious use of our energy
resources complemented with intensified conservation efforts and
efficient utilization thereof; * * *." 22 That is undeniable is that the
action taken is an appropriate response to a problem that presses
urgently for solution. It may not be the only alternative, but its
reasonableness is immediately apparent. Thus, to repeat, substantive
due process, which is the epitome of reasonableness and fair play, is
not ignored, much less infringed.
4. In the interplay between such a fundamental right and police
power, especially so where the assailed governmental action deals
with the use of one's property, the latter is accorded much leeway.
That is settled law. What is more, it is good law. Due process,
therefore, cannot be validly invoked. As stressed in the cited ErmitaMalate Hotel decision: "To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict
and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly
characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of
powers, extending as it does 'to all the great public needs.' It would
be, to paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very
purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be
deprived of its competence to promote public health, public morals,
public safety and the general welfare. Negatively put, police power is
'that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to
prohibit all that is hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of
society.' " 23
5. The due process question having been disposed of, there is still the
objection based on the equal protection clause to be considered. A
governmental act may not be offensive to the due process clause, but
may run counter to such a guarantee. Such is the case when there is
no rational basis for the classification followed. That is the point raised
by petitioners. For them, there is no rational justification for the ban
being imposed on vehicles classified as heavy (H) and extra-heavy
(EH), for precisely those owned by them fall within such category.
Tested by the applicable standard that must be satisfied to avoid the
charge of a denial of equal protection, the objection of petitioners is
shown to be lacking in merit. Such a classification on its face cannot be
characterized as an affront to reason. A legal norm according to J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure Administration, 24 "whether
embodied in a rule, principle, or standard, constitutes a defense
against anarchy at one extreme and tyranny at the other. Thereby,
people living together in a community with its myriad and complex
problems can minimize the friction and reduce the conflicts, to assure,
at the very least, a peaceful ordering of existence. The Ideal situation
is for the law's benefits to be available to all, that none be placed
outside the sphere of its coverage. Only thus could chance and favor
be excluded and the affairs of men governed by that serene and
impartial uniformity, which is of the very essence of the Idea of law.
The actual, given things as they are and likely to continue to be,
cannot approximate the Ideal. Nor is the law susceptible to the
reproach that it does not take into account the realties of the situation.
* * * To assure that the general welfare be promoted, which is the
end of law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to liberty and
property. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances
invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show that the
governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment
of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the
very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason. It suffices
then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under
similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same
manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges

conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference

cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and
security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if
not Identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden
or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same
fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally
binding on the rest." 25
6. Nor does it militate against the validity of the Letter of Instruction
just because the ban imposed does not go as far as it could have and
therefore could be less efficacious in character. That was the solution
which for the President expressing a power validly lodged in him,
recommended itself. There was a situation that called for a corrective
measure. He decided that what was issued by him would do just that
or, at the very least, help in easing the situation. That it did not cover
other matters which could very well have been regulated does not call
for a declaration of nullity. The President, to paraphrase Lutz v.
Araneta, 26 "is not required by the Constitution to adhere to the policy
of all or none." 27 It is quite obvious then that no equal protection
question arises.
7. It may not be amiss to refer to a 1981 American Supreme Court
decision, Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Company. 28 Respondent
along with several other business corporations adversely affected
involved in the manufacture and utilization of plastic milk containers
filed suit in a Minnesota district court seeking to enjoin enforcement of
a Minnesota statute banning the retail sale of milk in plastic
nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers, but permitting such sale in
other nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers, such as paperboard, milk
cartons. After conducting extensive evidentiary hearings, the
Minnesota court enjoined enforcement of the statute, finding that it
violated among others the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution. The Minnesota Supreme Court
affirmed. On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed,
with only Justice Stevens dissenting. The opinion by Justice Brennan
noted that "proponents of the legislation argued that it would promote
resource conservation, ease solid waste disposal problems, and
conserve energy." 29 That sufficed for the Court to conclude "that the
ban on plastic nonreturnable milk containers bears a rational relation
to the State's objectives, and must be sustained under the Equal
Protection Clause." 30 It does show that notwithstanding the "new
equal protection approach" with its emphasis on "suspect
classification" and "fundamental rights and interests standard," a
concept so ably expounded by professor Gunther, the "rational relation
test" 31 still retains its validity. Not that there could be any objection to
the classification here followed as being in any way susceptible to such
a pejorative expression as "suspect" or that the assailed Letter of
Instruction does not qualify under "the fundamental rights and
interests" standard
8. There was set forth in the petition what were referred to as "other
reasonable measures which the authorities concerned with energy
conservation can take immediately, which are in fact acceptable and
obviously called for and should have been done long ago, to wit: 1.
require and establish taxi stands equipped with efficient telephone and
communication systems; 2. strict implementation and observance of
cargo truck hours on main arteries; 3. strict observance of traffic rules;
4. effective solution of traffic problems and decongestion of traffic
through rerouting and quick repair of roads and efficient operation of
double decker buses; 5. rationing of gasoline to avoid panic buying
and give the private car owner the option and responsibility of deciding
on the use of his allocation; 6. allow neon and electrically devised
advertising signs only from five o'clock p.m. to nine o'clock p.m. 7.
prohibit immediately the importation of heavy and luxury cars and
seriously re-examine the car manufacturing program." 32 Admittedly,
such measures are conducive to energy conservation. The question
before us however is limited to whether or not Letter of Instruction
869 as implemented by Memorandum Circular No. 39 is violative of
certain constitutional rights. It goes no further than that. The
determination of the mode and manner through which the objective of
minimizing the consumption of oil products may be attained is left to
the discretion of the political branches. 33 Absent therefore the alleged
infringement of constitutional rights, more precisely the due process

and equal protection guarantees, this Court cannot adjudge Letter of

Instruction No. 869 as tainted by unconstitutionality.
9. It was likewise contended that Memorandum Circular No. 39, issued
by the then respondent Minister of Public Works, Transportation and
Communications, and then respondent Land Transportation
Commissioner, imposing the penalties "of fine, confiscation of vehicle
and cancellation of license is likewise unconstitutional," petitioners
invoking the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. 34 To that
extent that a Letter of Instruction may be viewed as an exercise of the
decree-making power of the President, then such an argument is
futile. If, however, viewed as a compliance with the duty to take care
that the laws be faithfully executed, as a consequence of which
subordinate executive officials may in turn issue implementing rules
and regulations, then the objection would properly be considered as
an ultra viresallegation. There is this relevant excerpt from Teoxon v.
Member of the Board of Administrators: 35 "1. The recognition of the
power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the
implementation of the statute, necessarily limited to what is provided
for in the legislative enactment, may be found in the early case
of United States v. Barrias decided in 1908. Then came, in a 1914
decision, United States v. Tupasi Molina, a delineation of the scope of
such competence. Thus: 'Of course the regulations adopted under
legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony
with the provisions of the law, and for the sole purpose of carrying into
effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law
itself can not be extended. So long, however, as the regulations relate
solely to carrying into effect the provisions of the law, they are valid.'
In 1936, in People v. Santos, this Court expressed its disapproval of an
administrative order that would amount to an excess of the regulatory
power vested in an administrative official. We reaffirmed such a
doctrine in a 1951 decision, where we again made clear that where an
administrative order betrays inconsistency or repugnancy to the
provisions of the Act, 'the mandate of the Act must prevail and must
be followed.' Justice Barrera, speaking for the Court in Victorias Milling
Company, Inc. v. Social Security Commission, citing Parker as well as
Davis did tersely sum up the matter thus: 'A rule is binding on tile
courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed
and its scope is within the statutory granted by the legislature, even if
the courts are not in agreement with the policy stated therein or its
innate wisdom * * *. On the other hand, administrative interpretation
of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally
determine what the law means.' It cannot be otherwise as the
Constitution limits the authority of the President, in whom all executive
power resides, to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. No
lesser administrative executive office or agency then can, contrary to
the express language of the Constitution, assert for itself a more
extensive prerogative." 36 It was alleged in the Answer of Solicitor
General Estelito P. Mendoza that Letter of Instruction 869 and
Memorandum Circular No. 39 were adopted pursuant to the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code. 37 It contains a specific provision as
to penalties. 38 Thus: "For violation of any provisions of this Act or
regulations promulgated pursuant hereto, not hereinbefore specifically
punished, a fine of not less than ten nor more than fifty pesos shall be
imposed." 39Memorandum Circular No. 39 cannot be held to be ultra
vires as long as the fine imposed is not less than ten nor more than
fifty pesos. As to suspension of registration, 40 the Code, insofar as
applicable, provides: "Whenever it shall appear from the records of the
Commission that during any twelve-month period more than three
warnings for violations of this Act have been given to the owner of a
motor vehicle, or that the said owner has been convicted by a
competent court more than once for violation of such laws, the
Commissioner may, in his discretion, suspend the certificate of
registration for a period not exceeding ninety days and, thereupon,
shall require the immediate surrender of the number plates * *
*." 41 It follows that while the imposition of a fine or the suspension of
registration under the conditions therein set forth is valid under the
Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the impounding of a vehicle
finds no statutory justification. To apply that portion of Memorandum
Circular No. 39 would be ultra vires. It must likewise be made clear
that a penalty even if warranted can only be imposed in accordance
with the procedure required by law. 42

