2.

) LIABILITY FOR CONTRACTS

G.R. No. 175527

December 8, 2008

HON. GABRIEL LUIS QUISUMBING, HON. ESTRELLA P. YAPHA, HON. VICTORIA G. COROMINAS, HON. RAUL D.
BACALTOS (Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cebu), petitioners,
vs.
HON. GWENDOLYN F. GARCIA (In her capacity as Governor of the Province of Cebu), HON. DELFIN P. AGUILAR (in his
capacity as Director IV (Cluster Director) of COA), Cluster IV Visayas Local Government Sector, HON. HELEN S.
HILAYO (In her capacity as Regional Cluster Director of COA), and HON. ROY L. URSAL (In his capacity as Regional Legal
and Adjudication Director of COA), respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Gabriel Luis Quisumbing (Quisumbing), Estrella P. Yapha, Victoria G. Corominas, and Raul D. Bacaltos (Bacaltos), collectively
petitioners, assail the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 9, in Civil Case No. CEB-31560, dated July
11, 2006, which declared that under the pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 7160 (R.A. No. 7160), or the Local Government
Code, and Republic Act No. 9184 (R.A. No. 9184), or the Government Procurement Reform Act, respondent Cebu Provincial
Governor Gwendolyn F. Garcia (Gov. Garcia), need not secure the prior authorization of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan before
entering into contracts committing the province to monetary obligations.
The undisputed facts gathered from the assailed Decision and the pleadings submitted by the parties are as follows:
The Commission on Audit (COA) conducted a financial audit on the Province of Cebu for the period ending December 2004. Its audit
team rendered a report, Part II of which states: "Several contracts in the total amount ofP102,092,841.47 were not supported with
a Sangguniang Panlalawigan resolution authorizing
the Provincial Governor to enter into a contract, as required under Section 22 of R.A. No. 7160."2 The audit team then recommended
that, "Henceforth, the local chief executive must secure a sanggunian resolution authorizing the former to enter into a contract as
provided under Section 22 of R.A. No. 7160."3
Gov. Garcia, in her capacity as the Provincial Governor of Cebu, sought the reconsideration of the findings and recommendation of
the COA. However, without waiting for the resolution of the reconsideration sought, she instituted an action for Declaratory Relief
before the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 9. Impleaded as respondents were Delfin P. Aguilar, Helen S. Hilayo and Roy L. Ursal in their
official capacities as Cluster Director IV, Regional Cluster Director and Regional Legal and Adjudication Director of the COA,
respectively. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Cebu, represented by Vice-Governor Gregorio Sanchez, Jr., was also
impleaded as respondent.
Alleging that the infrastructure contracts4 subject of the audit report complied with the bidding procedures provided under R.A. No.
9184 and were entered into pursuant to the general and/or supplemental appropriation ordinances passed by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, Gov. Garcia alleged that a separate authority to enter into such contracts was no longer necessary.
On the basis of the parties respective memoranda, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision dated July 11, 2006, declaring that
Gov. Garcia need not secure prior authorization from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cebu before entering into the questioned
contracts. The dispositive portion of the Decision provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court hereby renders judgment in favor of Petitioner and against the Respondent
COA officials and declares that pursuant to Sections 22 paragraph in relation to Sections 306 and 346 of the Local
Government Code and Section 37 of the Government Procurement Reform Act, the Petitioner Governor of Cebu need not
secure prior authorization by way of a resolution from theSangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Cebu before she
enters into a contract involving monetary obligations on the part of the Province of Cebu when there is a prior appropriation
ordinance enacted.

Insofar as Respondent Sangguniang Panlalawigan, this case is hereby dismissed.5

In brief, the trial court declared that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan does not have juridical personality nor is it vested by R.A. No.
7160 with authority to sue and be sued. The trial court accordingly dismissed the case against respondent members of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. On the question of the remedy of declaratory relief being improper because a breach had already been
committed, the trial court held that the case would ripen into and be treated as an ordinary civil action. The trial court further ruled that
it is only when the contract (entered into by the local chief executive) involves obligations which are not backed by prior ordinances
that the prior authority of thesanggunian concerned is required. In this case, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cebu had already
given its prior authorization when it passed the appropriation ordinances which authorized the expenditures in the questioned
contracts.
The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration6 filed by Quisumbing, Bacaltos, Carmiano Kintanar, Jose Ma. Gastardo, and
Agnes Magpale, in their capacities as members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cebu, in an Order7 dated October 25, 2006.
In the Petition for Review8 dated November 22, 2006, petitioners insisted that the RTC committed reversible error in granting due
course to Gov. Garcias petition for declaratory relief despite a breach of the law subject of the petition having already been
committed. This breach was allegedly already the subject of a pending investigation by the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas.
Petitioners further maintained that prior authorization from theSangguniang Panlalawigan should be secured before Gov. Garcia could
validly enter into contracts involving monetary obligations on the part of the province.
Gov. Garcia, in her Comment9 dated April 10, 2007, notes that the RTC had already dismissed the case against the members of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cebu on the ground that they did not have legal personality to sue and be sued. Since the COA
officials also named as respondents in the petition for declaratory relief neither filed a motion for reconsideration nor appealed the
RTC Decision, the said Decision became final and executory. Moreover, only two of the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
namely, petitioners Quisumbing and Bacaltos, originally named as respondents in the petition for declaratory relief, filed the instant
petition before the Court.
Respondent Governor insists that at the time of the filing of the petition for declaratory relief, there was not yet any breach of R.A. No.
7160. She further argues that the questioned contracts were executed after a public bidding in implementation of specific items in the
regular or supplemental appropriation ordinances passed by theSangguniang Panlalawigan. These ordinances allegedly serve as the
authorization required under R.A. No. 7160, such that the obtention of another authorization becomes not only redundant but also
detrimental to the speedy delivery of basic services.
Gov. Garcia also claims that in its Comment to the petition for declaratory relief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) took a
stand supportive of the governors arguments. The OSGs official position allegedly binds the COA.
Expressing gratitude for having been allowed by this Court to file a comment on the petition, respondent COA officials in their
Comment10 dated March 8, 2007, maintain that Sections 306 and 346 of R.A. No. 7160 cannot be considered exceptions to Sec. 22(c)
of R.A. No. 7160. Sec. 346 allegedly refers to disbursements which must be made in accordance with an appropriation ordinance
without need of approval from the sanggunian concerned. Sec. 306, on the other hand, refers to the authorization for the effectivity of
the budget and should not be mistaken for the specific authorization by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for the local chief executive to
enter into contracts under Sec. 22(c) of R.A. No. 7160.
The question that must be resolved by the Court should allegedly be whether the appropriation ordinance referred to in Sec. 346 in
relation to Sec. 306 of R.A. No. 7160 is the same prior authorization required under Sec. 22(c) of the same law. To uphold the assailed
Decision would allegedly give the local chief executive unbridled authority to enter into any contract as long as an appropriation
ordinance or budget has been passed by thesanggunian concerned.
Respondent COA officials also claim that the petition for declaratory relief should have been dismissed for the failure of Gov. Garcia
to exhaust administrative remedies, rendering the petition not ripe for judicial determination.
The OSG filed a Comment11 dated March 12, 2007, pointing out that the instant petition raises factual issues warranting its denial. For
instance, petitioners, on one hand, claim that there was no appropriation ordinance passed for 2004 but only a reenacted appropriations
ordinance and that the unauthorized contracts did not proceed from a public bidding pursuant to R.A. No. 9184. Gov. Garcia, on the

other hand, claims that the contracts were entered into in compliance with the bidding procedures in R.A. No. 9184 and pursuant to the
general and/or supplemental appropriations ordinances passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. She further asserts that there were
ordinances allowing the expenditures made.
On the propriety of the action for declaratory relief filed by Gov. Garcia, the OSG states in very general terms that such an action must
be brought before any breach or violation of the statute has been committed and may be treated as an ordinary action only if the breach
occurs after the filing of the action but before the termination thereof. However, it does not say in this case whether such recourse is
proper.
Nonetheless, the OSG goes on to discuss that Sec. 323 of R.A. No. 7160 allows disbursements for salaries and wages of existing
positions, statutory and contractual obligations and essential operating expenses authorized in the annual and supplemental budgets of
the preceding year (which are deemed reenacted in case thesanggunian concerned fails to pass the ordinance authorizing the annual
appropriations at the beginning of the ensuing fiscal year). Contractual obligations not included in the preceding years annual and
supplemental budgets allegedly require the prior approval or authorization of the local sanggunian.
In their Consolidated Reply12 dated August 8, 2007, petitioners insist that the instant petition raises only questions of law not only
because the parties have agreed during the proceedings before the trial court that the case involves purely legal questions, but also
because there is no dispute that the Province of Cebu was operating under a reenacted budget in 2004.
They further defend their standing to bring suit not only as members of the sanggunian whose powers Gov. Garcia has allegedly
usurped, but also as taxpayers whose taxes have been illegally spent. Petitioners plead leniency in the Courts ruling regarding their
legal standing, as this case involves a matter of public policy.
Petitioners finally draw attention to the OSGs seeming change of heart and adoption of their argument that Gov. Garcia has violated
R.A. No. 7160.
It should be mentioned at the outset that a reading of the OSGs Comment 13 on the petition for declaratory relief indeed reveals its
view that Sec. 22(c) of R.A. No. 7160 admits of exceptions. It maintains, however, that the said law is clear and leaves no room for
interpretation, only application. Its Comment on the instant petition does not reflect a change of heart but merely an amplification of
its original position.
Although we agree with the OSG that there are factual matters that have yet to be settled in this case, the records disclose enough facts
for the Court to be able to make a definitive ruling on the basic legal arguments of the parties.
The trial courts pronouncement that "the parties in this case all agree that the contracts referred to in the above findings are contracts
entered into pursuant to the bidding procedures allowed in Republic Act No. 9184 or the Government Procurement Reform Acti.e.,
public bidding, and negotiated bid. The biddings were made pursuant to the general and/or supplemental appropriation ordinances
passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cebu x x x"14 is clearly belied by the Answer15 filed by petitioners herein. Petitioners
herein actually argue in their Answer that the contracts subject of the COAs findings did not proceed from a public bidding. Further,
there was no budget passed in 2004. What was allegedly in force was the reenacted 2003 budget. 16
Gov. Garcias contention that the questioned contracts complied with the bidding procedure in R.A. No. 9184 and were entered into
pursuant to the general and supplemental appropriation ordinances allowing these expenditures is diametrically at odds with the facts
as presented by petitioners in this case. It is notable, however, that while Gov. Garcia insists on the existence of appropriation
ordinances which allegedly authorized her to enter into the questioned contracts, she does not squarely deny that these ordinances
pertain to the previous years budget which was reenacted in 2004.
Thus, contrary to the trial courts finding, there was no agreement among the parties with regard to the operative facts under which the
case was to be resolved. Nonetheless, we can gather from Gov. Garcias silence on the matter and the OSGs own discussion on the
effect of a reenacted budget on the local chief executives ability to enter into contracts, that during the year in question, the Province
of Cebu was indeed operating under a reenacted budget.

Note should be taken of the fact that Gov. Garcia, both in her petition for declaratory relief and in her Comment on the instant petition,
has failed to point out the specific provisions in the general and supplemental appropriation ordinances copiously mentioned in her
pleadings which supposedly authorized her to enter into the questioned contracts.
Based on the foregoing discussion, there appear two basic premises from which the Court can proceed to discuss the question of
whether prior approval by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was required before Gov. Garcia could have validly entered into the
questioned contracts. First, the Province of Cebu was operating under a reenacted budget in 2004. Second, Gov. Garcia entered
into contracts on behalf of the province while this reenacted budget was in force.
Sec. 22(c) of R.A. No. 7160 provides:
Sec. 22. Corporate Powers.(a) Every local government unit, as a corporation, shall have the following powers:
xxx
(c) Unless otherwise provided in this Code, no contract may be entered into by the local chief executive in behalf of the local
government unit without prior authorization by the sanggunian concerned. A legible copy of such contract shall be posted at a
conspicuous place in the provincial capitol or the city, municipal or barangay hall.
As it clearly appears from the foregoing provision, prior authorization by the sanggunian concerned is required before the local chief
executive may enter into contracts on behalf of the local government unit.
Gov. Garcia posits that Sections 306 and 346 of R.A. No. 7160 are the exceptions to Sec. 22(c) and operate to allow her to enter into
contracts on behalf of the Province of Cebu without further authority from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan other than that already
granted in the appropriation ordinance for 2003 and the supplemental ordinances which, however, she did not care to elucidate on.
The cited provisions state:
Sec. 306. Definition of Terms.When used in this Title, the term:
(a) "Annual Budget" refers to a financial plan embodying the estimates of income and expenditures for one (1) fiscal year;
(b) "Appropriation" refers to an authorization made by ordinance, directing the payment of goods and services from local
government funds under specified conditions or for specific purposes;
(c) "Budget Document" refers to the instrument used by the local chief executive to present a comprehensive financial plan to
the sanggunian concerned;
(d) "Capital Outlays" refers to appropriations for the purchase of goods and services, the benefits of which extend beyond the
fiscal year and which add to the assets of the local government unit concerned, including investments in public utilities such
as public markets and slaughterhouses;
(e) "Continuing Appropriation" refers to an appropriation available to support obligations for a specified purpose or projects,
such as those for the construction of physical structures or for the acquisition of real property or equipment, even when these
obligations are incurred beyond the budget year;
(f) "Current Operating Expenditures" refers to appropriations for the purchase of goods and services for the conduct of
normal government operations within the fiscal year, including goods and services that will be used or consumed during the
budget year;
(g) "Expected Results" refers to the services, products, or benefits that will accrue to the public, estimated in terms of
performance measures or physical targets;

(h) "Fund" refers to a sum of money, or other assets convertible to cash, set aside for the purpose of carrying out specific
activities or attaining certain objectives in accordance with special regulations, restrictions, or limitations, and constitutes an
independent fiscal and accounting entity;
(i) "Income" refers to all revenues and receipts collected or received forming the gross accretions of funds of the local
government unit;
(j) "Obligations" refers to an amount committed to be paid by the local government unit for any lawful act made by an
accountable officer for and in behalf of the local government unit concerned;
(k) "Personal Services" refers to appropriations for the payment of salaries, wages and other compensation of permanent,
temporary, contractual, and casual employees of the local government unit;
(l) "Receipts" refers to income realized from operations and activities of the local government or are received by it in the
exercise of its corporate functions, consisting of charges for services rendered, conveniences furnished, or the price of a
commodity sold, as well as loans, contributions or aids from other entities, except provisional advances for budgetary
purposes; and
(m) "Revenue" refers to income derived from the regular system of taxation enforced under authority of law or ordinance
and, as such, accrue more or less regularly every year.
xxx
Sec. 346. Disbursements of Local Funds and Statement of Accounts.Disbursements shall be made in accordance with the
ordinance authorizing the annual or supplemental appropriations without the prior approval of the sanggunian concerned.
Within thirty (3) days after the close of each month, the local accountant shall furnish the sanggunian with such financial
statements as may be prescribed by the COA. In the case of the year-end statement of accounts, the period shall be sixty (60)
days after the thirty-first (31st) of December.
Sec. 306 of R.A. No. 7160 merely contains a definition of terms. Read in conjunction with Sec. 346, Sec. 306 authorizes the local
chief executive to make disbursements of funds in accordance with the ordinance authorizing the annual or supplemental
appropriations. The "ordinance" referred to in Sec. 346 pertains to that which enacts the local government units budget, for which
reason no further authorization from the local council is required, the ordinance functioning, as it does, as the legislative authorization
of the budget.17
To construe Sections 306 and 346 of R.A. No. 7160 as exceptions to Sec. 22(c) would render the requirement of
prior sanggunian authorization superfluous, useless and irrelevant. There would be no instance when such prior authorization would
be required, as in contracts involving the disbursement of appropriated funds. Yet, this is obviously not the effect Congress had in
mind when it required, as a condition to the local chief executives representation of the local government unit in business
transactions, the prior authorization of the sanggunianconcerned. The requirement was deliberately added as a measure of check and
balance, to temper the authority of the local chief executive, and in recognition of the fact that the corporate powers of the local
government unit are wielded as much by its chief executive as by its council.18 However, as will be discussed later,
the sanggunianauthorization may be in the form of an appropriation ordinance passed for the year which specifically covers the
project, cost or contract to be entered into by the local government unit.
The fact that the Province of Cebu operated under a reenacted budget in 2004 lent a complexion to this case which the trial court did
not apprehend. Sec. 323 of R.A. No. 7160 provides that in case of a reenacted budget, "only the annual appropriations for salaries and
wages of existing positions, statutory and contractual obligations, and essential operating expenses authorized in the annual and
supplemental budgets for the preceding year shall be deemed reenacted and disbursement of funds shall be in accordance therewith." 19
It should be observed that, as indicated by the word "only" preceding the above enumeration in Sec. 323, the items for which
disbursements may be made under a reenacted budget are exclusive. Clearly, contractual obligations which were not included in the
previous years annual and supplemental budgets cannot be disbursed by the local government unit. It follows, too, that new contracts
entered into by the local chief executive require the prior approval of the sanggunian.

We agree with the OSG that the words "disbursement" and "contract" separately referred to in Sec. 346 and 22(c) of R.A. No. 7160
should be understood in their common signification. Disbursement is defined as "To pay out, commonly from a fund. To make
payment in settlement of a debt or account payable."20 Contract, on the other hand, is defined by our Civil Code as "a meeting of
minds between two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service." 21
And so, to give life to the obvious intendment of the law and to avoid a construction which would render Sec. 22(c) of R.A. No. 7160
meaningless,22 disbursement, as used in Sec. 346, should be understood to pertain to payments for statutory and contractual obligations
which the sanggunian has already authorized thru ordinances enacting the annual budget and are therefore already subsisting
obligations of the local government unit. Contracts, as used in Sec. 22(c) on the other hand, are those which bind the local government
unit to new obligations, with their corresponding terms and conditions, for which the local chief executive needs prior authority from
the sanggunian.
Elsewhere in R.A. No. 7160 are found provisions which buttress the stand taken by petitioners against Gov. Garcias seemingly
heedless actions. Sec. 465, Art. 1, Chapter 3 of R.A. No. 7160 states that the provincial governor shall "[r]epresent the province in all
its business transactions and sign in its behalf all bonds, contracts, and obligations, and such other documents upon authority of
the Sangguniang Panlalawiganor pursuant to law or ordinances." Sec. 468, Art. 3 of the same chapter also establishes
the sanggunians power, as the provinces legislative body, to authorize the provincial governor to negotiate and contract loans, lease
public buildings held in a proprietary capacity to private parties, among other things.
The foregoing inexorably confirms the indispensability of the sanggunians authorization in the execution of contracts which bind the
local government unit to new obligations. Note should be taken of the fact that R.A. No. 7160 does not expressly state the form that
the authorization by the sanggunian has to take. Such authorization may be done by resolution enacted in the same manner prescribed
by ordinances, except that the resolution need not go through a third reading for final consideration unless the majority of all the
members of thesanggunian decides otherwise.23
As regards the trial courts pronouncement that R.A. No. 9184 does not require the head of the procuring entity to secure a resolution
from the sanggunian concerned before entering into a contract, attention should be drawn to the very same provision upon which the
trial court based its conclusion. Sec. 37 provides: "The Procuring Entity shall issue the Notice to Proceed to the winning bidder not
later than seven (7) calendar days from the date of approval of the contract by the appropriate authority x x x."
R.A. No. 9184 establishes the law and procedure for public procurement. Sec. 37 thereof explicitly makes the approval of the
appropriate authority which, in the case of local government units, is the sanggunian, the point of reference for the notice to proceed
to be issued to the winning bidder. This provision, rather than being in conflict with or providing an exception to Sec. 22(c) of R.A.
No. 7160, blends seamlessly with the latter and even acknowledges that in the exercise of the local government units corporate
powers, the chief executive acts merely as an instrumentality of the local council. Read together, the cited provisions mandate the local
chief executive to secure the sanggunians approval before entering into procurement contracts and to transmit the notice to proceed to
the winning bidder not later than seven (7) calendar days therefrom.
Parenthetically, Gov. Garcias petition for declaratory relief should have been dismissed because it was instituted after the COA had
already found her in violation of Sec. 22(c) of R.A. No. 7160.
One of the important requirements for a petition for declaratory relief under Sec. 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court is that it be filed
before breach or violation of a deed, will, contract, other written instrument, statute, executive order, regulation, ordinance or any
other governmental regulation.
In Martelino v. National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation,24 we held that the purpose of the action is to secure an authoritative
statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, contract, etc., for their guidance in its enforcement or
compliance and not to settle issues arising from its alleged breach. It may be entertained only before the breach or violation of the
statute, deed, contract, etc. to which it refers. Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action
for declaratory relief, the court can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. Under such circumstances, inasmuch as a cause of
action has already accrued in favor of one or the other party, there is nothing more for the court to explain or clarify, short of a
judgment or final order.

Thus, the trial court erred in assuming jurisdiction over the action despite the fact that the subject thereof had already been breached
by Gov. Garcia prior to the filing of the action. Nonetheless, the conversion of the petition into an ordinary civil action is warranted
under Sec. 6, Rule 6325 of the Rules of Court.
Erroneously, however, the trial court did not treat the COA report as a breach of the law and proceeded to resolve the issues as it
would have in a declaratory relief action. Thus, it ruled that prior authorization is not required if there exist ordinances which authorize
the local chief executive to enter into contracts. The problem with this ruling is that it fails to take heed of the incongruent facts
presented by the parties. What the trial court should have done, instead of deciding the case based merely on the memoranda submitted
by the parties, was to conduct a full-blown trial to thresh out the facts and make an informed and complete decision.
As things stand, the declaration of the trial court to the effect that no prior authorization is required when there is a prior appropriation
ordinance enacted does not put the controversy to rest. The question which should have been answered by the trial court, and which it
failed to do was whether, during the period in question, there did exist ordinances (authorizing Gov. Garcia to enter into the questioned
contracts) which rendered the obtention of another authorization from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan superfluous. It should also have
determined the character of the questioned contracts, i.e., whether they were, as Gov. Garcia claims, mere disbursements pursuant to
the ordinances supposedly passed by the sanggunian or, as petitioners claim, new contracts which obligate the province without the
provincial boards authority.
It cannot be overemphasized that the paramount consideration in the present controversy is the fact that the Province of Cebu was
operating under a re-enacted budget in 2004, resulting in an altogether different set of rules as directed by Sec. 323 of R.A. 7160. This
Decision, however, should not be so construed as to proscribe any and all contracts entered into by the local chief executive without
formal sanggunian authorization. In cases, for instance, where the local government unit operates under an annual as opposed to a reenacted budget, it should be acknowledged that the appropriation passed by the sanggunian may validly serve as the authorization
required under Sec. 22(c) of R.A. No. 7160. After all, an appropriation is an authorization made by ordinance, directing the payment
of goods and services from local government funds under specified conditions or for specific purposes. The appropriation covers the
expenditures which are to be made by the local government unit, such as current operating expenditures 26 and capital outlays.27
The question of whether a sanggunian authorization separate from the appropriation ordinance is required should be resolved
depending on the particular circumstances of the case. Resort to the appropriation ordinance is necessary in order to determine if there
is a provision therein which specifically covers the expense to be incurred or the contract to be entered into. Should the appropriation
ordinance, for instance, already contain in sufficient detail the project and cost of a capital outlay such that all that the local chief
executive needs to do after undergoing the requisite public bidding is to execute the contract, no further authorization is required, the
appropriation ordinance already being sufficient.
On the other hand, should the appropriation ordinance describe the projects in generic terms such as "infrastructure projects," "intermunicipal waterworks, drainage and sewerage, flood control, and irrigation systems projects," "reclamation projects" or "roads and
bridges," there is an obvious need for a covering contract for every specific project that in turn requires approval by the sanggunian.
Specific sanggunian approval may also be required for the purchase of goods and services which are neither specified in the
appropriation ordinance nor encompassed within the regular personal services and maintenance operating expenses.
In view of the foregoing, the instant case should be treated as an ordinary civil action requiring for its complete adjudication the
confluence of all relevant facts. Guided by the framework laid out in this Decision, the trial court should receive further evidence in
order to determine the nature of the questioned contracts entered into by Gov. Garcia, and the existence of ordinances authorizing her
acts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED IN PART. The Decision dated July 11, 2006, of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 9, in Civil Case No. CEB-31560, and its Order dated October 25, 2006, are REVERSED andSET ASIDE. The case
is REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 71159 November 15, 1989

CITY OF MANILA, and EVANGELINE SUVA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, IRENE STO. DOMINGO and for and in behalf of her minor children,
VIVENCIO, JR., IRIS, VERGEL and IMELDA, all surnamed STO. DOMINGO, respondents.
The City Legal Officer for petitioners.
Jose M. Castillo for respondents.

PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside: (a) the Decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court now
Court of Appeals 1 promulgated on May 31, 1984 in AC-G.R. CV No. 00613-R entitled Irene Sto. Domingo et al., v. City Court of
Manila et al., modifying the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VIII 2 in Civil Case No. 121921 ordering
the defendants (herein petitioners,) to give plaintiffs (herein private respondents) the right to use a burial lot in the North Cemetery
corresponding to the unexpired term of the fully paid lease sued upon, to search the remains of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. and

to bury the same in a substitute lot to be chosen by the plaintiffs; and (b) the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated May 28, 1985
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
As found by the Court of Appeals and the trial court, the undisputed facts of the case are as follows:
Brought on February 22, 1979 by the widow and children of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. was this action for
damages against the City of Manila; Evangeline Suva of the City Health Office; Sergio Mallari, officer-in-charge of
the North Cemetery; and Joseph Helmuth, the latter's predecessor as officer-in-charge of the said burial grounds
owned and operated by the City Government of Manila.
Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. deceased husband of plaintiff Irene Sto. Domingo and father of the litigating minors,
died on June 4,1971 and buried on June 6,1971 in Lot No. 159, Block No. 194 of the North Cemetery which lot was
leased by the city to Irene Sto. Domingo for the period from June 6, 1971 to June 6, 2021 per Official Receipt No.
61307 dated June 6, 1971 (see Exh. A) with an expiry date of June 6, 2021 (see Exh. A-1). Full payment of the rental
therefor of P50.00 is evidenced by the said receipt which appears to be regular on its face. Apart from the
aforementioned receipt, no other document was executed to embody such lease over the burial lot in question. In
fact, the burial record for Block No. 194 of Manila North Cemetery (see Exh. 2) in which subject Lot No. 159 is
situated does not reflect the term of duration of the lease thereover in favor of the Sto. Domingos.
Believing in good faith that, in accordance with Administrative Order No. 5, Series of 1975, dated March 6, 1975, of
the City Mayor of Manila (See Exh. 1) prescribing uniform procedure and guidelines in the processing of documents
pertaining to and for the use and disposition of burial lots and plots within the North Cemetery, etc., subject Lot No.
159 of Block 194 in which the mortal remains of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo were laid to rest, was leased to the
bereaved family for five (5) years only, subject lot was certified on January 25, 1978 as ready for exhumation.
On the basis of such certification, the authorities of the North Cemetery then headed by defendant Joseph Helmuth
authorized the exhumation and removal from subject burial lot the remains of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr.,
placed the bones and skull in a bag or sack and kept the same in the depository or bodega of the cemetery y
Subsequently, the same lot in question was rented out to another lessee so that when the plaintiffs herein went to said
lot on All Souls Day in their shock, consternation and dismay, that the resting place of their dear departed did not
anymore bear the stone marker which they lovingly placed on the tomb. Indignant and disgusted over such a
sorrowful finding, Irene Sto. Domingo lost no time in inquiring from the officer-in-charge of the North Cemetery,
defendant Sergio Mallari, and was told that the remains of her late husband had been taken from the burial lot in
question which was given to another lessee.
Irene Sto. Domingo was also informed that she can look for the bones of her deceased husband in the warehouse of
the cemetery where the exhumed remains from the different burial lots of the North Cemetery are being kept until
they are retrieved by interested parties. But to the bereaved widow, what she was advised to do was simply
unacceptable. According to her, it was just impossible to locate the remains of her late husband in a depository
containing thousands upon thousands of sacks of human bones. She did not want to run the risk of claiming for the
wrong set of bones. She was even offered another lot but was never appeased. She was too aggrieved that she came
to court for relief even before she could formally present her claims and demands to the city government and to the
other defendants named in the present complaint. (Decision, Court of Appeals, pp. 2-3; Rollo, pp. 34-55)
The trial court, on August 4, 1981, rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the defendants to give plaintiffs the right to make use of
another single lot within the North Cemetery for a period of forty-three (43) years four (4) months and eleven (11)
days, corresponding to the unexpired term of the fully paid lease sued upon; and to search without let up and with
the use of all means humanly possible, for the remains of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. and thereafter, to bury
the same in the substitute lot to be chosen by the plaintiffs pursuant to this decision.
For want of merit, defendant's counterclaim is DISMISSED.

No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 31)
The decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals which on May 31, 1984 rendered a decision (Rollo, pp. 33-40) modifying the
decision appealed from, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED (is hereby
modified) and another one is hereby entered:
1. Requiring in full force the defendants to look in earnest for the bones and skull of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo,
Sr., and to bury the same in the substitute lot adjudged in favor of plaintiffs hereunder;
2. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs-appellants jointly and severally P10,000.00 for breach of contract;
3. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs-appellants, jointly and severally, P20,000.00 for moral damages;
4. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs-appellants jointly and severally, P20,000.00 for exemplary damages;
5. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs-appellants, jointly and severally, P10,000.00 as and for attorney's fees;
6. Ordering defendants, to pay plaintiffs-appellants, jointly and severally, on the foregoing amounts legal rate of
interest computed from filing hereof until fully paid; and
7. Ordering defendants, to pay plaintiffs-appellants, jointly and severally, the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 40)
The petitioners' motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
Hence, this instant petition (Rollo, pp. 7-27) filed on July 27, 1985.
The grounds relied upon for this petition are as follows:
I
THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING DAMAGES AGAINST
THE PETITIONERS HEREIN, NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR GOOD FAITH AND THEIR LACK OF
KNOWLEDGE OR CONSENT TO THE REMOVAL OF THE SKELETAL REMAINS OF THE LATE VIVENCIO
STO. DOMINGO, SR. FROM THE SUBJECT BURIAL LOT.
II
THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING PETITIONERS HEREIN
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ALLEGED TORTS OF THEIR SUBORDINATE OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES,
INSPITE OF THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 4 OF THE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 409 (REVISED CHARTER OF
MANILA) AND OTHER APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE ON THE SUBJECT EXEMPTING THE
PETITIONERS FROM DAMAGES FROM THE MALFEASANCE OR MISFEASANCE OF THEIR OFFICIALS
AND EMPLOYEES, IF THERE BE ANY IN THIS CASE. (Brief for Petitioners, Rollo, pp. 93-94)
In the resolution dated November 13, 1985 (,Rollo, p. 84), the petition was given due course.

The pivotal issue of this case is whether or not the operations and functions of a public cemetery are a governmental, or a corporate or
proprietary function of the City of Manila. The resolution of this issue is essential to the determination of the liability for damages of
the petitioner city.
Petitioners alleged in their petition that the North Cemetery is exclusively devoted for public use or purpose as stated in Sec. 316 of
the Compilation of the Ordinances of the City of Manila. They conclude that since the City is a political subdivision in the
performance of its governmental function, it is immune from tort liability which may be caused by its public officers and subordinate
employees. Further Section 4, Article I of the Revised Charter of Manila exempts the city from liability for damages or injuries to
persons or property arising from the failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other city officer, to enforce the provision of its
charter or any other laws, or ordinance, or from negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board or any other officers while enforcing or
attempting to enforce said provisions. They allege that the Revised Charter of Manila being a special law cannot be defeated by the
Human Relations provisions of the Civil Code being a general law.
Private respondents on the other hand maintain that the City of Manila entered into a contract of lease which involve the exercise of
proprietary functions with private respondent Irene Sto. Domingo. The city and its officers therefore can be sued for any-violation of
the contract of lease.
Private respondents' contention is well-taken.
Under Philippine laws, the City of Manila is a political body corporate and as such endowed with the faculties of municipal
corporations to be exercised by and through its city government in conformity with law, and in its proper corporate name. It may sue
and be sued, and contract and be contracted with. Its powers are twofold in character-public, governmental or political on the one
hand, and corporate, private and proprietary on the other. Governmental powers are those exercised in administering the powers of the
state and promoting the public welfare and they include the legislative, judicial, public and political. Municipal powers on the one
hand are exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the community and include those which are ministerial, private and
corporate. In McQuillin on Municipal Corporation, the rule is stated thus: "A municipal corporation proper has ... a public character as
regards the state at large insofar as it is its agent in government, and private (so called) insofar as it is to promote local necessities and
conveniences for its own community (Torio v. Fontanilla, 85 SCRA 599 [1978]). In connection with the powers of a municipal
corporation, it may acquire property in its public or governmental capacity, and private or proprietary capacity. The New Civil Code
divides such properties into property for public use and patrimonial properties (Article 423), and further enumerates the properties for
public use as provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for
public service paid for by said provisions, cities or municipalities, all other property is patrimonial without prejudice to the provisions
of special laws (Article 424; Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga, et al., 22 SCRA 1334 [1968]).
Thus in Torio v. Fontanilla, supra, the Court declared that with respect to proprietary functions the settled rule is that a municipal
corporation can be held liable to third persons ex contractu (Municipality of Moncada v. Cajuigan, et al., 21 Phil. 184 (1912) or ex
delicto (Mendoza v. de Leon, 33 Phil. 508 (1916).
The Court further stressed:
Municipal corporations are subject to be sued upon contracts and in tort....
xxx xxx xxx
The rule of law is a general one, that the superior or employer must answer civilly for the negligence or want of skill
of its agent or servant in the course or line of his employment, by which another who is free from contributory fault,
is injured. Municipal corporations under the conditions herein stated, fall within tile operation of this rule of law,
and are liable accordingly, to civil actions for damages when the requisite elements of liability co-exist. ...
(Emphasis supplied)
The Court added:
... while the following are corporate or proprietary in character, viz: municipal waterworks, slaughter houses,
markets, stables, bathing establishments, wharves, ferries and fisheries. Maintenance of parks, golf courses,

cemeteries and airports among others, are also recognized as municipal or city activities of a proprietary character.
(Dept. of Treasury v. City of Evansvulle, Sup. Ct. of Indiana, 60 N.E. 2nd 952, 954 cited in Torio v. Fontanilla,
supra) (Emphasis supplied)
Under the foregoing considerations and in the absence of a special law, the North Cemetery is a patrimonial property of the City of
Manila which was created by resolution of the Municipal Board of August 27, 1903 and January 7, 1904 (Petition, Rollo pp. 20-21
Compilation of the Ordinances of the City of Manila). The administration and government of the cemetery are under the City Health
Officer (Ibid., Sec. 3189), the order and police of the cemetery (Ibid., See. 319), the opening of graves, niches, or tombs, the exhuming
of remains, and the purification of the same (Ibid., Sec. 327) are under the charge and responsibility of the superintendent of the
cemetery. The City of Manila furthermore prescribes the procedure and guidelines for the use and dispositions of burial lots and plots
within the North Cemetery through Administrative Order No. 5, s. 1975 (Rollo, p. 44). With the acts of dominion, there is, therefore
no doubt that the North Cemetery is within the class of property which the City of Manila owns in its proprietary or private character.
Furthermore, there is no dispute that the burial lot was leased in favor of the private respondents. Hence, obligations arising from
contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties. Thus a lease contract executed by the lessor and lessee remains as the
law between them. (Henson v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 11 [1 987]). Therefore, a breach of contractual provision
entitles the other party to damages even if no penalty for such breach is prescribed in the contract. (Boysaw v. Interphil Promotions,
Inc., 148 SCRA 635 [1987]).
Noteworthy are the findings of the Court of Appeals as to the harrowing experience of private respondents and their wounded feelings
upon discovery that the remains of their loved one were exhumed without their knowledge and consent, as said Court declared:
It has been fully established that the appellants, in spite or perhaps because, of their lowly station in life have found
great consolation in their bereavement from the loss of their family head, by visiting his grave on special or even
ordinary occasions, but particularly on All Saints Day, in keeping with the deep, beautiful and Catholic Filipino
tradition of revering the memory of their dead. It would have been but fair and equitable that they were notified of
the intention of the city government to transfer the skeletal remains of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo to give them
an opportunity to demand the faithful fulfillment of their contract, or at least to prepare and make provisions for said
transfer in order that they would not lose track of the remains of their beloved dead, as what has actually happened
on this case. We understand fully what the family of the deceased must have felt when on All Saints Day of 1978,
they found a new marker on the grave they were to visit, only to be told to locate their beloved dead among
thousands of skeletal remains which to them was desecration and an impossible task. Even the lower court
recognized this when it stated in its decision thus:
All things considered, even as the Court commiserates with plaintiffs for the unfortunate
happening complained of and untimely desecration of the resting place and remains of their
deceased dearly beloved, it finds the reliefs prayed for by them lacking in legal and factual basis.
Under the aforementioned facts and circumstances, the most that plaintiffs ran ask for is the
replacement of subject lot with another lot of equal size and similar location in the North
Cemetery which substitute lot plaintiffs can make use of without paying any rental to the city
government for a period of forty-three (43) years, four (4) months and eleven (11) days
corresponding to the unexpired portion of the term of the lease sued upon as of January 25, 1978
when the remains of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. were prematurely removed from the
disputed lot; and to require the defendants to look in earnest for the bones and skull of the late
Vivencio Sto. Domingo Sr. and to bury the same in the substitute lot adjudged in favor of plaintiffs
hereunder. (Decision, Intermediate Appellate Court, p. 7, Rollo, p. 39)
As regards the issue of the validity of the contract of lease of grave lot No. 159, Block No. 195 of the North Cemetery for 50 years
beginning from June 6, 1971 to June 6, 2021 as clearly stated in the receipt duly signed by the deputy treasurer of the City of Manila
and sealed by the city government, there is nothing in the record that justifies the reversal of the conclusion of both the trial court and
the Intermediate Appellate Court to the effect that the receipt is in itself a contract of lease. (Decision, Intermediate Appellate Court, p.
3, Rollo, pp. 5-6).
Under the doctrine of respondent superior, (Torio v. Fontanilla, supra), petitioner City of Manila is liable for the tortious act
committed by its agents who failed to verify and check the duration of the contract of lease. The contention of the petitioner-city that

the lease is covered by Administrative Order No. 5, series of 1975 dated March 6, 1975 of the City of Manila for five (5) years only
beginning from June 6, 1971 is not meritorious for the said administrative order covers new leases. When subject lot was certified on
January 25, 1978 as ready for exhumation, the lease contract for fifty (50) years was still in full force and effect.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
DOCTRINE OF IMPLIED MUNICIPAL LIABILITY CONTRA PERSONAL LIABILITY
G.R. No. 96628 July 3, 1992
CEFERINO INCIONG, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE EUFEMIO DOMINGO, Chairman, Commission on Audit, respondents.

PARAS, J.:
For failure of the Philippine Sugar Commission (PHILSUCOM), now Philippine Sugar Refineries Corporation, to pay real estate taxes
due on its sugar refinery situated at Barangay Caloocan, Balayan, Batangas, the Provincial Treasurer of Batangas scheduled the sale of
said refinery at public auction on March 6, 1986. To restrain the sale, PHILSUCOM filed a petition for prohibition in the Court of
Appeals against the Provincial Treasurer and Provincial Assessor of Balayan, Batangas. The petition was docketed as CA GR SP No.
08467.
On March 5, 1986, the Court of Appeals issued a restraining order directing respondents therein to maintain thestatus quo.
Meanwhile, Barangay Caloocan thru herein petitioner Atty. Ceferino Inciong filed a Motion for Intervention alleging that it (Barangay
Caloocan) is an indispensable party in the case as it has a 10% share of the property tax sought to be collected from PHILSUCOM.
Thereafter, Barangay Caloocan filed an Answer to PHILSUCOM's Petition as well as a motion for reconsideration of the restraining
order of March 5, 1986.
On December 24, 1986, PHILSUCOM and the Municipal Treasurer of Balayan, Batangas entered into an Amnesty Compromise
Agreement pursuant to and in conformity with Executive Order No. 42 dated August 22, 1986. The agreement was submitted to the
Court of Appeals and the case was accordingly dismissed.
PHILSUCOM paid the amount of P7,199,887.51 to the Municipal Treasurer. Out of this amount, the Municipal Treasurer allocated to
Barangay Caloocan as its share 10% or a total of P719,988.75.
Consequently, Atty. Ceferino Inciong filed a case for payment of attorney's fees against the Province of Batangas, Municipality of
Balayan and Barangay Caloocan, before the Regional Trial Court, Branch XI, Balayan, Batangas. The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. 1878.
On August 9, 1989, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of Atty. Ceferino Inciong, the pertinent portion of which
reads:
From the foregoing testimony and the supporting exhibits D and D-1, it is gathered and established that indeed,
the plaintiff attorney was requested and has acted as counsel for defendant Barangay Caloocan and rendered his
utmost an in prosecuting the case. As a result of his efforts and zeal in pursuing the case, defendant Barangay
Caloocan was awarded the claim asked for, when finally the Philsucom acceded to a compromise agreement.

Plaintiff's counsel, assistance and services should therefore be recognized. That he acted as counsel is established as
even defendant Barangay Caloocan failed to deny the relationship and services rendered by failing to file its answer.
However, there was no formal contract as to the amount due the plaintiff by way of attorney's fees. Somewhere in
his testimony plaintiff suggest that TEN PERCENT (10%) of the barangay share on the amount paid, be fair and just
renumeration for all the expenses and services he rendered, which the Court finds such amount to be fair, proper and
just, taking into consideration, the professional standing of the plaintiff as a lawyer, the time and efforts he exerted,
the importance of the case. The law mandates that an attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no
more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the
controversy, the extent of the services rendered and the professional standing of the attorney.
The Court finds that a TEN PERCENT (10%) of what defendant Barangay Caloocan was awarded is fair and
reasonable amount for the legal services of the plaintiff counsel.
WHEREFORE, partial judgment in the case is hereby rendered.
1. Ordering the defendant Barangay Caloocan of the Municipality of Balayan, Batangas, to pay the plaintiff and by
way of attorney's fees, the amount equivalent to a TEN PERCENT (10%) of the amount awarded to said defendant
barangay.
2. Ordering defendant barangay to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. (p. 8, Rollo)
This decision has long become final, hence, a writ of execution was issued. But, when the Withdrawal Voucher was presented for audit
to satisfy the writ of execution, the Provincial Auditor of Batangas referred the matter en consulta to the Director, COA Regional Trial
Office No. IV.
In a 2nd Indorsement dated October 3, 1990, the COA Director referred the Auditor's query to respondent Chairman, Commission on
Audit, with the information among others, that the request of the Barangay Captain of Caloocan for petitioner's legal assistance was
not taken up nor approved by the Sangguniang Barangay nor was there any showing that it was approved by the Solicitor General and
concurred in by COA as required under COA Circular No. 86-255, dated April 2, 1986.
In a 3rd Indorsement dated December 12, 1990, respondent Chairman Eufemio Domingo, Commission on Audit, in reply to the query
stated that the hiring of petitioner by the Punong Barangay did not carry with it the approval of the Sangguniang Barangay as required
under Section 91 (1-1) of the B.P. 337, nor was there any appropriation therefor; the hiring was not approved by the Solicitor General
and concurred in by COA.
Hence, the instant petition.
Required to comment, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion stating that after a careful study of this
case, it is unable to agree with the position of respondent Chairman Eufemio Domingo in his3rd Indorsement disallowing payment of
attorney's fees to petitioner Atty. Ceferino Inciong by Barangay Caloocan. (p. 35, Rollo)
The Office of the Solicitor General was thus allowed to withdraw its appearance and the Comment for respondent was filed by COA's
Legal Office.
The petition was given due course in Our Resolution dated July 30, 1991.
We grant the petition.
As correctly stated by the Office of the Solicitor General, the position of respondent Chairman of the COA disallowing payment of
attorney's fees to petitioner Atty. Ceferino Inciong is not proper in the light of the following considerations.

(1) The employment by Barangay Caloocan of petitioner as its counsel, even if allegedly unauthorized by the Sangguniang Barangay,
is binding on Barangay Caloocan as it took no prompt measure to repudiate petitioner's employment (Province of Cebu v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 147 SCRA 447).
(2) The Decision dated August 9, 1989 of Branch XI, Regional Trial Court, Balayan, Batangas in Civil Case No. 1878, directing
Barangay Caloocan to pay attorney's fees to petitioner, has become final and executory and is binding upon Barangay Caloocan
(Mercado v. Court of Appeals, 162 SCRA 75).
(3) COA Circular No. 86-255 cannot diminish the substantive right of petitioner to recover attorney's fees under the final and
executory Decision dated August 9, 1989 of the Regional Trial Court.
In its Comment, the respondent, thru the COA Legal Office states that PHILSUCOM paid the amount of P7,199,887.51 to the
Municipal Treasurer under the Amnesty Compromise Agreement. Out of this amount, the Municipal Treasurer allocated to Barangay
Caloocan as its share the amount of P719,988.75. This allocation is erroneous because pursuant to Republic Act No. 5447, Barangay
Caloocan should only share from the basic tax which is 50% of what PHILSUCOM paid because the other half should go to the
Special Education Fund. Under the said Republic Act No. 5447, the rightful share of Barangay Caloocan should be P359,994.38 only.
Thus, respondent prays that in the event the Court orders the payment of attorney's fees to petitioner this amount of P359,994.38
should be made as the basis therefor.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and respondent is ordered to direct the payment of attorney's fees to petitioner Atty.
Ceferino Inciong in an amount equivalent to 10% of P359,994.38.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 72841 January 29, 1987

PROVINCE OF CEBU, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ATTY. PABLO P. GARCIA, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition to review the decision of the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court in A.C. G.R. CV No. 66502 entitled "Governor
Rene Espina, et. at v. Mayor Sergio Osmea, Jr., et. al, Atty. Pablo P. Garcia v. Province of Cebu" 1 affirming with modification the
order of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch VII, granting respondent Pablo P. Garcia's claim for compensation for services
rendered as counsel in behalf of the respondent Province of Cebu.
The facts of the case are not in dispute. On February 4, 1964, while then incumbent Governor Rene Espina was on official business in
Manila, the Vice-Governor, Priscillano Almendras and three (3) members of the Provincial Board enacted Resolution No. 188,
donating to the City of Cebu 210 province. owned lots all located in the City of Cebu, with an aggregate area of over 380 hectares, and
authorizing the Vice-Governor to sign the deed of donation on behalf of the province. The deed of donation was immediately executed
in behalf of the Province of Cebu by Vice-Governor Almendras and accepted in behalf of the City of Cebu by Mayor Sergio Osmea,
Jr. The document of donation was prepared and notarized by a private lawyer. The donation was later approved by the Office of the
President through Executive Secretary Juan Cancio.
According to the questioned deed of donation the lots donated were to be sold by the City of Cebu to raise funds that would be used to
finance its public improvement projects. The City of Cebu was given a period of one (1) year from August 15, 1964 within which to
dispose of the donated lots.
Upon his return from Manila, Governor Espina denounced as Legal and immoral the action of his colleagues in donating practically
all the patrimonial property of the province of Cebu, considering that the latter's income was less than one. fourth (1/4) of that of the
City of Cebu.
To prevent the sale or disposition of the lots, the officers and members of the Cebu Mayor's League (in behalf of their respective
municipalities) along with some taxpayers, including Atty. Garcia, filed a case seeking to have the donation declared illegal, null and
void. It was alleged in the complaint that the plaintiffs were filing it for and in behalf of the Province of Cebu in the nature of a
derivative suit. Named defendants in the suit were the City of Cebu, City Mayor Sergio Osmea, Jr. and the Cebu provincial officials
responsible for the donation of the province-owned lots. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. R-8669 of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu and assigned to Branch VI thereof.
Defendants City of Cebu and City Mayor Osmea, Jr. filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that plaintiffs did not have the
legal capacity to sue.

Subsequently, in an order, dated May, 1965, the court dismissed Case No. R-8669 on the ground that plaintiffs were not the real parties
in interest in the case. Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal. This motion was denied by the Court.
Meanwhile, Cebu City Mayor Sergio Osmea, Jr. announced that he would borrow funds from the Philippine National Bank (PNB)
and would use the donated lots as collaterals. In July, 1965, the City of Cebu advertised the sale of an the lots remaining unsold.
Thereupon, Governor Espina, apprehensive that the lots would be irretrievably lost by the Province of Cebu, decided to go to court.
He engaged the services of respondent Garcia in filing and prosecuting the case in his behalf and in behalf of the Province of Cebu.
Garcia filed the complaint for the annulment of the deed of donation with an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, which application was granted on the same day, August 6, 1965.
The complaint was later amended to implead Cebu City Mayor Carlos P. Cuizon as additional defendant in view of Fiscal Numeriano
Capangpangan's manifestation stating that on September 9, 1965, Sergio Osmea, Jr. filed his certificate of Candidacy for senator, his
position/office having been assumed by City Mayor Carlos P. Cuizon.
Sometime in 1972, the Provincial Board passed a resolution authorizing the Provincial Attorney, Alfredo G. Baguia, to enter his
appearance for the Province of Cebu and for the incumbent Governor, Vice-Governor and members of the Provincial Board in this
case.
On January 30, 1973, Alfredo G. Baguia, Provincial Attorney of the Province of Cebu, entered his appearance as additional counsel
for the Province of Cebu and as counsel for Governor Osmundo Rama, Vice-Governor Salutario Fernandez and Board Members
Leonardo Enad, Guillermo Legazpi, and Rizalina Migallos.
On January 31, 1973, Atty. Baguia filed a complaint in intervention stating that intervenors Province of Cebu and Provincial Board of
Cebu were joining or uniting with original plaintiff, former Governor of Cebu, Rene Espina. They adopted his causes of action,
claims, and position stated in the original complaint filed before the court on August 6, 1965.
On June 25, 1974, a compromise agreement was reached between the province of Cebu and the city of Cebu. On July 15, 1974, the
court approved the compromise agreement and a decision was rendered on its basis.
On December 4, 1974, the court issued an order directing the issuance of a writ of execution to implement the decision dated July 15,
1974, to wit:
1. Ordering the City of Cebu to return and deliver to the Province of Cebu all the lots enumerated in the second
paragraph hereof;
2. Ordering the Province of Cebu to pay the amount of One Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,500,000.00)
to the City of Cebu for and in consideration of the return by the latter to the former of the aforesaid lots;
3. Declaring the retention by the City of Cebu of the eleven (11) lots mentioned in paragraph No. 1 of the
compromise agreement, namely, Lot Nos. 1141, 1261, 1268, 1269, 1272, 1273, 917, 646-A, 646A-4-0 and 10107-C;
4. Ordering the City of Cebu or the City Treasurer to turn over to the Province of Cebu the amount of P187948.93
mentioned in Annex "A" of the defendants manifestation dated October 21, 1974;
5. Declaring the City of Cebu and an its present and past officers completely free from liabilities to third persons in
connection with the aforementioned lots, which liabilities if any, shall be assumed by the Province of Cebu;
6. Ordering the Register of Deeds of the City of Cebu to cancel the certification of titles in the name of the City of
Cebu covering the lots enumerated in the second paragraph of this order and to issue new ones in lieu thereof in the
name of the Province of Cebu.

For services rendered in Civil Case no. 238-BC, CFI of Cebu, respondent Pablo P. Garcia filed through counsel a Notice of Attorney's
Lien, dated April 14, 1975, praying that his statement of claim of attorney's lien in said case be entered upon the records thereof,
pursuant to Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
To said notice, petitioner Province of Cebu filed through counsel, its opposition dated April 23, 1975, stating that the payment of
attorney's fees and reimbursement of incidental expenses are not allowed by law and settled jurisprudence to be paid by the Province.
A rejoinder to this opposition was filed by private respondent Garcia.
After hearing, the Court of First Instance of Cebu, then presided over by Judge Alfredo Marigomen, rendered judgment dated May 30,
1979, in favor of private respondent and against petitioner Province of Cebu, declaring that the former is entitled to recover attorney's
fees on the basis of quantum meruit and fixing the amount thereof at P30,000.00.
Both parties appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals. In the case of private respondent, however, he appealed only from
that portion of the decision which fixed his attorney's fees at P30,000.00 instead of at 30% of the value of the properties involved in
the litigation as stated in his original claim
On October 18, 1985, the Intermediate Appellate Court rendered a decision affirming the findings and conclusions of the trial court
that the private respondent is entitled to recover attorney's fees but fixing the amount of such fees at 5% of the market value of the
properties involved in the litigation as of the date of the filing of the claim in 1975. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, except for the aforementioned modification that the compensation for the services rendered by the
Claimant Atty. Pablo P. Garcia is fixed at five percent (5%) of the total fair market value of the lots in question, the
order appealed from is hereby affirmed in all other respects.
Both parties went to the Supreme Court with private respondent questioning the fixing of his attorney's fees at 5% instead of 30% of
the value of the properties in litigations as prayed for in his claims. However, the private respondent later withdrew his petition in G.R.
No. 72818 with the following explanation:
That after a long and serious reflection and reassessment of his position and intended course of action and, after
seeking the views of his friends, petitioner has come to the definite conclusion that prosecuting his appeal would
only result in further delay in the final disposition of his claim (it has been pending for the last 10 years 4 in the CFI
and 6 in the Court of Appeals, later Intermediate Appellate Court) and that it would be more prudent and practicable
to accept in full the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court.
Hence, only the petition of the Province of Cebu is pending before this Court.
The matter of representation of a municipality by a private attorney has been settled in Ramos v. Court of Appeals(108 SCRA 728).
Collaboration of a private law firm with the fiscal and the municipal attorney is not allowed. Section 1683 of the Revised
Administrative Code provides:
.Section 1683. Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and provincial subdivisions in litigation. The provincial fiscal
shall represent the province and any municipality, or municipal district thereof in any court, except in cases whereof
original jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court or in cases where the municipality, or municipal district in
question is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality, or municipal district in the
same province. When the interests of a provincial government and of any political division thereof are opposed, the
provincial fiscal shall act on behalf of the province.
When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality or other political subdivision of a province, a
special attorney may be employed by its council
The above provision, complemented by Section 3 of the Local Autonomy Law, is clear in providing that only the provincial fiscal and
the municipal attorney can represent a province or municipality in its lawsuits. The provision is mandatory. The municipality's
authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it

(De Guia v. The Auditor General 44 SCRA 169; Municipality of Bocaue, et. al. v. Manotok, 93 Phil. 173; Enriquez, Sr., v. Honorable
Gimenez, 107 Phil. 932) as when he represents the province against a municipality.
The lawmaker, in requiring that the local government should be represented in its court cases by a government lawyer, like its
municipal attorney and the provincial fiscal intended that the local government should not be burdened with the expenses of hiring a
private lawyer. The lawmaker also assumed that the interests of the municipal corporation would be best protected if a government
lawyer handles its litigations. It is to be expected that the municipal attorney and the fiscal would be faithful and dedicated to the
corporation's interests, and that, as civil service employees, they could be held accountable for any misconduct or dereliction of duty
(See Ramos v. Court of Appeals, supra).
However, every rule is not without an exception, Ibi quid generaliter conceditur; inest haec exceptio, si non aliquid sit contra jus
fasque (Where anything is granted generally, this exception is implied; that nothing shall be contrary to law and right). Indeed, equity,
as well as the exceptional situation facing us in the case at bar, require a departure from the established rule.
The petitioner anchors its opposition to private respondent's claim for compensation on the grounds that the employment of claimant
as counsel for the Province of Cebu by then Governor Rene Espina was unauthorized and violative of Section 1681 to 1683 in relation
to Section 1679 of the Revised Administrative Code and that the claim for attorney's fees is beyond the purview of Section 37, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court.
It is argued that Governor Espina was not authorized by the Provincial Board, through a board resolution, to employ Atty. Pablo P.
Garcia as counsel of the Province of Cebu.
Admittedly, this is so.
However, the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar are such that the rule cannot be applied. The Provincial Board would never
have given such authorization. The decision of the respondent court elucidates the matter thus:
... The provisions of Sections 1681 to 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code contemplate a normal situation
where the adverse party of the province is a third person as in the case of Enriquez v. Auditor General, 107 Phil 932.
In the present case, the controversy involved an intramural fight between the Provincial Governor on one hand and
the members of the Provincial Board on the other hand. Obviously it is unthinkable for the Provincial Board to adopt
a resolution authorizing the Governor to employ Atty. Garcia to act as counsel for the Province of Cebu for the
purpose of filing and prosecuting a case against the members to the same Provincial Board According to the
claimant Atty. Garcia, how can Governor Espina be expected to secure authority from the Provincial Board to
employ claimant as counsel for the Province of Cebu when the very officials from whom authority is to be sought
are the same officials to be sued, It is simply impossible that the Vice-Governor and the members of the Provincial
Board would pass a resolution authorizing Governor Espina to hire a lawyer to file a suit against themselves.
xxx xxx xxx
Under Section 2102 of the Revised Administrative Code it is the Provincial Board upon whom is vested the
authority "to direct, in its discretion, the bringing or defense of civil suits on behalf of the Provincial Governor ___."
Considering that the members of the Provincial Board are the very ones involved in this case, they cannot be
expected to directed the Provincial Fiscal the filing of the suit on behalf of the provincial government against
themselves. Moreover, as argued by the claimant, even if the Provincial Fiscal should side with the Governor in the
bringing of this suit, the Provincial Board whose members are made defendants in this case, can simply frustrate his
efforts by directing him to dismiss the case or by refusing to appropriate funds for the expenses of the litigation.
... Consequently, there could have been no occasion for the exercise by the Provincial Fiscal of his powers and duties
since the members of the Provincial Board would not have directed him to file a suit against them.
A situation obtains, therefore, where the Provincial Governor, in behalf of the Province of Cebu, seeks redress against the very
members of the body, that is, the Provincial Board, which, under the law, is to provide it with legal assistance. A strict application of
the provisions of the Revise Administrative Code on the matter would deprive the plaintiffs in the court below of redress for a valid

grievance. The provincial board authorization required by law to secure the services of special counsel becomes an impossibility. The
decision of the respondent court is grounded in equity a correction applied to law, where on account of the general
comprehensiveness of the law, particular exceptions not being provided against, something is wanting to render it perfect.
It is also argued that the employment of claimant was violative of sections 1681 to 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code because
the Provincial Fiscal who was the only competent official to file this case was not disqualified to act for the Province of Cebu.
Respondent counsel's representation of the Province of Cebu became necessary because of the Provincial Board's failure or refusal to
direct the bringing of the action to recover the properties it had donated to the City of Cebu. The Board more effectively disqualified
the Provincial Fiscal from representing the Province of Cebu when it directed the Fiscal to appear for its members in Civil Case No.
R-8669 filed by Atty. Garcia, and others, to defend its actuation in passing and approving Provincial Board Resolution No. 186. The
answer of the Provincial Fiscal on behalf of the Vice-Governor and the Provincial Board members filed in Civil Case No. R-8669;
(Exhibit "K") upholds the validity and legality of the donation. How then could the Provincial Fiscal represent the Province of Cebu in
the suit to recover the properties in question? How could Governor Espina be represented by the Provincial Fiscal or seek
authorization from the Provincial Board to employ special counsel? Nemo tenetur ad impossibile (The law obliges no one to perform
an impossibility).lwphl@it Neither could a prosecutor be designated by the Department of Justice. Malacaang had already approved
the questioned donation
Anent the question of liability for respondent counsel's services, the general rule that an attorney cannot recover his fees from one who
did not employ him or authorize his employment, is subject to its own exception.
Until the contrary is clearly shown an attorney is presumed to be acting under authority of the litigant whom he purports to represent
(Azotes v. Blanco, 78 Phil. 739) His authority to appear for and represent petitioner in litigation, not having been questioned in the
lower court, it will be presumed on appeal that counsel was properly authorized to file the complaint and appear for his client.
(Republic v. Philippine Resources Development Corporation, 102 Phil. 960) Even where an attorney is employed by an unauthorized
person to represent a client, the latter will be bound where it has knowledge of the fact that it is being represented by an attorney in a
particular litigation and takes no prompt measure to repudiate the assumed authority. Such acquiescence in the employment of an
attorney as occurred in this case is tantamount to ratification (Tan Lua v. O' Brien, 55 Phil. 53). The act of the successor provincial
board and provincial officials in allowing respondent Atty. Pablo P. Garcia to continue as counsel and in joining him in the suit led the
counsel to believe his services were still necessary.
We apply a rule in the law of municipal corporations: "that a municipality may become obligated upon an implied contract to pay the
reasonable value of the benefits accepted or appropriated by it as to which it has the general power to contract. The doctrine of implied
municipal liability has been said to apply to all cases where money or other property of a party is received under such circumstances
that the general law, independent of express contract implies an obligation upon the municipality to do justice with respect to the
same." (38 Am Jur. Sec. 515, p. 193):
The obligation of a municipal corporation upon the doctrine of an implied contract does not connote an enforceable
obligation. Some specific principle or situation of which equity takes cognizance must be the foundation of the
claim. The principle of liability rests upon the theory that the obligation implied by law to pay does not originate in
the unlawful contract, but arises from considerations outside it. The measure of recovery is the benefit received by
the municipal corporation. The amount of the loan, the value of the property or services, or the compensation
specified in the contract, is not the measure. If the price named in the invalid contract is shown to be entirely fair and
reasonable not only in view of the labor done, but also in reference to the benefits conferred, it may be taken as the
true measure of recovery.
The petitioner can not set up the plea that the contract was ultra vires and still retain benefits thereunder. Having regarded the contract
as valid for purposes of reaping some benefits, the petitioner is estopped to question its validity for the purposes of denying
answerability.
The trial court discussed the services of respondent Garcia as follows:
... Thus because of his effort in the filing of this case and in securing the issuance of the injunction preventing the
City of Cebu and Sergio Osmea, Jr., from selling or disposing the lots to third parties, on the part of the members of

the Provincial Board from extending the date of the automatic reversion beyond August 15, 1965, on the part of the
Register of Deeds from effecting the transfer of title of any of the donated lots to any vendee or transferee, the
disposition of these lots by the City of Cebu to third parties was frustrated and thus: saved these lots for their
eventual recovery by the province of Cebu.
Actually it was Governor Espina who filed the case against Cebu City and Mayor Osmea. Garcia just happened to be the lawyer, Still
Atty. Garcia is entitled to compensation. To deny private respondent compensation for his professional services would amount to a
deprivation of property without due process of law (Cristobal v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 103 SCRA 329).
The petitioner alleges that although they do not deny Atty. Garcia's services for Governor Espina (who ceased to be such Governor of
Cebu on September 13, 1969) and the original plaintiffs in the case, "it cannot be said with candor and fairness that were it not for his
services the lots would have already been lost to the province forever, because the donation itself he was trying to enjoin and annul in
said case was subject to a reversion clause under which lots remaining undisposed of by the City as of August 15, 1965 automatically
reverted to the province and only about 17 lots were disposed of by August 15, 1965." We quote respondent counsel's comment with
approval:
xxx xxx xxx
While it is true that the donation was subject to a reversion clause, the same clause gave the Provincial Board the
discretion to extend the period of reversion beyond August 15, 1965 (see paragraph 3 of donation).
With the known predisposition of the majority of the members of the Provincial Board, there would have been no
impediment to the extension of the reversion date to beyond August 15, 1965. Once the date of reversion is
extended, the disposition of an the donated lots would be only a matter of course.
We have carefully reviewed the records of this case and conclude that 30% or even 5% of properties already worth (P120,000,000.00)
in 1979 as compensation for the private respondent's services is simply out of the question. The case handled by Atty. Garcia was
decided on the basis of a compromise agreement where he no longer participated. The decision was rendered after pre-trial and
without any hearing on the merits.
The factual findings and applicable law in this petition are accurately discussed in the exhaustive and well-written Order of then Trial
Judge, now Court of Appeals Justice Alfredo Marigomen We agree with his determination of reasonable fees for the private lawyer on
the basis of quantum meruit. The trial court fixed the compensation at P30,000.00 and ordered reimbursement of actual expenses in
the amount of P289.43.
WHEREFORE, the questioned October 18, 1985 decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is set aside. The Order of the Trial
Court dated May 30, 1979 is REINSTATED.
G.R. No. L-28353 September 30, 1987
SOLANO LAGANAPAN, petitioner,
vs.
Mayor ELPIDIO ASEDILLO, MUNICIPALITY OF KALAYAAN, LAGUNA, and EPIFANIO RAGOTERO,respondents.

PADILLA, J.:
This is an appeal from the judgment, * dated 16 October 1967, of the Court of First Instance of Laguna in Civil Case No. SC-719,
which ordered the respondents to reinstate the petitioner to his former position of chief of police of Kalayaan, Laguna, with back
salaries from his dismissal up to his actual reinstatement.

The facts are not disputed. The petitioner Solano Laganapan was appointed chief of police of the municipality of Kalayaan, Laguna on
4 January 1960, with a compensation of P660.00 per annum, by the respondent Mayor Asedillo. On 1 July 1960, his salary was
increased to P720.00 per annum, and he was extended an appointment which was approved as provisional under Sec. 24(c) of
Republic Act No. 2260 by the Commissioner of Civil Service. 1
On 1 April 1962, the petitioner was given another increase in salary and a corresponding appointment was made which the
Commissioner of Civil Service "approved under Sec. 24(c) of Republic Act No. 2260, to continue until replaced by an eligible but not
beyond thirty (30) days from receipt of certification of eligibles by the Provincial Treasurer of Laguna." 2
Then, on 1 July 1963, 1 July 1964, and 1 July 1965, he was again given salary increases, and new appointments were extended to him,
which appointments were also approved under Section 24(c) of Republic Act No. 2260 by the Commissioner ofCivil Service. 3
However, on 16 February 1967, the petitioner was summarily dismissed from his position by respondent Mayor Elpidio Asedillo, on
the ground that his appointment was provisional and that he has no civil service eligibility. The petitioner was told to surrender his
firearm and other office equipment to the Municipal Treasurer of Kalayaan, Laguna 4 who was also informed of petitioner's dismissal
on the same day. 5 Respondent Epifanio Ragotero was appointed acting chief of police of Kalayaan, Laguna on the same day, in place
of the petitioner. 6
Subsequently, or on 21 February 1967, the Municipal Council of Kalayaan, Laguna abolished the appropriation for the salary of the
chief of police of Kalayaan, Laguna. 7 In view thereof, the petitioner complained to the Police Commission which advised him to file
an injunction suit against Mayor Asedillo. 8
Hence, on 16 March 1967, the petitioner filed a petition for mandamus, quo warranto with preliminary mandatory injunction against
respondents Mayor Elpidio Asedillo, the Municipality of Kalayaan, Laguna, and Epifanio Ragotero, before the Court of First Instance
of Laguna, docketed therein as Civil Case No. SC-719, seeking his reinstatement to the position of chief of police of Kalayaan,
Laguna, with back salaries and damages. 9
In answer, respondents Mayor Elpidio Asedillo and Epifanio Ragotero claimed that the appointment of the petitioner, being merely
temporary in character, and the petitioner having no civil service eligibility, his services could be terminated with or without cause, at
the pleasure of the appoint power; and that the petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies. 10
The respondent Municipality of Kalayaan, Laguna, for its part, alleged that the petitioner has no cause of action against it; and that, if
the acts of the respondent mayor are patently irregular, the said mayor should be held solely liable therefor. 11
After due hearing, judgment was rendered, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment
(a) Declaring the summary dismissal of the petitioner on February 16,1967, illegal;
(b) Ordering the respondent Mayor Elpidio Asedillo to forthwith recall his designation of respondent Epifanio
Ragotero as Acting Chief of Police of Kalayaan;
(c) Ordering the respondent Mayor Elpidio Asedillo and the respondent Municipality of Kalayaan to forthwith
reinstate the petitioner to his former position of Chief of Police of Kalayaan, Laguna, restore the appropriation for
his salary and pay him his back salaries from February 16, 1967, until reinstated; and
(d) Ordering the respondent Mayor and respondent Municipality to give the petitioner a period of not less than thirty
days from the date this decision becomes final within which to file his application for Civil Service eligibility under
Sec. 9 of Republic Act No. 4864.
Without pronouncement as to costs. 12

From this judgment, the respondents appealed directly to this Court, claiming that the lower court erred: (1) in holding that petitioner
need not exhaust administrative remedies before bringing the action for quo warranto and mandamus in court, as the action prescribes
in one year and an administrative appeal does not interrupt the running of the period; (2) in holding that the summary dismissal of the
petitioner-appellee was illegal; (3) in ordering the respondents-appellants Mayor and Municipality to give the petitioner a period of not
less than thirty (30) days from the date the decision becomes final within which to file his application for civil service eligibility under
Sec. 9 of Republic Act No. 4864; and (4) in not fixing and ordering the petitioner to pay the respondents reasonable expenses incurred
by them by reason of the false allegations in the verified petition for mandamus and quo warranto.
The appellant Municipality of Kalayaan, Laguna additionally claims that the lower court erred in not holding respondent-appellant
Mayor Elpidio Asedillo personally liable for his illegal act.
We have carefully examined the records of the case and find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the trial court, which are
supported by the evidence and law. Thus, the appellants contend that the appellee should have first exhausted all administrative
remedies before he reported to the courts. They suggested that the appellee should have appealed the order of dismissal to the
Commissioner of Civil Service in view of the provisions of Sec. 16(i) and Sec. 16 of Republic Act No. 2260 which grant the
Commissioner of Civil Service the final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all permanent officers and
employees in the competitive or classified service; and to hear and determine appeals instituted by any person believing himself to be
aggrieved by an action or determination of any appointing authority contrary to the provisions of the Civil Service Law and rules.
While there are precedents which hold that before a litigant can bring a matter to court, it is necessary that he first exhaust all the
remedies in the administrative branch of the government, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard and fast
rule. It has been repeatedly held that the principle requiring previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable where the
question in dispute is purely a legal one; where the controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in
excess of jurisdiction; where the respondent is a department secretary, whose acts as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied or
assumed approval of the latter; where there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention; or where the respondent
has acted in utter disregard of due process. 13 The rule does not also apply where insistence on its observance would result in
nullification of the claim being asserted; and when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. 14
In the instant case, there is no doubt that, in terminating the services of the appellee, the appellant Mayor Elpidio Asedillo acted
summarily without any semblance of compliance or even an attempt to comply with the elementary rules of due process. No charges
were filed; nor was a hearing conducted in order to give the appellee an opportunity to defend himself, despite the provisions of Sec.
14 of Republic Act No. 4864, otherwise known as the Police Act of 1966, which took effect on 8 September 1966, that "Members of
the local police agency shall not be suspended or removed except upon written complaint filed under oath with the Board of
Investigators herein provided for misconduct or incompetence, dishonesty, disloyalty to the Government, serious irregularities in the
performance of their duties, and violation of law." Following the rule, there was no need for exhaustion of administrative remedies
before appellee could come to court for the protection of his rights.
Besides, it appears that the order was immediately executed and the appellee was immediately removed from office and replaced by
the appellant Epifanio Ragotero on the same day, so that appeal to the Commissioner of Civil Service, even if available to the
appellee, was not an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Furthermore, appeal to the Commissioner of Civil Service is not a pre-requisite to, nor a bar to the institution ofquo
warranto proceedings, 15 so that, as pointed out by the trial court, to require the appellee to exhaust administrative remedies before
bringing this action, could easily result in a grave injustice of barring him forever from bringing the matter to the courts of justice for
judicial determination.
We also find no merit in the appellants' contention that, since the appointments extended to the appellee as chief of police of Kalayaan,
Laguna were all provisional in nature, and not permanent, his services could be terminated with or without cause, at the pleasure of the
appointing officer. While it may be true that the appellee was holding a provisional appointment at the time of his dismissal, he was
not a temporary official who could be dismissed at any time. His provisional appointment could only be terminated thirty (30) days
after receipt by the appointing officer of a list of eligibles from the Civil Service Commission. 16 Here, no such certification was
received by Mayor Elpidio Asedillo thirty (30) days prior to his dismissal of the appellee.

The appellants have also assailed the trial court for ordering them to give the appellee a period of not less than thirty (30) days within
which to file an application for civil service eligibility under Sec. 9 of Republic Act No. 4864, claiming that the appellee had not asked
for such relief in his petition.
Whether or not such relief was asked "for in the petition or included in the petitioner's general prayer for such relief and remedies that
may be just and equitable in the premises," as the appellee claims, is now of little importance, in view of our finding that the appellee's
provisional appointment could only be terminated thirty (30) days after receipt by the appointing officer of a list of eligibles from the
Civil Service Commission. With such a posture, the appellee had ample time to ask the Civil Service Commission for a certification of
civil service eligibility under the law.
We, likewise, find no merit in the contention of the respondent Municipality of Kalayaan, Laguna that Mayor Elpidio
Asedillo alone should be held liable for the back salaries of the petitioner, because the records show that the action was instituted
against Mayor Asedillo, not personally, but in his capacity as Municipal Mayor of Kalayaan, Laguna, and he appeared and defended
the action in such capacity.
Furthermore, it is of record that, after the summary dismissal of the petitioner by respondent Mayor Asedillo on 16 February 1967, the
Municipal Council of Kalayaan instead of opposing or at least protesting the petitioner's summary dismissal from his position, even
abolished the appropriation for the salary of the Chief of Police of Kalayaan, Laguna, We consider this act of the Municipal Council of
Kalayaan as an approval or confirmation of the act of respondent Mayor in summarily dismissing the petitioner, as to make said
municipality equally liable, as held by the trial court, as respondent Mayor for the reinstatement of petitioner and for the payment of
his back salaries.
A number of cases decided by the Court where the municipal mayor alone was held liable for back salaries of, or damages to
dismissed municipal employees, to the exclusion of the municipality, are not applicable in this instance. In Salcedo vs. Court of
Appeals, 17 for instance, the municipal mayor was held liable for the back salaries of the Chief of Police he had dismissed, not only
because the dismissal was arbitrary but also because the mayor refused to reinstate him in defiance of an order of the Commissioner of
Civil Service to reinstate.
In Nemenzo vs. Sabillano, 18 the municipal mayor was held personally liable for dismissing a police corporal who possessed the
necessary civil service eligibility, the dismissal being done without justifiable cause and without any administrative investigation.
In Rama vs. Court of Appeals, 19 the governor, vice-governor, members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, provincial auditor,
provincial treasurer and provincial engineer were ordered to pay jointly and severally in their individual and personal capacity
damages to some 200 employees of the province of Cebu who were eased out from their positions because of their party affiliations.
The trial court, therefore, did not commit error in finding that the summary dismissal of the petitioner was illegal and in ordering the
respondent Mayor and respondent Municipality to reinstate him with back salaries from the time of his dismissal.
The appealed judgment, however, needs some modification in the light of supervening events. It would appear that the reinstatement
of the petitioner-appellee to his former position of chief of police of Kalayaan, Laguna, as ordered in the appealed judgment, is no
longer feasible and hence, it cannot be enforced, in view of the appointment of a permanent chief of police (now called Station
Commander) in accordance with PD 482, issued on 13 June 1974, which provides for the integration of police and fire departments
and jails in certain provinces, including the province of Laguna.
In the Court's Resolution, dated 18 May 1987, the parties were required "to MOVE in the premises within ten (10) days from notice,
considering the supervening events, including the change of administration that has transpired since the promulgation of the Freedom
Constitution by virtue of Proclamation No. 3, dated 25 March 1986 as well as the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and pursuant to
the provision of Section 18 of Rule 3, insofar as the public respondents are concerned (which requires the successor official to state
whether or not he maintains the action and position taken by his predecessor in office)." 20 Pursuant thereto, respondents-appellants
filed a Motion to Dismiss 21 which states, among others, that
3. Upon the organization of Integrated National Police, respondent Epifanio Ragotero, who was designated Acting
Chief of Police of Kalayaan, was replaced by a permanent Station Commander, Antonio de la Paz, who holds said
position until now;

4. That respondent Mayor Elpidio Asedillo has long been dead since April 26, 1978, but even before he died he had
been succeeded as Mayor of Kalayaan, Laguna, by Mayor Norma Macaraeg, then after his death by Mayor Gerardo
Kabamalan, who was elected in 1980, and finally by OIC Turiano Montes, Jr., who was appointed on April 3, 1986
after the EDSA revolution;
5. That petitioner-appellee Solano Laganapan himself was appointed as Municipal Secretary of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Kalayaan, Laguna on April 7, 1986 after the EDSA revolution but his services were terminated on April 7,
1987, as he is not a civil service eligible. 22
Such being the case, the petitioner-appellee is entitled only to backsalaries which, however, should be limited to a period of five (5)
years. 23
In addition, respondent Mayor Asedillo who was sued in his official capacity as municipal mayor, having passed away, the liability to
pay petitioner his back salaries must now devolve upon the respondent municipality alone.
WHEREFORE, with the modification that the petitioner-appellee is entitled only to the payment of five (5) years back salaries to be
paid by respondent municipality, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed. Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 165065

September 26, 2006

MELCHOR G. MADERAZO, SENIFORO PERIDO, and VICTOR MADERAZO, JR., petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the September 3, 2004 Decision 1 of the Sandiganbayan
convicting petitioners of unjust vexation in Criminal Case No. 24309.
On October 22, 1997, an Information2 was filed before the Sandiganbayan (First Division), charging the following with grave
coercion: Municipal Mayor Melchor G. Maderazo; his nephew, Victor Maderazo, Jr., who is a member of the Sangguniang Bayan; and
Seniforo Perido, Caibiran Police Station Chief, together with Rodolfo Rico, Orlando Mocorro, Rodolfo Azur, Reynaldo Oledan,
Jordan Gervacio and Jose Cesora. The Information reads:
That on or about the 27th day of January 1997, at about 2:20 oclock in the afternoon, at Barangay Palanay, Municipality of Caibiran,
Biliran, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, all public officers, having been duly
elected, appointed and qualified to such public positions above-mentioned, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to
office, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping with (sic) each other, by means of violence and intimidation,
without any authority of law, with deliberate intent did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and forcibly eject one Medaria
Verutiao from the market stall she was occupying and leasing from the Municipality of Caibiran, thereby compelling her to give up her
possession and occupation to said market stall against her will, to the damage and prejudice of said Medaria Verutiao and detriment of
public service.
Contrary to law.3
On arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. 4 The Sandiganbayan issued a Pre-Trial Order5 signed by all
the parties, where it was stipulated, among others, that all of the accused were government officials; Verutiao was physically in
possession of one of the stalls in the public market of the Municipality of Caibiran previous to and as of January 27, 1997; on January
21, 1997, the premises had been padlocked previously by Mayor Melchor Maderazo, so that her goods were inside the stall, and she
was unable to transact any business; on January 27, 1997, the locks were opened by the government upon the authority of the mayor,
the goods in the premises were inventoried and taken to the police station where they have remained up to the present. 6
The Case for the Prosecution7
The prosecution presented Verutiao as sole witness. She testified that she had been the lessee of a stall in the Biliran public market.
She paid a monthly rental of P200.00.8 She was allowed to finish the construction of the market stall with the permission of the
Municipal Mayor and the Municipal Treasurer.9 She averred that Municipal Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1984,10 provides that, to
facilitate the development of the public market, in the absence of adequate government finance, construction by private parties of
buildings and other structures for commercial purposes may be allowed and the expenses thereof shall be reimbursed to the builder by
applying 50% to the monthly rentals when occupied for business.11

She spent P24,267.00 for the construction of the market stall, as stated in the itemized statement of expenses 12she submitted to then
Municipal Treasurer Jose Lee on February 14, 1992. She was not, however, reimbursed by the Municipality of her expenses. After the
construction, she then opened the stall for business. She paid the rent for the whole year of 1992 but did not pay the rentals in 1993.
On January 13, 1994, Verutiao and the Municipality entered into a one-year lease contract,13 renewable every year with a monthly
rental of P400.00. It is also provided that, any violation of the conditions therein agreed shall be sufficient cause for its cancellation,
notwithstanding the fact that the contract has not yet expired.
In 1995, the Municipality partially paid her P10,000.00 of her total expenses in the construction of the market stall.14 However,
considering that she had not been fully reimbursed of her expenses for the construction of the stall, she did not pay her rent. 15 Almost
weekly, she went to the Municipal Treasurer to request for the reimbursement. 16 She was told by then Treasurer Lee and his successor,
Lorenzo Dadizon, that the Municipality had no money and she had to wait for another budget hearing. 17 The treasurers did not collect
her rents for they knew that the Municipality still owed her money.18
On December 22, 1996 Verutiao closed her stall and proceeded to Mindanao where she spent the Christmas holidays. 19 She returned to
Caibiran on January 15, 1997. On January 17, 1997, she and her husband received a letter-order from Mayor Melchor Maderazo,
directing her to vacate the stall within twenty-four (24) hours because of her failure to pay the rentals for the stall. 20 As of January
1997, Verutiao had an unpaid rental of P2,532.00, after deducting her expenses for the construction of the stall. The Mayor declared in
his letter that the lease contract had been cancelled.
On the same day, the spouses Verutiao, through counsel, sent a letter21 to the Mayor, stating, among others, that they can only be
ejected from the market stall if the Municipality reimbursed them for what they had advanced for the construction of the stall and if
the Municipality was no longer willing to lease the subject premises. They admitted that Verutiao had not paid any rent since 1993 but
maintained that, under Section 38 of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1984,22 she did not have to pay rental until her expenses were
reimbursed, as the rentals due would be debited from 50% of the amount she advanced for the construction of the market stall, and
that she will vacate the stall only after the municipality shall have reimbursed her expenses in the construction.
On January 21, 1997, Mayor Maderazo padlocked the leased premises.23 The locks were opened on the authority of the Mayor on
January 27, 1997. The contents of the market stall were inventoried by Victor Maderazo and taken to the police station for
safekeeping.24 While these were being undertaken, Verutiao was in her farm about 4 to 5 kilometers away from the market stall. 25 She
considered the act of the Mayor as a political harassment, given that her husband, was then a candidate for councilor under the ticket
of the opposition; and that she was a leader of the opposing party.26
The Case for the Accused27
Except for the accused Victor Maderazo, the other accused opted not to testify. Victor Maderazo declared that as of January 27, 1997,
he was a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Caibiran. On said date, he was at the stall of Verutiao at the public market in the
company of Seniforo Perido, who was the Chief of Police of Caibiran, Barangay Captain Rodolfo Rico, Revenue Collector Orlando
Mocorro, and Faulio Quizo, and other laborers. All of them witnessed the inventory of the goods in the stall of Verutiao which Victor
Maderazo made upon the request of Mayor Melchor Maderazo. Earlier, Verutiao was informed, by letter, of the inventory of the goods
in the stall, which, however, she failed to attend. One of the employees of the Municipality brought the key to the stall and opened it.
Victor Maderazo then conducted an inventory of the goods, each was described, while someone was listing the goods. The inventory
was orderly.
The goods were then brought to the police station where the supplies were kept.
The Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
On September 3, 2004, the Sandiganbayan rendered judgment28 convicting the accused Melchor G. Maderazo, Seniforo Perido, and
Victor Maderazo, Jr. of the crime of unjust vexation, but acquitted the other accused. The court ruled that Melchor Maderazo had no
authority to padlock, open and inventory the contents of the subject stall and take the same to the police station. Although, he had the
power to cancel the lease contract, as Mayor, he could not eject the lessee by padlocking the market stall and order the hauling and
seizure of the goods contained therein. The remedies of the Municipality in cases where there is delinquency in the payment of fees
and rentals are provided in the Local Government Code.

The court ruled that the accused cannot, however, be convicted of grave coercion because they did not use violence, threats or
intimidation. Verutiao could not have possibly been intimidated or forced by the accused, as she was not at the market stall when the
same was padlocked, and its goods inventoried and hauled. The court, however, held the said accused criminally liable for unjust
vexation even if the private complainant was not at the stall because the overt acts of the accused caused her annoyance, irritation and
vexation. The court ruled that if the second element of grave coercion under Article 286, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code is lacking,
the crime committed falls under the second paragraph of Article 287 of the same Code. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, accused MELCHOR G. MADERAZO, accused SENIFORO PERIDO and VICTOR
MADERAZO JR. are hereby CONVICTED of the crime of Unjust Vexation, in Criminal Case No. 24309 and hereby ordered to pay a
fine of Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00). Accused RODOLFO RICO, accused ORLANDO MOCORRO, accused RODOLFO AZUR,
accused REYNALDO OLEDAN, accused JORDAN GERVACIO, and accused JOSE CESORA are hereby ACQUITTED of the
Crime of Grave Coercion in Criminal Case No. 24309 for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Consequently, the cash bond they have posted for their provisional liberty are hereby CANCELLED and the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 37, Caibiran, Biliran Cashier is hereby ordered to release the said Cash Bond to accused Rico, accused Mocorro, accused
Cesora, accused Azur, accused Oledan, and accused Gervacio.
The Hold Departure Order issued against accused Rico, accused Mocorro, accused Cesora, accused Azur, accused Oledan, and
accused Gervacio are set aside and any Hold Departure Order issued by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation pursuant thereto is
hereby recalled. However, the Hold Departure Orders issued against accused Maderazo, accused Maderazo, Jr., and accused Perido
stand.
SO ORDERED.29
The Petition Before the Court
The accused, now petitioners, filed the instant petition30 and rely on the following grounds:
I
THE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING PETITIONERS OF THE CRIME OF UNJUST VEXATION.
II
THE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER MAYOR MADERAZO HAS NO POWER TO
PADLOCK A MARKET STALL AND TO HAUL THE GOODS CONTAINED THEREIN.
III
THE SACROSANCT RULE IS THAT WHERE THE PROSECUTION FAILS TO DISCHARGE ITS BURDEN OF PROVING
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT EVERY FACT NECESSARY TO CONSTITUTE THE CRIME FOR WHICH THE ACCUSED
IS BEING HELD TO ACCOUNT -- AS IN THE CASE AT BAR -- THE ACCUSED MUST PERFORCE BE ACQUITTED. 31
The threshold issue is whether or not the People adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt of petitioners guilt for unjust vexation.
Petitioners maintain that they are not criminally liable for unjust vexation because Verutiao was not prevented from doing something
not prohibited by law. She could not have been possibly intimidated or forced by petitioners, and could not have been prevented from
doing business. In fact, she was not transacting business at the time. Verutiao was not at her stall when it was opened and her goods
inventoried; hence, she could not have been vexed.
Under the Information, they were charged with grave coercion for allegedly evicting Verutiao from her stall on January 27, 1997,
thereby compelling her to give up her possession, and depriving her of said market stall. However, they were convicted by the trial
court of unjust vexation because they allegedly padlocked the stall, hauled and/or seized the goods contained therein. It was petitioner

Mayor Maderazo who had padlocked the stall earlier on January 21, 1997. Petitioners Perido and Victor Maderazo, Jr. were not
involved in the padlocking of the stall. For his part, petitioner Melchor Maderazo was not at the stall on January 27, 1997; he cannot,
thus, be guilty of unjust vexation for the overt acts of his co-petitioners on January 27, 1997.
Verutiaos refusal to vacate the premises of the subject stall despite proper demand and despite the fact that she was no longer
operating the same, rendered her a deforciant, and liable for violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1994. Consequently,
petitioner Mayor Maderazo had every right to consider the subject stall vacant; and proceed in accordance with Section 44 of
Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1994, which provides:
Section 44 - Vacancy of Tienda or Stall before expiration of lease.
Should any reason (sic), a tienda, stall or stand holder or leases (sic) discontinues or be required to discontinue his business before the
expiration of the lease, such tienda, stall or stand shall be considered vacant and its occupancy thereafter shall be disposed of in the
manner herein prescribed.
Petitioners posit that a Municipal Mayor has the duty to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the Municipality
and the exercise of its corporate powers and must ensure that all taxes and revenues of the Municipality are collected. He is
empowered to issue licenses and permits and to suspend or revoke the same for violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or
permits were issued; to adopt adequate measures to protect the funds, credits, rights and other properties of the municipality; and to
institute or cause to be instituted administrative or judicial proceedings for violation of ordinances in the collection of taxes, fees or
charges. Under Sec. 174 of the Local Government Code, among the civil remedies for the collection of delinquent local taxes, fees or
charges, and other revenues is "by administrative action through distraint of goods, chattels or effects, and other personal property of
whatever character, including stocks and other securities, debts, credits, bank accounts, and interest in and rights to personal property,
and by levy upon real property and interest in or rights to real property."
Petitioner Mayor Melchor Maderazo had the right to padlock the stall of Medaria Verutiao on January 21, 1997, after she refused to
vacate the stall despite his demand. Verutiao had no more lease contract and was no longer operating the stall for the purpose it was
intended, in violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1984. Moreover, she was delinquent in the payment of monthly rentals.
Under the circumstances, and in view of her violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1984, petitioner Mayor Melchor
Maderazo was duty-bound to institute the necessary administrative proceedings or to take immediate action to correct the violation,
protect the property of the Municipality, and ensure that the delinquent revenues from the subject stall would be collected.
Petitioners aver that in closing down the stall, Verutiao was not ejected therefrom but was merely stopped from improperly using it, in
the exercise of petitioner Mayor Maderazos power and duty to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the
Municipality and the exercise of its corporate powers.
The Special Prosecutor, for his part, avers that, under the Local Government Code, the local government concerned may avail of the
following remedies, either alternatively or simultaneously, for the collection of fees or charges: 1) the administrative remedies of
distraint of personal properties or levy upon real properties; and 2) by judicial action. But from the evidence, petitioner Melchor
Maderazo cancelled the lease contract and ordered, which the other petitioners obeyed, to padlock and to subsequently cart and haul
the goods of spouses Verutiao inside their market stall to the precinct, under the guise that it was done in accordance with the law. He
did not avail of the judicial action which is specifically provided in the Local Government Code. He failed to avail of the
administrative remedies of distraint and levy and its procedure as provided in Section 175 thereof.
Even if Verutiao was delinquent in the payment of their rentals, petitioner Melchor Maderazo is mandated to consider and resolve the
exemptions being claimed by the former and which were properly communicated to him. Petitioner Melchor Maderazo cannot take the
law into his hands, and order the seizure of the goods of the spouses Verutiao which was implemented by the other petitioners, in clear
violation of the law.
He maintains that nowhere in the Local Government Code is the Mayor of a Municipality authorized to take the law into his own
hands. Instead, the Local Government Code provides specifically for the measures, procedures and remedies to be undertaken in cases
of delinquency in the payment of fees or charges due to the local government concerned. Ordering to padlock, and to subsequently
cart and haul the goods inside the market stall being rented by Verutiao to the police precinct without any court order or notice of
distraint and levy prejudiced the spouses. Petitioner Mayor Maderazos duties of protecting the properties of the Municipality and

enforcing the law do not include depriving Verutiao of her means of livelihood. Perido and Maderazo, Jr. cannot escape criminal
liability by merely saying that they were following the orders of Melchor Maderazo as only lawful orders deserved to be followed and
obeyed. The participation of petitioners Perido and Maderazo, Jr. went beyond just being witnesses because they admitted that "they
opened the stall and x x x accounted for the goods and special effects contained inside." Petitioners Perido and Maderazo, Jr. were
invited to be at the vicinity as witnesses but they acted beyond their participation as mere witnesses; they became participants to an
illegal and unauthorized act.
Petitioners Seniforo Perido and Victor Maderazo, Jr. occupy the positions of Station Commander and Member of the Sangguniang
Bayan, respectively. They are public servants, and as such, owe the constituents of the Municipality of Caibiran, including Verutiao,
the performance of their official duties and obligations to a higher degree of commitment and standards, and must necessarily conform
to the norms of conduct set forth by the law.
Verutiao was not at the subject stall and could not have possibly been intimidated or forced by the accused. She could, likewise, not be
prevented from doing business because they were not transacting business at that time. By the actuations of the petitioners, Verutiao
was tormented and distressed. Unjust vexation is a form of light coercion which is broad enough to include any human conduct which,
although not productive of some physical or material harm, would unjustly annoy or irritate an innocent person.
The Ruling of the Court
On the first issue, we agree with the contention of respondents that indeed, the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt to
prove the guilt of petitioners Mayor Melchor Maderazo and Sangguniang Bayan Member Victor Maderazo, Jr. for unjust vexation.
Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
Art. 287. Light coercions. Any person, who by means of violence, shall seize anything belonging to his debtor for the purpose of
applying the same to the payment of the debt, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period and a fine equivalent to
the value of the thing, but in no case less than 75 pesos.
Any other coercions or unjust vexations shall be punished by arresto menor or a fine ranging from 5 to 200 pesos, or both.
The second paragraph of the Article is broad enough to include any human conduct which, although not productive of some physical
or material harm, could unjustifiably annoy or vex an innocent person.32 Compulsion or restraint need not be alleged in the
Information, for the crime of unjust vexation may exist without compulsion or restraint. However, in unjust vexation, being a felony
by dolo, malice is an inherent element of the crime. Good faith is a good defense to a charge for unjust vexation because good faith
negates malice. The paramount question to be considered is whether the offenders act caused annoyance, irritation, torment, distress
or disturbance to the mind of the person to whom it is directed.33 The main purpose of the law penalizing coercion and unjust vexation
is precisely to enforce the principle that no person may take the law into his hands and that our government is one of law, not of men.
It is unlawful for any person to take into his own hands the administration of justice. 34
In the present case, petitioner Melchor Maderazo opted not to testify in his behalf. The Sandiganbayan convicted the petitioners of
unjust vexation on its findings that petitioner Mayor Melchor Maderazo had the stall of Verutiao padlocked and had it reopened, and
had the contents of the stall inventoried and taken to the police station. However, the padlocking of the stall of Verutiao by petitioner
Melchor Maderazo took place on January 21, 1997 and not on January 27, 1997. Petitioners were charged with grave coercion, but
were convicted of unjust vexation for the eviction of Verutiao on January 27, 1997 and not on January 21, 1997 following the
inventory of the contents of the stall and the transportation thereof to the police station. The only events that took place on January 27,
1997 were the unlocking of the padlock of the stall, the inventory of its contents by petitioner Victor Maderazo on order of petitioner
Melchor Maderazo, and the transportation of the goods to the police station where it was stored. Petitioners Victor Maderazo, Jr. and
Seniforo Perido were not present when the stall was padlocked on January 21, 1997.
We agree with respondents contention that based on the evidence on record, the overt acts of petitioners Mayor Melchor Maderazo
and Victor Maderazo, Jr., on January 27, 1997, annoyed, irritated and caused embarrassment to her. It was petitioner Melchor
Maderazo who ordered petitioner Victor Maderazo, Jr. to have the stall reopened, to conduct an inventory of the contents thereof, and
to effect the transportation of the goods to the police station. Petitioner Victor Maderazo, who was a Sangguniang Bayan member,
obeyed the order of the Mayor.

Although Verutiao was not at her stall when it was unlocked, and the contents thereof taken from the stall and brought to the police
station, the crime of unjust vexation was nevertheless committed. For the crime to exist, it is not necessary that the offended party be
present when the crime was committed by said petitioners. It is enough that the private complainant was embarrassed, annoyed,
irritated or disturbed when she learned of the overt acts of the petitioners. Indeed, by their collective acts, petitioners evicted Verutiao
from her stall and prevented her from selling therein, hence, losing income from the business. Verutiao was deprived of her possession
of the stall from January 21, 1997.
Petitioners Mayor Melchor Maderazo and Sangguniang Bayan member Victor Maderazo, Jr., had no right, without judicial
intervention, to oust Verutiao from the stall, and had her merchandise transported to the police station, thereby preventing her from
doing business therein and selling her merchandize. Petitioner Mayor Maderazo had no right to take the law into his own hands and
deprive Verutiao of her possession of the stall and her means of livelihood.
Admittedly, the lease contract of Verutiao and the Municipality expired on January 13, 1997 without having been renewed, and
petitioner Mayor ordered Verutiao to vacate the stall, also for her failure to pay the rent amounting to P2,532.00. Under Section 44 of
Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1999, the stall is considered vacant and shall be disposed of. However, petitioner had to file an action for
unlawful detainer against Verutiao to recover possession of her stall and cause her eviction from said premises. 35 Verutiao insisted on
her right to remain as lessee of her stall and to do business thereat. Such action is designed to prevent breaches of the peace and
criminal disorder and prevent those believing themselves entitled to the possession of the property resort to force to gain possession
rather than to secure appropriate action in the court to assert their claims.36 It was incumbent upon petitioner Mayor to institute an
action for the eviction of Verutiao. He cannot be permitted to invade the property and oust the lessee who is entitled to the actual
possession and to place the burden upon the latter of instituting an action to try the property right. 37
An action for forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary proceedings established for the purpose of providing expeditious
means of protecting actual possession, which is presumed to be lawful until the contrary is proven. As this Court emphasized in Dizon
v. Concina:38
Succinctly did this Court explain in one case the nature of the forcible entry action: "In giving recognition to the action of forcible
entry and detainer the purpose of the law is to protect the person who in fact has actual possession; and in case of controverted right, it
requires the parties to preserve the status quo until one or the other of them sees fit to invoke the decision of a court of competent
jurisdiction upon the question of ownership. It is obviously just that the person who has first acquired possession should remain in
possession pending this decision; and the parties cannot be permitted meanwhile to engage in a petty warfare over the possession of
the property which is the subject of dispute.39
Undeniably, petitioner Mayor is tasked to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the Municipality and to
implement all approved programs, projects, services and activities of the Municipality40 and to ensure that all taxes and other revenues
of the Municipality are collected.41 He is obliged to institute or cause to be instituted administrative or judicial proceedings for the
recovery of funds and property.42 However, in the performance of his duties, petitioner Mayor should act within the confines of the law
and not resort to the commission of a felony. A public officer is proscribed from resorting to criminal acts in the enforcement of laws
and ordinances. He must exercise his power and perform his duties in accordance with law, with strict observance of the rights of the
people, and never whimsically, arbitrarily and despotically.
Even as we find petitioners Mayor Melchor Maderazo and Victor Maderazo, Jr. guilty of unjust vexation, we find petitioner Seniforo
Perido deserving of an acquittal. The Prosecution failed to prove that he conspired with the other petitioners. He was at the situs of the
stall merely to witness the inventory and ensure peace and order. He agreed to have the contents of the stall of Verutiao stored in the
police station presumably to protect the property from the elements and asportation by thieves until after Verutiao shall have claimed
the same or the disposition thereof determined by the authorities concerned.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION that petitioner Seniforo Perido is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. The bail bond posted by him for his
provisional liberty is cancelled. No costs.

LIABILITY OF MAYOR IF DRIVER ASSIGNED TO HIM COMMITS NEGLIGENCE

G.R. No. 165065

September 26, 2006

MELCHOR G. MADERAZO, SENIFORO PERIDO, and VICTOR MADERAZO, JR., petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the September 3, 2004 Decision 1 of the Sandiganbayan
convicting petitioners of unjust vexation in Criminal Case No. 24309.
On October 22, 1997, an Information2 was filed before the Sandiganbayan (First Division), charging the following with grave
coercion: Municipal Mayor Melchor G. Maderazo; his nephew, Victor Maderazo, Jr., who is a member of the Sangguniang Bayan; and

Seniforo Perido, Caibiran Police Station Chief, together with Rodolfo Rico, Orlando Mocorro, Rodolfo Azur, Reynaldo Oledan,
Jordan Gervacio and Jose Cesora. The Information reads:
That on or about the 27th day of January 1997, at about 2:20 oclock in the afternoon, at Barangay Palanay, Municipality of Caibiran,
Biliran, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, all public officers, having been duly
elected, appointed and qualified to such public positions above-mentioned, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to
office, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping with (sic) each other, by means of violence and intimidation,
without any authority of law, with deliberate intent did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and forcibly eject one Medaria
Verutiao from the market stall she was occupying and leasing from the Municipality of Caibiran, thereby compelling her to give up her
possession and occupation to said market stall against her will, to the damage and prejudice of said Medaria Verutiao and detriment of
public service.
Contrary to law.3
On arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. 4 The Sandiganbayan issued a Pre-Trial Order5 signed by all
the parties, where it was stipulated, among others, that all of the accused were government officials; Verutiao was physically in
possession of one of the stalls in the public market of the Municipality of Caibiran previous to and as of January 27, 1997; on January
21, 1997, the premises had been padlocked previously by Mayor Melchor Maderazo, so that her goods were inside the stall, and she
was unable to transact any business; on January 27, 1997, the locks were opened by the government upon the authority of the mayor,
the goods in the premises were inventoried and taken to the police station where they have remained up to the present. 6
The Case for the Prosecution7
The prosecution presented Verutiao as sole witness. She testified that she had been the lessee of a stall in the Biliran public market.
She paid a monthly rental of P200.00.8 She was allowed to finish the construction of the market stall with the permission of the
Municipal Mayor and the Municipal Treasurer.9 She averred that Municipal Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1984,10 provides that, to
facilitate the development of the public market, in the absence of adequate government finance, construction by private parties of
buildings and other structures for commercial purposes may be allowed and the expenses thereof shall be reimbursed to the builder by
applying 50% to the monthly rentals when occupied for business.11
She spent P24,267.00 for the construction of the market stall, as stated in the itemized statement of expenses 12she submitted to then
Municipal Treasurer Jose Lee on February 14, 1992. She was not, however, reimbursed by the Municipality of her expenses. After the
construction, she then opened the stall for business. She paid the rent for the whole year of 1992 but did not pay the rentals in 1993.
On January 13, 1994, Verutiao and the Municipality entered into a one-year lease contract,13 renewable every year with a monthly
rental of P400.00. It is also provided that, any violation of the conditions therein agreed shall be sufficient cause for its cancellation,
notwithstanding the fact that the contract has not yet expired.
In 1995, the Municipality partially paid her P10,000.00 of her total expenses in the construction of the market stall.14 However,
considering that she had not been fully reimbursed of her expenses for the construction of the stall, she did not pay her rent. 15 Almost
weekly, she went to the Municipal Treasurer to request for the reimbursement. 16 She was told by then Treasurer Lee and his successor,
Lorenzo Dadizon, that the Municipality had no money and she had to wait for another budget hearing. 17 The treasurers did not collect
her rents for they knew that the Municipality still owed her money.18
On December 22, 1996 Verutiao closed her stall and proceeded to Mindanao where she spent the Christmas holidays. 19 She returned to
Caibiran on January 15, 1997. On January 17, 1997, she and her husband received a letter-order from Mayor Melchor Maderazo,
directing her to vacate the stall within twenty-four (24) hours because of her failure to pay the rentals for the stall. 20 As of January
1997, Verutiao had an unpaid rental of P2,532.00, after deducting her expenses for the construction of the stall. The Mayor declared in
his letter that the lease contract had been cancelled.
On the same day, the spouses Verutiao, through counsel, sent a letter21 to the Mayor, stating, among others, that they can only be
ejected from the market stall if the Municipality reimbursed them for what they had advanced for the construction of the stall and if
the Municipality was no longer willing to lease the subject premises. They admitted that Verutiao had not paid any rent since 1993 but
maintained that, under Section 38 of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1984,22 she did not have to pay rental until her expenses were

reimbursed, as the rentals due would be debited from 50% of the amount she advanced for the construction of the market stall, and
that she will vacate the stall only after the municipality shall have reimbursed her expenses in the construction.
On January 21, 1997, Mayor Maderazo padlocked the leased premises.23 The locks were opened on the authority of the Mayor on
January 27, 1997. The contents of the market stall were inventoried by Victor Maderazo and taken to the police station for
safekeeping.24 While these were being undertaken, Verutiao was in her farm about 4 to 5 kilometers away from the market stall. 25 She
considered the act of the Mayor as a political harassment, given that her husband, was then a candidate for councilor under the ticket
of the opposition; and that she was a leader of the opposing party.26
The Case for the Accused27
Except for the accused Victor Maderazo, the other accused opted not to testify. Victor Maderazo declared that as of January 27, 1997,
he was a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Caibiran. On said date, he was at the stall of Verutiao at the public market in the
company of Seniforo Perido, who was the Chief of Police of Caibiran, Barangay Captain Rodolfo Rico, Revenue Collector Orlando
Mocorro, and Faulio Quizo, and other laborers. All of them witnessed the inventory of the goods in the stall of Verutiao which Victor
Maderazo made upon the request of Mayor Melchor Maderazo. Earlier, Verutiao was informed, by letter, of the inventory of the goods
in the stall, which, however, she failed to attend. One of the employees of the Municipality brought the key to the stall and opened it.
Victor Maderazo then conducted an inventory of the goods, each was described, while someone was listing the goods. The inventory
was orderly.
The goods were then brought to the police station where the supplies were kept.
The Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
On September 3, 2004, the Sandiganbayan rendered judgment28 convicting the accused Melchor G. Maderazo, Seniforo Perido, and
Victor Maderazo, Jr. of the crime of unjust vexation, but acquitted the other accused. The court ruled that Melchor Maderazo had no
authority to padlock, open and inventory the contents of the subject stall and take the same to the police station. Although, he had the
power to cancel the lease contract, as Mayor, he could not eject the lessee by padlocking the market stall and order the hauling and
seizure of the goods contained therein. The remedies of the Municipality in cases where there is delinquency in the payment of fees
and rentals are provided in the Local Government Code.
The court ruled that the accused cannot, however, be convicted of grave coercion because they did not use violence, threats or
intimidation. Verutiao could not have possibly been intimidated or forced by the accused, as she was not at the market stall when the
same was padlocked, and its goods inventoried and hauled. The court, however, held the said accused criminally liable for unjust
vexation even if the private complainant was not at the stall because the overt acts of the accused caused her annoyance, irritation and
vexation. The court ruled that if the second element of grave coercion under Article 286, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code is lacking,
the crime committed falls under the second paragraph of Article 287 of the same Code. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, accused MELCHOR G. MADERAZO, accused SENIFORO PERIDO and VICTOR
MADERAZO JR. are hereby CONVICTED of the crime of Unjust Vexation, in Criminal Case No. 24309 and hereby ordered to pay a
fine of Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00). Accused RODOLFO RICO, accused ORLANDO MOCORRO, accused RODOLFO AZUR,
accused REYNALDO OLEDAN, accused JORDAN GERVACIO, and accused JOSE CESORA are hereby ACQUITTED of the
Crime of Grave Coercion in Criminal Case No. 24309 for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Consequently, the cash bond they have posted for their provisional liberty are hereby CANCELLED and the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 37, Caibiran, Biliran Cashier is hereby ordered to release the said Cash Bond to accused Rico, accused Mocorro, accused
Cesora, accused Azur, accused Oledan, and accused Gervacio.
The Hold Departure Order issued against accused Rico, accused Mocorro, accused Cesora, accused Azur, accused Oledan, and
accused Gervacio are set aside and any Hold Departure Order issued by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation pursuant thereto is
hereby recalled. However, the Hold Departure Orders issued against accused Maderazo, accused Maderazo, Jr., and accused Perido
stand.
SO ORDERED.29

The Petition Before the Court

The accused, now petitioners, filed the instant petition30 and rely on the following grounds:
I
THE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING PETITIONERS OF THE CRIME OF UNJUST VEXATION.
II
THE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER MAYOR MADERAZO HAS NO POWER TO
PADLOCK A MARKET STALL AND TO HAUL THE GOODS CONTAINED THEREIN.
III
THE SACROSANCT RULE IS THAT WHERE THE PROSECUTION FAILS TO DISCHARGE ITS BURDEN OF PROVING
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT EVERY FACT NECESSARY TO CONSTITUTE THE CRIME FOR WHICH THE ACCUSED
IS BEING HELD TO ACCOUNT -- AS IN THE CASE AT BAR -- THE ACCUSED MUST PERFORCE BE ACQUITTED. 31
The threshold issue is whether or not the People adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt of petitioners guilt for unjust vexation.
Petitioners maintain that they are not criminally liable for unjust vexation because Verutiao was not prevented from doing something
not prohibited by law. She could not have been possibly intimidated or forced by petitioners, and could not have been prevented from
doing business. In fact, she was not transacting business at the time. Verutiao was not at her stall when it was opened and her goods
inventoried; hence, she could not have been vexed.
Under the Information, they were charged with grave coercion for allegedly evicting Verutiao from her stall on January 27, 1997,
thereby compelling her to give up her possession, and depriving her of said market stall. However, they were convicted by the trial
court of unjust vexation because they allegedly padlocked the stall, hauled and/or seized the goods contained therein. It was petitioner
Mayor Maderazo who had padlocked the stall earlier on January 21, 1997. Petitioners Perido and Victor Maderazo, Jr. were not
involved in the padlocking of the stall. For his part, petitioner Melchor Maderazo was not at the stall on January 27, 1997; he cannot,
thus, be guilty of unjust vexation for the overt acts of his co-petitioners on January 27, 1997.
Verutiaos refusal to vacate the premises of the subject stall despite proper demand and despite the fact that she was no longer
operating the same, rendered her a deforciant, and liable for violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1994. Consequently,
petitioner Mayor Maderazo had every right to consider the subject stall vacant; and proceed in accordance with Section 44 of
Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1994, which provides:
Section 44 - Vacancy of Tienda or Stall before expiration of lease.
Should any reason (sic), a tienda, stall or stand holder or leases (sic) discontinues or be required to discontinue his business before the
expiration of the lease, such tienda, stall or stand shall be considered vacant and its occupancy thereafter shall be disposed of in the
manner herein prescribed.
Petitioners posit that a Municipal Mayor has the duty to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the Municipality
and the exercise of its corporate powers and must ensure that all taxes and revenues of the Municipality are collected. He is
empowered to issue licenses and permits and to suspend or revoke the same for violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or
permits were issued; to adopt adequate measures to protect the funds, credits, rights and other properties of the municipality; and to
institute or cause to be instituted administrative or judicial proceedings for violation of ordinances in the collection of taxes, fees or
charges. Under Sec. 174 of the Local Government Code, among the civil remedies for the collection of delinquent local taxes, fees or
charges, and other revenues is "by administrative action through distraint of goods, chattels or effects, and other personal property of
whatever character, including stocks and other securities, debts, credits, bank accounts, and interest in and rights to personal property,
and by levy upon real property and interest in or rights to real property."

Petitioner Mayor Melchor Maderazo had the right to padlock the stall of Medaria Verutiao on January 21, 1997, after she refused to
vacate the stall despite his demand. Verutiao had no more lease contract and was no longer operating the stall for the purpose it was
intended, in violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1984. Moreover, she was delinquent in the payment of monthly rentals.
Under the circumstances, and in view of her violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1984, petitioner Mayor Melchor
Maderazo was duty-bound to institute the necessary administrative proceedings or to take immediate action to correct the violation,
protect the property of the Municipality, and ensure that the delinquent revenues from the subject stall would be collected.
Petitioners aver that in closing down the stall, Verutiao was not ejected therefrom but was merely stopped from improperly using it, in
the exercise of petitioner Mayor Maderazos power and duty to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the
Municipality and the exercise of its corporate powers.
The Special Prosecutor, for his part, avers that, under the Local Government Code, the local government concerned may avail of the
following remedies, either alternatively or simultaneously, for the collection of fees or charges: 1) the administrative remedies of
distraint of personal properties or levy upon real properties; and 2) by judicial action. But from the evidence, petitioner Melchor
Maderazo cancelled the lease contract and ordered, which the other petitioners obeyed, to padlock and to subsequently cart and haul
the goods of spouses Verutiao inside their market stall to the precinct, under the guise that it was done in accordance with the law. He
did not avail of the judicial action which is specifically provided in the Local Government Code. He failed to avail of the
administrative remedies of distraint and levy and its procedure as provided in Section 175 thereof.
Even if Verutiao was delinquent in the payment of their rentals, petitioner Melchor Maderazo is mandated to consider and resolve the
exemptions being claimed by the former and which were properly communicated to him. Petitioner Melchor Maderazo cannot take the
law into his hands, and order the seizure of the goods of the spouses Verutiao which was implemented by the other petitioners, in clear
violation of the law.
He maintains that nowhere in the Local Government Code is the Mayor of a Municipality authorized to take the law into his own
hands. Instead, the Local Government Code provides specifically for the measures, procedures and remedies to be undertaken in cases
of delinquency in the payment of fees or charges due to the local government concerned. Ordering to padlock, and to subsequently
cart and haul the goods inside the market stall being rented by Verutiao to the police precinct without any court order or notice of
distraint and levy prejudiced the spouses. Petitioner Mayor Maderazos duties of protecting the properties of the Municipality and
enforcing the law do not include depriving Verutiao of her means of livelihood. Perido and Maderazo, Jr. cannot escape criminal
liability by merely saying that they were following the orders of Melchor Maderazo as only lawful orders deserved to be followed and
obeyed. The participation of petitioners Perido and Maderazo, Jr. went beyond just being witnesses because they admitted that "they
opened the stall and x x x accounted for the goods and special effects contained inside." Petitioners Perido and Maderazo, Jr. were
invited to be at the vicinity as witnesses but they acted beyond their participation as mere witnesses; they became participants to an
illegal and unauthorized act.
Petitioners Seniforo Perido and Victor Maderazo, Jr. occupy the positions of Station Commander and Member of the Sangguniang
Bayan, respectively. They are public servants, and as such, owe the constituents of the Municipality of Caibiran, including Verutiao,
the performance of their official duties and obligations to a higher degree of commitment and standards, and must necessarily conform
to the norms of conduct set forth by the law.
Verutiao was not at the subject stall and could not have possibly been intimidated or forced by the accused. She could, likewise, not be
prevented from doing business because they were not transacting business at that time. By the actuations of the petitioners, Verutiao
was tormented and distressed. Unjust vexation is a form of light coercion which is broad enough to include any human conduct which,
although not productive of some physical or material harm, would unjustly annoy or irritate an innocent person.
The Ruling of the Court
On the first issue, we agree with the contention of respondents that indeed, the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt to
prove the guilt of petitioners Mayor Melchor Maderazo and Sangguniang Bayan Member Victor Maderazo, Jr. for unjust vexation.
Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code reads:

Art. 287. Light coercions. Any person, who by means of violence, shall seize anything belonging to his debtor for the purpose of
applying the same to the payment of the debt, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period and a fine equivalent to
the value of the thing, but in no case less than 75 pesos.
Any other coercions or unjust vexations shall be punished by arresto menor or a fine ranging from 5 to 200 pesos, or both.
The second paragraph of the Article is broad enough to include any human conduct which, although not productive of some physical
or material harm, could unjustifiably annoy or vex an innocent person.32 Compulsion or restraint need not be alleged in the
Information, for the crime of unjust vexation may exist without compulsion or restraint. However, in unjust vexation, being a felony
by dolo, malice is an inherent element of the crime. Good faith is a good defense to a charge for unjust vexation because good faith
negates malice. The paramount question to be considered is whether the offenders act caused annoyance, irritation, torment, distress
or disturbance to the mind of the person to whom it is directed.33 The main purpose of the law penalizing coercion and unjust vexation
is precisely to enforce the principle that no person may take the law into his hands and that our government is one of law, not of men.
It is unlawful for any person to take into his own hands the administration of justice. 34
In the present case, petitioner Melchor Maderazo opted not to testify in his behalf. The Sandiganbayan convicted the petitioners of
unjust vexation on its findings that petitioner Mayor Melchor Maderazo had the stall of Verutiao padlocked and had it reopened, and
had the contents of the stall inventoried and taken to the police station. However, the padlocking of the stall of Verutiao by petitioner
Melchor Maderazo took place on January 21, 1997 and not on January 27, 1997. Petitioners were charged with grave coercion, but
were convicted of unjust vexation for the eviction of Verutiao on January 27, 1997 and not on January 21, 1997 following the
inventory of the contents of the stall and the transportation thereof to the police station. The only events that took place on January 27,
1997 were the unlocking of the padlock of the stall, the inventory of its contents by petitioner Victor Maderazo on order of petitioner
Melchor Maderazo, and the transportation of the goods to the police station where it was stored. Petitioners Victor Maderazo, Jr. and
Seniforo Perido were not present when the stall was padlocked on January 21, 1997.
We agree with respondents contention that based on the evidence on record, the overt acts of petitioners Mayor Melchor Maderazo
and Victor Maderazo, Jr., on January 27, 1997, annoyed, irritated and caused embarrassment to her. It was petitioner Melchor
Maderazo who ordered petitioner Victor Maderazo, Jr. to have the stall reopened, to conduct an inventory of the contents thereof, and
to effect the transportation of the goods to the police station. Petitioner Victor Maderazo, who was a Sangguniang Bayan member,
obeyed the order of the Mayor.
Although Verutiao was not at her stall when it was unlocked, and the contents thereof taken from the stall and brought to the police
station, the crime of unjust vexation was nevertheless committed. For the crime to exist, it is not necessary that the offended party be
present when the crime was committed by said petitioners. It is enough that the private complainant was embarrassed, annoyed,
irritated or disturbed when she learned of the overt acts of the petitioners. Indeed, by their collective acts, petitioners evicted Verutiao
from her stall and prevented her from selling therein, hence, losing income from the business. Verutiao was deprived of her possession
of the stall from January 21, 1997.
Petitioners Mayor Melchor Maderazo and Sangguniang Bayan member Victor Maderazo, Jr., had no right, without judicial
intervention, to oust Verutiao from the stall, and had her merchandise transported to the police station, thereby preventing her from
doing business therein and selling her merchandize. Petitioner Mayor Maderazo had no right to take the law into his own hands and
deprive Verutiao of her possession of the stall and her means of livelihood.
Admittedly, the lease contract of Verutiao and the Municipality expired on January 13, 1997 without having been renewed, and
petitioner Mayor ordered Verutiao to vacate the stall, also for her failure to pay the rent amounting to P2,532.00. Under Section 44 of
Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1999, the stall is considered vacant and shall be disposed of. However, petitioner had to file an action for
unlawful detainer against Verutiao to recover possession of her stall and cause her eviction from said premises. 35 Verutiao insisted on
her right to remain as lessee of her stall and to do business thereat. Such action is designed to prevent breaches of the peace and
criminal disorder and prevent those believing themselves entitled to the possession of the property resort to force to gain possession
rather than to secure appropriate action in the court to assert their claims.36 It was incumbent upon petitioner Mayor to institute an
action for the eviction of Verutiao. He cannot be permitted to invade the property and oust the lessee who is entitled to the actual
possession and to place the burden upon the latter of instituting an action to try the property right. 37

An action for forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary proceedings established for the purpose of providing expeditious
means of protecting actual possession, which is presumed to be lawful until the contrary is proven. As this Court emphasized in Dizon
v. Concina:38
Succinctly did this Court explain in one case the nature of the forcible entry action: "In giving recognition to the action of forcible
entry and detainer the purpose of the law is to protect the person who in fact has actual possession; and in case of controverted right, it
requires the parties to preserve the status quo until one or the other of them sees fit to invoke the decision of a court of competent
jurisdiction upon the question of ownership. It is obviously just that the person who has first acquired possession should remain in
possession pending this decision; and the parties cannot be permitted meanwhile to engage in a petty warfare over the possession of
the property which is the subject of dispute.39
Undeniably, petitioner Mayor is tasked to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the Municipality and to
implement all approved programs, projects, services and activities of the Municipality40 and to ensure that all taxes and other revenues
of the Municipality are collected.41 He is obliged to institute or cause to be instituted administrative or judicial proceedings for the
recovery of funds and property.42 However, in the performance of his duties, petitioner Mayor should act within the confines of the law
and not resort to the commission of a felony. A public officer is proscribed from resorting to criminal acts in the enforcement of laws
and ordinances. He must exercise his power and perform his duties in accordance with law, with strict observance of the rights of the
people, and never whimsically, arbitrarily and despotically.
Even as we find petitioners Mayor Melchor Maderazo and Victor Maderazo, Jr. guilty of unjust vexation, we find petitioner Seniforo
Perido deserving of an acquittal. The Prosecution failed to prove that he conspired with the other petitioners. He was at the situs of the
stall merely to witness the inventory and ensure peace and order. He agreed to have the contents of the stall of Verutiao stored in the
police station presumably to protect the property from the elements and asportation by thieves until after Verutiao shall have claimed
the same or the disposition thereof determined by the authorities concerned.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION that petitioner Seniforo Perido is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. The bail bond posted by him for his
provisional liberty is cancelled. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

LEGISLATIVE POWER
1.) SIX REQUISITES OF A VALID ORDINANCE
G.R. No. 102782 December 11, 1991
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, RODOLFO A. MALAPIRA, STEPHEN A. MONSANTO, DAN R. CALDERON, and
GRANDY N. TRIESTE, petitioners
vs.
THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AUTHORITY and the MUNICIPALITY OF MANDALUYONG, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:p
In Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, G.R. No. 91023, promulgated on July 13,
1990, 1 the Court held that the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among the sanctions
that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605 and was permitted only under the conditions laid dowm by
LOI 43 in the case of stalled vehicles obstructing the public streets. It was there also observed that even the confiscation of driver's
licenses for traffic violations was not directly prescribed by the decree nor was it allowed by the decree to be imposed by the
Commission. No motion for reconsideration of that decision was submitted. The judgment became final and executory on August 6,
1990, and it was duly entered in the Book of Entries of Judgments on July 13, 1990.
Subsequently, the following developments transpired:
In a letter dated October 17, 1990, Rodolfo A. Malapira complained to the Court that when he was stopped for an alleged traffic
violation, his driver's license was confiscated by Traffic Enforcer Angel de los Reyes in Quezon City.
On December 18,1990, the Caloocan-Manila Drivers and Operators Association sent a letter to the Court asking who should enforce
the decision in the above-mentioned case, whether they could seek damages for confiscation of their driver's licenses, and where they
should file their complaints.
Another letter was received by the Court on February 14, 1991, from Stephen L. Monsanto, complaining against the confiscation of
his driver's license by Traffic Enforcer A.D. Martinez for an alleged traffic violation in Mandaluyong.
This was followed by a letter-complaint filed on March 7, 1991, from Dan R. Calderon, a lawyer, also for confiscation of his driver's
license by Pat. R.J. Tano-an of the Makati Police Force.

Still another complaint was received by the Court dated April 29, 1991, this time from Grandy N. Trieste, another lawyer, who also
protested the removal of his front license plate by E. Ramos of the Metropolitan Manila Authority-Traffic Operations Center and the
confiscation of his driver's license by Pat. A.V. Emmanuel of the Metropolitan Police Command-Western Police District.
Required to submit a Comment on the complaint against him, Allan D. Martinez invoked Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, of
Mandaluyong, authorizing the confiscation of driver's licenses and the removal of license plates of motor vehicles for traffic
violations.
For his part, A.V. Emmanuel said he confiscated Trieste's driver's license pursuant to a memorandum dated February 27, 1991, from
the District Commander of the Western Traffic District of the Philippine National Police, authorizing such sanction under certain
conditions.
Director General Cesar P. Nazareno of the Philippine National Police assured the Court in his own Comment that his office had never
authorized the removal of the license plates of illegally parked vehicles and that he had in fact directed full compliance with the
above-mentioned decision in a memorandum, copy of which he attached, entitled Removal of Motor Vehicle License Plates and dated
February 28, 1991.
Pat. R.J. Tano-an, on the other hand, argued that the Gonong decision prohibited only the removal of license plates and not the
confiscation of driver's licenses.
On May 24, 1990, the Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, authorizing itself "to detach the license
plate/tow and impound attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro
Manila."
On July 2, 1991, the Court issued the following resolution:
The attention ofthe Court has been called to the enactment by the Metropolitan Manila Authority of Ordinance No.
11, Series of 1991, providing inter alia that:
Section 2. Authority to Detach Plate/Tow and Impound. The Metropolitan Manila Authority, thru
the Traffic Operatiom Center, is authorized to detach the license plate/tow and impound
attended/unattended/abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in
Metro Manila.
The provision appears to be in conflict with the decision of the Court in the case at bar (as reported in 187 SCRA
432), where it was held that the license plates of motor vehicles may not be detached except only under the
conditions prescribed in LOI 43. Additionally, the Court has received several complaints against the confiscation by
police authorities of driver's licenses for alleged traffic violations, which sanction is, according to the said decision,
not among those that may be imposed under PD 1605.
To clarify these matters for the proper guidance of law-enforcement officers and motorists, the Court resolved to
require the Metropolitan Manila Authority and the Solicitor General to submit, within ten (10) days from notice
hereof, separate COMMENTS on such sanctions in light of the said decision.
In its Comment, the Metropolitan Manila Authority defended the said ordinance on the ground that it was adopted pursuant to the
powers conferred upon it by EO 392. It particularly cited Section 2 thereof vesting in the Council (its governing body) the
responsibility among others of:
1. Formulation of policies on the delivery of basic services requiring
coordination or consolidation for the Authority; and

2. Promulgation of resolutions and other issuances of metropolitan wide

application, approval of a code of basic services requiring coordination,
andexercise of its rule-making powers. (Emphasis supplied)
The Authority argued that there was no conflict between the decision and the ordinance because the latter was meant to supplement
and not supplant the latter. It stressed that the decision itself said that the confiscation of license plates was invalid in the absence of a
valid law or ordinance, which was why Ordinance No. 11 was enacted. The Authority also pointed out that the ordinance could not be
attacked collaterally but only in a direct action challenging its validity.
For his part, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the ordinance was null and void because it represented an invalid exercise of
a delegated legislative power. The flaw in the measure was that it violated existing law, specifically PD 1605, which does not permit,
and so impliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates and the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations in Metropolitan
Manila. He made no mention, however, of the alleged impropriety of examining the said ordinance in the absence of a formal
challenge to its validity.
On October 24, 1991, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted a motion for the early resolution of the questioned sanctions, to
remove once and for all the uncertainty of their vahdity. A similar motion was filed by the Metropolitan Manila Authority, which
reiterated its contention that the incidents in question should be dismissed because there was no actual case or controversy before the
Court.
The Metropolitan Manila Authority is correct in invoking the doctrine that the validity of a law or act can be challenged only in a
direct action and not collaterally. That is indeed the settled principle. However, that rule is not inflexible and may be relaxed by the
Court under exceptional circumstances, such as those in the present controversy.
The Solicitor General notes that the practices complained of have created a great deal of confusion among motorists about the state of
the law on the questioned sanctions. More importantly, he maintains that these sanctions are illegal, being violative of law and
the Gonong decision, and should therefore be stopped. We also note the disturbing report that one policeman who confiscated a
driver's license dismissed the Gonong decision as "wrong" and said the police would not stop their "habit" unless they received orders
"from the top." Regrettably, not one of the complainants has filed a formal challenge to the ordinances, including Monsanto and
Trieste, who are lawyers and could have been more assertive of their rights.
Given these considerations, the Court feels it must address the problem squarely presented to it and decide it as categorically rather
than dismiss the complaints on the basis of the technical objection raised and thus, through its inaction, allow them to fester.
The step we now take is not without legal authority or judicial precedent. Unquestionably, the Court has the power to suspend
procedural rules in the exercise of its inherent power, as expressly recognized in the Constitution, to promulgate rules concerning
"pleading, practice and procedure in all courts." 2 In proper cases, procedural rules may be relaxed or suspended in the interest of
substantial justice, which otherwise may be miscarried because of a rigid and formalistic adherence to such rules.
The Court has taken this step in a number of such cases, notably Araneta vs. Dinglasan, 3 where Justice Tuason justified the deviation
on the ground that "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely,
brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure."
We have made similar rulings in other cases, thus:
Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment ofjustice. Their
strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice, must always be avoided. (Aznar III vs. Bernad, G.R. No. 81190, May 9, 1988, 161 SCRA 276.) Time and
again, this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the
higher interests of justice so require. In the instant petition, we forego a lengthy disquisition of the proper procedure
that should have been taken by the parties involved and proceed directly to the merits of the case. (Piczon vs. Court
of Appeals, 190 SCRA 31).

Three of the cases were consolidated for argument and the other two were argued separately on other dates.
Inasmuch as all of them present the same fundamental question which, in our view, is decisive, they will be disposed
of jointly. For the same reason we will pass up the objection to the personality or sufficiency of interest of the
petitioners in case G.R. No. L-3054 and case G.R. No. L-3056 and the question whether prohibition lies in cases
G.R. Nos. L-2044 and L2756. No practical benefit can be gained from a discussion of these procedural matters,
since the decision in the cases wherein the petitioners'cause of action or the propriety of the procedure followed is
not in dispute, will be controlling authority on the others. Above all, the transcendental importance to the public of
these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of
procedure. (Avelino vs. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2821 cited in Araneta vs. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368.)
Accordingly, the Court will consider the motion to resolve filed by the Solicitor General a petition for prohibition against the
enforcement of Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, of the Metropohtan Manila Authority, and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, of the
Municipality of Mandaluyong. Stephen A. Monsanto, Rodolfo A. Malapira, Dan R. Calderon, and Grandy N. Trieste are considered
co-petitioners and the Metropolitan Manila Authority and the Municipality of Mandaluyong are hereby impleaded as respondents.
This petition is docketed as G.R. No. 102782. The comments already submitted are duly noted and shall be taken into account by the
Court in the resolution of the substantive issues raised.
It is stressed that this action is not intended to disparage procedural rules, which the Court has recognized often enough as necessary to
the orderly administration of justice. If we are relaxing them in this particular case, it is because of the failure of the proper parties to
file the appropriate proceeding against the acts complained of, and the necessity of resolving, in the interest of the public, the
important substantive issues raised.
Now to the merits.
The Metro Manila Authority sustains Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, under the specific authority conferred upon it by EO 392,
while Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, is justified on the basis of the General Welfare Clause embodied in the Local Government
Code. 4 It is not disputed that both measures were enacted to promote the comfort and convenience of the public and to alleviate the
worsening traffic problems in Metropolitan Manila due in large part to violations of traffic rules.
The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate such measures, it appearing that the requisites of
such delegation are present. These requisites are. 1) the completeness of the statute making the delegation; and 2) the presence of a
sufficient standard. 5
Under the first requirement, the statute must leave the legislature complete in all its terms and provisions such that all the delegate will
have to do when the statute reaches it is to implement it. What only can be delegated is not the discretion to determine what the law
shall be but the discretion to determine how the law shall be enforced. This has been done in the case at bar.
As a second requirement, the enforcement may be effected only in accordance with a sufficient standard, the function of which is to
map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and thus "prevent the delegation from running riot." This requirement has also been
met. It is settled that the "convenience and welfare" of the public, particularly the motorists and passengers in the case at bar, is an
acceptable sufficient standard to delimit the delegate's authority. 6
But the problem before us is not the validity of the delegation of legislative power. The question we must resolve is the validity of
the exercise of such delegated power.
The measures in question are enactments of local governments acting only as agents of the national legislature. Necessarily, the acts of
these agents must reflect and conform to the will of their principal. To test the validity of such acts in the specific case now before us,
we apply the particular requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by the accepted principles governing municipal corporations.
According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or
oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6)
must be general and consistent with public policy. 7

A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the measures under consideration do not pass the first criterion because they do
not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the
confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the following provisions
of the decree authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission (and now the Metropolitan Manila Authority) to impose such
sanctions:
Section 1. The Metropolitan Manila Commission shall have the power to impose fines and otherwise discipline
drivers and operators of motor vehicles for violations of traffic laws, ordinances, rules and regulations in
Metropolitan Manila in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed. For this purpose, the
powers of the Land Transportation Commission and the Board of Transportation under existing laws over such
violations and punishment thereof are hereby transferred to the Metropolitan Manila Commission. When the proper
penalty to be imposed issuspension or revocation of driver's license or certificate of public convenience, the
Metropolitan Manila Commission or its representatives shall suspend or revoke such license or certificate. The
suspended or revoked driver's license or the report of suspension or revocation of the certificate of public
convenience shall be sent to the Land Transportation Commission or the Board of Transportation, as the case may
be, for their records update.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 3.` Violations of traffic laws, ordinances, rules and regulations, committed within a twelve-month period,
reckoned from the date of birth of the licensee, shall subject the violator to graduated fines as follows: P10.00 for the
first offense, P20.00 for the and offense, P50.00 for the third offense, a one-year suspension of driver's license for
the fourth offense, and a revocation of the driver'slicense for the fifth offense: Provided, That the Metropolitan
Manila Commission may impose higher penalties as it may deem proper for violations of its ordinances prohibiting
or regulating the use of certain public roads, streets and thoroughfares in Metropolitan Manila.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 5. In case of traffic violations, the driver's license shall not be confiscated but the erring driver shall be
immediately issued a traffic citation ticket prescribed by the Metropolitan Manila Commission which shall state the
violation committed, the amount of fine imposed for the violation and an advice that he can make payment to the
city or municipal treasurer where the violation was committed or to the Philippine National Bank or Philippine
Veterans Bank or their branches within seven days from the date of issuance of the citation ticket.
If the offender fails to pay the fine imposed within the period herein prescribed, the Metropolitan Manila
Commission or the law-enforcement agency concerned shall endorse the case to the proper fiscal for appropriate
proceedings preparatory to the filing of the case with the competent traffic court, city or municipal court.
If at the time a driver renews his driver's license and records show that he has an unpaid fine, his driver's license
shall not be renewed until he has paid the fine and corresponding surcharges.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 8. Insofar as the Metropolitan Manila area is concerned, all laws, decrees, orders, ordinances, rules and
regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. (Emphasis supplied).
In fact, the above provisions prohibit the imposition of such sanctions in Metropolitan Manila. The Commission was allowed to
"impose fines and otherwise discipline" traffic violators only "in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed," that
is, by the decree itself. Nowhere is the removal of license plates directly imposed by the decree or at least allowed by it to be imposed
by the Commission. Notably, Section 5 thereof expressly provides that "in case of traffic violations, the driver's license shall not be
confiscated." These restrictions are applicable to the Metropolitan Manila Authority and all other local political subdivisions
comprising Metropolitan Manila, including the Municipality of Mandaluyong.

The requirement that the municipal enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. Local political subdivisions are able to
legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature (except only that the power to create
their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). 8 They are mere agents vested with what is
called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey
at all times the will of their principal. In the case before us, the enactments in question, which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail
against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute.
The self-serving language of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance is worth noting. Curiously, it is the measure itself, which was
enacted by the Metropolitan Manila Authority, that authorizes the Metropolitan Manila Authority to impose the questioned sanction.
In Villacorta vs, Bemardo, 9 the Court nullified an ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board of Dagupan City for being violative of
the Land Registration Act. The decision held in part:
In declaring the said ordinance null and void, the court a quo declared:
From the above-recited requirements, there is no showing that would justify the enactment of the
questioned ordinance. Section 1 of said ordinance clearly conflicts with Section 44 of Act 496,
because the latter law does not require subdivision plans to be submitted to the City Engineer
before the same is submitted for approval to and verification by the General Land Registration
Office or by the Director of Lands as provided for in Section 58 of said Act. Section 2 of the same
ordinance also contravenes the provisions of Section 44 of Act 496, the latter being silent on a
service fee of P0.03 per square meter of every lot subject of such subdivision application; Section
3 of the ordinance in question also conflicts with Section 44 of Act 496, because the latter law
does not mention of a certification to be made by the City Engineer before the Register of Deeds
allows registration of the subdivision plan; and the last section of said ordinance impose a penalty
for its violation, which Section 44 of Act 496 does not impose. In other words, Ordinance 22 of
the City of Dagupan imposes upon a subdivision owner additional conditions.
xxx xxx xxx
The Court takes note of the laudable purpose of the ordinance in bringing to a halt the surreptitious
registration of lands belonging to the government. But as already intimated above, the powers of
the board in enacting such a laudable ordinance cannot be held valid when it shall impede the
exercise of rights granted in a general law and/or make a general law subordinated to a local
ordinance.
We affirm.
To sustain the ordinance would be to open the floodgates to other ordinances amending and so violating national
laws in the guise of implementing them. Thus, ordinances could be passed imposing additional requirements for the
issuance of marriage licenses, to prevent bigamy; the registration of vehicles, to minimize carnapping; the execution
of contracts, to forestall fraud; the validation of parts, to deter imposture; the exercise of freedom of speech, to
reduce disorder; and so on. The list is endless, but the means, even if the end be valid, would be ultra vires.
The measures in question do not merely add to the requirement of PD 1605 but, worse, impose sanctions the decree does not allow
and in fact actually prohibits. In so doing, the ordinances disregard and violate and in effect partially repeal the law.
We here emphasize the ruling in the Gonong case that PD 1605 applies only to the Metropolitan Manila area. It is an exception to the
general authority conferred by R.A. No. 413 on the Commissioner of Land Transportation to punish violations of traffic rules
elsewhere in the country with the sanction therein prescribed, including those here questioned.
The Court agrees that the challenged ordinances were enacted with the best of motives and shares the concern of the rest of the public
for the effective reduction of traffic problems in Metropolitan Manila through the imposition and enforcement of more deterrent
penalties upon traffic violators. At the same time, it must also reiterate the public misgivings over the abuses that may attend the

enforcement of such sanction in eluding the illicit practices described in detail in the Gonong decision. At any rate, the fact is that
there is no statutory authority for and indeed there is a statutory prohibition against the imposition of such penalties in the
Metropolitan Manila area. Hence, regardless of their merits, they cannot be impose by the challenged enactments by virtue only of the
delegated legislative powers.
It is for Congress to determine, in the exercise of its own discretion, whether or not to impose such sanctions, either directly through a
statute or by simply delegating authority to this effect to the local governments in Metropolitan Manila. Without such action, PD 1605
remains effective and continues prohibit the confiscation of license plates of motor vehicles (except under the conditions prescribed in
LOI 43) and of driver licenses as well for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(1) declaring Ordinance No.11, Seriesof l991,of theMetropolitan Manila Authority and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988 of the
Municipality of Mandaluyong, NULL and VOID; and
(2) enjoining all law enforcement authorities in Metropolitan Manila from removing the license plates of motor vehicles (except when
authorized under LOI 43) and confiscating driver licenses for traffic violations within the said area.
SO ORDERED.

2.) DISTINCTION BETWEEN AN ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES AND RESOLUTIONS

G.R. No. 128509 August 22, 2006

ROBLE ARRASTRE, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
HON. ALTAGRACIA VILLAFLOR and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, assailing the 7 October 1996 Decision1 and the 13 February 1997 Resolution2 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40621, which reversed and set aside the 29 March 1995 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch XVIII, Hilongos, Leyte, in Special Civil Action No. H-237.
The Antecedents
Petitioner Roble Arrastre, Inc. is a cargo handling service operator, authorized by the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) through Permit
No. M92-005 to provide and render arrastre and stevedoring services at the Municipal Port of Hilongos, Leyte, and on all vessels
berthed thereat, from 7 September 1992 to 15 September 1993.4 For the years 1992 and 1993, petitioner was granted Business Permits
No. 349 and No. 276, respectively, by respondent Altagracia Villaflor as Municipal Mayor of Hilongos, Leyte. On 14 December 1993,
pending final consideration of petitioners application for renewal with the PPA Office, Manila, the PPA through its Port Manager
Salvador L. Reyna of the Tacloban Port Management Office issued a 90-day hold-over authority to petitioner. Stated therein was the
proviso that notwithstanding the 90-day period aforementioned, the authority shall be deemed ipso facto revoked if an earlier
permit/contract for cargo handling services is granted or sooner withdrawn or cancelled for cause pursuant to PPA Administrative
Order No. 10-81. On 27 January 1994, while the 90-day hold-over authority was in effect, petitioner filed with respondent mayor an
application for the renewal of its Business Permit No. 276. However, the same was denied.
Aggrieved by the denial, petitioner filed with the RTC, a Petition for Mandamus with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction 5 against
respondent mayor, raising the primary ground that the refusal to issue the business license sought for was a neglect to perform an act
which the law enjoins her to do, by virtue of the office she occupies. According to petitioner, the source of the power of the municipal
mayor to issue licenses is Section 444(b)(3)(iv)6of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991,
which is merely for the purpose of revenue generation and not regulation, hence, the municipal mayor has no discretion to refuse the
issuance of a business license following the applicants payment or satisfaction of the proper license fees. 7Petitioner further alleged
that it is the PPA which is vested with the discretion to determine whether a party can render arrastre service in a particular port area. 8
In answer thereto, respondent mayor averred, inter alia, that the remedy of mandamus does not lie as the issuance of the permit sought
is not a ministerial function, but one that requires the exercise of sound judgment and discretion. 9 In denying petitioners application,
respondent mayor invoked Municipal Resolution No. 93-27,10passed by the Sangguniang Bayan of Hilongos, Leyte, on 17 March
1993, which prohibits any party which likewise operates shipping lines plying the route of Cebu to Hilongos and vice versa, from
engaging in arrastre and stevedoring services at the port of Hilongos.11 Respondent mayor asserted that petitioner is owned and
operated by Roble Shipping Lines, a shipping company that operates along the routes specified in Municipal Resolution No. 9327;12 hence, effectively rendering petitioner disqualified from operating an arrastre service therein. 13 Finally, by way of counterclaim,
respondent mayor sought moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and expenses of litigation. 14
On 16 May 1994, petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition,15 contending that subsequent to the filing of the Petition for Mandamus with
the RTC, it was granted by the PPA a five-year contract16 to provide cargo handling and other related services at the Port of Hilongos,
Leyte, effective 1 March 1994. The aforesaid contract was indorsed by the District Manager for the Visayas to the Port Manager of
Tacloban. Moreover, petitioner sought to incorporate the five-year contract as an integral part of its Petition. The Supplemental
Petition was admitted by the RTC, in the Order17 dated 19 July 1994.
On 19 September 1994, the RTC issued a Pre-Trial Order containing the following admitted stipulations of facts, to wit:
1. That petitioner in 1993 was issued a Mayors Permit No. 276 on January 29, 1993, [as] shown by Annex "B" of the petition;

2. [That petitioner paid] for Business and License Permit for the year 1994 in the amount of P9,789.48 under Official Receipt No.
7534455-C;
3. [That petitioner procured a] Barangay Clearance.18
In the same Order, the RTC denied the parties motion that the case be submitted on the pleadings since no judgment on the pleadings
could be had as there were controverted issues material to the case.19
The Ruling of the RTC
The RTC opined that the PPA has the sole authority to grant permits in the operation of cargo handling services in all Philippine ports,
whether public or private. Proceeding therefrom, it ruled that the refusal of respondent mayor to approve petitioners application for
renewal of the business permit was not based on law nor upon her discretion.
The RTC ratiocinated in this wise, thus:
As can be read the resolution is to object to the approval of a five (5) year management contract for Arrastre and Stevedoring Services
in the port of Hilongos, Leyte, applied by the Roble Arrastre, Inc. with the concomitant reason that the Sangguniang Bayan finds it
logical and ethical not to grant any permit to any group or corporation in the municipal port of Hilongos who are operators of Shipping
Lines flying (sic) the route from Cebu to Hilongos and vice-versa to protect the business interest of the shipping industry of the
municipality. This resolution is signed by the Municipal Vice Mayor as Presiding Officer of Sangguniang Bayan and approved by the
Mayor. To the mind of the court the approval of the Mayor in a resolution by the Sangguniang Bayan is superfluous. This is not an
ordinance that should be signed by the mayor in order to become effective as a law but a resolution of that august body. The above
resolution was approved on March 17, 1993 not withstanding (sic) the fact that as shown by the wordings thereat there was already a
public hearing conducted by PPA Manila on March 9, 1993 at the Municipal Multi[-] Purpose Center. The Municipal Mayor was
present and complaints were entertained by the Hearing Officers from several shippers of Hilongos, Leyte. As appearing also in the
lower portion of the said resolution, the same was furnished PPA Manila and the respondent admitted that she did not even know
whether a copy had been sent by the Sangguniang Bayan to the concerned offices. Granting that this resolution reached the General
Manager, PPA, Manila, she have (sic) not pursued any action on the matter nor the Office of the Mayor and the Sangguniang Bayan
received any information of what proper action was taken therein. It is indeed unfortunate that whatever nature of the complaints
which was heard during the public hearing by the representative of the PPA, it is not shown whether PPA lend (sic) an ear to it. The
fact remains that on March 1, 1994[,] nearly 1 year after this resolution and public hearing, the petitioner, Roble Arrastre, Inc., was
given a contract by PPA who has the authority under P.D. 87520 (sic) to issue the same.
xxxx
x x x The law is clear that under P.D. 875 the sole authority to authorize operation of cargo handling services in all ports of the
Philippines whether public or private is lodge (sic) with the Philippine Ports Authority. Under the said law the granting of permits is
through the PPA Board carried out by the General Manager or his assistant. This Court has taken noticed (sic) also that no ordinance
had been passed by the Sangguniang Bayan and approved by the Municipal Mayor of Hilongos, Leyte, in accordance with the Local
Government with regards to the port operation in the port of Hilongos nor there was [a] showing that the Executive Officer of the
municipality has anything to say on the power and jurisdiction of the PPA in the port of Hilongos, Leyte. This goes to show that even
these public officers knows (sic) the extent of their power as regards the authority of the PPA.
This Court is of the firmed (sic) belief and so holds that the refusal of the Municipal Mayor to approve the application for renewal is
not based on law nor upon her discretion. Under the milieu of the case the PPA is authorized and have (sic) the exclusive jurisdiction
over all ports of the Philippines and they (sic) alone can issue cargo handling contracts. 21
Finding for petitioner, the court a quo disposed as follows:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, by preponderance of evidence, this Court give (sic) due course to this petition of Mandamus in favor of
the Roble Arrastre, Inc. and against the respondent, the Honorable Municipal Mayor of Hilongos sued in her capacity as a Public
Officer and orders her forthwith:

a) To approve the application of Roble Arrastre, Inc. for the year 1994 as he has already paid the necessary payments in connection
therewith albeit the same permit is now functous officio as this is now 1995. Nevertheless, this approved permit to be issued by the
Mayor shall be a basis for renewal of the said 1994 permit for the year 1995 after payment of due fees required by her office.
Without pronouncement as to costs. The counterclaim of respondent is hereby dismissed.22
Respondent mayor filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereon, which was denied for lack of merit by the RTC, in the Order 23 dated 25
October 1995.
The Ruling of the Appellate Court
Upon elevation of the case to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court rendered a Decision dated 7 October 1996, reversing and
setting aside the RTC. Moreover, it entered a new judgment dismissing Special Civil Action No. H-237.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the pursuit of the duty of respondent mayor under Section 444(b)(3)(iv)24 of the Local Government
Code necessarily entails the exercise of official discretion. Hence, it held that mandamus will not lie to control or review the exercise
of her discretion. Moreover, the Court of Appeals declared that petitioners main prayer, i.e., to compel respondent mayor to issue a
business license for the year 1994, by the passage of time had already become moot and academic. On this score, the appellate court
declared that the issue is academic. Courts will not adjudicate moot cases nor hear a case when the object sought is no longer
attainable.
The appellate court pronounced, thus:
Under Section 444(b)(3)(iv), all local chief executive officer (sic) or municipal mayors are vested with the authority to issue licenses
and permits within their jurisdiction. In the same provision, the mayor may likewise suspend or revoke a permit for any violation of
the conditions upon which the same had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance. In effect, under said Section 444(b)(3)(iv), the
municipal governments, thru its chief executive, are endowed with the authority to exercise police power.
Evidently, the pursuit of its duty under the (sic) police power necessarily entails exercise of official discretion in order for any local
officials to ascertain which will better serve their constituents who elected them into office. Full discretion must necessarily be granted
them to perform their functions and it will not be sound logic to simply make them perform purely ministerial functions. And when the
discharge of an official duty requires the exercise of official discretion or judgment, it is never a ministerial one (Mateo vs. CA, 196
SCRA 280 [1991]).
Furthermore, where the only power given to a municipal corporation or official is to issue license, as in Section 444 of the Local
Government Code, it is clearly regulatory in nature rather than a revenue raising one. Conclusively, regulation being the object of the
power to issue license and permits the exercise of discretion by the issuing authority becomes an inescapable prerogative. This could
be the very same reason why business permits and licenses are renewed almost annually in order that the licensing officials in carrying
out their functions could examine and evaluate availing circumstances and conditions and with the exercise of discretion determine
whether to grant or deny the application or, to revoke a license or permit already issued. It should also be understood that a municipal
license is not a property such that it is revocable when public interest so requires (Pedro vs. Provincial Board of Rizal, 56 Phil. 126). 25
The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and a new one entered
dismissing Special Civil Action No. [H-]237. No pronouncement as to costs.26
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 13 February
1997.
Hence, the instant Petition.
The Issues

Petitioner, in its Memorandum, presented the following statement of issues, to wit:

I
Whether or not it was valid for the Court of Appeals to have relied on the cases of Mateo v. Court of Appeals and Pedro v. Provincial
Board of Rizal, in ruling that respondent Mayor had full discretion in issuing or renewing the Business Permit even after the petitioner
duly complied with all documentary requirements and fully paid the corresponding permit fees.
II
Whether or not the Court of Appeals validly interpreted Section 444, (3) (iv), R.A. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code of 1991, as a grant of police power and full discretion to the respondent mayor to refuse the issuance of the permit despite due
compliance of all documentary requirements and full payment of the required permit fees by the petitioner.
III
Whether or not the Court of Appeals validly rendered its Decision when it refused to apply the precedent in Symaco v. Aquino
wherein this Honorable Supreme Court held that even in the absence of any ordinance granting the respondent Mayor such discretion,
she cannot refuse issuance of the permit if there is prior compliance by the petitioner with all documentary requirement and full
payment of the required permit fees.
IV
Whether or not the Court of Appeals validly rendered its Decision when it dismissed the [Petition] allegedly on the ground that it
became (sic) moot and academic.27
The Ruling of the Court
At the outset, we state our concurrence with the Court of Appeals when it entered a new judgment dismissing Special Civil Action No.
H-237 on the ground of mootness. The appellate court ratiocinated, to wit:
Lastly, it would seem that the main prayer of the complaint, that is, to compel the respondent mayor to issue a business license for the
year 1994, by the passage of time during which this case pends, had already become moot and academic. A new application is
necessary for the year 1995 and the year 1996 which is about to end. And in the grant or denial of such application for business
permits or licenses, the respondent mayor must examine closely the circumstances prevailing and again use her discretion in the
exercise of her official function. Accordingly, the issue at hand is already academic and it is well established that courts will not
adjudicate moot cases nor hear a case when the object sought is not attainable (State vs. Lambert, 52 W. Va. 248, 43 S. E. 176) and it
will decline jurisdiction over moot cases which must involve only actual interests. (In re: Estate of Caballos, 12 Phil. 271; Beech vs.
Crossfield, 12 Phil. 555).28
Indeed, Courts will not determine a moot question in a case in which no practical relief can be granted. It is unnecessary to indulge in
academic discussion of a case presenting a moot question as a judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the nature
of things, cannot be enforced.29 However, we are constrained to render judgment herein pursuant to our symbolic function of educating
the bench and the bar.30For another, this case comes within the rule that courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if
it is "capable of repetition yet evading review."31
The crux of the instant controversy is whether respondent mayor can be compelled by a writ of mandamus to grant petitioners
application for a renewal of a business permit to operate an arrastre service at the Municipal Port of Hilongos in Leyte.
Ostensibly, it is petitioners contention that respondent mayors power to issue permits as contained in the aforesaid law is ministerial;
hence, mandamus lies.

It bears to reiterate this Courts ruling on the nature of the writ of mandamus. The writ of mandamus serves to compel a respondent
who fails to perform a legal duty or unlawfully excludes another from the enjoyment of an entitled right or office to do the act required
to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner.32 Otherwise stated, mandamus is issued to command the performance of a ministerial,
but not a discretionary duty.
With that settled, we make a determination of the nature of the power of respondent mayor to grant petitioner a permit to operate an
arrastre service. Central to the resolution of the case at bar is a reading of Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government Code of
1991, which provides, thus:
SEC. 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation.
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of the municipality and its
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the Municipal mayor shall:
xxxx
(3) Initiate and maximize the generation of resources and revenues, and apply the same to the implementation of development plans,
program objectives and priorities as provided for under Section 18 of this Code, particularly those resources and revenues
programmed for agro-industrial development and country-wide growth and progress, and relative thereto, shall:
xxxx
(iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or permits
had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance. (Italics supplied.)
As Section 444(b)(3)(iv) so states, the power of the municipal mayor to issue licenses is pursuant to Section 16 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, which declares:
SEC. 16. General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure
and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the
people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and
technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among
their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
Section 16, known as the general welfare clause, encapsulates the delegated police power to local governments. Local government
units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies.33 Evidently, the Local Government Code of 1991 is
unequivocal that the municipal mayor has the power to issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of
the conditions upon which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance. On this matter, petitioner maintains
that under the Local Government Code of 1991, a suspension or revocation of permits shall be premised on a finding of violation of
the conditions upon which the permits were issued pursuant to a law or ordinance, which is independent of the Code itself. Petitioner
asseverates further that there was no law or ordinance that conferred upon the respondent mayor the power to refuse the issuance of
the permit despite compliance of petitioner with all documentary requirements and payment of all the fees.
First. On petitioners assertion that the power to issue license should be pursuant to law other than the Local Government Code of
1991, we so hold that the language of the law did not find the need to distinguish between other laws and that of the Local
Government Code of 1991 itself. When the law does not distinguish, we must not distinguish. 34 Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemus. Hence, even the Local Government Code of 1991, specifically Section 16 thereof, can be utilized to determine
the bounds of the exercise of the municipal mayor in issuing licenses and permits.
Second. While we agree with petitioner that there is no ordinance conferring upon the respondent mayor the power to refuse the
issuance of the permit for the operation of an arrastre service, we are, as yet, unprepared to declare that the power of the municipal

mayor as enunciated under Section 444(b)(3)(iv) is ministerial. What can be deduced from the aforesaid section is that the limits in the
exercise of the power of a municipal mayor to issue licenses, and permits and suspend or revoke the same can be contained in a law or
an ordinance. Otherwise stated, a law or an ordinance can provide the conditions upon which the power of the municipal mayor under
Section 444(b)(3)(iv) can be exercised. Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government Code of 1991 takes its cue from Section 16
thereof, which is largely an exercise of delegated police power. We said:
The general welfare clause is the delegation in statutory form of the police power of the State to LGUs. Through this, LGUs may
prescribe regulations to protect the lives, health, and property of their constituents and maintain peace and order within their respective
territorial jurisdictions. Accordingly, we have upheld enactments providing, for instance, the regulation of gambling, the occupation of
rig drivers, the installation and operation of pinball machines, the maintenance and operation of cockpits, the exhumation and transfer
of corpses from public burial grounds, and the operation of hotels, motels, and lodging houses as valid exercises by local legislatures
of the police power under the general welfare clause.35
Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government Code of 1991, whereby the power of the respondent mayor to issue license and permits
is circumscribed, is a manifestation of the delegated police power of a municipal corporation. 36 Necessarily, the exercise thereof
cannot be deemed ministerial. As to the question of whether the power is validly exercised, the matter is within the province of a writ
of certiorari, but certainly, not of mandamus.
It may be true, as argued by petitioner, that Resolution No. 93-27, which was enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan of Hilongos, is not an
ordinance but merely a resolution. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is
merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and
permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently - a third reading is necessary
for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members.37
However, the fact that Resolution No. 93-27 is a "mere" resolution can do nil to support petitioners cause. As stated earlier, the proper
action is certiorari to determine whether grave abuse of discretion had been committed on the part of respondent mayor in the refusal
to grant petitioners application. Petitioners petition for mandamus is incompetent against respondent mayors discretionary power.
Thus:
"Discretion," when applied to public functionaries, means a power or right conferred upon them by law or acting officially, under
certain circumstances, uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience of others. A purely ministerial act or duty in contradiction to a
discretional act is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the
mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.
If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty
is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official
discretion or judgment.38
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40621,
dated 7 October 1996 and 13 February 1997, respectively, dismissing Special Civil Action No. H-237 are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

3.) Meaning of Quorum

G.R. No. 147767

January 14, 2004

MANUEL E. ZAMORA, petitioner,

vs.
GOVERNOR JOSE R. CABALLERO, ANESIO M. RANARIO, in his capacity as Provincial Administrator, MARIANO
KINTANAR, in his capacity as Provincial Auditor, CARMEN R. RASUL, in his capacity as Provincial Treasurer, ROLANDO
L. OSORIO, BELINDA G. APAWAN, ARMANDO L. SERAS, RUWEL PETER S. GONZAGA, ARMANDO C. CODILLA,
RAUL B. BASAÑES, GRACIANO C. ARAFOL, JR., respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
Petitioner Manuel Zamora, a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Compostela Valley (the Sanggunian), seeks to invalidate all
acts executed and resolutions issued by the Sanggunian during its sessions held on February 8 and 26, 2001 for lack of quorum.
It appears that on February 6, 2001, Vice-Governor Reynaldo Navarro sent a written notice of a special session on February 7,
2001.1 Upon the request of Governor Jose R. Caballero, however, the scheduled special session was reset to February 8, 2001 without
the benefit of a written notice.2
On February 8, 2001, the Sanggunian thus held a special session to, among other things, allow the Governor to deliver his State of the
Province Address. As only seven members of the fourteen-member Sanggunian were present,3 no resolution was considered.
On February 26, 2001, the Sanggunian held its 4th regular session during which it issued Resolution No. 05 4declaring the entire
province of Compostela Valley under a state of calamity and Resolution No. 075 authorizing the Governor to, on behalf of the
province, enter into a construction contract (Contract) with Allado Construction Company, Inc. (the Allado Company) for the

completion of Phase II of the construction of the capitol building. During the same session, the Sanggunian accepted the letter of
irrevocable resignation submitted by Board Member Gemma Theresa M. Sotto.6
While only eight members of the Sanggunian were present at the commencement of the session on February 26, 2001, the Journal of
the Proceedings (Journal) and Resolution Nos. 05 and 07 showed that a total of thirteen members attended it. 7
Petitioner thus filed a petition8 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Nabunturan, Compostela Valley against the Governor, et al.,
challenging the validity of the acts of the Sanggunian on February 26, 2001, alleging that while the Journal and Resolutions indicated
the presence of 13 members, the Sanggunian nonetheless "conducted official business without a quorum" 9 as only seven of its fourteen
members were actually present when the irrevocable letter of resignation of Board Member Sotto was noted, 10 and the motions to
declare the entire province of Compostela Valley under a state of calamity11 and to authorize the Governor to enter into the Contract
with the Allado Company12 were approved.13
Petitioner additionally alleged that when the vote respecting Resolution No. 05 was taken, only the remaining six members voted for
the adoption thereof, the then presiding officer Board Member Rolando Osorio not having cast his vote; 14 that when Resolution No. 07
was taken up, however, then presiding officer Osorio,15 relinquished his seat to Board Member Graciano Arafol after the six members
present unanimously voted on the said resolution in the affirmative, following which Osorio cast his vote as a member also in the
affirmative, thereby authorizing the Governor to enter into the Contract with Allado Company; and that Board Member Arafol
thereafter relinquished his seat as presiding officer to Board Member Osorio who once again assumed the duties of a presiding
officer.16
Petitioner furthermore challenged the validity of the special session of February 8, 2001 for lack of quorum, there being only seven
members of the Sanggunian in attendance, and for lack of written notice sent to all members at least 24 hours before the holding of the
special session in accordance with Section 52 (d)17 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC).18
Respondents, on the other hand, contended that since Board Member Sotto was in the United States 19 at the time the questioned acts
were executed and resolutions adopted, the actual number of Board Members then in the country was thirteen which should be the
basis of the determination of a quorum.
Branch 3 of the RTC of Nabunturan, at Compostela Valley, by Order20 of April 24, 2001, dismissed the petition upon the following
ratiocination:
. . . Gemma Theresa M. Sotto should not be counted as member for the purpose of determining the number to constitute a
quorum because she is in the United States of America. However, sub-paragraph (b) [of section 53 of the Local Government
Code] states and provides for compulsion of any member absent without any justifiable cause.
This is interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case of Jose Avelino, petitioner vs. Mariano J. Cuenco, respondent, G.R. No.
L-2821, March 4, 1949.
Gemma Theresa M. Sotto is beyond the reach of the legal processes of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and could not be
arrested to compel her to attend its session. Quorum should be determined on the basis of the actual number of members of
the body concerned rather than upon its full membership which is fourteen (14). Therefore, in this case, with seven (7)
members of the thirteen (13) members present in constitutive of a quorum. x x x
Moreover, Presidential Decree 181821 prohibits the issuance of a restraining order or injunction in any case involving
government infrastructure projects.22 (Emphases omitted)
Hence, the present petition for Certiorari under Rule 45, faulting the trial court for erroneously (1) applying the case of Avelino v.
Cuenco23 to a controversy involving a local government unit; (2) taking judicial notice of Board Member Sottos being in the United
States without proof thereof; and (3) ruling that to grant a Temporary Restraining Order would be in violation of P.D. 1818. 24
Respondents question the authority of the Court to look beyond the Journal and Resolutions of the Sanggunian 25and assert that the
construction of the capitol building26 cannot be enjoined. And they too assert that the presence of thirteen members at the February 26,

2001 session should be conclusive on the strength of Arroyo v. De Venecia27 and U.S. v. Pons.28 Citation of these cases is misplaced,
however.
In Arroyo v. De Venecia, this Court refused to inquire into allegations that the House of Representatives failed to comply with
the rules of procedures which the House itself promulgated absent any showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision
or of the rights of private individuals.
In U.S. v. Pons, this Court did not go beyond the legislative journals which it found clear and explicit, it holding that to disprove the
entries in the journals, evidence must be adduced based merely upon the memory or recollection of witnesses in contrast to journals
which are the acts of the Government or sovereign itself.29
In the instant case, this Court is not called upon to inquire into the Sanggunians compliance with its own rules. Rather, it is called
upon to determine whether the Sanggunian complied with the LGC, a law enacted by Congress, and its Implementing Rules.
Moreover, the Journal of the Sanggunian is far from clear and explicit as to the presence of a quorum when the questioned acts were
taken. It does not indicate how many members were actually present when the body voted on the motions leading to the adoption of
Resolution Nos. 05 and 07. While the Journal and the Resolutions show that 13 members attended the session,30 the Journal shows that
only six members were called by the presiding officer to vote on the motions.31 Six members whose names appear in attendance,
namely: Vice Governor Navarro and Board Members Zamora, Yanong, Castillo, Andres and Gentugaya, were not called and, save for
the absent Vice Governor,32 no explanation was given therefor.
Coincidentally, in Resolutions 05 and 07, the names of the Board Members who were not called upon to vote, including petitioner as
he had in the meantime left, are followed by two asterisks (**).
Additionally, it was clearly noted by petitioner, when he asked permission to leave the session, that only seven members were left:
SP Member ZAMORA : Mr. President, I move to adjourn, Mr. President.
SP Member ARAFOL : Objection Mr. President.
SP Member ZAMORA : Mr. President, before the objection, before objection Mr. President, I would like to invite everybody
to go at my service I have a patient nga gi-pagawas na sa hospital nga i-uli na sa Awao, its been there for one hour so I really
have to go I have to carry that patient to Awao Mr. President.
SP Member OSORIO : You are excused Honorable
SP Member ZAMORA : Okay, then remember that youre only seven Mr. President.
SP Member ARAFOL : No problem.
SP Member ZAMORA : Okay so its alright for you to decide. The seven of you. I would like to manifest in the record that
before further discussion that
SP Member GONZAGA : Mr. President he is already excused Mr. President.
SP Member ZAMORA : Yes but I would like to make statement first for the record, for the record. That I do not want Mr.
President that the incident of the of the State of the Province Address will be repeated Mr. President, wherein there are only
seven members present and the quorum was declared Mr. President. x x x
SP Member GONZAGA : Thats only your opinion . . .33 (Underscoring supplied)
Respondents themselves admit that there were only seven members present when the motions were voted upon:

26. Nevertheless, even if that remark constituted a proper question on quorum, it is a matter of fact that there were still seven
(7) members present. x x x [T]here is a quorum since seven is a majority of thirteen (13). x x x34 (Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, this Court is constrained to look into the proceedings of the Sanggunian as recorded in the Journal and not just rely on
Resolution Nos. 05 and 07 to determine who and how many participated in the consideration thereof. The placing of the asterisks after
the names of five members in the Resolutions is highly irregular and suspicious especially since both resolutions indicate that
petitioner, whose name is also followed by asterisks, was present even if it is clear from the Journal that he had already left the session
before the Sanggunian took note of the resignation of Board Member Sotto and voted on the motions.
Respondents other contention that the construction of the capitol building cannot be enjoined in light of Malaga v. Penachos,
Jr.35 fails to convince. In Malaga, this Court declared that although Presidential Decree No. 1818 prohibits any court from issuing
injunctions in cases involving infrastructure projects, the prohibition extends only to the issuance of injunctions or restraining
orders against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases. On issues clearly
outside this dimension and involving questions of law, this Court declared that courts could not be prevented from exercising their
power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts.36
Respondents maintain that the exception in Malaga as indicated above should not be applied in the instant case because there was
therein a defect in the compliance with procedural rules on bidding. In contrast, respondents stress, the bidding for the construction of
the capitol building in which the winner was the Allado Company was not defective, they adding that Resolution 07 simply authorized
the Governor to formalize the Contract necessary for the full implementation of the project. 37
This Court fails to see the essential difference between Malaga and the instant case.
In both cases, the defect in the Contract relates to the non-compliance with the mandate of a law respecting requirements before
validly entering into a contract. In Malaga, the defect pertained to bidding. In the present case, the alleged defect pertains to the
required number of votes necessary to authorize the Governor to enter into a construction contract.
Clearly then, what is at issue in this case is not the propriety or the wisdom of entering into the Contract for the construction of the
capitol building, which is beyond the power of this Court to enjoin, but the Sanggunians compliance with the requirements prescribed
under the LGC before it may grant the Governor authority to enter into the Contract, which issue falls under the exception to the
proscription against injunctions in cases involving infrastructure projects, as held in Malaga.
On the applicability of Avelino38 to the present case: The issue in said case was whether there was a quorum in a meeting attended by
only 12 of 24 senators, one having been in the hospital while another was out of the country. This Court held that although the total
membership of the Senate was 24, the presence of 12 members already constituted a quorum since the 24th member was outside the
country and beyond the coercive power of the Senate.39
In the instant case, there is nothing on record, save for respondents allegation, to show that Board Member Sotto was out of the
country and to thereby conclude that she was outside the coercive power of the Sanggunian when the February 8 and 26, 2001
sessions were held. In fact it is undisputed that the leave form filed by said Board Member before the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG) did not mention that she was going out of the country.40 Petitioners contention that the trial court cannot take
judicial notice of Board Member Sottos whereabouts is thus well taken. On this score, the instant case is outside the application of the
doctrine in Avelino.
A court may take judicial notice of matters of public knowledge, or those which are capable of unquestionable determination or ought
to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.41 With respect to disputed facts, however, the court must receive evidence
thereof, with notice to the parties.42
Also, in Avelino, the legislative body involved was the Senate and the applicable rule on quorum was that embodied in Article VI,
Section 10 of the 1935 Constitution which reads:
Section 10. x x x

(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day
and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner and under such penalties as such House may
provide.43 (Emphasis supplied)
The present case, however, involves a local legislative body, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Compostela Valley Province, and the
applicable rule respecting quorum is found in Section 53(a) of the LGC which provides:
Section 53. Quorum.(a) A majority of all members of the sanggunian who have been elected and qualified shall constitute a quorum to
transact official business. Should a question of quorum be raised during a session, the presiding officer shall
immediately proceed to call the roll of the members and thereafter announce the results. (Emphasis supplied)
"Quorum" is defined as that number of members of a body which, when legally assembled in their proper places, will enable the body
to transact its proper business or that number which makes a lawful body and gives it power to pass upon a law or ordinance or do any
valid act.44 "Majority," when required to constitute a quorum, means the number greater than half or more than half of any total. 45 In
fine, the entire membership must be taken into account in computing the quorum of the sangguniang panlalawigan, for while the
constitution merely states that "majority of each House shall constitute a quorum," Section 53 of the LGC is more exacting as it
requires that the "majority of all members of the sanggunian . . . elected and qualified" shall constitute a quorum.
The difference in the wordings of the Constitution and the LGC is not merely "a matter of style and writing" as respondents would
argue, but is actually a matter of "meaning and intention."46 The qualification in the LGC that the majority be based on those "elected
and qualified" was meant to allow sanggunians to function even when not all members thereof have been proclaimed.47 And, while the
intent of the legislature in qualifying the quorum requirement was to allow sanggunians to function even when not all members
thereof have been proclaimed and have assumed office, the provision necessarily applies when, after all the members of
the sanggunian have assumed office, one or some of its members file for leave. What should be important then is the concurrence of
election to and qualification for the office. And election to, and qualification as member of, a local legislative body are not altered by
the simple expedient of filing a leave of absence.
The trial court should thus have based its determination of the existence of a quorum on the total number of members of the
Sanggunian without regard to the filing of a leave of absence by Board Member Sotto. The fear that a majority may, for reasons of
political affiliation, file leaves of absence in order to cripple the functioning of the sanggunian is already addressed by the grant of
coercive power to a mere majority of sanggunian members present when there is no quorum.48
A sanggunian is a collegial body. Legislation, which is the principal function and duty of the sanggunian, requires the participation of
all its members so that they may not only represent the interests of their respective constituents but also help in the making of
decisions by voting upon every question put upon the body. The acts of only a part of the Sanggunian done outside the parameters of
the legal provisions aforementioned are legally infirm, highly questionable and are, more importantly, null and void. And all such acts
cannot be given binding force and effect for they are considered unofficial acts done during an unauthorized session.
Board Member Sotto is then deemed not resigned because there was no quorum when her letter of irrevocable resignation was noted
by the Sanggunian. For the same reason, Resolution Nos. 05 and 07 are of no legal effect.
Even assuming arguendo that there were indeed thirteen members present during the questioned February 26, 2001 session,
Resolution No. 05 declaring the entire province of Compostela Valley under state of calamity is still null and void because the motion
for its approval was approved by only six members.49 When there are thirteen members present at a session, the vote of only six
members can not, at any instance, be deemed to be in compliance with Section 107(g)50 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
the LGC which requires the concurrence of the approval by the majority of the members present and the existence of a quorum in
order to validly enact a resolution.
The motion to grant the Governor authority to enter into the construction contract is also deemed not approved in accordance with the
law even if it received seven affirmative votes, which is already the majority of thirteen, due to the defect in the seventh vote. For as
priorly stated, as the Journal confirms, after all six members voted in the affirmative, Board Member Osorio, as acting presiding

officer, relinquished his seat to Board Member Arafol and thereafter cast his vote as a member in favor of granting authority to the
Governor.51
This Court is faced with an act clearly intended to circumvent an express prohibition under the law a situation that will not be
condoned.52 The LGC clearly limits the power of presiding officers to vote only in case of a tie, to wit:
Section 49. Presiding Officer. (a) The vice-governor shall be the presiding officer of the sangguniang panlalawigan x x x.
The presiding officer shall vote only to break a tie.
(b) In the event of inability of the regular presiding officer to preside at a sanggunian session, the members present and
constituting a quorum shall elect from among themselves a temporary presiding officer. x x x (Italics in the original.
Emphasis supplied.)
While acting as presiding officer, Board Member Osorio may not, at the same time, be allowed to exercise the rights of a regular board
member including that of voting even when there is no tie to break. A temporary presiding officer who merely steps into the shoes
of the presiding officer could not have greater power than that possessed by the latter53 who can vote only in case of a tie.
Lastly, for a resolution authorizing the governor to enter into a construction contract to be valid, the vote of the majority of all
members of the Sanggunian, and not only of those present during the session, is required in accordance with Section 468 54 of the LGC
in relation to Article 10755 of its Implementing Rules.
Even including the vote of Board Member Osorio, who was then the Acting Presiding Officer, Resolution No. 07 is still invalid.
Applying Section 468 of the LGC and Article 107 of its Implementing Rules, there being fourteen members in the Sanggunian, the
approval of eight members is required to authorize the governor to enter into the Contract with the Allado Company since it involves
the creation of liability for payment on the part of the local government unit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court of Nabunturan, Compostela Valley
dated April 24, 2001 is hereby reversed and set aside.
Resolution Nos. 05 and 07 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Compostela Valley approved on February 26, 2001 declaring the
entire Province of Compostela Valley under a state of calamity and granting authority to the Provincial Governor to enter into a
general construction agreement, respectively, are hereby declared null and void.
SO ORDERED.

Other Illustrative cases

G.R. No. 155110. March 31, 2005
HABAGAT GRILL Through LOUIE BIRAOGO, Proprietor/Manager, Petitioners,
vs.
DMC-URBAN PROPERTY DEVELOPER, INC., respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Entitlement to physical or material possession of the premises is the issue in an ejectment suit. The two forms of ejectment suits -forcible entry and unlawful detainer -- may be distinguished from each other mainly by the fact that in forcible entry, the plaintiffs
must prove that they were in prior possession of the premises until they were deprived thereof by the defendants; in unlawful detainer,
the plaintiffs need not have been in prior physical possession.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, challenging the April 12, 2002 Decision2and the August 19,
2002 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 53524. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, finding merit in the petition, the Court REVERSES the appealed Decision and renders judgment:
1. Commanding [Petitioner] Louie Biraogo and all persons acting for and in his behalf or by his authority to remove the Habagat Grill
and all improvements he has introduced into the lot in question and to vacate said lot; and
2. Ordering said [petitioner] to pay the [respondent] P10,000.00 monthly compensation for the occupation of the land in question until
the possession from December 1, 1993 of said property shall have been completely restored to the [respondent]; and
3. Ordering [petitioner] to pay [respondent] P10,000.00 as attorneys fees."4
The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The antecedents were ably summarized by the CA as follows:
"On June 11, 1981, David M. Consunji, Inc. acquired and became the owner of a residential lot situated in Matina, Davao City and
covered by TCT No. T-82338. This lot shall henceforth be called the lot in question. On June 13, 1981, David M. Consunji, Inc.
transferred said lot to its sister company, the DMC Urban Property Developers, Inc. (DMC) in whose favor TCT No. T-279042 was
issued. Alleging that Louie Biraogo forcibly entered said lot and built thereon the Habagat Grill in December, 1993, DMC filed on
March 28, 1994 a Complaint for Forcible Entry against Habagat Grill and/or Louie Biraogo. The Complaint was docketed as Civil
Case No. 1233-D-94 in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, in Davao City. The Complaint alleged that as owner DMC
possessed the lot in question from June 11, 1981 until December 1, 1993; that on that day, December 1, 1993, Louie Biraogo, by
means of strategy and stealth, unlawfully entered into the lot in question and constructed the Habagat Grill thereon, thus illegally
depriving DMC of the possession of said lot since then up to the present; that the reasonable rental value of said lot is P10,000.00 a
month.
"Louie Biraogo in his Answer denied illegally entering the lot in question. He averred that Habagat Grill was built in 1992 inside
Municipal Reservation No. 1050 (Presidential Proclamation No. 20) and so DMC has no cause of action against him. Since one of the
vital issues in the case was the location of Habagat Grill, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities constituted a team composed of three

members, one a Geodetic Engineer representing the DMC, another Geodetic Engineer representing Biraogo and the third from the
DENR which was tasked with the duty of determining where precisely was Habagat Grill located, on the lot in question or on
Municipal Reservation No. 1050. Biraogo was directed by the court to furnish the team with a copy of Municipal Reservation No. 20.
Biraogo never complied. Worse, his designated Geodetic Engineer Panfilo Jayme never took oath as such and did not participate in the
Relocation survey. The ones who conducted the survey were Engr. Edmindo Dida of the DENR and Engr. Jose Cordero, DMCs
representative. After conducting the relocation survey on March 30, 1998, engineers Dida and Cordero submitted their report to the
Court specifically stating that the Habagat Grill Restaurant was occupying 934 square meters of the lot in question.
"After necessary proceedings, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities rendered a Decision on August 6, 1998 dismissing the case on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction and lack of cause of action. DMC appealed from said Decision to the Regional Trial Court and the same
was docketed in Branch 12, in Davao City as Civil Case No. x x x 26,860.98. On February 16, 1999, said court rendered judgment
affirming the appealed Decision. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed but was denied in the courts Order dated April 21, 1999." 5
Consequently, respondent interposed an appeal to the CA.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Granting respondents appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that the court of origin had jurisdiction over the Complaint for Forcible
Entry.6 The CA gave greater weight to the testimony of respondents real property manager, Bienamer Garcia, that Habagat Grill had
been built on December 1, 1993.7 The appellate court opined that his testimony was credible, because he had personal knowledge of
the facts he had testified to -- it was his task to know such matters. On the other hand, it was not clear in what capacity petitioners
witness, Samuel Ruiz, came to know of the facts he had testified to.8 The CA further held that the minutes of the Urban Planning and
Economic Development hearings -- submitted by petitioner to prove the construction of Habagat Grill in 1992 -- were immaterial, as
these referred to another establishment.9
The CA faulted petitioner for not presenting any other documentary evidence to establish the date of Habagat Grills construction. 10 It
added that the court of origin had improperly adjudged the subject property as part of the public domain. The appellate court explained
that the lower court could take cognizance of Presidential Proclamation No. 20, but not of the situational relation between the property
covered by the Proclamation and the land in question. The CA further criticized petitioner for not presenting any evidence to show the
basis of the latters alleged authority to build Habagat Grill on the property.11
Hence, this Petition.12
The Issues
In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:
"1. That, with due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the Honorable Court of First Level has no
jurisdiction over this case as petitioners possession and occupation of the lot where Habagat Grill was constructed on the subject
premises was yet in 1992 or for more than one (1) year prior to the filing of this case on April 7, 1994 and that respondents
predecessor (David M. Consunji, Inc.) had not been in prior and physical possession of the subject premises, as a matter of fact, it
failed to allege the same in its Complaint in this case; and
"2. That, with due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the Complaint of respondents predecessor (David
M. Consunji, Inc.) in this case failed to state a valid cause of action as the lot referred to therein is not particularly described and is
different from the lot on which the Habagat Grill was constructed."13
Simplified, the issues are (1) whether the MTC had jurisdiction over the case, and (2) whether respondent alleged a sufficient cause of
action in its Complaint.
This Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.

First Issue:
Jurisdiction
Petitioner argues that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case, because mere allegation of ownership did not, by itself,
show that respondent had prior possession of the property.14
We disagree. Jurisdiction in ejectment cases is determined by the allegations pleaded in the complaint. 15 As long as these allegations
demonstrate a cause of action either for forcible entry or for unlawful detainer, the court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter.
This principle holds, even if the facts proved during the trial do not support the cause of action thus alleged, in which instance the
court -- after acquiring jurisdiction -- may resolve to dismiss the action for insufficiency of evidence.
The necessary allegations in a Complaint for ejectment are set forth in Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which reads thus:
SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived
of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person
against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or
other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the
proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or
persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.
In the present case, the Complaint filed before the trial court on March 28, 1994, stated:
"2. That [respondent] had been in lawful and peaceful possession of a residential lot at Tulip Drive, Ecoland and Subdivision covered
by TCT T-82338 of the Registry of Deeds of Davao City being owner thereof, since June 11, 1981, until the day and incident in the
following paragraph hereof.
"3. That on or about December 1, 1993, [petitioner] by means of strategy and stealth, unlawfully entered and occupied a portion of
said residential lot and constructed what is now known as the Habagat Grill, thereby illegally depriving [respondent] of the
possession of the premises."16
Notably, petitioner alleged (1) prior possession, (2) deprivation thereof by strategy and stealth, and (3) the date such unlawful
deprivation started, which was less than one year from the filing of the Complaint. Considering the presence in the Complaint of all
the necessary allegations,17 the trial court evidently acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
Date of Entry
Petitioner further contends that, as determined by the court of origin and the regional trial court, respondent has not adduced
preponderance of evidence to prove that this case was filed within the one-year prescriptive period. 18 Petitioner presented the
testimony of a certain Samuel Ruiz and offered the minutes of the hearings conducted by the Urban Planning and Economic
Development (UPED) to prove that the construction of the Habagat Grill began in 1992.19
Respondent counters that the CA properly relied on the testimony of the formers real property manager, Bienamer Garcia, as he had
personal knowledge of the facts.20 On the other hand, the two trial courts allegedly relied on the hearings conducted by the UPED in
resolving that petitioner had been in possession of the property since 1992. Respondent avers that those hearings referred to a
restaurant located 330 meters away, not to Habagat Grill.21
The determination of the date of entry into the subject lot is a question of fact. This Court has held in a long line of cases that the
review of cases brought before it via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to errors of law. Findings of fact by the CA are
conclusive except in a number of instances, one of which is when its factual findings are contrary to those of the courts below, as in
the present case.22

The appellate court held that the minutes of the UPED hearing pertained to matters relating to a different establishment, the Kawayan
Restaurant.23 Thus, the UPED minutes did not have any material bearing on the resolution of the present case. Consequently, the
determination of the date of entry into the subject lot boils down to the appreciation of the testimonies of Garcia and Ruiz.
"Preponderance of evidence" means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of
the other.24 Where the evidence presented by one side is insufficient to ascertain the claim, there is no preponderance of evidence. 25 In
criminal cases in which the quantum of evidence required is greater than in civil cases, the testimony of only one witness -- if credible,
straightforward, and worthy of belief -- is sufficient to convict.26 With more reason then, Garcias testimony, if clear and positive, may
be sufficient to establish respondents claim.
Under Section 1 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, among the facts and circumstances to be considered by the court in determining
which of the presented evidence has superior weight is the witnesses means and opportunity to know the facts to which they testify.27
The extent of such means and opportunity are determined by the following considerations:
"First, the Actor Rule. This rule maintains that a persons recollection of his own acts and of the attendant circumstances is more
definite and trustworthy than another persons recollection of it, especially if it was an act done in the performance of a duty, or if the
other persons testimony is little more than an expression of opinion or judgment. Apart from comparative tenacity of memory, the
actor usually knows better than any one else what he did or did not do, and his testimony is generally, but not always, entitled to
superior weight on that account. Thus, the execution and attestation of a will or other legal document may be so far regarded as the act
of the lawyer who superintends the transactions and knows the formalities required by law, and his testimony to the circumstances will
generally outweigh that of a non-professional witness.
"The Actor Rule has been applied in a multitude of admiralty cases and any other cases where a persons testimony concerning his
own conduct conflicts with the testimony of a non-participating observer or with inconclusive inferences from facts proved, especially
where the actor witness testifies to an act which the duties of his employment required him to perform. But it said that the testimony
of one who evidently speaks rather to his custom than to his acts on the particular occasion will hardly suffice to put him in the
category of those who are specially favored by the Actor Rule.
"Second, the witness who had the greater interest in noticing and remembering the facts is to be believed in preference to the one that
had a slighter interest to observe or was wholly indifferent. Interest has effect on the power of observation of witness. Thus, it has been
held that it was not remarkable that witnesses would not have observed traces of blood along the route through which the deceased
was taken because said witnesses had no reason to suspect that the crime was not committed in the place where the dead body was
found. Similarly, the failure of witnesses to notice whether or not there were houses at the place where they say the accused maltreat
the offended party was attributed as due to the fact that their attention was concentrated to what they say, and they had no interest in
knowing whether or not there were houses in or around the place.
"Third, the witness who gives reasons for the accuracy of his observations is preferred to him who merely states the fact to be so,
without adverting to any circumstances showing that his attention was particularly called to it. Thus, the testimony of the crew of a
vessel that their light on the night of a collision was red, and nothing more, was easily overcome by testimony of witnesses on the
other vessel that the light was white, not red, and that fact was a matter of remark among them when the light was observed.
"Fourth, the witness in a state of excitement, fear, or terror is generally incapable of observing accurately. This is so because, if men
perceive the most insignificant facts in the most diverse ways, even when it is impossible that these facts should produce on the
observer any emotion preventing him from observing with absolute calm, even much more will their impressions be diversified under
circumstances calculated to produce in the onlookers excitement, fear or terror.
"Fifth, intoxication tends to impair accuracy both of observation and memory of a witness."28 (Citations omitted)
Based on the foregoing criteria, the testimony of Garcia must be given greater weight, considering that it was his task -- as the real
property manager of respondent -- to know about matters involving the latters properties. In contrast, it was not explained how Ruiz
could be deemed competent and credible in his testimony as to those matters.

The lower courts dismissed the testimony of Garcia -- regardless of how clear, positive and straightforward it was -- solely on the
ground that he was not a disinterested witness. True, he was an employee of respondent; relationship, however, will not by itself
determine the true worth of ones testimony.29 The essential test is whether such testimony is disencumbered, credible, and in accord
with human experience.30 It cannot easily be dismissed by the mere invocation of the witness relationship with respondent. In sum, we
have no reason to disagree with the CAs evaluation that, being credible, Garcias direct testimony was sufficient to establish
respondents claim that petitioner had entered the premises on December 1, 1993.
Second Issue:
Cause of Action
Petitioner avers that no cause of action was alleged by respondent, as shown by the following circumstances: (1) the latters property
was not encroached upon by Habagat Grill, which had allegedly been constructed on a portion of land owned by the City Government
of Davao;31 and (2) respondent failed to prove that its predecessor-in-interest had prior possession of the property.32
On the other hand, respondent argues that the trial court indiscriminately ignored the Report of the survey team that had been
constituted to determine the exact location of Habagat Grill. Respondent further contends that the trial court erred in taking judicial
notice of the metes and bounds of the property covered by Presidential Proclamation No. 20.33 Although the lower court may take
judicial notice of PD No. 20, it may not do so in regard to the metes and bounds of Times Beach. Neither, may it claim knowledge of
the situational relation between the land in question and Times Beach.
Location of the Property
We agree with respondent. "Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly take and act on without proof
because they already know them."34 Its object is to save time, labor and expense in securing and introducing evidence on matters that
are not ordinarily capable of dispute or actually bona fide disputed, and the tenor of which can safely be assumed from the tribunals
general knowledge or from a slight search on its part.
Indeed, municipal courts may take judicial notice of the municipal ordinances in force in the municipality in which they sit. 35 Such
notice, however, is limited to what the law is and what it states. 36 As can be gleaned from its discussions, the trial court took judicial
notice of the existence of Presidential Proclamation No. 20, which declared Times Beach a recreation center. The MTC also took
judicial notice of the location of the beach, which was from the shoreline to the "road towards the shoreline." On the basis of these
premises, the trial court resolved that the lot on which petitioners restaurant was located should necessarily be inside Times Beach,
which was owned by the City of Davao. Hence, it was the City -- not respondent -- that had a cause of action against petitioner. To
arrive at this conclusion, the MTC made its own estimate of the location of the metes and bounds of the property mentioned by the
law.37
The location of Habagat Grill cannot be resolved by merely taking judicial notice of Presidential Proclamation No. 20; such location is
precisely at the core of the dispute in this case. Moreover, considering respondents allegation that the supposed lot covered by the
Ordinance has been lost due to inundation by the sea, we cannot fathom how the trial court could have known of the actual location of
the metes and bounds of the subject lot.
Neither may the MTC take discretionary judicial notice under Section 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, because the exact
boundaries of the lot covered by that law are not a matter of public knowledge capable of unquestionable demonstration. Neither may
these be known to judges because of their judicial functions.
Hence, the CA was correct in disregarding the findings of the trial courts, because they had erred in taking judicial notice of the exact
metes and bounds of the property. The appellate court aptly relied on the Report submitted by the survey team that had been
constituted by the trial court, precisely for the purpose of determining the location of Habagat Grill in relation to respondents lot.
Prior Possession

Finally, petitioner avers that respondent failed to prove that the latters predecessor-in-interest had prior possession of the
property.38 Conversely, respondent alleges that its predecessor was in prior physical possession of the property as the registered owner
thereof since June 11, 1981.39 Again, we rule for respondent.
There is only one issue in ejectment proceedings: who is entitled to physical or material possession of the premises; that is, to
possession de facto, not possession de jure? Issues as to the right of possession or ownership are not involved in the action; evidence
thereon is not admissible, except only for the purpose of determining the issue of possession. 40
The two forms of ejectment suits -- forcible entry or unlawful detainer -- may be distinguished from each other mainly by the fact that
in forcible entry, the plaintiffs must prove that they were in prior possession of the premises until they were deprived thereof by the
defendant; in unlawful detainer, the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession.41
Spouses Benitez v. CA42 has held that possession can be acquired not only by material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is
subject to the action of ones will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right.
Possession can be acquired by juridical acts. "These are acts to which the law gives the force of acts of possession. Examples of these
are donations, succession, x x x execution and registration of public instruments, and the inscription of possessory information
titles."43 For one to be considered in possession, one need not have actual or physical occupation44 of every square inch of the property
at all times. In the present case, prior possession of the lot by respondents predecessor was sufficiently proven by evidence of the
execution and registration of public instruments and by the fact that the lot was subject to its will from then until December 1, 1993,
when petitioner unlawfully entered the premises and deprived the former of possession thereof.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the challenged Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 138810

September 29, 2004

BATANGAS CATV, INC., petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE BATANGAS CITY SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD and BATANGAS CITY
MAYOR, respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
In the late 1940s, John Walson, an appliance dealer in Pennsylvania, suffered a decline in the sale of television (tv) sets because of
poor reception of signals in his community. Troubled, he built an antenna on top of a nearby mountain. Using coaxial cable lines, he
distributed the tv signals from the antenna to the homes of his customers. Walsons innovative idea improved his sales and at the same
time gave birth to a new telecommunication system -- the Community Antenna Television (CATV) or Cable Television. 1
This technological breakthrough found its way in our shores and, like in its country of origin, it spawned legal controversies,
especially in the field of regulation. The case at bar is just another occasion to clarify a shady area. Here, we are tasked to resolve the
inquiry -- may a local government unit (LGU) regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators within its territorial
jurisdiction?
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Batangas CATV, Inc. (petitioner herein) against the Sangguniang Panlungsod and
the Mayor of Batangas City (respondents herein) assailing the Court of Appeals (1) Decision2dated February 12, 1999
and (2) Resolution3 dated May 26, 1999, in CA-G.R. CV No. 52361.4 The Appellate Court reversed and set aside the Judgment5 dated

October 29, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 7, Batangas City in Civil Case No. 4254,6 holding that neither of the
respondents has the power to fix the subscriber rates of CATV operators, such being outside the scope of the LGUs power.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On July 28, 1986, respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Resolution No. 2107 granting petitioner apermit to
construct, install, and operate a CATV system in Batangas City. Section 8 of the Resolution provides that petitioner is
authorized to charge its subscribers the maximum rates specified therein, "provided, however, that any increase of rates shall
be subject to the approval of the Sangguniang Panlungsod."8
Sometime in November 1993, petitioner increased its subscriber rates from P88.00 to P180.00 per month. As a result, respondent
Mayor wrote petitioner a letter9 threatening to cancel its permit unless it secures the approval of respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod,
pursuant to Resolution No. 210.
Petitioner then filed with the RTC, Branch 7, Batangas City, a petition for injunction docketed as Civil Case No. 4254. It alleged that
respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod has no authority to regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators because under
Executive Order No. 205, the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) has the sole authority to regulate the CATV operation
in the Philippines.
On October 29, 1995, the trial court decided in favor of petitioner, thus:
"WHEREFORE, as prayed for, the defendants, their representatives, agents, deputies or other persons acting on their behalf
or under their instructions, are hereby enjoined from canceling plaintiffs permit to operate a Cable Antenna Television
(CATV) system in the City of Batangas or its environs or in any manner, from interfering with the authority and
power of the National Telecommunications Commission to grant franchises to operate CATV systems to qualified
applicants, and the right of plaintiff in fixing its service rates which needs no prior approval of the Sangguniang
Panlungsodof Batangas City.
The counterclaim of the plaintiff is hereby dismissed. No pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED."10
The trial court held that the enactment of Resolution No. 210 by respondent violates the States deregulation policy as set forth by then
NTC Commissioner Jose Luis A. Alcuaz in his Memorandum dated August 25, 1989. Also, it pointed out that the sole agency of the
government which can regulate CATV operation is the NTC, and that the LGUs cannot exercise regulatory power over it without
appropriate legislation.
Unsatisfied, respondents elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 52361.
On February 12, 1999, the Appellate Court reversed and set aside the trial courts Decision, ratiocinating as follows:
"Although the Certificate of Authority to operate a Cable Antenna Television (CATV) System is granted by the
National Telecommunications Commission pursuant to Executive Order No. 205, this does not preclude the
Sangguniang Panlungsod from regulating the operation of the CATV in their locality under the powers vested upon it
by Batas Pambansa Bilang 337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1983. Section 177 (now Section
457 paragraph 3 (ii) of Republic Act 7160) provides:
Section 177. Powers and Duties The Sangguniang Panlungsod shall:
a) Enact such ordinances as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the responsibilities
conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for health and safety,
comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve the morals, and promote the prosperity and
general welfare of the community and the inhabitants thereof, and the protection of property therein;

xxx
d) Regulate, fix the license fee for, and tax any business or profession being carried on and exercised within
the territorial jurisdiction of the city, except travel agencies, tourist guides, tourist transports, hotels, resorts,
de luxe restaurants, and tourist inns of international standards which shall remain under the licensing and
regulatory power of the Ministry of Tourism which shall exercise such authority without infringement on
the taxing and regulatory powers of the city government;
Under cover of the General Welfare Clause as provided in this section, Local Government Units can perform just about any
power that will benefit their constituencies. Thus, local government units can exercise powers that are: (1) expressly
granted; (2) necessarily implied from the power that is expressly granted; (3) necessary, appropriate or incidental for its
efficient and effective governance; and (4) essential to the promotion of the general welfare of their inhabitants. (Pimentel,
The Local Government Code of 1991, p. 46)
Verily, the regulation of businesses in the locality is expressly provided in the Local Government Code. The fixing of
service rates is lawful under the General Welfare Clause.
Resolution No. 210 granting appellee a permit to construct, install and operate a community antenna television (CATV)
system in Batangas City as quoted earlier in this decision, authorized the grantee to impose charges which cannot be
increased except upon approval of the Sangguniang Bayan. It further provided that in case of violation by the grantee of the
terms and conditions/requirements specifically provided therein, the City shall have the right to withdraw the franchise.
Appellee increased the service rates from EIGHTY EIGHT PESOS (P88.00) to ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY PESOS
(P180.00) (Records, p. 25) without the approval of appellant. Such act breached Resolution No. 210 which gives appellant
the right to withdraw the permit granted to appellee."11
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.12
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari anchored on the following assignments of error:
"I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE of the LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CODE AUTHORIZES RESPONDENT SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD TO EXERCISE THE
REGULATORY FUNCTION SOLELY LODGED WITH THE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 205, INCLUDING THE AUTHORITY TO FIX AND/OR
APPROVE THE SERVICE RATES OF CATV OPERATORS; AND
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION APPEALED FROM AND DISMISSING
PETITIONERS COMPLAINT."13
Petitioner contends that while Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, extends to the LGUs the general power to
perform any act that will benefit their constituents, nonetheless, it does not authorize them to regulate the CATV operation. Pursuant to
E.O. No. 205, only the NTC has the authority to regulate the CATV operation, including the fixing of subscriber rates.
Respondents counter that the Appellate Court did not commit any reversible error in rendering the assailed Decision. First, Resolution
No. 210 was enacted pursuant to Section 177(c) and (d) of Batas Pambansa Bilang337, the Local Government Code of 1983, which
authorizes LGUs to regulate businesses. The term "businesses" necessarily includes the CATV industry. And second, Resolution No.
210 is in the nature of a contract between petitioner and respondents, it being a grant to the former of a franchise to operate a CATV
system. To hold that E.O. No. 205 amended its terms would violate the constitutional prohibition against impairment of contracts. 14

The petition is impressed with merit.

Earlier, we posed the question -- may a local government unit (LGU) regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators within
its territorial jurisdiction? A review of pertinent laws and jurisprudence yields a negative answer.
President Ferdinand E. Marcos was the first one to place the CATV industry under the regulatory power of the national
government.15 On June 11, 1978, he issued Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 151216 establishing a monopoly of the industry by
granting Sining Makulay, Inc., an exclusive franchise to operate CATV system in any place within the Philippines. Accordingly, it
terminated all franchises, permits or certificates for the operation of CATV system previously granted by local governments or by any
instrumentality or agency of the national government.17 Likewise, it prescribed the subscriber rates to be charged by Sining Makulay,
Inc. to its customers.18
On July 21, 1979, President Marcos issued Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 894 vesting upon the Chairman of the Board of
Communications direct supervision over the operations of Sining Makulay, Inc. Three days after, he issued E.O. No. 546 19 integrating
the Board of Communications20 and the Telecommunications Control Bureau21to form a single entity to be known as the "National
Telecommunications Commission." Two of its assigned functions are:
"a. Issue Certificate of Public Convenience for the operation of communications utilities and services, radio communications
systems, wire or wireless telephone or telegraph systems, radio and television broadcasting system and other similar public
utilities;
b. Establish, prescribe and regulate areas of operation of particular operators of public service communications; and
determine and prescribe charges or rates pertinent to the operation of such public utility facilities and services except in cases
where charges or rates are established by international bodies or associations of which the Philippines is a participating
member or by bodies recognized by the Philippine Government as the proper arbiter of such charges or rates;"
Although Sining Makulay Inc.s exclusive franchise had a life term of 25 years, it was cut short by the advent of the 1986 Revolution.
Upon President Corazon C. Aquinos assumption of power, she issued E.O. No. 20522 opening the CATV industry to all citizens of the
Philippines. It mandated the NTC to grant Certificates of Authority to CATV operators and to issue the necessary
implementing rules and regulations.
On September 9, 1997, President Fidel V. Ramos issued E.O. No. 43623 prescribing policy guidelines to govern CATV operation in the
Philippines. Cast in more definitive terms, it restated the NTCs regulatory powers over CATV operations, thus:
"SECTION 2. The regulation and supervision of the cable television industry in the Philippines shall remain
vested solely with the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC).
SECTION 3. Only persons, associations, partnerships, corporations or cooperatives, granted a Provisional Authority or
Certificate of Authority by the Commission may install, operate and maintain a cable television system or render cable
television service within a service area."
Clearly, it has been more than two decades now since our national government, through the NTC, assumed regulatory power over the
CATV industry. Changes in the political arena did not alter the trend. Instead, subsequent presidential issuances further reinforced the
NTCs power. Significantly, President Marcos and President Aquino, in the exercise of their legislative power, issued P.D. No. 1512,
E.O. No. 546 and E.O. No. 205. Hence, they have the force and effect of statutes or laws passed by Congress.24 That the regulatory
power stays with the NTC is also clear from President Ramos E.O. No. 436 mandating that the regulation and supervision of the
CATV industry shall remain vested "solely" in the NTC. Blacks Law Dictionary defines "sole" as "without another or others." 25 The
logical conclusion, therefore, is that in light of the above laws and E.O. No. 436, the NTC exercises regulatory power over
CATV operators to the exclusion of other bodies.
But, lest we be misunderstood, nothing herein should be interpreted as to strip LGUs of their general power to prescribe regulations
under the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code. It must be emphasized that when E.O. No. 436 decrees that the
"regulatory power" shall be vested "solely" in the NTC, it pertains to the "regulatory power" over those matters which are peculiarly
within the NTCs competence, such as, the: (1) determination of rates, (2) issuance of "certificates of authority, (3) establishment of

areas of operation, (4) examination and assessment of the legal, technical and financial qualifications of applicant operators, (5)
granting of permits for the use of frequencies, (6) regulation of ownership and operation, (7) adjudication of issues arising from its
functions, and (8) other similar matters.26 Within these areas, the NTC reigns supreme as it possesses the exclusive power to regulate -a power comprising varied acts, such as "to fix, establish, or control; to adjust by rule, method or established mode; to direct by rule or
restriction; or to subject to governing principles or laws."27
Coincidentally, respondents justify their exercise of regulatory power over petitioners CATV operation under the general welfare
clause of the Local Government Code of 1983. The Court of Appeals sustained their stance.
There is no dispute that respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod, like other local legislative bodies, has been empowered to enact
ordinances and approve resolutions under the general welfare clause of B.P. Blg. 337, the Local Government Code of 1983. That it
continues to posses such power is clear under the new law, R.A. No. 7160 (the Local Government Code of 1991). Section 16 thereof
provides:
"SECTION 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those
necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among others, the preservation and enrichment of culture,
promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of
appropriate and self-reliant, scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity
and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and
convenience of their inhabitants."
In addition, Section 458 of the same Code specifically mandates:
"SECTION 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The Sangguniang Panlungsod, as the legislative body
of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for
under Section 22 of this Code, x x x:"
The general welfare clause is the delegation in statutory form of the police power of the State to LGUs.28Through this, LGUs
may prescribe regulations to protect the lives, health, and property of their constituents and maintain peace and order within their
respective territorial jurisdictions. Accordingly, we have upheld enactments providing, for instance, the regulation of gambling, 29 the
occupation of rig drivers,30 the installation and operation of pinball machines,31 the maintenance and operation of cockpits,32 the
exhumation and transfer of corpses from public burial grounds,33 and the operation of hotels, motels, and lodging houses34 as valid
exercises by local legislatures of the police power under the general welfare clause.
Like any other enterprise, CATV operation maybe regulated by LGUs under the general welfare clause. This is primarily because the
CATV system commits the indiscretion of crossing public properties. (It uses public properties in order to reach subscribers.) The
physical realities of constructing CATV system the use of public streets, rights of ways, the founding of structures, and the parceling
of large regions allow an LGU a certain degree of regulation over CATV operators.35 This is the same regulation that it exercises
over all private enterprises within its territory.
But, while we recognize the LGUs power under the general welfare clause, we cannot sustain Resolution No. 210. We are convinced
that respondents strayed from the well recognized limits of its power. The flaws in Resolution No. 210 are: (1) it violates the mandate
of existing laws and (2) it violates the States deregulation policy over the CATV industry.
I.
Resolution No. 210 is an enactment of an LGU acting only as agent of the national legislature. Necessarily, its act must reflect and
conform to the will of its principal. To test its validity, we must apply the particular requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by the
accepted principles governing municipal corporations.36

Speaking for the Court in the leading case of United States vs. Abendan,37 Justice Moreland said: "An ordinance enacted by virtue of
the general welfare clause is valid, unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the Philippine Islands, or an Act of the Philippine
Legislature, or unless it is against public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in derogation of common
right." In De la Cruz vs. Paraz,38 we laid the general rule "that ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found in the general
welfare clause must be reasonable, consonant with the general powers and purposes of the corporation, and not inconsistent with the
laws or policy of the State."
The apparent defect in Resolution No. 210 is that it contravenes E.O. No. 205 and E.O. No. 436 insofar as it permits respondent
Sangguniang Panlungsod to usurp a power exclusively vested in the NTC, i.e., the power to fix the subscriber rates charged by CATV
operators. As earlier discussed, the fixing of subscriber rates is definitely one of the matters within the NTCs exclusive domain.
In this regard, it is appropriate to stress that where the state legislature has made provision for the regulation of conduct, it has
manifested its intention that the subject matter shall be fully covered by the statute, and that a municipality, under its general powers,
cannot regulate the same conduct.39 In Keller vs. State,40 it was held that: "Where there is no express power in the charter of a
municipality authorizing it to adopt ordinances regulating certain matters which are specifically covered by a general statute, a
municipal ordinance, insofar as it attempts to regulate the subject which is completely covered by a general statute of the legislature,
may be rendered invalid. x x x Where the subject is of statewide concern, and the legislature has appropriated the field and declared
the rule, its declaration is binding throughout the State." A reason advanced for this view is that such ordinances are in excess of the
powers granted to the municipal corporation.41
Since E.O. No. 205, a general law, mandates that the regulation of CATV operations shall be exercised by the NTC, an LGU cannot
enact an ordinance or approve a resolution in violation of the said law.
It is a fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state. An ordinance in
conflict with a state law of general character and statewide application is universally held to be invalid. 42 The principle is frequently
expressed in the declaration that municipal authorities, under a general grant of power, cannot adopt ordinances which infringe the
spirit of a state law or repugnant to the general policy of the state. 43 In every power to pass ordinances given to a municipality, there is
an implied restriction that the ordinances shall be consistent with the general law.44 In the language of Justice Isagani Cruz (ret.), this
Court, inMagtajas vs. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc.,45 ruled that:
"The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal governments are
only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by
Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than
those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they
have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from the legislature. It
breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As it may
destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is some constitutional limitation on the right, the legislature might,
by a single act, and if we can suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of
the municipal corporations in the State, and the corporation could not prevent it. We know of no limitation on the
right so far as to the corporation themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the
legislature.
This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the new
provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy, we
here confirm that Congress retains control of the local government units although in significantly reduced degree now than
under our previous Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes the
power to withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the
local government units of the power to tax, which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the
national legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate
it."

Respondents have an ingenious retort against the above disquisition. Their theory is that the regulatory power of the LGUs is granted
by R.A. No. 7160 (the Local Government Code of 1991), a handiwork of the national lawmaking authority. They contend that R.A.
No. 7160 repealed E.O. No. 205 (issued by President Aquino). Respondents argument espouses a bad precedent. To say that LGUs
exercise the same regulatory power over matters which are peculiarly within the NTCs competence is to promote a scenario of LGUs
and the NTC locked in constant clash over the appropriate regulatory measure on the same subject matter. LGUs must recognize that
technical matters concerning CATV operation are within the exclusive regulatory power of the NTC.
At any rate, we find no basis to conclude that R.A. No. 7160 repealed E.O. No. 205, either expressly or impliedly. It is noteworthy that
R.A. No. 7160 repealing clause, which painstakingly mentions the specific laws or the parts thereof which are repealed, does not
include E.O. No. 205, thus:
"SECTION 534. Repealing Clause. (a) Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code."
Executive Order No. 112 (1987), and Executive Order No. 319 (1988) are hereby repealed.
(b) Presidential Decree Nos. 684, 1191, 1508 and such other decrees, orders, instructions, memoranda and issuances related
to or concerning the barangay are hereby repealed.
(c) The provisions of Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Republic Act No. 1939 regarding hospital fund; Section 3, a (3) and b (2) of
Republic Act. No. 5447 regarding the Special Education Fund; Presidential Decree No. 144 as amended by Presidential
Decree Nos. 559 and 1741; Presidential Decree No. 231 as amended; Presidential Decree No. 436 as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 558; and Presidential Decree Nos. 381, 436, 464, 477, 526, 632, 752, and 1136 are hereby repealed and rendered
of no force and effect.
(d) Presidential Decree No. 1594 is hereby repealed insofar as it governs locally-funded projects.
(e) The following provisions are hereby repealed or amended insofar as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this
Code: Sections 2, 16, and 29 of Presidential Decree No. 704; Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 87, as amended; Sections
52, 53, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, and 74 of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended; and Section 16 of Presidential
Decree No. 972, as amended, and
(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations,
or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly."
Neither is there an indication that E.O. No. 205 was impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 7160. It is a settled rule that implied repeals are
not lightly presumed in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing of such intentions. In Mecano vs. Commission on Audit, 46 we
ruled:
"Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the
legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect. Hence, before there can be a repeal, there
must be a clear showing on the part of the lawmaker that the intent in enacting the new law was to abrogate the old one. The
intention to repeal must be clear and manifest; otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later act is to be construed as a
continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the two acts are the same from the time of the
first enactment."
As previously stated, E.O. No. 436 (issued by President Ramos) vests upon the NTC the power to regulate the CATV operation in this
country. So also Memorandum Circular No. 8-9-95, the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7925 (the "Public
Telecommunications Policy Act of the Philippines"). This shows that the NTCs regulatory power over CATV operation is
continuously recognized.
It is a canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting one statute against another in an inevitably destructive confrontation, courts
must exert every effort to reconcile them, remembering that both laws deserve a becoming respect as the handiwork of coordinate
branches of the government.47 On the assumption of a conflict between E.O. No. 205 and R.A. No. 7160, the proper action is not to
uphold one and annul the other but to give effect to both by harmonizing them if possible. This recourse finds application here. Thus,

we hold that the NTC, under E.O. No. 205, has exclusive jurisdiction over matters affecting CATV operation, including specifically
the fixing of subscriber rates, but nothing herein precludes LGUs from exercising its general power, under R.A. No. 7160, to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of their constituents. In effect,
both laws become equally effective and mutually complementary.
The grant of regulatory power to the NTC is easily understandable. CATV system is not a mere local concern. The complexities that
characterize this new technology demand that it be regulated by a specialized agency. This is particularly true in the area of rate-fixing.
Rate fixing involves a series of technical operations.48 Consequently, on the hands of the regulatory body lies the ample discretion in
the choice of such rational processes as might be appropriate to the solution of its highly complicated and technical problems.
Considering that the CATV industry is so technical a field, we believe that the NTC, a specialized agency, is in a better position than
the LGU, to regulate it. Notably, in United States vs. Southwestern Cable Co.,49 the US Supreme Court affirmed the Federal
Communications Commissions (FCCs) jurisdiction over CATV operation. The Court held that the FCCs authority over cable
systems assures the preservation of the local broadcast service and an equitable distribution of broadcast services among the various
regions of the country.
II.
Resolution No. 210 violated the States deregulation policy.
Deregulation is the reduction of government regulation of business to permit freer markets and competition. 50Oftentimes, the State,
through its regulatory agencies, carries out a policy of deregulation to attain certain objectives or to address certain problems. In the
field of telecommunications, it is recognized that many areas in the Philippines are still "unserved" or "underserved." Thus, to
encourage private sectors to venture in this field and be partners of the government in stimulating the growth and development of
telecommunications, the State promoted the policy of deregulation.
In the United States, the country where CATV originated, the Congress observed, when it adopted the Telecommunications Act of
1996, that there was a need to provide a pro-competitive, deregulatory national policy framework designed to accelerate rapidly
private sector deployment of advanced telecommunications and information technologies and services to all Americans by opening all
telecommunications markets to competition. The FCC has adopted regulations to implement the requirements of the 1996 Act and the
intent of the Congress.
Our country follows the same policy. The fifth Whereas Clause of E.O. No. 436 states:
"WHEREAS, professionalism and self-regulation among existing operators, through a nationally recognized cable television
operators association, have enhanced the growth of the cable television industry and must therefore be maintained along
with minimal reasonable government regulations;"
This policy reaffirms the NTCs mandate set forth in the Memorandum dated August 25, 1989 of Commissioner Jose Luis A. Alcuaz,
to wit:
"In line with the purpose and objective of MC 4-08-88, Cable Television System or Community Antenna Television (CATV)
is made part of the broadcast media to promote the orderly growth of the Cable Television Industry it being in its developing
stage. Being part of the Broadcast Media, the service rates of CATV are likewise considered deregulated in accordance with
MC 06-2-81 dated 25 February 1981, the implementing guidelines for the authorization and operation of Radio and
Television Broadcasting stations/systems.
Further, the Commission will issue Provisional Authority to existing CATV operators to authorize their operations for a
period of ninety (90) days until such time that the Commission can issue the regular Certificate of Authority."
When the State declared a policy of deregulation, the LGUs are bound to follow. To rule otherwise is to render the States policy
ineffective. Being mere creatures of the State, LGUs cannot defeat national policies through enactments of contrary measures. Verily,
in the case at bar, petitioner may increase its subscriber rates without respondents approval.

At this juncture, it bears emphasizing that municipal corporations are bodies politic and corporate, created not only as local units of
local self-government, but as governmental agencies of the state.51 The legislature, by establishing a municipal corporation, does not
divest the State of any of its sovereignty; absolve itself from its right and duty to administer the public affairs of the entire state; or
divest itself of any power over the inhabitants of the district which it possesses before the charter was granted. 52
Respondents likewise argue that E.O. No. 205 violates the constitutional prohibition against impairment of contracts, Resolution No.
210 of Batangas City Sangguniang Panlungsod being a grant of franchise to petitioner.
We are not convinced.
There is no law specifically authorizing the LGUs to grant franchises to operate CATV system. Whatever authority the LGUs had
before, the same had been withdrawn when President Marcos issued P.D. No. 1512 "terminating all franchises, permits or certificates
for the operation of CATV system previously granted by local governments." Today, pursuant to Section 3 of E.O. No. 436, "only
persons, associations, partnerships, corporations or cooperatives granted a Provisional Authority or Certificate of Authority by the
NTC may install, operate and maintain a cable television system or render cable television service within a service area." It is clear
that in the absence of constitutional or legislative authorization, municipalities have no power to grant franchises. 53Consequently, the
protection of the constitutional provision as to impairment of the obligation of a contract does not extend to privileges, franchises and
grants given by a municipality in excess of its powers, or ultra vires.54
One last word. The devolution of powers to the LGUs, pursuant to the Constitutional mandate of ensuring their autonomy, has bred
jurisdictional tension between said LGUs and the State. LGUs must be reminded that they merely form part of the whole. Thus, when
the Drafters of the 1987 Constitution enunciated the policy of ensuring the autonomy of local governments, 55 it was never their
intention to create an imperium in imperio and install an intra-sovereign political subdivision independent of a single sovereign state.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 12, 1999 as well as its
Resolution dated May 26, 1999 in CA-G.R. CV No. 52461, are hereby REVERSED. The RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 4254
is AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

V. INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS OF PUBLIC CORPORATIONS

1.) Between Nat gov and local gov
G.R. No. L-9124
July 28, 1958
BERNARDO HEBRON, petitioner,
vs.
EULALIO D. REYES, respondent.
E. A. Beltran for petitioner.
Roxas and Sarmiento for respondent.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, Assistant Solicitor General Jose G. Bautista and Solicitor Troadio T. Quiazon, Jr.
for respondent.
Vicente G. Sinco and Enrique M. Fernando as amici curiae.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is a quo warranto case involving the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of Carmona, Province of Cavite.
In the general elections held in 1951, petitioner Bernardo Hebron, a member of the Liberal Party, and respondent Eulalio D.
Reyes, of the Nacionalista Party, were elected mayor and vice-mayor, respectively, of said municipality, for a term of four (4)
years, beginning from January 1, 1952, on which date they presumably assumed the aforementioned offices. Petitioner
discharged the duties and functions of mayor continuously until May 22 or 24, 1954, when he received the following
communication:

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES

Manila, May 14, 1954

SIR:
Please be advised that the President has decided for the good of the public service, to assume directly the investigation to the
administrative charges against you for alleged oppression, grave abuse of authority and serious misconduct in office, and has
designated the Provincial Fiscal of that province as Special Investigator of the said charges. Copy of his designation is
enclosed for your information.
In view of the serious nature of the aforementioned charges against you, and in order to promote a fair and impartial
investigation thereof, you are hereby suspended from office, effective immediately, your suspension, to last until the final
termination of the administrative proceedings against you aforementioned. In this connection, please be advised that
the Vice-Mayor has been directed to assume the office of Acting Mayor during the period of your suspension, in accordance
with the provisions of Section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code.
The Provincial Governor and the Special Investigator have been advised hereof.

Respectfully,
By authority of the President:
(Sgd.) FRED RUIZ CASTRO
Executive Secretary

Mr. BERNARDO HEBRON

Municipal Mayor
Carmona, Cavite
(Record, pp. 1-2).
Thereupon, respondent Eulalio D. Reyes acted as mayor of Carmona and the Provincial Fiscal of Cavite investigated the charges
referred to in the above-quoted letter. After holding hearings in connection with said charges, the provincial fiscal submitted his report
thereon on July 15, 1954. Since then the matter has been pending in the Office of the President for decision. Inasmuch as the same did
not appear to be forthcoming, and the term of petitioner, who remained suspended, was about to expire, on May 13, 1955, he instituted
the present action for quo warranto, upon the ground that respondent was illegally holding the Office of Mayor of Carmona, and had
unlawfully refused and still refused to surrender said office to petitioner, who claimed to be entitled thereto.
Respondent and the Solicitor General, who was allowed to intervene, filed their respective answers admitting substantially the main
allegations of fact in petitioner's complaint, but denying the alleged illegality of petitioner's suspension and alleging that respondent
was holding the office of the mayor in compliance with a valid and lawful order of the President. Owing to the nature and importance
of the issue thus raised, Dean Vicente G. Sinco of the College of Law, University of the Philippines, and Professor Enrique M.
Fernando, were allowed to intervene asamici curiae. At the hearing of this case, the parties, as well as the Solicitor General and
said amici curiae, appeared and argued extensively. Subsequently, they filed their respective memoranda, and, on September 2, 1955,
the case became submitted for decision. The case could not be disposed of, however, before the close of said year, because the
members of this Court could not, within the unexpired portion thereof, reach an agreement on the decision thereon. Although the term
of office of petitioner herein expired on December 31, 1955, his claim to the Office of Mayor of Carmona, Cavite, has not thereby
become entirely moot, as regards such rights as may have accrued to him prior thereto. For this reason, and, also, because the question
of law posed in the pleadings, concerns a vital feature of the relations between the national government and the local governments,
and the Court has been led to believe that the parties, specially the executive department, are earnestly interested in a clear-cut
settlement of said question, for the same will, otherwise, continue to be a constant source of friction, disputes and litigations to the
detriment of the smooth operation of the Government and of the welfare of the people, the members of this Court deem it necessary to
express their view thereon, after taking ample time to consider and discuss full every conceivable aspect thereof.
The issue is whether a municipal mayor, not charged with disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, may be removed or suspended
directly by the President of the Philippines, regardless of the procedure set forth in sections 2188 to 2191 of the Revised
Administrative Code.
1. At the outset, it should be noted that, referring to local elective officers, we held, in Lacson vs. Roque (92 Phil., 456; 49 Off. Gaz.,
93, 98), that the President has no "inherent power to remove or suspend" them. In said case, we declared, also:

. . . Removal and suspension of public officers are always controlled by the particular law applicable and its proper
construction subject to constitutional limitation. . . . .
xxx

xxx

xxx

There is neither statutory nor constitutional provision granting the President sweeping authority to remove municipal
officials. By article VII, section 10, paragraph (1) of the Constitution the President "shall . . . exercise general supervision
over all local governments", but supervision does not contemplate control. (People vs. Brophy, 120 P., 2nd., 946; 49 Cal.
App., 2nd., 15.) Far from implying control or power to remove the President's supervisory authority over municipal affairs is
qualified by the proviso "as may be provided by law", a clear indication of constitutional intention that the provisions was not
to be self-executing but requires legislative implementation. And the limitation does not stop here. It is significant to note that
section 64(b) of the Revised Administrative Code in conferring on the Chief Executive power to remove specifically enjoins
that the said power should be exercised conformably to law, which we assume to mean that removals must be accomplished
only for any of the causes and in the fashion prescribed by law and the procedure.
What are "the causes and . . . the fashion . . . and the procedure" prescribed by law for the suspension of elective municipal officials?
The aforementioned sections 2188 to 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code read:
SEC. 2188. Supervisory authority of provincial governor over municipal officers. The provincial governor shall receive
and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other
form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude. For minor
delinquency, he may reprimand the offender; and if a more severe punishment seems to be desirable, he shall
submit written charges touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either
personally or by registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending
action by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question. Where
suspension is thus effected the written charges against the officer shall be filed with the board within five days.
SEC. 2189. Trial of municipal officer by provincial board. When written charges are preferred by a provincial governor
against a municipal officer, the provincial board shall, at its next meeting, regular or special, set a day, hour, and place for the
trial of the same and notify the respondent thereof; and at the to and place appointed, the board shall proceed to hear and
investigate the truth or falsity of said charges, giving the accused official full opportunity to be heard in his defense. The
hearing shall occur as soon as may be practicable, and in case suspension has been effected, not later than ten days from the
date the accused is furnished or has sent to him a copy of the charges, unless the suspended official shall, on sufficient
grounds, request an extension of time to prepare his defense.
The preventive suspension of a municipal officer shall not be for more than thirty days. At the expiration of the thirty days,
the suspended officer shall be reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings against him until
their completion, unless the delay in the decision of the case is due to the fault, neglect, or request of the accused, in which
case the time of the delay shall not be counted in computing the time of the suspension: Provided, That the suspension of the
accused may continue after the expiration of the thirty days above mentioned in case of conviction until the Secretary of the
Interior shall otherwise direct or the case shall finally be decided by said Secretary.
SEC. 2190. Action by provincial board. If, upon due consideration, the provincial board shall adjudge that the charges are
not sustained, the proceedings shall be dismissed; if it shall adjudge that the accused has been guilty of misconduct which
would be sufficiently punished by reprimand or further reprimand, it shall direct the provincial governor to deliver such
reprimand in pursuance of its judgment; and in either case the official, if suspended, shall be reinstated.
If in the opinion of the board the case is one requiring more severe discipline, and in case of appeal, it shall without
unnecessary delay forward to the Secretary of the Interior, within eight days after the date of the decision of the provincial
board, certified copies of the record in the case, including the charges, the evidence, and the findings of the board, to which
shall be added the recommendation of the board as to whether the official ought to be suspended, further suspended, or
finally dismissed from office; and in such case the board may exercise its direction to reinstate the official, if suspended.
The trial of a suspended municipal official and the proceedings incident thereto shall be given preference over the current and
routine business of the board.
SEC. 2191. Action by Secretary of the Interior. Upon receiving the papers in any such proceedings, the Secretary of the
Interior shall review the case without unnecessary delay and shall make such order for the reinstatement, dismissal,
suspension, or further suspension of the official, as the facts shall warrant and shall render his final decision upon the matter
within thirty days after the date on which the case was received. Disciplinary suspension made upon order of the Secretary of

the Interior shall be without pay. No final dismissal hereinunder shall take effect until recommended by the Department Head
and approved by the President of the Philippines.
As regards the effect of these provisions, suffice it for us to quote the opinion of Mr. Justice Tuason former Secretary of Justice
in the case of Villena vs. Roque (93 Phil., 363, decided on June 19, 1953), referring, particularly, to said section 2190 of the Revised
Administrative Code:
By all canons of statutory construction and, I might say with apology, common sense, the preceding sections should control
in the field of investigations of charges against, and suspension of, municipal officials. The minuteness and care, in three
long paragraphs, with which the procedure in such investigations and suspensions is outlined, clearly manifests a purpose to
exclude other modes of proceeding by other authorities under general statutes, and not to make the operation of said
provisions depend upon the mercy and sufferance of higher authorities. To contend that these by their broad and unspecified
power can also investigate such charges and order the temporary suspension of the erring officials indefinitely is to defy all
concepts of the solemnity of legislative pronouncements and to set back the march of local self-government which it has been
the constant policy of the legislative branch and of the Constitution to promote.
Indeed, it is, likewise, well settled that laws governing the suspension or removal of public officers, especially those chosen by the
direct vote of the people, must be strictly construed in their favor.1
Accordingly, when the procedure for the suspension of an officer is specified by law, the same must be deemed mandatory and
adhered to strictly, in the absence of express or clear provision to the contrary which does not exist with respect to municipal
officers. What is more, the language of sections 2188 to 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code leaves no room for doubt that the
law in the words of Mr. Justice Tuason "frowns upon prolonged or indefinite suspension of local elective officials"
(Lacson vs. Roque, 92 Phil., 456; 49 Off. Gaz., 93). Pursuant to said section 2188,
. . . "the provincial governor shall receive and investigate complaints against municipal officers for neglect of duty,
oppression, corruption or other form of maladministation of office." It provides that in case suspension has been effected, the
hearing shall occur as soon as practicable, in no case later than ten days from the date the accused is furnished a copy of the
charges, unless the suspended official on sufficient grounds asks from an extension of time to prepare his defense. The
section further warns that "the preventive suspension shall not be for more than thirty days," and ordains that at the end of
that period the officer should be reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings against him until
their completion, unless the delay in the decision of the case is due to the defendant's fault, neglect or request and unless in
case of conviction the Secretary of the Interior shall otherwise direct.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The policy manifested by section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code, which is consecrated policy in other jurisdictions
whose republican institutions this country has copied, requires speedy termination of a case in which suspension has been
decreed, not only in the interest of the immediate party but of the public in general. The electorate is vitally interested, and
the public good demands, that the man it has elevated to office be, within the shortest time possible, separated from the
service if proven unfit and unfaithful to its trust, and restored if found innocent. Special proceedings alone, restored if found
innocent. Special proceedings alone, unencumbered by nice technicalities of pleading, practice and procedure, and the right
of appeal, are best calculated to guarantee quick result. (Lacson vs. Roque, 49 Off. Gaz., 93, 103-104, 105.)
In the case at bar, petitioner was suspended in May 1954. The records of the investigation by the Provincial Fiscal of Cavite, with the
report of the latter, were forwarded to the Executive Secretary since July 15, 1954. Yet, the administrative decision on the charges
against petitioner was not rendered, either before the filing of the complaint herein, on May 13, 1955, or before the expiration of
petitioner's term of office, on December 31, 1955. Manifestly, petitioner's continued, indefinite suspension cannot be reconciled with
the letter and spirit of aforementioned provisions of the Revised Administrative Code.
2. Respondent and the amici curiae involve sections 79 (C) and 86 of the Revised Administrative Code, which are of the following
tenor:
Sec. 79 (C). Power of direction and supervision. The Department Head shall have direct control, direction, and
supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction and may, any provision of existing law to the contrary
notwithstanding, repeal or modify the decisions of the chief of said bureaus or offices when advisable in the public interest.
The Department Head may order the investigation of any act conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office
under his Department and in connection therewith may appoint a committee or designate an official or person who shall

conduct such investigations, and such committee, official, or person may summon witnesses by subpoena and subpoena
duces tecum, administer oath, and take testimony relevant to the investigation.
Sec. 86. Bureaus and offices under the Department of Interior. The Department of the Interior shall have
executive supervision over the administration of provinces, municipalities, chartered cities, and other local political
subdivisions, except the financial affairs and financial agencies thereof, . . . .
Referring to these provisions, we postulated in Mondano vs. Silvosa (97 Phil., 143; 51 Off. Gaz., 2884, 2887):
The executive departments of the Government of the Philippines created and organized before the approval of the
Constitution continued to exist as "authorized by law until the Congress shall provide otherwise." Section 10, paragraph 1,
Article VII, of the Constitution provides: "The President shall have control of all the executive department, bureaus, or
offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be
faithfully executed." Under this constitutional provision the President has been invested with the power of control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, or offices, but not of all local governments over which he has been granted only the power
of general supervision as may be provided by the law. The Department head as agent of the President has direct control and
supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction as provided for in section 79(C) of the Revised Administrative
Code, but he does not have the same control of local governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and offices under his
jurisdiction. Likewise, his authority to order the investigation by any act or conduct of any person in the service of any
bureau or office under his department is confined to bureaus or offices under his jurisdiction and does not extend to local
governments over which, as already stated, the President exercises only general supervision as may be provided by law. If
the provisions of Section 79(C) of the Revised Administrative Code are to be construed as conferring upon the corresponding
department head direct control, direction, and supervision over all local governments and that for that reason he may order
the investigation of an official of a local government for malfeasance in office, such interpretation would be contrary to the
provisions of paragraph 1, section 10, Article VII, of the Constitution. If "general supervision over all local government's is
to be construed as the same power granted to the Department Head in section 79 (C) of the Revised Administrative Code,
then there would no longer be a distinction or difference between the power of control and that of supervision. In
administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers
perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to
make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for
that of the latter. Such in the import of the provisions of section 79 (C) of the Revised Administrative Code and 37 of Act No.
4007. The Congress has expressly and specifically lodge the provincial supervision over municipal officials in the provincial
governor who is authorized to "receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officer for neglect of
duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime
involving moral turpitude." And if the charges are serious, "he shall submit written charges touching the matter to the
provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either personally or by registered mail, and he may in such
case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one
affecting the official integrity of the officer in question." Section 86 of the Revised Administrative Code adds nothing to the
power of supervision to be exercised by the Department Head over the administration of . . . municipalities . . . . If it be
construed that it does and such additional power is the same authority as that vested in the Department Head by section 79(C)
of the Revised Administrative Code, then such additional power must be deemed to have been abrogated by section 10(1),
Article VII, of the Constitution. (51 Off. Gaz., pp. 2884, 2887-2888.)
In fact, said section 79(C) was inserted in the Administrative Code by Act No. 3535, passed by the Philippine Legislature, during the
American regime, in line with section 22 of the Jones Law, pursuant to which "all Executivefunctions of the Government must
be directly under the Governor General or within one of the Executive Departments under the supervision and control of the Governor
General." As already stated, however, this authority of the Executive has been constricted in our Constitution, which maintains the
presidential "control of the executive departments, bureau and offices, "but limit the powers of the Executive over local governments
to "supervision" of a "general," not particular, character, and this only "as may be provided by law.
If said section 79 (C) were fully applicable to local governments, the President who now discharges the functions of the former
Secretary of the Interior could "alter or modify or nullify or set aside" any duly enacted municipal ordinance or resolution of a
provincial board, or "substitute" his judgment in lieu of that of municipal councils or provincial boards. Yet, it is well settled that he
cannot even disapprove any said ordinance or resolution, except when the same is illegal (Gabriel vs. Gov't of Pampanga, 50 Phil.,
686; Rodriguez vs.Montinola, * 50 Off. Gaz., 4820). Thus, despite the "direct control" and "supervision" of every Department Head
over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction, and his specific power to "repeal or modify the decisions of the . . . bureaus
and offices" under his department, pursuant to said section 79 (C), and the fact that "provinces, municipalities, chartered cities and
other local political subdivisions" were among the "bureaus and offices under the Department of Interior", according to the abovequoted section 86, the word "offices", as used in section 79 (C), was not deemed to include local governments, even before the

adoption of the Constitution. Greater adherence to this view is, obviously, demand by the provision of the fundamental
law reducing the presidential authority over local governments, from "control" to mere "general supervision."
3. Section 64 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code, likewise, relied upon by respondent and the amici curiae, provides that the
President shall have authority "to order, when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires, an investigation of any action
or conduct of any person in the government services and in connection therewith, to designate the official committee or person by
whom such investigation shall be conducted.
Notwithstanding this, apparently, unqualified grant of said authority, it is obvious that the President may not apply it to members of
Congress and those of the Supreme Court, in view of the principle of separation of powers, as to both, and of the constitutional
provisions on impeachment (Article IX of the Constitution), as to members of this Court. In other words, said section 64 (c) cannot be
construed literally without violating the Constitution. Indeed, the opening paragraphs of said section 64 read:
In addition to his general supervisory authority, the (Governor-General)President of the Philippines shall have
such specific powers and duties as are expressly conferred or imposed on him by law and also, in particular, the powers and
duties set forth in this chapter.
Among such special powers and duties shall be: (Emphasis ours.)
Since the powers specified therein are given to the President, "in addition to his general supervisory authority", it follows that the
application of those powers to municipal corporations insofar as they may appear to sanction the assumption by the Executive of
the functions of provincial governors and provincial boards, under said sections 2188 to 2190 would contravene the constitutional
provision restricting the authority of the President over local government to "general supervision."
4. The foregoing considerations are equally applicable to paragraph (b) of said section 64 similarly stressed by the respondent and
the amici curiae empowering the Executive:
To remove officials from office conformably to law and to declare vacant the offices held by such removed officials. For
disloyalty to the (United States), the Republic of the Philippines, the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may at
any time remove a person from any position of trust or authority under the Government of the (Philippines Islands)
Philippines.
Besides, it is not claimed that petitioner falls under the second sentence of said provision, pursuant to which the President may "at any
time remove a person from any position of trust or authority under the Government" for "disloyalty" to our Republic. There is no
question of "disloyalty" in the present case.
Upon the other hand, the power of removal of the President, under the first sentence of said paragraph 64 (b), must be exercised
"conformably to law", which, as regards municipal officers, is found in sections 2188 to 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Accordingly, in Lacson vs. Roque, supra, we declared:
The contention that the President has inherent power to remove or suspend municipal officers is without doubt not well taken.
Removal and suspension of public officers are always controlled by the particular law applicable and its proper construction
subject to constitutional limitations. (2 McQuillen's Municipal Corporations [Revised], section 574.) So it has been declared
that the governor of a state, (who is to the state what the President is to the Republic of the Philippines) can only remove
where the power is expresslygiven or arises by necessary implication under the Constitution or statutes.(43 Am. Jur. 34.)
There is neither statutory nor constitutional provision granting the President sweeping authority to remove municipal
officials. By Article VII, section 10, paragraph (1) of the Constitution the President "shall . . . exercise general supervision
over all local governments", but supervision does not contemplate control. (People vs. Brophy, 120, P., 2nd., 946; 49 Cal.
App., 2nd., 15.) Far from implying control or power to remove, the President's supervisory authority over municipal affairs is
qualified by the proviso "as may be provided by law," a clear indication of constitutional intention that the provision was not
to be self-executing but requires legislative implementation. And the limitation does not stop here. It is significant to note that
section 64 (b) of the Revised Administrative Code in conferring on the Chief Executive power to remove specifically enjoins
that the said power should be exercised conformably to law, which we assume to mean that removals must be accomplished
only for any of the causes and in the fashion prescribed by law and the procedure.
Again, petitioner herein was suspended for more than a year and seven (7) months (representing over three-eights [3/8], or almost onehalf [1/2] of his full term) and, presumably, would have remained suspended up to the present, had his term not expired on December
31, 1955. In Alejandrino vs. Quezon (46 Phil., 83), it was held thatthe power of removal does not imply the authority to suspend for a
substantial period of time, which, in said case, was only one (1) year.2

5. If there is any conflict between said sections 64 (b) and (c), 79 (c) and 86 of the Revised Administrative Code, on the other hand,
and sections 2188 to 2191 of the same code, on the other, the latter being specificprovisions, setting forth the procedure for the
disciplinary action that may be taken, particularly, against municipalofficials must prevail over the former, as general provisions,
dealing with the powers of the President and the department heads over the officers of the Government.3
Such was the view adopted in Laxamana vs. Baltazar (92 Phil., 32; 48 Off. Gaz., 3869). The issue therein was whether, in case of
suspension of a municipal mayor, his duties shall be discharged by the vice-mayor, as provided in section 2195 of the Revised
Administrative Code,4 or by an appointee of the Provincial Governor, with the consent of the Provincial Board, pursuant to section
21(a) of Republic Act No. 180 (The Revised Election Code).5
It was held that, although subsequent in point of time, section 21 (a) of Republic Act No. 180, should yield to said section 2195.6
6. The alleged authority of the Executive to suspend a municipal mayor directly, without any opportunity on the part of the provincial
governor and the provincial board to exercise the administrative powers of both under sections 2188 to 2190 of the Administrative
Code, cannot be adopted without conceding that said powers are subject to repeal or suspension by the President. Obviously, this
cannot, and should not, be done without a legislation of the most explicit and categorical nature, and there is none to such effect.
Moreover, as stated inMondano vs. Silvosa (supra), said legislation would, in effect, place local governments under the control of the
Executive and consequently conflict with the Constitution (Article VII, section 10[1]). That such would be the effect of respondent's
pretense, is admitted in the very answer of the Solicitor General, on page 5 of which he avers:
Truly impressive in the intention to make the Constitutional grant "real and effective" and not a mere splendid bauble is the
significant fact that
. . . the deliberations of the Constitutional Convention show that the grant of the supervisory authority to Chief Executive in
this regard was in the nature of a compromise resulting from the conflict of views in that body, mainly between the historical
view which recognizes the right of local self-government (People ex rel. Le Roy vs. Hurlbut [1871], 24 Mich., 44) and the
legal theory which sanctions the possession by the state of absolute control over local governments (Booten vs. Pinson,
L.R.A. [N.S., 1917-A], 1244; 77 W. Va., 412 [1915]). The result was the recognition of the power of supervision and all its
implications and the rejectionof what otherwise would be an imperium in imperio to the detriment of a strong national
government. (Planas vs. Gil. 67 Phil., 62, 78.)
Such a compromise must have contemplated certain measure of control to be attached to the power of "general supervision",
equivalent to the degree of local autonomy that may be determined by Congress, which under the aforestated constitutional
provision, possesses final authority in applying it.
In this connection, the case of Rodriguez vs. Montinola (94 Phil., 964; 50 Off. Gaz., 4820) is most illuminating. The issue therein was
whether the Secretary of Finance could validly disapprove a resolution of the Provincial Board of Pangasinan abolishing the positions
of three special counsel in the province. Counsel for the Secretary of Finance maintained the affirmative view invoking, among other
things, Executive Order No. 167 (October 8, 1938), section 2 of which provides:
The Department of Finance is the agency of the National Government for the supervision and control of the financial affairs
of the provincial, city and municipal governments. (Emphasis ours.)
and Executive order No. 383 (December 20, 1950) transferring the supervision and control of the personnel and finances of provincial
governments from the Secretary of the Interior to the Secretary of Finance. In a unanimousdecision, this Court, however, resolved the
question in the negative. Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Labrador a member of our constitutional convention lucidly stated:
We must state frankly at the outset that the outset that the use of the word "control in Executive Order No. 167 finds no
support or justification either in the Constitution (which grants the President only powers of general supervision over local
governments), or in any provision of the law. Any effect or interpretation given to said executive order premised on the use of
the word "control" therein would be of doubtful validity.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Is the suppression of the position of three special counsel a financial matter falling under the supervisory power of the
Secretary of Finance over provincial governments? Whether or not funds are available to pay for a newly created position is
evidently a financial matter; but the suppression of positions is not a financial matter. The problem before the provincial
board was, Should not the services of the three special counsel be stopped and the funds appropriated for them used for other
services? This is not a financial matter. It is so only in the sense that the sum appropriated for the abolished positions reverts
to the general funds to be thereafter appropriated again as the provincial board may provide. Were we to consider all changes

in the purposes of appropriations as financial matters, because they may have relation to the annual appropriations, there
would be no form of activity involving the expenditure of money that would not fall within the power of the Secretary of
Finance to approve or disapprove. Such an interpretation can not be held to be within the intendment of the executive order
on the approval of the budget of the provincial board.
Having arrived at the conclusion that the suppression of the positions of three special counsel is not a financial matter, subject
to the approval of the Secretary of Finance, we now proceed to examine the issue from another angle, i.e., whether the
Secretary of Finance, as an alter ego of the President of the Philippines, may not have the authority to disapprove the
resolution in question under the general supervisory authority given to the President of the Philippines in sub-paragraph (1),
section 10, of the Constitution. The supervisory authority of the President is limited by the phrase "as provided by law" but
there is no law in accordance with which said authority is to be exercised. The authority must be exercised, therefore, in
accord with general principles (of law).
xxx

xxx

xxx

The Secretary of Finance is an official of the central government, not of provincial government, which are distinct an
separate. If any power of general supervision is given him over local governments certainly it can not be understood to mean
or to include the right to direct action or even to control action, as in cases of school superintendents or supervisors within
their respective districts. Such power (of general supervision) may include correction of violations of law, or of gross errors,
abuses, offenses, or maladministration. Unless the acts of local officials or provincial governments constitute
maladministration, or an abuse or violation of a law, the power of general supervision can not be exercised. In synthesis, we
hold that the power of general supervision granted the President, in the absence of any express provision of law, may not
generally be interpreted to mean that he, or his alterego, the Secretary of Finance, may direct the form and manner in which
local officials shall perform or comply with their duties.
The act of the provincial board in suppressing the positions of three special counsel not being contrary to law, or an act of
maladministration, nor an act of abuse, the same may not be disapproved by the Secretary of Finance acting as a
representative of the President by virtue of the latter's power of general supervisionover local governments
(Rodriguez vs. Montinola, 94 Phil., 964 50 Off. Gaz., 4820, 4825-27; Emphasis ours.)
If neither the Secretary of the Interior nor the President may disapprove a resolution of the Provincial Board of Pangasinan, passed
within the jurisdiction thereof, because such disapproval would connote the assumption ofcontrol, which is denied by the Constitution,
it is manifest that greater control would be wielded by said officers of the national government if they could either assume the powers
vested in said provincial board or act in substitution thereof, such as by suspending municipal officials, without the administrative
proceedings prescribed in sections 2188 to 2190 of the Administrative Code, before said board. As stated in People vs. Brophy (120 P.
[2nd series], pp. 946, 953).
As will be seen from an examination of the above section of the Constitution, the powers of the Attorney General are not
without limitation. Manifestly, "direct supervision over every district attorney and sheriff and over such other law
enforcement officers as may be designated by law" does not contemplate absolute control and direction of such officials.
Especially is this true as to sheriffs and district attorneys, as the provision plainly indicates. These officials are public
officers, as distinguished from mere employees, with public duties delegated and entrusted to them, as agents, the
performance of which is an exercise of a part of the governmental functions of the particular political unit for which they, as
agents, are active. Coulter vs. Pool, 187 Cal. 181, 201 p. 121. Moreover, sheriffs and district attorneys are officers created by
the Constitution. In that connection it should be noted that there is nothing in section 21 of article V that indicates any
intention to depart from the general scheme of state government by counties and cites and counties, as well as local authority
in cities, as provided by sections 7 1/2, 7 1/2 a, 8 and 8 1/2, of Article XI. By interpreting section 21 of article V in the light
of the above-mentioned provisions, it is at once evident that "supervision" does not contemplate control, and that sheriffs and
district attorneys cannot avoid or evade the duties and responsibilities of their respective offices by permitting a substitution
of judgment. The sole exception appears to be that whenever "in the opinion of the Attorney-General any law of the State is
not being adequately enforced in any county, it shall be the duty of the Attorney-General to prosecute," in which cases "he
shall have all the powers of a district attorney. But even this provision affords no excuse for a district attorney or a sheriff to
yield the general control of his office and duties to the Attorney General. (Emphasis ours.)
7. The philosophy upon which our system of local governments is hinged rejects the theory of respondent herein.
The starting point from which the question may he considered is article VII, section 10, of the Constitution of the Philippines,
subparagraph (1) of which provides as follows:

"(1) The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over
all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed."
It might be helpful to recall that under the Jones Law the Governor General had both control and supervision over all local
governments, (Section 22, Jones Law) The evident aim of the members of the Constitutional Convention in introducing the
change, therefore, must have been to free local governments from the control exercised by the central government, merely
allowing the latter supervision over them. But this supervisory jurisdiction is not unlimited; it is to be exercised "as may be
provided by law."
At the time of the adoption of the Constitution, provincial governments had been in existence for over thirty years, and their
relations with the central government had already been defined by law. Provincial governments were organized in the
Philippines way back in the year 1901 upon the approval of Act No. 82 by the Philippines Commission on January 31, 1901.
The policy enjoined by the President of the United States in his Instructions to the Philippines Commission was for the
insular government to have "only supervision and control over local governments as may be necessary to secure and enforce
faithful and efficient administration by local officers." (McKinley Instruction in Philippines Commission, April 7, 1900.) The
aim of the policy was to enable the Filipinos to acquire experience in the art of self-government, with the end in view of later
allowing them to assume complete management and control of the administration of their local affairs. This policy is the one
now embodied in the above quoted provision of the Constitution. (Rodriguez vs. Montinola, 94 Phil., 964, 50 Off. Gaz., 4820,
4823, 4824.) (Emphasis ours.)
As early as April 7, 1900, President McKinley, in his Instructions to the Second Philippine Commission, laid down the policy that our
municipal governments should be "subject to the least degree of supervision and control" on the part of the national government; that
said supervision and control should be "confined within the narrowest limits"; that in the distribution of powers among the
governments to be organized in the Philippines, "the presumption is always to be in favor of the smaller subdivision"; that the
organization of local governments should follow "the example of the distribution of powers between the states and the national
government of the United States"; and that, accordingly, the national government "shall have no direct administration except of matters
ofpurely general concern."
If such were the basic principles underlying the organization of our local governments, at a time when the same were under
the control of the Governor-General (the representative of the United States, which has delegated to us some governmental powers, to
be exercised in the name of the United States), with more reason must those principles be observed under the Constitution of the
Philippines, pursuant to which "sovereignty resides in the (Filipino) people and all government authority emanates from them" and the
power of the President over local governments is limited to "general supervision . . . as may be provided by law." Thus, commenting
on the executive power over municipalities, Dean Sinco, in his work on Philippine Political Law (10th ed., pp. 695-697), expressed
himself as follows:
Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include
any restraining authority over the supervised party. Hence, the power of general supervision over local governments should
exclude, in the strict sense, the authority to appoint and remove local officials.
The Congress of the Philippines may pass laws which shall guide the President in the exercise of his power of supervision
over provinces and municipalities; but it may not pass laws enlarging the extent of his supervisory authority to the power of
control. To do so would be assuming the right to amend the Constitution which expressly limits the power of the President
over local governments to general supervision.
The question then arises: How should disciplinary action be taken against a local office who might be guilty of dereliction of
duty? The legal procedure in such cases will have to be judicial, not administrative. An action will have to be presented in
court charging the official with violation of law or neglect of his duties. The Constitution in this respect does not establish
anything novel; it merely revives the rule of law in place of administrative discretion.
Local autonomy may thus be established to a limited degree. In the deliberations of the committee on provincial and
municipal governments of the Constitutional Convention held in Manila in 1934, there was practical unanimity of opinion
among the delegates that provincial and municipal governments should enjoy a certain degree of autonomy. The first drafts
prepared by the committee provincial and municipal governments included provisions intended to protect the local
governments against the absolute control of the central government. Some difficulty was, however, encountered in expressing
objectively the necessary provisions protective of local autonomy. This was due to the other desire of many of the delegates
of establishing a strong central government. Concretely the problem was how to keep some degree of local autonomy without
weakening the national government. The draft of the Committee on provincial and municipal governments was not
considered satisfactory, and so it was not incorporated in the Constitution.But the idea of giving local governments a more of
autonomy was not completely given up. It is, therefore, logical to conclude that the Constitution in limiting expressly the

power of the President over local governments to mere general supervision expresses a concession to the general demand for
some local autonomy. This idea of a compromise or concession should serve as a guide in construing the extent of the powers
of the President over local governments.
The Supreme Court of the Philippines, however, while admitting that the power of supervision over local governments given
by the Constitution to the President is not coextensive with control, before the last war declared that the totality of executive
powers constitutionally vested in the President and the adoption of the Presidential type of government for the Philippines
gave the President a comprehensive authority over all local officials. This broad interpretation of Presidential powers would
stultify the specific limitation expressly proved in the Constitution. Fortunately, newer decisions of the Courts are veering
away from its early pronouncements. (Emphasis ours.)
8. It is urged that the authority of the President over our municipal corporations is not identical to that of State Governors in the United
States, for the former is the Executive, with more comprehensive powers than those of the latter, who are merely chief executives, and
in Severino vs. Governor General (16 Phil., 366, 386), it was held:
. . . Governors of States in the Union are not the "executives" but are only the "chief executives". All State official associated
with the governor, it may be said as a general rule, are, both in law and in fact, his colleagues, not his agents nor even his
subordinates. . . . They are not given him as advisers; on the contrary they are coordinated with him. As a general rule he has
no power to suspend or remove them. It is true that in a few of the States the governors have power to appoint certain high
officials, but they can not be removed for administrative reasons. These are exceptions to the general rule. The duties of these
officials are prescribed by Constitutional provisions or by statute, and not by the governor. The actual execution of a great
many of the laws does not lie with the governors, but with the local officers who are chosen by the people in the towns and
counties and "bound to the central authorities of the States by no real bonds of responsibility." In most of the States there is a
significant distinction between the State and local officials, such as county and city officials over whom the governors have
very little, if any, control; while in this country the Insular and provincial executive officials are bound to the GovernorGeneral by strong bonds of responsibility. So we conclude that the powers, duties, and responsibilities conferred upon the
Governor-General are far more comprehensive than those conferred upon State governors. (Emphasis ours.)
Although accurate, this view is immaterial to the issue before us. The Severino case referred to the authority of the American
Governor-General over local governments established in the Philippines, as an unincorporated territory or insular possession of the
United States, which local governments had been placed by McKinley's Instructions ratified in the Philippine Bill (Act of
Congress of the U. S. of July 1, 1902) and the Jones Law (Act of Congress of the U. S. of August 29, 1916), under the "control" of
said officer. The case at bar deals with the authority of the President of the Philippines, as a full sovereign state, over local
governments created by Philippine laws, enacted by representatives of the Filipino people, who elected said representatives and are
the ultimate repository of our sovereignty (Sec. 1, Art. II, of the Constitution), in the exercise of which they adopted and promulgated a
Constitution, and ordained therein, that, in lieu of the power of control of the former Governors-General, our Executive shall merely
exercise "general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law." (Article VII, Section 10 [1], of the
Constitution.)
Obviously, this provision vests in the President of the Republic less powers over municipal corporations than those possessed by our
former Governors-General.7
9. It has, also, been pointed out that municipal corporations in the United States have the power of "local self-government", which is
not given to our political subdivisions. This means simply that, whereas the former may not be deprived of their right to local "selfgovernment", the latter have only such autonomy, if any, as the centralgovernment may deem fit to grant thereto, and that said
autonomy shall be under the control of the national government, which may decree its increase, decrease, or, even, complete abolition.
But, who shall exercise this power, on behalf of the State? Not the Executive, but the Legislative department, as an incident of its
authority to create or abolish municipal corporations, and, consequently, to define its jurisdiction and functions. Hence, after noting
the difference between the power of control of the Executive, under the former organic laws, and that of general supervision, under the
Constitution, Dean Sinco stated in his above-cited work:
. . . It is, therefore, obvious that local governments are subject to the control of Congress which has the authority to prescribe
the procedure by which the President may perform his constitutional power of general supervision. (Sinco, Philippine
Political Law, 10th ed., p. 294; (Emphasis ours.)
10. It is next said that, although the power of general supervision of the President imposes upon him the duty of non-interference in
purely corporate affairs of the governments, such limitation does not apply to its politicalaffairs. To bolster up this proposition, the
following has been cited:

"A municipal corporation, being recognized as an appropriate instrumentality for the administration of general laws of the
state within its boundaries and appointed and empowered for that purpose, thereby becomes an agent of the state for local
administration and enforcement of its sovereign power. This is the governmental aspect of the municipal corporation. In their
public and governmental aspects municipal corporations are referred to as arms of the state government, auxiliaries of the
state, branches of the state government, subordinate divisions of the state government, delegates of the sovereign state, local
divisions of the state, parts of the state government, parts of the civil governments of the state, parts of the governmental
machinery of the state, parts of the machinery by which the state conducts its governmental affairs, political subdivisions of
the state, political or governmental portion of the state in which they are situated, public agencies. They are not only
representatives of the state, but portions of its governmental power. They represent no sovereignty distinct from the state
itself. The government exercised by a municipal corporation is exercised as an agency of the whole public, and for all the
people of the state. A municipal corporation is, within its prescribed sphere, a political power. In its governmental capacity it
may command; it is a municipal government; a public corporation." (43 C. J., 69-70)
The Government of the Republic of the Philippines is a term which refers to the corporate governmental entity through which
the functions of government are exercised throughout the Philippines, including, save as the contrary appears from the
context, the various arms through which political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the
central Government or to the provincial or municipal branches or other form of local government. (Art. I, Sec. 2, Rev. Adm.
Code; (Emphasis ours.)" (See Answer of the Solicitor General, pp. 9-10)
These authorities are good law, but its implications have seemingly been misconstrued, for they refer to the power of the State,
exercised through its law-making body, not the Executive. In the Philippines, the constitutional provision limiting the authority of the
President over local governments to General supervision is unqualified and, hence, it applies to all powers of municipal corporations,
corporate and political alike. Thus, for instance, municipal ordinances, enacted under the police power delegated to municipal
corporations, involve the exercise of not corporate, but political authority. Yet, admittedly, such ordinances are not subject
to presidential control. The Executive may not repeal, modify or even disapprove said ordinances no matter how unwise the
same being within the powers conferred by law upon local governments.
In fact, there was no need of specifically qualifying the constitutional powers of the President as regards the corporate functions of
local governments, inasmuch as the Executive never had any control over said functions.8What is more, the same are not, and never
have been, under the control even of Congress, for, in the exercise of corporate, non-governmental or non-political functions,
municipal corporations stand practically on the same level,vis-a-vis the National Government or the State as private
corporations.9 Consequently, the aforesaid limitation of the powers of the President over local governments from "control" to "general
supervision", could have had no other purpose than to affect his authority with regard precisely to political functions.
In Villena vs. Secretary of the Interior (67 Phil., 451), the Solicitor General invoked the distinction between the governmental and the
corporate powers of municipal corporations in support of the alleged direct authority of the Secretary of the Interior to suspend a
municipal mayor. The argument was rejected by this Court in the following language:
. . . if the power of suspension of the Secretary of the Interior is to be justified on the plea that the pretended power is
governmental and not corporate, the result would be more disastrous. Then and thereunder, the Secretary of the Interior, in
lieu of the mayor of the municipality, could directly veto municipal ordinances and resolutions under section 2229 of the
revised Administrative Code; he could, without any formality, elbow aside the municipal mayor and himself make
appointments to all non-elective positions in the municipal service, under section 2199 of the Revised Administrative Code;
he could, instead of the provincial governor, fill a temporary vacancy in any municipal office under subsection (a), section
2188, as amended, of the said Code; he could even directly appoint lieutenants of barrios and wrest the authority given by
section 2218 of the Revised Administrative Code to a municipal councilor. Instances may be multiplied but it is unnecessary
to go any further. Prudence, then, dictates that we should hesitate to accept the suggestion urge upon us by the SolicitorGeneral, especially where we find the path indicated by him neither illumined by the light of our own experience nor
cemented by the virtuality of legal principles but is, on the contrary, dimmed by the recognition however limited in our own
Constitution of the right of local self-government and by the actual operation and enforcement of the laws governing
provinces, chartered cities, municipalities and other political subdivisions. It is not any question of wisdom of legislation but
the existence of any such destructive authority in the law invoked by the Government that we are called upon to pass and
determine here. (Villena vs. Sec. of the Interior, 67 Phil., 451, 461-462.).
11. The case of Planas vs. Gil, supra, cited in favor of respondent herein, is not in point, for Planas was a councilor of the City of
Manila, which for administrative purposes has, also, the status of a province (see section 2440, Revised Administrative Code;
Republic Act No. 409, section 14). As such, it was under the direct supervision of the Department of Interior,10 unlike regular
municipalities such as that Carmona, Cavite, which are under the immediate supervision of the Provincial Governor (section 2082,
Revised Administrative Code). In short, sections 2188 to 2191 of the Administrative Code have never been, and are not, applicable to
the City of Manila, the charter of which contains no counterpart thereof.

12. The case of Villena vs. Roque (93 Phil., 363) likewise relied upon by respondent is substantially different from the one at
bar. Administrative charges were filed, against Mayor Villena, with the office of the President, which referred the matter to the
Provincial Governor of Rizal, but the Provincial Board thereof failed to act on said charges for an unreasonable length of time. Under
such facts it is understandable that the power of supervision of the President was invoked, either to compel action, which the
Provincial Board had the duty to take, or, in view of its obvious unwillingness to comply therewith, to cause the charges to be
investigated by somebody else, in line with the responsibility of the Executive "to take care that the laws be faithfully executed."
In the present case, however, the Provincial Board of Cavite never had a to chance to investigate the charges against
petitioner herein. From the very beginning, the office of the Executive assumed authority to act on said charges. Worse still, such
assumption of authority was made under such conditions as to give the impression that the Provincial Governor and the Provincial
Board were banned from exercising said authority. Frankly, we are unable to see, how the aforementioned assumption of authority
may be justified, either under the power of "general supervision," or under the duty to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed."
As held in Mondano vs. Silvosa (51 Off. Gaz., 2888), in line with settled principles in administrative law, "supervision means
overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fails or neglects to
fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other
hand, means the power of an official to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance
of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter." When the office of the Executive Department acted, in
the case at bar, in lieu, or in substitution, of the Provincial Board of Cavite, the former sought, therefore, to "control" the latter. What is
more, instead of compelling the same to comply with its duties under sections 2188 to 2191 of the Administrative Code, the former, in
effect, restrained, prevented or prohibited it from performing said duties.
13. Let us now examine the case of Villena vs. The Secretary of the Interior (67 Phil., 451). It involved the same Mayor of Makati,
Rizal Jose D. Villena, whom the Secretary of the Interior suspended, allegedly with the authority of the President, who, it was claimed,
had verbally expressed no objection thereto. Then Villena was advised of the charges against him and of the designation of a given
official to investigate the same. Thereafter notified of the date set for the hearing of the aforementioned charges, before said official,
Villena applied for a writ of prohibition to restrain the Secretary of the Interior and his agents from proceeding with said investigation.
The issues raised were whether the Secretary of the Interior had authority (a) to order the investigation and (b) to suspend Villena.
The first question was resolved in the affirmative, upon the ground that the power of supervision of department heads, under section
79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, "implies authority to inquire into facts and conditions in order to render the power real and
effective," as held in Planas vs. Gil (67 Phil., 62).
The Court was divided on the second question. The majority opinion, subscribed by four (4) Justices, including its writer, used the
following language:
. . . the question, it may be admitted, is not free from difficulties. There is no clear and express grant of power to the secretary
to suspend a mayor of a municipality who is under investigation. On the contrary, the power appears lodged in the provincial
governor by section 2188 of the Administrative Code . . . .
The fact, however, that the power of suspension is expressly granted by section 2188 of the Administrative Code to the
provincial governor does not mean that the grant is necessarily exclusive and precludes the Secretary of the Interior from
exercising a similar power . . . .
After serious reflection, we have decided to sustain the contention of the government in this case on the broad proposition,
albeit not suggested, that under the presidential type of government which we have adopted and considering the departmental
organization established and continued in force by paragraph 1, section 12, Article VII, of our Constitution, all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are
assistance and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution
or the law to act in person or in exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the
secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. (Villena vs. The Secretary of the Interior, 67
Phil., 451, 459-460, 463.)
Concurring in the result, Associate Justice Villareal observed:
. . . The Secretary of the Interior is nowhere given the power to suspend a municipal elective officer pending charges, and in
the absence of such power be may not suspend him. The power to suspend cannot be implied even from an arbitrary power to
remove, except where the power to remove is limited to cause; in such case, the power to suspend, made use of as a
disciplinary power pending charges, is regarded as included within the power of removal (46 Corpus Juris, sec. 142, page

982). Provincial governors alone are expressly empowered to suspend municipal officers under certain conditions by section
2188 of the Revised Administrative Code, and the President of the Philippines by section 2191, as amended, of the same
Code. Though the suspension of the petitioner by the Secretary of the Interior was unauthorized, the implied approval by the
President of the Philippines validated such suspension. (Id., 67 Phil., 465-466.)
Likewise, Associate Justice Imperial concurred in the result, upon the ground that:
. . . (1) the President of the Philippines, under sections 64 (b), and 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code, as the later has
been amended, and section 11 (1), Article VII, of the Constitution, is vested with the power to expel and suspend municipal
officials for grave misconduct, and it appears that the suspension was ordered by virtue of that authority; and (2) the
Secretary of the Interior acted within the powers conferred upon him by section 79 (c), in connection with section 86, of the
Revised Administrative Code, as amended, in ordering an administrative investigation of the charges against the petitioner,
in his capacity as mayor of the municipality of Makati, Province of Rizal. (Id., 67 Phil., 466.).
He dissented, however, insofar as the majority held that the acts of department secretaries are "presumptively the case of the
executive" and that the suspension directed by the Secretary of the Interior should be considered as one "decreed by the President"
himself.
Then Associate Justice, later Chief Justice, Moran, similarly, dissented from said view of the majority and concurred in the result.
It is interesting to note that the authority of the President to suspend Mayor Villena was not even discussed. It was taken for granted.
The reason may be gleaned from the following passage of the majority opinion:
. . . counsel for the petitioner admitted in the oral argument that the President of the Philippines may himself suspend the
petitioner from office in virtue of his greater power of removal (Section 2191, as amended, Administrative Code) to be
exercised conformably to law. Indeed, if the President could, in the manner prescribed by law, remove a municipal official, it
would be a legal incongruity if he were to be devoid of the lesser power of suspension. And the incongruity would be more
patent if, possessed of the power both to suspend and to remove a provincial official (section 2078, Administrative Code), the
President were to be without the power to suspend a municipal official. Here is, parenthetically, an instance where, as counsel
for petitioner admitted, the power to suspend a municipal official is not exclusive. (Id., 67 Phil., 460; Emphasis supplied.)
More important still, said majority opinion and the aforementioned separate opinions cited section 2191 of the Revised Administrative
Code as the source of the power of the Executive to suspend and remove municipal officials. However, said provision deals with such
power of suspension and removal on appeal from a decision of the Provincial Board in proceedings held under sections 2188 to 2190
of the said Code. Nowhere in said opinions was anything said on the question whether said appellate authority implies a grant of
original power to suspend, either without an appeal from said decision of the Provincial Board, or without any proceedings before said
Boardcalling for the exercise of its disciplinary functions under said provisions of the Revised Administrative Code. In other words,
the Court passed this question sub silentio. Hence, the decision in Villena vs. Secretary of the Interior (supra) does not come within
the purview of the rule of stare decisis, insofar as the aforesaid question is concerned, and, as regards the same, neither binds this
Court nor bars it from passing thereon (McGirr vs.Hamilton and Abreu, 30 Phil., 563, 568-569; U.S. vs. More, 3 Cranch, 159, 172;
U.S. vs. Sanges, 144 U.S., 310, 319; Cross vs. Burke, 146 U.S., 82; Louisville Trust Co. vs. Knott, 191 U.S., 22).
14. It is but fair to note that the action of the Executive Department of our Government against petitioner herein was evidently taken in
the earnest belief that public interest demanded and justified it and had, in all probability, been premised upon the seeming implication
of some of the former decisions of this Court. However, in the words of Mr. Justice Labrador, "the question before us is not one of
necessity or usefulness, but exclusively one of authority or prerogative" (Rodriguez vs. Montinola, 50 Off. Gaz., 4820, 4828).
Furthermore, paraphrasing Lacson vs. Roque (49 Off. Gaz., 93, 99), "it may be true, as suggested, that the public interest and the
proper administration of official functions would be best served" by granting the Executive original authority to suspend a municipal
mayor. However,
. . . The answer to this observation is that the shortcoming is for legislative branch alone to correct byappropriate enactment.
It is trite to say that we are not to pass upon the folly or wisdom of the law. As had been said in Cornejo vs. Naval, supra,
anent identical criticisms, "if the law is too narrow in scope, it is for the Legislature rather than the courts to expand it." It is
only when all other means of determining the legislative intention fail that a court may look into the effect of the law;
otherwise the interpretation becomes judicial legislation. (Kansas ex rel, Little vs. Mitchell, 70 L.R.A., 306;
Dudly vs. Reynolds, 1 Kan., 285.) (Lacson vs. Roque, supra.; Emphasis supplied.)
Then again, the issue submitted for our determination has never been squarely presented and decided. Referring to a similar situation,
the Supreme Court of Illinois said:

. . . It may be frankly admitted that there are expressions in some of the decisions relied upon that lend support to counsel's
position that the court has heretofore intimated that section 2 of the Vacation Act is unconstitutional, but in our judgment this
is the first time that the constitutionality of this act has been squarely in the record and necessary for the consideration and
decision of this court, and we are confronted with the proposition whether we should follow what is dicta in those cases in
construing section 2 of the Vacation Act, and thus follow an erroneous construction of said Act. This court has said:
"It is highly important that the decisions of the Court affecting the right to property should be uniform and stable; but cases
will sometimes occur in the decision of the most enlightened judges where the settled rules and reasons of the law have been
departed from, and in such cases it becomes the duty of the court, before the error has been sanctioned by repeated decisions,
to embrace the first opportunity to pronounce the law as it is." Frink vs. Darat 14 Ill. 304, 58 Am. Dec. 575.
"The McNeer Case, supra, is a case particularly in point in support of the reasoning just given. In that case the court overruled the decision of Russell vs. Rumsey, 36 Ill. 362, which had been followed in Rose, vs. Sanderson, 38 Ill. 247, and Steele
vs. Gellatly, 41 Ill. 39, notwithstanding the decision in the Russel Case had stood unchallenged for 28 years and
notwithstanding the opinion in that case squarely decided the question involved that inchoate dower, although only an
expectancy, was as completely beyond legislative control as an estate. In Chicago, Danvilla & Vincennes Railroad Co. vs.
Smith, 62 Ill. 268, 14 Am. Rep. 99, the court discussed at some length the doctrine of stare decisis as authorities in other
jurisdictions that bear on that subject where a constitutional question is involved, and from that discussion we think it may be
fairly said that the conclusion of the court was that the rule of stare decisis will not prevent the courts from reviewing a
constitutional question where the facts in the instant case are slightly different from those in former decisions. In Arnold vs.
Knoxville, 115 Tenn. 195, 90 S. W. 469, 3 L.R.A. (N.S.) 837, 5 Ann. Cas. 881, the court considered the same doctrine as to
the necessity of recognizing to the fullest extent and adhering to that doctrine in passing upon and construing the provisions
of the organic law, but stated that when it is clear that the court has made a mistake it "will not decline to correct it, even
though it may have been reasserted and acquiesced in for a long number of years." In Paul vs. Davis, 100 Ind. 422, the court
said (page 427):
"The law is a science of principles, and this cannot be true if a departure from principle can be perpetuated by a persistence in
error."
"In Propeller Genesee Chief vs. Fitsnugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 456, 13 L. Ed. 1058, the court said:
"It is the decision in the case of The Thomas Jefferson which mainly embarrasses the court in the present inquiry. We are
sensible of the great weight to which it is entitled. But at the same time we are convinced that, if we follow it, we follow an
erroneous decision into which the court fell, when the great importance of the question as it now presents itself could not be
foreseen; and the subject did not therefore receive that deliberate consideration which at this time would have been given to
it by the eminent men who presided here when that case was decided. (Prall vs. Burckhartt, 132 N.E. 280, 287-288; Emphasis
ours.)10
In conclusion, we hold that, under the present law, the procedure prescribed in sections 2188 to 2191 of the Revised Administrative
Code, for the suspension and removal of the municipal officials therein referred to, is mandatory; that, in the absence of a clear and
explicit provision to the contrary, relative particularly to municipal corporations and none has been cited to us said procedure is
exclusive; that the executive department of the national government, in the exercise of its general supervision over local governments,
may conduct investigations with a view to determining whether municipal officials are guilty of acts or omissions warranting the
administrative action referred to in said sections, as a means only to ascertain whether the provincial governor and the provincial
board should take such action; that the Executive may take appropriate measures to compel the provincial governor and the provincial
board to take said action, if the same is warranted, and they failed to do so; that the provincial governor and the provincial board may
not be deprived by the Executive of the power to exercise the authority conferred upon them in sections 2188 to 2190 of the Revised
Administrative Code; that such would be the effect of the assumption of those powers by the Executive; that said assumption of
powers would further violate section 2191 of the same code, for the authority therein vested in the Executive is merelyappellate in
character; that, said assumption of powers, in the case at bar, even exceeded those of the Provincial Governor and Provincial Board, in
whom original jurisdiction is vested by said sections 2188 to 2190, for, pursuant thereto, "the preventive suspension of a municipal
officer shall not be for more than 30 days" at the expiration of which he shall be reinstated, unless the delay in the decision of the case
is due to his fault, neglect or request, or unless he shall have meanwhile been convicted, whereas petitioner herein was suspended
"until the final determination of the proceedings" against him, regardless of the duration thereof and cause of the delay in its
disposition;11 and that so much of the rule laid down in Villena vs. Secretary of the Interior (67 Phil., 451) Villena vs. Roque (93 Phil.,
363), as may be inconsistent with the foregoing views, should be deemed, and, are hereby, reversed or modified accordingly.
Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, and Reyes, J. B. L., JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
PARAS, C. J., dissenting:
In the allocation of governmental powers, our Constitution ordains that "the Executive power shall be vested in a President of the
Philippines." (Sec. 1, Art. VII, Constitution). And the President is enjoined in the same Constitution to "take care that the laws be
faithfully executed." (Sec. 10, par. 1, Art. VII, Constitution.) In the same breath, the Constitution provides that the President shall have
control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, and shall exercise general supervision over all local governments as may
be provided by law (Sec. 10, par. 1, Art. VII, Constitution).
In pursuance of the Constitution, the Revised Administrative Code declares that in addition to his general supervisory authority, the
President shall have such specific powers and duties as are expressly conferred or imposed on him by law and among such special
powers and duties shall be:
(b) To remove officials from office conformably to law and to declare vacant the offices held by such removed officials. For disloyalty
to the Republic of the Philippines the President may at any time remove a person from any position of trust or authority under the
Government of the Philippine Islands.
(c) To order, when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires, an investigation of any action or the conduct of any person
in the Government service, and in connection therewith to designate the official, committee, or person by whom such investigation
shall be conducted (Sec. 64, Rev. Adm. Code).
In reference to the malfeasance of any person in the Government service, by virtue of Sec. 64(b) and (c) of the Revised Administrative
Code, enacted in consonance with the totality of his executive power and, specifically, the power of supervision of all offices in the
executive branch of the government, the President has concurrentsupervisory authority with the provincial governor to order an
investigation of charges against an elective municipal official. While the provincial governor has to submit the charges to the
Provincial Board for investigation, the President may designate the official, committee or person by whom such investigation shall be
conducted (Sec. 64 [c], Rev. Adm. Code). The President can remove even elective municipal officials subject to the limitation that
such removal must be conformable to law, which are that it must be for a cause provided by law, as those enumerated in Sec. 2188 of
the Revised Administrative Code, and conducted in a manner in conformity with due process.
Already in Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil. 62, an attempt was made to have this Court distinguish the power of supervision and control of the
President in relation to his power to order the investigation of an elective municipal official. This Court, through Justice Laurel, said:
Our attention has been directed to the fact that with reference to local governments, the Constitution speaks of
general supervision which is distinct from the control given to the President over executive departments, bureaus and offices.
This is correct. But, aside from the fact that this distinction is not important insofar as the power of the President to order the
investigation is concerned, as hereinabove indicated, the deliberations of the Constitutional Convention show that the grant of
the supervisory authority to the Chief Executive in this regard was in the nature of a compromise resulting from the conflict
of views in that body, mainly between the historical view which recognizes the right of local self-government (People ex rel.
Le Roy vs. Hurlbut (1871) 24 Mich., 44), and the legal theory which sanction the possession by the state of absolute control
over local governments (Booten vs. Pinson, LRA (NS 1917-A) 1244; 77 W. Va. 412 (1915). The result was the recognition of
the power of supervision and all its implications and the rejection of what otherwise would be an imperium in imperio to the
detriment of a strong national government. (p. 78.)
Besides, if in administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers
perform their duties, and control means the power of an officer to alter modify, nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer has done
in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter (Mondano vs. Silvosa, 51 Off. Gaz.,
2884, 2887), how will the foregoing distinction affect the supervisory authority of the President to cause the investigation of the
malfeasance of a municipal official relating to and affecting the administration of his office, and directly affecting the rights and
interests of the public? If supervision and control meant by the Constitution relate to the power to oversee, or modify, set aside or
annul acts done by a subordinate officer in the performance of his duties (Rodriguez vs. Montinola, 50 Off. Gaz., 4820), the
supervisory authority to suspend and remove a subordinate official prescribed the administrative code refers to disciplinary action on
account of his misconduct or malfeasance in office.
The act complained of in the Mondano vs. Silvosa case, supra, has no reference to the performance of duty on the part of the Mayor
and is therefore not included even under the power of supervision of the Chief Executive.

I see no cogent reason for disturbing our ruling in Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil. 62; Villena vs. Sec. of Interior, 67 Phil. 451; Lacson vs.
Roque, 49 O. G. 93; and Villena vs. Roque, 93 Phil., 363, upholding the explicit supervisory authority of the President under Sec. 64 of
the Revised Administrative Code to include that of ordering the investigation of elective municipal officials, and to remove or suspend
them conformably to law.
Endencia, J., concurs.

2.) W/ Phil National police

G.R. No. 153624

October 24, 2008

JUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELES, petitioner,

vs.
P/INSP. JOHN A. MAMAUAG, SPO2 EUGENE ALMARIO, SPO4 ERLINDA GARCIA and SPO1 VIVIAN
FELIPE,respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision 1 dated September 6, 2001 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 61711, as reiterated in its Resolution2 of May 13, 2002, setting aside the July 3, 1997 resolution of
Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief Recaredo Sarmiento II (PNP Chief), the March 3, 2000 decision and the June 30, 2000
resolution, both of the National Appellate Board (NAB) of the National Police Commission.
Briefly, the facts are as follows,
On March 2, 1995, petitioners housemaids, Nancy Gaspar and Proclyn Pacay, were brought by a certain Agnes Lucero to the Baler
Police Station 2, Central Police District Command (CPDC), Quezon City after they were found wandering aimlessly in a bus terminal.
The incident drew the attention of the media and spawned several cases, among them is a complaint for grave misconduct filed by
petitioner against P/ Insp. Roberto V. Ganias, SPO1 Jaime Billedo, herein respondents SPO2 Eugene V. Almario (Almario), P/Insp.
John A. Mamauag (Mamauag), SPO1 Vivian M. Felipe (Felipe) and SPO4 Erlinda L. Garcia (Garcia) from which the present
controversy takes root.
The administrative complaint sought therein respondent police officers summary dismissal from service on ground of alleged serious
irregularities committed by them in the handling of petitioners criminal complaint for qualified theft against the two housemaids.
Allegedly, while the housemaids were under police custody, several items of jewelry and clothing materials belonging to and stolen
from her were found in the possession of housemaid Proclyn Pacay. Hence, petitioners witnesses requested that the respondent police

officers register the discovery of the stolen articles in the police logbook but the latter did not heed to the request. Moreover, the police
officers allegedly refused to act upon the incident and to conduct further investigation.
The case was initially investigated by the Inspection and Legal Affairs Division of the CPDC which recommended the dismissal of the
charges against the respondent police officers. In a resolution3 dated April 10, 1995, the CPDC District Director approved the
recommendation and dismissed the complaint.
Displeased with the outcome of her complaint, petitioner moved for a re-investigation of the case before the PNP Chief.
On June 7, 1996, upon conduct of summary proceedings, the PNP Chief issued a decision4. Dispositively, the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this headquarters finds: Respondents P/CINSP Roberto Ganias, SPO1 Jaime Billedo, SPO1 Roberto Cario guilty of
Serious Neglect of Duty and orders their dismissal from the police service; P/INSP John Mamauag and SPO2 Eugene Almario guilty
of Less Serious Neglect of Duty and orders that both of them be suspended from the police service for Ninety (90) days with forfeiture
of pay; and SPO4 Erlinda Garcia and SPO1 Vivian Felipe exonerated of the charge for insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED.
Still not satisfied, petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the foregoing decision. In a Resolution 5dated July 3, 1997,
the PNP Chief modified his previous ruling and ordered the dismissal from service of respondents Mamauag, Almario, Garcia and
Felipe.
Respondents filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus against the PNP Chief, the PNP Inspector General and petitioner before the
Quezon City Regional Trial Court, Branch 101. However, in an Order dated November 25, 1997, the trial court dismissed the petition
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Thereafter, respondents sought appellate recourse before the National Police Commission, NAB but in the decision 6 dated March 3,
2000, the appeal was dismissed for having been filed late. Subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on June 30,
2000.
Unperturbed, respondents elevated the matter to the CA by way of petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. On
September 6, 2001, the CA rendered the herein challenged Decision. The decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Resolution of the PNP Chief Recaredo Sarmiento II dated 3 July 1997, having been
rendered in excess of his jurisdiction is hereby SET ASIDE for being null and void. Accordingly, the DECISION and RESOLUTION
made by the National Appellate Board dated 3 March 2000 and 30 June 2000, respectively, are also SET ASIDE for being null and
void.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, petitioner is now before the Court via the present recourse raising the following issues:
1. Whether Sections 437 and 458 of Republic Act No. (RA) 69759 allow the filing of a motion for reconsideration;
2. Whether the PNP Chief could modify his June 7, 1996 decision and issue another with a higher penalty of dismissal from service;
and
3. Whether petitioner as private complainant in the administrative case has the legal personality to move for reconsideration, or appeal
an adverse decision of the disciplining authority.
At the outset, the Court notes that the issues raised by petitioner had already been settled by the Court in a kindred case, The National
Appellate Board (NAB) of the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) v. P/INSP John A. Mamauag, et al. 10 docketed as G.R. No.

149999. In the said case, the Court through its First Division ruled that RA 6975 itself does not authorize a private complainant to
appeal a decision of the disciplining authority. Explains the Court in said decision:
RA 6975 itself does not authorize a private complainant to appeal a decision of the disciplining authority. Sections 43 and 45 of RA
6975 authorize "either party" to appeal in the instances that the law allows appeal. One party is the PNP member-respondent when the
disciplining authority imposes the penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service. The other party is the government when the
disciplining authority imposes the penalty of demotion but the government believes that dismissal from the service is the proper
penalty.
However, the government party that can appeal is not the disciplining authority or tribunal which previously heard the case and
imposed the penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service. The government party appealing must be one that is prosecuting the
administrative case against the respondent. Otherwise, an anomalous situation will result where the disciplining authority or tribunal
hearing the case, instead of being impartial and detached, becomes an active participant in prosecuting the respondent. Thus,
in Mathay, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, decided after Dacoycoy, the Court declared:
To be sure, when the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission were brought before the Court of Appeals, the Civil Service
Commission was included only as a nominal party. As a quasi-judicial body, the Civil Service Commission can be likened to a judge
who should "detach himself from cases where his decision is appealed to a higher court for review."
In instituting G.R. No. 126354, the Civil Service Commission dangerously departed from its role as adjudicator and became an
advocate. Its mandated function is to "hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal,
including contested appointments and to review decisions and actions of its offices and agencies," not to litigate.
In any event, a private complainant like Judge Angeles is not one of "either party" who can appeal under Sections 43 and 45 of RA
6975. The private complainant is a mere witness of the government which is the real party in interest. In short, private complainant
Judge Angeles is not a party under Sections 43 and 45 who can appeal the decision of the disciplining authority.
Thus, Judge Angeles has no legal personality to appeal the dismissal of the charges against Mamauag, et al. by the CPDC District
Director in the Resolution of 10 April 1995. The motion for re-investigation filed by Judge Angeles with the PNP Chief is in substance
an appeal from the decision of the CPDC District Director. The PNP Chief had no jurisdiction to entertain Judge Angeles appeal in the
guise of a motion for re-investigation. Since the PNP Chief had no jurisdiction, all actions taken by the PNP Chief pursuant to the
appeal is void. Thus, the Decision of the CPDC District Director dismissing the charges against Mamauag, et al. stands and is now
final and executory.
Accordingly, the Court disposed G.R. No. 149999 as follows:
WHEREFORE, we DENY the instant petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 06 September
2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 61711 with MODIFICATION. We REVERSE the 3 July 1997 Resolution of PNP Chief Recaredo Sarmiento
II and REINSTATE the Resolution of 10 April 1995 of the CPDC District Director dismissing the charges against P/Insp. John A.
Mamauag, SPO2 Eugene Almario, SPO4 Erlinda Garcia, and SPO1 Vivian Felipe, who are all entitled to back salaries and other
benefits as provided under Section 48 of Republic Act No. 6975.
SO ORDERED.
The Court sees no reason to depart from the foregoing decision. Hence, the instant petition must likewise be disposed in same manner.
To recapitulate, the PNP Chief had no jurisdiction to entertain petitioners appeal in the guise of a motion for re-investigation. Since
the PNP Chief had no jurisdiction, all actions taken by him pursuant to the appeal is void. Thus, the April 10, 1995 resolution of the
CPDC District Director, dismissing the charges against respondents, stands and is now final and executory.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed decision and resolution of the CA are AFFIRMEDwith
MODIFICATION. The June 7, 1996 decision and July 3, 1997 Resolution of the PNP Chief are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and the Resolution of April 10, 1995 of the CPDC District Director dismissing the charges against respondents P/Insp. John A.

Mamauag, SPO2 Eugene Almario, SPO4 Erlinda Garcia, and SPO1 Vivian Felipe is REINSTATED. Respondents are all entitled to
back salaries and other benefits as provided under Section 48 of Republic Act No. 6975.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. L

3.)
G.R. No. 131442

July 10, 2003

BANGUS FRY FISHERFOLK, DIWATA MAGBUHOS, ANGELITA BINAY, ELMA GARCIA, VIRGILIO PANGUIO,
ARSENIO CASTILLO, ARIEL PANGUIO, ANTONIO PANGUIO, ANTONIO BUNQUIN, GENEROSO BUNQUIN,
CHARLIE DIMAYACYAC, RENATO PANGUIO, ATILANO BUNQUIN, CARLOS CHAVEZ, JUAN DIMAYACYAC,
FILEMON BUNQUIN, MARIO MAGBUHOS, MAURO MAGBUHOS, NORA MAGBUHOS, JEOVILYN, GENALYN and
JORVAN QUIMUEL, minors, represented by their parents FELICIANA and SABINO QUIMUEL, MARICAR MAGBUHOS,
minor, represented by her parents CARMELITA and ANTONIO MAGBUHOS, MARLO BINAY, minor, represented by his
parents EFRENITA and CHARLITO BINAY, and the BANGUS, BANGUS FRY and other MARINE LIFE OF MINOLO
COVE, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE ENRICO LANZANAS as Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch VII, THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES Region IV, represented by its Regional Executive
Director and its Regional Director for Environment, THE NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, ORIENTAL MINDORO
ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF ORIENTAL MINDORO, herein represented by

GOVERNOR RODOLFO VALENCIA, PUERTO GALERA MAYOR GREGORIO DELGADO, VICE MAYOR ARISTEO
ATIENZA, and MEMBERS OF THE SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF PUERTO GALERA, JUAN ASCAN, JR., RAFAEL
ROMEY, CENON SALCEDO, JERRY DALISAY, SIMON BALITAAN, RENATO CATAQUIS, MARCELINO BANAAG,
DANIEL ENRIQUEZ, AMELYN MARCO, GABRIEL ILAGAN, MUNICIPAL ENGINEER RODEL RUBIO, and
MUNICIPAL PLANNING and DEVELOPMENT COORDINATOR WILHELMINA LINESES, respondents.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review1 of the Order2 dated 7 November 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 7 ("Manila RTC"),
dismissing petitioners' complaint for lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction.
The Facts
On 30 June 1997, Regional Executive Director Antonio G. Principe ("RED Principe") of Region IV, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources ("DENR"), issued an Environmental Clearance Certificate ("ECC") in favor of respondent National Power
Corporation ("NAPOCOR"). The ECC authorized NAPOCOR to construct a temporary mooring facility in Minolo Cove, Sitio
Minolo, Barangay San Isidro, Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro. The Sangguniang Bayan of Puerto Galera has declared Minolo Cove,
a mangrove area and breeding ground for bangus fry, an eco-tourist zone.3
The mooring facility would serve as the temporary docking site of NAPOCOR's power barge, which, due to turbulent waters at its
former mooring site in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, required relocation to a safer site like Minolo Cove. The 14.4 megawatts power
barge would provide the main source of power for the entire province of Oriental Mindoro pending the construction of a land-based
power plant in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro. The ECC for the mooring facility was valid for two years counted from its date of issuance
or until 30 June 1999.4
Petitioners, claiming to be fisherfolks from Minolo, San Isidro, Puerto Galera, 5 sought reconsideration of the ECC issuance. RED
Principe, however, denied petitioners' plea on 15 July 1997. On 21 July 1997, petitioners filed a complaint with the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 7, for the cancellation of the ECC and for the issuance of a writ of injunction to stop the construction of the
mooring facility. Impleaded as defendants were the following: (1) NAPOCOR, (2) RED Principe, (3) DENR Region IV Technical
Director for Environment Oscar Dominguez, (4) Oriental Mindoro Electric Cooperative ("ORMECO"), which is engaged in the
distribution of electricity in Oriental Mindoro, and (5) certain officials of Puerto Galera. 6 Petitioners subsequently amended their
complaint to include as additional defendants the elective officials of Oriental Mindoro represented by then Governor Rodolfo G.
Valencia. Petitioners further prayed for the demolition of mooring structures that respondents had already built.
On 28 July 1997, prior to the filing of the amended complaint, the trial court issued a 20-day temporary restraining order enjoining the
construction of the mooring facility. However, the trial court lifted the same on 6 August 1997 on NAPOCOR's manifestation that the
provincial government of Oriental Mindoro was the one undertaking the construction of the mooring facility.7
On 28 August 1997, before filing their answers, respondents ORMECO and the provincial officials of Oriental Mindoro moved to
dismiss the complaint. These respondents claimed that petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies, rendering the complaint
without cause of action. They also asserted that the Manila RTC has no jurisdiction to enjoin the construction of the mooring facility in
Oriental Mindoro, which lies outside the Manila RTC's territorial jurisdiction.
Petitioners opposed the motion on the ground that there was no need to exhaust administrative remedies. They argued that the issuance
of the ECC was in patent violation of Presidential Decree No. 1605, 8 Sections 26 and 27 of Republic Act No. 7160,9 and the
provisions of DENR Department Administrative Order No. 96-37 ("DAO 96-37") on the documentation of ECC applications.
Petitioners also claimed that the implementation of the ECC was in patent violation of its terms.
In its order of 7 November 1997, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed petitioners' complaint.
Hence, this petition.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court's order dismissing the complaint reads in part:
After careful evaluation and analysis, this Court finds the Motion to Dismiss tenable and meritorious.
Petitioners have clearly failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before taking this legal action in Court x x x.
It is x x x worth mentioning that the decision of the Regional Director may still be x x x elevated to the Office of the
Secretary of the DENR to fully comply with the process of exhaustion of administrative remedies. And well settled is the rule
in our jurisdiction that before bringing an action in or resorting to the Courts of Justice, all remedies of administrative
character affecting or determinative of the controversy at that level should first be exhausted by the aggrieved party
(Pestanas vs. Dyogi, L-25786, February 27, 1978). And petitioners' failure to exhaust administrative remedies renders his
[sic] petition dismissible (Chia vs. Acting Collector of Customs, 177 SCRA 755). And a dismissal on the ground of failure to
exhaust administrative remedies is tantamount to a dismissal based on lack of cause of action (Baguiro vs. Basa, Jr., 214
SCRA 437; Pineda vs. CFI of Davao, 111 Phil. 643; Sarabia vs. Secretary of Agriculture & Natural Resources, L-16002,
May 23, 1961; Gone, et al. vs. District Engineer, et. al., L-22782, August 29, 1975; Abe-Abe, et al. vs. Manta, et. al., L-4827,
May 31, 1979) although it does not affect the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter (Mun. of La Trinidad, et al. vs.
CFI of Baguio-Benguet, et al., L-33889, June 28, 1983).
Moreover, this Court finds the Opposition of the Petitioners highly untenable and bereft of merits that the controverted act in
question is patently illegal and there was an immediate need for judicial intervention.
The ECC in question was issued by the Regional Office of the DENR which has jurisdiction and authority over the same . . ..
And corollary to this, the issue as to whether or not the Minolo Cove is within the enclosed coves and waters embraced by
Puerto Galera bay and protected by Medio island is a clear question of fact which the DENR may appropriately resolve
before resorting to [the] Court[s].
This Court is likewise aware and cognizant of its territorial jurisdiction in the enforcement of Writ of Injunction. That truly,
[a] writ of injunction can only be enforced within [the] territorial jurisdiction of this Court but not for acts which are being or
about to be committed outside its territorial jurisdiction. Thus, inPhilippine National Bank vs. Pineda, 197 SCRA 1, the
Honorable Supreme Court ruled: "Regional Trial Courts can only enforce their writs of injunction within their respective
designated territories. Furthermore, we find the issuance of the preliminary injunction directed against the Provincial Sheriff
of Negros Occidental a jurisdictional paux [sic] pas (from Black Dictionary means jurisdictional falsity) as the Courts of First
Instance now Regional Trial Court[s], can only enforce their writs of injunction within their respective designated territories.
And finally, this Court is not unmindful of the relevant and square application in the case at bar of Presidential Decree No.
1818, Executive Order No. 380 dated November 27, 1989, and Circular No. 2-91 of the Supreme Court that the National
Power Corporation (NPC) is a public utility, created under special legislation, engaged in the generation and distribution of
electric power and energy. The mooring site of NPC in Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro is one of its infrastructure projects
falling within the mantle of Executive Order No. 380, November 27, 1989 x x x.
And as held by the Supreme Court in the case of National Power Corporation vs. Honorable Abraham P. Vera, et al., 170
SCRA 721, courts are without jurisdiction to issue injunctive writs against [the] National Power Corporation. The latter
enjoys the protective mantle of P.D. 1818, (Circular No. 2-91).
xxx

xxx

xxx

Injunction in this case is not a mere ancillary [sic] writ but the main action itself together with the Annulment of the
Environmental Clearance Certificate (ECC). Even assuming arguendo that the court [can] annul the ECC how can the latter
enforce the same against the Provincial Government of Oriental Mindoro which was impleaded by the petitioners as a
necessary party together with the Oriental Mindoro Electric Cooperative and the government officials of Puerto Galera,
Oriental Mindoro, whose acts and functions are being performed outside the territorial jurisdiction of this court? x x x
Indisputably, the injunction and annulment of ECC as prayed for in the petition are inseparable x x x.

The conclusion, therefore, is inescapable that petitioners have failed to exhaust all the available administrative remedies and
this Court has no jurisdiction to issue the injunctive writ prayed for in the Amended [Complaint]. 10
The Issue
The issue is whether the trial court erred in dismissing petitioners' complaint for lack of cause action and lack of jurisdiction.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
Jurisdiction of the Manila RTC over the Case
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law. Such jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint,
irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the reliefs sought.11
A perusal of the allegations in the complaint shows that petitioners' principal cause of action is the alleged illegality of the issuance of
the ECC. The violation of laws on environmental protection and on local government participation in the implementation of
environmentally critical projects is an issue that involves the validity of NAPOCOR's ECC. If the ECC is void, then as a necessary
consequence, NAPOCOR or the provincial government of Oriental Mindoro could not construct the mooring facility. The subsidiary
issue of non-compliance with pertinent local ordinances in the construction of the mooring facility becomes immaterial for purposes of
granting petitioners' main prayer, which is the annulment of the ECC. Thus, if the court has jurisdiction to determine the validity of the
issuance of the ECC, then it has jurisdiction to hear and decide petitioners' complaint.
Petitioners' complaint is one that is not capable of pecuniary estimation. It falls within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts under Section 19(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691. The question of
whether petitioners should file their complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Manila or Oriental Mindoro then becomes a matter of
venue, to be determined by the residence of the parties.12
Petitioners' main prayer is the annulment of the ECC. The principal respondent, DENR Region IV, has its main office at the L & S
Building, Roxas Boulevard, Manila. Regional Executive Director Principe of the DENR Region IV, who issued the ECC, holds office
there. Plainly, the principal respondent resides in Manila, which is within the territorial jurisdiction of the Manila RTC. Thus,
petitioners filed their complaint in the proper venue.
On the other hand, the jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts to issue injunctive writs is limited to acts committed or about to be
committed within their judicial region.13 Moreover, Presidential Decree No. 1818 ("PD No. 1818") prohibited14 courts from issuing
injunctive writs against government infrastructure projects like the mooring facility in the present case. Republic Act No. 8975 ("RA
No. 8975"), which took effect on 26 November 2000, superseded PD No. 1818 and delineates more clearly the coverage of the
prohibition, reserves the power to issue such writs exclusively with this Court, and provides penalties for its violation. 15 Obviously,
neither the Manila RTC nor the Oriental Mindoro RTC can issue an injunctive writ to stop the construction of the mooring facility.
Only this Court can do so under PD No. 1818 and later under RA No. 8975. Thus, the question of whether the Manila RTC has
jurisdiction over the complaint considering that its injunctive writ is not enforceable in Oriental Mindoro is academic.
Clearly, the Manila RTC has jurisdiction to determine the validity of the issuance of the ECC, although it could not issue an injunctive
writ against the DENR or NAPOCOR. However, since the construction of the mooring facility could not proceed without a valid ECC,
the validity of the ECC remains the determinative issue in resolving petitioners' complaint.
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The settled rule is before a party may seek the intervention of the courts, he should first avail of all the means afforded by
administrative processes. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery is still available, with a procedure prescribed
pursuant to law for an administrative officer to decide the controversy, a party should first exhaust such remedy before resorting to the

courts. The premature invocation of a court's intervention renders the complaint without cause of action and dismissible on such
ground.16
RED Principe of the DENR Region IV Office issued the ECC based on (1) Presidential Decree No. 1586 ("PD No. 1586") and its
implementing rules establishing the Environmental Impact Statement System, (2) DAO 96-37 17 and (3) the Procedural Manual of
DAO 96-37. Section 418 of PD No. 1586 requires a proponent of an environmentally critical project, or a project located within an
environmentally critical area as declared by the President, to secure an ECC prior to the project's operation. 19 NAPOCOR thus secured
the ECC because the mooring facility in Minolo Cove, while not an environmentally critical project, is located within an
environmentally critical area under Presidential Proclamation No. 2146, issued on 14 December 1981.20
The rules on administrative appeals from rulings of the DENR Regional Directors on the implementation of PD No. 1586 are found in
Article VI of DAO 96-37, which provides:
SECTION 1.0. Appeal to the Office of the Secretary. Any party aggrieved by the final decision of the RED may, within 15
days from receipt of such decision, file an appeal with the Office of the Secretary. The decision of the Secretary shall be
immediately executory.
SECTION 2.0. Grounds for Appeal. The grounds for appeal shall be limited to grave abuse of discretion and serious errors
in the findings of fact which would cause grave or irreparable injury to the aggrieved party. Frivolous appeals shall not be
countenanced.
SECTION 3.0. Who May Appeal. The proponent or any stakeholder, including but not limited to, the LGUs concerned and
affected communities, may file an appeal.
The DENR Procedural Manual for DAO 96-37 explains these provisions thus:
Final decisions of the RED may be appealed. These decisions include those relating to the issuance or non-issuance of an
ECC, and the imposition of fines and penalties. By inference, the decision of the Secretary on the issuance or non-issuance of
the ECC may also be appealed based on this provision.Resort to courts prior to availing of this remedy would make the
appellant's action dismissible on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The right to appeal must be exercised within 15 days from receipt by the aggrieved party of such decision. Failure to file such
appeal within the requisite period will result in the finality of the RED's or Secretary's decision(s), which can no longer be
disturbed.
An appeal shall not stay the effectivity of the RED's decision, unless the Secretary directs otherwise.
The right to appeal does not prevent the aggrieved party from first resorting to the filing of a motion for reconsideration with
the RED, to give the RED an opportunity to re-evaluate his decision. (Emphasis added)
Instead of following the foregoing procedure, petitioners bypassed the DENR Secretary and immediately filed their complaint with the
Manila RTC, depriving the DENR Secretary the opportunity to review the decision of his subordinate, RED Principe. Under the
Procedural Manual for DAO 96-37 and applicable jurisprudence, petitioners' omission renders their complaint dismissible for lack of
cause of action.21 Consequently, the Manila RTC did not err in dismissing petitioners' complaint for lack of cause of action.
On the Alleged Patent Illegality of the ECC
Petitioners nevertheless contend that they are exempt from filing an appeal with the DENR Secretary because the issuance of the ECC
was in patent violation of existing laws and regulations. These are (1) Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1605, as amended, (2)
Sections 26 and 27 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), and (3) the provisions of DAO 96-37 on the
documentary requirements for the zoning permit and social acceptability of the mooring facility.

Petitioners' contention is without merit. While the patent illegality of an act exempts a party from complying with the rule on
exhaustion Of administrative remedies,22 this does not apply in the present case.
Presidential Decree No. 1605
Presidential Decree No. 1605 ("PD No. 1605"),23 as amended by Presidential Decrees Nos. 1605-A and 1805, declares as ecologically
threatened zone "the coves and waters embraced by Puerto Galera Bay as protected by Medio Island." This decree provides in part:
Section 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the construction of marinas, hotels, restaurants, other
commercial structures; commercial or semi-commercial wharfs [sic]; commercial docking within the enclosed coves of
Puerto Galera; the destruction of its mangrove stands; the devastation of its corals and coastline by large barges,
motorboats, tugboat propellers, and any form of destruction by other human activities are hereby prohibited.
Section 2. x x x
No permit for the construction of any wharf, marina, hotel, restaurants and other commercial structures in Puerto Galera
shall be issued without prior approval of the Office of the President upon the recommendation of the Philippine Tourism
Authority. (Emphasis supplied)
NAPOCOR claims that since Minolo Cove lies outside of "Puerto Galera Bay as protected by Medio Island", 24 PD No. 1605 does not
apply to this case. However, petitioners assert that Minolo Cove is one of the "enclosed coves of Puerto Galera" 25 and thus protected
under PD No. 1605. This is a question of fact that the DENR Secretary should have first resolved. In any event, there is no dispute that
NAPOCOR will use the mooring facility for its power barge that will supply 14.4 megawatts of electricity to the entire province of
Oriental Mindoro, including Puerto Galera. The mooring facility is obviously a government-owned public infrastructure intended to
serve a basic need of the people of Oriental Mindoro. The mooring facility is not a "commercial structure; commercial or semicommercial wharf or commercial docking" as contemplated in Section 1 of PD No. 1605. Therefore, the issuance of the ECC does not
violate PD No. 1605 which applies only to commercial structures like wharves, marinas, hotels and restaurants.
Sections 26 and 27 of RA No. 7160
Congress introduced Sections 26 and 27 in the Local Government Code to emphasize the legislative concern "for the maintenance of a
sound ecology and clean environment."26 These provisions require every national government agency or government-owned and
controlled corporation to hold prior consultations with the local government unit concerned and to secure the prior approval of
its sanggunian before implementing "any project or program that may cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of non-renewable
resources, loss of cropland, rangeland, or forest cover and extinction of animal or plant species." Sections 26 and 27 respectively
provide:
Section 26. Duty of National Government Agencies in the Maintenance of Ecological Balance. It shall be the duty of every
national agency or government-owned or controlled corporation authorized or involved in the planning and implementation
of any project or program that may cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of crop land,
rangeland, or forest cover and extinction of animal or plant species, to consult with the local government units, nongovernmental organizations, and other sectors concerned and explain the goals and objectives of the project or program, its
impact upon the people and the community in terms of environmental or ecological balance, and the measures that will be
undertaken to prevent or minimize the adverse effects thereof.
Section 27. Prior Consultations Required. No project or program shall be implemented by government authorities unless
the consultations mentioned in Section . . . 26 hereof are complied with, and prior approval of the sanggunian concerned is
obtained: Provided, That occupants in areas where such projects are to be implemented shall not be evicted unless appropriate
relocation sites have been provided, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
In Lina, Jr. v. Pao,27 the Court interpreted these provisions in this manner:
Section 27 of the Code should be read in conjunction with Section 26 thereof x x x.

Thus, the projects and programs mentioned in Section 27 should be interpreted to mean projects and programs whose effects
are among those enumerated in Sections 26 and 27, to wit, those that: (1) may cause pollution; (2) may bring about climatic
change; (3) may cause the depletion of non-renewable resources; (4) may result in loss of crop land, rangeland, or forest
cover; (5) may eradicate certain animal or plant species; and (6) other projects or programs that may call for the eviction of a
particular group of people residing in the locality where these will be implemented.
Again, Sections 26 and 27 do not apply to this case because as petitioners admit,28 the mooring facility itself is not environmentally
critical and hence does not belong to any of the six types of projects mentioned in the law. There is no statutory requirement for the
concerned sanggunian to approve the construction of the mooring facility. It is another matter if the operation of the power barge is at
issue. As an environmentally critical project that causes pollution, the operation of the power barge needs the prior approval of the
concerned sanggunian. However, what is before this Court is only the construction of the mooring facility, not the operation of the
power barge. Thus, the issuance of the ECC does not violate Sections 26 and 27 of RA No. 7160.
Documentary Requirements for ECC Applications
Under DAO 96-37, an ECC applicant for a project located within an environmentally critical area is required to submit an Initial
Environment Examination, which must contain a brief description of the environmental setting and a documentation of the
consultative process undertaken, when appropriate.29 As part of the description of the environmental setting, the ECC applicant must
submit a certificate of locational clearance or zoning certificate.
Petitioners further contend that NAPOCOR, in applying for the ECC, did not submit to the DENR Region IV Office the documents
proving the holding of consultations and the issuance of a locational clearance or zoning certificate. Petitioners assert that this
omission renders the issuance of the ECC patently illegal.
The contention is also without merit. While such documents are part of the submissions required from a project proponent, their mere
absence does not render the issuance of the ECC patently illegal. To justify non-exhaustion of administrative remedies due to the
patent illegality of the ECC, the public officer must have issued the ECC "[without any] semblance of compliance, or even an attempt
to comply, with the pertinent laws; when manifestly, the officer has acted without jurisdiction or has exceeded his jurisdiction, or has
committed a grave abuse of discretion; or when his act is clearly and obviously devoid of any color of authority." 30
RED Principe, as chief of DENR Region IV, is the officer duly authorized under DAO 96-3731 to issue ECCs for projects located
within environmentally critical areas. RED Principe issued the ECC on the recommendation of Amelia Supetran, the Director of the
Environmental Management Bureau. Thus, RED Principe acted with full authority pursuant to DENR regulations. Moreover, the legal
presumption is that he acted with the requisite authority.32 This clothes RED Principe's acts with presumptive validity and negates any
claim that his actions are patently illegal or that he gravely abused his discretion. While petitioners may present proof to the contrary,
they must do so before the proper administrative forum before resorting to judicial remedies.
On the Alleged Non-Compliance with the Terms of the ECC
Lastly, petitioners claim that they are justified in immediately seeking judicial recourse because NAPOCOR is guilty of violating the
conditions of the ECC, which requires it to secure a separate ECC for the operation of the power barge. The ECC also mandates
NAPOCOR to secure the usual local government permits, like zoning and building permits, from the municipal government of Puerto
Galera.
The contention is similarly without merit. The fact that NAPOCOR's ECC is subject to cancellation for non-compliance with its
conditions does not justify petitioners' conduct in ignoring the procedure prescribed in DAO 96-37 on appeals from the decision of the
DENR Executive Director. Petitioners vigorously insist that NAPOCOR should comply with the requirements of consultation and
locational clearance prescribed in DAO 96-37. Ironically, petitioners themselves refuse to abide with the procedure for filing
complaints and appealing decisions laid down in DAO 96-37.
DAO 96-37 provides for a separate administrative proceeding to address complaints for the cancellation of an ECC. Under Article IX
of DAO 96-37, complaints to nullify an ECC must undergo an administrative investigation, after which the hearing officer will submit
his report to the EMB Director or the Regional Executive Director, who will then render his decision. The aggrieved party may file an
appeal to the DENR Secretary, who has authority to issue cease and desist orders. Article IX also classifies the types of violations

covered under DAO 96-37, including projects operating without an ECC or violating the conditions of the ECC. This is the applicable
procedure to address petitioners' complaint on NAPOCOR's alleged violations and not the filing of the instant case in court.
A Final Word
The Court commends petitioners for their courageous efforts to safeguard and maintain the ecological balance of Minolo Cove. This
Court recognizes the utmost importance of protecting the environment.33 Indeed, we have called for the vigorous prosecution of
violators of environmental laws.34 Legal actions to achieve this end, however, must be done in accordance with established rules of
procedure that were intended, in the first place, to achieve orderly and efficient administration of justice.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

VI. INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

G.R. No. 180986

December 10, 2008

NORBERTO ALTRES, EVITA BULINGAN, EVANGELINE SASTINE, FELIPE SASA, LILIBETH SILLAR, RAMONITO
JAYSON, JELO TUCALO, JUAN BUCA, JR., JUE CHRISTINE CALAMBA, ROMEO PACQUINGAN, JR., CLEO JEAN
ANGARA, LOVENA OYAO, RODOLFO TRINIDAD, LEONILA SARA, SORINA BELDAD, MA. LINDA NINAL, LILIA
PONCE, JOSEFINA ONGCOY, ADELYN BUCTUAN, ALMA ORBE, MYLENE SOLIVA, NAZARENE LLOREN,
ELIZABETH MANSERAS, DIAMOND MOHAMAD, MARYDELL CADAVOS, ELENA DADIOS, ALVIN CASTRO,
LILIBETH RAZO, NORMA CEPRIA, PINIDO BELEY, JULIUS HAGANAS, ARTHUR CABIGON, CERILA BALABA,
LIEZEL SIMAN, JUSTINA YUMOL, NERLITA CALI, JANETH BICOY, HENRY LACIDA, CESARIO ADVINCULA, JR.,
MERLYN RAMOS, VIRGIE TABADA, BERNARDITA CANGKE, LYNIE GUMALO, ISABEL ADANZA, ERNESTO
LOBATON, RENE ARIMAS, FE SALVACION ORBE, JULIE QUIJANO, JUDITHO LANIT, GILBERTO ELIMIA,
MANUEL PADAYOGDOG, HENRY BESIN, ROMULO PASILANG, BARTOLOME TAPOYAO, JR., RUWENA GORRES,
MARIBETH RONDEZ, FERDINAND CAORONG, TEODOMERO CORONEL, ELIZABETH SAGPANG, and JUANITA
ALVIOLA, petitioners,
vs.
CAMILO G. EMPLEO, FRANKLIN MAATA, LIVEY VILLAREN, RAIDES CAGA, FRANCO BADELLES, ERNESTO
BALAT, GRACE SAQUILABON, MARINA JUMALON and GEORGE DACUP, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Assailed via petition for review on certiorari are the Decision dated February 2, 20071 and Order dated October 22, 20072 of Branch 3
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iligan City, which denied petitioners petition for mandamus praying for a writ commanding the
city accountant of Iligan, Camilo G. Empleo (Empleo), or his successor in office, to issue a certification of availability of funds in
connection with their appointments, issued by then Iligan City Mayor Franklin M. Quijano (Mayor Quijano), which were pending
approval by the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
Sometime in July 2003, Mayor Quijano sent notices of numerous vacant career positions in the city government to the CSC. The city
government and the CSC thereupon proceeded to publicly announce the existence of the vacant positions. Petitioners and other
applicants submitted their applications for the different positions where they felt qualified.

Toward the end of his term or on May 27, June 1, and June 24, 2004, Mayor Quijano issued appointments to petitioners.
In the meantime, the Sangguniang Panglungsod issued Resolution No. 04-2423 addressed to the CSC Iligan City Field Office
requesting a suspension of action on the processing of appointments to all vacant positions in the plantilla of the city government as of
March 19, 2004 until the enactment of a new budget.
The Sangguniang Panglungsod subsequently issued Resolution No. 04-2664 which, in view of its stated policy against "midnight
appointments," directed the officers of the City Human Resource Management Office to hold in abeyance the transmission of all
appointments signed or to be signed by the incumbent mayor in order to ascertain whether these had been hurriedly prepared or
carefully considered and whether the matters of promotion and/or qualifications had been properly addressed. The same Resolution
enjoined all officers of the said Office to put off the transmission of all appointments to the CSC, therein making it clear that noncompliance therewith would be met with administrative action.
Respondent city accountant Empleo did not thus issue a certification as to availability of funds for the payment of salaries and wages
of petitioners, as required by Section 1(e)(ii), Rule V of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, Series of 1998 reading:
xxxx
e. LGU Appointment. Appointment in local government units for submission to the Commission shall beaccompanied, in
addition to the common requirements, by the following:
xxxx
ii. Certification by the Municipal/City Provincial Accountant/Budget Officer that funds are available. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
And the other respondents did not sign petitioners position description forms.
The CSC Field Office for Lanao del Norte and Iligan City disapproved the appointments issued to petitioners invariably due to lack of
certification of availability of funds.
On appeal by Mayor Quijano, CSC Regional Office No. XII in Cotabato City, by Decision of July 30, 2004,5dismissed the appeal, it
explaining that its function in approving appointments is only ministerial, hence, if an appointment lacks a requirement prescribed by
the civil service law, rules and regulations, it would disapprove it without delving into the reasons why the requirement was not
complied with.
Petitioners thus filed with the RTC of Iligan City the above-stated petition for mandamus against respondent Empleo or his successor
in office for him to issue a certification of availability of funds for the payment of the salaries and wages of petitioners, and for his corespondents or their successors in office to sign the position description forms.
As stated early on, Branch 3 of the Iligan RTC denied petitioners petition for mandamus. It held that, among other things, while it is
the ministerial duty of the city accountant to certify as to the availability of budgetary allotment to which expenses and obligations
may properly be charged under Section 474(b)(4) of Republic Act No. 7160,6otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1991, the city accountant cannot be compelled to issue a certification as to availability of funds for the payment of salaries and wages
of petitioners as this ministerial function pertains to the city treasurer. In so holding, the trial court relied on Section 344 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 the pertinent portion of which provides:
Sec. 344. Certification and Approval of Vouchers. No money shall be disbursed unless the local budget officer certifies to
the existence of appropriation that has been legally made for the purpose, the local accountant has obligated said
appropriation, and the local treasurer certifies to the availability of funds for the purpose. x x x x (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration7 in which they maintained only their prayer for a writ of mandamus for respondent
Empleo or his successor in office to issue a certification of availability of funds for the payment of their salaries and wages. The trial
court denied the motion by Order of October 22, 2007,8 hence, the present petition.
By Resolution of January 22, 2008,9 this Court, without giving due course to the petition, required respondents to comment thereon
within ten (10) days from notice, and at the same time required petitioners to comply, within the same period, with the relevant
provisions of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Petitioners filed a Compliance Report dated February 18, 200810 to which they attached 18 copies of (a) a verification and
certification, (b) an affidavit of service, and (c) photocopies of counsels Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) official receipt for the
year 2008 and his privilege tax receipt for the same year.
Respondents duly filed their Comment,11 alleging technical flaws in petitioners petition, to which Comment petitioners filed their
Reply12 in compliance with the Courts Resolution dated April 1, 2008.13
The lone issue in the present petition is whether it is Section 474(b)(4) or Section 344 of the Local Government Code of 1991 which
applies to the requirement of certification of availability of funds under Section 1(e)(ii), Rule V of CSC Memorandum Circular
Number 40, Series of 1998. As earlier stated, the trial court ruled that it is Section 344. Petitioners posit, however, that it is Section
474(b)(4) under which it is the ministerial duty of the cityaccountant to issue the certification, and not Section 344 which pertains to
the ministerial function of the citytreasurer to issue the therein stated certification.
A discussion first of the technical matters questioned by respondents is in order.
Respondents assail as defective the verification and certification against forum shopping attached to the petition as it bears the
signature of only 11 out of the 59 petitioners, and no competent evidence of identity was presented by the signing petitioners. They
thus move for the dismissal of the petition, citing Section 5, Rule 714 vis a visSection 5, Rule 4515 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
and Docena v. Lapesura16 which held that the certification against forum shopping should be signed by all the petitioners or plaintiffs
in a case and that the signing by only one of them is insufficient as the attestation requires personal knowledge by the party executing
the same.17
Petitioners, on the other hand, argue that they have a justifiable cause for their inability to obtain the signatures of the other petitioners
as they could no longer be contacted or are no longer interested in pursuing the case.18Petitioners plead substantial compliance,
citing Huntington Steel Products, Inc., et al. v. NLRC19 which held, among other things, that while the rule is mandatory in nature,
substantial compliance under justifiable circumstances is enough.
Petitioners position is more in accord with recent decisions of this Court.
In Iglesia ni Cristo v. Ponferrada,20 the Court held:
The substantial compliance rule has been applied by this Court in a number of cases: Cavile v. Heirs of Cavile, where the
Court sustained the validity of the certification signed by only one of petitioners because he is a relative of the other
petitioners and co-owner of the properties in dispute; Heirs of Agapito T. Olarte v. Office of the President of the Philippines,
where the Court allowed a certification signed by only two petitioners because the case involved a family home in which all
the petitioners shared a common interest;Gudoy v. Guadalquiver, where the Court considered as valid the certification signed
by only four of the nine petitioners because all petitioners filed as co-owners pro indiviso a complaint against respondents for
quieting of title and damages, as such, they all have joint interest in the undivided whole; and DAR v. Alonzo-Legasto, where
the Court sustained the certification signed by only one of the spouses as they were sued jointly involving a property in which
they had a common interest.21 (Italics in the original, underscoring supplied)
Very recently, in Tan, et al. v. Ballena, et al.,22 the verification and certification against forum shopping attached to the original petition
for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals was signed by only two out of over 100 petitioners and the same was filed one day
beyond the period allowed by the Rules. The appellate court initially resolved to dismiss the original petition precisely for these
reasons, but on the therein petitioners motion for reconsideration, the appellate court ordered the filing of an amended petition in
order to include all the original complainants numbering about 240. An amended petition was then filed in compliance with the said

order, but only 180 of the 240 original complainants signed the verification and certification against forum shopping. The Court of
Appeals granted the motion for reconsideration and resolved to reinstate the petition.
In sustaining the Court of Appeals in Tan, the Court held that it is a far better and more prudent course of action to excuse a technical
lapse and afford the parties a review of the case to attain the ends of justice, rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause
grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a
miscarriage of justice.
The Court further discoursed in Tan:
Under justifiable circumstances, we have already allowed the relaxation of the requirements of verification and certification
so that the ends of justice may be better served. Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in
the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is
filed in good faith; while the purpose of the aforesaid certification is to prohibit and penalize the evils of forum shopping.
In Torres v. Specialized Packaging Development Corporation, we ruled that the verification requirement had been
substantially complied with despite the fact that only two (2) out of the twenty-five (25) petitioners have signed the petition
for review and the verification. In that case, we held that the two signatories were unquestionably real parties-in-interest, who
undoubtedly had sufficient knowledge and belief to swear to the truth of the allegations in the Petition.
In Ateneo de Naga University v. Manalo, we also ruled that there was substantial compliance with the requirement of
verification when only one of the petitioners, the President of the University, signed for and on behalf of the institution and its
officers.
Similarly, in Bases Conversion and Development Authority v. Uy, we allowed the signature of only one of the principal
parties in the case despite the absence of a Board Resolution which conferred upon him the authority to represent the
petitioner BCDA.
In the present case, the circumstances squarely involve a verification that was not signed by all the petitioners therein. Thus,
we see no reason why we should not uphold the ruling of the Court of Appeals in reinstating the petition despite the said
formal defect.
On the requirement of a certification of non-forum shopping, the well-settled rule is that all the petitioners must sign the
certification of non-forum shopping. The reason for this is that the persons who have signed the certification cannot be
presumed to have the personal knowledge of the other non-signing petitioners with respect to the filing or non-filing of any
action or claim the same as or similar to the current petition. The rule, however, admits of an exception and that is when the
petitioners show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification. The petitioners must be able to convince the
court that the outright dismissal of the petition would defeat the administration of justice.
In the case at bar, counsel for the respondents disclosed that most of the respondents who were the original complainants
have since sought employment in the neighboring towns of Bulacan, Pampanga and Angeles City. Only the one hundred
eighty (180) signatories were then available to sign the amended Petition for Certiorari and the accompanying verification
and certification of non-forum shopping.23
In the present case, the signing of the verification by only 11 out of the 59 petitioners already sufficiently assures the Court that the
allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation; that the pleading is
filed in good faith; and that the signatories are unquestionably real parties-in-interest who undoubtedly have sufficient knowledge and
belief to swear to the truth of the allegations in the petition.
With respect to petitioners certification against forum shopping, the failure of the other petitioners to sign as they could no longer be
contacted or are no longer interested in pursuing the case need not merit the outright dismissal of the petition without defeating the
administration of justice. The non-signing petitioners are, however, dropped as parties to the case.

