Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://about.jstor.org/terms
This content downloaded from 66.11.2.165 on Sun, 11 Sep 2016 21:03:10 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
T
J. here has been a recent fashion of self
seeking in cognitive neuroscience. Researchers
have been trying to identify the neurophysio
logical processes that underlie our experiences
but as a limit. In this discussion, I will critically of different ways, and my goal here is not to
pertaining to the self can help us see where we experience the contents of our thoughts
some current empirical efforts go wrong. In and perceptions, but not a subject of them.
fact, some of those efforts repeat mistakes of
the philosophical theories that Wittgenstein in a moment, but first it is worth noting that
was intent to criticize. What I offer here is a
Wittgenstein also appears to be advancing the
naturalistic Wittgensteinian inquiry into the metaphysical thesis that "there is no subject."
emerging neuroscience of the self.
must is
clarify both the sense in which the sub
Wittgenstein's skepticism about the self
ject does not exist, and the sense (or senses) in
already clearly expressed in the Tractatus
2011 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois
This content downloaded from 66.11.2.165 on Sun, 11 Sep 2016 21:03:10 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
"metaphysical subject":
penhauer (1818, vol. 2, pp. xxii, xli). Scho Having abandoned the idea of a world beyond
penhauer is working within the grip of Kant's representation, Wittgenstein turns the world
distinction between the phenomenal and theof representation into the real world, and the
noumenal, and he claims we know the self metaphysical selfwho would have to lie
only through phenomena, in Kant's sense, outside that world if it existed, rendering it
and phenomena are directed outward on the merely phenomenalshrinks away.
world, not inward. So for Schopenhauer the Thus, we see in these passages that Witt
This content downloaded from 66.11.2.165 on Sun, 11 Sep 2016 21:03:10 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
Brown Books (Wittgenstein 1960), we are self is somewhat less explicit, but it actu
famously told:
toothache!'(pp. 67ff.)
(sec. 620)
subject. The self whose arms can break is an about an introspectible I to include a more
item in the world, but the subject of experi general skepticism about the introspectibility
ences and intentional actions is not, if the
the first person are immune to error through only is there no subject to be found; there is
misidentification. In the objective use, I can also no item in the mind corresponding to
make first erroneous judgments first person subject's intentions or will. There is no inner
by referring to the wrong person. I might look doing, but only various effects (often publicly
someone else's reflection and think my hair a psychological analogue of the self as sub
has been tussled by the wind. But according ject will meet with frustration. There is no
to Shoemaker's Wittgenstein, I cannot think I such self to be found. At best, we can find
am experiencing a pain only to discover that a self as limit. This suggests that many phi
In the present context, I think Wittgenstein's are mistaken. It also has implications for
point about error might be more revealingly cognitive science. In recent years there has
reformulated as a point about correctness. In been an active effort to identify psychologi
the subjective cases, I do not get things right cal and neural correlates of the self. These
by identifying myself. I do not find an "I" and efforts often presuppose that the self is an
then say, this I is experiencing a pain. Rather, item in experience. The science proceeds by
I just experience the pain. This formulation identifying experiences that allegedly contain
reminds us that, for Wittgenstein, there is no an awareness of the self, followed by efforts
I to be found in experience.
This content downloaded from 66.11.2.165 on Sun, 11 Sep 2016 21:03:10 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
which develops the idea of self as limit, may headings. If the empirical research fails, that
The discussion below surveys recent ef the contents of thought, then the self would
to finding the self. In fact, each of the researchof thinking suggests that, for Descartes, the
programs in neuroscience that I will mentionself is present to the mind as a thing over
has counterparts in the history of philosophy. and above our thoughts.
This content downloaded from 66.11.2.165 on Sun, 11 Sep 2016 21:03:10 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
One difficulty with this interpretation isnothing about themselves and offers no time
that Descartes may arrive at his res cogitansfor contemplation or free association. Un
der these conditions, self-awareness seems
through inference rather than introspection.
titled to infer thinkers from thoughts. Thoughbut to identify underlying brain structures.
