Professional Documents
Culture Documents
real properties in the Philippines. His forced heirs were his widow Helen
Meyers Guzman, and his son David Rey Guzman, both of whom are also
American citizens. On 9 August 1989, Helen executed a deed of quitclaim
assigning, ansferring and conveying to David Rey all her rights, titles and
interests in and over six parcels of land they inherited from Simeon.
Subsequent thereto, a new TCT was issued in the name of David Rey. On
5 February 1991, David Rey Guzman sold the land to Emiliano Cataniag.
Celso and Arthur Halili, who are owners of the adjoining lot, filed a
complaint questioning the constitutionality and validity of the two
conveyances between Helen Guzman and David Rey Guzman and between
David Rey Guzman and Emiliano Cataniag. They also claimed ownership
over the land.
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by
the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural
resources shall not be alienated.
We are limiting now to our discussion with the exception-the agricultural lands
because ito lang ang pwedeng ma alienate. We are talking now with concession,
modes of disposition so of course agricultural lands lang ang pwede.
4 MODES OF CONCESSION OF PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LANDS:
1) Homestead
2) Sale
3) Lease
4) Confirmation of Imperfect Title
a) Judicial
b) Administrative
By Public Land as contemplated in CA 141, we mean that lands of the public
domain as such subject to alienation and disposal of the State in accordance
with CA 141.
HOMESTEAD
It is defined as the house and the adjoining land where the head of the
family dwells. It can be the fixed residence of the head of the family with
the land and building surrounding the main house. We will differentiate
that with the usual understanding of family home under the Civil Code.
P U RP OS E . According to the Supreme Court in Jocson v. Soriano, it is to
provide a home for each citizen of the Government, where his family may
shelter and live beyond the reach of financial misfortune, and to inculcate
in individuals those feelings of independence which are essential to the
maintenance of three institutions.
homestead.
EXCEPTIONS:
1) if the married woman has been living separately from her
husband and not dependent upon him for support;
2) if the husband is insane or incapacitated; or
3) the husband is in imprison serving a term as such duration as to
prevent him from complying with the requirements of the law
requiring the residence and the cultivation requirements.
WHAT IF THE PROPERTY HAS ALREADY BEEN REGISTERED OR BROUGHT INTO THE
APPLICATION OF THE TORRENS SYSTEM OF REGISTRATION IN FAVOR OF A PERSON
WHO HAS VIOLATED SECTION 118? CAN THE GOVERNMENT INSTITUTE AN ACTION
FOR RECONVEYANCE, FOR EXAMPLE?
Yes. Even if it was already registered to another person.
WHAT IF IT WAS SOLD DURING THE 5-YEAR PROHIBITORY PERIOD BUT IT WAS MADE
TO APPEAR IN THE DOCUMENT THAT IT WAS MADE AFTER THE PROHIBITORY PERIOD?
It would still be prohibited. Section 118 is strictly construed.
Absolutely no alienation or encumbrance.
The answer would be different if falls under the situation wherein
it only need the approval by the Director of Lands. Take note of the
phrasing in Section 118, the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Commerce shall not be denied except on two grounds:
1. Constitutional; and
2. Legal grounds
THE
WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE APPROVAL BY THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS? SO, AFTE R
THE 5-YEAR PROHIBITORY PERIOD?
This requirement is merely directory. It is merely a formality and
the sale, alienation, or encumbrance is not rendered null and void
by the mere failure to obtain the required approval.
Section 22. Any citizen of lawful age of the Philippines, and any
such citizen not of lawful age who is a head of a family, and any
corporation or association of which at least sixty per centum of
the capital stock or of any interest in said capital stock belongs
wholly to citizens of the Philippines, and which is organized and
constituted under the laws of Philippines, and corporate bodies
organized in the Philippines authorized under their charters to do
so; may purchase any tract of public agricultural land disposable
under this Act, not to exceed one hundred and forty-four hectares
in the case of an individual and one thousand and twenty-four
hectares in that of a corporation or association, by proceeding as
prescribed in this chapter: Provided, That partnerships shall be
entitled to purchase not to exceed one hundred and forty-four
hectares for each member thereof. But the total area so
purchased shall in no case exceed the one thousand and twentyfour hectares authorized in this section for associations and
corporations.