In fact, even Docena24 cited by respondents sustains petitioners position. In that case, the certification against forum shopping was
signed by only one of the petitioning spouses. The Court held that the certification against forum shopping should be deemed to
constitute substantial compliance with the Rules considering, among other things, that the petitioners were husband and wife, and that
the subject property was their residence which was alleged in their verified petition to be conjugal. 25
With respect to petitioners non-presentation of any identification before the notary public at the time they swore to their verification
and certification attached to the petition, suffice it to state that this was cured by petitioners compliance 26 with the Courts Resolution
of January 22, 200827 wherein they submitted a notarized verification and certification bearing the details of their community tax
certificates. This, too, is substantial compliance. The Court need not belabor its discretion to authorize subsequent compliance with the
Rules.
For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court restates in capsule form the jurisprudential pronouncements already reflected above
respecting non-compliance with the requirements on, or submission of defective, verification and certification against forum shopping:
1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective verification, and noncompliance with the requirement on or submission of defective certification against forum shopping.
2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court
may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the
Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby.28
3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in
the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and
correct.29
4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not
curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial
compliance" or presence of "special circumstances or compelling reasons."30
5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case;31otherwise, those who did not
sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or
petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the
certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule.32
6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. 33 If, however, for
reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney34 designating his
counsel of record to sign on his behalf.
And now, on respondents argument that petitioners raise questions of fact which are not proper in a petition for review on certiorari as
the same must raise only questions of law. They entertain doubt on whether petitioners seek the payment of their salaries, and assert
that the question of whether the city accountant can be compelled to issue a certification of availability of funds under the
circumstances herein obtaining is a factual issue.35
The Court holds that indeed petitioners are raising a question of law.
The Court had repeatedly clarified the distinction between a question of law and a question of fact. A question of law exists when the
doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call
for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. 36 A question of fact,
on the other hand, exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration
of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevance of specific surrounding
circumstances, as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation. 37When there is no dispute as
to fact, the question of whether the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct is a question of law.38

In the case at bar, the issue posed for resolution does not call for the reevaluation of the probative value of the evidence presented, but
rather the determination of which of the provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991 applies to the Civil Service Memorandum
Circular requiring a certificate of availability of funds relative to the approval of petitioners appointments.
At all events, respondents contend that the case has become moot and academic as the appointments of petitioners had already been
disapproved by the CSC. Petitioners maintain otherwise, arguing that the act of respondent Empleo in not issuing the required
certification of availability of funds unduly interfered with the power of appointment of then Mayor Quijano; that the Sangguniang
Panglungsod Resolutions relied upon by respondent Empleo constituted legislative intervention in the mayors power to appoint; and
that the prohibition against midnight appointments applies only to presidential appointments as affirmed in De Rama v. Court of
Appeals.39
The Court finds that, indeed, the case had been rendered moot and academic by the final disapproval of petitioners
appointments by the CSC.
The mootness of the case notwithstanding, the Court resolved to rule on its merits in order to settle the issue once and for all,
given that the contested action is one capable of repetition40 or susceptible of recurrence.
The pertinent portions of Sections 474(b)(4) and 344 of the Local Government Code of 1991 provide:
Section 474. Qualifications, Powers and Duties.
xxxx
(b) The accountant shall take charge of both the accounting and internal audit services of the local government unit concerned
and shall:
xxxx
(4) certify to the availability of budgetary allotment to which expenditures and obligations may be properly charged.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
xxxx
Sec. 344. Certification and Approval of Vouchers. No money shall be disbursed unless the local budget officer certifies to
the existence of appropriation that has been legally made for the purpose, the local accountant has obligated said
appropriation, and the local treasurer certifies to the availability of funds for the purpose. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Petitioners propound the following distinctions between Sections 474(b)(4) and 344 of the Local Government Code of 1991:
(1) Section 474(b)(4) speaks of certification of availability of budgetary allotment, while Section 344 speaks of certification
of availability of funds for disbursement;
(2) Under Section 474(b)(4), before a certification is issued, there must be an appropriation, while under Section 344, before
a certification is issued, two requisites must concur: (a) there must be an appropriation legally made for the purpose, and (b)
the local accountant has obligated said appropriation;
(3) Under Section 474(b)(4), there is no actual payment involved because the certification is for the purpose of obligating a
portion of the appropriation; while under Section 344, the certification is for the purpose of payment after the local
accountant had obligated a portion of the appropriation;

(4) Under Section 474(b)(4), the certification is issued if there is an appropriation, let us say, for the salaries of appointees;
while under Section 344, the certification is issued if there is an appropriation and the same is obligated, let us say, for the
payment of salaries of employees.41
Respondents do not squarely address the issue in their Comment.
Section 344 speaks of actual disbursements of money from the local treasury in payment of due and demandable obligations of the
local government unit. The disbursements are to be made through the issuance, certification, and approval of vouchers. The full text of
Section 344 provides:
Sec. 344. Certification and Approval of Vouchers. No money shall be disbursed unless the local budget officer certifies to
the existence of appropriation that has been legally made for the purpose, the local accountant has obligated said
appropriation, and the local treasurer certifies to the availability of funds for the purpose. Vouchers and payrolls shall be
certified to and approved by the head of the department or office who has administrative control of the fund concerned, as to
validity, propriety, and legality of the claim involved. Except in cases of disbursements involving regularly recurring
administrative expenses such as payrolls for regular or permanent employees, expenses for light, water, telephone and
telegraph services, remittances to government creditor agencies such as GSIS, SSS, LDP, DBP, National Printing Office,
Procurement Service of the DBM and others, approval of the disbursement voucher by the local chief executive himself shall
be required whenever local funds are disbursed.
In cases of special or trust funds, disbursements shall be approved by the administrator of the fund.
In case of temporary absence or incapacity of the department head or chief of office, the officer next-in-rank shall
automatically perform his function and he shall be fully responsible therefor. (Italics and underscoring supplied)
"Voucher," in its ordinary meaning, is a document which shows that services have been performed or expenses incurred. 42 When used
in connection with disbursement of money, it implies the existence of an instrument that shows on what account or by what authority a
particular payment has been made, or that services have been performed which entitle the party to whom it is issued to payment. 43
Section 344 of the Local Government Code of 1991 thus applies only when there is already an obligation to payon the part of the local
government unit, precisely because vouchers are issued only when services have been performed or expenses incurred.
The requirement of certification of availability of funds from the city treasurer under Section 344 of the Local Government Code of
1991 is for the purpose of facilitating the approval of vouchers issued for the payment of services already rendered to, and expenses
incurred by, the local government unit.
The trial court thus erred in relying on Section 344 of the Local Government Code of 1991 in ruling that the ministerial function to
issue a certification as to availability of funds for the payment of the wages and salaries of petitioners pertains to the city treasurer. For
at the time material to the required issuance of the certification, the appointments issued to petitioners were not yet approved by the
CSC, hence, there were yet no services performed to speak of. In other words, there was yet no due and demandable obligation of the
local government to petitioners.
Section 474, subparagraph (b)(4) of the Local Government Code of 1991, on the other hand, requires the cityaccountant to "certify to
the availability of budgetary allotment to which expenditures and obligations may be properly charged."44 By necessary implication, it
includes the duty to certify to the availability of funds for the payment of salaries and wages of appointees to positions in the plantilla
of the local government unit, as required under Section 1(e)(ii), Rule V of CSC Memorandum Circular Number 40, Series of 1998, a
requirement before the CSC considers the approval of the appointments.
In fine, whenever a certification as to availability of funds is required for purposes other than actual payment of an obligation which
requires disbursement of money, Section 474(b)(4) of the Local Government Code of 1991 applies, and it is the ministerial duty of the
city accountant to issue the certification.

WHEREFORE, the Court declares that it is Section 474(b)(4), not Section 344, of the Local Government Code of 1991, which
applies to the requirement of certification of availability of funds under Section 1(e)(ii), Rule V of Civil Service Commission
Memorandum Circular Number 40, Series of 1998.
SO ORDERED.

b.) City Legal Officer

G.R. No. 162525

September 23, 2008

ASEAN PACIFIC PLANNERS, APP CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION*AND CESAR GOCO,
petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF URDANETA, CEFERINO J. CAPALAD, WALDO C. DEL CASTILLO, NORBERTO M. DEL PRADO, JESUS A.
ORDONO AND AQUILINO MAGUISA,**, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
The instant petition seeks to set aside the Resolutions1 dated April 15, 2003 and February 4, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 76170.
This case stemmed from a Complaint2 for annulment of contracts with prayer for preliminary prohibitory injunction and temporary
restraining order filed by respondent Waldo C. Del Castillo, in his capacity as taxpayer, against respondents City of Urdaneta and
Ceferino J. Capalad doing business under the name JJEFWA Builders, and petitioners Asean Pacific Planners (APP) represented by
Ronilo G. Goco and Asean Pacific Planners Construction and Development Corporation (APPCDC) represented by Cesar D. Goco.
Del Castillo alleged that then Urdaneta City Mayor Rodolfo E. Parayno entered into five contracts for the preliminary design,
construction and management of a four-storey twin cinema commercial center and hotel involving a massive expenditure of public
funds amounting to P250 million, funded by a loan from the Philippine National Bank (PNB). For minimal work, the contractor was
allegedly paidP95 million. Del Castillo also claimed that all the contracts are void because the object is outside the commerce of men.
The object is a piece of land belonging to the public domain and which remains devoted to a public purpose as a public elementary
school. Additionally, he claimed that the contracts, from the feasibility study to management and lease of the future building, are also
void because they were all awarded solely to the Goco family.
In their Answer,3 APP and APPCDC claimed that the contracts are valid. Urdaneta City Mayor Amadeo R. Perez, Jr., who filed the
city's Answer,4 joined in the defense and asserted that the contracts were properly executed by then Mayor Parayno with prior
authority from the Sangguniang Panlungsod. Mayor Perez also stated that Del Castillo has no legal capacity to sue and that the
complaint states no cause of action. For respondent Ceferino J. Capalad, Atty. Oscar C. Sahagun filed an Answer 5 with compulsory
counterclaim and motion to dismiss on the ground that Del Castillo has no legal standing to sue.
Respondents Norberto M. Del Prado, Jesus A. Ordono and Aquilino Maguisa became parties to the case when they jointly filed, also
in their capacity as taxpayers, a Complaint-in-Intervention6 adopting the allegations of Del Castillo.
After pre-trial, the Lazaro Law Firm entered its appearance as counsel for Urdaneta City and filed an Omnibus Motion 7 with prayer to
(1) withdraw Urdaneta City's Answer; (2) drop Urdaneta City as defendant and be joined as plaintiff; (3) admit Urdaneta City's
complaint; and (4) conduct a new pre-trial. Urdaneta City allegedly wanted to rectify its position and claimed that inadequate legal
representation caused its inability to file the necessary pleadings in representation of its interests.
In its Order8 dated September 11, 2002, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, Branch 45, admitted the entry
of appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm and granted the withdrawal of appearance of the City Prosecutor. It also granted the prayer to
drop the city as defendant and admitted its complaint for consolidation with Del Castillo's complaint, and directed the defendants to
answer the city's complaint.

In its February 14, 2003 Order,9 the RTC denied reconsideration of the September 11, 2002 Order. It also granted Capalad's motion to
expunge all pleadings filed by Atty. Sahagun in his behalf. Capalad was dropped as defendant, and his complaint filed by Atty. Jorito
C. Peralta was admitted and consolidated with the complaints of Del Castillo and Urdaneta City. The RTC also directed APP and
APPCDC to answer Capalad's complaint.
Aggrieved, APP and APPCDC filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. In its April 15, 2003 Resolution, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition on the following grounds: (1) defective verification and certification of non-forum shopping, (2) failure
of the petitioners to submit certified true copies of the RTC's assailed orders as mere photocopies were submitted, and (3) lack of
written explanation why service of the petition to adverse parties was not personal. 10 The Court of Appeals also denied APP and
APPCDC's motion for reconsideration in its February 4, 2004 Resolution.11
Hence, this petition, which we treat as one for review on certiorari under Rule 45, the proper remedy to assail the resolutions of the
Court of Appeals.12
Petitioners argue that:
I.
THE APPELLATE COURT PALPABLY ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS JUDICIAL PREROGATIVES BY SUMMARILY
DISMISSING THE PETITION ON THE BASIS OF PROCEDURAL TECHNICALITIES DESPITE SUBSTANTIAL
COMPLIANCE [THEREWITH]
II.
THE TRIAL COURT PALPABLY ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS JUDICIAL PREROGATIVES BY CAPRICIOUSLY
(a.) Entertaining the taxpayers' suits of private respondents del Castillo, del Prado, Ordono and Maguisa despite their clear lack of
legal standing to file the same.
(b.) Allowing the entry of appearance of a private law firm to represent the City of Urdaneta despite the clear statutory and
jurisprudential prohibitions thereto.
(c.) Allowing Ceferino J. Capalad and the City of Urdaneta to switch sides, by permitting the withdrawal of their respective answers
and admitting their complaints as well as allowing the appearance of Atty. Jorito C. Peralta to represent Capalad although Atty. Oscar
C. Sahagun, his counsel of record, had not withdrawn from the case, in gross violation of well settled rules and case law on the
matter.13
We first resolve whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying reconsideration of its April 15, 2003 Resolution despite APP and
APPCDC's subsequent compliance.
Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals should not have dismissed the petition on mere technicalities since they have attached the
proper documents in their motion for reconsideration and substantially complied with the rules.
Respondent Urdaneta City maintains that the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition because Cesar Goco had no proof he
was authorized to sign the certification of non-forum shopping in behalf of APPCDC.
Indeed, Cesar Goco had no proof of his authority to sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping of the petition for
certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals.14 Thus, the Court of Appeals is allowed by the rules the discretion to dismiss the petition
since only individuals vested with authority by a valid board resolution may sign the certificate of non-forum shopping in behalf of a
corporation. Proof of said authority must be attached; otherwise, the petition is subject to dismissal. 15
However, it must be pointed out that in several cases,16 this Court had considered as substantial compliance with the procedural
requirements the submission in the motion for reconsideration of the authority to sign the verification and certification, as in this case.

The Court notes that the attachments in the motion for reconsideration show that on March 5, 2003, the Board of Directors of
APPCDC authorized Cesar Goco to institute the petition before the Court of Appeals.17 On March 22, 2003, Ronilo Goco doing
business under the name APP, also appointed his father, Cesar Goco, as his attorney-in-fact to file the petition. 18 When the petition was
filed on March 26, 200319 before the Court of Appeals, Cesar Goco was duly authorized to sign the verification and certification
except that the proof of his authority was not submitted together with the petition.
Similarly, petitioners submitted in the motion for reconsideration certified true copies of the assailed RTC orders and we may also
consider the same as substantial compliance.20 Petitioners also included in the motion for reconsideration their explanation21 that
copies of the petition were personally served on the Lazaro Law Firm and mailed to the RTC and Atty. Peralta because of distance.
The affidavit of service22 supported the explanation. Considering the substantial issues involved, it was thus error for the appellate
court to deny reinstatement of the petition.
Having discussed the procedural issues, we shall now proceed to address the substantive issues raised by petitioners, rather than
remand this case to the Court of Appeals. In our view, the issue, simply put, is: Did the RTC err and commit grave abuse of discretion
in (a) entertaining the taxpayers' suits; (b) allowing a private law firm to represent Urdaneta City; (c) allowing respondents Capalad
and Urdaneta City to switch from being defendants to becoming complainants; and (d) allowing Capalad's change of attorneys?
On the first point at issue, petitioners argue that a taxpayer may only sue where the act complained of directly involves illegal
disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. The allegation of respondents Del Castillo, Del Prado, Ordono and Maguisa that
the construction of the project is funded by the PNB loan contradicts the claim regarding illegal disbursement since the funds are not
directly derived from taxation.
Respondents Del Castillo, Del Prado, Ordono and Maguisa counter that their personality to sue was not raised by petitioners APP and
APPCDC in their Answer and that this issue was not even discussed in the RTC's assailed orders.
Petitioners' contentions lack merit. The RTC properly allowed the taxpayers' suits. In Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Roxas, 23 we held:
In the case of taxpayers' suits, the party suing as a taxpayer must prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
expenditure of money raised by taxation. Thus, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are
illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.
xxxx
Petitioners' allegations in their Amended Complaint that the loan contracts entered into by the Republic and NPC are serviced or paid
through a disbursement of public funds are not disputed by respondents, hence, they are invested with personality to institute the
same.24
Here, the allegation of taxpayers Del Castillo, Del Prado, Ordono and Maguisa that P95 million of theP250 million PNB loan had
already been paid for minimal work is sufficient allegation of overpayment, of illegal disbursement, that invests them with personality
to sue. Petitioners do not dispute the allegation as they merely insist, albeit erroneously, that public funds are not involved. Under
Article 195325 of the Civil Code, the city acquired ownership of the money loaned from PNB, making the money public fund. The city
will have to pay the loan by revenues raised from local taxation or by its internal revenue allotment.
In addition, APP and APPCDC's lack of objection in their Answer on the personality to sue of the four complainants constitutes waiver
to raise the objection under Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.26
On the second point, petitioners contend that only the City Prosecutor can represent Urdaneta City and that law and jurisprudence
prohibit the appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm as the city's counsel.
The Lazaro Law Firm, as the city's counsel, counters that the city was inutile defending its cause before the RTC for lack of needed
legal advice. The city has no legal officer and both City Prosecutor and Provincial Legal Officer are busy. Practical considerations also
dictate that the city and Mayor Perez must have the same counsel since he faces related criminal cases. Citing Mancenido v. Court of

Appeals,27 the law firm states that hiring private counsel is proper where rigid adherence to the law on representation would deprive a
party of his right to redress a valid grievance.28
We cannot agree with the Lazaro Law Firm. Its appearance as Urdaneta City's counsel is against the law as it provides expressly who
should represent it. The City Prosecutor should continue to represent the city.
Section 481(a)29 of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 199130 mandates the appointment of a city legal officer. Under Section
481(b)(3)(i)31 of the LGC, the city legal officer is supposed to represent the city in all civil actions, as in this case, and special
proceedings wherein the city or any of its officials is a party. In Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 32 we cited that under Section 1933 of
Republic Act No. 5185,34 city governments may already create the position of city legal officer to whom the function of the city fiscal
(now prosecutor) as legal adviser and officer for civil cases of the city shall be transferred. 35 In the case of Urdaneta City, however, the
position of city legal officer is still vacant, although its charter 36 was enacted way back in 1998.
Because of such vacancy, the City Prosecutor's appearance as counsel of Urdaneta City is proper. The City Prosecutor remains as the
city's legal adviser and officer for civil cases, a function that could not yet be transferred to the city legal officer. Under the
circumstances, the RTC should not have allowed the entry of appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm vice the City Prosecutor. Notably,
the city's Answer was sworn to before the City Prosecutor by Mayor Perez. The City Prosecutor prepared the city's pre-trial brief and
represented the city in the pre-trial conference. No question was raised against the City Prosecutor's actions until the Lazaro Law Firm
entered its appearance and claimed that the city lacked adequate legal representation.
Moreover, the appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm as counsel for Urdaneta City is against the law. Section 481(b)(3)(i) of the LGC
provides when a special legal officer may be employed, that is, in actions or proceedings where a component city or municipality is a
party adverse to the provincial government. But this case is not between Urdaneta City and the Province of Pangasinan. And we have
consistently held that a local government unit cannot be represented by private counsel37 as only public officers may act for and in
behalf of public entities and public funds should not be spent to hire private lawyers. 38 Pro bono representation in collaboration with
the municipal attorney and prosecutor has not even been allowed.39
Neither is the law firm's appearance justified under the instances listed in Mancenido when local government officials can be
represented by private counsel, such as when a claim for damages could result in personal liability. No such claim against said officials
was made in this case. Note that before it joined the complainants, the city was the one sued, not its officials. That the firm represents
Mayor Perez in criminal cases, suits in his personal capacity,40 is of no moment.
On the third point, petitioners claim that Urdaneta City is estopped to reverse admissions in its Answer that the contracts are valid and,
in its pre-trial brief, that the execution of the contracts was in good faith.
We disagree. The court may allow amendment of pleadings.
Section 5,41 Rule 10 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides that if evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not
within the issues raised by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the
presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice will be subserved thereby. Objections need not even arise in
this case since the Pre-trial Order42 dated April 1, 2002 already defined as an issue whether the contracts are valid. Thus, what is
needed is presentation of the parties' evidence on the issue. Any evidence of the city for or against the validity of the contracts will be
relevant and admissible. Note also that under Section 5, Rule 10, necessary amendments to pleadings may be made to cause them to
conform to the evidence.
In addition, despite Urdaneta City's judicial admissions, the trial court is still given leeway to consider other evidence to be presented
for said admissions may not necessarily prevail over documentary evidence,43 e.g., the contracts assailed. A party's testimony in open
court may also override admissions in the Answer.44
As regards the RTC's order admitting Capalad's complaint and dropping him as defendant, we find the same in order. Capalad insists
that Atty. Sahagun has no authority to represent him. Atty. Sahagun claims otherwise. We note, however, that Atty. Sahagun represents
petitioners who claim that the contracts are valid. On the other hand, Capalad filed a complaint for annulment of the contracts.
Certainly, Atty. Sahagun cannot represent totally conflicting interests. Thus, we should expunge all pleadings filed by Atty. Sahagun in
behalf of Capalad.

Relatedly, we affirm the order of the RTC in allowing Capalad's change of attorneys, if we can properly call it as such, considering
Capalad's claim that Atty. Sahagun was never his attorney.
Before we close, notice is taken of the offensive language used by Attys. Oscar C. Sahagun and Antonio B. Escalante in their
pleadings before us and the Court of Appeals. They unfairly called the Court of Appeals a "court of technicalities" 45 for validly
dismissing their defectively prepared petition. They also accused the Court of Appeals of protecting, in their view, "an incompetent
judge."46 In explaining the "concededly strong language," Atty. Sahagun further indicted himself. He said that the Court of Appeals'
dismissal of the case shows its "impatience and readiness to punish petitioners for a perceived slight on its dignity" and such dismissal
"smacks of retaliation and does not augur for the cold neutrality and impartiality demanded of the appellate court." 47
Accordingly, we impose upon Attys. Oscar C. Sahagun and Antonio B. Escalante a fine of P2,00048each payable to this Court within
ten days from notice and we remind them that they should observe and maintain the respect due to the Court of Appeals and judicial
officers;49 abstain from offensive language before the courts;50 and not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the
record.51Similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
WHEREFORE, we (1) GRANT the petition; (2) SET ASIDE the Resolutions dated April 15, 2003 and February 4, 2004 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76170; (3) DENY the entry of appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm in Civil Case No. U-7388 and
EXPUNGE all pleadings it filed as counsel of Urdaneta City; (4) ORDER the City Prosecutor to represent Urdaneta City in Civil
Case No. U-7388; (5) AFFIRM the RTC in admitting the complaint of Capalad; and (6) PROHIBIT Atty. Oscar C. Sahagun from
representing Capalad and EXPUNGE all pleadings that he filed in behalf of Capalad.
Let the records of Civil Case No. U-7388 be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
Finally, we IMPOSE a fine of P2,000 each on Attys. Oscar C. Sahagun and Antonio B. Escalante for their use of offensive language,
payable to this Court within ten (10) days from receipt of this Decision.
c.) Provincial Administrator
G.R. No. 185740

July 23, 2013

THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMARINES NORTE, represented by GOVERNOR JESUS O. TYPOCO,

JR., Petitioner,
vs.
BEATRIZ O. GONZALES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the Provincial Government of Camarines Norte's (petitioner) petition for review on certiorari 1 assailing the Decision2 dated
June 25, 2008 and the Resolution3 dated December 2, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 97425, reinstating
respondent Beatriz O. Gonzales as the Province of Camarines Nortes provincial administrator, or to an equivalent position.
Factual Antecedents
Gonzales was appointed as the provincial administrator of the Province of Camarines Norte by then Governor Roy A. Padilla, Jr. on
April 1, 1991. Her appointment was on a permanent capacity. On March 8, 1999, Governor Jess B. Pimentel sent Gonzales a
memorandum directing her to explain in writing why no administrative charges should be filed against her for gross
insubordination/gross discourtesy in the course of official duties, and conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service; this
was later on captioned as Administrative Case No. 001. After Gonzales submitted her comment, an Ad Hoc Investigation Committee
found her guilty of the charges against her, and recommended to Governor Pimentel that she be held administratively liable. 4 On
September 30, 1999, Governor Pimentel adopted the Ad Hoc Investigation Committees recommendation and dismissed Gonzales. 5
Proceedings before the Civil Service Commission

Gonzales appealed Governor Pimentels decision to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The CSC issued Resolution No.
0014186 modifying Governor Pimentels decision, finding Gonzales guilty of insubordination and suspending her for six months. This
decision was appealed by Governor Pimentel, which the CSC denied in its Resolution No. 001952.7
Gonzales then filed a motion for execution and clarification of Resolution No. 001418, in which she claimed that she had already
served her six-month suspension and asked to be reinstated. The CSC issued Resolution No. 002245, 8 which directed Gonzales
reinstatement.
Governor Pimentel reinstated Gonzales as provincial administrator on October 12, 2000, but terminated her services the next day for
lack of confidence. He then wrote a letter9 to the CSC reporting his compliance with its order, and Gonzales subsequent dismissal as a
confidential employee. In his letter, Governor Pimentel cited Resolution No. 0001158,10 where the CSC ruled that the provincial
administrator position is highly confidential and is coterminous in nature.
The CSC responded through Resolution No. 030008,11 which again directed Gonzales reinstatement as provincial administrator. It
clarified that while the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. RA 7160) made the provincial administrator position
coterminous and highly confidential in nature, this conversion cannot operate to prejudice officials who were already issued
permanent appointments as administrators prior to the new laws effectivity. According to the CSC, Gonzales has acquired a vested
right to her permanent appointment as provincial administrator and is entitled to continue holding this office despite its subsequent
classification as a coterminous position. The conversion of the provincial administrator position from a career to a non-career service
should not jeopardize Gonzales security of tenure guaranteed to her by the Constitution. As a permanent appointee, Gonzales may
only be removed for cause, after due notice and hearing. Loss of trust and confidence is not among the grounds for a permanent
appointees dismissal or discipline under existing laws.
In a letter12 dated February 17, 2005, Gonzales wrote the CSC alleging that Governor Jesus O. Typoco, Jr., Camarines Nortes
incumbent governor, refused to reinstate her. The CSC responded with Resolution No. 061988,13 which ordered Gonzales
reinstatement to the provincial administrator position, or to an equivalent position.Thus, the petitioner, through Governor Typoco, filed
a petition for review before the CA, seeking to nullify the CSCs Resolution No. 030008 and Resolution No. 061988.
The Appellate Courts Ruling
The CA supported the CSCs ruling that reinstated Gonzales as provincial administrator or to an equivalent position. 14
Citing Aquino v. Civil Service Commission,15 the CA emphasized that an appointee acquires a legal right to his position once he
assumes a position in the civil service under a completed appointment. This legal right is protected both by statute and the
Constitution, and he cannot be removed from office without cause and previous notice and hearing. Appointees cannot be removed at
the mere will of those vested with the power of removal, or without any cause.
The CA then enumerated the list of valid causes for a public officers removal under Section 46,16 Book V, Title I, Subtitle A of the
Revised Administrative Code (Administrative Code), and noted that lack of confidence was not in the list. Thus, the CA concluded
that Gonzales dismissal on the ground of loss of confidence violated her security of tenure, and that she has the right to be reinstated
with payment of backwages.
The CA further held that Gonzales dismissal was illegal because it was done without due process. The proceedings under
Administrative Case No. 001 cannot be the basis for complying with the requirements of due process because they are separate and
distinct from the proceedings in the present controversy. Thus, Gonzales was illegally terminated when she was dismissed for lack of
confidence, without any hearing, the day after she was reinstated.
Lastly, the CA noted that Resolution No. 002245, which modified Governor Pimentels decision, has long been final and executory.
The petitioner did not file any petition for reconsideration against Resolution No. 002245, and hence, it is no longer alterable.
The petitioner sought a reconsideration17 of the CAs Decision, which the CA denied in a Resolution18 dated December 2, 2008.
The Present Petition

In its present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner argues that the provincial administrator position has been converted into a
highly confidential, coterminous position by RA 7160. Hence, Gonzales no longer enjoyed security of tenure to the position she held
prior to RA 7160s enactment.
In her Comment19 and Memorandum,20 Gonzales maintained that the provincial administrator remained a career service position.
Section 721 of Presidential Decree No. 807, which was one of the bases of the Court in Laurel V v. Civil Service Commission 22 to
declare the provincial administrator as a career service position, is a verbatim copy of Section 7, 23 Chapter 2 of the Administrative
Code. This classification, established by law and jurisprudence, cannot be altered by the mere implementing rules and regulations of
RA 7160. And assuming arguendo that the provincial administrator position has indeed become a primarily confidential position, this
reclassification should not apply retroactively to Gonzales appointment on a permanent capacity prior to RA 7160s effectivity.
Issues
The parties arguments, properly joined, present to us the following issues:
1) Whether Congress has re-classified the provincial administrator position from a career service to a primarily confidential,
non-career service position; and
2) Whether Gonzales has security of tenure over her position as provincial administrator of the Province of Camarines Norte.
The Courts Ruling
We find the petition meritorious.
Congress has reclassified the provincial administrator position as a primarily confidential, non-career position
We support the CSCs conclusion that the provincial administrator position has been classified into a primarily confidential, noncareer position when Congress, through RA 7160, made substantial changes to it. First, prior to RA 7160, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337,
the old Local Government Code (LGC), did not include a provincial administrator position among the listing of mandatory provincial
officials,24 but empowered the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to create such other offices as might then be necessary to carry out the
purposes of the provincial government.25 RA 7160 made the position mandatory for every province.26 Thus, the creation of the
provincial administrator position under the old LGC used to be a prerogative of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
Second, in introducing the mandatory provincial administrator position, RA 7160 also amended the qualifications for the provincial
administrator position. While Section 48027 of RA 7160 retained the requirement of civil service eligibility for a provincial
administrator, together with the educational requirements, it shortened the six-year work experience requirement to five years. 28 It also
mandated the additional requirements of residence in the local government concerned, and imposed a good moral character
requirement.
Third, RA 7160 made the provincial administrator position coterminous with its appointing authority, reclassifying it as a non-career
service position that is primarily confidential.
Before RA 7160 took effect, Laurel classified the provincial administrator position as an open career position which required
qualification in an appropriate examination prior to appointment. Laurel placed the provincial administrator position under the second
major level of positions in the career service under Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 807. This provision reads:
Section 7. Classes of Positions in the Career Service.
(a) Classes of positions in the career service appointment to which requires examinations shall be grouped into three major levels as
follows:
xxxx

2. The second level shall include professional, technical, and scientific positions which involve professional, technical, or scientific
work in a non-supervisory or supervisory capacity requiring at least four years of college work up to Division Chief level.
Section 480 of RA 7160 made the provincial administrators functions closely related to the prevailing provincial administration by
identifying the incumbent with the provincial governor to ensure the alignment of the governors direction for the province with what
the provincial administrator would implement. In contrast with the general direction provided by the provincial governor under the
Manual of Position Descriptions cited in Laurel, Section 480(b) of RA 7160 now mandates constant interaction between the provincial
administrator and the provincial governor, to wit:
(b) The administrator shall take charge of the office of the administrator and shall:
(1) Develop plans and strategies and upon approval thereof by the governor or mayor, as the case may be, implement the
same particularly those which have to do with the management and administration-related programs and projects which the
governor or mayor is empowered to implement and which the sanggunian is empowered to provide for under this Code;
(2) In addition to the foregoing duties and functions, the administrator shall:
(i) Assist in the coordination of the work of all the officials of the local government unit, under the supervision, direction, and control
of the governor or mayor, and for this purpose, he may convene the chiefs of offices and other officials of the local government unit;
xxxx
(4) Recommend to the sanggunian and advise the governor and mayor, as the case may be, on all other matters relative to the
management and administration of the local government unit. [emphases and italics ours]
As the CSC correctly noted in Resolution No. 0001158,29 the administrator position demands a close intimate relationship with the
office of the governor (its appointing authority) to effectively develop, implement and administer the different programs of the
province. The administrators functions are to recommend to the Sanggunian and to advise the governor on all matters regarding the
management and administration of the province, thus requiring that its occupant enjoy the governors full trust and confidence.
To emphasize the close relations that the provincial administrators functions have with the office of the governor, RA 7160 even made
the provincial administrator position coterminous with its appointing authority.30 This provision, along with the interrelations between
the provincial administrator and governor under Section 480, renders clear the intent of Congress to make the provincial administrator
position primarily confidential under the non-career service category of the civil service.
Congress reclassification of the provincial administrator position in RA 7160 is a valid exercise of legislative power that does not
violate Gonzales security of tenure
Having established that Congress has changed the nature of the provincial administrator position to a primarily confidential employee,
the next question to address would be its impact on Gonzales security of tenure. According to the petitioner, Gonzales lost her
security of tenure when the provincial administrator position became a primarily confidential position. Gonzales, on the other hand,
retorted that the conversion of the position should not be retroactively applied to her, as she is a permanent appointee. Both the CA and
the CSC ruled in favor of the latter, and gave premium to Gonzales original permanent appointment under the old LGC. They posit
that Gonzales acquired a vested legal right over her position from the moment she assumed her duties as provincial administrator.
Thus, she cannot be removed from office except for cause and after due hearing; otherwise such removal would amount to a violation
of her security of tenure.
The arguments presented by the parties and ruled upon by the CA reflect a conceptual entanglement between the nature of the position
and an employees right to hold a position. These two concepts are different. The nature of a position may change by law according to
the dictates of Congress. The right to hold a position, on the other hand, is a right that enjoys constitutional and statutory guarantee,
but may itself change according to the nature of the position.

Congress has the power and prerogative to introduce substantial changes in the provincial administrator position and to reclassify it as
a primarily confidential, non-career service position. Flowing from the legislative power to create public offices is the power to
abolish and modify them to meet the demands of society;31 Congress can change the qualifications for and shorten the term of existing
statutory offices. When done in good faith, these acts would not violate a public officers security of tenure, even if they result in his
removal from office or the shortening of his term.32 Modifications in public office, such as changes in qualifications or shortening of
its tenure, are made in good faith so long as they are aimed at the office and not at the incumbent. 33
In Salcedo and Ignacio v. Carpio and Carreon,34 for instance, Congress enacted a law modifying the offices in the Board of Dental
Examiners. The new law, RA 546, raised the qualifications for the board members, and provided for a different appointment process.
Dr. Alfonso C. Salcedo and Dr. Pascual Ignacio, who were incumbent board members at the time RA 546 took effect, filed a special
civil action for quo warranto against their replacements, arguing that their term of office under the old law had not yet expired, and
neither had they abandoned or been removed from office for cause. We dismissed their petition, and held that Congress may, by law,
terminate the term of a public office at any time and even while it is occupied by the incumbent. Thus, whether Dr. Salcedo and Dr.
Ignacio were removed for cause or had abandoned their office is immaterial.
More recently, in Dimayuga v. Benedicto II, 35 we upheld the removal of Chona M. Dimayuga, a permanent appointee to the Executive
Director II position, which was not part of the career executive service at the time of her appointment. During her incumbency, the
CSC, by authority granted under Presidential Decree No. 1, classified the Executive Director II position to be within the career
executive service. Since Dimayuga was not a career executive service officer, her initially permanent appointment to the position
became temporary; thus, she could be removed from office at any time.
In the current case, Congress, through RA 7160, did not abolish the provincial administrator position but significantly modified many
of its aspects. It is now a primarily confidential position under the non-career service tranche of the civil service. This change could
not have been aimed at prejudicing Gonzales, as she was not the only provincial administrator incumbent at the time RA 7160 was
enacted. Rather, this change was part of the reform measures that RA 7160 introduced to further empower local governments and
decentralize the delivery of public service. Section 3(b) of RA 7160 provides as one of its operative principles that:
(b) There shall be established in every local government unit an accountable, efficient, and dynamic organizational structure and
operating mechanism that will meet the priority needs and service requirements of its communities.
Thus, Gonzales permanent appointment as provincial administrator prior to the enactment of RA 7160 is immaterial to her removal as
provincial administrator. For purposes of determining whether Gonzales termination violated her right to security of tenure, the nature
of the position she occupied at the time of her removal should be considered, and not merely the nature of her appointment at the time
she entered government service.
In echoing the CSC and the CAs conclusion, the dissenting opinion posits the view that security of tenure protects the permanent
appointment of a public officer, despite subsequent changes in the nature of his position.
Citing Gabriel v. Domingo,36 the dissenting opinion quotes our categorical declaration that "a permanent employee remains a
permanent employee unless he is validly terminated," and from there attempts to draw an analogy between Gabriel and the case at
hand.
The very first sentence of Gabriel spells out its vast difference from the present case. The sole and main issue in Gabriel is whether
backwages and other monetary benefits could be awarded to an illegally dismissed government employee, who was later ordered
reinstated. From this sentence alone can be discerned that the issues involved related to the consequences of illegal dismissal rather
than to the dismissal itself. Nowhere in Gabrielwas there any mention of a change in the nature of the position held by the public
officer involved.
Further, key factual differences make Gabriel inapplicable to the present case, even if only by analogy: first, the public officer in
Gabriel received a Memorandum stating that he would be appointed as Transportation District Supervisor III under their office
reorganization. Second, the Court in Gabriel clearly pointed out that the reason for his eventual appointment as a casual employee,
which led to his termination from service, was due to a pending protest he filed before the CSC indicating that there was no ground
for him to not receive the appointment earlier promised. In contrast, the issue of Gonzales is whether the appointing authoritys lack of
trust and confidence in the appointee was sufficient cause for the termination of employment of a primarily confidential employee.

And third, there was a change in the position held by the public officer in Gabriel. He was a permanent employee who was extended a
different appointment, which was casual in nature, because of a protest that he earlier filed. In contrast, the current case involves a
public officer who held the same position whose nature changed because of the passage of RA 7160.
The dissent also quotes the penultimate paragraph of Civil Service Commission v. Javier 37 to support its contention that permanent
appointees could expect protection for their tenure and appointments in the event that the Court determines that the position is actually
confidential in nature:
The Court is aware that this decision has repercussions on the tenure of other corporate secretaries in various GOCCs. The officers
likely assumed their positions on permanent career status, expecting protection for their tenure and appointments, but are now reclassified as primarily confidential appointees. Such concern is unfounded, however, since the statutes themselves do not classify the
position of corporate secretary as permanent and career in nature. Moreover, there is no absolute guarantee that it will not be classified
as confidential when a dispute arises. As earlier stated, the Court, by legal tradition, has the power to make a final determination as to
which positions in government are primarily confidential or otherwise. In the light of the instant controversy, the Court's view is that
the greater public interest is served if the position of a corporate secretary is classified as primarily confidential in nature. 38
The quoted portion, however, even bolsters our theory. Read together with its succeeding paragraph, the quoted portion in Civil
Service Commission v. Javier39 actually stands for the proposition that other corporate secretaries in government-owned and
controlled corporations cannot expect protection for their tenure and appointments upon the reclassification of their position to a
primarily confidential position. There, the Court emphasized that these officers cannot rely on the statutes providing for their
permanent appointments, if and when the Court determines these to be primarily confidential. In the succeeding paragraph after the
portion quoted by the dissent, we even pointed out that there is no vested right to public office, nor is public service a property right.
Thus:
Moreover, it is a basic tenet in the country's constitutional system that "public office is a public trust," and that there is no vested right
in public office, nor an absolute right to hold office. No proprietary title attaches to a public office, as public service is not a property
right. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any
vested right in an office. The rule is that offices in government, except those created by the constitution, may be abolished, altered, or
created anytime by statute. And any issues on the classification for a position in government may be brought to and determined by the
courts.40 (emphases and italics ours)
Executive Order No. 503 does not grant Gonzales security of tenure in the provincial administrator position on a permanent capacity
In extending security of tenure to Gonzales permanent appointment as provincial administrator, the dissenting opinion cites as
authority Executive Order No. (EO) 503 which provided certain safeguards against the termination of government employees affected
by the implementation of RA 7160. According to the dissenting opinion, EO 503 is an obvious indication of the executive
departments intent to protect and uphold both the national government and the local government employees security of tenure. It
cites Section 2(a), paragraph 8 (providing for the tenure of an administrator) to prove its point:
8. Incumbents of positions, namely administrator, legal officer, and information officer declared by the Code as coterminous, who hold
permanent appointments, shall continue to enjoy their permanent status until they vacate their positions.
At first glance, EO 503 does seem to extend the provincial administrators security of tenure in their permanent appointments even
beyond the effectivity of RA 7160. EO 503, however, does not apply to employees of the local government affected by RA 7160s
enactment. The title of EO 503 clearly provides for its scope of application, to wit:
Executive Order No. 503. Providing for the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Transfer of Personnel and Assets, Liabilities and
Records of National Government Agencies whose Functions are to be Devolved to the Local Government Units and for other Related
Purposes. [underscore, italics and emphases ours]
A reading of EO 503s whereas clauses confirms that it applies only to national government employees whose functions are to be
devolved to local governments:

WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Code,
transfers the responsibility for the delivery of basic services and facilities from the national government agencies (NGAs) concerned to
the local government units (LGUs);
WHEREAS, the Code stipulated that the transfer of basic services and facilities shall be accompanied by the transfer of the national
personnel concerned and assets to ensure continuity in the delivery of such services and facilities;
WHEREAS, responsive rules and regulations are needed to affect the required transfer of national personnel concerned and assets to
the LGUs. [underscores, italics and emphases ours]
Thus, paragraph 8, section 2(a) of EO 503 cannot apply to Gonzales, a provincial administrator. As explained earlier, the existence of
the provincial administrator position was a prerogative of the Sanggunian Panlalawigan, and was not even a mandatory public office
under the old LGC. It is clearly not a national government position whose functions are to be devolved to the local governments.
The dissenting opinion, on the other hand, argues that EO 503 does not apply to national government employees only. According to
the dissent, the phrase "and for related purposes" in EO 503s title could encompass personnel not necessarily employed by national
government agencies but by local government units such as the administrator, the legal officer and the information officer, as
enumerated in Section 2(a), paragraph 8 thereof. This provision, according to the dissent, fills the crucial gap left by RA 7160 which
did not provide whether the term of an incumbent provincial administrator would automatically become coterminous with that of the
appointing authority upon RA 7160s effectivity.
This kind of construction effectively adds to EO 503s object matters that it did not explicitly provide for. The phrase "and for other
related purposes" can only add to EO 503 matters related to the devolution of personnel, basic services and facilities to local
government units. The impact of the change in a local government positions nature is clearly different from the implementation of
devolution and its ancillary effects: the former involves a change in a local government positions functions and concept of tenure,
while the latter involves (among other things) the transfer of national government employees to local government units. This
difference is highlighted by the fact that EO 503, as reflected by its whereas clauses, was issued to implement Section 17 of RA 7160.
In contrast, the change in the nature of the provincial administrator position may be gleaned from Section 480 of RA 7160. Hence, by
no stretch of reasonable construction can the phrase "and for other related purposes" in EO 503s title be understood to encompass the
consequences of the change in the local government positions nature.
Furthermore, construing that the administrator position in Section 2(a), paragraph 8 pertains to city, municipal and/or provincial
administrators would result in a legal infirmity. EO 503 was issued pursuant to the Presidents ordinance powers to provide for rules
that are general or permanent in character for the purpose of implementing the Presidents constitutional or statutory
powers.41 Exercising her constitutional duty to ensure that all laws are faithfully executed, then President Corazon Aquino issued EO
503 to ensure the executives compliance with paragraph (i), Section 17 of RA 7160, which requires local government units to absorb
the personnel of national agencies whose functions shall be devolved to them.42 This is reflected in EO 503s title and whereas clauses,
and its limited application as discussed earlier.
Thus, the dissenting opinions interpretation would result in the judicial recognition of an act of the Executive usurping a legislative
power. The grant of permanent status to incumbent provincial administrators, despite the clear language and intent of RA 7160 to
make the position coterminous, is an act outside the Presidents legitimate powers. The power to create, abolish and modify public
offices is lodged with Congress.43 The President cannot, through an Executive Order, grant permanent status to incumbents, when
Congress by law has declared that the positions they occupy are now confidential. Such act would amount to the Presidents
amendment of an act of Congress an act that the Constitution prohibits. Allowing this kind of interpretation violates the separation of
powers, a constitutionally enshrined principle that the Court has the duty to uphold.44
The dissent counters this argument by pointing out that Section 2(a), paragraph 8 of EO 503 enjoys the legal presumption of validity.
Unless the law or rule is annulled in a direct proceeding, the legal presumption of its validity stands. The EOs validity, however, is not
in question in the present case. What is at issue is a proper interpretation of its application giving due respect to the principle of
separation of powers, and the dissenting opinions interpretation does violence to this principle.
Gonzales has security of tenure, but only as a primarily confidential employee

To be sure, both career and non-career service employees have a right to security of tenure.1wphi1 All permanent officers and
employees in the civil service, regardless of whether they belong to the career or non-career service category, are entitled to this
guaranty; they cannot be removed from office except for cause provided by law and after procedural due process.45 The concept of
security of tenure, however, labors under a variation for primarily confidential employees due to the basic concept of a "primarily
confidential" position. Serving at the confidence of the appointing authority, the primarily confidential employees term of office
expires when the appointing authority loses trust in the employee. When this happens, the confidential employee is not "removed" or
"dismissed" from office; his term merely "expires"46 and the loss of trust and confidence is the "just cause" provided by law that
results in the termination of employment. In the present case where the trust and confidence has been irretrievably eroded, we cannot
fault Governor Pimentels exercise of discretion when he decided that he could no longer entrust his confidence in Gonzales.
Security of tenure in public office simply means that a public officer or employee shall not be suspended or dismissed except for
cause, as provided by law and after due process. It cannot be expanded to grant a right to public office despite a change in the nature
of the office held. In other words, the CSC might have been legally correct when it ruled that the petitioner violated Gonzales right to
security of tenure when she was removed without sufficient just cause from her position, but the situation had since then been
changed. In fact, Gonzales was reinstated as ordered, but her services were subsequently terminated under the law prevailing at the
time of the termination of her service; i.e., she was then already occupying a position that was primarily confidential and had to be
dismissed because she no longer enjoyed the trust and confidence of the appointing authority. Thus, Gonzales termination for lack of
confidence was lawful. She could no longer be reinstated as provincial administrator of Camarines Norte or to any other comparable
position. This conclusion, however, is without prejudice to Gonzales entitlement to retirement benefits, leave credits, and future
employment in government service.
WHEREFORE, all premises considered, we hereby GRANT the petition, and REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision dated June 25,
2008 and the Resolution dated December 2, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 97425.
SO ORDERED.