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North American Philosophical Publications

WITTGENSTEIN AND THE NEUROSCIENCE OF THE SELF


Author(s): Jesse Prinz
Source: American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 48, No. 2, Wittgenstein and Naturalism
(APRIL 2011), pp. 147-160
Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of the North American Philosophical
Publications
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American Philosophical Quarterly


Volume 48, Number 2, April 2011

WITTGENSTEIN AND THE

NEUROSCIENCE OF THE SELF


Jesse Prinz

T
J. here has been a recent fashion of self
seeking in cognitive neuroscience. Researchers
have been trying to identify the neurophysio
logical processes that underlie our experiences

Logico-Philosophicus (hereafter Tractatus


or TLP). He famously writes:
There is no such thing as the subject that thinks
or entertains ideas. If I wrote a book called The

of a self. This endeavor presupposes that such

World as I Found It, I should have to include

experiences existthat there is something it


feels like to be the subject of our thoughts,

a report on my body and should have to say


which parts were subordinate to my will and
which were not, etc., this being a method of
isolating the subject, or rather of showing that
in an important sense there is no subject; for

actions, and perceptions. That presupposition


would not have sat well with Wittgenstein.

Skepticism about such a self is expressed


throughout Wittgenstein's writings, from the
early stages of his career on. One's identity as
a subject is not given as an item in experience,

it alone could not be mentioned in that book.

(TLP, sec. 5.631)

This remark can be interpreted in a number

but as a limit. In this discussion, I will critically of different ways, and my goal here is not to

review recent scientific approaches to the self

engage in scholarship but simply to advance

with Wittgenstein's skepticism in mind. My


goal is not to criticize the methodology of
cognitive neuroscience or expose foundational
confusions; I am an unreconstructed natural

one possible reading, which will help to frame


the rest of the discussion. I think Wittgenstein

can be read here as endorsing a psychological


thesis. He can be read as saying there is no

ist. I do, however, think that Wittgenstein has

self to be found in introspective experience

much to teach the neuroscientist. His insights

no phenomenal I. When we think or perceive,

pertaining to the self can help us see where we experience the contents of our thoughts
some current empirical efforts go wrong. In and perceptions, but not a subject of them.
fact, some of those efforts repeat mistakes of

I will come back to this psychological thesis

the philosophical theories that Wittgenstein in a moment, but first it is worth noting that
was intent to criticize. What I offer here is a
Wittgenstein also appears to be advancing the
naturalistic Wittgensteinian inquiry into the metaphysical thesis that "there is no subject."
emerging neuroscience of the self.

i. Wittgenstein on the Self

Interpreting this remark is complicated by the


qualification that the self fails to exist only "in

one important sense." To understand this, we

must is
clarify both the sense in which the sub
Wittgenstein's skepticism about the self
ject does not exist, and the sense (or senses) in
already clearly expressed in the Tractatus
2011 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois

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148 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY


which the subject might exist. On the former,

the limits of the world. For Schopenhauer,

it is telling that Wittgenstein's skepticism is

this constitutes a kind of idealism. But Witt

sometimes articulated with reference to the

genstein sees a route from this idealism into


realism, by way of solipsism:

"metaphysical subject":

Idealism singles men out from the world as

Where in the world is a metaphysical subject


to be found? You say that this case is altogether

unique, solipsism singles me alone out, and at

like that of the eye and the field of sight. But

last I see that I too belong with the rest of the

you do not really see the eye. And from nothing

world, and so on the one side nothing is left

in the field of sight can it be concluded that it is

over, and on the other side, as unique, the world.

seen from an eye. (TLP, sec. 5.633)

(Notebooks 1914-1916 (hereafter Notebooks),

The metaphor here is taken over from Scho

sec.15.10.16; see also TLP, sec. 5.64)

penhauer (1818, vol. 2, pp. xxii, xli). Scho Having abandoned the idea of a world beyond
penhauer is working within the grip of Kant's representation, Wittgenstein turns the world
distinction between the phenomenal and theof representation into the real world, and the

noumenal, and he claims we know the self metaphysical selfwho would have to lie
only through phenomena, in Kant's sense, outside that world if it existed, rendering it
and phenomena are directed outward on the merely phenomenalshrinks away.
world, not inward. So for Schopenhauer the Thus, we see in these passages that Witt

noumenal self is unknowable. (Schopengenstein has ascended into some of the


hauer's main departure from Kant is that he loftiest metaphysical debates of the Kantian
locates the noumenal self in the will, rather tradition, a move that might make the later
than the intellect.) For Wittgenstein there is quietist Wittgenstein blush. In this discussion
no noumenal/phenomenal distinction, so theI want to bracket these issues and focus on the
failure to find a metaphysical self in experi psychology. We can deflate the metaphysical

tone of these passages by noting that Witt


genstein often talks about my world ("The
World
as I Found It"), rather than the world.
does exist for Wittgenstein. We are given
a
The psychological counterpart of his solip
clue about this just after the passage in which
he announces that he cannot find himself in
sism consists in the metaphysically modest
the world:
claim that, from my perspective, there is no
The subject does not belong to the world: rather, world beyond that which I can grasp. This
ence suggests that no such self exists.