There are two personalities that may be qualified to apply for sales patent:
1. Filipino citizens of legal age who is the head of the family; and
2. Any corporation or association of which is owned by 60% Filipino
citizens
Take note in Section 118, CA 141 impliedly permits alienation after the 5-year
prohibitory period. But in line with the purpose to favor the homesteader and
his family, the law itself provides for a longer right of redemption in Section
119.
Note that this right of redemption is not waivable. It prevails even if you waive
a portion of it.
Filing of Application
Appraisal
Publication and Posting of the notice of sale
5.
6.
7.
Submission of Bids
The amount would be 10% of the bid and the bid price
must not be less than the appraised value of the land
Opening of the bids
Award
When there are two or more equal bids, the law grants
in favor of the applicants
Same with other modes of concession, under CA 141 there is always this
cultivation requirement. For a sales patent, you need to have at least 1/5 of
the land which has to be cultivated within 5 years from the date of the award.
Before the issuance of the actual patent, the purchaser must show actual
occupancy, cultivation, and improvement of at least 1/5 of the land applied
until the date wherein the final payment is made.
The approval of the Sales Application merely authorizes the applicant to take
possession of the land so that he can comply with the requirements before a
final patent can be issued in his favor.
CAN THE SALES PATENT APPLICANT ENGAGE THE SERVICES OF ANOTHER OR AGREED
WITH ANOTHER PERSON AS TO THE CULTIVATION OF THE LAND?
Under PD 152 March 13, 1973 Prohibiting the Employment Or Use
Of Share Tenants In Complying With Requirements Of Law Regarding
Entry, Occupation, Improvement And Cultivation Of Public Lands. It
is not allowed.
this Act shall not include nor convey the title to any gold, silver,
copper, iron, or other metals or minerals, or other substances
containing minerals, guano, gums, precious stones, coal, or coal
oil contained in lands granted thereunder. These shall remain to
be property of the State.
Sec. 112. Said land shall further be subject to a right-of-way not
It is the same with Sales Patent, the procedure etc., only that the mode is lease.
QUALIFICATIONS :
Section 33. Any citizen of lawful age of the Philippines, and any
TWO MODES:
1.
2.
REPUBLIC VS RIZALVO
On Dec 7, 2000, respondent Teodoro P. Rizalvo, Jr. filed before the MTC
of Bauang, La Union, acting as a land registration court, an application fo
r the registration of a parcel of land, located in Bauang, La Union.
Respondent alleged thathe is the owner in fee simple of the subject parcel
of land, that he obtained title over theland by virtue of a Deed of
Transfer dated December 31, 1962, and that he is currentlyin possession
of the land. In support of his claim, he presented, among others,
TaxDeclaration for the year 1994 in his name, and Proof of Payment of
real property taxesbeginning in 1952 up to the time of filing of the
application.
On April 20, 2001, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed an
Opposition. TheMTC of Bauang, La Union, acting as a land registration
court, rendered its Decision,approving respondents application. The
Republic of the Philippines through the OSGfiled a Notice of Appeal.
WAS THERE AN EXPRESS DECLARATION FROM THE STATE THAT THE LANDS ARE
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE?
No. Respondent merely presented a certification and report from
the DENR-CENRO dated July 17, 2001 certifying that the land in
question entirely falls within the alienable and disposable zone
since January 21, 1987; that it has not been earmarked for public
use; and that it does not encroach any area devoted to general
public use. Unfortunately, such certification and report is not
enough in order to commence the thirty (30)-year prescriptive
period under Section 14 (2). There is no evidence in this case
indicating any express declaration by the state that the subject
land is no longer intended for public service or the development of
the national wealth.
Even assuming arguendo that the DENR-CENRO certification and
report is enough to signify that the land is no longer intended for
public service or the development of the national wealth,
respondent is still not entitled to registration because the land was
certified as alienable and disposable in 1987, while the application
for registration was filed on December 7, 2000, a mere thirteen
(13) years after and far short of the required thirty (30) years
under existing laws on prescription.
years; and since Tax Declaration No. 4627 was issued in the year
1948, it can be presupposed that Tax Declaration No. 2948 was
issued in the year 1944.
RTC granted the application of the spouses Tan.