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed.

GR # L-50908 January 31, 1984 (Constitutional Law Police Power,
LOI, No Violation of Equal Protection Clause)

FACTS: The constitutionality of Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 869, a

response to protracted oil crisis, banning the use of private motor
vehicles with H (heavy) and EH (extra heavy) plates on week-ends and
holidays, was assailed for being allegedly violative of the due process
and equal protection guarantees of the Constitution.
Petitioners also contends that Memorandum Circular No. 39 issued by
herein respondents imposing penalties of fine, confiscation of the
vehicle and cancellation of license of owners of the above specified
vehicles found violating such LOI, is likewise unconstitutional, for being
violative of the doctrine of undue delegation of legislative power.
Respondents denied the above allegations.
ISSUE: Whether or not Letter of Instruction 869 as implemented by
Memorandum Circular No. 39 is violative of certain constitutional
rights.
HELD: No, the disputed regulatory measure is an appropriate response
to a problem that presses urgently for solution, wherein its
reasonableness is immediately apparent. Thus due process is not
ignored, much less infringed. The exercise of police power may cut
into the rights to liberty and property for the promotion of the general
welfare. Those adversely affected may invoke the equal protection
clause only if they can show a factual foundation for its invalidity.
Moreover, since LOI No. 869 and MC No. 39 were adopted pursuant to
the Land Transportation and Traffic Code which contains a specific
provision as to penalties, the imposition of a fine or the suspension of
registration under the conditions therein set forth is valid with the
exception of the impounding of a vehicle.

City of Manila vs. Judge Laguio, G.R. No. 118127

DECISION
TINGA, J.:
I know only that what is moral is what you feel good after and what is
immoral is what you feel bad after.

Street in the North, Taft Avenue in the East, Vito Cruz Street in the
South and Roxas Boulevard in the West, pursuant to P.D. 499 be
allowed or authorized to contract and engage in, any business
providing certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and
facilities where women are used as tools in entertainment and which
tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely
affect the social and moral welfare of the community, such as but not
limited to:

Ernest Hermingway
Death in the Afternoon, Ch. 1

1. Sauna Parlors

It is a moral and political axiom that any dishonorable act, if performed

by oneself, is less immoral than if performed by someone else, who
would be well-intentioned in his dishonesty.

2. Massage Parlors

J. Christopher Gerald

4. Beerhouses

Bonaparte in Egypt, Ch. I

5. Night Clubs

The Court's commitment to the protection of morals is secondary to its

fealty to the fundamental law of the land. It is foremost a guardian of
the Constitution but not the conscience of individuals. And if it need
be, the Court will not hesitate to "make the hammer fall, and heavily"
in the words of Justice Laurel, and uphold the constitutional
guarantees when faced with laws that, though not lacking in zeal to
promote morality, nevertheless fail to pass the test of constitutionality.

6. Day Clubs

The pivotal issue in this Petition1 under Rule 45 (then Rule 42) of the
Revised Rules on Civil Procedure seeking the reversal of the Decision2
in Civil Case No. 93-66511 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 18 (lower court),3 is the validity of Ordinance No. 7783 (the
Ordinance) of the City of Manila.4

10. Dance Halls

The antecedents are as follows:

SEC. 2 The City Mayor, the City Treasurer or any person acting in
behalf of the said officials are prohibited from issuing permits,
temporary or otherwise, or from granting licenses and accepting
payments for the operation of business enumerated in the preceding
section.

Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is

a corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels,
hostels and lodging houses.5 It built and opened Victoria Court in
Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with
the Department of Tourism as a hotel.6 On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed
a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order7 (RTC Petition) with
the lower court impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of
Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the
members of the City Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed
that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its
prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional.8
Enacted by the City Council9 on 9 March 1993 and approved by
petitioner City Mayor on 30 March 1993, the said Ordinance is entitled
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION
OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT,
ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITAMALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.10
The Ordinance is reproduced in full, hereunder:

3. Karaoke Bars

7. Super Clubs
8. Discotheques
9. Cabarets

11. Motels
12. Inns

SEC. 3. Owners and/or operator of establishments engaged in, or

devoted to, the businesses enumerated in Section 1 hereof are hereby
given three (3) months from the date of approval of this ordinance
within which to wind up business operations or to transfer to any place
outside of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other
kinds of business allowable within the area, such as but not limited to:
1. Curio or antique shop
2. Souvenir Shops
3. Handicrafts display centers
4. Art galleries
5. Records and music shops
6. Restaurants
7. Coffee shops
8. Flower shops

SECTION 1. Any provision of existing laws and ordinances to the

contrary notwithstanding, no person, partnership, corporation or entity
shall, in the Ermita-Malate area bounded by Teodoro M. Kalaw Sr.

9. Music lounge and sing-along restaurants, with well-defined activities

for wholesome family entertainment that cater to both local and
foreign clientele.

10. Theaters engaged in the exhibition, not only of motion pictures but
also of cultural shows, stage and theatrical plays, art exhibitions,
concerts and the like.
11. Businesses allowable within the law and medium intensity districts
as provided for in the zoning ordinances for Metropolitan Manila,
except new warehouse or open-storage depot, dock or yard, motor
repair shop, gasoline service station, light industry with any machinery,
or funeral establishments.
SEC. 4. Any person violating any provisions of this ordinance, shall
upon conviction, be punished by imprisonment of one (1) year or fine
of FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS, or both, at the discretion of
the Court, PROVIDED, that in case of juridical person, the President,
the General Manager, or person-in-charge of operation shall be liable
thereof; PROVIDED FURTHER, that in case of subsequent violation and
conviction, the premises of the erring establishment shall be closed
and padlocked permanently.
SEC. 5. This ordinance shall take effect upon approval.
Enacted by the City Council of Manila at its regular session today,
March 9, 1993.
Approved by His Honor, the Mayor on March 30, 1993. (Emphasis
supplied)
In the RTC Petition, MTDC argued that the Ordinance erroneously and
improperly included in its enumeration of prohibited establishments,
motels and inns such as MTDC's Victoria Court considering that these
were not establishments for "amusement" or "entertainment" and they
were not "services or facilities for entertainment," nor did they use
women as "tools for entertainment," and neither did they "disturb the
community," "annoy the inhabitants" or "adversely affect the social
and moral welfare of the community."11
MTDC further advanced that the Ordinance was invalid and
unconstitutional for the following reasons: (1) The City Council has no
power to prohibit the operation of motels as Section 458 (a) 4 (iv)12 of
the Local Government Code of 1991 (the Code) grants to the City
Council only the power to regulate the establishment, operation and
maintenance of hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses
and other similar establishments; (2) The Ordinance is void as it is
violative of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 49913 which specifically
declared portions of the Ermita-Malate area as a commercial zone with
certain restrictions; (3) The Ordinance does not constitute a proper
exercise of police power as the compulsory closure of the motel
business has no reasonable relation to the legitimate municipal
interests sought to be protected; (4) The Ordinance constitutes an ex
post facto law by punishing the operation of Victoria Court which was
a legitimate business prior to its enactment; (5) The Ordinance violates
MTDC's constitutional rights in that: (a) it is confiscatory and
constitutes an invasion of plaintiff's property rights; (b) the City
Council has no power to find as a fact that a particular thing is a
nuisance per se nor does it have the power to extrajudicially destroy it;
and (6) The Ordinance constitutes a denial of equal protection under
the law as no reasonable basis exists for prohibiting the operation of
motels and inns, but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or
other similar establishments, and for prohibiting said business in the
Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area.14
In their Answer15 dated 23 July 1993, petitioners City of Manila and
Lim maintained that the City Council had the power to "prohibit certain
forms of entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare

of the community" as provided for in Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the

Local Government Code,16 which reads, thus:
Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The
sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general
welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this
Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as
provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
....
(4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and
structures within the city in order to promote the general welfare and
for said purpose shall:
....
(vii) Regulate the establishment, operation, and maintenance of any
entertainment or amusement facilities, including theatrical
performances, circuses, billiard pools, public dancing schools, public
dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places for
entertainment or amusement; regulate such other events or activities
for amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend to
disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants, or require the
suspension or suppression of the same; or, prohibit certain forms of
amusement or entertainment in order to protect the social and moral
welfare of the community.
Citing Kwong Sing v. City of Manila,17 petitioners insisted that the
power of regulation spoken of in the above-quoted provision included
the power to control, to govern and to restrain places of exhibition and
amusement.18
Petitioners likewise asserted that the Ordinance was enacted by the
City Council of Manila to protect the social and moral welfare of the
community in conjunction with its police power as found in Article III,
Section 18(kk) of Republic Act No. 409,19 otherwise known as the
Revised Charter of the City of Manila (Revised Charter of Manila)20
which reads, thus:
ARTICLE III
THE MUNICIPAL BOARD
. . .
Section 18. Legislative powers. The Municipal Board shall have the
following legislative powers:
. . .
(kk) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the
sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity, and the
promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience,
and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and such others as
may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and
duties conferred by this chapter; and to fix penalties for the violation
of ordinances which shall not exceed two hundred pesos fine or six
months' imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment, for a
single offense.
Further, the petitioners noted, the Ordinance had the presumption of
validity; hence, private respondent had the burden to prove its
illegality or unconstitutionality.21

Petitioners also maintained that there was no inconsistency between

P.D. 499 and the Ordinance as the latter simply disauthorized certain
forms of businesses and allowed the Ermita-Malate area to remain a
commercial zone.22 The Ordinance, the petitioners likewise claimed,
cannot be assailed as ex post facto as it was prospective in
operation.23 The Ordinance also did not infringe the equal protection
clause and cannot be denounced as class legislation as there existed
substantial and real differences between the Ermita-Malate area and
other places in the City of Manila.24
On 28 June 1993, respondent Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr. (Judge
Laguio) issued an ex-parte temporary restraining order against the
enforcement of the Ordinance.25 And on 16 July 1993, again in an
intrepid gesture, he granted the writ of preliminary injunction prayed
for by MTDC.26
After trial, on 25 November 1994, Judge Laguio rendered the assailed
Decision, enjoining the petitioners from implementing the Ordinance.
The dispositive portion of said Decision reads:27
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No.
778[3], Series of 1993, of the City of Manila null and void, and making
permanent the writ of preliminary injunction that had been issued by
this Court against the defendant. No costs.
SO ORDERED.28
Petitioners filed with the lower court a Notice of Appeal29 on 12
December 1994, manifesting that they are elevating the case to this
Court under then Rule 42 on pure questions of law.30
On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that
the following errors were committed by the lower court in its ruling:
(1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or
otherwise, unfair, unreasonable and oppressive exercise of police
power; (2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance
contravenes P.D. 49931 which allows operators of all kinds of
commercial establishments, except those specified therein; and (3) It
erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.32
In the Petition and in its Memorandum,33 petitioners in essence repeat
the assertions they made before the lower court. They contend that
the assailed Ordinance was enacted in the exercise of the inherent and
plenary power of the State and the general welfare clause exercised by
local government units provided for in Art. 3, Sec. 18 (kk) of the
Revised Charter of Manila and conjunctively, Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of
the Code.34 They allege that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police
power; it does not contravene P.D. 499; and that it enjoys the
presumption of validity.35
In its Memorandum36 dated 27 May 1996, private respondent
maintains that the Ordinance is ultra vires and that it is void for being
repugnant to the general law. It reiterates that the questioned
Ordinance is not a valid exercise of police power; that it is violative of
due process, confiscatory and amounts to an arbitrary interference
with its lawful business; that it is violative of the equal protection
clause; and that it confers on petitioner City Mayor or any officer
unregulated discretion in the execution of the Ordinance absent rules
to guide and control his actions.
This is an opportune time to express the Court's deep sentiment and
tenderness for the Ermita-Malate area being its home for several
decades. A long-time resident, the Court witnessed the area's many
turn of events. It relished its glory days and endured its days of
infamy. Much as the Court harks back to the resplendent era of the

Old Manila and yearns to restore its lost grandeur, it believes that the
Ordinance is not the fitting means to that end. The Court is of the
opinion, and so holds, that the lower court did not err in declaring the
Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires and therefore null and void.
The Ordinance is so replete with constitutional infirmities that almost
every sentence thereof violates a constitutional provision. The
prohibitions and sanctions therein transgress the cardinal rights of
persons enshrined by the Constitution. The Court is called upon to
shelter these rights from attempts at rendering them worthless.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of
decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only
be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact
and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it
must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must
not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair
or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not
prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent
with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.37
Anent the first criterion, ordinances shall only be valid when they are
not contrary to the Constitution and to the laws.38 The Ordinance
must satisfy two requirements: it must pass muster under the test of
constitutionality and the test of consistency with the prevailing laws.
That ordinances should be constitutional uphold the principle of the
supremacy of the Constitution. The requirement that the enactment
must not violate existing law gives stress to the precept that local
government units are able to legislate only by virtue of their derivative
legislative power, a delegation of legislative power from the national
legislature. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or
exercise powers higher than those of the latter.39
This relationship between the national legislature and the local
government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the
Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. The national
legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which
cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.40
The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its
police power, an enactment of the City Council acting as agent of
Congress. Local government units, as agencies of the State, are
endowed with police power in order to effectively accomplish and carry
out the declared objects of their creation.41 This delegated police
power is found in Section 16 of the Code, known as the general
welfare clause, viz:

exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied

therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for
its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to
the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among
other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote
health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced
ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and
self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public
morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full
employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and
preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
Local government units exercise police power through their respective
legislative bodies; in this case, the sangguniang panlungsod or the city
council. The Code empowers the legislative bodies to "enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general

welfare of the province/city/municipality and its inhabitants pursuant

to Section 16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate
powers of the province/city/ municipality provided under the Code.42
The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the
exercise of such delegated power.
The Ordinance contravenes
the Constitution
The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching,
is subordinate to the constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject
to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public
good.43 In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an
invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and
repugnant to general laws.
The relevant constitutional provisions are the following:
SEC. 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life,
liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are
essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy.44
SEC. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building,
and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women
and men.45
SEC. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of laws.46
Sec. 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.47
A. The Ordinance infringes
the Due Process Clause
The constitutional safeguard of due process is embodied in the fiat
"(N)o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law. . . ."48
There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It
furnishes though a standard to which governmental action should
conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each
appropriate case, be valid. This standard is aptly described as a
responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates
of justice,49 and as such it is a limitation upon the exercise of the
police power.50
The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent governmental encroachment
against the life, liberty and property of individuals; to secure the
individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of the government,
unrestrained by the established principles of private rights and
distributive justice; to protect property from confiscation by legislative
enactments, from seizure, forfeiture, and destruction without a trial
and conviction by the ordinary mode of judicial procedure; and to
secure to all persons equal and impartial justice and the benefit of the
general law.51
The guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation, and
private corporations and partnerships are "persons" within the scope of
the guaranty insofar as their property is concerned.52

This clause has been interpreted as imposing two separate limits on

government, usually called "procedural due process" and "substantive
due process."
Procedural due process, as the phrase implies, refers to the procedures
that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life,
liberty, or property. Classic procedural due process issues are
concerned with what kind of notice and what form of hearing the
government must provide when it takes a particular action.53
Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes, asks whether the
government has an adequate reason for taking away a person's life,
liberty, or property. In other words, substantive due process looks to
whether there is a sufficient justification for the government's
action.54 Case law in the United States (U.S.) tells us that whether
there is such a justification depends very much on the level of scrutiny
used.55 For example, if a law is in an area where only rational basis
review is applied, substantive due process is met so long as the law is
rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. But if it is an
area where strict scrutiny is used, such as for protecting fundamental
rights, then the government will meet substantive due process only if it
can prove that the law is necessary to achieve a compelling
government purpose.56
The police power granted to local government units must always be
exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due
process and equal protection of the law. Such power cannot be
exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically57 as its exercise is
subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the
respect and regard due to the prescription of the fundamental law,
particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it
bears emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the extent that may
fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public
welfare.58 Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in
interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and
property.59
Requisites for the valid exercise of Police Power are not met
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for
the enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of
constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require an interference with private rights, but the means adopted
must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.60 It must be evident that
no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less
intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable relation must exist
between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed
for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the
public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property
will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.61
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall
violation of the due process clause.
The Ordinance was enacted to address and arrest the social ills
purportedly spawned by the establishments in the Ermita-Malate area
which are allegedly operated under the deceptive veneer of legitimate,
licensed and tax-paying nightclubs, bars, karaoke bars, girlie houses,
cocktail lounges, hotels and motels. Petitioners insist that even the
Court in the case of Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators
Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila63 had already taken judicial
notice of the "alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery

and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to existence of motels,

which provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence
and exit and thus become the ideal haven for prostitutes and thrillseekers."64
The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and
protection of the social and moral values of the community. Granting
for the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are
within the scope of the City Council's police powers, the means
employed for the accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and
unduly oppressive.
It is undoubtedly one of the fundamental duties of the City of Manila to
make all reasonable regulations looking to the promotion of the moral
and social values of the community. However, the worthy aim of
fostering public morals and the eradication of the community's social
ills can be achieved through means less restrictive of private rights; it
can be attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute
prohibition. The closing down and transfer of businesses or their
conversion into businesses "allowed" under the Ordinance have no
reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its purposes. Otherwise
stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per
se protect and promote the social and moral welfare of the
community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social ills of
prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual
disease in Manila.
Conceding for the nonce that the Ermita-Malate area teems with
houses of ill-repute and establishments of the like which the City
Council may lawfully prohibit,65 it is baseless and insupportable to
bring within that classification sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke
bars, night clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets,
dance halls, motels and inns. This is not warranted under the accepted
definitions of these terms. The enumerated establishments are lawful
pursuits which are not per se offensive to the moral welfare of the
community.
That these are used as arenas to consummate illicit sexual affairs and
as venues to further the illegal prostitution is of no moment. We lay
stress on the acrid truth that sexual immorality, being a human frailty,
may take place in the most innocent of places that it may even take
place in the substitute establishments enumerated under Section 3 of
the Ordinance. If the flawed logic of the Ordinance were to be
followed, in the remote instance that an immoral sexual act transpires
in a church cloister or a court chamber, we would behold the spectacle
of the City of Manila ordering the closure of the church or court
concerned. Every house, building, park, curb, street or even vehicles
for that matter will not be exempt from the prohibition. Simply
because there are no "pure" places where there are impure men.
Indeed, even the Scripture and the Tradition of Christians churches
continually recall the presence and universality of sin in man's
history.66
The problem, it needs to be pointed out, is not the establishment,
which by its nature cannot be said to be injurious to the health or
comfort of the community and which in itself is amoral, but the
deplorable human activity that may occur within its premises. While a
motel may be used as a venue for immoral sexual activity, it cannot for
that reason alone be punished. It cannot be classified as a house of illrepute or as a nuisance per se on a mere likelihood or a naked
assumption. If that were so and if that were allowed, then the ErmitaMalate area would not only be purged of its supposed social ills, it
would be extinguished of its soul as well as every human activity,
reprehensible or not, in its every nook and cranny would be laid bare
to the estimation of the authorities.

The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but fails to address the core
issues of morality. Try as the Ordinance may to shape morality, it
should not foster the illusion that it can make a moral man out of it
because immorality is not a thing, a building or establishment; it is in
the hearts of men. The City Council instead should regulate human
conduct that occurs inside the establishments, but not to the detriment
of liberty and privacy which are covenants, premiums and blessings of
democracy.
While petitioners' earnestness at curbing clearly objectionable social ills
is commendable, they unwittingly punish even the proprietors and
operators of "wholesome," "innocent" establishments. In the instant
case, there is a clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal
in the case of those individuals desirous of owning, operating and
patronizing those motels and property in terms of the investments
made and the salaries to be paid to those therein employed. If the City
of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication and other
social ills, it can instead impose reasonable regulations such as daily
inspections of the establishments for any violation of the conditions of
their licenses or permits; it may exercise its authority to suspend or
revoke their licenses for these violations;67 and it may even impose
increased license fees. In other words, there are other means to
reasonably accomplish the desired end.
Means employed are constitutionally infirm
The Ordinance disallows the operation of sauna parlors, massage
parlors, karaoke bars, beerhouses, night clubs, day clubs, super clubs,
discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns in the ErmitaMalate area. In Section 3 thereof, owners and/or operators of the
enumerated establishments are given three (3) months from the date
of approval of the Ordinance within which "to wind up business
operations or to transfer to any place outside the Ermita-Malate area
or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within
the area." Further, it states in Section 4 that in cases of subsequent
violations of the provisions of the Ordinance, the "premises of the
erring establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently."
It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for
the achievement of its purposes, the governmental interference itself,
infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a person's fundamental
right to liberty and property.
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice
Malcolm to include "the right to exist and the right to be free from
arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere
freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is
deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which
he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as
are necessary for the common welfare."68 In accordance with this
case, the rights of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful
ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any
lawful calling; and to pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced
in the concept of liberty.69
The U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Roth v. Board of Regents,70
sought to clarify the meaning of "liberty." It said:
While the Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty.
. . guaranteed [by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments], the term
denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of
the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a
home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates
of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long

recognizedas essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free

men. In a Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that
the meaning of "liberty" must be broad indeed.
In another case, it also confirmed that liberty protected by the due
process clause includes personal decisions relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and
education. In explaining the respect the Constitution demands for the
autonomy of the person in making these choices, the U.S. Supreme
Court explained:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of universe, and of the mystery of
human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes
of personhood where they formed under compulsion of the State.71

Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was recognized in

Morfe, the invasion of which should be justified by a compelling state
interest. Morfe accorded recognition to the right to privacy
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully
deserving of constitutional protection. Governmental powers should
stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.76
There is a great temptation to have an extended discussion on these
civil liberties but the Court chooses to exercise restraint and restrict
itself to the issues presented when it should. The previous
pronouncements of the Court are not to be interpreted as a license for
adults to engage in criminal conduct. The reprehensibility of such
conduct is not diminished. The Court only reaffirms and guarantees
their right to make this choice. Should they be prosecuted for their
illegal conduct, they should suffer the consequences of the choice they
have made. That, ultimately, is their choice.