But there is also a sense in which the self

it is a limit of the world. {TLP, sec. 5.632)

Here Wittgenstein's solipsism comes out,


which is one of the more difficult features of

his philosophy. The subject is not an item in


the world, but there is nothing to the world

beyond what is available to the subject. This

again echoes Schopenhauer, according to

may sound trivial, but when coupled with the

remarks about the self, it is insightful. Recall


that Wittgenstein's psychological thesis about

the self is that there is no subject in experi


ence. Thus, my world does not contain a sub
ject, even though it is mine. Thus, from my
point of view I am both everything (the limit)

and nothing. It is this psychological thesis


that I will be focusing on here, especially on
tions in thought is a product of those repre
the claim that there is no subject present in
sentations. For Wittgenstein, the world is the
experience.
totality of propositions, and propositions are
whom the world we know through representa

also identified with thoughts, so all that exists


is the totality of thoughts. Thus, the limit of

my thoughts (or my language) determines

It is important in this context that we think

of the illusive self as the "subject" and not a


mere object. Wittgenstein's view would be
easily refuted if we focus on objective forms

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NEUROSCIENCE OF THE SELF / 149


of self-awareness. I can be aware that I need

By the time of the Philosophical Investiga


a shave, or that I am sitting in a chairjust tions (hereafter PI), Wittgenstein's skepticism
one object among many. In The Blue and about the psychological availability of the

Brown Books (Wittgenstein 1960), we are self is somewhat less explicit, but it actu
famously told:

ally seems to have deepened. In one telling

There are two different cases in the use of the

word "I" (or "my") which I might call "the use

as object" and "the use as subject." Examples


of the first kind of use are these: "My arm is
broken," "I have grown six inches," "I have a

bump on my forehead," "The wind blows my


hair about." Examples of the second kind are:

"/ see so-and-so," "/ hear so-and-so"I try


to lift my arm," "7 think it will rain," "I have a

toothache!'(pp. 67ff.)

remark, echoing metaphors in the Tractatus,


we read:

Doing itself seems not to have any volume in


experience. It seems like an extensionless point,
the point of a needle. This point seems to be
the real agent. And the phenomenal happen
ings only to be the consequence of this acting,

(sec. 620)

Here, Wittgenstein does not mention the


subject, but instead "the agent"an acting

Wittgenstein's psychological skepticism subject. In the passages that follow, we see

about the self pertains only to the self as

that Wittgenstein has extended his skepticism

subject. The self whose arms can break is an about an introspectible I to include a more
item in the world, but the subject of experi general skepticism about the introspectibility
ences and intentional actions is not, if the

of intentions as psychological states. Com


pounding this, he also expresses skepticism
This sheds some light on Wittgenstein's about introspection as a kind of inner seeing
widely discussed suggestion that with subject (e.g., PI, sec. 420). The immunity to error
uses of "I," there is no possibility of error. through misidentification (or, I would say,
Shoemaker (1968) has explicated this by say the absence of identification as a precondition
ing that, for Wittgenstein, subjective uses offor self-ascription) remains relevant here. Not
Tractarian view is right.

the first person are immune to error through only is there no subject to be found; there is

misidentification. In the objective use, I can also no item in the mind corresponding to
make first erroneous judgments first person subject's intentions or will. There is no inner

by referring to the wrong person. I might look doing, but only various effects (often publicly

at the wrong medical charts and mistakenly observable) of what is done.

infer that I have grown two inches. I might see

If Wittgenstein is right, any effort to find

someone else's reflection and think my hair a psychological analogue of the self as sub
has been tussled by the wind. But according ject will meet with frustration. There is no
to Shoemaker's Wittgenstein, I cannot think I such self to be found. At best, we can find
am experiencing a pain only to discover that a self as limit. This suggests that many phi

someone else is having that experience.

losophers who have written about the self

In the present context, I think Wittgenstein's are mistaken. It also has implications for

point about error might be more revealingly cognitive science. In recent years there has
reformulated as a point about correctness. In been an active effort to identify psychologi

the subjective cases, I do not get things right cal and neural correlates of the self. These
by identifying myself. I do not find an "I" and efforts often presuppose that the self is an
then say, this I is experiencing a pain. Rather, item in experience. The science proceeds by

I just experience the pain. This formulation identifying experiences that allegedly contain
reminds us that, for Wittgenstein, there is no an awareness of the self, followed by efforts
I to be found in experience.

to identify the correlates of that awareness

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150 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY


in the brain. This project is doomed to fail

I will make that vivid by organizing the

if Wittgenstein is right, and another project,

neuroscientific research under philosophical

which develops the idea of self as limit, may headings. If the empirical research fails, that

have greater promise.

may result from the fact that the correspond

In what follows, I will offer a Wittgenstein

ing philosophical tradition is misguided. In

ian critique of recent work on the neurosci


ence of the self. My goal is not to argue that

effect, we will see that old philosophical


debates can be re-staged in contemporary

mainstream neuroscience is fundamentally

neuroscience. This shows the relevance of

misguided. I will not take issue with the

philosophy in formulating scientific hypoth

widespread commitments to representation


alism, the use of homuncular explanations,

eses about the mind.

mechanistic accounts of person-level psy

2. Neuroscience of the Self

chology, or realism about private experience.


