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H83IPA Lecture 2

Dr Maria Kosseva
Department of Chemical &
Environmental Engineering, FoSE

Lecture Outline
Revise: Risk definitions
Risk Acceptance criteria: FAR, PLL and Facility Risk
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)
Cost of safety
Risk and Safety Decision Process
Reliability Terminology (reliability and availability)
Risk Assessment Process
Solving of practical problems

Risk Acceptance Criteria


The process industry level of risk for a particular facility is
based on one of 2 parameters:
1) The average risk to the individual, which is FAR
Fatal Accident Rate, or Potential Loss of Life (PLL),
2) The risk of catastrophic event at the facility, use
Quantified Risk Analysis (QRA).
The Facility Risk is the total frequency of an event for
each main type of accident. For chemical/ petrochemical
industries, FR should not exceed a value of 1x10-4 per year.
The risk criteria can be expressed in 2 ways: risk per year
(annual) or facility risk (lifetime).

ALARP diagram
Unacceptable risk level

Risk cannot be justified

1x10-4 - 1x10-5
ALARP region or
Tolerable risk level

fatalities/year

Tolerable risk only if


Reduction is impractical

1x10-6
Acceptable or
Negligible risk level

fatalities/year

Provide measures to ensure


That the risk remains at this level
No need for detailed ALARP

As Low As Reasonably Practicable


The farmers principle of reducing probability of occurrence with increasing consequence is applied to define 3 zones.

Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)


(a) Identification of potential hazards,
(b) Estimation of the consequences (C) of each hazard
(c) Estimation of the probability (P) of occurrence of each
hazard
(d) Evaluation of the quantified risk and comparison with
acceptability criteria.
R = C x P = consequence x probability of occurrence
The risk can be reduced by reducing the C of the incident or
by reducing the P or frequency of its occurrence.
Well use probabilistic methods to evaluate the
frequencies of incidents, which have major safety
implications.

Cost of safety
Safety can always be improved the question is at what
point is it considered too expensive?
Value of a human life
explicit values can be placed on human life or implicit
values indicated from the actions taken.
Evaluated from the investment expected to save a single life:
Department of Transport 1998 - 902.5k
- New building codes following Ronan
Point collapse - 14M
- New building codes now take into account the possibilities of progressive
collapse and of forces from an internal explosion. The codes also require
minimum amounts of ductility and redundancy.

Child proof bottle tops on medicine


bottles - 5 (initially rejected)

Risk and Safety Decision Processes


Need:
systematic process to evaluate the hazards
together with their consequences and
frequencies.
quantifiable risk measure to provide a basis to
compare risks.
decision making processes based on objective
(but maybe not perfect) information.

Risk and Safety Decision Processes


This enables:
Comprehensive assessments of the risk of all types
of hazard,
Consistent decisions to be made regarding
alternative system designs,
The best use of limited financial resources,
Decisions, which can be justified and demonstrated
(to designers, managers and regulators),
decisions which can be audited.

WELL INFORMED DECISIONS!!!!

The Alternative
Decisions will be subjective (based on opinions)
Decisions based on biased information
Inconsistent decisions based on qualitative
measures
Inefficient and perhaps ineffective use of available
finances

The Safety Case

Safety cases are often required as part of a regulatory process, a certificate of


safety being granted only, when the regulator is satisfied by the argument
presented in a safety case.
A Safety Case is a structured argument, supported by evidence, intended to
justify that a system is acceptably safe.
CONTENTS
1. What does the safety case cover (a new site/facility, facility extension, modification)?
2. What does the site/facility, etc. look like (site layout, design, key features)?
3. What must be right and why (e.g. structural integrity, performance)?
4. How is this achieved (e.g. regulations, codes, standards and specifications)?
5. What can go wrong (faults, hazards internal and external)?
6. What prevents /mitigates against it going wrong (e.g. protection systems, redundancy,
diversity, procedures)?
7. What if it still goes wrong (risk/consequences, emergency arrangements)?
8. Are the risks As Low As Reasonably Practicable?
9. What could be done to make it safer; what areas need further work (e.g. verification,
research) and what are the limitations and uncertainties)?
10. What must be done to implement the safety case (e.g. operating limits and conditions,
procedures, maintenance, resource and training requirements)?
11. How long will the safety case be valid (e.g. full life time or shorter due to life limiting
features)?
12. What happens at the end-of-life (decommissioning principles / strategy)?

Risk Assessment

Reliability Terminology
The reliability of a component or a system, R(t),
Is defined as the probability that the component
or system remains operating from time 0 to time t,
given that it was operating at time 0.
The unreliability of a component or system, F(t),
Is defined as the probability that the component
or system has failed at least once from time 0 to
time t, given that it was operating at time 0.
R(t) + F(t) = 1

Reliability bath-tub curve


Reliability is a measure of the probability of successful
performance of the system over a period of time.
Hazard rate
or failure rate
I

II

III

Burn-in
Useful-life

Wear out

In phase I failure rate will reduce as the weak components are


eliminated , in phase II it will remain ~constant, in phase III
components will start to wear and the hazard rate will increase.

Availability
The availability of a component or system, A(t),
Is defined as the probability that the component or
system is operating at time t, given that it was operating
at time 0.
Availability is a fraction of the total time that device or system is
able to perform its required function.

The unavailability, Q(t),


Is defined as the probability that the component or
system is not operating at time t, given that is was
operating at time 0.
A(t) + Q(t) = 1
Q(t) F(t) (unreliability of a component or system)
For non-repairable components:
Q(t) = F(t)

Failure frequencies
The failure rate of a component or system, (t),
Is defined as the probability per unit time that
the component or system experiences a failure at
time t, given that the component or system was
operating at time 0 and has survived to time t.

Risk Assessment Process


For all phases of operation:
Define the problem
Identify potential hazards
Determine their frequency and consequences
Quantification methods generally applicable across all
industries
Industry specific consequences

Risk is calculated
Compare alternatives and make decisions
A peer review of independent experts is essential

How do we make decisions on


what is the safest option?

Risk
Expected loss defined quantitatively
Risk = Consequence x Frequency
Consequences
Fatalities / injuries / financial loss
Frequency- or probability of occurrence over a
specified period of operation

Problem 1
300 people are travelling on an underground
train. The train collides with the tunnel wall where
it passes under a river and water is entering the
tunnel:
Action A will definitely result in 100 fatalities with
a further 100 people having a 0.25 chance of
fatality
Action B will definitely result in 50 fatalities with
a further 120 people having a 0.75 chance of
fatality
Action A OR Action B?

Axioms of probability
Axiom 1.
For every event A, 0 P(A) 1.
Where P is called a probability function, and
P(A) is called the probability of the event A

Problem 2
300 people are travelling on an underground train.
The train collides with the tunnel wall where it
passes under a river and water is entering the
tunnel:
Action A will definitely result in 100 people
surviving with a further 100 people having a 0.75
chance of surviving
Action B will definitely result in 130 people
surviving with a further 120 people having a 0.25
chance of surviving.
Action A OR Action B?

Problem 3
300 people are travelling on an underground train.
The train collides with the tunnel wall where it
passes under a river and water is entering the
tunnel:
Action A will definitely result in 100 fatalities with
a further 100 people having a 0.25 chance of
fatality
Action B will definitely result in 100 people
surviving with a further 100 people having a 0.75
chance of surviving.

Action A OR Action B?