Modality employed is
Persons desirous to own, operate and patronize the enumerated
establishments under Section 1 of the Ordinance may seek autonomy
for these purposes.

Motel patrons who are single and unmarried may invoke this right to
autonomy to consummate their bonds in intimate sexual conduct
within the motel's
behavior does not contravene any fundamental state policy as
contained in the Constitution.72 Adults have a right to choose to forge
such relationships with others in the confines of their own private lives
and still retain their dignity as free persons. The liberty protected by
the Constitution allows persons the right to make this choice.73 Their
right to liberty under the due process clause gives them the full right
to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government, as
long as they do not run afoul of the law. Liberty should be the rule and
restraint the exception.

Liberty in the constitutional sense not only means freedom from

unlawful government restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it is to
be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is the beginning
most valued by civilized men.74

The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual whose claim
to privacy and interference demands respect. As the case of Morfe v.
Mutuc,75 borrowing the words of Laski, so very aptly stated:

Man is one among many, obstinately refusing reduction to unity. His

separateness, his isolation, are indefeasible; indeed, they are so
fundamental that they are the basis on which his civic obligations are
built. He cannot abandon the consequences of his isolation, which are,
broadly speaking, that his experience is private, and the will built out
of that experience personal to himself. If he surrenders his will to
others, he surrenders himself. If his will is set by the will of others, he
ceases to be a master of himself. I cannot believe that a man no
longer a master of himself is in any real sense free.

unlawful taking

In addition, the Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it

substantially divests the respondent of the beneficial use of its
property.77 The Ordinance in Section 1 thereof forbids the running of
the enumerated businesses in the Ermita-Malate area and in Section 3
instructs its owners/operators to wind up business operations or to
transfer outside the area or convert said businesses into allowed
businesses. An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of
property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes
beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property
without just compensation.78 It is intrusive and violative of the private
property rights of individuals.

The Constitution expressly provides in Article III, Section 9, that

"private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation." The provision is the most important protection of
property rights in the Constitution. This is a restriction on the general
power of the government to take property. The constitutional provision
is about ensuring that the government does not confiscate the
property of some to give it to others. In part too, it is about loss
spreading. If the government takes away a person's property to
benefit society, then society should pay. The principal purpose of the
guarantee is "to bar the Government from forcing some people alone
to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole.79

There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A

"possessory" taking occurs when the government confiscates or
physically occupies property. A "regulatory" taking occurs when the
government's regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use
of the property.80

In the landmark case of Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon,81 it was held

that a taking also could be found if government regulation of the use
of property went "too far." When regulation reaches a certain
magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of

eminent domain and compensation to support the act. While property

may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will
be recognized as a taking.82

No formula or rule can be devised to answer the questions of what is

too far and when regulation becomes a taking. In Mahon, Justice
Holmes recognized that it was "a question of degree and therefore
cannot be disposed of by general propositions." On many other
occasions as well, the U.S. Supreme Court has said that the issue of
when regulation constitutes a taking is a matter of considering the
facts in each case. The Court asks whether justice and fairness require
that the economic loss caused by public action must be compensated
by the government and thus borne by the public as a whole, or
whether the loss should remain concentrated on those few persons
subject to the public action.83

What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that

government regulation is a taking if it leaves no reasonable
economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with
reasonable expectations for use.84 A regulation that permanently
denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land is, from the
owner's point of view, equivalent to a "taking" unless principles of
nuisance or property law that existed when the owner acquired the
land make the use prohibitable.85 When the owner of real property
has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the
name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically
idle, he has suffered a taking.86

A regulation which denies all economically beneficial or productive use

of land will require compensation under the takings clause. Where a
regulation places limitations on land that fall short of eliminating all
economically beneficial use, a taking nonetheless may have occurred,
depending on a complex of factors including the regulation's economic
effect on the landowner, the extent to which the regulation interferes
with reasonable investment-backed expectations and the character of
government action. These inquiries are informed by the purpose of the
takings clause which is to prevent the government from forcing some
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole.87

A restriction on use of property may also constitute a "taking" if not

reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public
purpose or if it has an unduly harsh impact on the distinct investmentbacked expectations of the owner.88

The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the "prohibited"

establishments three (3) months from its approval within which to
"wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the
Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of
business allowable within the area." The directive to "wind up business
operations" amounts to a closure of the establishment, a permanent
deprivation of property, and is practically confiscatory. Unless the
owner converts his establishment to accommodate an "allowed"
business, the structure which housed the previous business will be left
empty and gathering dust. Suppose he transfers it to another area, he

will likewise leave the entire establishment idle. Consideration must be

given to the substantial amount of money invested to build the edifices
which the owner reasonably expects to be returned within a period of
time. It is apparent that the Ordinance leaves no reasonable
economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with
reasonable expectations for use.

Ermitaconfiscatory as well. The penalty of permanent closure in cases of

subsequent violations found in Section 4 of the Ordinance is also
equivalent to a "taking" of private property.

The second option instructs the owners to abandon their property and
build another one outside the Ermita-Malate area. In every sense, it
qualifies as a taking without just compensation with an additional
burden imposed on the owner to build another establishment solely
from his coffers. The proffered solution does not put an end to the
"problem," it merely relocates it. Not only is this impractical, it is
unreasonable, onerous and oppressive. The conversion into allowed
enterprises is just as ridiculous. How may the respondent convert a
motel into a restaurant or a coffee shop, art gallery or music lounge
without essentially destroying its property? This is a taking of private
property without due process of law, nay, even without compensation.

The penalty of closure likewise constitutes unlawful taking that should

be compensated by the government. The burden on the owner to
convert or transfer his business, otherwise it will be closed
permanently after a subsequent violation should be borne by the
public as this end benefits them as a whole.

Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning

ordinance. A zoning ordinance, although a valid exercise of police
power, which limits a "wholesome" property to a use which can not
reasonably be made of it constitutes the taking of such property
without just compensation. Private property which is not noxious nor
intended for noxious purposes may not, by zoning, be destroyed
without compensation. Such principle finds no support in the principles
of justice as we know them. The police powers of local government
units which have always received broad and liberal interpretation
cannot be stretched to cover this particular taking.

Distinction should be made between destruction from necessity and

eminent domain. It needs restating that the property taken in the
exercise of police power is destroyed because it is noxious or intended
for a noxious purpose while the property taken under the power of
eminent domain is intended for a public use or purpose and is
therefore "wholesome."89 If it be of public benefit that a "wholesome"
property remain unused or relegated to a particular purpose, then
certainly the public should bear the cost of reasonable compensation
for the condemnation of private property for public use.90

Further, the Ordinance fails to set up any standard to guide or limit the
petitioners' actions. It in no way controls or guides the discretion

vested in them. It provides no definition of the establishments covered

by it and it fails to set forth the conditions when the establishments
come within its ambit of prohibition. The Ordinance confers upon the
mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to close down establishments.
Ordinances such as this, which make possible abuses in its execution,
depending upon no conditions or qualifications whatsoever other than
the unregulated arbitrary will of the city authorities as the touchstone
by which its validity is to be tested, are unreasonable and invalid. The
Ordinance should have established a rule by which its impartial
enforcement could be secured.91

Ordinances placing restrictions upon the lawful use of property must,

in order to be valid and constitutional, specify the rules and conditions
to be observed and conduct to avoid; and must not admit of the
exercise, or of an opportunity for the exercise, of unbridled discretion
by the law enforcers in carrying out its provisions.92

Thus, in Coates v. City of Cincinnati,93 as cited in People v. Nazario,94

the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an ordinance that had made it
illegal for "three or more persons to assemble on any sidewalk and
there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing
by." The ordinance was nullified as it imposed no standard at all
"because one may never know in advance what 'annoys some people
but does not annoy others.' "

Similarly, the Ordinance does not specify the standards to ascertain

which establishments "tend to disturb the community," "annoy the
inhabitants," and "adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the
community." The cited case supports the nullification of the Ordinance
for lack of comprehensible standards to guide the law enforcers in
carrying out its provisions.

Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated

establishments without infringing the due process clause. These lawful
establishments may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on
their business. This is a sweeping exercise of police power that is a
result of a lack of imagination on the part of the City Council and
which amounts to an interference into personal and private rights
which the Court will not countenance. In this regard, we take a
resolute stand to uphold the constitutional guarantee of the right to
liberty and property.

Worthy of note is an example derived from the U.S. of a reasonable

regulation which is a far cry from the ill-considered Ordinance enacted
by the City Council.

In FW/PBS, INC. v. Dallas,95 the city of Dallas adopted a

comprehensive ordinance regulating "sexually oriented businesses,"
which are defined to include adult arcades, bookstores, video stores,
cabarets, motels, and theaters as well as escort agencies, nude model
studio and sexual encounter centers. Among other things, the
ordinance required that such businesses be licensed. A group of motel
owners were among the three groups of businesses that filed separate
suits challenging the ordinance. The motel owners asserted that the

city violated the due process clause by failing to produce adequate

support for its supposition that renting room for fewer than ten (10)
hours resulted in increased crime and other secondary effects. They
likewise argued than the ten (10)-hour limitation on the rental of motel
rooms placed an unconstitutional burden on the right to freedom of
association. Anent the first contention, the U.S. Supreme Court held
that the reasonableness of the legislative judgment combined with a
study which the city considered, was adequate to support the city's
determination that motels permitting room rentals for fewer than ten
(10 ) hours should be included within the licensing scheme. As regards
the second point, the Court held that limiting motel room rentals to ten
(10) hours will have no discernible effect on personal bonds as those
bonds that are formed from the use of a motel room for fewer than
ten (10) hours are not those that have played a critical role in the
culture and traditions of the nation by cultivating and transmitting
shared ideals and beliefs.

The ordinance challenged in the above-cited case merely regulated the

targeted businesses. It imposed reasonable restrictions; hence, its
validity was upheld.

The case of Ermita Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc.
v. City Mayor of Manila,96 it needs pointing out, is also different from
this case in that what was involved therein was a measure which
regulated the mode in which motels may conduct business in order to
put an end to practices which could encourage vice and immorality.
Necessarily, there was no valid objection on due process or equal
protection grounds as the ordinance did not prohibit motels. The
Ordinance in this case however is not a regulatory measure but is an
exercise of an assumed power to prohibit.97

The foregoing premises show that the Ordinance is an unwarranted

and unlawful curtailment of property and personal rights of citizens.
For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot,
even under the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as valid.

B. The Ordinance violates Equal

Protection Clause

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated

should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated
differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate
against others.98 The guarantee means that no person or class of
persons shall be denied the same protection of laws which is enjoyed
by other persons or other classes in like circumstances.99 The "equal
protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws."100
It limits governmental discrimination. The equal protection clause
extends to artificial persons but only insofar as their property is
concerned.101

The Court has explained the scope of the equal protection clause in
this wise:

It is arbitrary as it does not rest on substantial distinctions bearing a

just and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance.
What does it signify? To quote from J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Land
Tenure Administration: "The ideal situation is for the law's benefits to
be available to all, that none be placed outside the sphere of its
coverage. Only thus could chance and favor be excluded and the
affairs of men governed by that serene and impartial uniformity, which
is of the very essence of the idea of law." There is recognition,
however, in the opinion that what in fact exists "cannot approximate
the ideal. Nor is the law susceptible to the reproach that it does not
take into account the realities of the situation. The constitutional
guarantee then is not to be given a meaning that disregards what is,
what does in fact exist. To assure that the general welfare be
promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut into
the rights to liberty and property. Those adversely affected may under
such circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can
show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by
the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of
hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in
reason." Classification is thus not ruled out, it being sufficient to quote
from the Tuason decision anew "that the laws operate equally and
uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons
must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being
different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed.
Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle
is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person
under circumstances which, if not identical, are analogous. If law be
looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a
class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast
on some in the group equally binding on the rest.102

The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business
and operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of
this area. A noxious establishment does not become any less noxious
if located outside the area.

The standard "where women are used as tools for entertainment" is

e of the hinted ills the Ordinance
women have an equal propensity to engage in prostitution. It is not
any less grave a sin when men engage in it. And why would the
assumption that there is an ongoing immoral activity apply only when
women are employed and be inapposite when men are in harness?
This discrimination based on gender violates equal protection as it is
not substantially related to important government objectives.105 Thus,
the discrimination is invalid.

Failing the test of constitutionality, the Ordinance likewise failed to

pass the test of consistency with prevailing laws.

C.

The Ordinance is repugnant

to general laws; it is ultra vires

Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation. If
the classification is reasonable, the law may operate only on some and
not all of the people without violating the equal protection clause.103
The classification must, as an indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary.
To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements:

1) It must be based on substantial distinctions.

2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law.

3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only.

4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.104

In the Court's view, there are no substantial distinctions between

motels, inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar
establishments. By definition, all are commercial establishments
providing lodging and usually meals and other services for the public.
No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension
houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The
classification in the instant case is invalid as similar subjects are not
similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.

The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code as the latter merely

empowers local government units to regulate, and not prohibit, the
establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof.

The power of the City Council to regulate by ordinances the

establishment, operation, and maintenance of motels, hotels and other
similar establishments is found in Section 458 (a) 4 (iv), which
provides that:

Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The

sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general
welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this
Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as
provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:

. . .

(4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and

structures within the city in order to promote the general welfare and
for said purpose shall:

. . .

(iv) Regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes,

restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging
houses, and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and
transports . . . .

While its power to regulate the establishment, operation and

maintenance of any entertainment or amusement facilities, and to
prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment is provided
under Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code, which reads as follows:

Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The

sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general
welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this
Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as
provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:

The word "regulate," as used in subsection (l), section 2444 of the

Administrative Code, means and includes the power to control, to
govern, and to restrain; but "regulate" should not be construed as
synonymous with "suppress" or "prohibit." Consequently, under the
power to regulate laundries, the municipal authorities could make
proper police regulations as to the mode in which the employment or
business shall be exercised.107

And in People v. Esguerra,108 wherein the Court nullified an ordinance

of the Municipality of Tacloban which prohibited the selling, giving and
dispensing of liquor ratiocinating that the municipality is empowered
only to regulate the same and not prohibit. The Court therein declared
that:

(A)s a general rule when a municipal corporation is specifically given

authority or power to regulate or to license and regulate the liquor
traffic, power to prohibit is impliedly withheld.109

These doctrines still hold contrary to petitioners' assertion110 that they

were modified by the Code vesting upon City Councils prohibitory
powers.

. . .

(4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and

structures within the city in order to promote the general welfare and
for said purpose shall:

. . .

(vii) Regulate the establishment, operation, and maintenance of any

entertainment or amusement facilities, including theatrical
performances, circuses, billiard pools, public dancing schools, public
dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places for
entertainment or amusement; regulate such other events or activities
for amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend to
disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants, or require the
suspension or suppression of the same; or, prohibit certain forms of
amusement or entertainment in order to protect the social and moral
welfare of the community.

Clearly, with respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels,

inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar
establishments, the only power of the City Council to legislate relative
thereto is to regulate them to promote the general welfare. The Code
still withholds from cities the power to suppress and prohibit altogether
the establishment, operation and maintenance of such establishments.
It is well to recall the rulings of the Court in Kwong Sing v. City of
Manila106 that:

Similarly, the City Council exercises regulatory powers over public

dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and
other places for entertainment or amusement as found in the first
clause of Section 458 (a) 4 (vii). Its powers to regulate, suppress and
suspend "such other events or activities for amusement or
entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb the community
or annoy the inhabitants" and to "prohibit certain forms of amusement
or entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the
community" are stated in the second and third clauses, respectively of
the same Section. The several powers of the City Council as provided
in Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code, it is pertinent to emphasize, are
separated by semi-colons (;), the use of which indicates that the
clauses in which these powers are set forth are independent of each
other albeit closely related to justify being put together in a single
enumeration or paragraph.111 These powers, therefore, should not be
confused, commingled or consolidated as to create a conglomerated
and unified power of regulation, suppression and prohibition.112

The Congress unequivocably specified the establishments and forms of

amusement or entertainment subject to regulation among which are
beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and
other similar establishments (Section 458 (a) 4 (iv)), public dancing
schools, public dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other
places for entertainment or amusement (Section 458 (a) 4 (vii)). This
enumeration therefore cannot be included as among "other events or
activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly those which
tend to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants" or "certain
forms of amusement or entertainment" which the City Council may
suspend, suppress or prohibit.

The rule is that the City Council has only such powers as are expressly
granted to it and those which are necessarily implied or incidental to

the exercise thereof. By reason of its limited powers and the nature
thereof, said powers are to be construed strictissimi juris and any
doubt or ambiguity arising out of the terms used in granting said
powers must be construed against the City Council.113 Moreover, it is
a general rule in statutory construction that the express mention of
one person, thing, or consequence is tantamount to an express
exclusion of all others. Expressio unius est exclusio alterium. This
maxim is based upon the rules of logic and the natural workings of
human mind. It is particularly applicable in the construction of such
statutes as create new rights or remedies, impose penalties or
punishments, or otherwise come under the rule of strict
construction.114

The argument that the City Council is empowered to enact the

Ordinance by virtue of the general welfare clause of the Code and of
Art. 3, Sec. 18 (kk) of the Revised Charter of Manila is likewise without
merit. On the first point, the ruling of the Court in People v.
Esguerra,115 is instructive. It held that:

The powers conferred upon a municipal council in the general welfare

clause, or section 2238 of the Revised Administrative Code, refers to
matters not covered by the other provisions of the same Code, and
therefore it can not be applied to intoxicating liquors, for the power to
regulate the selling, giving away and dispensing thereof is granted
specifically by section 2242 (g) to municipal councils. To hold that,
under the general power granted by section 2238, a municipal council
may enact the ordinance in question, notwithstanding the provision of
section 2242 (g), would be to make the latter superfluous and
nugatory, because the power to prohibit, includes the power to
regulate, the selling, giving away and dispensing of intoxicating
liquors.

On the second point, it suffices to say that the Code being a later
expression of the legislative will must necessarily prevail and override
the earlier law, the Revised Charter of Manila. Legis posteriores priores
contrarias abrogant, or later statute repeals prior ones which are
repugnant thereto. As between two laws on the same subject matter,
which are irreconcilably inconsistent, that which is passed later
prevails, since it is the latest expression of legislative will.116 If there
is an inconsistency or repugnance between two statutes, both relating
to the same subject matter, which cannot be removed by any fair and
reasonable method of interpretation, it is the latest expression of the
legislative will which must prevail and override the earlier.117

Implied repeals are those which take place when a subsequently

enacted law contains provisions contrary to those of an existing law
but no provisions expressly repealing them. Such repeals have been
divided into two general classes: those which occur where an act is so
inconsistent or irreconcilable with an existing prior act that only one of
the two can remain in force and those which occur when an act covers
the whole subject of an earlier act and is intended to be a substitute
therefor. The validity of such a repeal is sustained on the ground that
the latest expression of the legislative will should prevail.118

In addition, Section 534(f) of the Code states that "All general and
special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof
which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly." Thus, submitting to
petitioners' interpretation that the Revised Charter of Manila empowers
the City Council to prohibit motels, that portion of the Charter stating
such must be considered repealed by the Code as it is at variance with
the latter's provisions granting the City Council mere regulatory
powers.

It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the
general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without
judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one
which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may
be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. It can not
be said that motels are injurious to the rights of property, health or
comfort of the community. It is a legitimate business. If it be a
nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for
that purpose. A motel is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary
abatement without judicial intervention.119

Notably, the City Council was conferred powers to prevent and prohibit
certain activities and establishments in another section of the Code
which is reproduced as follows:

Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The

sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general
welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this
Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as
provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:

(1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient

and effective city government, and in this connection, shall:

. . .

(v) Enact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress and impose

appropriate penalties for habitual drunkenness in public places,
vagrancy, mendicancy, prostitution, establishment and maintenance
of
houses of ill repute, gambling and other prohibited games of
chance, fraudulent devices and ways to obtain money or property,
drug addiction, maintenance of drug dens, drug pushing, juvenile
delinquency, the printing, distribution or exhibition of obscene or
pornographic materials or publications, and such other activities
inimical to the welfare and morals of the inhabitants of the city;

. . .

If it were the intention of Congress to confer upon the City Council the
power to prohibit the establishments enumerated in Section 1 of the
Ordinance, it would have so declared in uncertain terms by adding
them to the list of the matters it may prohibit under the above-quoted
Section. The Ordinance now vainly attempts to lump these
establishments with houses of ill-repute and expand the City Council's
powers in the second and third clauses of Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the
Code in an effort to overreach its prohibitory powers. It is evident that
these establishments may only be regulated in their establishment,
operation and maintenance.

It is important to distinguish the punishable activities from the

establishments themselves. That these establishments are recognized
legitimate enterprises can be gleaned from another Section of the
Code. Section 131 under the Title on Local Government Taxation
expressly mentioned proprietors or operators of massage clinics,
sauna, Turkish and Swedish baths, hotels, motels and lodging houses
as among the "contractors" defined in paragraph (h) thereof. The
same Section also defined "amusement" as a "pleasurable diversion
and entertainment," "synonymous to relaxation, avocation, pastime or
fun;" and "amusement places" to include "theaters, cinemas, concert
halls, circuses and other places of amusement where one seeks
admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or
performances." Thus, it can be inferred that the Code considers these
establishments as legitimate enterprises and activities. It is well to
recall the maxim reddendo singula singulis which means that words in
different parts of a statute must be referred to their appropriate
connection, giving to each in its place, its proper force and effect, and,
if possible, rendering none of them useless or superfluous, even if
strict grammatical construction demands otherwise. Likewise, where
words under consideration appear in different sections or are widely
dispersed throughout an act the same principle applies.120

Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs
counter to the provisions of P.D. 499. As correctly argued by MTDC,
the statute had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area
into a commercial area. The decree allowed the establishment and
operation of all kinds of commercial establishments except warehouse
or open storage depot, dump or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline
service station, light industry with any machinery or funeral
establishment. The rule is that for an ordinance to be valid and to have
force and effect, it must not only be within the powers of the council
to enact but the same must not be in conflict with or repugnant to the
general law.121 As succinctly illustrated in Solicitor General v.
Metropolitan Manila Authority:122

The requirement that the enactment must not violate existing law
explains itself. Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by
virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national
legislature (except only that the power to create their own sources of
revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). They
are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate
legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government units
cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal.
In the case before us, the enactment in question, which are merely
local in origin cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force
and effect of a statute.123

Petitioners contend that the Ordinance enjoys the presumption of

validity. While this may be the rule, it has already been held that
although the presumption is always in favor of the validity or
reasonableness of the ordinance, such presumption must nevertheless
be set aside when the invalidity or unreasonableness appears on the
face of the ordinance itself or is established by proper evidence. The
exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it
contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the
legislature, or unless it is against public policy or is unreasonable,
oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common
right.124

Conclusion

All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and

property rights and impairs personal privileges. It is constitutionally
infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and
unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit
that abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to
be forgotten, the City Council under the Code had no power to enact
the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void.

Concededly, the challenged Ordinance was enacted with the best of

motives and shares the concern of the public for the cleansing of the
Ermita-Malate area of its social sins. Police power legislation of such
our support for it. But inspite of its virtuous aims, the enactment of the
Ordinance has no statutory or constitutional authority to stand on.
Local legislative bodies, in this case, the City Council, cannot prohibit
the operation of the enumerated establishments under Section 1
thereof or order their transfer or conversion without infringing the
constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of laws

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the

Regional Trial Court declaring the Ordinance void is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
FACTS: Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation
(MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels,
motels, hostels and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court
in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with
the DOT as a hotel. On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for
Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
and/or Temporary Restraining Order7 with the lower court impleading
as defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim
(Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City Council of
Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it
includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be
declared invalid and unconstitutional.

Enacted by the City Council and approved by petitioner City Mayor, the
said Ordinance is entitled
A. The Ordinance contravenes
the Constitution
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION
OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT,
ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITAMALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision (in favour of respondent).

On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that

the following errors were committed by the lower court in its ruling:

The enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated

power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
The police power granted to LGUs must always be exercised with
utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and
equal protection of the law. Due process requires the intrinsic validity
of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty
and property.

Requisites for the valid exercise

(1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or
otherwise, unfair, unreasonable and oppressive exercise of police
power;
(2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance contravenes P.D.
499 which allows operators of all kinds of commercial establishments,
except those specified therein; and
(3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.

ISSUE: WON the ordinance is unconstitutional.

HELD: The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower court
did not err in declaring the Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires and
therefore null and void.

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of

decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only
be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact
and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it
must also conform to the following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;

of Police Power are not met

To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for

the enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of
constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require an interference with private rights, but the means adopted
must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.60 It must be evident that
no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less
intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable relation must exist
between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed
for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the
public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property
will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.

Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall

of the due process clause.

The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and

protection of the social and moral values of the community. Granting
for the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are
within the scope of the City Councils police powers, the means
employed for the accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and
unduly oppressive.

(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;

(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its
police power, an enactment of the City Council acting as agent of
Congress. This delegated police power is found in Section 16 of the
LGC, known as the general welfare clause.
The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the
exercise of such delegated power.

The worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the
communitys social ills can be achieved through means less restrictive
of private rights; it can be attained by reasonable restrictions rather
than by an absolute prohibition. The closing down and transfer of
businesses or their conversion into businesses allowed under the
Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its
purposes. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated
establishments will not per se protect and promote the social and
moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself eradicate the

alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest

the spread of sexual disease in Manila.

The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are not per
se offensive to the moral welfare of the community. While a motel may
be used as a venue for immoral sexual activity, it cannot for that
reason alone be punished. It cannot be classified as a house of illrepute or as a nuisance per se on a mere likelihood or a naked
assumption.

If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution,

fornication and other social ills, it can instead impose reasonable
regulations such as daily inspections of the establishments for any
violation of the conditions of their licenses or permits; it may exercise
its authority to suspend or revoke their licenses for these violations;
and it may even impose increased license fees. In other words, there
are other means to reasonably accomplish the desired end.

It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for

the achievement of its purposes, the governmental interference itself,
infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a persons fundamental
right to liberty and property.

Modality employed is
unlawful taking

It is an ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that

it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation
and must be recognized as a taking of the property without just
compensation.78 It is intrusive and violative of the private property
rights of individuals.

There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A

possessory taking occurs when the government confiscates or
physically occupies property. A regulatory taking occurs when the
governments regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use
of the property.

What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that

government regulation is a taking if it leaves no reasonable
economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with
reasonable expectations for use. When the owner of real property has
been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the
name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically
idle, he has suffered a taking.

Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of

business allowable within the area. The directive to wind up business
operations amounts to a closure of the establishment, a permanent
deprivation of property, and is practically confiscatory. Unless the
owner converts his establishment to accommodate an allowed
business, the structure which housed the previous business will be left
empty and gathering dust. It is apparent that the Ordinance leaves no
reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that
interferes with reasonable expectations for use.

Ermitaconfiscatory as well. The penalty of permanent closure in cases of

subsequent violations found in Section 4 of the Ordinance is also
equivalent to a taking of private property.

Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning

ordinance. A zoning ordinance, although a valid exercise of police
power, which limits a wholesome property to a use which can not
reasonably be made of it constitutes the taking of such property
without just compensation. Private property which is not noxious nor
intended for noxious purposes may not, by zoning, be destroyed
without compensation. Such principle finds no support in the principles
of justice as we know them. The police powers of local government
units which have always received broad and liberal interpretation
cannot be stretched to cover this particular taking.

Further, The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and

unrestricted power to close down establishments. Ordinances such as
this, which make possible abuses in its execution, depending upon no
conditions or qualifications whatsoever other than the unregulated
arbitrary will of the city authorities as the touchstone by which its
validity is to be tested, are unreasonable and invalid. The Ordinance
should have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement
could be secured. Similarly, the Ordinance does not specify the
standards to ascertain which establishments tend to disturb the
community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social
and moral welfare of the community.

The cited case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for lack of
comprehensible standards to guide the law enforcers in carrying out its
provisions.

Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated

establishments without infringing the due process clause. These lawful
establishments may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on
their business.

B. The Ordinance violates Equal

Protection Clause

The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the prohibited

establishments three (3) months from its approval within which to
wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the

In the Courts view, there are no substantial distinctions between

motels, inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar

establishments. By definition, all are commercial establishments

providing lodging and usually meals and other services for the public.
No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension
houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The
classification in the instant case is invalid as similar subjects are not
similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
It is arbitrary as it does not rest on substantial distinctions bearing a
just and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance.

The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business
and operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of
this area. A noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if
located outside the area.

The standard where women are used as tools for entertainment is

women have an equal propensity to engage in prostitution. Thus, the

discrimination is invalid.

C. The Ordinance is repugnant

to general laws; it is ultra vires

The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code (Sec 458) as the latter

merely empowers local government units to regulate, and not prohibit,
the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof.

With respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns,

pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar establishments, the
only power of the City Council to legislate relative thereto is to regulate
them to promote the general welfare. The Code still withholds from
cities the power to suppress and prohibit altogether the establishment,
operation and maintenance of such establishments.

It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the
general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without
judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one
which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may
be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. It can not
be said that motels are injurious to the rights of property, health or
comfort of the community. It is a legitimate business. If it be a
nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for
that purpose. A motel is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary
abatement without judicial intervention.

Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs
counter to the provisions of P.D. 499. As correctly argued by MTDC,
the statute had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area
into a commercial area. The decree allowed the establishment and
operation of all kinds of commercial establishments except warehouse
or open storage depot, dump or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline

service station, light industry with any machinery or funeral

establishment. The rule is that for an ordinance to be valid and to have
force and effect, it must not only be within the powers of the council
to enact but the same must not be in conflict with or repugnant to the
general law.

Conclusion
All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and
property rights and impairs personal privileges. It is constitutionally
infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and
unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit
that abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to
be forgotten, the City Council under the Code had no power to enact
the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void.