I have no sympathy with the Wittgenstein

2.1 The Cartesian Self

who would balk at these things, much less


with the Wittgenstein who opposes meth

would contrast most markedly with any

Wittgenstein's skepticism about the self


view that said the self is an introspectible

odological naturalism. In this respect my item in experience. Finding explicit defenses


approach is profoundly un-Wittgensteinian.
But I do think Wittgenstein's views about the

of such a view is surprisingly difficult. If


you peruse the history of philosophy, for

self (among others) can be fruitfully used to


critically assess particular theories within

example, it is difficult to identify important

neuroscience. Any effort to map the manifest

phenomenal I. Some say, as we will see, that


the self has a phenomenology, but it can be

thinkers who unambiguously say there is a

image onto a scientific one had better get


the manifest image right in the first place. reduced to something else, something that
Here I think Wittgenstein's observations are cannot be characterized without reference to
helpful. It would be a great loss if all his anything like a subject of experience. Few
philosophical insights were simply ignored if any explicitly endorse the idea that there
by those who thought that his methodologi is a sui generis phenomenal Ia quale that
cal strictures were off base. Wittgenstein's exists over and above the qualia that charac
reflections on aspect perception (informed by

terize the contents of thought and perception

Gestalt psychology) have inspired research


on how people perceive multi-stable figures,
and his ideas about family resemblance in
spired a generation of psychologists study
ing categorization. Likewise, there can be a
Wittgensteinian psychology of the self, even
if it is not a research program that he would
have signed onto.

which the subject is said to experience. The


person closest to this position is, perhaps,
Descartes, who says two things that invite
this interpretation. First, in advancing the
cogito, he implies that we are directly aware

of thoughts as well as a thinker. Second,


Descartes says that the self is a res cogitans
and indivisible. If the self were reducible to

The discussion below surveys recent ef the contents of thought, then the self would

forts to find a correlate of self-awareness

be divisible, because thoughts have identifi


in the brain. But the lessons I hope to draw able parts. The idea that there is an indivis
are also relevant to those who would pursue ible res cogitans of which we can have clear
more traditionally philosophical approachesand distinct knowledge from the mere act

to finding the self. In fact, each of the researchof thinking suggests that, for Descartes, the

programs in neuroscience that I will mentionself is present to the mind as a thing over
has counterparts in the history of philosophy. and above our thoughts.

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NEUROSCIENCE OF THE SELF / 151

One difficulty with this interpretation isnothing about themselves and offers no time
that Descartes may arrive at his res cogitansfor contemplation or free association. Un
der these conditions, self-awareness seems
through inference rather than introspection.

Perhaps he presumes that thoughts must


to diminish and subjects think only about
have thinkers and that, therefore, thinking
providing correct answers with the required
entails that selves exist. Such an assumptionspeed and accuracy.
would make him vulnerable to a version of

The goal of this study was not merely to


Lichtenberg's objection that we are not en manipulate the felt presence and loss of self,

titled to infer thinkers from thoughts. Thoughbut to identify underlying brain structures.

Descarte might have been making this dubiParticipants performed the described task
ous inferential move, it is also possible thatin an fMRI (functional magnetic resonance
Descartes believed in sui generis phenomenalimaging) scanner, in an effort to identify the
I. For exposition, let us call this a Cartesianbrain structures that turn off and on with the
view of the self.

experience of the self. Goldberg et al. report


Though it is hard to find any explicit enthat the left superior frontal gyrus distin
dorsement of a Cartesian self in philosophyguishes these conditions. When people lose
(including in the works of Descartes), therethemselves, activation in this structure dimin

is at least one research program in contempoishes. Have the experimenters discovered the
neural seat of the self?
rary cognitive neuroscience that implies such

a view. Goldberg et al. (2006) claim that the

I think we should resist this interpreta

self can be present as an item in experiencetion. For one thing, the left superior frontal
but, unlike Descartes, they claim that the self gyrus is known to be involved in working
is not always present. In a clever experiment, memorythe mechanisms that allow us to
they try to find neural correlates of the self bybriefly hold information in our heads. The

exploiting this fact. Their point of the deparfact that working memory is active when
ture is the folk psychological observation that people reflect on their attitudes towards
we sometimes seem to become so absorbed in

familiar objects is unsurprising, since such


a task that we "lose ourselves." Goldberg etreflection is likely to bring past memories to
al. take this idea very seriously and developmind and a weighing of pros and cons. But

laboratory conditions under which loss of self the same structure will also be active in tasks

seems likely to occur.


that by the experimenters' reckoning should
In their study, they show participants a involve loss of self, such as any speeded task
series of images of familiar objects such asthat requires holding a lot of information in
lions and sailboats and ask one of two quesmind. For example, we might see it playing a
tions. Some participants are asked to indicate
role in rapid arithmetic. Here subjects would
whether they like the depicted objectapresumably report "losing themselves" in the
question that seems to require introspectiontask, even though the supposed neural seat of
of the selfand others are asked whether the

the self is active. My guess is that this brain

picture is of an animal or nota task that


does not require reflection on one's self. In

structure is less active during Goldberg et al.'s

addition, the experimenters alter the speed at


which the pictures are presented, so that some

participants see the sequence very rapidly.

speeded categorization task simply because


identifying whether something is an animal
does not require use of working memoryit
is a purely perceptual task.

Those who are asked to make the animal/

Another point needs emphasis as well.


no-animal discrimination very quickly The
re authors are taking the colloquial phrase
"losing one's self" too literally. The phe
port losing themselves. The task asks them

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152 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

nomenology associated with losing one's

known to exist. The most obvious alternative

self does not literally involve a loss of self.

interpretation is that they consider the self to

Rather, it seems to involve a high degree of

be embodied in the emotions that participants

absorption, in which one's personal goals

reflect on in deciding whether they like the

and interests temporarily lose salience. It is


a bit like losing track of timewhich is not

whether a lion is an animal, you need consider

an absence of temporality in experience, but

only features of the lion itself; but when asked

objects presented in the study. When asked

rather a failure to track clock time. Notice

whether you like lions, you must reflect on


how lions make you feel. This inward reflec
that losing one's self is not an absence of sub

jectivity, or even executive control. One cantion might be taken as reflection of the self.
lose oneself in pleasure or while performing The effort to identify self-awareness with
a challenging task. Wittgenstein would noteemotions can be traced to William James. In
the Principles of Psychology, James (1890,
that there is no way to lose oneself because

that implies that the self is also somethingchap. 25) argues that emotions are felt
we can find when we look for it, and this ischanges in the body. He says a similar thing
precisely what he sets out to deny. Suppose,about the self (chap. 10). When we experience
ourselves, he says, we are actually experienc
after being asked to say whether animals are

ing bodily perturbations. Some of these are


present in the photographs, participants in
Goldberg et al.'s study were then asked to straightforwardly identifiable with emotions,
reflect on which animals they like. Would such as the aversion we feel for certain things
this shift involve a discovery of some mental or the pride we have in our own accomplish
item we can call the self? Presumably not.ments. In addition, James says there are
Participants would begin reflecting on thesubtler bodily events, just barely detectable,
various properties animals have and the feelassociated with the experience of being a self.
ings they have towards those properties; they He focuses on "cephalic motions":
would not need to bring before the mind a The "Self of selves," when carefully examined,
bearer of those feelings. (In the next section, is found to consist mainly of the collection of
we will consider the suggestion that the self these peculiar motions in the head or between
is reducible to feelings.) Indeed, it is telling the head and throat. I do not for a moment say
that we do not have an expression, "to find that this is all it consists of, for I fully realize
yourself," that corresponds to recovery from
"loss of self." "Finding yourself" refers to the

how desperately hard is introspection in this


field. But I feel quite sure that these cephalic

quest for authentic desires, not to the recovery motions are the portions of my innermost
activity of which I am most distinctly aware.

of a subject in experience.

(1890, p. 301)
If the Goldberg et al. study is any indica
tion, we should not hold out hope for idenSuch physiological changes reflect our reac
tifying a sui generis self. Wittgensteinian tions to the thoughts we have and the objects
skepticism seems to be the appropriate stance we encounter, and are thus experiences as
towards the Cartesian I, so understood.
corporal analogues of the self.

2.2 The Jamesian Self

The embodied approach to emotions, on


the one hand, and self, on the other, has been

In fairness to Goldberg et al., they do nottaken up by the neurologist Antonio Damasio


explicitly say that they take the self to be (1999).
a
He argues that there is a primitive ex
sui generis component of experience. Perhaps
perience of the self constituted by experience

they think the self is reducible to some other of ongoing changes in the body. When we

component of experiencea componentperceive something, we experience both the

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NEUROSCIENCE OF THE SELF / 153

external object and its physiological effects


which they seem to involve the self. Embar
on us as we react to it. Self-consciousness,rassment seems highly self-involving, and
in its most primitive form, is constituted by disgust is less so. Now compare intense
those felt effects. Damasio identifies brain
fear and mild embarrassment. Intuitively,
structures that are associated with percep the former involves less self-awareness than

the latter, because fear focuses attention


tion of the body. There are ancient first-order
outward, while embarrassment focuses at
structures that detect ongoing changes, such
as the reticular formation in the brain stem,
tention inward. If the Jamesian approach to
and more advanced structures that track
self-consciousness is right, however, intense
global patterns of change, found in the fear
in involves more sense of self than mild

sula, secondary somatosensory cortex and


embarrassment because there is a stronger
the anterior cingulate cortex. Damasio thinks
feeling of bodily change.
that the most primitive of these structures
Another problem with the Jamesian ap
are preconditions for consciousness itself,
proach is that it may be better suited as an
meaning that all consciousness includes some
account of the self as object rather than self
registration of the bodily changes that consti
as subject. Recall Wittgenstein's examples of
tute self-consciousness. Like James, Damasio
self as object: growing two inches, breaking
thinks that some of our experienced bodily
an arm, having hair blown in the wind. All of
patterns qualify as emotions, but he uses these
the are states of the body, just like James's
more generic term "background feelings" for
emotions and Damasio's background feel

those we experience even when we are not


ings. One might try to argue that James and
undergoing a namable emotional state.
Damasio have identified a form of subjective
The Jamesian self can be defined as the
self-awareness by arguing that we cannot
alleged experience of a self that consists
beof
mistaken about whose body is changing
felt changes in the body, including thosewhen
we we have an emotion, in contrast to cases
identify as emotions. The idea that the selfof
is objective self-awareness, where errors

experienced in this has an obvious advantage


through misidentification are possible. But
over the Cartesian view. Everyone recognizes
this claim about emotions' immunity to error
that bodily feelings exist, so the Jamesian through
self
misidentification may be mistaken.

There is evidence that we contagiously pick


does not require postulation of any dubious
mental entity. In addition, Damasio's work on
up the emotions of other people when we
the neural correlates of emotion has helpedobserve
to
them. For example, if you see an

actor express fear in a horror film, you will


support James's conjecture that these bodily
experience a corresponding emotion. When
feelings underpin our emotions and evalua
tive attitudes (Damasio 1994, Prinz 2004).
this happens, we can justifiably wonder: Am

The crucial question, however, is whether I afraid, or did I just catch your fear?
Related to this, one can question whether
bodily feelings can really be interpreted as
feelings qualifies as a form of self awareness.
If so, Wittgenstein's skepticism is misplaced. playing a subject role. Suppose I reflect on
We can find ourselves. We are located in our
some philosophical problem. If Damasio is
the experience of emotions and other bodily

bodily responses to the world.

right, I will, throughout my reflection, experi

ence some background feelings in my body.


appeal because emotions and bodily changes It does not follow that my body is doing the
are changes in us that reflect our attitudes. philosophical reflection. My body may react
But I think there are reasons to resist. First, to my thoughts, but it is not the author of my
emotions vary considerably in the extent to thoughts, and I do not experience it as such.
The Jamesian approach has strong intuitive

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154 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY


Nor is it even the bearer of my thoughts. I

2.3 The Merleau-Pontian Self

have no inclination to locate thoughts in my

This discussion of the Jamesian view might

body or to infer that my body is a precondition

be taken as a reason for denying any psycho

for thinking. This suggests that awareness of

logical link between experience of the body

the body should not be described as aware


ness of a subjective self.
In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgen
stein comments on the Jamesian approach,
saying:

and subjectivity. If the body is not construed

as the bearer of psychological states, then


the body cannot be experienced as a subject.
This is essentially a Cartesian point, but it is
one that I think Wittgenstein would endorse.

And James' introspection showed, not the

Others, however, in the history of philosophy

meaning of the word "self" ... but the state


of a philosopher's attention when he says the
word "self" to himself and tried to analyze the
meaning, (sec. 413)

resistance in the phenomenological tradition.


Husserl (1973), though heavily influenced by
Descartes, identifies self-consciousness with

Here, Wittgenstein is suggesting that James


is on a fool's errand. In PI, section 411, he

contrasts two ways of understanding the


question, "Is this my sensation?" We might
ask that question while looking in a mirror

at somebody expressing a feeling. That is


perfectly legitimate. But if we ask it while

have rejected it. We find especially strong

experiences of the body. This idea is pushed

even farther by Merleau-Ponty (1962), who


says, "My existence as subjectivity is merely
one with my existence as a body" (p. 408).
Merleau-Ponty credits Descartes with recog
nizing that the body can be experienced both
as an object, grasped by the intellect, and as a

introspecting and treat it as a claim that

lived thing, but Descartes fails to realize that

can be observationally confirmed as in the


mirror case, then we are subject to a confu
sion. Wittgenstein thinks there is no way to
point to a sensation from within, much less

the lived body may, by moving through word,

the lived body might constitute a primary


form of subjectivity (1962, p. 199). Indeed,

simultaneously allow us to constitute exter


nal objects as such, while also experiencing
broader skepticism to share his doubts about ourselves as subjects of those actions.
the Jamesian move. Even if we can, in some This emphasis on motility in Merleau
metaphorical sense, point to our sensations Ponty goes some way toward deflecting an
while having them, it does not follow that we objection raised in the last section. For while

a self. But one does not need to take on this

can point to the having of them, much less it is true that mere physiological reactions are
to a subject who bears the having relation. not experienced as playing the subject role in

There is a leap from the platitude that we are experience, the feeling of controlled motility
might play such a role. On the face of it, to
conscious of our sensations to the odd idea

feel myself willfully acting is to feel myself


that consciousness is an inner act of percep
tion in which we point to a sensation and thenas subject.
point to a subject and attribute the former This insight from the phenomenological
tradition has been echoed by a research pro
to the latter. James's version of this invites
ridicule because it identifies the subject with gram in contemporary neuroscience. Building
on theories of motor control, Blakemore and
just another sensation. One wants to know
Frith
(2003) have proposed that the feeling
not only how one sensation can serve as the
subject for others, but why the question of of subjectivity may stem from a kind of pre
subjectivity does not also arise for cephalic dictive process involving the motor control
structures in prefrontal cortex and soma
sensations, creating a kind of regress.
tosensory structures in the inferior parietal

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NEUROSCIENCE OF THE SELF / 155

lobe. The basic idea goes like this. When


supposed to take place consciously or un

we execute actions, the motor cortex does consciously. Suppose, first, that it takes place
two things: it causes the body to move, andconsciously. This would be a bit surprising,
it also causes the parietal cortex to produce
since it is certainly not obvious that we an
a predictive sensory state that corresponds
ticipate our actions and thoughts just prior to
to how the body will be perceived once that
perceiving them, but we can grant that this oc
movement takes place. This predictive state
curs for the sake of argument. Now notice in
(or "forward model") is matched against the
what this matching is supposed to consist. In
actual movements as they are perceived. Ifthe case of actions (I will ignore thoughts for
there is a match, we, at the personal level,ease of exposition), we are supposed to form
have an experience as of a willed movement.
an anticipatory mental image as of our bodies
When there is no prediction or no match, thein motion followed by an actual perception
of our bodies in motion. These two states are
movements in our body are not experienced
as our own. Thus, for Blakemore and Frith
sensory. Presumably they are kinesthetic in
a central form of felt subjectivity can be
nature. The problem is that sensory states are

explained by appeal to a prediction-andnot doing anything agentic. They are not the
matching process that takes place in the brain.states that actually cause our bodies to move,

Hohwy and Rosenberg (2005) have general


but rather they are predictions and perceptions
ized this proposal, arguing that the feeling ofof our bodies in motion. In Philosophical

subjective control over cognitive processes,


Investigations, Wittgenstein pointedly asks,
such as thinking, also involves formation of
"Are the kinesthetic sensations my willing?"
{PI, sec. 621), and a bit later he notes that a
predictions and matching.
This is an attractive proposal because thepredicted action is not the cause of the ac
alleged correlate of subjectivity is actuallytion (PI, sec. 632). Thus, contrary to initial
implicated in the production of action andappearances, kinesthetic prediction is not the

thoughts. If we experience ourselves ascorrelate of the self as subjectthe self that is


subjects, pace Wittgenstein, then it seemsthe author of actions. The willing self, if such
natural to suppose that we experience psy exists, operates unconsciously, and what we
find in experience, if this proposal is right, is
chological states that play a role in willed
nothing more than a perception of the body
activities. The neural mechanisms postulated
once it has been set into motion. This is the
by this approach have also been extensively
tested and are believed to be implicated inbody as object, not subject.
delusional disorders, such as schizophrenia, Things are even worse if we assume that
the anticipatory image and matching process
where feelings of agency break down. When
a person with schizophrenia concludes that go
a on unconsciously. If that is the case, then
thought is not self-generated, that may resultthe experience of willed actions does not

from an abnormality in the brain structures


present those actions as willed. Rather, willed

actions are just experienced as mere bodily


that are ordinarily involved in predicting what
movements. They are not even experienced
thoughts will feel like just before they actu

as anticipated. If this account is correct,


Despite its appeal, the prediction-andthen there may be nothing in experience
that marks an action as originating from
matching account of the self faces some

ally appear in consciousness.

the willnothing that suggests our actions


serious problems. To see what is wrong, let
come from the self. Instead, we only directly
us begin by pointing out a way in which the
experience cases where actions come from
proposal is underspecified. As presented, it

is unclear whether the matching process is


something other than the will. For example,

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156 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY


I might feel you pushing my body. On this

in another way: the self is what unifies our

picture, there is an experience of the other,


but never of the self. As Wittgenstein puts

experiences together. For Hume, experiences


are just a bundle, and Kant saw that this was

it, "voluntary movement is marked by the


absence of surprise" (PI, sec. 628).

problematic. When I see a bird and listen to


its song, the visual experience and the sound
are bound together. When I walk around a

We can see that Merleau-Ponty's appeal

sculpture in a gallery, each new perspective is


to the lived body, and the neuroscientific
research program that echoes this appeal, bound into a unified whole. The bundle theory
cannot defeat Wittgenstein's skepticism implies that the components of experience
about consciousness of the self. It is true

merely coexist, and Kant recognized that they

must be more intimately linked. The linkage,


that we experience our bodies in motion, but
he suggested, stems from the fact that there
the contrast between the lived body and the

is a single perceiver, a unity of apperception


body as object, which Merleau-Ponty tries

to whom each component of experience


to draw, does not hold up under scrutiny. We
Vistas of the sculpture correspond
experience the lived body as an object. belongs.
As
to a single object, because there is a single
Wittgenstein points out, we can experien
subject of experience who experiences them.
tially discover which parts of our body are
Thus, the self is not an item in experience; it
subordinate to the will without discovering
the will to which they are subordinated. is the bringing together of different sensory
components, and to the extent that our percep

2.4 The Kantian Self


tions are experienced as bound, the self can
The theories surveyed so far have some
be said to be experientially manifest.

thing in common. They all try to identify an I have no intention of defending or elabo

item in experience that could qualify as the


rating this reading of Kant here. I present
experiential counterpart of the self. The Car
this picture only to introduce one final neu
tesian approach looks for a sui generis self,
roscientific account of the self, which can
and the other two approaches try to reduce
be described as broadly consistent with the

self-consciousness to consciousness of the

Kantian approach as I have rendered it. The


body. Perhaps another approach is needed.
account I have in mind has been developed
One option is suggested by a reading by
of the psychologist Manos Tsakiris (2010),
Kant.
though he does not explicitly invoke Kant.
Kant's discussion of the self is, to some ex Tsakiris is interested in how we come to
tent, a reaction to Hume. Hume famously ar experience our bodies as our own. To ex

gued, like Wittgenstein, that we have no direct amine this, he conducted numerous experi
awareness of the self. When we look for the

ments on a phenomenon called the rubber


self in experience, we find only sensations of hand illusion. If a rubber hand is placed in

the world. Hume was not sure whether there

front of you, with your own hand out of


were any metaphysical conclusions to draw sight, and both are stroked with a brush in
from this, but he was quite sure that there is the same way, the rubber hand begins to be
no phenomenal self. Kant's response to this experienced as if it were part of your own
is somewhat concessive. He agrees that there body. You feel as if it belongs to your self.
is no item in experience corresponding to the
What makes this interesting is that there is
self. There is nothing we can attend to and a robust phenomenology associated with
say, that is me. To this extent, Kant is another ownership, but it is very hard to pin on any

skeptic. But Kant can also be read as saying of the sensory components. In control con
ditions, experimental participants undergo

that the self makes itself known in experience

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NEUROSCIENCE OF THE SELF / 157


the same setup with a stroking on the rubberimportant to the feeling of being a self. We
hand and their own, but the brushes move outdo not experience the rubber hand as part of

of sync. Under these conditions they havea body, but rather as part of my body, and that
more or less the same sensory inputs (feltseems to involve binding together different
touch and visual experiences of the rubbersensations. But does this qualify as an expe
hand being touched), but no illusion occurs.rience of the self as subject? Arguably not.
It seems the illusion requires that these com
When I experience my body as mine, I do not
ponents be bound together in the right way.
thereby experience my body as the bearer of
What is more, Tsakiris has shown that thethoughts and sensations. I do not experience
illusion does not arise when the observed
any subject that owns my body, nor do I ex
object does not look like a real hand. This
perience my body as its own owner. I experi
suggests that sensory integration depends ence
on my body as mine without experiencing
the existence of a "body model" that tells any
us me. It seems unlikely then that the right
what morphology something must have to beposterior insula gives rise to experiences of
felt as part of the body. This is reminiscent
the self as subject.
of Kant's idea that integration makes use ofAgainst this objection, it might be pointed
schemas that function as rules indicating
out that lesions to the right posterior insula
which sensory components can be bound
cause a syndrome that is strikingly sugges
together. The overall picture suggests that
tive of lost subjectivity in Wittgenstein's
ownership is experienced when and only
sense. People with such lesions continue to
when there is binding of sensory features
feel their bodies, but deny that those bodies
are theirs. This is an illusion of nonowner
governed top-down by stored knowledge
about which things can go together.
ship. What is fascinating about this is it
seems like an error of misidentification.
Tsakiris has proposed neural correlates
of body ownership based on neuroimaging
People say, I feel you touching that arm,
studies. On his account, the secondary soma
but it is not mine; it belongs to someone
tosensory cortex implements representations
else. Thus, the injury gives rise to a para
of the body, the right temporal parietal junc
digmatically objective experience of the
ture allows us to determine which observed

body. In contrast, when the right posterior

objects could be parts of our body, the premo insula is intact, we seem to be immune to

tor cortex recalibrates the body coordinateerrors of this kind. The tactile sensations we
system when the illusion is induced, and thefeel cannot be mistaken for sensations in
right posterior insula gives rise to the expe someone else. That suggests this bit of the
rience of ownership. Rephrased in Kantian brain grounds the difference between having
terms, we might say that the right posterior sensations that are objective and subjective.
insula undergirds the unity of bodily percepTo this extent, it looks plausible to say the
tion. It is the brain structure that allows us

right posterior insula gives rise to the feeling

to experience the visually presented rubberof being a subject.


hand and the tactile sensation of stroking as I think we should resist this inference. It
representations of the same object. The unity is fascinating that we can have bodily sen
is part of our phenomenology, but it is not an sations without recognizing them as ours;
item in experience that can be separated from Wittgenstein might have been very surprised.
the unified sensations.
But it does not follow that such recognition

Tsakiris regards this research as revealing involves the feeling of being a subject. There
something about the neural correlates of selfmay be no such sensation. Rather, the im

consciousness. The feeling of ownership is munity to error that arises when the insula

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158 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

3. Conclusions: Limiting the Self

is intact may stem from the fact that the


insula binds tactile perception to centers of
control, so that we come to know, from tac
tile sensations, that the affected limb is one

The foregoing survey is not exhaustive.