Descarte might have been making this dubiParticipants performed the described task
ous inferential move, it is also possible thatin an fMRI (functional magnetic resonance
Descartes believed in sui generis phenomenalimaging) scanner, in an effort to identify the
I. For exposition, let us call this a Cartesianbrain structures that turn off and on with the
view of the self.
is at least one research program in contempoishes. Have the experimenters discovered the
neural seat of the self?
rary cognitive neuroscience that implies such
self can be present as an item in experiencetion. For one thing, the left superior frontal
but, unlike Descartes, they claim that the self gyrus is known to be involved in working
is not always present. In a clever experiment, memorythe mechanisms that allow us to
they try to find neural correlates of the self bybriefly hold information in our heads. The
exploiting this fact. Their point of the deparfact that working memory is active when
ture is the folk psychological observation that people reflect on their attitudes towards
we sometimes seem to become so absorbed in
laboratory conditions under which loss of self the same structure will also be active in tasks
This content downloaded from 66.11.2.165 on Sun, 11 Sep 2016 21:03:10 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
jectivity, or even executive control. One cantion might be taken as reflection of the self.
lose oneself in pleasure or while performing The effort to identify self-awareness with
a challenging task. Wittgenstein would noteemotions can be traced to William James. In
the Principles of Psychology, James (1890,
that there is no way to lose oneself because
that implies that the self is also somethingchap. 25) argues that emotions are felt
we can find when we look for it, and this ischanges in the body. He says a similar thing
precisely what he sets out to deny. Suppose,about the self (chap. 10). When we experience
ourselves, he says, we are actually experienc
after being asked to say whether animals are
quest for authentic desires, not to the recovery motions are the portions of my innermost
activity of which I am most distinctly aware.
of a subject in experience.
(1890, p. 301)
If the Goldberg et al. study is any indica
tion, we should not hold out hope for idenSuch physiological changes reflect our reac
tifying a sui generis self. Wittgensteinian tions to the thoughts we have and the objects
skepticism seems to be the appropriate stance we encounter, and are thus experiences as
towards the Cartesian I, so understood.
corporal analogues of the self.
they think the self is reducible to some other of ongoing changes in the body. When we
This content downloaded from 66.11.2.165 on Sun, 11 Sep 2016 21:03:10 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
The crucial question, however, is whether I afraid, or did I just catch your fear?
Related to this, one can question whether
bodily feelings can really be interpreted as
feelings qualifies as a form of self awareness.
If so, Wittgenstein's skepticism is misplaced. playing a subject role. Suppose I reflect on
We can find ourselves. We are located in our
some philosophical problem. If Damasio is
the experience of emotions and other bodily
This content downloaded from 66.11.2.165 on Sun, 11 Sep 2016 21:03:10 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
can point to the having of them, much less it is true that mere physiological reactions are
to a subject who bears the having relation. not experienced as playing the subject role in
There is a leap from the platitude that we are experience, the feeling of controlled motility
might play such a role. On the face of it, to
conscious of our sensations to the odd idea
This content downloaded from 66.11.2.165 on Sun, 11 Sep 2016 21:03:10 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
we execute actions, the motor cortex does consciously. Suppose, first, that it takes place
two things: it causes the body to move, andconsciously. This would be a bit surprising,
it also causes the parietal cortex to produce
since it is certainly not obvious that we an
a predictive sensory state that corresponds
ticipate our actions and thoughts just prior to
to how the body will be perceived once that
perceiving them, but we can grant that this oc
movement takes place. This predictive state
curs for the sake of argument. Now notice in
(or "forward model") is matched against the
what this matching is supposed to consist. In
actual movements as they are perceived. Ifthe case of actions (I will ignore thoughts for
there is a match, we, at the personal level,ease of exposition), we are supposed to form
have an experience as of a willed movement.
an anticipatory mental image as of our bodies
When there is no prediction or no match, thein motion followed by an actual perception
of our bodies in motion. These two states are
movements in our body are not experienced
as our own. Thus, for Blakemore and Frith
sensory. Presumably they are kinesthetic in
a central form of felt subjectivity can be
nature. The problem is that sensory states are
explained by appeal to a prediction-andnot doing anything agentic. They are not the
matching process that takes place in the brain.states that actually cause our bodies to move,
This content downloaded from 66.11.2.165 on Sun, 11 Sep 2016 21:03:10 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
thing in common. They all try to identify an I have no intention of defending or elabo
gued, like Wittgenstein, that we have no direct amine this, he conducted numerous experi
awareness of the self. When we look for the
skeptic. But Kant can also be read as saying of the sensory components. In control con
ditions, experimental participants undergo
This content downloaded from 66.11.2.165 on Sun, 11 Sep 2016 21:03:10 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
of sync. Under these conditions they havea body, but rather as part of my body, and that
more or less the same sensory inputs (feltseems to involve binding together different
touch and visual experiences of the rubbersensations. But does this qualify as an expe
hand being touched), but no illusion occurs.rience of the self as subject? Arguably not.
