Ratio Juris. Vol. 12 No.

1 March 1999 (2638)

Deontic Logic: A Personal View

GEORG HENRIK VON WRIGHT
Abstract. This article contains an overview of the authors long-standing involvement with deontic logic, both from a technical and from a wider philosophical point
of view. As far as the formal aspects of deontic logic are concerned, the author
describes his intellectual development from the original discovery of the analogy
between modal (and deontic) notions on the one hand, and quantifiers on the other,
through the formulation of a systematic theory of dyadic deontic concepts, to the
proposal of a formal logic of action as a foundation for deontic logic. In a more philosophical vein, the author discusses such questions as the very possibility of deontic
logic if norms have no truth-value, the relation between the descriptive interpretation
of classical deontic logic and the logic of norm-propositions, the correct representation of conditional or hypothetical norms, the distinction between moral obligation
and practical necessity, and the interdefinability of permission and obligation.*

1.
I have now been involved with deontic logic for nearly half a centuryfirst
with its birth as an academic discipline and later with its further development.
On more than one occasion when I had contributed something new to
the subject I thought that I had finished with it for good. On something I
have even said in print that it was my last word. But time and again I have
returned, challenged by unsettled difficulties in what still seems to me a
most problematic branch of logico-philosophical study.
What I propose to do here is to give a sketchy overview of the development of deontic logic seen in the somewhat egocentric perspective of my
own contributions to it.
2.
From Aristotle on, one can find in the writings of philosophers conceptual
remarks on obligation, permission, and prohibition which bear on their

* Abstract by Giorgio Volpe.

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formal logical relations. A first attempt to systematize them was made by

Leibniz in his early works Specimina juris and Elementa juris naturalis (see
Poser 1969). Leibniz notes that the modalia juris, as he calls them, of licitum,
illicitum, and debitum are mutually related according to the same schema as
the logical modalities of possibility, impossibility, and necessity. It has interested me that Leibnizs idea of a logic of the normative concepts is not only
based on an analogy with the modal notions but also treats possibility,
and not necessity, as the fundamental modal idea. From the point of view of
a deontic logic, the concept of obligatoriness (ought, debitum) would seem
much more natural as Grundbegriff than that of permittedness (may, licitum).
This attitude has since been adopted by a majority of contemporary writers
(cf. below sect. 14).
In 1926 Ernst Mallys book Grundgesetze des Sollens appeared (Mally 1926).
It had the subtitle Elemente der Logik des Willens. For his Logic of the Will
Mally used the name Deontik. He also called it the logic of that which ought
to be (the Seinsollen) and thought of it as a counterpart to the traditional Logic
of Thought. There is no mention in Mallys book of Leibniz nor of the
analogy between modal and normative concepts.
Mallys work had few, if any, repercussions in the literature. But in the
late 1930s and early 1940s there was a certain amount of discussion whether
a logic of norms or of imperatives is at all possible in view of the fact that
imperativesand presumably norms toolack truth-value. In the debate
two Danes took a prominent part. One was Jrgen Jrgensen, after whom the
name Jrgensens Dilemma was coined. The other was Alf Ross, inventor
of the famous paradox. Both the dilemma and the paradox are still active
topics of current debate.
In 1951 my paper Deontic Logic was published in Mind (von Wright
1951a). A year later Oskar Beckers Untersuchungen ber den Modalkalkl
appeared (Becker 1952)and after yet another year Jerzy Kalinowskis essay
Theorie des propositions normatives was published in Poland in Studia
Logica (Kalinowski 1953). With these three independent publications from
the early 1950sone in English, one in German, and one in Frenchthe new
logical discipline, henceforth commonly known under the name Deontic
Logic, can be said to have established itself on the academic stage. All three
authors exploited the analogy between normative and modal concepts.
Becker did not contribute more to the subject. Kalinowski has continued to
work in the field until recently. The same is true of me. But of both Kalinowski
and myself I think it is also true to say that our continued work has with time
distanced itself from what I would call mainstream developments.
3.
It may interest some of my readers to know how it happened that I, without
any knowledge of predecessors, found my way to deontic logic.
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Georg Henrik Von Wright