There has been considerable interest in the

self in recent neuroscience, and other imagi

that we can control. When tactile sensations

native research programs exist, exploring


are bound to control centers, we cannot be
everything from the feeling of free will to out

mistaken about whose they are, because the


of-body experiences. All of this work is teach
who in question is the one doing the control
ing us something about the conditions under
ling. It would be bizarre in the extreme to
which we make judgments about ourselves
have a sensation in my hand, recognize that
and the neural mechanisms that make such
I can move that same hand, and still wonder
judgments possible. But I do not think any
whose hand it is. This immunity to error
of this work should be taken as establishing
through misidentification does not imply
that there is anything like a self as subject in
that we make correct judgments of owner
experience. None of the research undermines
ship through anything like identification. We
Wittgenstein's skeptical claim that there is
do not feel tactile sensations and then locate
no subject there to be found. We can find
their subject as another item in experience.
thoughts, intentions, and the body in action,
I do not even think we directly experience
but not the bearer of thoughts, the author of
the capacity to control movements. Rather,
intentions, or the owner of the body. If that is
the capacity is a kind of know-how. When
right, the neuroscience of the self is best un
we lose that capacity, or knowledge of it,
derstood as either the scientific investigation
we rely on inferential knowledge to settle
of self as object or the investigation of factors
on who owns our limbs, and at that point
that contribute to judgments about the self as
the possibility of error arises.
subject. We have not found any correlates of
If this interpretation is right, sensory inte
the self as subject that might be encountered
gration (or rather, sensorimotor integration) is

in experience, and if Wittgenstein is right, we

important to a knowledge of ownership, and never will.


knowledge of ownership furnishes us with a
This does not mean that any of the neuro
kind of immunity to error through misiden scientific research reviewed here should be
tification. But knowledge of ownership does
abandoned. Those pursuing this work have
not involve any experience of ourselves as
not explicitly set out to find the self as sub
subjects. It is a kind of know-how.
ject; they aim only to find neural correlates
None of this threatens Tsakiris's research as

of measurable behaviors (e.g., judgments

he presents it. His studies are helping identify

of control, ownership, emotional responses,

the factors that lead us to recognize our bodies


or the feeling of being absorbed in a task).
as our own. But we should not infer that he

is locating neural correlates of the subjective


self. Nor should we find in this research any

This work is often highly informative. For


example, Frith's work on predictive models
is helping us understand primary symptoms

reason to be optimistic about the Kantian


in schizophrenia, and Damasio's work on
approach to self-consciousness. Tsakiris
bodily feelings has helped establish a role

does show that, by manipulating what gets


for emotions in decision making. But much
bound with what, we can alter one's sense of
ownership, but he does not show that binding

is sufficient (or necessary) for experiencing


one's self as such.

of this work is done under the rubric of "the

self," and that label can potentially mislead.


The idea that we might find the self in the
brain, or even the feeling of being an agentic

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NEUROSCIENCE OF THE SELF / 159

self, may be misguided from the start. Witt


simulation, thus extending the self into the
genstein's observations help to see why thissocial world (cf. Notebooks, sec. 15.10.16).
project is unlikely to succeed.
To say that the self is the limit is to say that
It does not follow that there can be no Witt the worlds we inhabit, our worlds, have con

gensteinian neuroscience of the self. Witttents that depend on how we perceive, think,
genstein is happy to say that the self exists
and socially interact. Neuroscience can play
in two sensesas an object and as a limit.
a role in investigating these things. In fact,
Some of the research surveyed here may help cognitive neuroscience is almost always
us understand the mechanisms that allow us
concerned with how we construct the world

to see the self as an object (consider again or, more accurately, with the mechanisms that
the impact of lesions in the right posterior constrain our constructions. Neuroscience
insula). Other research can be described as cannot replace other forms of inquiry into
exploring the self as limit. Research on the the self as limit, but it can help us figure out,
shape of the visual field (a favorite example in a mechanistic way, why our world has the
of the young Wittgenstein) reveals facts about boundaries that it does. Neuroscience might

the geometry of perceived space and the way even help us understand why we cannot find

in which space can become distorted withthe self as subject in the world. If the self turns
shifts in attention. Neuroscience can helpout to be real, in some sense, then why can we
identify mechanisms by which we convert not view it? Wittgenstein might recommend
perspective-dependent sensations into an conceptual therapy to answer this question,
objective conception of the world, and it can but a different answer may be discovered
play a role in understanding how we impose by studying the constraints on inner aware
categorial joints on nature (think of Wittgenness that result from the architecture of the

stein on aspect perception). Such researchbrain.


can also examine the role of language and
memory in the construction time (cf. PI,
sec. 650), and it can be used to show how

City University of New York,


Graduate Center

comprehension of other minds makes use of

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