It seems the illusion requires that these com
When I experience my body as mine, I do not
ponents be bound together in the right way.
thereby experience my body as the bearer of
What is more, Tsakiris has shown that thethoughts and sensations. I do not experience
illusion does not arise when the observed
any subject that owns my body, nor do I ex
object does not look like a real hand. This
perience my body as its own owner. I experi
suggests that sensory integration depends ence
on my body as mine without experiencing
the existence of a "body model" that tells any
us me. It seems unlikely then that the right
what morphology something must have to beposterior insula gives rise to experiences of
felt as part of the body. This is reminiscent
the self as subject.
of Kant's idea that integration makes use ofAgainst this objection, it might be pointed
schemas that function as rules indicating
out that lesions to the right posterior insula
which sensory components can be bound
cause a syndrome that is strikingly sugges
together. The overall picture suggests that
tive of lost subjectivity in Wittgenstein's
ownership is experienced when and only
sense. People with such lesions continue to
when there is binding of sensory features
feel their bodies, but deny that those bodies
are theirs. This is an illusion of nonowner
governed top-down by stored knowledge
about which things can go together.
ship. What is fascinating about this is it
seems like an error of misidentification.
Tsakiris has proposed neural correlates
of body ownership based on neuroimaging
People say, I feel you touching that arm,
studies. On his account, the secondary soma
but it is not mine; it belongs to someone
tosensory cortex implements representations
else. Thus, the injury gives rise to a para
of the body, the right temporal parietal junc
digmatically objective experience of the
ture allows us to determine which observed
objects could be parts of our body, the premo insula is intact, we seem to be immune to
tor cortex recalibrates the body coordinateerrors of this kind. The tactile sensations we
system when the illusion is induced, and thefeel cannot be mistaken for sensations in
right posterior insula gives rise to the expe someone else. That suggests this bit of the
rience of ownership. Rephrased in Kantian brain grounds the difference between having
terms, we might say that the right posterior sensations that are objective and subjective.
insula undergirds the unity of bodily percepTo this extent, it looks plausible to say the
tion. It is the brain structure that allows us
Tsakiris regards this research as revealing involves the feeling of being a subject. There
something about the neural correlates of selfmay be no such sensation. Rather, the im
consciousness. The feeling of ownership is munity to error that arises when the insula
This content downloaded from 66.11.2.165 on Sun, 11 Sep 2016 21:03:10 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
This content downloaded from 66.11.2.165 on Sun, 11 Sep 2016 21:03:10 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
gensteinian neuroscience of the self. Witttents that depend on how we perceive, think,
genstein is happy to say that the self exists
and socially interact. Neuroscience can play
in two sensesas an object and as a limit.
a role in investigating these things. In fact,
Some of the research surveyed here may help cognitive neuroscience is almost always
us understand the mechanisms that allow us
concerned with how we construct the world
to see the self as an object (consider again or, more accurately, with the mechanisms that
the impact of lesions in the right posterior constrain our constructions. Neuroscience
insula). Other research can be described as cannot replace other forms of inquiry into
exploring the self as limit. Research on the the self as limit, but it can help us figure out,
shape of the visual field (a favorite example in a mechanistic way, why our world has the
of the young Wittgenstein) reveals facts about boundaries that it does. Neuroscience might
the geometry of perceived space and the way even help us understand why we cannot find
in which space can become distorted withthe self as subject in the world. If the self turns
shifts in attention. Neuroscience can helpout to be real, in some sense, then why can we
identify mechanisms by which we convert not view it? Wittgenstein might recommend
perspective-dependent sensations into an conceptual therapy to answer this question,
objective conception of the world, and it can but a different answer may be discovered
play a role in understanding how we impose by studying the constraints on inner aware
categorial joints on nature (think of Wittgenness that result from the architecture of the
REFERENCES
Blakemore, S. J., and C. D. Frith. 2003. "Self-Awareness and Action," Current Opinion in N
ogy, vol. 13, pp. 219-224.
Damasio, A. 1994. Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New York:
nam's).
. 1999. The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Conscious
(New York: Harcourt).
Goldberg, 1.1., M. Harel, and R. Malach. 2006. "When the Brain Loses Itself: Prefrontal Ina
This content downloaded from 66.11.2.165 on Sun, 11 Sep 2016 21:03:10 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
Shoemaker, S. 1968. "Self-Reference and Self-Awareness," Journal of Philosophy, vol. 65, pp.
555-567.
Tsakiris, M. 2010. "My Body in the Brain: A Neurocognitive Model of Body-Ownership," Neuropsy
This content downloaded from 66.11.2.165 on Sun, 11 Sep 2016 21:03:10 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms