Persons and Family Relations Case Digest (2016 Collation)

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO
TOMAS
Digested by: DC 2016 Members
Editors:
Tricia Lacuesta
Lorenzo Gayya
Cristopher Reyes
Macky Siazon
Janine Arenas
Ninna Bonsol
Lloyd Javier
PERSONS AND
FAMILY
RELATIONS
LAW
First Sem Cases
Persons and Family Relations Law
Table of Contents
Preliminaries2
Human Relations
14
Prejudicial Question
Civil Personality
Citizenship
34
Marriage
35
Void Marriages
29
33
46
Psychological Incapacity 53
Voidable Marriages 76
Legal Separation
78
Rights and Obligations between Husband & Wife
81
Property Relations 85
The Family as an Institution
103
Family Home106
Paternity and Filiation
Adoption
125
Support
130
108
Parental Authority 131
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
Preliminaries
LORENZO M. TANADA v. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA
G.R. No. L-63915, April 24, 1985, ESCOLIN, J.
The requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity cannot be dispensed with.
Facts:
Tanada seeks for the issuance of writ of mandamus to compel public officials
to publish or cause to be published in the Official Gazette of various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders,
letter of implementation and administrative orders because it involves public interest.
Tuvera dismissed the case outright beacause Tanada has no legal personality to file
petition for mandamus since he is not an aggrieved party which what the law
requires that only a person who is personally and directly affected by non-publication
of laws would have the personality to file such. Tuvera further contends that
publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for effectivity of
laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates and since the
presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are
to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their
effectivity.
Issue:
Whether or not the requirement of publication can be dispensed with.
Ruling:
No. The requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law
itself provides for the date of its effectivity cannot be dispensed with.
Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
Section 1.There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important
legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines;
[2] all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have
no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance
to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required
so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the
President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general
applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published.
The word "shall" used therein imposes upon public officials an imperative duty.
That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on
matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a
list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind,
leaves public officials with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or
excluded from such publication.
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The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public
adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct
as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of
injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of
which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for
fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or the
people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other
presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such
as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that
they have been circularized to all concerned. It is needless to add that the
publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability"
is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound
by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents.
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all
form part of the law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law
demand that the Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate
and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people
may know where to obtain their official and specific contents.
LORENZO M. TANADA ET AL v. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA

G.R. No. L-63915, December 29, 1986, CRUZ, J.
The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" under Article 2 of the Civil Code
refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which
cannot in any event be omitted.
Facts:
Tanada requested for publication of presidential decrees for public purposes.
The government argued that while publication is necessary as a ruled, it is not so
when it is "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they
were to become effective immediately upon their approval.
Issue:
Whether or not the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date
of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself
Ruling:
Yes. Article 2 of the Civil Code states that laws shall take effect after fifteen
days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.
After a careful study of this provision, SC have come to the conclusion and so
hold, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity
and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be
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omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective
immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its
discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. It
is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed
with altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as
it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern the
legislature could validly provide that a law e effective immediately upon its approval
notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after
publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a
result and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with but simply
because they did not know of its existence, Significantly, this is not true only of penal
laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a
law on prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may
affect before they can begin to operate.
SC holds therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and
private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin
fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.
PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT and SERVICES CORPORATION v. THE

HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, VIVENCIO DE MESA,
RODRIGO MIKIN and CEDRIC LEYSON
G.R. No. 103144, April 4, 2001, GONZAGA-REYES, J.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Covered by
this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President
in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the
legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution: Administrative rules
and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement
existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. Interpretative regulations and those
merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative
agency and the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the
so-called letter of instructions issued by the administrative superiors concerning the
rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their
duties
Facts:
Philsa International Placement and Services Corporation is a domestic
corporation engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment. It
recruited private respondents for employment in Saudi and made to pay placement
fees. However when the private reached the Saudi they were made to sign contracts
resulting to some reduction of their benefits but they refused to do sp. Due to their
refusal they, were terminated and repatriated back in the Philippines. Thereafter, the
filed a complaint of illegal exaction against Philsa which the Secretary of Labor found
it guilty of such for collecting fees beyond the prescribed by law. Philsa insists
however, that it cannot be held liable for illegal exaction as POEA Memorandum
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Circular No. 11, Series of 1983, which enumerated the allowable fees which may be
collected from applicants, is void for lack of publication.
Issue:
Whether or not Philsa is guilty of illegal exaction despite the fact that the
POEA Memorandum Circular No. 11, Series of 1983 was not published.
Ruling:
No. In Taada vs. Tuvera, the Court held, as follows: that all statutes, including
those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the
same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the
Constitution: Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only
the personnel of the administrative agency and the public, need not be published.
Neither is publication required of the so-called letter of instructions issued by the
administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties."
Applying this doctrine, SC ruled that the abovementioned Memorandum shall
be ineffective since it lacks publication which makes Philsa not liable for illegal
exaction.
UNCIANO PARAMEDICAL COLLEGE INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 100335, April 7, 1993, NOCON, J.
It is a settled rule that when a doctrine of the Supreme Court is overruled and
a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and
should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith
thereof.
Facts:
Elena Villegas and Ted Magallanes were students of Unciano Paramedical
College Inc. After their first term, they were no longer allowed to enroll due to
allegedly being members of National Union of Students of the Philippines and League
of Filipinos Officers which they organized despite the prohibition to organize such.
Unciano cited the ruling in Alcuaz which was promulgated on 1988 that when a
college student registered in a school, it is understood that he is only enrolling for the
entire semester. Thus it also refuted the argument of Villegas and Magallanes that
since in a more recent case of Ariel Non, et al. vs. Hon. Sancho Dames promulgated
in 1990 (185 SCRA 523), the Supreme Court, abandoned and overruled its decision in
Alcuaz since it was promulgated later when the contract has already been
terminated. Thus, it cannot apply retroactively.
Issue:
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Whether or not the ruling in the case of Ariel Non et al vs. Hon Dames may be
applied retroactively.
Ruling:
No. Settled is the rule that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a
different view is adopted, the new doctrine is applied prospectively, and should not
apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
Under Article 4 of the New Civil Code, Laws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided. Furthermore, Under Article 8 of the New Civil Code
states that Judicial decision applying or interpreting the laws or constitution shall
form a part of the legal system. Thus, since judicial decisions are laws it shall not
have retroactive effect unless otherwise provided.
The ruling in the Non case should not be given a retroactive effect to cases
that arose before its promulgation. If it were otherwise, it would result in oppression
to petitioners and other schools similarly situated who relied on the ruling in the
Alcuaz case.
EMETERIO CUI v. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY

G.R. No. L-15127, May 30, 1961, CONCEPCION, J.
In order to declare a contract void as against public policy, a court must find
that the contract as to consideration or the thing to be done, contravenes some
established interest of society, or is inconsistent with sound policy and good morals
or tends clearly to undermine the security of individual rights.
Facts:
Cui was a student of Arellano University from prelaw up to fourth year first
semester in the College of law. By that time he was a scholar of such university and
his tuition fees were reimbursed after each semester. The scholarship agreement
however stipulates that in consideration of the scholarship granted to him by the
University, he waives his right to transfer to another school without having refunded
to the University the equivalent of his scholarship cash. But after in his fourth year
last semester, he transferred to College of Law Abad Santos University thus he
graduated therein. The conflict arose when he needed his law school records for
taking up the bar exam but Arellano University contended that it will only release
such upon payment of reimbursed tuition fees. Thus, Director of private schools
issued a Memorandum which states that the amount in tuition and other fees
corresponding to these scholarships should not be subsequently charged to the
recipient students when they decide to quit school or to transfer to another
institution for it is against public policy. When students are given full or partial
scholarships, it is understood that such scholarships are merited and earned.
Scholarships should not be offered merely to attract and keep students in a school.
Issue:
Whether or not the Contract of Scholarship entered into by the Cui and
Arellano waiving the formers right to transfer to another school without having
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refunded to the University the equivalent of his scholarship cash is void for it is
against public policy.
Ruling:
Yes, Under Article 6 of the New Civil Code states that Rights may be waived,
unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good
customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
In order to declare a contract void as against public policy, a court must find
that the contract as to consideration or the thing to be done, contravenes some
established interest of society, or is inconsistent with sound policy and good morals
or tends clearly to undermine the security of individual rights. It has been
consistently held that under the principles relating to the doctrine of public policy, as
applied to the law of contracts, courts of justice will not recognize or uphold a
transaction which its object, operation, or tendency is calculated to be prejudicial to
the public welfare, to sound morality or to civic honesty.
Thus, if Arellano University understood clearly the real essence of scholarships
it should have not entered into a contract of waiver with Cui, which is a direct
violation of the Memorandum and an open challenge to the authority of the Director
of Private Schools because the contract was repugnant to sound morality and civic
honesty.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSE JABINAL Y CARMEN

G.R. No. L-30061, February 27, 1974, ANTONIO, J.
Decisions of the Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless
evidence of what the laws mean.
Facts:
Jose Jabinal was charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition
without the required license permit on 1964. However, he contended that he was a
Secret agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas for prevention of crimes as
well as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander for prevention of
smuggling. Thus the said appointments carried with them the authority to possess
and carry the firearm. His argument was relied on the Supreme Court's decision in
People vs. Macarandang (1959) and People vs. Lucero (1958). However, the RTC
convicted the accused on the basis that such decisions were already overturned by
latest decision promulgated by the SC in People vs. Mapa on 1967 thereby Secret
Agents were no longer exempted from license permit. Thus such ruling shall apply
retroactively convicting the accused of such crime.
Issue:
Whether or not People vs. Mapa shall be applied retroactively, thus convicting
Jabinal for illegal possession of firearms.
Ruling:
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No, Under Article 8 of the New Civil Code states that "Judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal
system. Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless
evidence of what the laws mean.
The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the
jurisprudence, hence of the law, of the land, at the time Jabinal was found in
possession of the firearm in question and when he arraigned by the trial court. It is
true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of
this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be
applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old
doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the construction and
application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the punishability of an act be
reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.
It follows, therefore, that considering that Jabinal conferred his appointments
as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a firearm pursuant
to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero, under which no
criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm in spite of the absence
of a license and permit therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly, He may not
be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable.
ALICE REYES VAN DORN v. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR.

G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985, MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.
While it is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of
the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.
Facts:
Alice Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines was married to Richard Upton a
US citizen. They were married in Hongkong. Thereafter, they established their
residence in the Philippines. However due to conflicts, they obtained a divorce in
Nevada US and later on Alice Van Dorn remarried to Theodore Van Dorn. Conflict
arose when, Upton claimed in the RTC through a petition that Alice Vandorns shop in
Ermita is a conjugal property which he orders the latter to render an accounting and
that he be declared to manage the property. Van Dorn then filed motion to dismiss on
the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in divorce
proceedings before Nevada Court which was acknowledge by Upton that they had no
community property. However, it was denied by the RTC on the ground that the
property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no
bearing in the case. Hence this petition. Upton averred that the Divorce Decree
issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines
and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court
cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of
jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not the Divorce decree is binding as between the parties.
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Ruling:
Yes, it is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of
the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case,
the divorce in Nevada released Upton from the marriage from the standards of
American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, Upton is no longer the husband of Van
Dorn. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as Vandorn's husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his
own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said
Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as Upton does, that, under our laws, Vandorn has to be
considered still married to him and still subject to a wife's obligations cannot be just.
Vandorn should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and
render support to Upton. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with
possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her
own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
FE D. QUITA v. COURT OF APPEALS AND BLANDINA DANDAN

G.R. No. 124862, December 22, 1998, BELLOSILLO, J.
Citizenship at the time the divorce decree was obtained is necessary for the
purpose of recognition of such in the Philippine Courts.
Facts:
Fe. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan both Filipinos were married in the Philippines.
However, they obtained a divorce decree in San Francisco California USA. Later on,
she remarried twice. When Padlan died, she claimed for the estate of such and
invoking that the divorce decree was not valid in the Philippines since at the time
they obtained divorce, they were both Filipino citizens and thus, she is entitled to the
estate of Padlan. Meanwhile, Dandan the second wife of Padlan claimed that she is
the lawful wife and that Quita was already an American Citizen at the time of the
divorce which makes Padlan entitled validly remarry. RTC invoking Tenchavez v. Escao
which held that a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens sought and decreed after
the effectivity of the present Civil Code was not entitled to recognition as valid in this
jurisdiction, thereby disregarded the divorce between Qiuta and Padlan. However the
trial court did not bother to resolve the issue of citizenship of Quita at the time the
divorce decree was obtained.
Issue:
Whether or not citizenship at the time of the divorce is necessary for the
divorce decree to be recognized in the Philippine Courts.
Ruling:
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Yes, If Quita was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from
Arturo, this should have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her
citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in issue
with the aid of documentary and testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of
the parties either supporting or opposing the evidence. Instead, the lower court
perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by merely applying the ruling in Tenchavez
v. Escao. Thus Quitas citizenship of was relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn
v. Romillo Jr.that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.
Thus, since RTC has failed to resolve the issue of citizenship of Quita at the
time of the divorce, then the case must be remanded to such for trial.
FELICITAS AMOR-CATALAN v. COURT OF APPEALS, ORLANDO CATALAN AND

MEROPE BRAGANZA
G.R. No. 167109, February 6, 2007, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest and must be based
on a cause of action.
Facts:
Felicitas Amor-Catalan married Orlando in Mabini, Pangasinan. Thereafter,
they migrated to the United States of America and allegedly became naturalized
citizens thereof and later on allegedly divorced. Orlando remarried to Braganza
though the later had prior subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol. Felicitas then filed
a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Orlando and Merope. RTC
granted such petition but on Appeal it was reversed by the CA ruling that Felicitas
does not have the legal capacity to file the petition since they already obtained
divorce thus severing her ties with Orlando.
Issue:
Whether or not Felicitas has the legal capacity to file the petition assuming
arguendo that they obtained divorce decree after they were naturalized as American
citizens.
Ruling:
No, If there was indeed a divorce decree obtained and which, following the
national law of Orlando, does not restrict remarriage. Freed from their existing marital
bond, each of the former spouses no longer has any interest nor should each have
the personality to inquire into the marriage that the other might subsequently
contract.
Viewed from another perspective, Felicitas has no existing interest in
Orlandos subsequent marriage since the validity, as well as any defect or infirmity,
of this subsequent marriage will not affect the divorced status of Orlando and
Felicitas.
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A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest and must be based
on a cause of action. Significantly, Section 2(a) of The Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, which took effect on
March 15, 2003, now specifically provides that a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
EDGAR SAN LUIS v. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS

The presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of
its authenticity and due execution must be presented.
Facts:
Felicisimo San Luis had three marriages. His first marriage was dissolve
because his first wife died. His second marriage was with Merry Lee an America
citizen though they obtained divorce. His third marriage was with Felicidad San Luis.
Felicisimo died, which prompted Felicidad in filing for petition for the issuance of
letters of administration in her favor. It was then opposed by the children of Felicisimo
in his first marriage contending that the marriage between Felicidad and Felicisimo
was bigamous due to the fact that the divorce cannot be recognized in the Philippines
since Felicisimo is a Filipino and the Philippine Laws does not grant divorce. Felicidad
then presented the divorce decree but it was opposed by the children of Felicisimo
from his first wife.
Issue:
Whether or not the presentation solely of divorce decree is sufficient to prove
its authenticity and due execution.
Ruling:
No, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely
allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality
to file the present petition as Felicisimos surviving spouse.
In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and
proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the
divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution
must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document
may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an
official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody
of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in
the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT
G.R. No. 155635, November 7, 2008, VELASCO, JR., J.
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A divorce obtained abroad by an alien married to a Philippine national may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided the decree of divorce is valid according to the
national law of the foreigner.
Facts:
Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot (Rebecca) and Vicente Madrigal Bayot
(Vicente) were married on April 20, 1979 in Mandaluyong City. On its face, the
Marriage Certificate identified Rebecca to be an American citizen born in Agaa,
Guam, USA. Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra or Alix. From then on,
Vicente and Rebecca's marital relationship seemed to have soured as the latter
initiated divorce proceedings in the CFI of Dominican Republic which ordered the
dissolution of the couple's marriage but giving them joint custody and guardianship
over Alix.
Rebecca filed a petition before the Muntinlupa City RTC for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage and also sought the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains with application for support pendente lite for her and Alix.
Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and that
the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce. Rebecca interposed an
opposition, insisting her Filipino citizenship, therefore, there is no valid divorce to
speak of.
The RTC denied Vicente's motion to dismiss and granted Rebecca's application
for support pendente lite. The CA dismissed the petition of Rebecca and set aside
incidental orders the RTC issued in relation to the case.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce
judgment was rendered in the Dominican Republic.
2. Whether or not the judgment of divorce is valid.
Ruling:
1. No. There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied
for and obtained her divorce from Vicente, was an American citizen and remains to
be one, absent proof of an effective repudiation of such citizenship. The following are
compelling circumstances indicative of her American citizenship: (1) she was born in
Agaa, Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus soli is followed in this American territory
granting American citizenship to those who are born there; and (3) she was, and may
still be, a holder of an American passport.
And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently professed, asserted,
and represented herself as an American citizen, particularly: (1) during her marriage
as shown in the marriage certificate; (2) in the birth certificate of Alix; and (3) when
she secured the divorce from the Dominican Republic. Mention may be made of the
Affidavit of Acknowledgment in which she stated being an American citizen. The
Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a Filipino citizen. But from the
foregoing disquisition, it is indubitable that Rebecca did not have that status of, or at
least was not yet recognized as, a Filipino citizen when she secured the February 22,
1996 judgment of divorce from the Dominican Republic.
2. Yes. The Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a foreign
divorce can be recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and
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as valid under the national law of the alien spouse. Be this as it may, the fact that
Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that
divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation
of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing
said decree is, as here, sufficient.
Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall be
given a res judicata effect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce
decree obtained, the marital vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente is considered
severed; they are both freed from the bond of matrimony. In plain language, Vicente
and Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to each other. Consequent to the
dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be subject to a husband's
obligation under the code
ADOLFO C. AZNAR AND LUCY CHRISTENSEN v. HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA

G.R. No. L-16749, January 31, 1963, LABRADOR, J.
Doctrine of Renvoi is a legal doctrine which applies when a court is faced with
a conflict of law and must consider the law of another state, referred to as private
international law rules.
Facts:
Edward E. Christensen executed a will bequeathing a part of his property
located in the Philippines to Maria Helen Christensen his acknowledge daughter. He
was a citizen of US and State of California but domiciled in the Philippines at the time
of his death. Lucy his other child alleged that under the State of California Law
acknowledge children shall not inherit. Furthermore, Article 16 of the Civil Code
states that in case of testamentary succession with respect to the order of succession
and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the deceased. Thus, Helen shall
not inherit. Helen Christen on the other hand alleged that since there is no single
American law to such issue for the disposition of property located in the domicile of
the deceased what shall govern is the State of California Law that under Article 946
of the Civil Code of California, if there is no law to the contrary, in the place where
personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is
governed by the law of his domicile. Moreover in accordance therewith and following
the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision
in question should be referred back to the law of the decedent's domicile, which is
the Philippines.
Issue:
Whether or not the Doctrine of Renvoi shall apply in this case.
Ruling:
Yes, Doctrine of Renvoi is a legal doctrine which applies when a court is faced
with a conflict of law and must consider the law of another state, referred to as
private international law rules. This can apply when considering foreign issues arising
in succession planning and in administering estates.
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Thus, Article 16 par. 2 of the Civil Code provides that intestate and
testamentary successions with respect to order of succession and amount of
successional right is regulated by the national law of the deceased. While California
Probate Code provides that a testator may dispose of his property in the form and
manner he desires. Furthermore, Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California provides that
if no law on the contrary, the place where the personal property is situated is deemed
to follow the person of its owner and is governed by the law of his domicile
These provisions are cases when the Doctrine of Renvoi may be applied where
the question of validity of the testamentary provision in question is referred back to
the decedents domicile the Philippines. The conflicts of law rule in California Law
Probate and Art. 946 authorize the return of question of law to the testators
domicile. The court must apply its own rule in the Philippines as directed in the
conflicts of law rule in CA, otherwise the case/issue will not be resolved if the issue is
referred back and forth between 2 states.
SC finds that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of
California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his
acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law,
the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal
law of California.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS AND MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS v. EDWARD A. BELLIS ET

AL.
G.R. No. L-23678, June 6, 1967, BENGZON, J.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be
involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same
to the succession of foreign nationals.
Facts:
Amos G. Bellis born in Texas and was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the
United States. He therefore executed a will in the Philippines in favor of his children
and his first wife then later on died. Thereafter, when the will is probated, Maria
Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis were claiming to be the illegitimate children of
Amog and contended that they were deprived of legitimes. However, the Probate
court denied the claim on the ground that the national law of Amos G. Bellis does not
grant legitimes to illegitimate children relying on Article 16 of the Civil Code. They
argue that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph
of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code that prohibitive laws concerning
persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order,
public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a
foreign country prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code which
renders applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary
successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of
successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the
capacity to succeed.
Issue:
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Whether or not Article 17 last paragraph of the civil code is an exception for
the application of national law of decedent in Article 16 of the Civil Code
Ruling:
No. This is not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase,
"notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article" when they
incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while
reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old
Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the second
paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and
intestate succession. As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a
new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be
governed by the national law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be
involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to
the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia,
the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions
must prevail over general ones. The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis,
was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are
no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of
the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law,
the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
PAULA T. LLORENTE v. COURT OF APPEAL, AND ALICIA F. LLORENTE

G.R. No. 124371, November 23, 2000, PARDO, J.
Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their
national law.
Facts:
Lorenzo N. Llorente (Lorenzo) was married to his first wife Paula llorento
(Paula). However they obtained a divorce because of Paulas infidelity to Lorenzos
brother. The divorce was obtained long after Lorenzo was naturalized as American
Citizen. He then married his second wife Alice and begot three children. He executed
a will in the Philippines and bequeathing his properties situated therein to his second
wife and three children the later on died. Paula then claimed that she was the
surviving spouse of Lorenzo and that the divorce was not valid in the Philippines.
Issue:
Whether or not the divorce was recognizable in the Philippines.
Ruling:
Yes. In long line of cases decided by the SC it ruled that owing to the
nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals
are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court
ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to
their national law. Once proven that Lorenzo was no longer a Filipino citizen when he
15 | P a g e

obtained the divorce from Paula, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and
Paula could very well lose her right to inherit from him. Thus the divorce obtained by
Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this
jurisdiction as a matter of comity.
Human Relations
ALFREDO M. VELAYO v. SHELL COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, LTD.
G.R. No. L-7817, October 31, 1956, FELIX, J.
A moral wrong or injury, even if it does not constitute a violation of a statute
law, should be compensated by damages.
Facts:
Shell supplies fuel needs of CALI. However, due to financial crisis it failed to
pay Shell and its other creditors. Thus, they entered into an agreement that they
would present suits against the corporation but to strive for a pro-rata division of the
assets, and only in the case of non-agreement would the creditors file insolvency
proceedings. However, when Shell PH assigned the credit to Shell oil its American
Sister Corporation, the latter filed a case against CALI for the collection of assigned
Credit attaching the C-54 plane of CALI which the creditors opposed and filed
damages against Shell for breach of their agreement.
Issue:
Whether or not Shell shall be liable for damages.
Ruling:
Yes, Under Article 21 of the Civil Code states that any person who wilfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. This is the legal remedy
for that untold numbers of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to
provide for specifically in the statutes.
Another rule is expressed in Article 23 which compels the return of a thing
acquired without just or legal grounds. This provision embodies the doctrine that no
person should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another, which has been one
of the mainstays of every legal system for centuries. Now, if Article 23 of the Civil
Code goes as far as to provide that: Even if an act or event causing damage to
anothers property was not due to the fault or negligence of the Shell, the latter shall
be liable for indemnity if through the act or event he was benefited with mere much
more reason the Shell should be liable for indemnity for acts it committed in bad faith
and with betrayal of confidence.
Shell taking advantage of his knowledge that insolvency proceedings were to
be instituted by CALI if the creditors did not come to an understanding as to the
manner of distribution of the insolvent asset among them, and believing it most
probable that they would not arrive at such understanding as it was really the case
schemed and effected the transfer of its sister corporation in the United States,
where CALIs plane C-54 was by that swift and unsuspected operation efficaciously
16 | P a g e

disposed of said insolvents property depriving the latter, of the opportunity to
recover said plane to the detriment of the other creditors.
GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., and HERBERT C. HENDRY v.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RESTITUTO M. TOBIAS
G.R. No. 81262, August 25, 1989, CORTES, J.
Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the NCC are known to contain what is commonly
referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, which sets certain standards which
must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance
of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give
everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith.
Facts:
Restituto M. Tobias (Tobias) herein private respondent was an employee of
Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp (GMCRC) herein petitioner. Herbert Hendry
(Hendry) herein petitioner, was the Executive Vice-President and General Manager of
GMCRC. Sometime in 1972, GMCRC discovered fictitious purchases and other
fraudulent transactions for which it lost several thousands of pesos. Thereafter,
Hendry ordered Tobias to take a force leave so as to have Tobias investigated. Hendry
declared that Tobias was their number one suspect in the anomaly. Thus, criminal
complaints for estafa were filed against Tobias. These charges were however
dismissed for lack of probable cause. Subsequently, Hendry dismissed Tobias from
employment. Claiming that he was illegally dismissed, Tobias filed a complaint for
damages against GMCRC and Hendry with the RTC.
The RTC decided in favor of Tobias. On appeal, the CA affirmed. Now, GMCRC
and Hendry assail the decision of the CA. It asseverates that the dismissal of Tobias
was in lawful exercise of its right. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not GMCRC and Hendry exercised lawfully their right to dismiss
Tobias.
Ruling:
No. An employer who harbors suspicions that an employee has committed
dishonesty might be justified in taking the appropriate action such as ordering an
investigation and directing the employee to go on a leave. Firmness and the resolve
to uncover the truth would also be expected from such employer. But the highhanded treatment accorded Tobias by petitioners was certainly uncalled for. The
imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the
investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in
Article 19 of the Civil Code. The Court has already ruled that the right of the
employer to dismiss an employee should not be confused with the manner in which
the right is exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done
abusively, then the employer is liable for damages to the employee. Under the
circumstances of the instant case, the petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a
legitimate manner their right to dismiss Tobias, giving the latter the right to recover
damages under Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code.
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BARONS MARKETING CORP. v. COURT OF APPEALS and PHELPS DODGE
PHILS., INC.
G.R. No. 126486, February 9, 1998, KAPUNAN, J.
There is undoubtedly an abuse of right when it is exercised for the only
purpose of prejudicing or injuring another.
Facts:
Sometime in 1973, Barons Marketing Corp (Barons) herein petitioner,
appointed Phelps Dodge Phils Inc (Phelps) herein private respondent, as its dealer for
the sale of electrical wires and cables. Phelps was given by Barons credit for the
formers purchases of the latters electric products. Thereafter, Phelps, purchased on
credit from Barons various electric wires and cables. These wires and cables in turn,
were sold by Phelps to MERALCO. Subsequently, Barons demanded payment from
Phelps the amount covering the wires and cables. However, Phelps was unable to pay
the same. This prompted Barons to file a complaint for collection against Phelps.
The RTC held in favor of Barons and ordered Phelps to pay Barons. On appeal
with the CA, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Now Phelps assails the decision of
the CA. It avers that Barons abused its right as credit to the prejudice of Phelps.
Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not Barons abused its right to the prejudice of Phelps.
Ruling:
No. It is an elementary rule in this jurisdiction that good faith is presumed and
that the burden of proving bad faith rests upon the party alleging the same. In the
case at bar, petitioner has failed to prove bad faith on the part of private respondent.
Petitioners allegation that private respondent was motivated by a desire to terminate
its agency relationship with petitioner so that private respondent itself may deal
directly with Meralco is simply not supported by the evidence. At most, such
supposition is merely speculative.
Moreover, we find that private respondent was driven by very legitimate
reasons for rejecting petitioners offer and instituting the action for collection before
the trial court. As pointed out by private respondent, the corporation had its own
cash position to protect in order for it to pay its own obligations. This is not such a
lame and poor rationalization as petitioner purports it to be. For if private respondent
were to be required to accept petitioners offer, there would be no reason for the
latter to reject similar offers from its other debtors. Clearly, this would be inimical to
the interests of any enterprise, especially a profit-oriented one like private
respondent. It is plain to see that what we have here is a mere exercise of rights, not
an abuse thereof. Under these circumstances, we do not deem private respondent to
have acted in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy as to
violate the provisions of Article 21 of the Civil Code.
METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE SYSTEM v. ACT THEATER,

