Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Introduction
In criticizing intellectual myopia of those nominalist scholars of Eastern
scriptures to whom such knowledge as is not empirical is meaningless,
Ananda K. Coomaraswamy states that the terms of Scripture and Ritual are
symbolic (pratkavat); and merely to submit this self-evident proposition is to
say that the symbol is not its own meaning but is significant of its referent.1
Of course, scriptures and rituals may include literal or superficial meanings,
but needless to say, if we want to know their real significance, trying to understand their referent is much more important than merely grasping them
at a literal superficial level.2
There are two important points by which the use of symbolism in traditional religions is distinguished from mere metaphor or other figures of
speech in literary use. The first is that the relationship between a symbol and
its referent is hierarchical.3 In other words, a symbol always refers to something higher than itself. That is why Ren Gunon emphasizes that the lower
can symbolize the higher, but the inverse is impossible.4 Therefore, when
considered from the standpoint of the human, we can say that symbols help
us to rise up to a higher level of reality.
The second point, which is deeply related to the first, is that forms of
symbols, whether verbal or visual, are not something arbitrarily created or
1
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these marvels, for example in the miracles of Scripture, that the deepest
truths of the legend inhere; philosophy, as Platowhom Aristotle followed
in this respectaffirms, beginning in wonder.9
In the light of these insightful observations of Coomaraswamy and Gunon,
the present paper intends to discuss the problematic points of the historical
reductionist approach to the Buddhas life story. First, we will review the
recent criticism of that approach by several scholars of Buddhism. Second,
we will discuss some of the essential problems that are involved in the idea of
the apotheosis of the historical Buddha which is presupposed in the historical reductionist approach to the Buddhas life story.
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However, since the late twentieth century, thanks to the emergent historians of religion and comparative mythologists, such as Mircea Eliade and
Joseph Campbell, who began to focus on and explore the internal meanings
of myths themselves, the significance of mythology has in some way come to
be seen in its own right. In addition, the recent trends in contemporary
thought, which are represented by post-modernism and post-colonialism,
have led many to question the validity of the conventional methods of research on myth, i.e., the historical, naturalistic, and sociological reductionist approaches.12 Perhaps, under the influence of such a shift in the trends of
contemporary thought at large and the study of mythology in particular, the
historical reductionist research on the legend of the Buddha has been criticized by several scholars in recent years. For example, Peter Masefield (1986)
says:
Until now Buddhism has tended, consciously or otherwise, to suffer demythologization at the hands of those ignorant of its mythology including, it
may be added, some scholars in the East aping the bad habits of the West,
so much so that the time has surely come when the texts should be seen in
their own terms. If the Buddhism of ancient India is to be understood it
will have to be remythologised in the sense that there will have to be restored to its technical and metaphorical language all the nuances and associations its terms once had for those who heard them.13
Moreover, Reginald Ray (1994) interprets the Buddhas legend as a narrative
which shows the paradigm of saints, and introduces us to the story as the
paradigm as he finds it in the Buddhacarita of Avaghoa. There, he expresses that:
It may be suggested here that in approaching Buddha kyamuni, it is
invalid and finally impossible to separate, as some have tried to do, the
Gotama Buddha k ( Tky: Daiz Shuppan, 2005).
12
In such a shift in the general trends of thought in the learned world in the latter half
of the last century, we can undoubtedly find some signs favorable to the restoration of
the traditional understanding of myths. However, this new current also contains the
danger of becoming an anti-traditional movement. Although I cannot elaborate on this
point here, one of the dangerous factors inherent in this line of thought is its
relativizing tendency. To get a vantage point to relativize both the modern
Western and all other traditional cultures altogetheras this trend of thought
generally inclinessignifies, on the one hand, the contradictory attempt of selfrelativization entailing the nonsensical notion of the absolute relative, and on the
other hand, to assume unwarrantedly something resembling the transcendental
universalism without accepting its genuine authority, that is the eternal metaphysical
Truth (Sophia Perennis). Nitta Tomomichi, Some Reflections on Oriental Studies,
Towards Metanoia: Essays Presented to A. K. Saran on his Eightieth Birthday
(Lucknow, India: Coomaraswamy Center, 2002), p. 143.
13
Peter Masefield, Divine Revelation in Pali Buddhism (Colombo: The Sri Lanka
Institution of Traditional Studies, 1986), p. xvi.
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states:
These narrations may contain fictions about the Buddhalegends and
traditions that have accrued around himbut these fictions are in many
ways truer, or at least religiously more meaningful, than the facts.18
Apart from this, he considers the story of the Buddha to be a biographical
blueprint which all Buddhas follow.19
There are several scholars in Japan too, who have made similar assertions.
For example, Akira Hirakawa (1968) argues that it is impossible to reproduce a pure life story of the Buddha as a human being at present because all
the events concerning him are colored with mythical characters,20 and states:
The ancient followers of Buddhism never imagined a life story of the Buddha as a human being, because what was important for them was not
kyamuni as a human being, but kyamuni as the Buddha, and therefore
their concern was how he attained Buddhahood.21
Moreover, Kichi Hokazono (1994), criticizing the historical reductionist
approach of both Oldenberg (1881) and Nakamura (1958), states that the
life story [of the Buddha] which is obtained by such [an approach] is nothing
but meager traces and what is possible [for such an approach] is only to
choose seemingly historical facts [from the life of the Buddha] from a relative point of view and to bring his image as close as possible to that of a
human being.22 Further, Hokazono states that the most significant aspect of
the mythical legend in the Buddhas life story is to express the concept of
Buddha.23
Masahiro Shimoda, a noted Japanese scholar, also questions the historycentrism in modern Buddhist philology. Relying on the research carried out
by Roger-Pol Droit and Philip Almond, he points out that the image of the
Buddha as a noble philosopher and moralist, which was created in the
Buddhist Studies of nineteenth-century Europe, is not, in fact, based on either
philological or historical evidence, but produced by the European scholars at
that time attaching their ideal image of a human being to the Buddha. Therefore, Shimoda makes the criticism that Oldenberg and Rhys Davids just
presupposed the existence of the historical Buddha a priori, and they did not
demonstrate this based on any existing Buddhist text. Also, Shimoda indicates the risks involved in reconstructing the image of the historical Bud18
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dha. According to his position, the reader of the texts who attempts to extract
historicity from them, would discard all other elements even though they
might include a much richer content than the historical facts themselves, or
suggest some complex and difficult doctrines concerning the Buddha. In
other words, from the viewpoint of the historical Buddha, the reader is
not actually reading but tampering with the texts so as to make them comprehensible for himself alone. Moreover, in that case, he will be unable to understand the Buddha as he is from the texts because he will presuppose that
the Buddha who is beyond historicity is not, in fact, the Buddha. In brief, the
investigation of the historical Buddha is completely different from the
question What is the Buddha? and the person who pursues this will never
be able to discover, but instead actually diminish, the significance of the
Buddha.24
In this way, this historical reductionist approach, mentioned above, has
recently come under criticism by many scholars. We can recognize two points
which all of these criticisms have in common. First, many of them argue that
it is utterly impossible to extract the historical facts from the legend of the
Buddha. No matter what criterion is provided in that operation, its results will
never be anything more than plausible historical fact based on deduction.
Secondly, even if we could exclude the mythical elements from the Buddhas
life, what remains is insignificant, i.e., such a way of reading the legend of
the Buddha could never reveal the primary significance of that story.
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God. Therefore, if a person or a community that had the former understanding one day all of a sudden changed to the latter, such a shift is certainly not a
gradual one which can be called progress or development of understanding, but a gigantic leap, something like a total mutation. Therefore, it is
difficult to image that, from a Buddhist community in which the former understanding of the Buddha was shared, a person or a group that held the latter
view could suddenly appear.
Let us now examine this problem in greater detail. First of all, it seems
impossible that all members of a Buddhist community could suddenly change
their understanding concerning the Buddha, as it were, overnight. If the apotheosis of Gotama actually occurred, perhaps this might have happened
some time after the Buddha had passed away, when monks in a particular
community who had held the former interpretation, started to agree with the
latter opinion. This explanation is plausible, especially as it corresponds to
the historical fact that the early Buddhist community split into many sects.
However, if that were the case, a sect that held the understanding that the
Buddha was just a human being would have naturally continued to exist.
Perhaps the scholars who support the apotheosis theory would insist that
that sect was the Theravda. This is a sect generally regarded as the most
conservative, and actually, is often seen as having quite a realistic and humanistic perception concerning the Buddha when compared to the
Mahsaghika, whose understanding is rather transcendental, mythical and
similar to the Mahyna.28 However, as Ray (1994) has indicated when comparing the Suttanipta with the Buddhacarita, the image of the Buddha which
is depicted in early Theravda sutras is already of a mythical superhuman, not
fundamentally different from that of the Mahyna literature.29 It is even so
in the case of the image of the Buddha as described in late-Theravda literature, such as the Jtaka and the Buddhavasa. Is it possible, therefore, that
such scriptures have been maintained by people who regard the Buddha as
just a historical human being? Or can we dispose of this problem as a matter
of degree by explaining that basically the Theravdins understood the Buddha as a human being, but even they could not help but apotheosize him more
or less?
Of course, I do not wish to deny the historical actuality of Gotama
Buddha by arguing this, nor do I want to object to the fact that the birth of the
stras has a history, and that the Buddhist doctrines have developed
28
Such a view can be seen in, for example, Mochizuki Shinry , Indo ni
okeru buddakan no hattatsu , Tetsugaku zasshi
613 (1927), pp. 1-9; Kimura Taiken , Shj bukky shis ron
(Tky: Meiji Shoin, 1937), pp. 62 and 89-92; Nalinaksha Dutt, Mahayana
Buddhism (New Delhi: Rakesh Press, corrected reprint, 1976), pp. 141-177; ibid.,
Buddhist Sects in India (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978), pp. 98-100; tienne
Lamotte, Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien: Des origines lre aka (Louvain:
Bibliothque du Muson, 1958), pp. 713-718.
29
Reginald A. Ray, Buddhist Saints in India, p. 62.
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according to the period in which they appeared. Though it is not easy to judge
the exact historical position of a particular stra, we are able perhaps to say
that, in general, the earlier stras have more simplicity than later ones. Moreover, according to the age, a difference of understanding on a certain matter
must have become clearer in the Buddhist community, which eventually
caused a split within the sects.
However, on the other hand, if one community or sect had maintained historical continuity, there must have been consistent understandings over time
concerning doctrines. Even if a new term or a way of expression were born
within such a group at a certain time, it must have had some kind of consistency with a former understanding. In other words, such a new term or expression needed to be created because it became necessary to articulate such
understandings, which had already existed, within a new context due to some
epochal factor.
The second problem is that this concept of the apotheosis of Gotama itself includes a fundamental contradiction, and it is logically absurd from the
beginning. When we say that something has changed into X, we rightly
presume that the X was non-X before the actual change. This logic, X has
changed into non-X, does not cause a problem a priori when it is applied to
relative matters. However, when it is assigned to an absolute or eternal being,
this logic a priori becomes contradictory because, in that situation, X was
(or could be) non-X immediately signifies the denial of the absoluteness or
the eternity of X. If such a logical contradiction is accepted in a particular
tradition as the heart of that religion as in the aforementioned Christian
case,30 then it is totally another matter. However, if such a view is presented
as a historical explanation by an external observer to the internal understandings of Buddhism (that is, by a researcher who insists on the apotheosis of
Gotama), it virtually signifies a denial of the internal understandings of that
particular tradition itself. In other words, saying that Gotama Buddha was
subsequently absolutized and eternalized is the same as saying that Buddhism merely absolutizes and eternalizes what was originally not, which, in
turn, is just the same as saying that Buddhism is false.
When we start thinking like that, then it must be said that the idea, namely
Gotama Buddha was originally a human being but subsequently was deified is not based on philological evidence, but is due to a bias, which developed in nineteenthcentury Europe and remains as an unquestioned supposition in Buddhist Studies today. Normally in philological studies, we seek to
exclude such prejudices as much as possible and discuss only what is based
on evidence obtained from literature. However, the idea of the apotheosis of
Gotama Buddha has been an unconditional preoccupation in the mainstream
study of the Buddhas legend up to now.
30
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Conclusion
Though the Buddhas life story might include several historical facts, we
do not have any certain method of extracting them, and it is obvious that
describing such facts is not the subject of the story. Moreover, it has become clear that the idea of the apotheosis of the human Buddha, which is
presupposed in the reductionistic approach, is absurd. If we wish to understand the real significance of the mythical story of the Buddha, we have to try
to read the texts in themselves. We need further discussion concerning the
concrete method for this process, but perhaps a comparison to the myths of
Hinduism and Brahmanism, which has already been attempted by such
scholars as Senart, Kern and Coomaraswamy, would be useful, and moreover,
we should make use of the traditional commentaries that have been passed
down in the Theravda tradition as well as other methods of studying myth.
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