Redressing The Balance

Redressing The
Balance
Striking an Equilibrium Between
Pakistans Civil and Military
Administration

Sahibzada Shahroze Ahmad Khan

.
Sahibzada Shahroze Ahmad Khan

Page 0

B.Eng.(Robotics)NUST

INTRODUCTION:
In July 2016 Senator Farhatullah Babar called for formulation of
new guidelines to balance civil-military relationship in the country and empower
government to devise foreign policy independently on sensitive issues. Pakistan has
suffered the negative political and policy-making consequences of military coups
since the late fifties. Repeated military interventions have not only created a civilmilitary divide but also twisted the entire concept of national security and have
rendered the foreign office to the function of, as quoted by the Former Pakistan
Ambassador to the US Sherry Rehman , a post office. This piece of writing will not
only try to highlight the causes of this civil-military divide but will also briefly
provide a case study, on Turkeys similar dilemma, in an attempt to provide long
term solutions to even out this shifted scale in Pakistan.

PAKISTAN, A MODERN PRAETORIAN STATE:

In a modern praetorian state,
the military plays a dominant role in political structures and institutions. The
political processes of this state favor the development of the military as the core
group and the growth of its expectations as a ruling class; its political leadership (as
distinguished from bureaucratic, administrative, and managerial leadership) is
chiefly recruited from the military, or from groups sympathetic, or at least not
antagonistic, to the military. Constitutional changes are effected and sustained by
the military, and the army frequently intervenes in the government and from this
definition Pakistan can be classified as one.
Pakistans history of military coups dates back to 1958 when the first
constitutionally elected government was removed, its first ever constitution
abrogated and martial law imposed in the country. Field Marshal Ayub Khan deposed
then President Iskandar Mirza (who, ironically, had abrogated the Constitution and
asked the armed forces to intervene to begin with!) and became President. A new
constitution was promulgated in 1962, and Ayub Khan was elected as President
again in controversial indirect elections held in 1965. His reign lasted until 1969 at
which point martial law was again imposed in the country under General Yahya
Khan. After the war in 1971 that saw East Pakistan became the independent state of
Bangladesh, a new Constitution was promulgated in 1973 and the Pakistan Peoples
Party led by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto swept into power2. The countrys subsequent
experiment with democracy lasted only until 1977. In the aftermath of elections
held in 1977, there were nation-wide protests alleging that the elections had been
rigged by the incumbent government. After a protracted and prolonged period in
which no resolution to the protests could be found between the political parties, the
military led by General Zia-ul-Haq launched a military coup and thus began
Pakistans third martial law in its thirty year history. This lasted until 1988. The next

11 years were Pakistans next foray into democracy and a time when the military
was not directly involved in politics. However, not a single government was allowed
to complete its tenure during these 11 years. A sequence of weak democratic
governments culminated in the 1999 military coup by then Chief of Army Staff
Pervez Musharraf, who proceeded to rule till 2008

CAUSES FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION:

a) Failure of Political Leadership
Theoretically, the test of leadership is to lead the country and the nation out
of a crisis situation. The dynamic leadership of Jinnah is a witness to this reality.
Muslims of the sub-continent under the leadership of Jinnah successfully fought the
forces of British imperialism and Hindu nationalism culminating in the creation of
Pakistan. After the death of Jinnah, his political successors badly failed to create
consensus politics. The second line leadership could not translate the political
achievements of Jinnah into a vibrant, moderate and forward-looking democratic
polity. Factionalism, provincialism and power politics marred the first decade of
Independence. Pakistan had seven Prime Ministers and eight cabinets during 194758. The ruling parties maintained power by using state patronage and coercive
apparatus in a highly partisan manner. The situation was not much different at the
provincial level where different political parties and leaders engaged in struggle for
power in violation of parliamentary norms. They remained self-centered petty
politicians. The result was inevitable extreme political instability, palace intrigues,
the ever-growing influence of the bureaucracy and the military in politics. Thus,
military leaders felt justified in taking over when politicians failed to provide
efficient and popular governance.
b) International Factor:
Both blocs were looking for allies worldwide. America invited India in the early
1950s to become a part of U.S. sponsored policy of containment against Communist
bloc. But Nehru refused to identify India with the Western World and toed the path
of neutrality in the East-West confrontation. Pakistan welcomed the U.S. move and
happily became a part of U.S. sponsored military pacts-SEATO and CENTO
respectively The Pakistani Army was at the center of this move as a result,
Americas patronage of Pakistans military rulers contributed to the inability of
democracy to take root in the country.

c) The Pakistan Army and the India Syndrome:

In Pakistan, the army is the ultimate arbiter in the affairs of the state.
Through most of Pakistans history, the military has remained the central focus of
power. For half of its existence, Pakistan has been under military rule or military
dominated governance. The rest of the time, the army has still maintained a
significant influence in politics. In this context an astute scholar aptly comments,
The army and bureaucracy have been the self-appointed guardians of the Pakistani
state since independence. Political parties and constitutions have come and gone or
been transformed, but these twin unelected institutions have remained the pillars of
the state.
There was little military organization to speak of when Pakistan was created
in 1947. Soon after her birth, the small-sized and inexperienced Pakistani military
moved towards an improvement in resources, and by 1958 the ex-colonial military
was in a position to be able to challenge the civilian political institutions and took
over total control of the political system. Despite a weak military organizational
establishment, the Pakistani armed forces enjoyed three massive political
advantages over civilian organizations, as suggested by S.E. Finer, namely: a
marked superiority in organization, a highly emotionalized symbolic status, and a
monopoly of arms. Because of the peculiar features of the military organization
hierarchy, discipline, cohesiveness, esprit de corps, and the military virtues such as
bravery, obedience, self-abnegation and patriotism, the Pakistani military formed a
more prestigious and highly organized corporation than any civilian body
It has also been argued that Pakistans pursuit of parity with India in defense
potential put army into a commanding position in the corridors of power. This
phenomenon, also known as the India syndrome, continued to operate for half a
century after Partition. This insecurity, combined with the Kashmir dispute, brought
the military into the political arena almost from the inception of Pakistan. In this
India-Pakistan tension, a militarily strong Pakistan was considered imperative.
The administrative and political weaknesses of the country and the high
ambitions of the armys top brass introduced the military factor into its national
politics at an early stage of its life. The country was caught in a vicious circle in
which political instability created opportunities for military interference. The
egocentric commanders intervened to preserve the unity of the motherland. In a
society in which individuals overshadowed institutions and a democratic political
system was preached but not practiced, the fiber of national unity remained weak
and under stress this created a political void in the country and the ambitious
military leadership stepped into politics to fill the gap.

d) Homogeneity of the Pakistan Army:

The militarys strength in Pakistan is also a result of its strong ethnic and
regional cohesion. The Punjab provides the majority of officers, followed by the
North West Frontier Province and Tribal Areas. The Army officer cadre and other
ranks are predominantly Punjabis and Pakhtuns. The officers of these two ethnic
groups have not only developed strong mutual ties but have also established links
with the civilian bureaucratic elite, most of whom have a similar ethnic background.
A theory of military intervention maintains that this has been a cover for
continued Punjabi domination over the rest of Pakistan. This view is strongly held by
politicians, intellectuals, and journalists, in Sindh, and in Balochistan. Not only are
Sindhis and Baluchis underrepresented in both the officer corps and the ranks, but
there are important differences in regional styles. Historically considered, tensions
have existed between the Punjab and these other areas. Then, too, there may be
strategic considerations that inadvertently reinforce the impression of Punjabi
dominance. Thus, the relative homogeneity of the Pakistani Army, dominated by
Punjabis and Pakhtuns, facilitated its direct and indirect participation in the body
politic of the country.

In short, Pakistan inherited the well-established tradition of supremacy of civilpolitical over military institution under British political theory. Within a few years of
her independence, Pakistan encountered the ever growing influence of military into
politics. Ultimately, Pakistan degenerated into a praetorian state with dreadful
political, social and economic fallouts. This process of militarization of Pakistan owes
its transformation to multiple variables as have been discussed. No single factor can
be cited as the sole cause; rather, a cluster of causes led to the intervention of
military into politics in Pakistan.

TURKEY, A CONCISE TIMELINE:

The military has long seen itself as the "guardian of Turkish democracy",
which it defines as the staunchly secular state created by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk,
the founder of the modern Turkish republic. It has directly intervened three times in
Turkish politics, and in 1997 it carried out what some scholars describe as a
"postmodern coup".
1960

The first coup in the Turkish republic took place in 1960, during a time of
heightened tensions between the Turkish government and the opposition.
The ruling Democratic Party, headed by prime minister Adnan Menderes and
president Celal Bayar, began to loosen some of the toughest Ataturk-era rules
dealing with religion: it allowed thousands of mosques to reopen, legalised the call
to prayer in Arabic instead of Turkish, and opened new schools for religious
personnel, among others. It also shortened the period of mandatory military service.
At the same time, it further alienated the opposition by imposing restrictive new
press laws and occasionally barring critical newspapers from publishing.
Growing tensions caused the Menderes government to impose martial law in early
1960. The army stepped in and toppled the government on May 27; the president,
prime minister and several cabinet members were arrested and quickly tried for
treason and other offences. Menderes was executed.
General Cemal Gursel assumed power - as both president and prime minister beginning a period of military-dominated politics that would last until 1965.

1971
The Turkish economy stagnated in the late 1960s, and the recession caused
widespread unrest: workers' groups staged demonstrations, sometimes violent, and
right-wing groups carried out attacks of their own. The currency was devalued in
1960; annual inflation reached nearly 80 percent.
So in March the military intervened once again, an effort to "restore order", it said.
Memduh Tagmac, the chief of the general staff, gave a memorandum to the prime
minister, Suleyman Demirel. It accused his government of driving the country into
anarchy, and demanded the formation of a "strong and credible government ...
inspired by Ataturk's views."
Demirel resigned hours later, after meeting with his cabinet.
The military did not rule directly during this period. It first asked Nihat Erim, a
member of the right-wing Republican People's Party, to form a caretaker
government; it was the first of several which governed Turkey until 1973, when
Fahri Koruturk, a retired naval officer, was installed as president by the parliament.
1980

Instability continued even after the 1971 coup: Turkey changed prime ministers 11
times in the 1970s, the economy continued to stagnate, and left and right-wing
groups continued their violent clashes in the streets. Thousands of people were
assassinated.
The military began discussing a possible coup in late 1979, and in March 1980 a
group of generals recommended that they move forward. It was delayed several
times, and finally launched in September, when officers announced on state
television that they were imposing martial law and dissolving the government.
Evren became president, and a naval officer, Bulent Ulusu, assumed the post of
prime minister.
These years of military rule did bring some stability to Turkey. Ulusu was succeeded
in 1983 by Turgut Ozal, who is now widely credited with stabilising the Turkish
economy by privatising many state-owned industries. Inflation dropped and
employment grew.
The military also arrested hundreds of thousands of people; dozens were executed,
while many others were tortured or simply disappeared.
A new constitution was drafted and put before a public referendum in 1982; it was
overwhelmingly approved.
1997
The 1995 election led to overwhelming gains for the Islamist Welfare party, which
took power the following year as the head of a coalition government.
In 1997 the military issued a series of "recommendations", which the government
had no choice but to accept. The prime minister, Necmettin Erbakan, agreed to a
compulsory eight-year education programme (to prevent pupis from enrolling in
religious schools), a headscarf ban at universities, and other measures. Erbakan was
then forced to resign.
The Welfare party was shut down in 1998, and Erbakan was banned from politics for
five years.
Some former members of the party, including current prime minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan, would eventually go on to found the Justice and Development Party.
2016
Military faction attempts coup. Civilians take to the streets resulting in a failure on
behalf of the military

LESSONS FROM TURKEY:

Four primary lessons are offered by
Turkeys checkered history of civil-military relations to other nations, like Pakistan,
seeking to normalize their civil-military relations:
a) Avoid widespread dispersion of political power
Military interventions in politics tend to occur when political institutions lack
autonomy or coherence. Weak political institutionalization creates power vacuums
and strips the society of its means to define and realize its common interests.
Where the civil or military bureaucracy is more developed than political parties, the
military will have an incentive to move into the power vacuum to fill the void. That
pattern has been common in Latin America, including in Guatemala, El Salvador,
Peru, and Argentina.
One of the most significant legal changes was the adoption of the 1961
Constitution. That constitution, widely accepted as one of the most liberal in
Turkeys history, was aimed at curbing the powers of the single-chamber parliament
that the military faulted for the establishment of an autocratic regime in Turkey. The
1961 Constitution established numerous counter-majoritarian institutions to check
the power of the legislature.
Although these new institutions played a significant role in keeping
majoritarian forces in check, the dispersion of political power in the Constitution
went too far. The dilution of the Parliaments authority with the creation of a
plethora of counter-majoritarian institutions caused the political branches to
become too weak and the bureaucracy too strong. As Bruce Ackerman has
explained, the more power-centers we insulate from the classical political and
judicial institutions, the greater the problem we have in coordinating the
proliferating number of separated powers into a coherent whole. The insulation of
too many power-centers from direct political control deprives the democratic
process of its significance, leaving elected leaders at the mercy of numerous
independent and unelected officials. Although some of the counter-majoritarian
institutions in the 1961 Constitution, such as the Constitutional Court, were inspired
by the constitutions of Western democracies, many others were created specifically
to address the militarys understandable distrust of the Turkish Parliament as the
only source of authority. This distribution of constitutional authority across a wide
spectrum of counter-majoritarian institutions created frequent power vacuums in
Turkey, prompting the Turkish military to stage political interventions.
In addition to weakening the elected branches, the 1960 coup also ushered in
a new era of political pluralism. Political pluralism is crucial for the establishment of
a constitutional democracy, but excessive political pluralism led to undesirable
consequences in Turkey. A serious side effect of proportional representation and