INC.
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G.R. No. 147076, June 17, 2004, CALLEJO SR., J.
When a right is exercised in a manner which discards the norms provided by
Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the NCC resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is
committed for which actor can be held accountable.
Facts:
This case stems from a criminal complaint filed by Metropolitan Waterworks
and Sewerage System (MWSS) herein petitioner, against the employees of Act
Theater (AT) herein respondent. Thereafter, MWSS disconnected the water services
provided to AT. This prompted AT to file a complaint for damages against MWSS for
having allegedly abused its right to the prejudice of AT.
The RTC ruled in favor of AT. The CA affirmed. This prompted MWSS to elevate
the case, assailing the decision of the CA. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not MWSS abused its right in cutting the water supply services to
the prejudice of AT.
Ruling:
Yes, it has abused its right. In this case, the petitioner failed to act with justice
and give the respondent what is due to it when the petitioner unceremoniously cut
off the respondents water service connection. As correctly found by the appellate
court:
While it is true that MWSS had sent a notice of investigation to
plaintiff-appellee prior to the disconnection of the latters water
services, this was done only a few hours before the actual
disconnection. Upon receipt of the notice and in order to ascertain the
matter, Act sent its assistant manager Teodulo Gumalid, Jr. to the
MWSS office but he was treated badly on the flimsy excuse that he had
no authority to represent Act. Acts water services were cut at midnight
of the day following the apprehension of the employees. Clearly, the
plaintiff-appellee was denied due process when it was deprived of the
water services. As a consequence thereof, Act had to contract another
source to provide water for a number of days. Plaintiff-appellee was
also compelled to deposit with MWSS the sum of P200,000.00 for the
restoration of their water services.
There is, thus, no reason to deviate from the uniform findings and conclusion of the
court a quo and the appellate court that the petitioners act was arbitrary, injurious
and prejudicial to the respondent, justifying the award of damages under Article 19 of
the Civil Code.
SOLEDAD CARPIO v. LEONORA A. VALMONTE

G.R. No. 151866, September 9, 2004, TINGA, J.
To warrant recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action, for a
wrong inflicted by the defendant, and the damage resulting therefrom to the plaintiff.
19 | P a g e

Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of
action.
Facts:
Leonora Valmonte (Valmonte) herein respondent, is a wedding coordinator
who was engaged by one Michelle del Rosario (Michelle) and Jon Sierra (Jon) for their
wedding. On the day at the wedding and within the Manila Hotel where the Michelle
and Jon were billeted, Valmonte was overseeing the preparations for the wedding.
Upon entering the suite where the bride, brides maids, parents, relatives, make-up
artist, assistants, photographers and fashion designers were located, Soledad Carpio
(Carpio) herein petitioner exclaimed, Ikaw ang lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan ang dala
mong bag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto, ikaw ang kumuha.
Thereafter, Carpio ordered one of the ladies at the suite to search the body of
Valmonte. Apparently, the million dollar pieces of jewellery owned by Carpio were
missing and Carpio was speculating the Valmonte had it. Throughout the event,
Valmonte was being accused by Carpio of taking the pieces of jewellery owned by
Carpio. Thereafter, Valmonte filed a complaint for damages against Carpio alleging
that her ordeal has caused her humiliation, and has besmirched her reputation.
The RTC dismissed the complaint of Valmonte. On appeal, the CA reversed and
set aside the decision of the RTC. It held Carpio liable for damages in favor of
Valmonte. Now, Carpio comes before the Supreme Court assailing decision of the CA.
Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Carpios imputations has prejudiced Valmonte.
Ruling:
Yes. In the case at bar, petitioners verbal reproach against respondent was
certainly uncalled for considering that by her own account nobody knew that she
brought such kind and amount of jewellery inside the paper bag. This being the case,
she had no right to attack respondent with her innuendos which were not merely
inquisitive but out-rightly accusatory. By openly accusing respondent as the only
person who went out of the room before the loss of the jewellery in the presence of
all the guests therein, and ordering that she be immediately bodily searched,
petitioner virtually branded respondent as the thief. True, petitioner had the right to
ascertain the identity of the malefactor, but to malign respondent without an iota of
proof that she was the one who actually stole the jewellery is an act which, by any
standard or principle of law is impermissible. Petitioner had wilfully caused injury to
respondent in a manner which is contrary to morals and good customs. Her firmness
and resolve to find her missing jewellery cannot justify her acts toward respondent.
She did not act with justice and good faith for apparently, she had no other purpose
in mind but to prejudice respondent. Certainly, petitioner transgressed the provisions
of Article 19 in relation to Article 21 for which she should be held accountable.
ELEAZAR S. PADILLO v. RURAL BANK OF NABUNTURAN, INC. and MARK S.

OROPEZA
G.R. No. 199338, January 21, 2013, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
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Damages may be recoverable due to an abuse of right under Article 21 in
conjunction with Article 19 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the following elements
must, however, obtain: ( 1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) exercised in bad faith;
and (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
Facts:
Eleazar Padillo (Padillo) herein petitioner, deceased and represented by his
heirs, was an employed by Rural Bank of Nabunturan Inc. (RBNI) herein respondent,
as its Bookkeeper. Thereafter, on 2007, Padillo suffered a mild stroke due to
hypertension which consequently impaired his ability to effectively pursue his work.
On September 10 2007 he wrote a letter addressed to Mark Oropeza (Oropeza)
President of RBNI expressing his intention to avail of an early retirement package.
However despite several follow-ups, Padillos request remained unheeded. Thus, on
October 3, 2007, Padillo was separated from employment due to his poor and failing
health. Not having received his claimed retirement benefits, Padillo filed a complaint
for recovery of unpaid retirement benefits.
The LA dismissed the complaint of Padillo. On appeal with the NLRC, the NLRC
reversed and set aside the decision of the LA. Subsequently, the CA reversed the
ruling of the NLRC and affirmed the decision of the LA. Among others, Padillo avers
that the act of RBNI and Oropeza in ignoring his request for the early retirement
package constitutes bad faith and thus susceptible for the damages. Hence this
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the act of ignoring the request of Padillo is a violation of the
NCC on Human Relations
Ruling:
No, it is not. The Court finds no bad faith in any of respondents actuations as
they were within their right, absent any proof of its abuse, to ignore Padillos
misplaced claim for retirement benefits. Respondents obstinate refusal to accede to
Padillos request is precisely justified by the fact that there lies no basis under any
applicable agreement or law which accords the latter the right to demand any
retirement benefits from the Bank. While the Court mindfully notes that damages
may be recoverable due to an abuse of right under Article 21 in conjunction with
Article 19 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the following elements must, however,
obtain: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) exercised in bad faith; and (3) for the sole
intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Records reveal that none of these elements
exists in the case at bar and thus, no damages on account of abuse of right may he
recovered.
ORLANDO D. GARCIA, JR., doing business under the name and style
COMMUNITY DIAGNOSTIC CENTER and BU CASTRO v. RANIDA D. SALVADOR
and RAMON SALVADOR
G.R. No. 168512, March 20, 2007, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Article 20, NCC provides the legal basis for the award of damages to a party
who suffers damage whenever one commits an act in violation of some legal
21 | P a g e

provision. This was incorporated by the Code Commission to provide relief to a
person who suffers damage because another has violated some legal provision.
Facts:
Ranida Salvador (Ranida) herein respondent underwent a HBs Ag test for the
purpose of determining whether Ranida had Hepatitis B. The test was conducted by
Bu Castro (Castro) of the Community Diagnostic Center (CDC) represented by
Orlando Garcia (Garcia) herein petitioners. Subsequently, it was determined that
Ranida was positive of Hepatitis B. As a result, Ranida was terminated from her
employment. Because of Ranidas alleged positive identification for Hepatitis B which
resulted to her termination, Ramon Salvador (Ramon) herein respondent and father
of Ranida, suffered a heart attack and was forced to be admitted to the hospital for
medication. Thereafter, Ranida sought further tests from other medical practitioners
and it was later found out that Ranida was in truth and in fact, not suffering from
Hepatitis B. Verily, CDC conducted a second test on Ranida the test yielded a
negative result. Thus Ranida was reinstated in her employment. Thereafter, Ranida
and Ramon filed a complaint for damages. They anchored their claim on the fact that
Ranida lost her job, suffered serious mental anxiety, trauma and sleepless night. In
the same vein, Ramon avers that he was hospitalized and had therefore lost business
opportunities because of the erroneous test results of CDC.
The RTC dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of
the RTC and held CDC and Castro liable. Now, CDC and Castro comes before the
Supreme Court assailing the decision of the CA. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not CDC and Castro are liable for damages in favor of Ranida and
Ramon.
Ruling:
Yes. The failure of petitioners to comply with the laws and rules promulgated
and issued for the protection of public safety and interest is failure to observe that
care which a reasonably prudent health care provider would observe. Thus, their act
or omission constitutes a breach of duty.
Indubitably, Ranida suffered injury as a direct consequence of Garcias failure
to comply with the mandate of the laws and rules aforequoted. She was terminated
from the service for failing the physical examination; suffered anxiety because of the
diagnosis; and was compelled to undergo several more tests. All these could have
been avoided had the proper safeguards been scrupulously followed in conducting
the clinical examination and releasing the clinical report.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY and PEDRO YAMBAO v. THE HONORABLE COURT

OF APPEALS and ISAAC CHAVEZ, SR., ISAAC O. CHAVEZ, JR., ROSENDO O.
CHAVES, and JUAN O. CHAVES
G.R. No. L-39019, January 22, 1988, YAP, J.
The act of MERALCO in disconnecting the electricity of the Chavez' without
prior notice constitutes a violation of Article 21, NCC and hence, therefore a ground
for award of damages.
22 | P a g e

Facts:
Sometime in 1965 Pedro Yambao (Yambao) representing Manila Electric
Company (MERALCO) herein petitioners, sent two (2) overdue bills representing the
unpaid electricity of Isaac Chavez Sr. et al (Chavez et al). Thereafter, Chavez et al
caused the payment of one (1) of the electric bills. Subsequently, MERALCO
disconnected its power services without prior notice to the prejudice of Chavez et al.
The day after, Chavez et al caused the payment of the other overdue bill. Later on,
Chavez et al sued MERALCO for damages on the ground that they have suffered
embarrassment, humiliation, wounded feelings, and hurt pride because of the undue
disconnection.
The RTC ruled in favor of Chavez et al and held MERALCO liable. On appeal,
the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Meralcos act of disconnecting the electricity of Chavez et al
without prior notice is a ground for damages
Ruling:
Yes it is a ground. We find no reversible error in the decision appealed from.
One cannot deny the vital role which a public utility such as MERALCO, having a
monopoly of the supply of electrical power in Metro Manila and some nearby
municipalities, plays in the life of people living in such areas. Electricity has become a
necessity to most people in these areas justifying the exercise by the State of its
regulatory power over the business of supplying electrical service to the public, in
which petitioner MERALCO is engaged. Thus, the state may regulate, as it has done
through Section 97 of the Revised Order No. 1 of the Public Service Commission, the
conditions under which and the manner by which a public utility such as MERALCO
may effect a disconnection of service to a delinquent customer. Among others, a prior
written notice to the customer is required before disconnection of the service. Failure
to give such prior notice amounts to a tort, as held by us in a similar case, where we
said:
Petitioner's act in 'disconnecting respondent Ongsip's gas
service without prior notice constitutes breach of contract amounting
to an independent tort. The prematurity of the action is indicative of
intent to cause additional mental and moral suffering to private
respondent. This is a clear violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code
which provides that any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for damages. This is reiterated by
paragraph 10 of Article 2219 of the Code. Moreover, the award of
moral damages is sanctioned by Article 2220 which provides that wilful
injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages
if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages
are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the
defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
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SPOUSES CRISTINO and BRIGIDA CUSTODIO and SPOUSES LITO and MARIA
CRISTINA SANTOS v. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF PACIFICO C. MABASA
and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG,
METRO MANILA, BRANCH 181
G.R. No. 116100, February 9, 1996, REGALADO, J.
In order that the principle of abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil
Code can be applied, it is essential that the following requisites concur: (1) The
defendant should have acted in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy; (2) The acts should be willful; and (3) There was damage or injury to
the plaintiff.
Facts:
This case stems from a civil case filed by Pacifico Mabasa (Mabasa) against
Spouses Custodio (Sps.Custodio) and Spouses Santos (Sps. Santos) herein petitioner
for easement or right of way in favor of Mabasa. The RTC decided in favor of Mabasa
and ordered Sps. Custodio and Santos to give Mabasa his right of way. In the same
case however, the RTC denied the claim of damages filed by Mabasa. Thus, the Heirs
of Mabasa (Heirs) appealed to the CA only as regards the claim for damages. The CA
held in favor of the Heirs and ordered the Spouses Custodio and Santos to pay the
Heir damages for unrealized rentals resulting from the easement or right of way. Now,
Sps. Custodio and Santos come before the Supreme Court, assailing, among others
the award of damages. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Sps. Custodio and Santos are liable for damages.
Ruling:
No. The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid
exercise of their right as owners, hence not contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a
thing, without other limitations than those established by law. It is within the right of
petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence their property. Article 430 of the Civil
Code provides that every owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements by
means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other means without
detriment to servitudes constituted thereon.
At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any
servitude. There was no easement of way existing in favor of private respondents,
either by law or by contract. The fact that private respondents had no existing right
over the said passageway is confirmed by the very decision of the trial court granting
a compulsory right of way in their favor after payment of just compensation. It was
only that decision which gave private respondents the right to use the said
passageway after payment of the compensation and imposed a corresponding duty
on petitioners not to interfere in the exercise of said right.
Hence, prior to said decision, petitioners had an absolute right over their
property and their act of fencing and enclosing the same was an act which they may
lawfully perform in the employment and exercise of said right. To repeat, whatever
injury or damage may have been sustained by private respondents by reason of the
rightful use of the said land by petitioners is damnum absque injuria.
24 | P a g e
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T.

GONZALES
G.R. No. 97336, February 19, 1993, DAVIDE JR. J.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an
actionable wrong.
Facts:
Gashem Shookat Baksh (Baksh) herein petitioner is an Iranian citizen who is
studying here in the Philippines. On the other hand Marilou Gonzales (Gonzales)
herein private respondent is a Filipino citizen. Sometime in 1987 Baksh courted and
proposed to Gonzales for the purpose of marrying the latter. Thereafter, Baksh and
Gonzales went to the latters parent so as to obtain their consent. Thus, Baksh and
Gonzales started to live together under one roof. Subsequently, a week before their
marriage, their relationship turned sour. Baksh started to abuse, maltreat and
threatened to kill Gonzales. This ordeal culminated to a confrontation before the
barangay whereby Baksh repudiated their marriage agreement, asked Gonzales to
leave and disclosed that he was already married to another woman. Aggrieved,
Gonzales filed a complaint for damages against Baksh with the RTC.
The RTC held in favor of Gonzales and awarded damages in her favor. On
appeal with the CA, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Now, Baksh comes
before the Supreme Court assailing the decision of the CA. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Baksh can be held liable for damages for his breach of promise
to marry Gonzales.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court is of the opinion that where a man's promise to marry is in fact
the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation
to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself
unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying
her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or
inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify
the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry
but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the wilful injury to her honour and
reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential however, that such injury should
have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's
"fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that
made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the
honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these
fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their
daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage." In short, the
private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every
single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction.
25 | P a g e

The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private
respondent may not have been impelled by the purest of intentions, she eventually
submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but because of moral
seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of conscience about the entire
episode for as soon as she found out that the petitioner was not going to marry her
after all, she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari
delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal
fault." At most, it could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.
VICENTE RELLOSA, CYNTHIA ORTEGA assisted by husband Roberto Ortega v.

GONZALO PELLOSIS, INESITA MOSTE, and DANILO RADAM
G.R. No. 138964, August 9, 2001, VITUG, J.
The abuse of rights rule established in Article 19 of the Civil Code requires
every person to act with justice, to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty
and good faith. When a right is exercised in a manner which discards these norms
resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which the actor can
be held accountable.
Facts:
Gonzalo Pellosis, Inesita Moste, and Danilo Radam (Pellosis et al) herein
respondents, were lessee on the land of one Marta Reyes. During their lease, they
erected houses upon the land owned by Reyes. Thereafter, Reyes died. Without the
knowledge of Pellosis et al, Vicente Rellosa (Rellosa) and his daughter Cynthia Ortega
(Ortega) herein petitioners, bought the leased land where the houses of Pellosis et al
were located. Thus, titles covering the aforementioned land were issued in favor of
Ortega. Subsequently, Ortega filed a petition for condemnation with the Office of the
Building Official (OBO) praying for the demolition of the houses and evacuation of its
occupants, namely Pellosis et al. The OBO issued a resolution ordering the demolition
of the houses. Copies of the resolution were served upon Pellosis et al on December
7, 1989. The following day, Ortega hired workers to commence the demolition of the
houses of Pellosis et al. Pellosis et al were able to timely intervene averring that the
resolution for demolition was not yet final and executory hence appealable. On
December 11, 1989, Pellosis et al filed their appeal to the OBO. However, on
December 12, 1989 Ortega once again hired workers and proceeded with the
demolition of the houses of Pellosis et al. This prompted, Pellosis et al to file a
complaint for damages for untimely demolition of the houses against Ortega.
The RTC dismissed the complaint of Pellosis et al. On appeal, the CA reversed
and set aside the decision of the RTC. It held Ortega liable for damages in favor of
Pellosis et al. Now, Ortega comes before the Supreme Court assailing the decision of
the CA. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the act of Ortega of demolishing prematurely the houses of
Pellosis et al is a ground for damages.
Ruling:
Yes. Petitioner might verily be the owner of the land, with the right to enjoy
and to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof, but the exercise
26 | P a g e

of these rights is not without limitations. The abuse of rights rule established in
Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person to act with justice, to give everyone
his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. When a right is exercised in a
manner which discards these norms resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is
committed for which the actor can be held accountable. In this instance, the issue is
not so much about the existence of the right or validity of the order of demolition as
the question of whether or not petitioners have acted in conformity with, and not in
disregard of, the standard set by Article 19 of the Civil Code.
At the time petitioners implemented the order of demolition, barely five days
after respondents received a copy thereof, the same was not yet final and executory.
The law provided for a fifteen-day appeal period in favor of a party aggrieved by an
adverse ruling of the Office of the Building Official but by the precipitate action of
petitioners in demolishing the houses of respondents (prior to the expiration of the
period to appeal), the latter were effectively deprived of this recourse. The fact that
the order of demolition was later affirmed by the Department of Public Works and
Highways was of no moment. The action of petitioners up to the point where they
were able to secure an order of demolition was not condemnable but implementing
the order unmindful of the right of respondents to contest the ruling was a different
matter and could only be held utterly indefensible.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. PHILIPP BROTHERS OCEANIC, INC.

G.R. No. 126204, November 20, 2001, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
Where a person merely uses a right pertaining to him, without bad faith or
intent to injure, the fact that damages are thereby suffered by another will not make
him liable.
Facts:
Sometime in 1987 the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) herein
petitioner issued invitations to bid for the supply of imported coal for its Batangas
Coal-Fired Thermal Power Plant in Batangas. One of the bidders was the Philipp
Brother Oceanic Inc (PHIBRO) herein respondent. After public bidding, PHIBROs bid
was accepted. Thereafter a contract was entered into between NAPOCOR and PHIBRO
whereby it stipulates that within thirty (30) days from the transmission of the Letter
of Credit (LC) by NAPOCOR, PHIBRO would ship the coal. However, PHIBRO failed to
undertake such obligation. PHIBRO imputed such failure on the fact that there was an
on-going strike somewhere in Australia involving workers who carry out the
exportation and transfer of the coal. PHIBRO was able to transmit the coal only after
ninety (90) days after the LC was sent. Subsequently, NAPOCOR advertised once
more for the delivery of coal. PHIBRO again submitted an application to bid. However
NAPOCOR disapproved PHIBROs application because of PHIBROs purported failure to
ship the coal on time as per their contract. This prompted PHIBRO to file a complaint
for damages against NAPOCOR.
The RTC and CA held in favor of PHIBRO and ordered NAPOCOR to pay PHIBRO
damages for proscribing PHIBRO to bid. Now, NAPOCOR comes before the Supreme
Court assailing the decision of the CA. Hence this petition.
Issue:
27 | P a g e

Whether or not NAPOCOR exercised its right legally when it disapproved
PHIBROs application to bid.
Ruling:
Yes, it exercised its right legally. Accordingly, a bidder has no ground of action
to compel the Government to award the contract in his favor, nor to compel it to
accept his bid. Verily, a reservation of the government of its right to reject any bid,
generally vests in the authorities a wide discretion as to who is the best and most
advantageous bidder. The exercise of such discretion involves inquiry, investigation,
comparison, deliberation and decision, which are quasi-judicial functions, and when
honestly exercised, may not be reviewed by the court. The discretion to accept or
reject a bid and award contracts is vested in the Government agencies entrusted with
that function. The discretion given to the authorities on this matter is of such wide
latitude that the Courts will not interfere therewith, unless it is apparent that it is
used as a shield to a fraudulent award.
Owing to the discretionary character of the right involved in this case, the
propriety of NAPOCORs act should therefore be judged on the basis of the general
principles regulating human relations, the forefront provision of which is Article 19 of
the Civil Code which provides that every person must, in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith. Accordingly, a person will be protected only when he
acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with prudence and in
good faith; but not when he acts with negligence or abuse. We went over the record
of the case with painstaking solicitude and we are convinced that NAPOCORs act of
disapproving PHIBRO's application for pre-qualification to bid was without any intent
to injure or a purposive motive to perpetrate damage. Apparently, NAPOCOR acted
on the strong conviction that PHIBRO had a seriously-impaired track record.
NAPOCOR cannot be faulted from believing so.
ALFRED FRITZ FRENZEL v. EDERLINA P. CATITO

G.R. No. 143958, July 11 2003, CALLEJO, SR., J.
Article 22, NCC is expressed in the maxim MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER
DETREMENTO PROTEST" (No persons should enrich himself at the expense of
another). However, this article does not apply if the action is proscribed by the
Constitution or by the application of the pari delicto doctrine.
Facts:
Alfred Fritz Frenzel (Frenzel) a German national met Ederlina Catito (Catito) a
Filipino citizen. Frenzel and Catito were married respectively to other persons.
However, despite such marriage of each, Frenzel and Catito decided to have an
amorous or common law relationship without the benefit of marriage. Thereafter,
Frenzel bought real properties in the Philippines but had it named to Frenzel.
Sometime after, their relationship turned sour resulting to their separation. Now,
Frenzel seeks the return of the real properties he allegedly bought and named in
favor of Catito contending that it was his money which was used in the acquisition of
such real properties.
The RTC and CA found scant merit in the position of Frenzel. They opine that
Frenzel is not qualified to own real properties in the Philippines since it is proscribed
28 | P a g e

by the Constitution. Now, Frenzel comes before the Supreme Court assailing the
decision of the CA. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Frenzel has a legal right to cause the return of the real
properties in his favor.
Ruling:
No. The respondent was herself married to Klaus Muller, a German citizen.
Thus, the petitioner and the respondent could not lawfully join in wedlock. The
evidence on record shows that the petitioner in fact knew of the respondent's
marriage to another man, but nonetheless purchased the subject properties under
the name of the respondent and paid the purchase prices therefor. Even if it is
assumed gratia arguendi that the respondent and the petitioner were capacitated to
marry, the petitioner is still disqualified to own the properties in tandem with the
respondent.
The reliance of petitioner on Art. 22 of the New Civil Code is misplaced. The
said provision does not apply if, as in this case, the action is proscribed by the
Constitution or by the application of the pari delicto doctrine. It may be unfair and
unjust to bar the petitioner from filing an accion in rem verso over the subject
properties, or from recovering the money he paid for the said properties, but, as Lord
Mansfield stated in the early case of Holman vs. Johnson: "The objection that a
contract is immoral or illegal as between the plaintiff and the defendant, sounds at all
times very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that the
objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in general principles of policy, which the
defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as between him and the
plaintiff."
DAVID REYES (Substituted by Victoria R. Fabella) v. JOSE LIM, CHUY CHENG

KENG and HARRISON LUMBER, INC.
G.R. No. 134241, August 11, 2003, CARPIO, J.
The principle that no person may unjustly enrich himself at the expense of
another is embodied in Article 22 of the Civil Code. This principle applies not only to
substantive rights but also to procedural remedies.
Facts:
David Reyes (Reyes) herein petitioner, was the owner of a parcel of land
somewhere in Pasay City. Chuy Cheng Keng (Keng) and Harrison Lumber Inc (HLI)
herein respondents, are lessee in the aforementioned parcel of land owned by Reyes.
Sometime in 1994, Reyes entered into a Contract to Sell with Jose Lim (Lim) herein
respondent for the sale of the parcel of land owned by Reyes. In the Contract to Sell,
it was stipulated that in case of failure by Reyes to have Keng and HLI vacate the
premises, Reyes would pay Lim a percentage of the contract price agreed into
between Reyes and Lim. The agreed contract price was P28M. P10M was paid when
the Contract to Sell was entered into. Thereafter the remaining P18M would be paid
after the Deed of Absolute Sale has been entered into and the lessee namely Keng
and HLI, be vacated from the land. However, Keng and HLI did not vacate the
aforementioned land. This prompted Reyes to sue for annulment of contract against
29 | P a g e

Lim, Keng and HLI. Reyes imputed that Lim, Keng and HLI were in connivance in
making sure that Keng and HLI would not vacate the premises. During the
proceedings with the RTC, Lim requested in open court that Reyes be ordered to
deposit the P10M down payment with the cashier of the RTC. The RTC granted said
motion. Thereafter, Reyes filed a motion to set aside the aforementioned ordered on
the ground that it is not one of the remedies provided for by the Rules of Court in civil
proceedings.
The RTC denied the motion. On appeal with the CA, the CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the deposit of P10M ordered by the trial court is valid.
Ruling:
Yes, it is valid. The principle that no person may unjustly enrich himself at the
expense of another is embodied in Article 22 of the Civil Code. This principle applies
not only to substantive rights but also to procedural remedies. One condition for
invoking this principle is that the aggrieved party has no other action based on
contract, quasi-contract, crime, quasi-delict or any other provision of law. Courts can
extend this condition to the hiatus in the Rules of Court where the aggrieved party,
during the pendency of the case, has no other recourse based on the provisional
remedies of the Rules of Court.
Thus, a court may not permit a seller to retain, pendente lite, money paid by a
buyer if the seller himself seeks rescission of the sale because he has subsequently
sold the same property to another buyer. By seeking rescission, a seller necessarily
offers to return what he has received from the buyer. Such a seller may not take back
his offer if the court deems it equitable, to prevent unjust enrichment and ensure
restitution, to put the money in judicial deposit.
There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss
of another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the
fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience. In this case, it was
just, equitable and proper for the trial court to order the deposit of the P10 million
down payment to prevent unjust enrichment by Reyes at the expense of Lim.
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY v. MADRIGAL WAN HAI LINES

CORPORATION
G.R. No. 148332, September 30, 2003, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
The case at bar calls to mind the principle of unjust enrichment Nemo Cum
Alterius Detrimento Locupletari Potest. No person shall be allowed to enrich himself
unjustly at the expense of others.
Facts:
The National Development Company (NDC) herein petitioner, wholly owns the
subsidiary National Corporation (NSCP) which offers shipping services for
containerized cargo between the Far East ports and the US West Coast.
Subsequently, the NDC Board of Directors sent out invitations to bid for stock
30 | P a g e

ownership of the NSCP as well as its three (3) ocean-going vessels. Thereafter, a
Notice of Award was issued to Madrigal Wan Hai Lines Corporation (MWHLC) since it
won the bidding process. Thus, NDC and MWHLC entered into a Contract of Sale
whereby MWHLC acquired NSCP, its assets, personnel, records and its three (3)
vessels. Later on, MWHLC was flabbergasted when the US Internal Revenue Service
sent MWHLC a Notice of Final Assessment against NSCP for deficiency taxes on gross
transportation income derived from US sources for the years 1990, 1991 and 1992
when NSCP was still owned by NDC. Thus MWHLC was constrained to pay.
Subsequently, MWHLC sought reimbursement from the NDC for the expenses it
incurred for the payment of NSCPs taxes. However, MWHLCs demand fell on stony
ground. This prompted MWHLC to sue NDC.
The RTC and CA found MWHLCs position meritorious. Now, NDC comes before
the Supreme Court assailing the decision of the CA holding it liable for
reimbursement of taxes paid by MWHLC. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not NDC is liable for reimbursing MWHLC.
Ruling:
Yes. There is no dispute that petitioner was aware of its US tax liabilities
considering its numerous communications with the agents of the United States
Internal Revenue Service, just prior to the sale of NSCP and the marine vessels to
respondent. The NSCP itself made an ambiguous contingent provision in its
Unaudited Financial Statements for the year ending December 1993, thereby
indicating its awareness of a possible US tax assessment. It bears stressing that
petitioner did not convey such information to respondent despite its inquiries.
Obviously, such concealment constitutes bad faith on its part.
The case at bar calls to mind the principle of unjust enrichment Nemo cum
alterius detrimento locupletari potest. No person shall be allowed to enrich himself
unjustly at the expense of others. This principle of equity has been enshrined in our
Civil Code, Article 22 of which provides:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act or performance by another or
by any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at
the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the
same to him.
Justice and equity thus oblige that petitioner be held liable for NSCPs tax
liabilities and reimburse respondent for the amounts it paid. It would be unjust
enrichment on the part of petitioner to be relieved of that obligation.
ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGO and JOSE FARLEY

BEDENIA v.
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-39999, May 31, 1984, GUTIERREZ JR., J.
What Article 29 clearly and expressly provides is a remedy for the plaintiff in
case the defendant has been acquitted in a criminal prosecution on the ground that
his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. It merely emphasizes that a
31 | P a g e

civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act or
omission.
Facts:
Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdones, Ismael Gonzalgo, and Jose Farley (Padilla et al)
herein petitioners, were charged with the crime of Grave Coercion by one Antonio
Vergara (Vergara) for allegedly preventing the latter from closing his stall at the
public market and by subsequently forcibly opening the door of the said stall and
thereafter brutally demolishing and destroying the same.
The RTC found Padilla et al guilty beyond reasonable doubt. On appeal with
the CA, acquitted Padilla et al on the ground of reasonable doubt but were ordered to
pay jointly and severally the amount of P9,600.00 as damages. To this, Padilla et al
appealed as regards the civil aspect of the case. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Padilla et al may be held civilly liable for damages despite
their acquittal
Ruling:
Yes, they may still be held civilly liable. There is nothing contrary to the Civil
Code provision in the rendition of a judgment of acquittal and a judgment awarding
damages in the same criminal action. The two can stand side by side. A judgment of
acquittal operates to extinguish the criminal liability. It does not, however, extinguish
the civil liability unless there is clear showing that the act from which civil liability
might arise did not exist.
We further note the rationale behind Art. 29 of the Civil Code in arriving at the
intent of the legislator that they could not possibly have intended to make it more
difficult for the aggrieved party to recover just compensation by making a separate
civil action mandatory and exclusive.
A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be
established or more evidence must be adduced or where the criminal case has been
fully terminated and a separate complaint would be just as efficacious or even more
expedient than a timely remand to the trial court where the criminal action was
decided for further hearings on the civil aspects of the case. The offended party may,
of course, choose to file a separate action. These do not exist in this case.
Considering moreover the delays suffered by the case in the trial, appellate, and
review stages, it would be unjust to the complainants in this case to require at this
time a separate civil action to be filed.
Prejudicial Question
LEONILO C. DONATO v. HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT
OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF MANIIA, BRANCH XXXII HON. JOSE FLAMINIANO,
CITY FISCAL OF MANILA; PAZ B. ABAYAN
G.R. No. L-53642 April 15, 1988, GANCAYCO, J.
32 | P a g e

The civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage does not determine the
guilt or innocence of the accused, and is thus not a prejudicial question in the crime
of bigamy. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves
its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts;
otherwise, the presumption is that the first marriage exists.
Facts:
Paz B. Abayan and Leonilo C. Donato lived together as husband and wife
without the benefit of wedlock for at least five (5) years. In 1978, Paz married Leonilo,
without knowing that the latter had a subsisting marriage with another woman. Upon
discovering the truth, Paz left Leonilo and filed a criminal complaint for bigamy.
Before Leonilo was arraigned, Paz filed a civil action for declaration of nullity of her
marriage with Leonilo. Taking advantage of the situation, Leonilo moved to suspend
the criminal proceedings on the ground that civil case for nullity of marriage filed by
private respondent raises a prejudicial question.
Issue:
Whether or not the civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage poses a
prejudicial question to the criminal case.
Ruling:
No. A prejudicial question is one based on a fact distinct and separate from
the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence
of the accused. For a prejudicial question to suspend the criminal action, it must
appear that (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which
the criminal prosecution would be based, and that (2) the resolution of the issue/s
raised in the civil case would necessarily determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. The
civil case does not determine Leonilos guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy.
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for
the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts; otherwise, the
presumption is that the first marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second
marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the
risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
RICARDO QUIAMBAO v. HON. ADRIANO OSORIO, ZENAIDA GAZA

BUENSUCERO, JUSTINA GAZA BERNARDO, AND FELIPE GAZA
G.R. No. L-48157 March 16, 1988, FERNAN, J.
Even if the cases involved are civil and administrative in nature, a prejudicial
question exists so long as the following requisites are present: (a) the
(administrative) case involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue in
the (civil) case; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
(civil) action may proceed.
Facts:
33 | P a g e

Ricardo Quiambao filed an administrative case against Zenaida Gaza
Buensucero, et al. before the Office of the Land Authority. Ricardo questioned
Zenaida, et al.s right of possession over a parcel of land in Malabon, Rizal. During
the pendency of the case, Ricardo went to the subject property, fenced it, and began
construction of a house thereon. Zenaida, et al. thereafter filed a civil case against
Ricardo for forcible entry. Ricardo argued that the pending administrative case poses
a prejudicial question which bars the civil case.
Issue:
Whether or not the administrative case questioning Zenaida, et al.s right of
possession over the property poses a prejudicial question to the civil case for forcible
entry.
Ruling:
Yes. The actions involved in the case at bar being respectively civil and
administrative in character. This means that technically speaking, prejudicial question
does not exist. Equally apparent, however, is the intimate correlation of the issues
between the said cases. The right of Zenaida, et al. in the civil case to eject petitioner
over the subject property is intertwined on their right of possession over the said
parcel of land, which is the subject of the administrative case. Likewise, the
resolution of the administrative case necessarily determines whether or not the civil
case may proceed. Hence, the administrative case posed a prejudicial question as
against the civil case.
ISABELO APA, MANUEL APA AND LEONILO JACALAN v. HON. RUMOLDO R.

FERNANDEZ, HON. CELSO V. ESPINOSA, AND SPS. FELIXBERTO TIGOL, JR.
AND ROSITA TAGHOY TIGOL
G.R. No. 112381 March 20, 1995, MENDOZA, J.
A prejudicial question is a question which is based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that its resolution is
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
Facts:
A case for declaration of nullity of Rositas title over a parcel of land in Lapu
Lapu City was filed in 1990. Three (3) years later, Rosita and her husband filed a
criminal complaint against Isabelo Apa, et al. for violation of the Anti-Squatting law,
alleging therein that Rositas ownership over the subject lot was violated by Isabelo,
et al.s occupation of a portion of Rositas said real property. Isabelo, et al. moved for
the suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for declaration of
nullity of Rositas title posed a prejudicial question to the criminal case.
Issue:
Whether or not the civil case questioning Rositas title over the property poses
a prejudicial question to the criminal case for violation of the Anti-Squatting law.
Ruling:
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Yes. A prejudicial question exists if: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar
or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution
of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. The issue
of Rositas ownership in the prior civil case is intimately related to the criminal case,
which alleges violation of Rositas right of ownership. Likewise, resolving Rositas
right of ownership in the civil case will determine if the criminal action for violation of
the Anti-Squatting Law, which hinges on Rositas claim of ownership, will proceed.
MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND HON. JUDGE

FLORENTINO TUAZON, JR., BEING THE JUDGE OF THE RTC, BRANCH 139,
MAKATI CITY
G.R. No. 137567 June 20, 2000, BUENA, J.
A prejudicial question exists if the resolution of the common issue of the civil
and criminal cases determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Facts:
Meynardo L. Beltran and Charmaine E. Felix were married in 1973. Years later,
Meynardo abandoned the conjugal home and cohabited with another woman. In
1997, Meynardo filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage with
Charmaine on the ground of psychological incapacity. Charmaine responded with a
criminal complaint for concubinage against Meynardo. To forestall his arrest,
Meynardo moved to suspend the criminal proceedings on the ground that the civil
case for declaration of nullity of marriage poses a prejudicial question the criminal
case for concubinage.
Issue:
Whether or not the civil case for declaration of nullity of Meynardos marriage
poses a prejudicial question to the criminal case for concubinage.
Ruling:
No. A prejudicial question exists if the resolution of the common issue of the
civil and criminal cases determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Since Article 40 of the Family Code provides that the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of marriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void, Meynardo does not need the final
judgment in the civil case to prove the nullity of his marriage for purposes of his
acquittal in the criminal case.
In any case, a subsequent declaration of nullity of his marriage in the civil
case is not a valid defense in a criminal complaint for concubinage. Parties to the
marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same
must be submitted to judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of
the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes.
Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration
of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage.
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SPOUSES ANTONIO S. PAHANG AND LOLITA T. PAHANG v. HON. AUGUSTINE
A. VESTIL, PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT- BRANCH 56,
MANDAUE CITY,
DEPUTY SHERIFF, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT-BRANCH 56 AND
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY
G.R. No. 148595 July 12, 2004, CALLEJO, SR., J.
A prejudicial question exists if the issues involved in the first case are similar or
intimately related to the issues raised in the second case.
Facts:
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) extrajudicially foreclosed
the real estate mortgage which secured Sps. Antonio and Lolita Pahangs loan upon
the latters default. The property was sold to Metrobank at public auction and a
certificate of sale was issued. Metrobank informed Sps. Pahang about the looming
deadline of the redemption period. But instead of redeeming the property, Sps.
Pahang filed a complaint for annulment of extrajudicial sale on the ground that their
obligations were bloated by Metrobank.
After expiration of the redemption period, Metrobank consolidated its
ownership over the foreclosed property and filed a Petition for Writ of Possession.
Sps. Pahang opposed the Petition on the ground that their complaint for annulment of
extrajudicial sale constituted a prejudicial question to Metrobanks petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the civil case for annulment of extrajudicial sale poses a
prejudicial question to the land registration case for the issuance of writ of
possession.
Ruling:
No. In the present case, the complaint of the petitioners for Annulment of
Extrajudicial Sale is a civil action and the respondents petition for the issuance of a
writ of possession of Lot No. 3-A, Block 1 is but an incident in the land registration
case and, therefore, no prejudicial question can arise from the existence of the two
actions.
The focal issue in the civil case filed by Sps. Pahang was whether the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage executed by Sps. Pahang in favor
of Metrobank and the sale of their property at public auction are null and void. The
issue in the land registration case was whether Metrobank was entitled to the
possession of the property after the statutory period for redemption had lapsed and
title was issued.
Civil Personality
ANTONIO GELUZ v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND OSCAR LAZO
G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961, REYES, JBL, J.
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Under Article 40 of the Civil Code, a conceived child only has a provisional
personality (conceptus pro nato habetur), or a personality burdened with a condition or
an express limitation that the child be subsequently born alive.
Facts:
Nita Villanueva became pregnant for a third time with her husband Antonio
Geluzs child. Unknown to Antonio, Nita had two (2) previous abortions and is
planning another one through the aid of Dr. Oscar Lazo. Nita succeeded again in
aborting her two-month old fetus; but this time, Antonio discovered the latest
abortion. Thereafter, Antonio, for and in behalf of the dead foetus, filed an action for
damages against Dr. Oscar.
Issue:
Whether or not an action for damages may be instituted in behalf of the
unborn child on account of the injuries it received.
Ruling:
No. An action for damages on account of personal injury or death pertains
primarily to the one injured. The action presupposes that the one injured has juridical
personality. Under Article 40 of the Civil Code, a conceived child only has a
provisional personality (conceptus pro nato habetur), or a personality burdened with
a condition or an express limitation that the child be subsequently born alive.
Here, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its
mothers womb. Since the conceived childs personality was extinguished by its prenatal death, no cause of action for such damages accrued in behalf of the said
unborn child. Likewise, since no action for damages could be instituted on account of
the injuries the unborn child received, no such right of action could derivatively
accrue to its parents or heirs.
Citizenship
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CHULE Y. LIM
G.R. No. 153883 January 13, 2004, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, provides that the citizenship
of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the
citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected
Philippine citizenship. Since the requirement applies only to legitimate children, an
illegitimate child of a Filipino mother automatically becomes a Filipino upon birth.
Facts:
Chule Y. Lim was born as an illegitimate child of her Chinese father and Filipino
mother in 1954. Her birth records show that she is a Chinese citizen. Nearly four (4)
decades later, Chule filed a petition for correction of entries of her birth records,
alleging among others that she is a Filipino citizen.
Issue:
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Whether or not Chules citizenship as shown in her birth records should be
changed from Chinese to Filipino.
Ruling:
Yes. Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, provides that the
citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed
the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child
elected Philippine citizenship. Likewise, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625,
states that legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine
citizenship by expressing such intention in a statement to be signed and sworn to by
the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be
filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid
statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the
Philippines.
Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino
citizenship apply only to legitimate children. These do not apply in the case of Chule
who was concededly an illegitimate child. As such, Chule was not required to comply
with said constitutional and statutory requirements to become a Filipino citizen. By
being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, Chule automatically became a Filipino
upon birth. Stated differently, she is a Filipino since birth without having to elect
Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority.
CASAN MACODE MACQUILING v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

ROMMEL ARNADO Y CAGOCO, AND LINOG G. BALUA
G.R. No. 195649 July 2, 2013, SERENO, J.
By using a passport, a person positively declares that he is a citizen of the
country which issued the passport. In the same vein, a passport proves that the
country which issued it recognizes the person named therein as its national.
Facts:
Rommel Arnando was a natural-born Filipino. Thereafter, he acquired
American citizenship by naturalization. By virtue of Republic Act No. 9225, Rommel
reacquired his Filipino citizenship by taking his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines. Rommel likewise renounced his American citizenship as a prerequisite
for running as Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte for the May 2010 elections.
Nevertheless, Rommel continued using his American passport at least six (6) times
after his renunciation, even if he already holds a Philippine passport.
His
qualifications were soon challenged before the COMELEC on the ground that Section
40(d) of the Local Government Code disqualifies those with dual citizenship from
running for local elective positions.
Issue:
Whether or not Rommel is a dual citizen disqualified to run for local elective
positions on the ground that his renunciation was rendered nugatory by his
subsequent use of his American passport.
Ruling:
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Yes. The renunciation of foreign citizenship must be complete and
unequivocal. The requirement that the renunciation must be made through an oath
emphasizes the solemn duty of the one making the oath of renunciation to remain
true to what he has sworn to.
Allowing the subsequent use of a foreign passport because it is convenient for
the person to do so is rendering the oath a hollow act. It devalues the act of taking of
an oath, reducing it to a mere ceremonial formality. After all, by using a passport, a
person positively declares that he is a citizen of the country which issued the
passport. In the same vein, a passport proves that the country which issued it
recognizes the person named therein as its national.
Here, since Rommel continued to use his American issued passport long after
his renunciation, he is still deemed to be both a Filipino and an American citizen for
purposes of applying the dual citizenship disqualification found in Sec. 40(d) of the
Local Government Code.
Marriage
PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO v. TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO
G.R. No. 173540 January 22, 2014, PEREZ, J.
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital
union, it is not the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. The fact of marriage may
be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate.
Facts:
Tecla Hoybia Avenido and Eustaquio Avenido were married in 1942 in Talibon,
Bohol, but the records of the Local Civil Registrar therein, including their marriage
certificate, were lost due to World War II. Their union bore four (4) children. Eustaquio
soon abandoned his family in 1952, and married Peregrina Hoybia Avenido in 1979.
After Eustaquios death, Tecla filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage of Peregrina and Eustaquio on the ground that Tecla is Eustaquios legal
wife. Tecla presented as evidence the certifications of loss of her marriage certificate,
the birth certificates of her children, as well as the testimonies of witnesses who
attended Tecla and Eustaquios marriage ceremony.
Issue:
Whether or not the evidence presented during trial proves the existence of
Teclas marriage to Eustaquio.
Ruling:
Yes. While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a
marital union, it is not the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. The fact of
marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate.
Hence, even a persons birth certificate, the testimony of the witnesses to the
marriage, and even the testimony of the solemnizing officer may be recognized as
competent evidence of the marriage between the parties. Likewise, since the due
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execution and loss of the marriage certificate were clearly shown by the evidence
presented, secondary evidencetestamentary and documentarymay be admitted
to prove the fact of marriage.
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007, CORONA, J.
The sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant
by examining the genitals of the infant. Without a law recognizing sex reassignment,
the determination of a persons sex at the time of birth is immutable, if not attended
by error.
Facts:
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio, a Filipino, was born male per his birth
certificate. Feeling trapped inside a mans body, he underwent sex reassignment
surgery in Bangkok, Thailand and transformed himself into a woman. Since then,
Rommel lived as a female and is in fact engaged to his American fianc. To allow him
to marry his fianc under Philippine law, Rommel filed a petition to change his name
from Rommel Jacinto to Mely, and his sex from male to female.
Issue:
equity.
Whether or not Rommel can change his sex from male to female by law or
Ruling:
No. Under the Civil Register Law (Act 3753), a birth certificate, which includes
a declaration of a persons sex, is a historical record of the facts as they existed at
the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by
the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant.
Since there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a
persons sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is
immutable.
The change cannot also be granted even on the grounds of equity, since the
changes would have serious and wide-ranging consequences. Marriage, one of the
most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a
man and a woman. One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the
contracting parties who must be a male and a female. Changing Rommels sex in his
birth certificate will substantially alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It
will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex
reassignment.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN

G.R. No. 166676 September 12, 2008, Quisumbing, J.
Where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in
his gender classification would be what the intersexed person, having reached the age
of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex.
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Facts:
Jennifer B. Cagandahan was born and registered as a female in her birth
certificate. She was later diagnosed with Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), a
condition wherein a person is genetically female but secretes male hormones.
Because of Jennifers very rare condition, she has both male and female sex organs,
did not develop breasts or ovaries, and never had her monthly period. Feeling that
she has become a male person in mind and body, she filed a Petition to change her
name from Jennifer to Jeff, and her sex from female to male.
Issue:
Whether or not Jennifer can change her sex from female to male.
Ruling:
Yes. Where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining
factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like Jennifer (now
Jeff), having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex.
Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at
birth inconclusive. Since the gender of intersexed persons is fixed only at maturity,
the original entries in the birth certificate are thus correctible under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.
In this case, intersexed Jeff lets nature take its course without taking unnatural
steps to interfere with such development. Nature made him male over time and Jeff
simply chose what nature has given him.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LIBERTY D. ALBIOS

G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013, MENDOZA, J.
For consent to be valid, it must be freely given, i.e. real in the sense that it
is not vitiated, and conscious or intelligent, in the sense that the parties must be
capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or
unfavorable consequences of their act of marriage.
Facts:
Liberty D. Albios, a Filipina, paid Daniel Lee Fringer, an American, $2,000.00
for the latter to marry Liberty for purposes of immigration. In 2004, Liberty and
Daniel were married out of jest. Immediately after the marriage, they separated and
never lived as husband and wife. However, Libertys immigration application was
denied. In 2006, Liberty filed a Petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with
Daniel on the ground that they never really had any intention of entering into a
married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations.
Issue:
Whether or not a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring
American citizenship and in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground
of lack of consent.
Ruling:
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No. For consent to be valid, it must be freely given. A "freely given" consent
must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated by any of the vices of consent under
Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, and must also be conscious or intelligent, in
the sense that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature
of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act.
Here, Liberty and Daniels freely given consent is best evidenced by their
conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. There was a
clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage to fully comply with the
requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete
understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that
precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
In any case, so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by
law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it
shall be declared valid, notwithstanding the possibility that the parties in a marriage
might have no real intention to establish a life together.
SYED AZHAR ABBAS v. GLORIA GOO ABBAS

G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013, VELASCO, JR., J.
A certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative value, as his duty
was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. The
certification likewise enjoys the presumption of regularity.
Facts:
Syed Azhar Abbas, a Pakistani, decided to stay in the Philippines two (2) years
after meeting Gloria Goo Abbas, a Filipina. While Syed was staying at the house of
Glorias mother in Manila, Glorias mother arrived with two (2) men. Syed underwent
a ceremony as a requirement for his stay in the Philippines. They signed a
document, which Syed learned later on was a marriage certificate. Upon
investigation, Syed discovered that the marriage license was procured in Carmona,
Cavite, where neither Syed nor Gloria resided. Likewise, the marriage license was
issued under a different name, and that no marriage license was ever issued for Syed
and Gloria per certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between Syed and Gloria should be declared
void ab initio based on the lack of marriage license.
Ruling:
Yes. A certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative value, as his
duty was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
The certification likewise enjoys the presumption of regularity, and such presumption
may only be rebutted upon proof of the claimant that no diligent search was made or
that the certification did not categorically state that no such marriage license was
made or found.
In this case, not only did Gloria fail to explain why she procured a marriage
license in Carmona, Cavite, where neither party resides. There is also proof that
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diligent search was made by the Municipal Civil Registrar to find Syed and Glorias
marriage license since they were able to trace the marriage license written at the
marriage certificate, albeit registered in another couples names.
Since a marriage is generally void ab initio if celebrated without a marriage
license, then the marriage between Syed and Gloria without the requisite marriage
license should be declared null and void.
SALLY GO-BANGAYAN v. BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR.

G.R. No. 201061, July 03, 2013, CARPIO, J.
Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license,
except those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be void from
the beginning."
Facts:
On September 1973, Benjamin married Azucena. In 1979, Benjamin developed
a romantic relationship with Sally. Sallys father was against the relationship. On 7
March 1982, in order to appease her father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in
Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a purported marriage contract. Sally,
knowing Benjamins marital status, assured him that the marriage contract would not
be registered.
The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for
Canada. She then filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public
documents against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract as evidence.
Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or
declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court on the ground that his
marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid
marriage.
Issues:
Whether or not the marriage of Benjamin to Sally was valid and existing.
Ruling:
No. The Court sees no inconsistency in finding the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and, at the same time, non-existent. Under
Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license, except those
covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be void from the
beginning." In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized
without a license. It was duly established that no marriage license was issued to
them and that Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license
numbers issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig City for the month of February
1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 35 which made their marriage
void ab initio. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent.
In relation to the above ruling, the marriage of petitioner and respondent was
not bigamous. For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all
the essential requisites for validity except for the existence of a prior marriage. In this
case, there was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a
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purported marriage contract without a marriage license. The supposed marriage was
not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. In short,
the marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together and
represented themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
RENE RONULO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 182438, July 02, 2014, BRION, J.
While the petitioner may view this merely as a "blessing," the presence of the
requirements of the law constitutive of a marriage ceremony qualified this "blessing"
into a "marriage ceremony" as contemplated by Article 3(3) of the Family Code
Facts:
Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry each other at the
Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church. However, on the day of the wedding, the supposed
officiating priest refused to solemnize the marriage upon learning that the couple
failed to secure a marriage license. As a recourse, Joey, who was then dressed in
barong tagalong, and Claire, clad in a wedding gown, together with their parents,
sponsors and guests, proceeded to the Aglipayan Church. They requested the
petitioner, an Aglipayan priest, to perform a ceremony to which the latter agreed
despite having been informed by the couple that they had no marriage certificate.
Now, Fr. Ronulo, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied that
his act of blessing the couple was tantamount to a solemnization of the marriage as
contemplated by law.
Issues:
Whether the solemnization by the petitioner of this marriage ceremony was
illegal.
Ruling:
Yes. Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of
marriage is the presence of a valid marriage certificate. In the present case, the
petitioner admitted that he knew that the couple had no marriage license, yet he
conducted the "blessing" of their relationship.
Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite
knowledge that the essential and formal requirements of marriage set by law were
lacking. The marriage ceremony, therefore, was illegal. The petitioners knowledge of
the absence of these requirements negates his defense of good faith.
OSCAR P. MALLION v. EDITHA ALCANTARA

G.R. No. 141528, October 31, 2006, AZCUNA, J.
The losing party who files another action regarding the same controversy will
be needlessly squandering time, effort and financial resources because he is barred
by law from litigating the same controversy all over again. Having expressly and
impliedly conceded the validity of their marriage celebration, petitioner is now
deemed to have waived any defects therein.
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Facts:
In 1995, petitioner Oscar Mallion (Oscar) filed a petition before the San Pablo
City RTC (Civil Case 4341-95) seeking a declaration of nullity of his marriage to
respondent alleging his wifes psychological incapacity. The case was dismissed upon
the finding that petitioner failed to adduce preponderant evidence to warrant the
grant of the relief he is seeking.
In 1999, Oscar filed another petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, this
time alleging that his marriage with respondent Edith Alcantara (Edith) was null and
void due to the fact that it was celebrated without a valid marriage license.
Issue:
Whether or not a final judgment denying a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity bars a subsequent petition for
declaration of nullity on the ground of lack of marriage license.
Ruling:
Yes. Res judicata as a bar by prior judgment obtains in the present case.
Petitioner forgets that he is simply invoking different grounds for the same cause of
action. In both petitions, petitioner has the same cause - the declaration of nullity of
his marriage to respondent. What differs is the ground upon which the cause of
action is predicated.
Litigants are provided with the options on the course of action to take in order
to obtain judicial relief. Once an option has been taken and a case is filed in court, the
parties must ventilate all matters and relevant issues therein. The losing party who
files another action regarding the same controversy will be needlessly squandering
time, effort and financial resources because he is barred by law from litigating the
same controversy all over again. Having expressly and impliedly conceded the
validity of their marriage celebration, petitioner is now deemed to have waived any
defects therein. For this reason, the Court finds that the present action for declaration
of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license is barred by the
decision in Civil Case No. 4341-95.
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO v. JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY

A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088. July 19, 1996, ROMERO, J.
While magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they
are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary
provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married
persons.
Facts:
Municipal Mayor Navarro of Dapa, Surigao del Norte filed a complaint on two
specific acts committed by MCTC Judge Domagtoy on the grounds of gross
misconduct, inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law. First, that respondent
Judge Domagtoy solemnized the wedding between Tagadan and Borga, despite the
knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife without institution
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of summary proceeding for the declaration of wifes presumptive death; and second,
that the judge performed a marriage ceremony between Sumaylo and del Rosario
outside his court's jurisdiction upon the written request of del Rosario only. Judge
Domagtory holds office and has jurisdiction in the MCTC of Sta. Monica-Burgos,
Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's residence
in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the
municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 km away from the
municipality of Dapa.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the marriage between Tagadan and Borga is valid.
(2) Whether or not the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario is valid.
Ruling:
(1) No. Article 41 of the Family code provides that for the purpose of
contracting the subsequent marriage, the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. Tagadan did not
institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wife's presumptive
death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to his first wife.
(2) Yes. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction,
there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which
while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official
to administrative liability. Hence, while it was only the latter who made the written
request where it should have been both parties as stated in Article 8 of the Family
Code, their non-compliance did not invalidate their marriage however, Domagtoy
may be held administratively liable.
ZENAIDA S. BESO v. Judge JUAN DAGUMAN, MCTC, Sta. Margarita-TaranganPagsanjan, Samar

A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211. January 28, 2000, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is
a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it
may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability.
Facts:
Juan Daguman, MCTC Judge of Sta. Margarita-Tarangan_Pagsanjan, Samar,
solemnized the marriage of complainant Zenaida Beso to Bernardito Yman, on August
28, 1987, at the Judges residence in Calbayog City, Samar. Respondent alleged that
was prompted more by urgency to solemnize the marriage of Beso and Yman
because complainant was "an overseas worker, who, respondent realized deserved
more than ordinary official attention under present Government policy." Respondent
Judge further averred that in solemnizing the marriage in question, "he believed in
good faith that by doing so he was leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that
it may not be too expensive and complicated for citizens to get married.
Issue:
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Whether or not the marriage between Beso and Yman conducted outside the
judges jurisdiction is valid.
Ruling:
Yes. A marriage can be held outside the judges chambers or courtroom only
(1) at the point of death; (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29; or (3)
upon the request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. None
of these instances was present in this case. Considering that respondent Judges
jurisdiction covers the municipality of Sta. Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan, Samar only,
he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the City of Calbayog.
Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a
resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may
not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CRASUS L. IYOY

G.R. No. 152577, September 21, 2005, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage. No less than the Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to protect and
strengthen the family as the basic social institution and marriage as the foundation
of the family.
Facts:
In 1997, Respondent Crasus L. Iyoy, married to Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy, sought the
nullity of their marriage held on the year 1961 on the basis of Article 36, FC, alleging
that Fely was hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant. He averred also that in 1984,
Fely left the Philippines for USA and obtained a divorce. She married another man in
1985. In Felys Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since
1988.
RTC and CA declared their marriage null and void finding merit on Felys
psychological incapacity and the applicability of Article 26 paragraph 2 of the Family
Code. Consequently, OSG filed this petition for review alleging that abandonment by
and sexual infidelity of respondents wife do not per se constitute psychological
incapacity and that Article 26, paragraph 2 is inapplicable to the case at bar.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not RTC and CA correctly declared the marriage as null and
void on the ground of psychological incapacity of Fely.
(2) Whether or not paragraph 2 Article 26 of the Family Code applies in the
case.
Ruling:
(1) No. The evidence may
embarrassed respondent
cause for such was not
identified, then it cannot
have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and

Crasus and the rest of the family. Nonetheless, the root
identified. If the root cause of the incapacity was not
be satisfactorily established as a psychological or mental
47 | P a g e

defect that is serious or grave; neither could it be proven to be in existence at the
time of celebration of the marriage; nor that it is incurable.
(2) No. Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple
getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage
was celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be
applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely
obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Pursuant to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still
bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal
capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even
until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely
could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III

G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005, QUISUMBING, J.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving
parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
decree.
Facts:
On May 1981, Cipriano Orbecido (Cipriano) married Villanueva. Their marriage
was blessed with a son and a daughter. In 1986, Villanueva, the wife left for the US
bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife
had been naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000, Cirpriano learned
that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent
Stanley. Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry
invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding
merit in the petition, the court granted the same.
The OSG now contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the FC is not
applicable because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. Hence, Orbecido cannot remarry.
Issue:
Whether or not Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the FC applies in the case at bar.
Ruling:
Yes. Taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of
reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases
involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and
obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as
if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.
To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
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obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. In this case,
when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid
marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it,
the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to
remarry. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
GERBERT R. CORPUZ v. STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL

G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010, BRION, J.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the
party with legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction.
Facts:
Petitioner Corpuz is a naturalized Canadian citizen who married respondent
Sto. Tomas but subsequently left for Canada due to work and other professional
commitments. When he returned to the Philippines, he discovered that Sto. Tomas
was already romantically involved with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert
returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce which was eventually granted.
Two years later, Corpuz has fallen in love with another Filipina and wished to
marry her. He went to the civil registry to register the divorce decree of his marriage
certificate with Sto. Tomas. However, despite the registration, an official of NSO
informed Corpuz that the former marriage still subsists under the Philippine law until
there has been a judicial recognition of the Canadian divorce by a competent judicial
court in view of NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.
Consequently, he filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce
and/or declaration of dissolution of marriage with the RTC. RTC denied the same and
concluded that Corpuz was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial
recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It
ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
Issue:
Whether or not Corpuz has no legal interest to petition the RTC for the
recognition of his foreign divorce decree.
Ruling:
No. The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes
the party with legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction. While the
alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse,
such unavailability does not necessarily strip Corpuz of legal interest to petition the
RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself,
after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been duly
proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right
in favor of Corpuz, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which
provides for the effect of foreign judgments.
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HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO v. JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta,
Pangasinan
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001, DAVIDE, JR., C.J.
Legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the
parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de
facto.
Facts:
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife David Manzano, having been
married to him in 1966. In 1993, however, her husband contracted another marriage
with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge.
On the other hand, respondent Judge averred that when he officiated the
marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally
married. However, in his later Manifestation, he maintained that the affidavits of both
David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were married to
Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively; they had been cohabiting as
husband and wife for seven years, and that since their respective marriages had
been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left their families and had never
cohabited or communicated with their spouses anymore. Hence, on the basis of those
affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in accordance with Article
34 of the Family Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the solemnization of a marriage between Manzano and Payao
who were both bound by a prior existing marriage is valid.
Ruling:
No. The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their
respective spouses for a long time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family
Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to live
separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not severed.
Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less
authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is
merely de facto, as in the case at bar.
Neither can respondent Judge Sanchez take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of
Manzano and Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for
seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person
for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage.
Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who are legally
capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage
license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a
subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.
Void Marriages
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FEDERICO C. SUNTAY v. ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY and HON. GREGORIO S.
SAMPAGA, Presiding Judge, Branch 78, Regional Trial Court, Malolos,
Bulacan
G.R. No. 132524, December 29, 1998, MARTINEZ, J.
Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment
shall be considered legitimate; and children conceived thereafter shall have the
same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are also
called natural children by legal fiction.
Facts:
Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (son of petitioner Federico Suntay) and Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay were married were the parents of Margarita Guadalupe, Isabel
Aguinaldo and Emilio Aguinaldo all surnamed Cojuangco Suntay. After 4 years, the
marriage soured so that in 1962, Isabel Cojuanco-Suntay filed a criminal case against
her husband. In retaliation, Emilio Aguinaldo filed before the CFI a complaint for legal
separation. TC declared in its dispositive portion the marriage null and void and of no
effect as between the parties. The body of the decision however stated that the legal
basis for setting aside the marriage is paragraph 3, Article 85 of the New Civil Code.
In 1995, Isabel Aguinaldo Cojuangco Suntay filed before the RTC a petition for
issuance in her favor of Letters of Administration of the Intestate Estate of her late
grandmother Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay in representation of her father, Emilio.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the same and argued that since CFI declared the
marriage of the respondent Isabels parents null and void, the latter is an illegitimate
child, and has no right nor interest in the estate of her paternal grandmother the
decedent.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between Emilio and Isabel is null and void as
stated in the dispositive part of the decision making the respondent an illegitimate
child.
Ruling:
No. Articles 80, 81, 82 and 83 of the New Civil Code classify what marriages
are void while Article 85 enumerates the causes for which a marriage may be
annulled. The fundamental distinction between void and voidable marriages is that
void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all. Children born of such
marriages who are called natural children by legal fiction have the same status,
rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children under Article 89. On the
other hand, a voidable marriage, is considered valid and produces all its civil effects,
until it is set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment.
Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be
considered legitimate; and children conceived thereafter shall have the same status,
rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are also called natural
children by legal fiction.
Assuming that a doubt or uncertainty exists between the dispositive portion
and the body of the decision, effort must be made to harmonize the whole body of
the decision in order to give effect to the intention, purpose and judgment of the
51 | P a g e

court. A reading of the pertinent portion of the decision of the CFI shows that the
marriage is voidable.
ENGRACE NINAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors

BABYLINE NINAL, INGRID NINAL, ARCHIE NINAL & PEPITO NINAL, JR.,
petitioners, v. NORMA BAYADOG
G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested
party may attack a void marriage.
Facts:
Pepito Ninal was married to Teodulfa Bellones in 1974. Out of their marriage
were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her in 1985.
One year and 8 months thereafter, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got
married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an
affidavit stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. In 1997, Pepito died in
a car accident. After their fathers death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for
lack of a marriage license. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could
file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not the second marriage is null and void ab initio
(2) Whether or not the heirs of a deceased person can file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death
Ruling:
(1) Yes. At the time Pepito and Normas marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived
with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day.
From the time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with
respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and
his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had
started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains
that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by
law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but
rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a
subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is
immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated
in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was
actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any
cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and
wife.
(2) Yes. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. Void marriages can be questioned
even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only
during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the
parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That
52 | P a g e

is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages
where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but
any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
LOLITA D. ENRICO v. HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO B. MEDINACELI AND TRINIDAD

CATLI-MEDINACELI, REPRESENTED BY VILMA M. ARTICULO
G.R. No. 173614, September 28, 2007, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on 15 March 2003
thereof makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage.
Facts:
Eulogio and Trinidad were married in 1962. They begot seven children, herein
respondents. On 1 May 2004, Trinidad died. On 26 August 2004, Eulogio married the
petitioner. Six months later, or on 10 February 2005, Eulogio passed away. Thereafter,
respondents filed with the RTC an action for declaration of nullity of marriage of
Eulogio and petitioner Lolita D. Enrico since the same was entered into without the
requisite marriage license. Article 34 FC, which exempts a man and a woman who
have been living together for at least five years without any legal impediment from
securing a marriage license, was not applicable to petitioner and Eulogio because
they could not have lived together under the circumstances required by said
provision.
In her Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together as
husband and wife under one roof for 21 years openly and publicly; hence, they were
exempted from the requirement of a marriage license. She sought the dismissal of
the action on the ground that it is only the contracting parties while living who can
file an action for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Issue:
Whether or not the heirs of Eulogio can seek the declaration of the nullity of
his marriage after his death.
Ruling:
No. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took
effect on 15 March 2003 applies in this case. Section 2(a) thereof makes it the sole
right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage.
While it is true that in Ninal case, no uncertain terms allowed therein
petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their fathers marriage to
therein respondent after the death of their father, we cannot, however, apply its
ruling for the reason that the impugned marriage therein was solemnized prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code. The Court in Ninal recognized that the applicable law
to determine the validity of the two marriages involved therein is the Civil Code,
which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. What we have before us
belongs to a different milieu, i.e., the marriage sought to be declared void was
53 | P a g e

entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code. As can be gleaned from the
facts, petitioners marriage to Eulogio was celebrated in 2004.
OFELIA P. TY v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, and EDGARDO M. REYES

G.R. No. 127406, November 27, 2000, QUISUMBING, J.
When the second marriage of private respondent was entered into, the
prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. As to whether a judicial
declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary, the Civil Code contains no
express provision to that effect. Therefore, we conclude that private respondents
second marriage to petitioner is valid.
Facts:
Private respondent married Villanueva in a civil ceremony in 1977. Then they
had a church wedding on the same year. However, in 1980, the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of QC declared their marriage null and void ab initio for lack
of license and consent. However, even before the decree was issued nullifying his
marriage to Villanueva, private respondent wed Ty, herein petitioner, in 1979. In
1991, private respondent sought the nullity of his marriage to Ty alleging that at the
time he married petitioner, he was still married to Villanueva and the decree of nullity
of his marriage had not been issued. The decree of nullity of his marriage was
rendered only on August 4, 1980, while his civil marriage to petitioner took place on
April 4, 1979.
The RTC declared his marriage to herein petitioner null and void ab initio. CA
affirmed. It ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage must first
be secured before a subsequent marriage could be validly contracted.
Issue:
Whether or not the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required before a
subsequent marriage can be entered into validly.
Ruling:
No. We must note that private respondents first and second marriages
contracted in 1977 and 1979, respectively, are governed by the provisions of the Civil
Code. The lower court and the CA cannot apply the provision of the FC. Both
marriages entered by private respondent were solemnized prior to the FC. As to
whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary, the Civil Code
contains no express provision to that effect. Therefore, we conclude that private
respondents second marriage to petitioner is valid. The provisions of the Family Code
cannot be retroactively applied to the present case, for to do so would prejudice the
vested rights of petitioner and of her children.
DOROTHY B. TERRE v. ATTY. JORDAN TERRE

A.M. No. 2349 July 3, 1992, PER CURIAM
The prevailing case law of this Court holds that for purposes of determining
whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration
that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential.
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Facts:
An administrative complaint was filed by Dorothy against her husband for
gross immorality. She posited that the respondent made her believe that her prior
marriage to Bercenilla was null and void ab initio being incestuous (Dorothy and
Merlito being allegedly first cousins to each other), that she was still legally single
and free to marry him. She also alleged that the respondent contracted a second
marriage and lived with another woman other than complainant, while his prior
marriage with complainant remained subsisting.
In his answer, he sought to defend himself by claiming that he had believed in
good faith that his prior marriage with complainant Dorothy was null and void ab
initio and that no action for a judicial declaration of nullity was necessary.
Issue:
Whether or not a judicial declaration of nullity was necessary for purposes of
remarriage.
Ruling:
Yes. Respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that
such an argument ran counter to the prevailing case law of this Court which holds
that for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second
marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is
essential. Even if we were to assume, arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre held that
mistaken belief in good faith, the same result will follow. For if we are to hold Jordan
Terre to his own argument, his first marriage to complainant Dorothy Terre must be
deemed valid, with the result that his second marriage to Helina Malicdem must be
regarded as bigamous and criminal in character.
YASUO IWASAWA v. FELISA CUSTODIO GANGAN (A.K.A FELISA GANGAN

ARAMBULO, AND FELISA GANGAN IWASAWA) AND THE LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF PASAY CITY
G.R. No. 204169, September 11, 2013, VILLARAMA, J.
A judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage
can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, which is void
from the beginning as provided in Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines.
Facts:
Yasuo Iwasawa and Felisa Gangan were married on November 28, 2002. It was
only in 2009 when Yasuo learned about his wife's previous marriage to Raymond
Arambulo upon Felisa's confession when she learned of Raymond's death. This
prompted Yasuo to file a petition for the declaration of his marriage to Felisa as null
and void on the ground that their marriage is a bigamous one, based on Article 35(4)
in relation to Article 41 of the FC. The RTC ruled that there was insufficient evidence
to prove Felisa's prior existing valid marriage to another man. It was only Yasuo who
testified about said marriage who has no personal knowledge of Felisa's prior
marriage nor of Raymond's death. It also held that Yasuo's testimony about the NSO
55 | P a g e

certification is likewise unreliable since he is a stranger to the preparation of said
document.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between Yasuo and Felisa is null and void.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is
required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what
transpires is a bigamous marriage, which is void from the beginning as provided in
Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines. In this case, Raymond died on July
14, 2009 and that it was only on said date that Felisas marriage with Raymond was
deemed to have been dissolved. The second marriage of Felisa to Yasuo is bigamous,
hence null and void, since the first marriage was still valid and subsisting when the
second marriage was contracted.
There is no question that the documentary evidence submitted by Yasuo are
all public documents. As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even
without further proof of their due execution and genuineness. Thus, the RTC erred
when it disregarded said documents on the sole ground that the petitioner did not
present the records custodian of the NSO who issued them to testify on their
authenticity and due execution since proof of authenticity and due execution was not
anymore necessary. Moreover, not only are said documents admissible, they deserve
to be given evidentiary weight because they constitute prima facie evidence of the
facts stated therein.
MINORU FUJIKI v. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL

CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL
REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE
G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013, CARPIO, J.
When Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife"it refers to the
husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage.
Facts:
Maria Paz Galela Marinay was first married to Minoru Fujiki on January 24,
2004. Without her first marriage being dissolved, Marinay married Shinichi Maekara
on May 15, 2008. Marinay left Makeara when she allegedly suffered physical abuse
from him. She then started to contact Fujiki. In 2010, Marinay's marriage with
Makeara was declared void on the ground of bigamy by a family court in Japan. In
2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC for judicial recognition of foreign judgment. The
RTC dismissed the petition citing Secs. 2 and 4 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10SC). It took the view that only "the husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara
or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.
Issue:
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Whether or not a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her
spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
Ruling:
Yes. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition
to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, the Court held that the rule in A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy."
(See Juliano-Llave v. Republic, 646 SCRA 637, March 30, 2011)
When Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife"it refers to the
husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family
Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a
bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband
or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR

G.R. No. 189538, February 10, 2014, PERALTA, J.
In allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling
the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void
as there was no marriage to speak of.
Facts:
When Merlinda Olaybar requested from the NSO a Certificate of No Marriage
(CENOMAR), she discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a
Korean National, in 2002. She then filed a petition for cancellation of entries in the
marriage contract especially the entries in the wife portion thereof. She impleaded
the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband, as parties to
the case. She denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not
know the alleged husband; she did not appear before the solemnizing officer; and,
that the signature appearing in the marriage certificate is not hers. The RTC granted
her petition. Petitioner then contends that there was no clerical spelling,
typographical and other innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it to fall within
the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Also, it was asserted that the grant of
the cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage contract
is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio.
Issue:
Whether or not the cancellation of "all the entries in the wife portion of the
alleged marriage contract" is in effect declaring the marriage void ab initio.
Ruling:
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No. Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to
show the existence of marriage. Rather, Olaybar showed by overwhelming evidence
that no marriage was entered into and that she was not even aware of such
existence. The testimonial and documentary evidence clearly established that the
only evidence of marriage which is the marriage certificate was a forgery. While the
Court maintains that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of
marriage, the Court cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the
parties had been given the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the
procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already been
admitted and examined. Olaybar indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as
there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage
to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the
correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof,
the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no
marriage to speak of.
Psychological Incapacity
DIANA M. BARCELONA v. COURT OF APPEALS and TADEO R. BENGZON
G.R. No. 130087, September 24, 2003, Carpio, J.
The obvious effect of the new Rules providing that expert opinion need not be
alleged in the petition is that there is also no need to allege the root cause of the
psychological incapacity.
Facts:
Tadeo Bengzon filed a petition for annulment of marriage against Diana. It was
alleged that during their marriage, they had frequent quarrels due to their varied
upbringing. She withdrew to herself and eventually refused to speak to her husband
when she suffered several miscarriages. She even requested him to leave the
conjugal dwelling. The petition further alleged that Diana was psychologically
incapacitated at the time of the celebration of their marriage to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage and such incapacity subsists up to the present time.
Diana filed a motion to dismiss the said petition on the ground that it failed to state a
cause of action. The petition is defective because it fails to allege the root cause of
the alleged psychological incapacity, that it existed from the celebration of the
marriage and that it is permanent or incurable. Further, it is devoid of any reference
of the grave nature of the illness to bring about the disability of Diana to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Lastly, it did not even state the marital obligations
which Diana allegedly failed to comply due to psychological incapacity.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition states a cause of action.
Ruling:
Yes. The petition states the legal right of Tadeo, the correlative obligation of
Diana, and the act or omission of Diana in violation of the legal right.
Section 2, paragraph (d) of the new Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriage provides:
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(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall
specifically allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties were
psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital
obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are
indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the
marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.
The petition states the ultimate facts on which Tadeo bases his claim in
accordance with Section 1, Rule 8 of the old Rules of Court. The obvious effect of the
new Rules providing that expert opinion need not be alleged in the petition is that
there is also no need to allege the root cause of the psychological incapacity. Only
experts in the fields of neurological and behavioral sciences are competent to
determine the root cause of psychological incapacity.
CHI MING TSOI v. COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI

G.R. No. 119190, January 16, 1997, TORRES, JR., J.
One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "to
procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children
through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." The senseless and
protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is
equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Facts:
On May 22, 1988, Chi Ming Tsoi married Gina Lao-Tsoi. However, since their
marriage until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact
between them. Gina then filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of her
marriage with Chi Ming Tsoi on the ground of psychological incapacity. Gina claims
that Chi Ming Tsoi is impotent and a closet homosexual. According to Chi Ming Tsoi,
the fault lies with his wife since everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with
his her, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she
always removed his hands. The RTC rendered a decision declaring the nullity of their
marriage. The CA affirmed the said decision.
Issue:
Whether or not refusal to have sexual intercourse constitutes psychological
incapacity.
RULING:
Yes. One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "to
procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children
through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of
this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the
case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the
above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
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As stated by the CA, the admission that the husband is reluctant or unwilling
to perform the sexual act with his wife whom he professes to love very dearly, and
who has not posed any insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is
indicative of a hopeless situation, and of a serious personality disorder that
constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants within
the contemplation of the Family Code.
DAVID B. DEDEL v. COURT OF APPEALS and SHARON L. CORPUZ-DEDEL

a.k.a. JANE IBRAHIM, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 151867, January 29, 2004, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Respondents sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by
themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the
Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated
with psychological incapacity.
Facts:
David and Sharon Dedel were married in 1966. However, during the marriage,
Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible and immature wife and mother. She had
extra-marital affairs with several men. Petitioner alleged that despite confirmed in
the Manila Medical City for treatment, Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship with
Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she married and with whom she had two children. David then
filed a petition seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. The RTC declared the civil and church marriages between
David and Sharon null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part
of the Sharon to perform the essential obligations of marriage. The CA reversed the
said decision dismissing the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not aberrant sexual behavior fall within the term "psychological
incapacity."
Ruling:
No. The difficulty in resolving the problem lies in the fact that a personality
disorder is a very complex and elusive phenomenon which defies easy analysis and
definition. In this case, respondents sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that she could not have known the
obligations she was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given a valid
assumption thereof. It appears that respondents promiscuity did not exist prior to or
at the inception of the marriage.
Sharon's sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by
themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the
Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated
with psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of
a disordered personality which make respondent completely unable to discharge the
essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity16
or sexual promiscuity.
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MA. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS v. BRIX FERRARIS
G.R. No. 162368, July 17, 2006, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
The "leaving-the-house" attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent
tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack
of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his
family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal
or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Facts:
Armida Perez-Ferraris was married to Brix Ferraris. She filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage with Brix on the ground of his psychological
incapacity. The RTC denied her petition holding that suffering from epilepsy does not
amount to psychological incapacity and the evidence on record were insufficient to
prove infidelity. The CA affirmed the said judgment where it held that the evidence on
record did not convincingly establish that Brix was suffering from psychological
incapacity or that his "defects" were incurable and already present at the inception of
the marriage.
Issue:
Whether or not Brix Ferraris is psychologically incapacitated to comply with
marital obligations.
Ruling:
No. The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the FC, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting
a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume. The Court finds that the alleged mixed
personality disorder of Brix, the "leaving-the-house" attitude whenever they
quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the
abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his
band mates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological
condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of
marriage.
BRENDA B. MARCOS v. WILSON G. MARCOS

G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000, PANGANIBAN, J.
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage,
may be established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement,
however, that the respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist
as a condition sine qua non for such declaration.
Facts:
The marriage between Wilson and Brenda Marcos was declared null and void
in a petition filed by Brenda pursuant to Art. 36 of the FC. Wilson was declared
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations mainly because of his
failure to find work to support his family and his violent attitude towards Brenda and
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their children. However, the said decision was reversed by the CA ratiocinating that
Wilson was not subjected to any psychological or psychiatric evaluation. Expert
evidence by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is essential if only to
prove that the parties were or any one of them was mentally or psychically ill to be
truly incognitive of the marital obligations he or she was assuming, or as would make
him or her unable to assume them.
Issues:
Whether or not the totality of the evidence presented was enough to sustain a
finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated.
Ruling:
No. The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated
by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals: "psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The
foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or
clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.
Although the Court is sufficiently convinced that Wilson failed to provide
material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological
incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already
present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. Equally important,
there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is
gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL

OLAVIANO MOLINA
G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997, PANGANIBAN, J.
Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in
no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.
Facts:
Roridel Molina filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to
Reynaldo Molina. Roridel alleged that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed
signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he
preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his
money; that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance; and was never
honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between
them. She asserted that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically
incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature
and habitually quarrel some individual. Their marriage was declared void ab initio by
the RTC which decision was affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
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Whether or not "opposing and conflicting personalities" is equivalent to
psychological incapacity.
Ruling:
No. It appears to the Court to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal"
or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of
"irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their
responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown
to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts
and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that
the incapacity must be psychological not physical. It must be proven to be existing
at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. It must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO

G.R. No. 149498, May 20, 2004, CORONA, J.
Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual medical examination, it
would have greatly helped respondents case had she presented evidence that
medically or clinically identified his illness.
Facts:
In 1988, Lolita Quintero-Hamano was married to Toshio Hamano. Eight years
later, Lolita filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to
Article 36 of the FC. As alleged, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume
his marital responsibilities, which incapacity became manifest only after the
marriage. One month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to
return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending money to
Lolita for two months, Toshio stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several
times but he never responded. Sometime in 1991, she learned from her friends that
Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their child. Their
marriage was declared null and void by the RTC. The CA affirmed the said decision.
Issue:
Whether or not Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to perform his
Ruling:
No. In Molina, the guidelines provided the root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. In this
case, the Court finds that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that
Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. His
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act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor
proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. After Lolita testified on how
Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented showing that his
behavior was caused by a psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no
need for an actual medical examination, it would have greatly helped respondents
case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness. This
could have been done through an expert witness. This Lolita did not do.
The Court cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio
abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage. It is not
enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married
person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some
psychological, not physical, illness. There was no proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with
the obligations essential to marriage. (See Republic vs. CA, 268 SCRA 198, 1997)
LEOUEL SANTOS v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA

ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS
G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, VITUG, J.
Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support.
Facts:
The marriage between Leouel and Julia took place on September 20, 1986. In
1988, Julia went to the US to work as a nurse. Having failed to get Julia to somehow
come home, Leouel filed a complaint to have his marriage with Julia declared null and
void under Article 36 of the Family Code. Leouel argues that Julia's failure to return
home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more than five years are
circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into
married life. Leouel asserts that "a wife who does not care to inform her husband
about her whereabouts for a period of five years, more or less, is psychologically
incapacitated." The RTC and the CA both dismissed the complaint.
Issue:
Whether or not Julia is psychologically incapacitated to comply with her
Ruling:
No. The factual settings in the this case, in no measure at all, can come close
to the standards required to decree a nullity of marriage.
Justice Sempio-Diy cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso who
opines that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that
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the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage;
it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the
overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable
or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.
The use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code
has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise
mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity,
and like circumstances. It should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at
the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the
other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This
conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children
conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be
"legitimate."
JUANITA CARATING-SIAYNGCO v. MANUEL SIAYNGCO

G.R. NO. 158896, October 27, 2004, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological incapacity
within the contemplation of the Family Code.
Facts:
Manuel Siayngco filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
with Juanita Siayngco on the ground of the latter's psychological incapacity. Manuel
alleged, among others, that his wife exhibited an over domineering and selfish
attitude towards him, she incessantly complained about almost everything and
anyone connected with him like his elderly parents, the staff in his office and
anything not of her liking like the physical arrangement, tables, chairs, wastebaskets
in his office and with other trivial matters, she would yell and scream at him and
throw objects around the house within the hearing of their neighbors and she cared
even less about his professional advancement as she did not even give him moral
support and encouragement. In her answer, Juanita contended that it was respondent
Manuel who was remiss in his marital and family obligations and that she supported
Manuel in all his endeavors despite his philandering. The RTC dismissed Manuel's
petition. The CA reversed the RTC decision.
Issue:
Whether or not Juanita/Manuel is psychologically incapacitated to comply with
Ruling:
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No. What emerges from the psychological report of Dr. Garcia as well as from
the testimonies of the parties and their witnesses is that the only essential marital
obligation which Manuel was not able to fulfill, if any, is the obligation of fidelity.
Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological incapacity within
the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that Manuels unfaithfulness
is a manifestation of a disordered personality which makes him completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of the marital state and not merely due to his
ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and blood.
As to the allegation of psychological incapacity on the part of Juanita, Manuel
failed to prove that his wifes lack of respect for him, her jealousies and obsession
with cleanliness, her outbursts and her controlling nature (especially with respect to
his salary), and her inability to endear herself to his parents are grave psychological
maladies that paralyze her from complying with the essential obligations of marriage.
Neither is there any showing that these "defects" were already present at the
inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. The record clearly shows that
the root cause of Juanitas behavior is traceable not from the inception of their
marriage as required by law but from her experiences during the marriage, e.g., her
in-laws disapproval of her as they wanted their son to enter the priesthood, her
husbands philandering, admitted no less by him, and her inability to conceive.
JAIME F. VILLALON v. MA. CORAZON N. VILLALON

G.R. No. 167206, November 18, 2005, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering
from psychological incapacity. It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are
manifestations of a disordered personality which make petitioner completely unable
to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.
Facts:
Jaime Villalon filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with
Corazon Villalon pursuant to Article 36 of the FC. He cited as one of the
manifestations of his psychological incapacity his desire for other women and a life
unchained from any spousal obligation. He admitted that on certain occasions before
his marriage, he had two girlfriends at the same time. He also saw other women even
when he became engaged to and, later on, married Corazon. Dr. Dayan was
presented to testify on his alleged psychological disorder of Narcissistic Histrionic
Personality Disorder with Casanova Complex. A person afflicted with this disorder
believes that he is entitled to gratify his emotional and sexual feelings and thus
engages in serial infidelities. Likewise, a person with Casanova Complex exhibits
habitual adulterous behavior and goes from one relationship to another. When asked
about the womanizing ways of her husband, Corazon averred that she did not know
whether her husband's acts could be deemed womanizing since there were only two
instances of infidelity which occurred 13 years apart. The RTC declared their marriage
null and void. The said decision was reversed by the CA dismissing the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Jaime is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital
obligations.
Ruling:
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No. Jaime failed to establish the incurability and gravity of his alleged
psychological disorder. While Dr. Dayan described the symptoms of one afflicted with
Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder as self-centered, characterized by
grandiose ideation and lack of empathy in relating to others, and one with Casanova
Complex as a serial adulterer, the evidence on record betrays the presence of any of
these symptoms.
The Court is not convinced that petitioner is a serial or habitual adulterer, as
he wants the court to believe. As stated by Corazon, it cannot be said that two
instances of infidelity which occurred 13 years apart could be deemed womanizing,
especially considering that these instances involved the same woman. This is not
consistent with the symptoms of a person suffering from Casanova Complex who,
according to Dr. Dayan, is one who jumps from one relationship to another. Sexual
infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from
psychological incapacity. It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are
manifestations of a disordered personality which make petitioner completely unable
to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.
LEONILO ANTONIO v. MARIE IVONNE F. REYES

G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006, TINGA, J.
Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations
of marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them.
Facts:
Petitioner Leonilo Antonio filed a petition to declare his marriage with
respondent Marie Ivonne Reyes be declared null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Antonio claimed that
Reyes persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income,
educational attainment and other events or things. Reyes allegedly concealed the
fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son, which she represented to
Antonio as adopted child of the family. She fabricated stories, misrepresented herself
as a psychiatrist, claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent and even
invented imaginary friends.
The Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic
marriage of the parties, which was upheld by the Roman Rota of the Vatican.
Thereafter, the trial court declared the marriage of the parties null and void. Despite
the rulings of the Catholic tribunals, the CA reversed the RTCs judgment.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage of the parties should be declared null and void
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Ruling:
Yes. Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the
obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them. The
evidence to establish psychological incapacity must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such extent that the person
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could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereto.
Respondent had consistently lied about many material aspects as to her
character and personality. Respondents fantastic ability to invent and fabricate
stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made
her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and
significance to her marriage. It has been shown clearly from her actuations that
respondent has that propensity for telling lies about almost anything, be it her
occupation, her state of health, her singing abilities, her income, etc. In persistently
and constantly lying to petitioner, respondent undermined the basic tenets of
relationship between spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As concluded
by the psychiatrist presented by petitioner, such repeated lying is abnormal and
pathological and amounts to psychological incapacity. The Court of Appeals clearly
erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage of the
parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. Respondents psychological incapacity
was considered so grave that a restrictive clause was appended to the sentence of
nullity prohibiting respondent from contracting another marriage without the
Tribunals consent.
JORDAN CHAN PAZ v. JEANICE PAVON PAZ

G.R. No. 166579, February 18, 2010, CARPIO, J.
What the law requires to render a marriage void on the ground of
psychological incapacity is downright incapacity, not refusal or neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. The mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting
personalities does not constitute psychological incapacity.
Facts:
Jeanice filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Jordan
under Article 36 of the Family Code. Jordan allegedly had a tendency to lie about his
whereabouts. He was alleged to be a Mamas boy as he depended on his mother for
support and supplies of milk and diapers for their son. Jeanice also alleged that
Jordan resented their son and spent more time with his friends rather than help her
take care of their son. Psychologist Cristina Gates testified that Jordan was afflicted
with Borderline Personality Disorder.
The trial court granted the petition and declared the marriage null and void.
The trial court declared that Jordans psychological incapacity, which was specifically
identified as Borderline Personality Disorder, deprived him of the capacity to fully
understand his responsibilities under the marital bond. The CA dismissed Jordans
appeal and motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether Jordan is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
Ruling:
No. The Court has declared that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity; (b) judicial antecedence; and (c) incurability. It must be
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confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
Although there is no requirement that a party to be declared psychologically
incapacitated should be personally examined by a physician or a psychologist, there
is nevertheless a need to prove the psychological incapacity through independent
evidence adduced by the person alleging said disorder. In this case, the Court notes
that the report and testimony of Gates on Jordans psychological incapacity were
based exclusively on her interviews with Jeanice and the transcript of stenographic
notes of Jeanices testimony before the trial court. Consequently, Gates report and
testimony were hearsay evidence since she had no personal knowledge of the
alleged facts she was testifying on. Gates testimony should have thus been
dismissed for being unscientific and unreliable.
Moreover, contrary to the ruling of the trial court, Jordans alleged
psychological incapacity was not shown to be so grave and so permanent as to
deprive him of the awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond. What the law requires to render a marriage void on the ground of
psychological incapacity is downright incapacity, not refusal or neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. The mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting
personalities does not constitute psychological incapacity.
JOCELYN M. SUAZO v. ANGELITO SUAZO and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 164493, March 10, 2010, BRION, J.
Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of
psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity.
Facts:
Jocelyn Suazo and Angelito Suazo got married when they were 16 years old.
They lived with Angelitos parents as they have no means to support themselves.
They stopped schooling and Jocelyn was forced to work. Angelito allegedly refused to
work and became an alcoholic and heavy gambler. Jocelyn alleged that Angelito beat
her, thus prompting Jocelyn to leave Angelito. Ten years after their separation,
Jocelyn filed a petition to declare their marriage null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code. The psychologist diagnosed Angelito with Anti-Social Personality
Disorder. The trial court granted the petition and declared the marriage null and
void. However, the CA reversed.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between Jocelyn and Angelito should be declared
null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Ruling:
No. Both the psychologists testimony and the psychological report did not
conclusively show the root cause, gravity and incurability of Angelitos alleged
psychological condition. The psychologist, using meager information coming from
Jocelyn, a directly interested party, could not have secured a complete personality
profile and could not have conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of
Angelitos psychological condition.
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Jocelyn merely testified on Angelitos habitual drunkenness, gambling, refusal
to seek employment and the physical beatings she received from him all of which
occurred after the marriage. Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a
job, while indicative of psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show
psychological incapacity. All these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal
to perform marital obligations that, as the cited jurisprudence holds, cannot be
considered to be constitutive of psychological incapacity in the absence of proof that
these are manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological
condition or illness.
MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al.

G.R. No. 137567, June 20, 2000, BUENA, J.
The import of Article 40 of the Family Code is that for purposes of remarriage,
the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity
is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of
other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable.
Facts:
Meynardo Beltran filed a petition for nullity of marriage against his wife
Charmaine Felix on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
Charmaine subsequently sued Meynardo and his paramour for
concubinage. Meynardo filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of
the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case. He contended that the pendency of the
civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code
posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case. The said
motion was denied.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC
questioning the denial of his motion to defer the proceedings in the concubinage
case. Said petition was likewise denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the Meynardo Beltran could be convicted of the crime of
concubinage despite the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of
marriage.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court has held that the import of Article 40 of the Family Code is that
for purposes of remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous
marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void, whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable.
So that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner need not
present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in
the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment
declaring his marriage void.
With regard to petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted of the charge
of concubinage should his marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state that
even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void from the beginning is
not a defense. In the case at bar, it must be held that parties to the marriage should
not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted
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to judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the
presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he
who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of
the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage.
ROBERTO DOMINGO v. COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA

represented by her Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R. AVERA
G.R. No. 104818, September 17, 1993, ROMERO, J.
A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required
either as a cause of action or a ground for defense.
Facts:
Private respondent Delia Soledad Domingo and petitioner Roberto Domingo
got married while the marriage of Roberto with one Emerlina dela Paz was still
subsisting. Hence, Emerlina sued Roberto for bigamy. Thereafter, Delia filed a
petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with Roberto and separation of
property. Roberto filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the marriage being
void ab initio, the petition for the declaration of its nullity is unnecessary. The trial
court denied the motion. Roberto then filed a special civil action of certiorari and
mandamus, which was dismissed by the CA. Roberto contended that the judicial
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage can be maintained only if it is for the
purpose of remarriage.
Issue:
Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is
necessary for the recovery and the separation of properties.
Ruling:
Yes. The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence
on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly
required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. In fact, the requirement
for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the
spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With
the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who
marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.
Article 40 of the Family Code denotes that such final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage.
Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party might well invoke
the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such
as in case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of
property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the custody and
support of their common children and the delivery of the latters' presumptive
legitimes.
In such cases, evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage
an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a
court declaring such previous marriage void. Hence, in the instance where a party
who has previously contracted a marriage which remains subsisting desires to enter
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into another marriage which is legally unassailable, he is required by law to prove
that the previous one was an absolute nullity. But this he may do on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
VINCENT PAUL G. MERCADO a.k.a. VINCENT G. MERCADO v. CONSUELO TAN

G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000, PANGANIBAN, J.
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a
subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent
marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy.
Facts:
Vincent Mercado married Consuelo Tan while his marriage with Ma. Thelma
Oliva was still subsisting. Hence, Tan filed a complaint for bigamy against Mercado.
Subsequently, Mercado filed a petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against
Oliva. The petition was granted and the marriage between Mercado and Oliva was
declared null and void. Nevertheless, the RTC convicted Mercado of the crime of
bigamy.
Mercado contended that since his previous marriage had been declared null
and void, he cannot be convicted of the crime of bigamy as there was no first
marriage to speak of.
Issue:
Whether or not the element of previous legal marriage is present in order to
convict petitioner.
Ruling:
Yes. Article 40 of the Family Code expressly requires a judicial declaration of
nullity of the previous marriage before that person can marry again; otherwise, the
second marriage will also be void. It is now settled that the fact that the first
marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge. One who
enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is
guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by
statute as void.
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there
was yet no judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the
Petition to have the first marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a
letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while
the first was still subsisting, he committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code. That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the
nullity of the first marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been
consummated by then.
LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 145226, February 06, 2004, QUISUMBING, J.
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The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a
valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone,
without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which
petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial
declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
Facts:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete got married in the Philippines. When Barrete
returned to Canada to work, she filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a
petition for divorce against Morigo which was granted by the court. Consequently,
Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago in the Philippines. Morigo subsequently filed
a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage with Barrete on the ground
that no marriage ceremony actually took place. Thereafter, Morigo was charged with
the crime of bigamy, and later convicted by the RTC. Pending appeal to the CA, the
trial court declared the marriage between Morigo and Barrete null and void. The CA
eventually affirmed the conviction of Morigo.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete is valid,
thereby warranting the conviction of Morigo of the crime of bigamy.
Ruling:
No. The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must
have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was
never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under
the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were
never married from the beginning. The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal
effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner
was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha.
The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the
crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be
sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce
be acquitted of the instant charge.
In the instant case, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly
authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage
contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no
semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such
act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage
for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial
declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
ANTONIA ARMAS y CALISTERIO v. MARIETTA CALISTERIO

G.R. No. 136467, April 6, 2000, VITUG, J.
Under Article 83 of the New Civil Code, a subsequent marriage contracted
during the lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior
marriage is first annulled or dissolved. For the subsequent marriage referred to in the
three exceptional cases therein provided, to be held valid, the spouse present (not
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the absentee spouse) so contracting the later marriage must have done so in good
faith.
Facts:
Teodorico Calisterio died intestate and was survived by his wife, respondent
Marietta Calisterio.
Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had
previously been married to James William Bounds. Teodorico and Marietta were
married eleven years after James had disappeared, without Marietta having secured a
court declaration that James was presumptively dead. Petitioner Antonia Armas, a
surviving sister of Teodorico, filed a petition for the intestate proceedings of the
estate of Teodorico with the RTC. She claimed to be the sole surviving heir of
Teodorico, and that the marriage between the Teodorico and Marietta is bigamous
and thereby null and void. Marietta, who opposed the petition, stated that her first
marriage with James had been dissolved due to the latter's absence for more than
eleven years before she contracted her second marriage with Teodorico. The RTC
ruled in favor of Antonia. Marietta went to the CA contending that the trial court
erred in applying the provisions of the Family Code despite the fact that the
controversy arose when the New Civil Code was the law in force. The CA reversed
the decision of the RTC and declared the marriage between Marietta and Teodorico
valid.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between the deceased Teodorico and Marietta is
valid, despite the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of Mariettas
first husband, James.
Ruling:
Yes. The marriage between the deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta
was solemnized on 08 May 1958. The law in force at that time was the Civil Code, not
the Family Code which took effect only on 03 August 1988. Under Article 83 of the
New Civil Code, a subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first
spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or
dissolved. Paragraph (2) of the law gives exceptions from the above rule. For the
subsequent marriage referred to in the three exceptional cases therein provided, to
be held valid, the spouse present (not the absentee spouse) so contracting the later
marriage must have done so in good faith. Bad faith imports a dishonest purpose or
some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong it partakes of the nature of
fraud, a breach of a known duty through some motive of interest or ill will. The Court
does not find these circumstances to be here extant.
A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary as
long as the prescribed period of absence is met. It is equally noteworthy that the
marriage in these exceptional cases are, by the explicit mandate of Article 83, to be
deemed valid "until declared null and void by a competent court." It follows that the
burden of proof would be, in these cases, on the party assailing the second marriage.
In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous
marriage may exceptionally be considered valid, the following conditions must
concur; viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting party must have been absent for
four consecutive years, or two years where there is danger of death under the
circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b)
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the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead;
and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee for which purpose the spouse present can institute a summary proceeding
in court to ask for that declaration.
The last condition is consistent and in
consonance with the requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent marriages as
so provided in Article 41, in relation to Article 40, of the Family Code.
EDUARDO P. MANUEL v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 165842, November 29, 2005, CALLEJO, SR., J.
Before the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage, he or she
must institute summary proceedings for the declaration of the presumptive death of
the absentee spouse, without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the
absentee spouse.
Facts:
Eduardo Manuel married Tina Gandalera while his marriage with Rubylus Gaa
was still subsisting. Thus, Gandalera sued Manuel for bigamy. Gandalera alleged
that she married Manuel based on the latters representation that he was single when
in fact he was not. Manuel, on the other hand, allegedly declared he was single in his
marriage contract with Gandalera because he believed in good faith that his first
marriage was invalid. He stated that he was merely forced to marry Gaa and that
after Gaa was imprisoned for estafa, he had not heard from her for more than 20
years. He thought that there was no more need to nullify his first marriage before
marrying Gandalera. The RTC convicted Manuel of the crime of bigamy, which the CA
affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not Eduardo Manuel should be convicted of bigamy considering
the absence of judicial declaration of presumptive death of Rubylus Gaa under Article
Ruling:
Yes. The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure
the juridical tie of marriage established by law. The phrase or before the absent
spouse had been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in
the proper proceedings was incorporated in the Revised Penal Code because the
drafters of the law were of the impression that in consonance with the civil law which
provides for the presumption of death after an absence of a number of years, the
judicial declaration of presumed death like annulment of marriage should be a
justification for bigamy. It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that
when he married the private complainant in 1996, he was of the well-grounded belief
that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than 20
years since 1975. He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent
court declaring the presumptive death of his first wife as required by Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code.
With the effectivity of the Family Code, the period of seven years under the
first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code was reduced to four consecutive years.
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Thus, before the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage, he or she
must institute summary proceedings for the declaration of the presumptive death of
the absentee spouse, without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the
absentee spouse.
IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS v. ISAGANI D. BOBIS

G.R. No. 138509, July 31, 2000, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
A decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal
charge. It is not a prejudicial question.
Facts:
Respondent Isagani Bobis got married three times. The first was with one
Maria Dulce B. Javier, the second was with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis, and the
third was with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. An Information for bigamy was filed
against Isagani. Subsequently, Isagani filed a civil action for the judicial declaration
of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a
marriage license. Invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a
prejudicial question to the criminal case for bigamy, Isagani filed a motion to suspend
the proceedings in the criminal case, which the lower court granted. Imelda moved
for reconsideration, but the same was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity
of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for
bigamy.
Ruling:
No. Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of
celebration of the second marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a
previous marriage before a party may remarry. The clear implication of this is that it
is not for the parties, particularly the accused, to determine the validity or invalidity
of the marriage. Whether or not the first marriage was void for lack of a license is a
matter of defense because there is still no judicial declaration of its nullity at the time
the second marriage was contracted. It should be remembered that bigamy can
successfully be prosecuted provided all its elements concur two of which are a
previous marriage and a subsequent marriage which would have been valid had it
not been for the existence at the material time of the first marriage.
In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having
obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, cannot be said to
have validly entered into the second marriage. Per current jurisprudence, a marriage
though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any party can marry
again; otherwise the second marriage will also be void. The reason is that, without a
judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In
the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a
married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Against
this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact
that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first
marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of
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the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. As stated above,
respondent cannot be permitted to use his own malfeasance to defeat the criminal
action against him.
SUSAN NICDAO CARIO v. SUSAN YEE CARIO

Under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must
first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void,
before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage
would also be void.
Facts:
The late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario contracted two marriages during his lifetime.
The first was with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cario, and the second was with
respondent Susan Yee Cario.
SPO4 Cario passed away under the care of
respondent, who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and
respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to
the deceased from various government agencies. Respondent filed a case for
collection of sum of money against petitioner praying that petitioner be ordered to
return to her at least one-half of the P146,000.00 death benefits which petitioner
received from various government agencies. Respondent admitted that her marriage
to the deceased took place during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a
judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and the deceased.
She, however, claimed to be in good faith since she had no knowledge of the
previous marriage. To bolster her action for collection of sum of money, respondent
contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because
the same was solemnized without the required marriage license. The trial court ruled
in favor of respondent, which the CA affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between SPO4 Santiago Cario and petitioner
Susan Nicdao Cario is valid, thereby entitling her to the entire subject death
benefits.
Ruling:
No. Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage
license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence thereof, subject to certain
exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. The records reveal that the marriage
contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as
certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no
record of such marriage license. It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage
between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been solemnized without
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the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the
marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must
first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void,
before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage
would also be void. Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the
previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the
second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that
their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the
marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of
respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.
Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a
bigamous marriage, having been solemnized during the subsistence of a previous
marriage then presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the deceased), the
application of Article 148 of the Family Code is therefore in order. The disputed
P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM,
Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits
from governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police officer. Unless
respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said that she
contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary
benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common by respondent and the deceased,
but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no right whatsoever to claim
the same.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article
147 of the Family Code governs. Even if the disputed death benefits were earned
by the deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a coownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. As
there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case, both parties of the first
marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject death
benefits under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property
regime, and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate
succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GLORIA BERMUDEZ-LORINO

G.R. No. 160258, January 19, 2005, GARCIA, J.
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no
reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments
rendered thereunder, by express provision of Section 247 of the Family Code, are
immediately final and executory.
Facts:
Nine years after she left her husband due to the latters violent character,
Gloria filed a verified petition for the declaration of the presumptive death of his
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absent spouse with the RTC under the rules on Summary Judicial Proceedings in the
Family Law provided for in the Family Code. The RTC granted the petition and
declared Francisco presumptively dead pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code.
Despite the judgment being immediately final and executory under Article 247 of the
Family Code, the OSG filed a Notice of Appeal. The RTC elevated the records to the
CA. The CA, treating the case as an ordinary appealed case, denied the appeal and
affirmed the appealed RTC decision. Without filing any motion for reconsideration,
petitioner Republic filed a petition for review for certiorari under Rule 45, maintaining
that the petition raises a pure question of law that does not require prior filing of a
motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether or not the judgment declaring Francisco presumptively dead is final
and executory, and therefore, not appealable.
Ruling:
Yes. In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no
reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments
rendered thereunder, by express provision of Section 247, Family Code, are
immediately final and executory. It was erroneous, therefore, on the part of the RTC
to give due course to the Republics appeal and order the transmittal of the entire
records of the case to the Court of Appeals.
An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by
express provision of law, is immediately final and executory. The right to appeal is not
a natural right nor is it a part of due process, for it is merely a statutory privilege.
Since, by express mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code, all judgments rendered
in summary judicial proceedings in Family Law are immediately final and executory,
the right to appeal was not granted to any of the parties therein. The Republic of the
Philippines, as oppositor in the petition for declaration of presumptive death, should
not be treated differently. It had no right to appeal the RTC decision of November 7,
2001. The Court of Appeals committed grave reversible error when it failed to
dismiss the erroneous appeal of the Republic on ground of lack of jurisdiction
because, by express provision of law, the judgment was not appealable.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

(TENTH DIVISION) and ALAN B. ALEGRO
G.R. No. 159614, December 9, 2005, CALLEJO, SR., J.
The spouse present is burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and
that he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the
present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage.
Facts:
Alan Alegro filed a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his
wife, Rosalia (Lea) Julaton. Alan stated when he arrived home from work one day,
Lea was nowhere to be found. Alan thought that Lea merely went to her parents
house but when he went there, Lea was not there. He sought the help of his friends,
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Leas friends, and the barangay captain, to locate his wife but to no avail. He even
went to Manila to look for her, but he also failed. Alan then decided to report Leas
disappearance to the local police station and to the NBI. The RTC granted the
petition and declared Lea presumptively dead. The CA affirmed the RTC Decision.
The OSG contended that Alan failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief that
Lea was already dead since Alan did not exert reasonable and diligent efforts to
locate his wife.
Issue:
Whether or not Alan had a well-founded belief that Lea was already dead and
thus, Lea should be declared presumptively dead.
Ruling:
No. Under Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines, the spouse present
is burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract
a subsequent marriage. The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper
and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the
absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.
Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the
absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many
circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse
and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse.
In this case, the respondent failed to present a witness other
than Barangay Captain Juan Magat. The respondent even failed to present Janeth
Bautista or Nelson Abaenza or any other person from whom he allegedly made
inquiries about Lea to corroborate his testimony. On the other hand, the respondent
admitted that when he returned to the house of his parents-in-law, his father-in-law
told him that Lea had just been there but that she left without notice. The
respondent declared that Lea left their abode after he chided her for coming home
late and for being always out of their house, and told her that it would be better for
her to go home to her parents if she enjoyed the life of a single person. Lea, thus,
left their conjugal abode and never returned. Neither did she communicate with the
respondent after leaving the conjugal abode because of her resentment to the
chastisement she received from him barely a month after their marriage. What is so
worrisome is that, the respondent failed to make inquiries from his parents-in-law
regarding Leas whereabouts before filing his petition in the RTC. It could have
enhanced the credibility of the respondent had he made inquiries from his parents-inlaw about Leas whereabouts considering that Leas father was the owner of Radio
DYMS. The respondent did report and seek the help of the local police authorities
and the NBI to locate Lea, but it was only an afterthought. He did so only after the
OSG filed its notice to dismiss his petition in the RTC.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARIA FE ESPINOSA CANTOR

G.R. No. 184621, December 10, 2013, BRION, J.
Article 41 of the Family Code, compared to the old provision of the Civil Code
which it superseded, imposes a stricter standard. It requires a "well-founded belief"
that the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive
death can be granted.
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Facts:
Jerry Cantor, the husband of respondent Maria Fe Cantor, left their conjugal
home after having a violent quarrel about respondents inability to reach "sexual
climax" and Jerrys expression of animosity toward the respondents father. More
than four years from the time of Jerrys disappearance, the respondent filed before
the RTC a petition for her husbands declaration of presumptive death under Article
41 of the Family Code. She stated that she had a well-founded belief that Jerry was
already dead. She allegedly exerted efforts to look for her husband by inquiring from
her in-laws, neighbors and friends of Jerrys whereabouts, but to no avail. She further
alleged that she checks the patients directory whenever she went to a hospital
hoping to find Jerry. The RTC granted the petition and declared Jerry presumptively
dead. The CA affirmed.
Issue:
dead.
Whether or not the respondent had a well-founded belief that Jerry is already
Ruling:
No. Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it
must be shown that the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and
the present spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead.
Article 41 of the Family Code, compared to the old provision of the Civil Code which it
superseded, imposes a stricter standard. It requires a "well-founded belief" that
the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death
can be granted. To be able to comply with this requirement, the present spouse must
prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries
to locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she
believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It requires
exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one).
In the case at bar, the respondents "well-founded belief" was anchored on her
alleged "earnest efforts" to locate Jerry. These efforts, however, fell short of the
"stringent standard" and degree of diligence required by jurisprudence.
The
respondent did not actively look for her missing husband. She did not report Jerrys
absence to the police nor did she seek the aid of the authorities to look for him. She
did not present as witnesses Jerrys relatives or their neighbors and friends, who can
corroborate her efforts to locate Jerry. There was no other corroborative evidence to
support the respondents claim that she conducted a diligent search.
In sum, the Court is of the view that the respondent merely engaged in a
"passive search" where she relied on uncorroborated inquiries from her in-laws,
neighbors and friends. She failed to conduct a diligent search because her alleged
efforts are insufficient to form a well-founded belief that her husband was already
dead.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GREGORIO NOLASCO

G.R. No. 94053, March 17, 1993, FELICIANO, J.
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The Family Code prescribes as "well founded belief" that the absentee
is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be
granted.
Facts:
Respondent Gregorio Nolasco, a seaman, met Janet Monica Parker in a bar in
England during one of his ship's port calls. The two became sweethearts and
eventually got married in the Philippines. Nolasco obtained another employment
contract as a seaman and left Parker with his parents. After Parker gave birth to their
son, she left the Philippines. Nolasco allegedly exerted efforts to look for her in
England, but to no avail. He, however, admitted that he did not report Parkers
disappearance to the Philippine government authorities. Nolasco filed a petition for
the declaration of presumptive death of Parker, invoking Article 41 of the Family
Code. The RTC granted the petition, which the CA affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.
Ruling:
No. When Article 41 is compared with the old provision of the Civil Code,
which it superseded, the following crucial differences emerge. Under Article 41, the
time required for the presumption to arise has been shortened to four (4) years;
however, there is need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable the
spouse present to remarry. Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a stricter
standard than the Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code merely requires either that
there be no news that such absentee is still alive; or the absentee is generally
considered to be dead and believed to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed
dead under Article 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. The Family Code, upon the other
hand, prescribes as "well founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a
petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted.
In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly
conducted by respondent in his attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's
whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief
that she was already dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of
Janet Monica's departure, instead of seeking the help of local authorities or of the
British Embassy, he secured another seaman's contract and went to London, a vast
city of many millions of inhabitants, to look for her there. The Court also views
respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined to give any information as to her
personal background even after she had married respondent too convenient an
excuse to justify his failure to locate her. The same can be said of the loss of the
alleged letters respondent had sent to his wife which respondent claims were all
returned to him. Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare
assertion that he had inquired from their friends of her whereabouts, considering that
respondent did not identify those friends in his testimony. In fine, respondent failed
to establish that he had the well-founded belief required by law that his absent wife
was already dead that would sustain the issuance of a court order declaring Janet
Monica Parker presumptively dead.
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Voidable Marriages
AURORA A. ANAYA v. FERNANDO O. PALAROAN
G.R. No. L-27930 November 26, 1970, JBL Reyes, J.
Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is
not one of the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for
annulment; and it is further excluded by the last paragraph of the article, providing
that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to ... chastity" shall give ground for an
action to annul a marriage.
Facts:
Palaroan filed for an action for annulment of his marriage with Anaya on the
ground that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation. The CFI of
Manila dismissed his complaint upholding their marriage. Anaya also filed for
annulment of marriage on the ground that Palaroan had divulged to Anaya that
months prior to their marriage, he had a pre-marital relationship with a close relative
of his which Anaya considered a fact that wrecked their marriage thus she averres
that there was fraud in the contracting of their marriage. The court considered
Anayas allegation of fraud as insufficient thus they dismissed her claim.
Issue:
Whether or not non-disclosure of a pre-marital relationship is a ground for
annulment of marriage.
Ruling:
No. Non-disclosure of pre-marital relationships is not a ground for annulment.
Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one
of the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment; and
it is further excluded by the last paragraph of the article, providing that "no other
misrepresentation or deceit as to ... chastity" shall give ground for an action to annul
a marriage. While a woman may detest such non-disclosure of premarital lewdness or
feel having been thereby cheated into giving her consent to the marriage,
nevertheless the law does not assuage her grief after her consent was solemnly
given, for upon marriage she entered into an institution in which society, and not
herself alone, is interested. The lawmaker's intent being plain, the Court's duty is to
give effect to the same, whether it agrees with the rule or not.
FERNANDO AQUINO v. CONCHITA DELIZO

G.R. No. L-15853 July 27, 1960, GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.
According to medical authorities, even on the 5th month of pregnancy, the
enlargement of a woman's abdomen is still below the umbilicus, that is to say, the
enlargement is limited to the lower part of the abdomen so that it is hardly
noticeable and may, if noticed, be attributed only to fat formation on the lower part
of the abdomen.
Facts:
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Delizo, at the date of her marriage to Aquino, concealed the fact that shewas
pregnant by another man that four months after their marriage, she gave birth to a
child which she claims that the child was conceived out of lawful wedlock between
her and Aquino. The trial court dismissed the complaint for Aquino did not show any
birth certificate to show the child was born within 180 days after the marriage
between the parties. Later on Aquino presented evidence to show proof tho the
childs birth but still his petition was denied. The CA denied Aquinos appeal on the
theory that it was not impossible for the parties to have sex during their engagement
so that the child could be their own and finding it absurd for Aquino not to notice or
suspect that Delizo was pregnant when he married her. In a motion for
reconsideration filed by Aquino, Delizo and her counsel did not file an answer thus
the motion for reconsideration was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the dismissal of Aquinos complaint is correct.
Ruling:
No. The dismissal is not correct. Under the new Civil Code, concealment by
the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man
other than her husband constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment of marriage.
Here the defendant wife was alleged to be only more than four months pregnant at
the time of her marriage to plaintiff. At that stage, we are not prepared to say that
her pregnancy was readily apparent, especially since she was "naturally plump" or fat
as alleged by plaintiff. According to medical authorities, even on the 5th month of
pregnancy, the enlargement of a woman's abdomen is still below the umbilicus, that
is to say, the enlargement is limited to the lower part of the abdomen so that it is
hardly noticeable and may, if noticed, be attributed only to fat formation on the lower
part of the abdomen. It is only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement
of the woman's abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the
roundness of the abdomen more general and apparent.
Furthermore, The Court of Appeals should not have denied the motion praying
for new trial simply because defendant failed to file her answer thereto. Such failure
of the defendant cannot be taken as evidence of collusion, especially since a
provincial fiscal has been ordered of represent the Government precisely to prevent
such collusion.
JOEL JIMENEZ v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. L-12790 August 31, 1960, PADILLA, J.
The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of
sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear as under the ties that have bound them
together as husband and wife.
Facts:
Jimenez is praying for a decree to annul his marriage with Canizares on the
ground that the office of her vagina was to small to allow the penetration of the penis
for copulation which he states existed at the time of marriage and continues to exist.
Canizares did not file an answer when she was summoned. Canizares did not respond
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as well to subsequent calls to her by the court thus the MTC entered a decree
annulling the marriage between Jimenez and Canizares.
Issue:
Whether or not amarriage may be annulled on the strength only of the lone
testimony of the husband.
Ruling:
No. It is not enough proof. The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds
that must be proved to exist by indubitable evidence, to annul a marriage. In the
case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question was decreed upon the sole
testimony of the husband who was expected to give testimony tending or aiming at
securing the annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether the wife is
really impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily established, becase
from the commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the decree she had
abstained from taking part therein. Although her refusal to be examined or failure to
appear in court show indifference on her part, yet from such attitude the presumption
arising out of the suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred because
women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a
physical examination unless compelled to by competent authority. This the Court may
do without doing violence to and infringing in this case is not self-incrimination. She is
not charged with any offense. She is not being compelled to be a witness against
herself. "Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The
presumption is in favor of potency." The lone testimony of the husband that his wife
is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties
that have bound them together as husband and wife.
Legal Separation
JOSE DE OCAMPO v. SERAFINA FLORENCIANO
G.R. No. L-13553 February 23, 1960, BENGZON, J.
Collusion in divorce or legal separation means the agreement between
husband and wife for one of them to commit, or to appear to commit, or to be
represented in court as having committed, a matrimonial offense, or to suppress
evidence of a valid defense, for the purpose of enabling the other to obtain a divorce.
Facts:
After years of marriage, Ocampo discovered on several occasions that his wife
was maintaining illicit affairs with a Jose Arcalas when Ocampo sent her to study
beauty culture in Manila. When she finished her course, she left Ocampo and that he
even caught her with an affair with another man by the name of Nelson Orzame.
Ocampo filed for legal separation. She did not made any answer to the RTC and
admits having such sexual relation so when the case was appealed to the CA, the CA
construed such confession a confession of judgment thus they did not decree the
legal separation.
Issue:
Whether or not there was collusion between Ocampo and Floreniano.
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Ruling:
No. In this case, there would be collusion if the parties had arranged to make
it appear that a matrimonial offense had been committed although it was not, or if
the parties had connived to bring about a legal separation even in the absence of
grounds therefor.
Here, the offense of adultery had really taking place, according to the
evidence. The defendant could not have falsely told the adulterous acts to the Fiscal,
because her story might send her to jail the moment her husband requests the Fiscal
to prosecute. She could not have practiced deception at such a personal risk.
In this connection, it has been held that collusion may not be inferred from the
mere fact that the guilty party confesses to the offense and thus enables the other
party to procure evidence necessary to prove it. And proof that the defendant desires
the divorce and makes no defense, is not by itself collusion.
BENJAMIN BUGAYONG v. LEONILA GINEZ

G.R. No. L-10033 December 28, 1956, FELIX, J.
Single voluntary act of marital intercourse between the parties ordinarily is
sufficient to constitute condonation, and where the parties live in the same house, it
is presumed that they live on terms of matrimonial cohabitation.
Facts:
Bugayong is married to Ginez. They lived together with their sisters in Manila.
After some time, Ginez left the dwelling and informed her husbnad that she will be
staying with her mother in Pangasinan from which she moved to Dagupan to study in
a local college there. Bugayong began receiving letters from his sister in law and
from other unknown writers stating that Ginez was performing acts of infidelity.
Bugayong went to Pangasinan to meet with his wife and when they met, they stayed
in the house of Bugayongs cousin for 2 nights and 1 day as husband and day.
Bugayong tried to verify the truth of Ginez alleged infidelity to which Ginez
responded by merely packing her bags and leaving to which he took as a
confirmation for the acts. He could not find Ginez anymore. Bugayong filed with the
CFI of Pangasinan a complaint for legal separation to which Ginez answered denying
the averments of the complaint. She set up the posive defense that her acts were
condoned by Bugayong.
Issue:
Whether or not there was condonation in the part of Bugayong.
Ruling:
Yes. A detailed examination of the testimony of the plaintiff-husband,
especially those portions quoted above, clearly shows that there was a condonation
on the part of the husband for the supposed "acts of rank infidelity amounting to
adultery" committed by defendant-wife. Admitting for the sake of argument that the
infidelities amounting to adultery were committed by the defendant, a reconciliation
was effected between her and the plaintiff. The act of the latter in persuading her to
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come along with him, and the fact that she went with him and consented to be
brought to the house of his cousin Pedro Bugayong and together they slept there as
husband and wife for one day and one night, and the further fact that in the second
night they again slept together in their house likewise as husband and wife all
these facts have no other meaning in the opinion of this court than that a
reconciliation between them was effected and that there was a condonation of the
wife by the husband. The reconciliation occurred almost ten months after he came to
know of the acts of infidelity amounting to adultery.
It has been held that condonation is implied from sexual intercourse after
knowledge of the other infidelity. such acts necessary implied forgiveness. It is
entirely consonant with reason and justice that if the wife freely consents to sexual
intercourse after she has full knowledge of the husband's guilt, her consent should
operate as a pardon of his wrong.
ELISEA LAPERAL v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. L-18008 October 30, 1962, BARRERA, J.
The wife, even after the legal separation has been decreed, shall continue
using her name and surname employed before the legal separation. This is so
because her married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no
severance of the vinculum.
Facts:
Elisea was legally separated from his former husband Enrique. She desired to
use her maiden name Elisea Laperal on the ground that she had long been separated
from Enrique so she filed an action with the court to which at first was denied with
respect to Article 372 of the Civil Code but later granted by the court treating the
action as a change of name which the City Attorney of Baguio opposed to.
Issue:
Whether or not Elisea is allowed to use her maiden name since she is legally
separated from her husband.
Ruling:
No. According to Article 372 of the Civil Code, the wife, even after the legal
separation has been decreed, shall continue using her name and surname employed
before the legal separation. This is so because her married status is unaffected by
the separation, there being no severance of the vinculum. It seems to be the policy of
the law that the wife should continue to use the name indicative of her unchanged
status for the benefit of all concerned.
There seems to be no dispute that in the institution of these proceedings, the
procedure prescribed in Rule 103 of the Rules of Court for change of name has been
observed. But from the petition quoted in full at the beginning of these opinion, the
only reason relied upon for the change of name is the fact that petitioner is legally
separated from her husband and has, in fact, ceased to live with him for many years.
It is doubtful, to say the least, whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in
general, may prevail over the specific provisions of Article 372 of the New Civil Code
with regards to married women legally separated from their husbands. Even,
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however, applying Rule 103 to this case, the fact of legal separation alone which is
the only basis for the petition at bar is, in our opinion, not a sufficient ground to
justify a change of the name of herein petitioner, for to hold otherwise would be to
provide an easy circumvention of the mandatory provisions of Article 372.
ONG ENG KIAM a.k.a. WILLIAM ONG v. LUCITA G. ONG

G.R. No. 153206 October 23, 2006, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without
justifiable cause for more than one year.
Facts:
After 3 years of marriage Williamn and Lucita would almost quarrel every day
to where William began to physically assault Lucita in different ways for petty
reasons. William also committed physical violence to his children. He also said
offensive and insulting language to her. William denied the allegations. The RTC ruled
in favor of Lucita finding the acts of William detrimental to their marriage. The CA
affirmed the RTCs decision finding the testimonies of Dr. Elinzano, the doctor who
treated Lucitas wounds and Linda, Lucitas sister to be proven true.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC and CA is correct in decreeing a legal separation.
Ruling:
Yes. The claim of William that a decree of legal separation would taint his
reputation and label him as a wife-beater and child-abuser also does not elicit
sympathy from this Court. If there would be such a smear on his reputation then it
would not be because of Lucitas decision to seek relief from the courts, but because
he gave Lucita reason to go to court in the first place.
Also without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita has abandoned
the family, a decree of legal separation should not be granted, following Art. 56, par.
(4) of the Family Code which provides that legal separation shall be denied when both
parties have given ground for legal separation. The abandonment referred to by the
Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one year. As it
was established that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does not
constitute abandonment contemplated by the said provision.
As a final note, we reiterate that our Constitution is committed to the policy of
strengthening the family as a basic social institution. The Constitution itself however
does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage and the family, as
it remains the province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and
prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it and put into operation the
constitutional provisions that protect the same. With the enactment of the Family
Code, this has been accomplished as it defines marriage and the family, spells out
the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect married and
family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for
legal separation. As Lucita has adequately proven the presence of a ground for legal
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separation, the Court has no reason but to affirm the findings of the RTC and the CA,
and grant her the relief she is entitled to under the law.
Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife

MARIANO B. ARROYO v. DOLORES C. VASQUEZ DE ARROYO
G.R. No. L-17014 August 11, 1921, STREET, J.
Mere austerity of temper, petulance of manners, rudeness of language, a
want of civil attention and accommodation, even occasional sallies of passion, if they
do not threaten bodily harm, do not amount to legal cruelty
Facts:
Mariano and Dolores lived together as husband and wife in Iloilo with a few
short intervals of separation. There came a time when Dolores went away to be
separated from Mariano on the ground that she was cruelly treated by Mariano.
Mariano opted for her to return home to resume their married life but Dolores wanted
to be legally separated from him. The trial court ruled in favor Dolores ruling that it
was Marianos ill treatment that caused Dolores to leave.
Issue:
Whether or not the Dolores may choose not to cohabit with respect to
Marianos cruelty towards Dolores.
Ruling:
No. Dolores must cohabit. The evidence shows that the wife is afflicted with a
disposition of jealousy towards her husband in an aggravated degree; and to his
cause are chiefly traceable without a doubt the many miseries that have attended
their married life. The tales of cruelty on the part of the husband towards the wife,
which are the basis of the cross-action, are in our opinion no more than highly colored
versions of personal wrangles in which the spouses have allowed themselves from
time to time to become involved and would have little significance apart from the
morbid condition exhibited by the wife.
Cruelty has been defined as what merely wounds the mental feelings is in few
cases to be admitted where they are not accompanied with bodily injury, either
actual or menaced. Mere austerity of temper, petulance of manners, rudeness of
language, a want of civil attention and accommodation, even occasional sallies of
passion, if they do not threaten bodily harm, do not amount to legal cruelty: they are
high moral offenses in the marriage-state undoubtedly, not innocent surely in any
state of life, but still they are not that cruelty against which the law can relieve.
Under such misconduct of either of the parties, for it may exist on the one side as
well as on the other, the suffering party must bear in some degree the consequences
of an injudicious connection; must subdue by decent resistance or by prudent
conciliation; and if this cannot be done, both must suffer in silence. .
Mariano B. Arroyo, has done nothing to forfeit his right to the marital society
of his wife and that she is under an obligation, both moral and legal, to return to the
common home and cohabit with him.
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ELOISA GOITIA DE LA CAMARA v. JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA
G.R. No. 11263 November 2, 1916, TRENT, J.
The spouses must be faithful to, assist, and support each other. The husband
must live with and protect his wife. The wife must obey and live with her husband
and follow him when he changes his domicile or residence, except when he removes
to a foreign country.
Facts:
Eloisa and Jose were married and after a month, Eloisa left to return to her
parents. It was alleged in Eloisas complaint that Jose had her do unchaste and
lascivious acts on his genitals and other obscene demands to which Eloisa did not
agree to thus Jose treated him harshly. Jose even did not comply with the marital
duties of a husband. Eloisa thus filed for an action of support against her husband.
Issue:
Whether or not Eloisa can compel her husband to support her outside the
conjugal home.
Ruling:
Yes. She may claim for support. The obligation on the part of the husband to
support his wife is created merely in the act of marriage. The law provides that the
husband, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill the obligation either by
paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option.
However, this option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the
husband to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven
away from the conjugal home because of his wrongful acts. In the case at bar, the
wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and
physical assault of the husband, she can therefore claim support from the husband
for separate maintenance even outside the conjugal home.
The spouses must be faithful to, assist, and support each other. The husband
must live with and protect his wife. The wife must obey and live with her husband
and follow him when he changes his domicile or residence, except when he removes
to a foreign country. But the husband who is obliged to support his wife may, at his
option, do so by paying her a fixed pension or by receiving and maintaining her in his
own home.
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO v. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO,

JOHN DOE and JANE DOE
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER, and SYLVIA ILUSORIO
v. COURT OF APPEALS and ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO
G.R. No. 139789 and G.R. No. 139808 May 12, 2000, PARDO, J.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with
his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus
carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process. That is a matter beyond
judicial authority and is best left to the man and womans free choice.
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Facts:
Erlinda and Potenciano were once married but were separated for undisclosed
reasons. When Potenciano returned from the US, he stayed with Erlinda in Antipolo
where their children claimed that Erlinda gave Potenciano an overdose of his
antidepressant drug which caused Potencianos health to deteriorate. Erlinda filed
with the RTC for guardianship over Potenciano due to his failing health. After a
meeting in Baguio, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo and lived in Makati thus
Erlinda filed for a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of Potenciano. She
alleged that the other respondents refused her demands to see and visit her husband
and prohibit Potenciano from returning to Antipolo.
Issue:
Whether or not spouses can furnish a writ of habeas corpus to compel one
another to live with each other.
Ruling:
No. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire
into all manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal. To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be
an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of
liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral.
The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or
deprivation of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorios liberty that would justify the issuance of
the writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or under
medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. Soundness of
mind does not hinge on age or medical condition but on the capacity of the individual
to discern his actions.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with
his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus
carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process. That is a matter beyond
judicial authority and is best left to the man and womans free choice.
ARTURO PELAYO v. MARCELO LAURON, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-4089 January 12, 1909, TORRES, J.
If every obligation consists in giving, doing or not doing something and
spouses are mutually bound to support each other, there can be no question but
that, when either of them by reason of illness should be in need of medical
assistance, the other is under the unavoidable obligation to furnish the necessary
services of a physician in order that health may be restored.
Facts:
Pelayo filed a complaint against Lauron and Abella when they refused to pay
him for services he rendered in the birth of their daughter-in-laws child. They
claimed in their answer the she died after the childbirth and that she lived with her
husband independently of them and that they are not bound to pay for their
daughter-in-laws expenses. The trial court ruled in favor of Lauron and Abella.
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Issue:
Whether or not Lauron and Abella should be liable for the expenses of the
operation.
Ruling:
No. If every obligation consists in giving, doing or not doing something and
spouses are mutually bound to support each other, there can be no question but that,
when either of them by reason of illness should be in need of medical assistance, the
other is under the unavoidable obligation to furnish the necessary services of a
physician in order that health may be restored, and he or she may be freed from the
sickness by which life is jeopardized; the party bound to furnish such support is
therefore liable for all expenses, including the fees of the medical expert for his
professional services.
In the face of the above legal precepts it is unquestionable that the person
bound to pay the fees due to the plaintiff for the professional services that he
rendered to the daughter-in-law of the defendants during her childbirth, is the
husband of the patient and not her father and mother- in-law, the defendants herein.
The fact that it was not the husband who called the plaintiff and requested his
assistance for his wife is no bar to the fulfillment of the said obligation, as the
defendants, in view of the imminent danger, to which the life of the patient was at
that moment exposed, considered that medical assistance was urgently needed, and
the obligation of the husband to furnish his wife in the indispensable services of a
physician at such critical moments is specially established by the law, as has been
seen, and compliance therewith is unavoidable; therefore, the plaintiff, who believes
that he is entitled to recover his fees, must direct his action against the husband who
is under obligation to furnish medical assistance to his lawful wife in such an
emergency.
Property Relations
MOISES JOCSON v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, AGUSTINA JOCSON-VASQUEZ,
ERNESTO VASQUEZ
G.R. No. L-55322 February 16, 1989, MEDILEA, J.
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife.
Facts:
The petitioner and respondent are the surviving offsprings of the spouses
Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. Poblete died before emilio without her estate
being settled. Emilio died shortly. Emilio executed three documents in his lifetime
which conveyed by sale to Agustina, one of the respondents, majority of his property
including 1/3 share in the estate of Agustina. The petitoner, Moises, assailed the
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documents and prayed for their nullity. and the properties be partioned between him
and Agustina. The RTC ruled in favor of Moises in which the CA reversed the decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject property is part of Emilio and Alejandras conjugal
property.
Ruling:
No. The property is not part of their conjugal property. It is thus clear that
before Moises Jocson may validly invoke the presumption under Article 160 he must
first present proof that the disputed properties were acquired during the marriage of
Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. The certificates of title, however, upon which
petitioner rests his claim is insufficient. The fact that the properties were registered in
the name of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete" is no proof that the
properties were acquired during the spouses' coverture. Acquisition of title and
registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that registration does not
confer title but merely confirms one already existing (See Torela vs. Torela, supra). It
may be that the properties under dispute were acquired by Emilio Jocson when he
was still a bachelor but were registered only after his marriage to Alejandra Poblete,
which explains why he was described in the certificates of title as married to the
latter.
Contrary to petitioner's position, the certificates of title show, on their face,
that the properties were exclusively Emilio Jocson's, the registered owner. There
being no showing also that the camarin and the two ricemills, which are the subject
of Exhibit 4, were conjugal properties of the spouses Emilio Jocson and Alejandra
Poblete, they should be considered, likewise, as the exclusive properties of Emilio
Jocson, the burden of proof being on petitioner.
ANTONIO A. S. VALDEZ v. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON

CITY, and CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-VALDEZ
G.R. No. 122749 July 31, 1996, VITUG, J.
When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or
when they do not live exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only the
property acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of money,
property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their respective
contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares, however, are prima facie
presumed to be equal.
Facts:
Antonio Valez filed for a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity. The trial court granted the petition directing
them to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as defined
by Article 147 of the Family Code and to comply with Articles 50, 51 and 52. Consuelo
asserted that the Family Code contains no provisions on the procedure for the
liquidation of property in unions without marriage. The RTC clarified that suich
provision applies.
Issue:
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Whether or not Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the case at bar.
Ruling:
Yes. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations
of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of
Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code.
Article 147 applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment
to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void
marriage or without the benefit of marriage. Under this property regime, property
acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the
rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie
presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not
participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having
contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the
fruits of the couple's separate property are not included in the co-ownership.
When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or
when they do not live exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only the
property acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of money,
property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their respective
contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares, however, are prima facie
presumed to be equal. The share of any party who is married to another shall accrue
to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be, if so existing
under a valid marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is not validly married
to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner already heretofore
expressed.
BENIGNO TODA, JR v. COURT OF APPEALS and ROSE MARIE TUASON-TODA

ROSE MARIE TUASON-TODA v. BENIGNO TODA, JR.
G.R. Nos. 78583-4 and G.R. Nos.78696-7 March 26,1990, REGALADO, J.
The separation of property is not effected by the mere execution of the
contract or agreement of the parties, but by the decree of the court approving the
same. It, therefore, becomes effective on y upon judicial approval, without which it is
void.
Facts:
Benigno and Rose Marie Toda were married until the alleged infidelity of
Benigno which promted Romse Marie to file for the termination of their marriage for
alleged mismanagement and dissipation of conjugal funds against Bengigno. The
parties agreed to file a joint petition for judicial approval of conjugal partnership on
April 1, 1981. This petition was signed by the both of them on March 30, 1981
embodied with a compromise agreement in the separation of their properties. Such
agreement was approved in June 9, 1981.
Issue:
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Whether or not the CA is correct in stating that the compromise agreement is
effective only on June 9, 1981.
Ruling:
Yes. The CA is correct in holding that the compromise agreement became
effective only on June 9, 1981, the date when it was approved by the trial court, and
not on March 30,1981 when it was signed by the parties. Under Article 190 of the
Civil Code, "(i)n the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements,
the separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place
save in virtue of a judicial order." Hence, the separation of property is not effected by
the mere execution of the contract or agreement of the parties, but by the decree of
the court approving the same. It, therefore, becomes effective on y upon judicial
approval, without which it is void. Furthermore, Article 192 of said Code explicitly
provides that the conjugal partnership is dissolved only upon the issuance of a
decree of separation of property.
Consequently, the conjugal partnership of Benigno and Rose Marie should be
considered dissolved only on June 9, 1981 when the trial court approved their joint
petition for voluntary dissolution of their conjugal partnership. Conformably thereto,
the cash dividends declared on July 1, 1981 and July 25,1981 in the amount of
P2,191.62 and P40,196.12, respectively, should pertain to Rose Marie; and that
declared on April 2,5, 1981 in the amount of P37,126.30 ought to be paid to Benigno,
pursuant to Paragraph 4 (c) of the compromise agreement which awards to Benigno
the conjugal assets not otherwise specifically assigned to Rose Marie.
SPOUSES RICKY WONG and ANITA CHAN, LEONARDO JOSON, JUANITO

SANTOS, EMERITO SICAT and CONRADO LAGMAN v. HON. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT and
ROMARICO HENSON
G.R. No. 70082 August 19, 1991, FERNAN, C.J.
The presumption of the conjugal nature of the properties subsists in the
absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said presumption
Facts:
Romarico and Katrina Henson were married spouses and had 3 children. Even
during their marriage, the spouses had been most of the time living separately.
Romarico bought a parcel of land from his father using money he borrowed from an
officemate. Katrina entered an agreement with Anita Chan where the latter consigned
to Katrina pieces of jewelry. Katrina failed to return the same thus Anita demanded
for payment of the value jewelry thus Katrina issued a check but was dishonored.
Anita Chan and Wong filed action for collection of the sum of money against Katrina
and her husband Romarico. The trial court ruled in favor of the Wongs where a writ of
execution was issued attaching 4 lots in Angeles City in the name of Romarico
married to Katrina. Such lots were sold to Juanito Santos and Leonardo Josn. Romarico
filed an action for annulment of the decision which was meritorious.
Issue:
Whether or not the properties are exclusively owned by Romancio.
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Ruling:
No. The properties are not owned exclusively by Romarico. The presumption of
the conjugal nature of the properties subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory
and convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the
properties are exclusively owned by Romarico. While there is proof that Romarico
acquired the properties with money he had borrowed from an officemate, it is unclear
where he obtained the money to repay the loan. If he paid it out of his salaries, then
the money is part of the conjugal assets and not exclusively his. Proof on this matter
is of paramount importance considering that in the determination of the nature of a
property acquired by a person during covertrue, the controlling factor is the source of
the money utilized in the purchase.
The conjugal nature of the properties notwithstanding, Katrina's indebtedness
may not be paid for with them her obligation not having been shown by the
petitioners to be one of the charges against the conjugal partnership. In addition to
the fact that her rights over the properties are merely inchoate prior to the liquidation
of the conjugal partnership, the consent of her husband and her authority to incur
such indebtedness had not been alleged in the complaint and proven at the trial.
Furthermore, under the Civil Code (before the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988), a wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases
things necessary for the support of the family or when she borrows money for the
purpose of purchasing things necessary for the support of the family if the husband
fails to deliver the proper sum; when the administration of the conjugal partnership
is transferred to the wife by the courts or by the husband and when the wife gives
moderate donations for charity. Having failed to establish that any of these
circumstances occurred, the Wongs may not bind the conjugal assets to answer for
Katrina's personal obligation to them.
ERLINDA A. AGAPAY v. CARLINA (CORNELIA) V. PALANG and HERMINIA P.

DELA CRUZ
GR NO. 116668, July 28, 1997, ROMERO, J.
The property acquired by one spouse while living in an illicit relationship with
another still belongs to the conjugal partnership or community property of his/her
valid and legal spouse.
Facts:
Miguel Palang married his first wife Carlina in 1949. Their marriage was
described by the frequent absence and separation of Miguel and Carlina due to
Miguels leaving abroad. In 1972, Miguel returned to the Philippines for good but did
not choose to leave with his wife and daughter Herminia. In July 1973, then 63 years
old Miguel contracted his second marriage with 19 years old Erlinda Agapay. In May
1973 or two months prior to their marriage Miguel and Erlinda jointly purchased a
parcel of agricultural land located at San Felipe, Binalonan, Pangasinan.
Upon the death of Miguel in 1981. Carlina and Herminia filed a case to recover
the ownership and possession of the Agricultural land in Pangasinan. To counter,
Erlinda defended claiming that it was her sole property, having bought the same with
her own money with facts however providing that she only has a sari-sari store as her
source if income.
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Issue:
Whether or not the property acquired during the illicit cohabitation or
subsequent void marriage (Erlinda and Miguel) belongs to conjugal property of the
first and valid marriage (Carlina and Miguel)
Ruling:
Yes.
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned
by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. It must be
stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision, in contrast to Article
147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and
household, are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by
one who has no salary or income or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the
party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal
shares.
In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is
engaged in the business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store but failed to
persuade us that she actually contributed money to buy the subject riceland. Worth
noting is the fact that on the date of conveyance, May 17, 1973, petitioner was only
around twenty years of age and Miguel Palang was already sixty-four and a pensioner
of the U.S. Government. Considering her youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude
that in 1973 she contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase price of subject
property, there being no proof of the same.
Erlinda claims that the riceland was bought two months before Miguel and
Erlinda actually cohabited. In the nature of an afterthought, said added assertion was
intended to exclude their case from the operation of Article 148 of the Family Code.
Proof of the precise date when they commenced their adulterous cohabitation not
having been adduced, we cannot state definitively that the riceland was purchased
even before they started living together. In any case, even assuming that the subject
property was bought before cohabitation, the rules of co-ownership would still apply
and proof of actual contribution would still be essential.
Since Erlinda failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price
of the riceland in Binalonan, Pangasinan, we find no basis to justify her co-ownership
with Miguel over the same. Consequently, the riceland should, as correctly held by
the Court of Appeals, revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased
Miguel and private respondent Carlina Palang.
SPOUSES ONESIFORO AND ROSARIO ALINAS v. SPOUSES VICTOR and ELENA

ALINAS, GR NO. 158040, APRIL 14, 2008, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
In Heirs of Aguilar-Reyes, the husband's sale of conjugal property without the
consent of the wife was annulled but the spouses were ordered to refund the
purchase price to the buyers.
Facts:
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Spouses Onesiforo and Rosario Alinas owns a land property in which Onesiforo
sold to respondent spouses Victor and Elena Alinas without Rosarios consent.
Onesiforo's signature appears in an Absolute Deed of Sale dated March 10, 1989,
selling Lot 896-B-9-B to respondent spouses. The records show a notarized document
and captioned Agreement whereby petitioner Onesiforo acknowledged that his
brother Victor used his own money to redeem Lot 896-B-9-B from the SSS and, thus,
Victor became the owner of said lot. In the same Agreeement, petitioner Onesiforo
waived whatever rights, claims, and interests he or his heirs, successors and assigns
have or may have over the subject property. On March 15, 1993, by virtue of said
documents, TCT No. 17394 covering Lot 896-B-9-B was issued in the name of
respondent spouses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale is valid notwithstanding the absence of Rosarios
(wife) consent.
Ruling:
No. Although petitioners were married before the enactment of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988, the sale in question occurred in 1989. Thus, their property
relations are governed by Chapter IV on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family
Code. Hence, pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code and jurisprudence, the sale
of petitioners' conjugal property made by petitioner Onesiforo alone is void in its
entirety.
However, in consonance with the salutary principle of non-enrichment at
anothers expense, the Court agrees with the CA that petitioners spouses should
reimburse respondent spouses the redemption price paid for Lot 896-B-9-B in the
amount of P111,110.09 with legal interest from the time of filing of the complaint.
AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. and ABELARDO MAGSAJO v.

COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES ALFREDO & ENCARNACION CHING
G.R. NO. 118305, February 12, 1998, MARTINEZ, J.
When there is no showing that the execution of an indemnity agreement by
the husband redounded to the benefit of his family, the undertaking is not a conjugal
debt but an obligation personal to him.
Facts:
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a P50, 300, 000.00 loan from
petitioner Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). As added security
for the credit line extended to PBM, respondent Alfredo Ching, Executive Vice
President of PBM, executed security agreements making himself jointly and severally
answerable with PBMs indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, AIDC
filed a case for sum of money against PBM and respondent-husband Alfredo Ching. As
a result the conjugal property of spouses Ching was sought to answer.
Issue:
Whether or not the conjugal property is liable for the husbands obligation as a
surety of PBM.
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Ruling:
No. The evidence of Ayala Investment indubitably show that co-respondent
Alfredo Ching signed as surety for the P50M loan contracted on behalf of PBM. Ayala
should have adduced evidence to prove that Alfredo Chings acting as surety
redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
In all our decisions involving accommodation contracts of the husband, we
underscored the requirement that: there must be the requisite showing of some
advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses or benefits to his
family or that such obligations are productive of some benefit to the family.
Unfortunately, the petition did not present any proof to show: (a) Whether or not the
corporate existence of PBM was prolonged and for how many months or years; and/or
(b) Whether or not the PBM was saved by the loan and its shares of stock
appreciated, if so, how much and how substantial was the holdings of the Ching
family.
Ayala Investment (AIDC) insist that the corporate debt in question falls under
the exception laid down in said Article 122 (par. one). We do not agree. The loan
procured from AIDC was for the sole advancement and benefit of Philippine Blooming
Mills and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of Ching. Appellee-husband
derives salaries, dividends benefits from Philippine Blooming Mills (the debtor
corporation), only because said husband is an employee of said PBM. These salaries
and benefits, are not the benefits contemplated by Articles 121 and 122 of the Family
Code. The benefits contemplated by the exception in Article 122 (Family Code) is that
benefit derived directly from the use of the loan. In the case at bar, the loan is a
corporate loan extended to PBM and used by PBM itself, not by petitioner-appelleehusband Ching or his family. The alleged benefit, if any, continuously harped by
respondents-appellants, are not only incidental but also speculative.
WILLEM BEUMER v. AVELINA AMORES

G.R. No. 195670, December 3, 2012, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
A foreigner husband cannot claim reimbursement from the amount he
contributed from the purchase of a private land they acquired during the marriage
upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership for it violates the constitution.
Facts:
Willem Beumer a Dutch national and Avelina Amores a Filipina were married in
1980. During their marriage they acquired properties. This Includes several house
and lot in which instruments and deeds were named before her wife acknowledging
the incapacity of Willem to acquire private lands. When their marriage was dissolved
on the ground of psychological incapacity of Willem Beumer, in a similar vein, the
latter upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership claims for the reimbursement
of the amount of money he contributed for the acquisition of the land. The RTC and
CA denied Willems claim on the ground of the constitutional prohibition.
Issue:
Whether or not Willem may claim reimbursement?
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Ruling:
No. In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant
reimbursement to petitioner Beumer given that he acquired no right whatsoever over
the subject properties by virtue of its unconstitutional purchase. It is well established
that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly
which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly. Surely, a contract that
violates the Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no
obligations and produces no legal effect at all. Corollary thereto, under Article 1412 of
the Civil Code, Beumer cannot have the subject properties deeded to him or allow
him to recover the money he had spent for the purchase thereof. The law will not aid
either party to an illegal contract or agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds
them. Indeed, one cannot salvage any rights from an unconstitutional transaction
knowingly entered into.
Neither can the Court grant petitioners claim for reimbursement on the basis
of unjust enrichment. As held in Frenzel v. Catito, a case also involving a foreigner
seeking monetary reimbursement for money spent on purchase of Philippine land,
the provision on unjust enrichment does not apply if the action is proscribed by the
Constitution.
Nor would the denial of his claim amount to an injustice based on his foreign
citizenship. Precisely, it is the Constitution itself which demarcates the rights of
citizens and non-citizens in owning Philippine land. To be sure, the constitutional ban
against foreigners applies only to ownership of Philippine land and not to the
improvements built thereon, such as the two (2) houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142
which were properly declared to be co-owned by the parties subject to partition.
Needless to state, the purpose of the prohibition is to conserve the national
patrimoni6 and it is this policy which the Court is duty-bound to protect.
HONORIO L. CARLOS v. MANUEL T. ABELARDO

G.R. No. 146504, April 9, 2002, KAPUNAN, J.
The conjugal property is liable for the debts and obligations contracted by
either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may
have been benefited
Facts:
Manuel Abelardo and Maria Abelardo were husband and wife. To start their
journey as spouses they contracted loan from Honorario Carlos for the payment of
the house and lot that would serve as their conjugal dwelling. Notably, Manuels wife
Maria executed an instrument acknowledging the loan but which respondent Manuel
did not sign. When they failed to pay for their obligation the spouses were sued by
herein petitioner Carlos.
Issue:
Whether or not the conjugal property of the spouses Abelardo is liable?
Ruling:
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Yes. Early in time, it must be noted that payment of personal debts contracted
by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the
conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.
The defendants spouses Abelardo never denied that the check of US$25,000.00 was
used to purchase the subject house and lot. They do not deny that the same served
as their conjugal home, thus benefiting the family. On the same principle,
acknowledgment of the loan made by the defendant-wife binds the conjugal
partnership since its proceeds redounded to the benefit of the family. Hence,
defendant-husband Manuel Abelardo and defendant-wife Maria Abelardo are jointly
and severally liable in the payment of the loan.
While respondent Manuel Abelardo did not and refused to sign the
acknowledgment executed and signed by his wife Maria Abelardo, undoubtedly, the
loan redounded to the benefit of the family because it was used to purchase the
house and lot which became the conjugal home of respondent and his family. Hence,
notwithstanding the alleged lack of consent of respondent Manuel, under Art. 121 of
the Family Code, he shall be solidarily liable for such loan together with his wife
Maria.
SPS. TRINIDAD S. ESTONINA and PAULINO ESTONINA v. COURT OF APPEALS,