After having finished my early occupation with inductive logic and probability theory, I turned to the study of logical truth in the predicate calculus
with particular attention to the Entscheidungsproblem (decision problem).
One day when I was walking along the banks of the River CamI was at
that time living in Cambridge (England)I was struck by the thought that
the modal attributes possible, impossible and necessary are mutually
related to one another in the same way as the quantifiers some, no and
all. I soon found that the formal analogy between quantifiers and modal
concepts extended beyond the patterns of interdefinability and I was curious
to explore this alley before returning to the predicate calculus. I doubt whether
I had ever heard about modal logic until thenand it took some time before
I discovered that I had distinguished predecessors in the field: ukasiewicz
and C.I. Lewis in modern times, Aristotle in the past. I had been invited to
contribute a monograph on induction to the newly started series in Holland,
Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics. But I availed myself
of the offer by writing a small book called An Essay in Modal Logic (1951b).
Before finishing it I had made another accidental observationthis time in
the course of a discussion with friendsnamely that the normative notions
of permission, prohibition, and obligation seemed to conform to the same
pattern of mutual relatedness as quantifiers and basic modalities. I thought
this observation worth a separate paper, and so I wrote Deontic Logic and
sent it to the then editor of Mind, Gilbert Ryle, who promptly published it.
Now I was ready to go back to my occupation with logical truth and the
decision problem. This I did. I dimly realized that my discovery would
attract attention, but I felt no inclination myself to return to the subject. This
attitude of indifference, however, did not last long.
4.
Two critics in Mind had challenged some views in my 1951 paper. One was
Arthur Prior (1954), whom I did not know at the time but later came to esteem
very highly. His challenge concerned what are called derived obligations,
i.e., obligations which are not unconditional but arise under certain conditions. The topic is closely related to hypothetical norms (imperatives) and
has remained controversial in deontic logic up to the present.
Prior noted that my views gave rise to oddities which are similar to
the well-known implication paradoxes of propositional and modal logic.
My reply to him (von Wright 1956) was a retreat from my earlier position
and the introduction of a new notion which I called relative permission (also
prohibition and obligation). I introduced for it a symbol which has become
standard, P(p/q). It is read it is permitted that p given that (on condition
that) q. Some years later and, as far as I know, independently of me, a
very similar dyadic deontic logic was developed by Nicholas Rescher (1958,
1962).
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This renewed venture of mine into deontic logic also had its point of departure in modal logic. In the early 1950s I had sketched a system of dyadic
or relative modality of which traditional monadic modal logic could be
considered a limiting case (von Wright 1957).1 For a number of years I
played with the transfer of analogies from what I called alethic to deontic
modalities. Throughout I used permission as my basic concept. The classical unconditional modalities I thought of as conditional ones relative to
tautological circumstances.
Dyadic deontic logic is still used as a tool by many logicians, but whether
it can deal satisfactorily with structures which cannot also be successfully
treated in monadic logic is a question on which I have never been able to
make up my mind.
My occupation with dyadic systems reached its climax and its conclusion
with my monograph An Essay in Deontic Logic and General Theory of Action
(von Wright 1967). There I construed a systematic variety of dyadic deontic
concepts answering to the six different ways in which quantifiers in front of
a dyadic relation-sentence can be iterated and shifted. This idea, to the best
of my knowledge, has not been further developed in later writings but still
seems to me to be of some promise. Another novelty in the Essay was the
introduction of the notion of free choice permission or the idea that the permittedness of a disjunction entails the permittedness of each disjunct individually. The idea agrees with the way we naturally speak about these things, but
is difficult to accommodate with standard deontic notions. A huge literature
on the topic has grown up through the years, but a universally accepted
solution to the difficulties has not yet been found.
5.
The variables, p, q, etc., and their molecular compounds in the deontic
formulas can be understood as schematic representations either of (names
of) human action or of (sentences describing) states of affairs which can
come to obtain as the result of human action. I shall call them doable states of
affairs. For example: Op could represent the expression one ought to
close the window or, alternatively, the window ought to be closed. The
first isto use established German terminologya Tun-Sollen (ought to
do); the second is a Sein-Sollen (ought to be).
The deontic logic of my early paper was a norm-logic of the Tun-Sollen
(and a fortiori Tun-Drfen) type. This conception is connected with some
formal snags and also some limitations. Therefore, two other early pioneers
in the field, Alan Anderson, who studied with me at Cambridge, and Arthur
Prior preferred a Sein-Sollen (-Drfen) conception of the deontic formulas

Later I abandoned this approach to modal logic.

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Georg Henrik Von Wright

(see Prior 1955, 220ff.) This soon became standardand I too followed the
same track.
I shall later (sect. 13) return to the two conceptions. But first we must
follow another line of development of deontic logic which I inaugurated
in the early 1960s and tried to systematize in my book Norm and Action
(von Wright 1963).
6.
Let p stand for the window is closed. This state can result from two
different actions of a given agent. One is the act of closing the window if it
is open. The other is the act of preventing the window from opening should
that happen if the agent stays passive. The first action produces a state which
is not there. The second prevents a state which is there from vanishing.
The two actions may have different deontic status. For example: Closing
the window, if open, may be obligatory, but preventing it from being opened,
should it be closed, may in fact be forbidden. In order to express in formal
symbolism which status the actions have which result in the state that p, we
need a symbolism for schematic action sentences and rules for how to
handle them. A Logic of Norms must therefore be supplemented by, or stand
on the shoulders of, a Logic of Action. But this supplement to deontic logic
had yet to be created.
In Norm and Action I made a first attempt to supply this missing foundation for deontic logic. Since then, considerable further development has
taken placemainly thanks to the efforts of other logicians. Of my own later
contributions I shall here only mention one, a paper called Action Logic as
a Basis for Deontic Logic (von Wright 1988; see also von Wright 1983).
Laying the foundations of a formal Logic of Action is the only major
contribution of mine to the development of formal deontic logic beyond the
platform of my first publication in the field. Unlike the logic of normative
concepts, the logic of action concepts has, to the best of my knowledge, no
anticipation or roots in earlier formal theory. If it has any they are probably
to be found in the fertile soil of medieval scholastic logic.
Change, and a fortiori action, might be called dynamic logical categories as
distinct from thing and state of affairs which are static. At the time when
I wrote Norm and Action I viewed the novelty of deontic logic in the light of
a turn in logic away from a traditional interest in what is, the static, to that
which comes to be, the dynamic. But I may have exaggerated the magnitude
of this shift in points of view.
7.
The rest of the paper I shall devote to the continued, not to say incessant,
efforts of mine to clarify the philosophical rather than the formal logical
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aspects of deontic logic. They have made me feel more and more like a lone
wolf in the crowd of explorers who have been active in the field. I gave my
first semi-autobiographical account on how this came about in a paper from
the mid-1970s called A Pilgrims Progress (von Wright 1975). But since its
publication the pilgrim has made still further headway.
I had been educated in a philosophic tradition which regarded norms
and values, not only as culture dependent, subjective and relative, but also
as entities removed from truth and falsehood. Hgerstrm and Kelsenin
value theory also Westermarckhad been my guides and heroes. I still think
there is an undeniable and important element of correctness in their views.
Norms, as prescriptions for conduct, simply are not true or false. There may
exist other, more objectivist conceptions of them, but they belong in a
different dimension and do not overthrow the prescriptivist view.
I adhered to this a-theoretical conception of norms when I started to
develop deontic logic. But it did not occur to me to begin with that there was
a problem here. If norms have no truth-value, how can logical relations such
as contradiction or logical consequence (entailment) obtain between them?
In my first paper I had proceeded as though the mere fact that one can
construct a formal calculus with plausible-sounding axioms was all that
was needed to satisfy the demands of logic. And I think it is right to say that
this attitude still implicitly underlies much of the work which is being done
in deontic logic. Its problematic nature, however, has to this day remained a
thorn in my logical flesh, if I may use this metaphor.
My first reflective stand on the problem was in the Preface to my book
Logical Studies (von Wright 1957). There I said that Deontic logic gets part
of its philosophic significance from the fact that norms and valuations,
though removed from the realm of truth, yet are subject to logical law. This
shows that logic, so to speak, has a wider reach than truth. This may be
sobut the mere existence of the calculus is not sufficient to justify the
statement.
8.
In the years immediately preceding Norm and Action I had become intrigued
by the following observation: Deontic sentences exhibit a characteristic ambiguity. One and the same form of words may be used for giving a norm and
for stating that a norm to such and such effect has been given (exists). In the
former case the sentence is used prescriptively, in the second descriptively. An
example might be you may not park your car this side of the street. Used
prescriptively it imposes a prohibition; used descriptively it gives information about existing parking regulations. In the prescriptive use the sentence
does not say anything which is true or false. In the descriptive use it does. In
the first it expresses (enunciates) a norm, in the second it expresses what
I called a norm-proposition.
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Georg Henrik Von Wright

The first to draw systematic attention to this ambiguity in normative

language was, as far as I know, the Swedish philosopher Ingemar Hedenius
(1941). This was long before the days of deontic logic.
Now the question arose: Was deontic logic, after all, not a logic of norms but
of norm-propositions? In Norm and Action I opted for the second alternative
on the ground that the application of sentential connectives to prescriptively
interpreted deontic sentences seemed problematic. But at the same time I
also thought that the axioms and theorems of deontic logic reflected genuine
logical properties of the norms themselves. I thus attributed to deontic logic,
as it then existed, a kind of hybrid status in relation to norms and normpropositions. This, obviously, was not a very satisfactory position. No wonder,
therefore, that the problem to which it had suggested a solution continued to
torment me.
9.
Any syntactic structure of deontic sentences and their molecular compounds
can be interpreted as a truth-functional structure of norm-propositions. This
holds true, for example, of my original system of deontic logichenceforth
referred to here as classical. Since norm-propositions are true or false, so
too are their molecular compounds. Thus the formulas of deontic logic, on
the descriptive interpretation of the deontic sentences, become true or false
propositions about the existence of norms. The question then arises: Do the
formulas of classic deontic logic, on the descriptive interpretation of their
constituent sentences, hold true about norms? And, if true, is their truth
logical or empirical?
In the classical system one can prove (derive) the formulas Pp O ~ p and
~(Op&O ~ p) and ~(Op&P ~ p). The first says that any possible state of affairs
is either permitted or forbidden. A normative order (system) which satisfies
this condition is said to be complete or gapless. The second formula says that
no state and its contradictory are both obligatory. The third says that no state
is such that it is obligatory but its contradiction (nevertheless) permitted. A
normative order which satisfies these conditions is said to be consistent or
contradiction-free.
Thus classic deontic logic, on the descriptive interpretation of its formulas,
pictures a gapless and contradiction-free system of norms. A factual normative order may have these properties, and it may be thought desirable that it
should have them. But can it be a truth of logic that a normative order has
(must have) these perfection-properties? Experience seems to testify that
mutually contradictory norms may co-exist within one and the same legal
orderand also that there are a good many gaps in any such order, i.e., states
which simply have no normative or deontic status, are neither permitted nor
forbidden nor obligatory. This being so, classical deontic logic, descriptively
interpreted, cannot claim to be the (correct) logic of norm-propositions. The
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merit to have clearly realized this belongs to Carlos Alchourrn. Alchourrn

(1969) was the first to devise a Logic of Norm-Propositions in contradistinction to a Logic of Norms. I am afraid that later logicians have not always
recognized this double task of the logical study of normative discourse.2
10.
Some legal philosophers have been of the opinion that, of norm-logical
necessity normative orders are gapless and free from contradiction. Hans
Kelsen would be one example. This opinion is difficult to uphold in view of
the empirical fact that existing legal orders sometimes contain mutually
contradicting norms as well as gaps.
On the other hand, contradictions in the law are undesirable and may
cause trouble in the practice of jurisdiction. The same may also be true about
the existence of gaps.
The question therefore arises: Can one, one way or another, try to secure
that a given legal order is free from these defects? Certainly not by means
of logic. But there is another way. It is to view the ideas of completeness and
freedom of contradiction as themselves normative ideas, as normative demands
on normative systems. They could be called meta-normative principles. They
are norms of higher order.
Consider the expression O(Pp O ~ p). The second-order expression can be
interpreted either descriptively or prescriptively. According to the first interpretation it says that there is a norm to the effect that any given state of affairs
ought to be either permitted or forbidden. According to the second interpretation it enjoins the norm-giving authority to see to it that this is the case.
I shall call the meta-norm O(Pp O ~ p) a closure- or completeness-norm
for a given normative order. Its aim is to secure that the order be gapless.
Consider next O ~ (Op&P ~ p). Descriptively interpreted it says that it is
prohibited for the norm-giver to order something to be the case and at the
same time to allow it not to be the case. Prescriptively it enjoins the normgiver to observe this prohibition.
Similarly with O ~ (Op&O ~ p). Prescriptively, it prohibits the norm-giver
from pronouncing both a state and its contradictory obligatory. Descriptively,
it states that there is such a prohibition.
I shall call the two norms O ~ (Op&P ~ p) and O ~ (Op&O ~ p) metanorms of consistency. Their aim is to secure that the normative order is
contradiction-free.
2
I shall not here discuss the prospects which Alchourrns insight opened. To this day, the idea
of a Logic of Norm-Propositions which is different from a Logic of Norms has, to the best of my
knowledge, not been much further developed from the stage where it was taken by Alchourrn
(1969) and later by him and Bulygin (1971). It is characteristic of the two authors construction
that their Logic of Norm-Propositions presupposes the existence and possibility of a Logic of Norms
(real Deontic Logic). This presupposition may be debated, however. See von Wright 1997.

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Georg Henrik Von Wright

11.
Deontic logic would not be possible if one could not assign a plausible
meaning to relations of (in)consistency and entailment between norms. But
how is this to be done considering that norms have no truth-value? I think
the answerimplicitly given already in Norm and Actionis as follows:
A set of norms is consistent if, and only if, the conjunction of all states
pronounced obligatory by the norms with any one of the states pronounced
permitted is a doable state of affairs, i.e., something which can be achieved
through human action.
The criteria of doability are laid down in a Logic of Action. In the elementary symbolism of classic deontic logic the only states which for reasons
of logic can be shown to be not-doable are contradictory and tautologous
states of affairs. Thus, according to the definition given, a set consisting of
the two norms Op and O ~ p, or one consisting of Op and P ~ p, would be
inconsistent (not consistent), since the conjunction of p and ~p is not a doable
state of affairs.
But why should the two norms themselves be called inconsistent on this
ground? One cannot answer by saying that they cannot both be true, since
truth-value does not apply to them. The only acceptable answer I can think
of must make reference to the purpose or rationale of norm-giving activity.
It would be irrational, contrary to reason, if a law-giver enjoined or allowed
things which cannot be done. It would be similarly irrational if he enjoined
the doing of something and at the same time permitted it to be left undone.
The form of words it is not permitted is often used prescriptively to
mean the same as it is forbiddenand the words it is not forbidden to
mean it is permitted. This observation enables us to define the notion of
the negation-norm of a given norm. The negation of an obligation Op is a
permission of the contradictory state, P ~ p. And the negation of a permission Pp is the obligatoriness of the contradictory state, O ~ p.
We can now define the notion of (normative) entailment as follows:
A consistent set of norms entails a further norm if, and only if, adding to the
set the negation norm of this further norm makes the set inconsistent.
A very simple example would be: Op entails Pp, i.e., obligation entails
permission. This is so because the negation norm of Pp is O ~ p and the
norms Op and O ~ p contradict each other.
Another example. In classic deontic logic Pp&O(p q) Pq is a theorem.
The formula is sometimes read a permitted thing can commit one only to
other permitted things, i.e., cannot commit one to do anything forbidden.
The negation norm of Pq is O ~ q. The set of three norms Pp and O(p q)
and O ~ q is inconsistent, since p&(p q)& ~ q is a logical contradiction and
thus not a doable state of affairs. Hence, the two first norms jointly entail the
third one.
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The definitions of normative consistency and entailment rely on the notions

of doability of norm-contents and rationality of norm-giving activity. These
notions have no place in pure, traditional logic. One could on this ground
say that norms, after all, have no logic, that deontic logic is an impossibility.
But since the definitions given make the logical notions of consistency and
entailment applicable to genuine norms in what seems a very natural and convincing way, one could also say that this shows that logic, in fact, has a wider
reach than truth. I leave it to the reader to decide which attitude is wiser.
12.
A topic in deontic logic which remains controversial concerns conditional or
hypothetical norms. In my first paper on deontic logic I suggested that the
formula O(p q) was a correct representation of what I then called commitment, but which is perhaps better called conditional obligation. An
alternative representation is p Oq. It was first suggested, I believe, by
Professor Chisholm (1963).3 The suggestion has won the approval, it seems,
of a majority of deontic logicians. I myself have remained faithful to my
original suggestion. I shall try to justify my position.
Consider the norm: Promises ought to be kept. Now someone gives a
promise. Call this fact about him p and the fact that he keeps his promise q.
Having promised he must stand by his word. If his commitment is formalized by p Oq, then one can, it seems, from the conjunction of p Oq with
p modo ponente detach Oq or the promisers obligation to fulfil his promise.
The conjunction of O(p q) with p does not allow a corresponding detachment. Does this now show that O(p q) will not do as a formal representation
of the norm of promise-keeping?
When reasoning as above, it looks as if the giving of a promise generated
or gave rise to an obligation which was not there before, viz. the obligation
to do the promised thing. But this, I maintain, is to misrepresent the situation.
The moral obligation to fulfil promises had been there since time immemorial. It obliges all members of the moral community either not to give
promises or, if they promise something, to do the promised thing. The new
situation which arises when a promise is given, is not a new obligation, but
the practical necessity, as I shall call it, incumbent on the promiser to do a certain thing in order to satisfy his pre-existing obligation to keep given promises.
It is useful to reserve the word must for practical necessity and ought
for (moral or legal) obligation. But one need not be pedantic about this;
must may also be called ought and ought must. This is how we express
ourselves. The important thing to notice here is that, whereas the norm itself
is nothing to which it makes sense to attribute truth-value, the statement of
3

It is one of the peculiarities of Mally 1926, that he postulates the logical equivalence of the two
expressions p Oq and O(p q). This leads to great confusion in his system.
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Georg Henrik Von Wright

practical necessity is a true statement relative to facts that there is the norm of
promise keeping and that a promise has been given. One could say, with
caution, that the ought, the obligation, is neither true nor false, whereas
the must, the practical necessity, is either true or false depending on the
circumstances.
I think that any sound further development of deontic logic must pay due
attention to the distinction between what I shall call the ought of obligation and the must of practical necessity. Only the first is genuinely normative. It is the Sollen which in German philosophic literature is habitually
contrasted with Sein.4
13.
One can relate the above to another distinction, which is also deeper rooted
in traditional German than in English terminology. This is the distinction
between Sein-Sollen (-Drfen) and Tun-Sollen (-Drfen), between that which
ought to be and that which ought to be done. My suggestionto be taken
with a grain of saltis the following: The ought of obligation is a SeinSollen, something which ought to be, whereas the practical necessitation is a
Tun-Sollen, something which has to be done. (I am not saying that every
Tun-Sollen is an instance of practical necessitynor that every Sein-Sollen is
a legal or moral obligation. The relation is one of implication and not of
equivalence.)
As noted earlier (sec. 5), my first attempt to build a deontic logic was of
the ought-to-do rather than the ought-to-be type. (Although I did not then
pay attention to the distinction.) I took the variables p, q, etc., to be schematic
representations of categories of action such as theft, murder, smoking, etc.
But, for reasons of formal convenience, I soon shifted to a conception of them
as representing sentences. This was a shift to an ought-to-be conception. And I,
and others, first thought that this also covered the ought-to-do interpretation
of deontic formulas. For, cannot that which ought to (or may) be be that
something or other ought (or may) be done? So that, for example, Op could
be interpreted, alternatively, as standing for he ought to shut the window
and the window ought to be shut by him? This is possiblebut it does not
obliterate the distinction between the two conceptions. If it is a genuine
Ought or Sollen that the window be shut by him, then, in order to satisfy his
obligation, he must shut the window should it happen to be open. This is,
under the circumstances, true just as it is true that if the window is closed he
is not under this practical necessity.
4
Statements concerning that which one (a given subject, somebody, everybody) ought to or
may or must not do in order to do ones duty or avail oneself of a given permission or avoid
doing the forbidden are true or false. Duties, permissions and prohibitions are laid down in
norms, and norms lack truth-value.

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14.
A problem-child in the philosophy of norms has been the notion of permission. It was by accident that it figured as Grundbegriff in my first effort to
construct a deontic logic (von Wright 1951a). This was an after-effect of the
fact that possibility had been the basic concept of the modal logic I had
devised a little earlier.5 It soon became the fashion, however, to take obligation (ought) as basic. I agree that this is much more natural. But it is also a
way of steering round some problems traditionally associated with permission
which deserve special consideration.
One such problem concerns the relation of permission to prohibition.
Is permission the same as absence (lack) of prohibitionand vice versa? Since
prohibition can be defined as an obligation to the contrary (O ~ p = it is
prohibited that p), an affirmative answer would imply that permission and
obligation (may and ought) are interdefinable. Pp = df ~ O ~ p and Op = df
~ P ~ p. These defining identities were crucial to my first systemand I think
it is right to say that to this day they continue to be accepted by most researchers in the field of deontic logic. But from Norm and Action on I rejected
themand have since then (on the whole) treated both O and P as basic and
not interdefinable.
The interdefinability thesis depends on a confusion between norms and
norm-propositions. Normatively (prescriptively), the not-obligatoriness of
p means the permittedness of ~pand the not-permittedness of p means
the obligatoriness of ~p (prohibitedness of p). Descriptively, as normproposition, however, not-obligatoriness does not mean permittedness, nor
not-permittedness that the thing in question be prohibited. The prescriptive
meaning of ~P is O~ and that of ~O is P~ (norm and negation-norm).
But a logic of norm-propositions cannot accept the equivalences Op ~ P ~
or Pp ~ O ~ as logical truths about descriptively interpreted deontic
sentences (cf. above sect. 9).
If permission is not just absence of prohibition what is it then as something
positive? A person, who has a permission may do, usually also not do, the
permitted thing. But what does the person do who gives a permission?
Giving permission is a kind of binding ones hands. It is somewhat like
giving a promise or like saying you are free to do this, I am not going to
interfere. One could also say that the permission-giver imposes a prohibition on himself not to prevent the permission-holder from availing himself
of the permission.
According to this view permission-giving is a self-imposed commitment
to consistent normative activity. The norm-authority, and the authorities
subordinate to him, ought not to permit something to some norm-subject and
at the same time prohibit it. This is a second-order obligation O ~ (Pp&O ~ p).
5

The same holds good of Leibniz. Cf. above sect. 2.

Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1999.

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Georg Henrik Von Wright

If he permits something he must not also forbid itand if he prohibits something he must not also permit it (to the same subjects). Because if he does
either of these two things he introduces a contradiction in the set of norms
which he has issued. I believe that this view relating permission-giving to
consistent norm-giving helps us understand better what permission is.
University of Helsinki
SFCO100 Helsinki
Finland
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