political pluralism was political instability and frequent collapse of governments. The
new electoral laws and bureaucratic checks and balances in the 1961 Constitution
increased the likelihood of weak coalition governments and power vacuums. As
politicians remained unable to form governmentslet alone effectively conduct
legislative affairsthe militarys power and willingness to intervene in politics
increased. Although the 1960 coup ushered in a new era of modernization and
democratization, both occurred too swiftly and without effective political
institutionalization.
The tide in favor of military interventions began to turn in the early 2000s as
weak coalition governments gave way to the strong majority government of the
Justice and Development Party. As Prime Minister Erdogan put it: The military
intervened in politics only when there was a political vacuum; the military played a
somewhat expanded role because the political will was weak. With its popular
mandate, the Erdogan government managed to establish the most stable regime in
recent Turkish history, altering the civilmilitary power dynamic and prompting the
military to retreat to the barracks through the means discussed above.
Turkeys struggle with military interventions prompted by weak political
institutionalization suggests that it is crucial to build effective political institutions
and strong political parties. The more effective the civilian politicians are in
attaining social and economic stability, the less likely that power vacuums, and
concomitant military interventions, will occur.
b) Exploit factionalism within the military
Another lesson to be drawn from the Turkish experience is that factionalism
within the military can hinder military interventions. Although factionalism can
create uncertainty, it can also help establish equilibrium by pitting different groups
against each other and fracture cooperation among those seeking to undermine
democratization. Factionalism within the Turkish military during the 1970s and
more recently in 2016 ensured that no one faction could marshal sufficient support
to affect a full takeover of the government. So long as one strong faction within the
military remains committed to democracy, factionalism can facilitate democratic
progress and also assist in the extrication of the military from politics by allowing
politicians to seize upon and exploit divisions within the military.
c) Seek membership in democratic international organizations
The Turkish experience also highlights the importance of democratic
international organizations in normalizing domestic civilmilitary relations. For
Turkey, candidacy for membership in the European Union provided a major impetus
for adopting legal and constitutional changes to curb the militarys political
influence. The demands to subordinate the military to civilian leaders came

primarily from the European Union. In addition, the military was not the sole target
of EU-mandated reforms; other extensive policy reforms accompanied changes to
civilmilitary relations. That made the sweeping legal changes to civilmilitary
relations more palatable to Turkish military leaders. In addition, as its leaders are
well aware, membership in the European Union will have its advantages for the
Turkish military as well. Among other things, EU membership will solidify Turkeys
alliances with European nations and allow the establishment of a more robust
military capability. The EU-mandated reforms therefore do not constitute a zero-sum
game for the Turkish military, which also stands to benefit from EU accession.

d) Focus the military on external threats

The Turkish experience also shows that a military whose mission includes the
provision of advice on domestic policy conflicts is more likely to intervene in the
political home front. As the Turkish militarys focus shifted from external threats to
domestic politics with its institutionalization in the National Security Council, its
inclination to stage indirect and direct interventions also increased. The Council
allowed the military to obtain a strong advisory voice in domestic policies ranging
from school curricula to the substance of criminal laws and provided an institutional
avenue for further political interventions.

The lessons learnt from the Turkish model show how to cater the problems faced by
a modern praetorian state by developing long term solution that will ensure that
military intervention is made highly unlikely thus giving democracy a chance to
flourish.

CONCLUSION:
Pakistan has long suffered from not only an imbalance in civil-military
administration but more importantly also a lack of far sighted, effective policies and
their implementation. This incompetency in policy making has contributed to a
plethora of troubling situations and repeated failures in all aspects of the states
functioning. Pakistan must reform its frail and short sighted policy formation and
develop long term solutions to its problems. This includes the civil-military
imbalance that has haunted the Nation for the past 6 decades