CA granted the appeal of the Republic, and reversing and setting aside
the Decision of the RTC on the ground that the spouses Tan failed to
comply with Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise
known as the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1073, which requires possession of the subject property to start on or
prior to 12 June 1945. Hence, the appellate court ordered the spouses
Tan to return the subject property to the Republic.
Whether or not Sps Tan have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject property, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since [12 June 1945], or
earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title.
NEGATIVE. The spouses Tan filed their Application for Registration of Title
to the subject property in the year 2000 generally invoking the provisions
of Act No. 496 and/or Section 48 of CA No. 141, as amended.
Two requisites which the applicants must comply with for the grant of
their Application for Registration of Title are: (1) the land applied for is
alienable and disposable ; and (2) the applicants and their predecessors-
In the case at bar, the spouses Tan presented a Certification from the
DENR-CENRO, dated 14 August 2000, to prove the alienability and
disposability of the subject property. The said Certification stated that
the subject property became alienable and disposable on 31 December
1925. A certification from the DENR that a lot is alienable and disposable
is sufficient to establish the true nature and character of the property
and enjoys a presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory
evidence.
The spouses Tan, however, failed to satisfactorily establish compliance
with the second requisite for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete title, i.e. , open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject property since 12 June 1945
or earlier.
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act has been amended several times:
The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for possession
and occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26,
1894. This was superseded by R.A. No. 1942, which provided for
a simple thirty-year prescriptive period of occupation by an
applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The same,
however, has already been amended by Presidential Decree 1073,
approved on January 25, 1977. As amended, Section 48(b) now
reads:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessorsin- interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain,under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
LUNINGNING VS REPUBLIC
08 Jan 1998, PETs filed an application for registration of land under (PD)
No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. They
alleged that they acquired the Subject Property by purchase, and that
they, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest, had
been in actual, continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, and adverse
possession of the Subject Property in the concept of owner for more that
30 years.
The history of possession of the Subject Property back to 1958, when the
Subject Property was first declared for tax purposes by Justina Hintog.
Teodoro Calanog came into possession of the Subject Property in 1968. In
the same year, the Subject Property was transferred to spouses Alfredo
Tonido and Agatona Calanog. Agatona Calanog allegedly inherited the
Subject Property from Teodoro Calanog, her father; on the other hand ,
Alfredo Tonido supposedly purchased the same property also from
Teodoro Calanog, his father-in-law. Alfredo Tonido planted the Subject
Property with palay, sayote, coffee, guyabano and other fruit bearing
trees. After the demise of Agatona Calanog, the rest of the Tonido family,
consisting of Alfredo and his children, Samuel, Elizabeth, Benjamin, Imelda
and Esther, shared possession of the Subject Property.
21 Nov 1995, the Tonido family sold the Subject Property to PETs.
The history of possession of the Subject Property, as related above, was
supported by tax declarations in the name of petitioners and their
predecessors-in-interest from 1958 to 1998.
TC approved PETs application for registration of the Subject Property.
REPUBLIC: TC erred in approving the application for registration despite
petitioners failure to prove open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the Subject Property since 12 June 1945,
or earlier, as required by Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended by PD No. 1073. PETs also failed to produce muniments of title
to tack their possession to those of their predecessors-in-interest in
compliance with the prescriptive period required by law.
CA dismissed the application for registration.
PETs: they are entitled to confirmation and registration of their title to
the Subject Property in accordance with Section 14 of the Property
Registration Decree, although they had not identified under which
specific paragraph of the said Section.
alienable public land; and (2) his open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the same must either be since
time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act.
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by PD No. 1073,
presently requires, for judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete
title, the possession and occupation of the piece of land by the applicants,
by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, since 12 June
1945 or earlier. This provision is in total conformity with Section 14(1)
of the Property Registration Decree heretofore cited.
In the case at bar, the CA correctly ruled that PETs have failed to comply
with the period of possession and occupation of the Subject Property, as
required by both the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land
Act. In its decision, the Court of Appeals held that
The earliest period that the applicants could claim ownership over the
property is in 1958, which is the earliest date Justina Hintog, the
previous owner/occupant, declared the property for taxation purposes.
This is far later than June 12, 1945, the date prescribed by law that the
applicants possession under claim of ownership should have begun at the
latest.
IN ALL:
(1) Section 44 of the Public Land Act, as amended by RA No. 6940,
which provides for a prescriptive period of thirty (30) years
possession, applies only to applications for free patents;
(2) The case at bar is a judicial application for confirmation of an
imperfect or incomplete title over the Subject Property covered
by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act; and
(3) Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act requires for judicial
confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title the continuous
possession of the land since 12 June 1945, or earlier, which
petitioners herein failed to comply with.
Both are against the whole world, both take the nature of judicial
proceedings, and the decree of registration issued for both is conclusive and
final
GOAL: a Torrens title, which aims at complete extinguishment, once and for
all, of rights adverse to the record title
Who -between the RCAM and Cresencia -is entitled to the benefits of C.A.
No. 141 and Presidential Decree No. 1529 for confirmation and
registration of imperfect title?
NONE.
Since the RCAM filed its application on September 15, 1966 and its
amended application on October 4, 1974, Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141,
as amended by R.A. No. 1942 (which then required possession of thirty
years), governs.
The RCAM failed to prove possession of the property in the manner and
for the period required by law.
First, the tax declarations issued in the RCAM's name in 1948, 1966,
1977, 1984, 1990, 1993 and 1999 did not in any way prove the character
of its possession over the property. The declaration for taxation
purposes of property in the names of applicants for registration or of
their predecessors-in-interest may constitute collaborating evidence
only when coupled with other acts of possession and ownership; standing
alone, it is inconclusive.
While the RCAM asserts that it had been in possession of the property
since the Spanish time, the earliest tax declaration that it could present
was that issued in 1948. Also, when it filed its application in 1966 and
its amended application in 197 4, the RCAM presented only two tax
declarations (issued in 1948 and 1966) covering the property. And since
then, up to the issuance of the January 17, 2005 decision of the R TC, the
RCAM presented only five other tax declarations -those issued in 1977,
1984, 1990, 1993 and 1999.
Second, even if we were to consider the RCAM' s tax declarations as basis
for inferring possession, the RCAM still failed to prove actual possession
of the property for the required duration. As already noted, the earliest
tax declaration that it presented was for 1948. RCAM first declared the
property in its name only in 1948 as this tax declaration does not appear
to have cancelled any previously-issued tax declaration. Thus, when it
filed its application in 1966, it was in possession of the property for only
eighteen years, counted from 1948. Even if we were to count the
possession period from the filing of its amended application in 1974, its
alleged possession (which was only for twenty-six years counted from
1948) would still be short of the thirty-year period required by Section
48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended by RA No. 1942.
Third, the amended plan Psu-223919, technical description for Lots 1 and
2, and surveyor s certificate only prove the identity of the property that
the RCAM sought to register in its name.
Fourth, the RCAM did not build any permanent structure or any other
improvement that clearly announces its claim of ownership over the
property.. The "bahay ni Maria" where the RCAM conducts its fiestarelated and Lenten activities could hardly satisfy the possession
requirement of C.A. No. 141. As found out by the CA, this structure was
constructed only in 1991 and not at the time of, or prior to, the filing of
its application in 1966.
The RCAM failed to prove that the property is alienable and disposable
land of the public domain.
RCAM was bound to establish "the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute." It could have also
secured a certification from the government that the property applied for
was alienable and disposable.
We also find insufficient the evidence that Cresencia presented to prove
her claimed possession of the property in the manner and for the period
required by C.A. No. 141.
Cresencia was bound to adduce evidence that irrefutably proves her
compliance with the requirements for confirmation of title. To our mind,
she also failed to discharge this burden of proof.
First, the various pieces of documentary evidence that Cresencia
presented to support her own claim of imperfect title hardly proved her
alleged actual possession of the property. Specifically, the certificates of
marriage, birth and death did not particularly state that each of these
certified events, i.e. marriage, birth and death, in fact transpired on the
claimed property; at best, the certificates proved the occurrence of these
events in Bagumbayan, Taguig, Rizal and on the stated dates,
respectively.
The presence on the property, as shown by photographs, of Cresencia s
daughter, of the two bancas owned by her family, and of the pile of gravel
and sand they allegedly used in their gravel and sand business also hardly
count as acts of occupation, development or maintenance that could have
been sufficient as proof of actual possession. The presence of these
objects and of Cresencias daughter on the property was obviously
transient and impermanent; at most, they proved that Cresencia and her
family used the property for a certain period of time, albeit, briefly and
temporarily.
Finally, the records show that the La Compania Refreshment Store
business (that they allegedly conducted on the property) actually stood
on their titled lot adjoining the property.
Second, while Cresencia registered in her name the adjoining lot (which
they had been occupying at the time the RCAM filed its application and
where their La Compania Refreshment Store stood), she never had the
property registered in her name. Neither did Cresencia or her
predecessors-in-interest declare the property for taxation purposes nor
had the property surveyed in their names to properly identify it and to
specifically determine its metes and bounds. The declaration for taxation
purposes of property in their names would have at least served as proof
that she or her predecessors-in-interest had a claim over the property
that could be labeled as "possession" if coupled with proof of actual
possession.
22 June 1957
30-year period
25 January 1877
11 June 1978
2000
12 JUNE 1945
OR EARLIER
JAN 1998
12 JUNE 1945
OR EARLIER
15 SEPT 1966
30-YEAR
PERIOD
REPUBLIC VS DE GUZMAN
Conflicting applications for confirmation of imperfect title were filed by
Norma Almanzor and Salvador De Guzman over parcels of land located in
Silang, Cavite.
TC denied the application for registration of the parcels of land mentioned
therein by applicant Norma R. Almanzor while approved the application of
De Guzman.
CA affirmed the decision.
Almeda vs. Court of Appeals: "The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that
the private respondents had not qualified for a grant under Section 48( b)
of the Public Land Act because their possession of the land while it was
still inalienable forest land, or before it was declared alienable and
disposable land of the public domain on January 13, 1968, could not ripen
into private ownership, and should be excluded from the computation of
the 30-year open and continuous possession in concept of
owner required under Section 48(b) of Com. Act 141. 'Unless and until
the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that
effect so that it may form part of the disposable lands of the public
domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply .
Thus possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership.
Prior to its declaration as alienable land in 1965, any occupation or
possession thereon cannot be considered in the counting of the thirty
year possession requirement.
While we acknowledge the Court of Appeals' finding that private
respondents and their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession
of the subject land for sixty three (63) years at the time of the
application of their petition, our hands are tied by the applicable laws and
jurisprudence in giving practical relief to them. The fact remains that from
the time the subject land was declared alienable until the time of their
application, private respondents' occupation thereof was only twenty six
(26) years. We cannot consider their thirty seven (37) years of
possession prior to the release of the land as alienable because absent
the fact of declassification prior to the possession and cultivation in good
faith by petitioner, the property occupied by him remained classified as
forest or timberland, which he could not have acquired by
prescription. Further, jurisprudence is replete with cases which reiterate
that forest lands or forest reserves are not capable of private
appropriation and possession thereof, however long, cannot convert
them into private property. Possession of the land by private
respondents, whether spanning decades or centuries, could never ripen
into ownership.
REPUBLIC V. NAGUIT
W/N it is necessary under section 14(1) of PD 1529 that the subject land
shall be classified as alienable and disposable before the applicants
possession under a bonafide claim of ownership could start.
Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it
merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable
and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed.
If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it
proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the
presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize
the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State
irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith.
However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and
disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the
part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
Atty. Tan: Basically in this case, what was applied was the classification that
the land is alienable and disposable at the time of applicatio n. So it is a relax
application of section 14(1).
DIS TIN C TI ON B E T WE EN N AG UI T AN D HE RB I E TO
PEOPLE V. HERBIETO
Any period of possession prior to the date when the subject Lots were
classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be
excluded from the computation of the period of possessi on; such
possession can never ripen into ownership and unless the land had been
classified as alienable and disposable, the rules on confirmation of
imperfect title shall not apply thereto.
In Naguit, the classification is only needed at the time the application for
registration was filed. The qualifying word since June 12, 1945 or simplistic
30 years is only to the occupation, not to really of the classification of
alienability. While in Herbieto, take note of section 4w. We mentioned about
the periods depending at the time where the application was filed. Kung alin sa
3 periods (CA 141- since July 26, 1894; RA 1942- 30 years; and PD1073- since
June 12, 1945) ang applicable. So in that particular case, ang period applicable
is June12, 1945. Naguit is saying that the period or simplistic 30 years
(e) The alleged absurdity of the law addresses the wisdom of the law
and is a matter for the Legislature, not for this Court, to address.
FA C TS TO P RO VE
1.
2.
Agricultural
Timber
Mineral
Agricultural
Industrial
Residential
Resettlement
Mineral
Timber or forest
Grazing land
Agricultural
Timber or forest
Mineral
National parks
Note : RA 9176 has extended the filing of applications for judicial confirmation
of imperfect title. The applicable period as of now is December 31, 2020.
AMINISTRTIVA LEGALIZATION
SEC 44. Any natural born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of more
than twelve hectares who for at least thirty years has continuously occupied
and cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, a
tract or tracts of agricultural public lands subject to disposition
Just take note that possession and occupation requirement that at least 30
years, that is the main difference of administrative legalization.
Although the right to a balanced and healthful ecology as stated here in the
Philippine Constitution is found in the State Policies, not really entered in the
Bill of Right, they are enforceable by themselves. In the Oposa case, it was
stated that it may not be written in the Philippine Constitution to be
enforceable because it is very fundamental.
After the pronouncement in 1993 of the case of Oposa, another landmark case
in 2008 is the Metro Manila Development Authority vs. Concerned Citizens of
Manila Bay, better known as the Manila Bay clean-up case. This is the first time
that a continuing mandamus was issued even before the enactment of the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases providing for the issuance of
continuing mandamus.
Before, it was asked in the bar what is a continuing mandamus with reference
to this case. But now, its different because it was specifically provided in the
Rules which was enacted on April 13, 2010 in the exercise of the Supreme Court
of its extra-ordinary constitutional powers in promulgating the said rules. It is
said that there is no other country, even the United States of America, who has
come up with this type of procedural rules. So this is the first in the world. So
after the enactment in 2010, several justices were occasionally invited to talk
about how the Supreme Court of the Philippines came up with these particular
rules specifically to govern environmental cases.
The problem with the other countries is that they have no particular provisions
in their respective constitution as to the right to the promulgation of their own
set of rules as opposed to our 1987 constitution where it is specifically
provided.
Also, there is now a specific provision on citizen suit. Meaning you can
sue as a citizen.
Part II (Civil Procedure), Rule 2 (Pleadings and Parties), Section 5. Citizen suit.
Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or
Recall also in your constitutional law that you have this exception that
if you are suing as a taxpayer etc. etc. pwede diba. Pero here, it is
really not difficult to prove your standing as long as it is really and
environmental case because the rules itself provides for the liberal
interpretation on the requirement of legal standing. So the rules
specifically provides for citizen suit which is not really in other
instances except for a few laws enacted before the rules which
provides for citizen suit. For example, Clean Air Act, Ecological Solid
Waste Management Act, wherein may special provisions na talaga on a
citizen suit. Yung citizen suit provided in the rules will apply to all
other environmental cases na hindi Clean Air Act, Ecological Solid
Waste Management Act because prior to the enactment of the rules
may specific provision na ang citizen suit.
Part II (Civil Procedure), Rule 2 (Pleadings and Parties), Section 4. Who may file.
Any real party in interest, including the government and juridical entities
authorized by law, may file a civil action involving the enforcement or violation
of any environmental law.
What do you recall about locus standi in your constitutional law? What
are the requisites for judicial review? If you recall in your cases in your
constitutional law, there were instances wherein the requisites were
not complied with because of the strict requirement on legal standing.
Meaning, you must be injured. There is this requirement of injury as to
you. However, when it comes to environmental cases, the rules itself
provide that there is a liberal interpretation of your legal standing. You
Part II (Civil Procedure), Rule 2 (Pleadings and Parties), Section 6. Service of the
complaint on the government or its agencies. - Upon the filing of the complaint,
allowed:
(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint;
(b) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(c) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, except to file answer, the
extension not to exceed fifteen (15) days;
(d) Motion to declare the defendant in default;
(e) Reply and rejoinder; and
(f) Third party complaint.
There are also special civil actions provided under the rules. This is
over and above our usual special civil actions when we reach third
year. One would be the writ of kalikasan. You study and memorize
how it is defined in the rules because you cannot find it anywhere.
Part III (Special Civil Actions), Rule 7 (Writ Of Kalikasan),Section 1. Nature of
the writ. - The writ is a remedy available to a natural or juridical person, entity
(d) Environmental protection order (EPO) refers to an order issued by the court
directing or enjoining any person or government agency to perform or desist
from performing an act in order to protect, preserve or rehabilitate the
environment.
Precautionary principle states that when human activities may lead to threats
among others, may be considered: (1) threats to human life or health; (2)
inequity to present or future generations; or (3) prejudice to the enviro nment
without legal consideration of the environmental rights of those affected.
Code of 1991; R.A. No. 7161, Tax Laws Incorporated in the Revised
Forestry Code and Other Environmental Laws (Amending the NIRC); R.A.
No. 7308, Seed Industry Development Act of 1992; R.A. No. 7900, High Value Crops Development
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases Act; R.A. No. 8048, Coconut
Preservation Act; R.A. No. 8435, Agriculture and Fisheries Modernizat ion Act of
1997; R.A. No. 9522, The Philippine Archipelagic Baselines Law; R.A. No. 9593,
Renewable Energy Act of 2008; R.A. No. 9637, Philippine Biofuels Act; and other
existing laws that relate to the conservation, development, preservation,
protection and utilization of the environment and natural resources.
C O NS EN T DE C RE E (SU P RA )
Part II (Civil Procedure), Rule 3 (Pre-Trial), Section 5. Pre-trial conference;
consent decree. - The judge shall put the parties and their counsels under oath,
and they shall remain under oath in all pre-trial conferences.
The judge shall exert best efforts to persuade the parties to arrive
at a settlement of the dispute. The judge may issue a consent decree approving
the agreement between the parties in accordance with law, morals, public order
and public policy to protect the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology.
Evidence not presented during the pre-trial, except newlydiscovered evidence, shall be deemed waived.
P R E CA U TI ON A RY P R IN CIP L E (S UP R A )
S T R A TE GI C L A WS UI T A G AINS T PUB LI C P A R TI CIP A TIO N
( S L APP ) a special affirmative defense in addition to those provided
in Civil Procedure.
Part I, Rule 1 (General Provisions), Section 4. Definition Of Terms. (g) Strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) refers to
an action whether civil, criminal or administrative, brought against any person,
institution or any government agency or local government unit or its officials
and employees, with the intent to harass, vex, exert undue pressure or stifle
any legal recourse that such person, institution or government agency has
taken or may take in the enforcement of environmental laws, protection of the
environment or assertion of environmental rights.
V E RI FI ED C O MP LA IN T
Part II (Civil Procedure), Rule 2 (Pleadings and Parties), Section 3. Verified
complaint. The verified complaint shall contain the names of the parties,
their addresses, the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for.
The plaintiff shall attach to the verified complaint all evidence
proving or supporting the cause of action consisting of the affidavits of
witnesses, documentary evidence and if possible, object evidence. The
affidavits shall be in question and answer form and shall comply with the rules
of admissibility of evidence.
The complaint shall state that it is an environmental case and the
law involved. The complaint shall also include a certification against forum
shopping. If the complaint is not an environmental complaint, the presiding
judge shall refer it to the executive judge for re-raffle.
C I TIZ EN S UI T (S U P RA )
T E PO A N D EPO (S UP R A ) take note that it is exempt from the
posting of a bond as opposed to your normal writs.
P A YM EN T O F FI LI NG AN D O TH E R L EG A L F EES it is deferred
until judgement unless the plaintiff is allowed to litigate as indigent
in which case, he will not pay the fees.
Part II (Civil Procedure), Rule 2 (Pleadings and Parties), Section 12. Payment of
filing and other legal fees. - The payment of filing and other legal fees by the
plaintiff shall be deferred until after judgment unless the plaintiff is allowed to
litigate as an indigent. It shall constitute a first lien on the judgment award.
For a citizen suit, the court shall defer the payment of filing a nd
other legal fees that shall serve as first lien on the judgment award.
SLAPP shall be resolved within thirty (30) days after the summary hearing. If
the court dismisses the action, the court may award damages, attorneys fees
and costs of suit under a counterclaim if such has been filed. The dismissal shall
be with prejudice.
If the court rejects the defense of a SLAPP, the evidence adduced during the
summary hearing shall be treated as evidence of the parties on the merits of
the case. The action shall proceed in accordance with the Rules of Court.
Part III (Special Civil Actions), Rule 7 (Writ of Kalikasan), Section 3. Where to
file. - The petition shall be filed with the Supreme Court or with any of the
stations of the Court of Appeals.
ii.
R U L ES 6 ON S L APP
Part II (Civil Procedure), Rule 6 (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation)
action filed to harass, vex, exert undue pressure or stifle any legal recourse
that any person, institution or the government has taken or may take in the
enforcement of environmental laws, protection of the environment or assertion
of environmental rights shall be treated as a SLAPP and shall be governed by
these Rules.
Part III (Special Civil Actions), Rule 7 (Writ of Kalikasan), Section 5. Issuance of
the writ. - Within three (3) days from the date of filing of the petition, if the
petition is sufficient in form and substance, the court shall give an order: (a)
issuing the writ; and (b) requiring the respondent to file a verified return as
provided in Section 8 of this Rule. The clerk of court shall forthwith issue the
writ under the seal of the court including the issuance of a cease and desist
order and other temporary reliefs effective until further order.
iii.
Part III (Special Civil Actions), Rule 7 (Writ of Kalikasan), Section 8. Return of
respondent; contents. - Within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days after
service of the writ, the respondent shall file a verified return which shall
contain all defenses to show that respondent did not violate or threaten to
violate, or allow the violation of any environmental law, rule or regulation or
commit any act resulting to environmental damage of such magnitude as to
prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or
provinces.
Where filed
Part III (Special Civil Actions), Rule 8 (Writ of Continuing Mandamus), Section 2.
Where to file the petition. - The petition shall be filed with the Regional Trial
Court exercising jurisdiction over the territory where the actionable neglect or
omission occurred or with the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court.
ii.
No docket fees
Part III (Special Civil Actions), Rule 8 (Writ of Continuing Mandamus), Section
3. No docket fees. - The petitioner shall be exempt from the payment of
docket fees.
SECTION 53. It shall be lawful for the Director of Lands, whenever in the
opinion of the President the public interests shall require it, to cause to be
filed in the proper Court of First Instance, through the Solicitor
General or the officer acting in his stead, a petition against the holder,
claimant, possessor, or occupant of any land who shall not have voluntarily
come in under the provisions of this chapter or of the Land Registration Act,
stating in substance that the title of such holder, claimant, possessor, or
occupant is open to discussion; or that the boundaries of any such land
which has not been brought into court as aforesaid are open to question;
or that it is advisable that the title to such lands be settled and adjudicated,
and praying that the title to any such land or the boundaries thereof or the
right to occupancy thereof be settled and adjudicated. The judicial
proceedings under this section shall be in accordance with the laws on
adjudication of title in cadastral proceedings.
Under Cadastral registration, it is the government or the State that
initiates the case. It is one way of compelling all the claimants to
litigate against one another regarding their respective claims of
ownership. As opposed to any other act of transfer for example
Judicial Confirmation, and there is an oppositor, dito, if we are talking
about cadastral registration, it is the government which initiated the
cadastral case and all the claimants will litigate and prove their claims
of ownership. The aim of this procedure is:
1) to settle all disputes over the land;
2) and to remove all clouds over land titles as far as practicable
Today, the applicable law regarding cadastral poceeding is Property
Registration Decree. So, it has no separate title cadastral registration
proceedings as opposed before, that there was a separate cadastral
act for the process for registration but now it is provided under
Property Registration Decree.
SECTION 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the
public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor-
General or the officer acting in his stead , in the proper courts, in the name
of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.
Differentiate an action Reversion vs an action for nullity . Nullity in a
generic sense (relating to patent or certificate of title), you want it to
be nullified. The distinction lies with the allegations in the complaint.
In the action for Reversion, it could admit that it is owned by the state.
There is an admission that the disputed land is owned by the
government. In an action for nullity, the allegation in the complaint is
that, the plaintiff would allege ownership prior to the issuance of the
patent or certificate of title. The real party in interest in that case is
NOT the state but the plaintiff who is claiming pre-existing right of
ownership. Dont be confused sa Cadastral case, reversion, and an
action for nullity. Cadastral registration is on the registration of the
land. In Reversion, the government wanted to reclaim the ownership of
the land. In an action for nullity, it is the private individual who claims
ownership over the property. The plaintiff has a pre-existing right
prior to the grant of patent or a certificate of title.