SPS. CELSO ATAYAN, HEIRS OF GARCIA, ET.AL.
G.R. No. 111547, Januiary 27, 1997, FRANCISCO, J.
For the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership to
apply proof of its acquisition during marriage must first be established.
Facts:
Santiago Garcia and Consuelo Garcia were husband and wife. Santiago has
five children with his first wife Consuelo and four others from another for a total of
nine children. The subject property in controversy in this case was inherited by
Santiago prior to his marriage with Consuelo. However it was named and registered
only during their marriage in which providesSantiago Garcia married to Consuelo
Gaza. After the death of Santiago a writ of attachment was issued in favor of
petitioner Estonina against Consuelo Garcia. 55% of the subject property was
included in the attachment which means the share plus 1/10 share of Consuelo
claiming that the subject property is presumed conjugal property since it was issued
during their marriage that would entitle Consuelo to share of the property.
On the other hand, respondent Atayan claiming interest from the other heirs
claimed that it is not a Conjugal property. Hence, Consuelo only has 1/10 interest to
the property which consequently would give only 1/10 right of attachment for
petitioner Estonina. The RTC ruled in favor of Estonina. The CA on appeal reversed
the RTC and held that it is not a conjugal property.
Issue:
Whether or not the title to land Santiago Garcia married to Consuelo Gaza
give rise to presumption of conjugality.
Ruling:
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No. The evidence on record as well as established jurisprudence on the matter
lead us to concur with the finding of the Court of Appeals that the property involved
in this dispute is indeed the exclusive property of the deceased Santiago Garcia. It
has been repeatedly held by this Court that the presumption under Article 160 of the
Civil Code that all property of the marriage belong to the conjugal partnership applies
only when there is proof that the property was acquired during the marriage.
Otherwise stated, proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non
for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. In the case
at bench, the petitioners have been unable to present any proof that the property in
question was acquired during the marriage of Santiago and Consuelo.
Being the exclusive property of Santiago Garcia, it was the entire parcel of
land in question that formed part of his estate and which passed to his ten heirs by
compulsory succession upon his death. And as correctly held by the Court of Appeals,
what could therefore be attached and sold at public auction in Civil Case No. 88430
was only the one-tenth (1/10) pro indiviso share of Consuelo Garcia in the said parcel
of land. The sale at public auction of the disputed property in its entirety by the
Sheriff in favor of Trinidad Estonina over and above the one-tenth (1/10) share of
Consuelo Garcia is null and void, belonging as it does to the other heirs of Santiago
Garcia and later to the spouses Atayan.
JOSEFA BAUTISTA FERRER v. SPS. MANUEL M. FERRER & VIRGINIA FERRER

and SPS. ISMAEL M. FERRER and FLORA FERRER
G.R. No. 166496, November 9, 2006, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
While we could concede to the right of the spouse as contemplated in Article
120 of the Family Code to be reimbursed for the cost of the improvements, the
obligation to reimburse rests on the spouse upon whom ownership of the entire
property is vested. There is no obligation on the part of the purchaser of the
property, in case the property is sold by the owner-spouse.
Facts:
Alfredo and Josefa Ferrer were husband and wife. Alfredo owns a lot which he
acquired prior to his marriage to Josefa. Upon their marriage improvements were
introduced by Josefa. However, before the death of Alfredo and at the time when
Alfredo was allegedly was already bedridden the respondents Ferrer were able to
acquire the subject lot including its improvements through a deed of sale contracted
with Alfredo. Josefa then questioned the validity of sale. However, in a decision of the
Supreme Court it was finally held that it was a separate property in which Alfredo can
rightfully sell without his wifes consent.
Hence, as a final attempt to recover Josefa now claims that since she
introduced some improvements and since the subject land was the only property of
his deceased husband Alfredo she now has the right of reimbursement from the
buyer spouses Ferrer pursuant to Article 120 of the Family Code.
Issue:
Whether or not Josefa Ferrer may claim reimbursement from the buyer
spouses pursuant to Art.120 of the Family Code.
Ruling:
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No. Indeed, Article 120 provides the solution in determining the ownership of
the improvements that are made on the separate property of the spouses at the
expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both spouses.
Thus, when the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase in value are more
than the value of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire property of
one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to
reimbursement of the value of the property of the owner-spouse at the time of the
improvement; otherwise, said property shall be retained in ownership by the ownerspouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the improvement. The
subject property was precisely declared as the exclusive property of Alfredo on the
basis of Article 120 of the Family Code.
However, in this case what is incontrovertible is that the respondents Ferrer,
despite the allegations contained in the Complaint that they are the buyers of the
subject premises, are not petitioner Josefas spouse nor can they ever be deemed as
the owner-spouse upon whom the obligation to reimburse Josefa for her costs rested.
It is the owner-spouse Manuel Ferrer who has the obligation to reimburse the conjugal
partnership or the spouse who expended the acts or efforts, as the case may be.
Otherwise stated, respondents Ferrer do not have the obligation to respect petitioner
Josefa Ferrers right to be reimbursed.
HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK v. MIGUELA C. DAILO

A real estate mortgage without the consent or authority of the wife is void.
Facts:
Marcelino Dailo Jr. and Miguela Dailo were husband and wife married in 1967.
During their marriage they acquired house and lot. In 1993, Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of one Lilibeth Gesmundo,
authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan
Bank to be secured by the spouses Dailos house and lot in San Pablo City. Pursuant to
the SPA, Gesmundo obtained a loan in the amount of P300,000.00 from petitioner
Homeowners Bank. As security therefor, Gesmundo executed on the same day a Real
Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject property in favor of Homeowners Bank.
The abovementioned transactions, including the execution of the SPA in favor of
Gesmundo, took place without the knowledge and consent of Miguela.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the Mortgage executed by Marcelino Dailo Jr. without the
consent of his wife Miguela valid as to his undivided share.
2. Whether or not the obligation redounded to the benefit of the family.
Ruling:
1. No. The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the
knowledge and consent of his wife, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. constituted a real estate
mortgage on the subject property, which formed part of their conjugal partnership.
By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court)
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authority or written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of
the conjugal property shall be void.
2. No. For the subject property to be held liable, the obligation contracted by
the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. Here, it was not sufficiently provided. There must be the requisite
showing then of some advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses.
Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership respond for a liability that should appertain
to the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the new Civil
Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and well-being of the family as a
unit
IN RE: PETITION FOR SEPARATION OF PROPERTY: ELENA BUENAVENTURA

MULLER v. HELMUT MULLER
G.R. No. 149615, August 29, 2006, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
An alien spouse cannot claim reimbursement from the money used to
purchase a land property due to the constitutional prohibition.
Facts:
Elena Buenaventura Muller and Helmut Muller were husband and wife married
in Germany in 1989. During the subsistence of their marriage the spouses acquired a
land in Antipolo from the money of Helmut but was named after Elena due to their
acknowledgement of the constitutional prohibition. However, Due to incompatibilities
and Helmuts alleged womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the spouses
eventually separated. Consequently, Helmut now claims reimbursement of the
money used for the acquisition of the land property in Antipolo.
Issue:
Whether or not Helmut Muller is entitled to reimbursement of the funds used
for the acquisition of the Antipolo property.
RULING:
No. Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring
lands of the public domain. Hence, they are also disqualified from acquiring private
lands. The primary purpose of the constitutional provision is the conservation of the
national patrimony. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust was
created and resulted by operation of law in view of Elena Mullers marriage to Helmut
Muller. Save for the exception provided in cases of hereditary succession, Helmut
Mullers disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute. Not even an
ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, where the purchase is made in violation of an
existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in favor of
the party who is guilty of the fraud.To hold otherwise would allow circumvention of
the constitutional prohibition.
Thus, in the instant case, Helmut cannot seek reimbursement on the ground
of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite
the constitutional prohibition. Further, the distinction made between transfers of
ownership as opposed to recovery of funds is a futile exercise on Helmut Mullers
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part. To allow reimbursement would in effect permit Helmut to enjoy the fruits of a
property which he is not allowed to own. Thus, it is likewise proscribed by law
EUSTAQUIO MALLILIN, JR. v. MA. ELVIRA CASTILLO

G.R. No. 136803, June 16, 2000, MENDOZA, J.
Art. 148 of the Family Code now provides for a limited co-ownership in cases
where the parties in union are incapacitated to marry each other.
Facts:
Eustaquio Mallilin,Jr. and Ma. Elvira Castillo, both married and with children,
but separated from their respective spouses, cohabited after a brief courtship
sometime in 1979 while their respective marriages still subsisted. During their union,
they set up the Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation, with Eustaquio as
president and chairman of the board of directors, and Ma. Elvira as vice-president and
treasurer. The business flourished and Eustaquio and Ma. Elvira acquired real and
personal properties which were registered solely in Ma. Elviras name. In 1992, due to
irreconcilable differences, the couple separated. Eustaquio demanded from Ma.Elvira
his share in the subject properties, but Elvira refused alleging that said properties had
been registered solely in her name. In her defense, Elvira claimed that it was her sole
property and that there cannot be a co-ownership between them because of an illicit
relationship.
Issue:
Whether or not co-ownership can occur in an illicit/adulterous relationship.
Ruling:
Yes. It was error for the trial court to rule that, because the parties in this case
were not capacitated to marry each other at the time that they were alleged to have
been living together, they could not have owned properties in common. The Family
Code, in addition to providing that a co-ownership exists between a man and a
woman who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage,
likewise provides that, if the parties are incapacitated to marry each other, properties
acquired by them through their joint contribution of money, property or industry shall
be owned by them in common in proportion to their contributions which, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal. There is thus co-ownership
even though the couple are not capacitated to marry each other.
THELMA A. JADER-MANALO v. NORMA FERNANDEZ C. CAMAISA and

EDILBERTO CAMAISA
G.R. No. 147978, January 23, 2002, KAPUNAN, J.
The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by the husband as
administrator in appropriate cases requires the written consent of the wife,
otherwise, the disposition is void.
Facts:
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An advertisement was posted by the spouses Camaisa with regard to the
property they are selling. After seeing the Ad petitioner Jader-Manalo became
interested and offered to buy the property to the spouses Camaisa. An initial
negotiation took place in which the spouses Camaisa and Jader-Manalo was present.
In their second meeting Manalo paid a down payment to Edilberto Camaisa
(husband) who received it, based on the latters promised of the follow up consent of
her wife Norma Camaisa. When Norma was later on informed of the payment she did
not consent and did not sign the contract. Consequently, the initial down payment
was returned then to Manalo. However, Manalo now claims that the sale was already
perfected and valid.
Issue:
Whether or not the sale of the conjugal property without the wifes written
consent is valid.
Ruling:
No. The properties subject of the contracts in this case were conjugal; hence,
for the contracts to sell to be effective, the consent of both husband and wife must
concur. Respondent Norma Camaisa admittedly did not give her written consent to
the sale. Even granting that respondent Norma Camaisa actively participated in
negotiating for the sale of the subject properties, which she denied, her written
consent to the sale is required by law for its validity. Significantly, petitioner herself
admits that Norma refused to sign the contracts to sell. Respondent Norma may have
been aware of the negotiations for the sale of their conjugal properties. However,
being merely aware of a transaction is not consent.
Finally, Manalo argues that since respondent Norma unjustly refuses to affix
her signatures to the contracts to sell, court authorization under Article 124 of the
Family Code is warranted. The argument is bereft of merit. Manalo is correct insofar
as she alleges that if the written consent of the other spouse cannot be obtained or is
being withheld, the matter may be brought to court which will give such authority if
the same is warranted by the circumstances. However, it should be stressed that
court authorization under Art. 124 is only resorted to in cases where the spouse who
does not give consent is incapacitated. In this case, Manalo failed to allege and prove
that respondent Norma was incapacitated to give her consent to the contracts. In the
absence of such showing of the wifes incapacity, court authorization cannot be
sought
IMELDA RELUCIO v. ANGELINA MEJIA LOPEZ

G.R. No. 138497, January 16, 2002, PARDO, J.
Article 128 of the Family Code refers only to spouses. Stated otherwise, the
administration of the property of the marriage is entirely between husband and wife,
to the exclusion of all other persons
Facts:
Angeline Lopez filed for judicial appointment as administratrix of the conjugal
partnership or absolute community property, accounting and forfeiture arising from
her marriage to Alberto J. Lopez. In addition to his husband, Imelda Relusion was also
impleaded by Angeline on the alleged illicit relationship thereof to his husband which
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resulted to the abandonment and the abuse of their conjugal propertys
administration to the detriment of Angeline and four children. Nonetheless, Imelda
defended by claiming lack of cause of action against her that should warrant the
dismissal of the case against her.
Issue:
Whether or not the inclusion of Imelda as a party defendant in special
proceeding for judicial appointment as administratrix of the conjugal partnership or
absolute community property, accounting and forfeiture between spouses Lopez
should prosper.
Ruling:
No. The administration of the property of the marriage is entirely between
them, to the exclusion of all other persons. Angeline alleges that Alberto J. Lopez is
her husband. Therefore, her first cause of action is against Alberto J. Lopez. There is
no right-duty relation between Imelda and Angeline that can possibly support a cause
of action. In fact, none of the three elements of a cause of action exists.
The second cause of action is for an accounting by Angelines husband. The
accounting of conjugal partnership arises from or is an incident of marriage. Imelda
has nothing to do with the marriage between Angeline and Alberto J. Lopez. Hence,
no cause of action can exist against Imelda on this ground.
Further, Angelines asserted right to forfeit extends to Alberto J. Lopez share
alone. Failure of Alberto J. Lopez to surrender such share, assuming the trial court
finds in Angelines favor, results in a breach of an obligation to Angeline and gives
rise to a cause of action. Such cause of action, however, pertains to Alberto J. Lopez,
not Imelda.
ANTONIO DOCENA and ALFREDA DOCENA v. HON. RICARDO P. LAPESURA,

RUFINO M. GARADO, and CASIANO HOMBRIA
G.R. No. 140153, March 28, 2001, GONZAGA-REYES, J.
The husband alone in a suit involving the conjugal property may sign the
certificate against forum shopping pursuant to the right granted by law to administer
it.
Facts:
A case in which the conjugal property of the spouses Docena was involved is
filed. Pursuant to this case, however, rather than both spouses signing the
certification against forum shopping it is only Antonio the husband in behalf of the
conjugal property signed the certification against forum shopping. The private
respondent Casiano Hombria assails this claiming that the certification is invalid.
Issue:
Whether or not the certification against forum shopping signed by the
husband alone involving conjugal property is valid.
Ruling:
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Yes. Under the New Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the
conjugal partnership. In fact, he is the sole administrator, and the wife is not entitled
as a matter of right to join him in this endeavor. The husband may defend the
conjugal partnership in a suit or action without being joined by the wife. Corollary, the
husband alone may execute the necessary certificate of non-forum shopping to
accompany the pleading. The husband as the statutory administrator of the conjugal
property could have filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition alone, without the
concurrence of the wife. If suits to defend an interest in the conjugal properties may
be filed by the husband alone, with more reason, he may sign the certificate of nonforum shopping to be attached to the petition.
Under the Family Code, the administration of the conjugal property belongs to
the husband and the wife jointly. However, unlike an act of alienation or
encumbrance where the consent of both spouses is required, joint management or
administration does not require that the husband and wife always act together. Each
spouse may validly exercise full power of management alone, subject to the
intervention of the court in proper cases as provided under Article 124 of the Family
Code. It is believed that even under the provisions of the Family Code, the husband
alone could have filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition to contest the writs of
demolition issued against the conjugal property with the Court of Appeals without
being joined by his wife. The signing of the attached certificate of non-forum
shopping only by the husband is not a fatal defect.
Therefore, in view of the circumstances of this case, namely, the property
involved is a conjugal property, the petition questioning the writ of demolition thereof
originated from an action for recovery brought against the spouses, and is clearly
intended for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and the wife, as pointed out in
the Motion for Reconsideration in respondent court, was in the province of Guian,
Samar, whereas the petition was prepared in Metro Manila, a rigid application of the
rules on forum shopping that would not authorize a husbands signing the certification
in his behalf and that of his wife is too harsh and is clearly uncalled for.
SPOUSES ANTONIO and LUZVIMINDA GUIANG v. COURT OF APPEALS and

GILDA CORPUZ
G.R. No. 125172, June 26, 1998, PANGANIBAN, J.
Without authority or consent of the spouse any disposition or encumbrance by
the other spouse is null and void.
Facts:
Gilda Corpuz and Judie Corpuz where spouses. In January of 1990 when Gilda
was away looking for work Judie Corpuz sold their house to spouses Guiang. Upon her
return, she was informed that his husband Judie already left with his new wife and
that their house was already sold to the spouses Guiang. When Gilda stayed in the
house and refused to accede with spouses Guiangs order to leave the house, the
latter filed a case for trespassing against Gilda Corpuz and children.
At the barangay level, Gilda Corpuz was forced to sign an amicable settlement
in relation to the trespassing case filed against her. Nonetheless, she stayed and
claimed that she was forced by the barangay captain to sign it. Spouses Guiang now
claims that the sale is valid and if ever it is voidable on account of Gildas lack of
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consent it was nonetheless ratified by the amicable settlement subsequently
rendered.
Issue:
Whether or not the sale of the house without the wifes consent is valid.
Ruling:
No. Petitioner spouses Guiang insist that the questioned Deed of Transfer of
Rights was validly executed by the parties-litigants in good faith and for valuable
consideration. The absence of private respondent Gildas consent merely rendered
the Deed voidable under Article 1390 of the Civil Code. However we cannot agree for
ART. 124 of the Family Code is clear. The disposition or encumbrance is void. It
becomes still clearer if we compare the same with the equivalent provision of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. The provision in the civil code giving the wife ten (10)
years during the marriage to annul the alienation or encumbrance was not carried
over to the Family Code. It is thus clear that any alienation or encumbrance made
after August 3, 1988 when the Family Code took effect by the husband of the
conjugal partnership property without the consent of the wife is null and void.
Furthermore, it must be noted that the fraud and the intimidation referred to
by petitioners were perpetrated in the execution of the document embodying the
amicable settlement. Gilda Corpuz alleged during trial that barangay authorities
made her sign said document through misrepresentation and coercion. In any event,
its execution does not alter the void character of the deed of sale between the
husband Judie Corpuz and the petitioners-spouses Guiang for doctrinally and clearly,
a void contract cannot be ratified. The fact remains that such contract was entered
into without the wifes consent.
In sum, the nullity of the contract of sale is premised on the absence of Gildas
consent. To constitute a valid contract, the Civil Code requires the concurrence of the
following elements: (1) cause, (2) object, and (3) consent. Here, the last element
being indubitably absent in the case at bar.
GUILLERMA TUMLOS v. SPOUSES MARIO FERNANDEZ and LOURDES

FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 137650, April 12, 2000, PANGANIBAN, J.
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, a man and a woman who are not legally
capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together conjugally, may
be deemed co-owners of a property acquired during the cohabitation only upon proof
that each made an actual contribution to its acquisition. Hence, mere cohabitation
without proof of contribution will not result in a co-ownership.
Facts:
Spouses Mario and Lourdez Fernandez filed an ejectment suit against
Guillarma Tumlos. Spouses Fernandez claimed that the apartment building where
Guillerma stays is owned by them and that they allowed Guillermas possession by
mere tolerance. In her defense, Guillerma said that she had a relationship with Mario
that would entitle her to the possession of the property being the co-owner thereof.
Guillerma alleged that they bought the property as their love nest; that they lived
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together in the property with their 2 children and that Guillerma administered the
property by collecting rentals, until she discovered that Mario deceived her as to the
annulment of his marriage.
Issue:
Whether or not Guillerma is entitled to the possession of the property.
Ruling:
No. In this case, Guillerma failed to present any evidence that she had made
an actual contribution to purchase the subject property. Indeed, she anchors her
claim of co-ownership merely on her cohabitation with Respondent Mario Fernandez.
Likewise, her claim of having administered the property during the cohabitation is
unsubstantiated. In any event, this fact by itself does not justify her claim, for nothing
in Article 148 of the Family Code provides that the administration of the property
amounts to a contribution in its acquisition. Clearly, there is no basis for Guillermas
claim of co-ownership. The property in question belongs to the conjugal partnership
of respondent spouses Fernandez.
LUPO ATIENZA v. YOLANDA DE CASTRO

G.R. No. 169698, November 29, 2006, GARCIA, J.
There can clearly be no co-ownership when, as here, De Castro sufficiently
established that she derived the funds used to purchase the property from her
earnings, not only as an accountant but also as a businesswoman engaged in foreign
currency trading, money lending and jewelry retail.
Facts:
Despite Lupo Atienza being a married man, he and Yolanda eventually lived
together in consortium. However, after the birth of their second child, their
relationship turned sour until they parted ways. Consequently, Lupo filed in the RTC a
complaint against Yolanda De Castro for the judicial partition between them of a
parcel of land with improvements located in Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati City wherein
he alleged that the subject property was acquired during his union with Yolanda as
common-law husband and wife, hence the property is co-owned by them. Moreover,
he averred that the property in question was acquired by De Castro sometime in
1987 using his exclusive funds and that the title thereto was transferred by the seller
in De Castros name without his knowledge and consent. He did not interpose any
objection thereto because at the time, their affair was still thriving. He further argued
that pursuant to Article 144 of the Civil Code, he was in no way burdened to prove
that he contributed to the acquisition of the subject property because with or without
the contribution by either partner, he is deemed a co-owner thereof, adding that
under Article 484 of Civil Code, as long as the property was acquired by either or
both of them during their extramarital union, such property would be legally owned
by them in common and governed by the rules on co-ownership, which apply in
default of contracts, or special provisions.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject property is commonly owned by the parties.
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Ruling:
No. Atienzas claim of co-ownership in the disputed property is without basis
because not only did he fail to substantiate his alleged contribution in the purchase
thereof but likewise the very trail of documents pertaining to its purchase as
evidentiary proof redounds to the benefit of the respondent. True, the mere issuance
of a certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility
that the real property covered thereby may be under co-ownership with persons not
named in the certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other
parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of
title. However, as already stated, petitioners evidence in support of his claim is either
insufficient or immaterial to warrant the trial courts finding that the disputed property
falls under the purview of Article 148 of the Family Code. In contrast to Atienzas
dismal failure to prove his cause, De Castro was able to present preponderant
evidence of her sole ownership. There can clearly be no co-ownership when, as here,
De Castro sufficiently established that she derived the funds used to purchase the
property from her earnings, not only as an accountant but also as a businesswoman
engaged in foreign currency trading, money lending and jewelry retail. She presented
her clientele and the promissory notes evincing substantial dealings with her clients.
She also presented her bank account statements and bank transactions, which reflect
that she had the financial capacity to pay the purchase price of the subject property.
ELNA MERCADO-FEHR v. BRUNO FEHR

G.R. No. 152716, October 23, 2003, PUNO, J.
Article 147 applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not
barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless
void, as in the case at bar. This provision creates a co-ownership with respect to the
properties they acquire during their cohabitation.
Facts:
The RTC declared the marriage between Bruno and Elna Fehr void ab
initio under Article 36 of the Family Code and ordered the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership of property. Petitioner however questioned the order of the RTC with
respect to the adjudication of Suite 204, LCG Condominium and the support of the
children. Petitioner alleged that Suite 204 was purchased on installment basis at the
time when petitioner and respondent were living exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, hence the rules on co-ownership
should apply in accordance with Article 147 of the Family Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject property is a common property of the parties and
their property regime should be divided in accordance with the law on co-ownership.
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Ruling:
Yes. For Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be
capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and
wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is
void. All these elements are present in the case at bar. It has not been shown that
Elna and Bruno suffered any impediment to marry each other. They lived exclusively
with each other as husband and wife when petitioner moved in with respondent in his
residence and were later united in marriage. Their marriage, however, was found to
be void under Article 36 of the Family Code because of respondents psychological
incapacity to comply with essential marital obligations. The disputed
property, Suite 204 of LCG Condominium, was purchased on installment basis on July
26, 1983, at the time when they were already living together. Hence, it should be
considered as common property of the parties.
JACINTO SAGUID v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE REGIONAL TRIAL

COURT, BRANCH 94, BOAC, MARINDUQUE and GINA S. REY
G.R. No. 150611. June 10, 2003, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
The issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous

marriage and an adulterous relationship requires proof of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property.
Facts:
Seventeen-year old Gina Rey was married, but separated de facto from her
husband, when she met Jacinto Saguid. However, after 9 years of cohabitation, the
couple decided to separate. Rey filed a complaint for Partition and Recovery of
Personal Property with Receivership against Saguid wherein she alleged that from her
salary of $1,500.00 a month as entertainer in Japan, she was able to contribute
P70,000.00 in the completion of their unfinished house. Also, from her own earnings
as an entertainer and fish dealer, she was able to acquire and accumulate
appliances, pieces of furniture and household effects, with a total value of
P111,375.00. She prayed that she be declared the sole owner of these personal
properties and that the amount of P70,000.00, representing her contribution to the
construction of their house, be reimbursed to her.
Issue:
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Whether or not Saguid was able to prove her actual contribution as provided
under Art.148 of the Famiy Code.
Ruling:
No. It is not disputed that Rey and Saguid were not capacitated to marry each
other because the former was validly married to another man at the time of her
cohabitation with the latter. Their property regime therefore is governed by Article
148 of the Family Code, which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous
relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both man
and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married
man. Under this regime, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them
in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Proof of actual contribution
is required.
In the case at bar, the controversy centers on the house and personal
properties of the parties. Rey alleged in her complaint that she contributed
P70,000.00 for the completion of their house. However, nowhere in her testimony did
she specify the extent of her contribution. What appears in the record are receipts in
her name for the purchase of construction materials on November 17, 1995 and
December 23, 1995, in the total amount of P11,413.00. On the other hand, while
there is no question that both parties contributed in their joint account deposit, there
is, however, no sufficient proof of the exact amount of their respective shares
therein. Pursuant to Article 148 of the Family Code, in the absence of proof of extent
of the parties respective contribution, their share shall be presumed to be
equal. Here, the disputed personal properties were valued at P111,375.00, the
existence and value of which were not questioned by the petitioner. Hence, their
share therein is equivalent to one-half, i.e., P55,687.50 each.
The Family as an Institution
SPOUSES AUGUSTO HONTIVEROS and MARIA HONTIVEROS v. REGIONAL

TRIAL COURT, Branch 25, Iloilo City and SPOUSES GREGORIO HONTIVEROS
and TEODORA AYSON
G.R. No. 125465. June 29, 1999, MENDOZA, J.
Whenever a stranger is a party in a case involving family members, the

requisite showing of earnest efforts to compromise is no longer mandatory.
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Facts:
Spouses Hontiveros filed a complaint for damages against private respondents

before the RTC. Later, the spouses filed an Amended Complaint to insert therein an
allegation that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made between the
parties but the same were unsuccessful. In due time, private respondents filed an
answer in which they denied that earnest efforts had been made to reach a
compromise but the parties were unsuccessful. The RTC dismissed the case on the
ground that the complaint was not verified as required by Art. 151 of the Family Code
and, therefore, it did not believe that earnest efforts had been made to arrive at a
compromise.
Issue:
Whether or not the Art. 151 of the Family Code is applicable herein.
Ruling:
NO. Art. 151 of the Family Code does not apply in this case since the suit is
not exclusively among family members. The inclusion of Ayson as defendant and
Maria Hontiveros as plaintiff takes the case out of the ambit of Art. 151 of the Family
Code. Under this provision, the phrase members of the same family refers to the
husband and wife, parents and children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers
and sisters, whether full or half-blood. Religious relationship and relationship by
affinity are not given any legal effect in this jurisdiction. Consequently, Ayson, who is
described in the complaint as the spouse of respondent Hontiveros, and Maria
Hontiveros, who is admittedly the spouse of petitioner Augusto Hontiveros, are
considered strangers to the Hontiveros family, for purposes of Art. 151.
HEIRS OF DR. MARIANO FAVIS, SR. v. JUANA GONZALES, ET. AL

G.R. No. 185922, January 15, 2014, PEREZ, J.
If the respondents as partiesdefendants could not, and did not, after filing
their answer to petitioners complaint, invoke the objection of absence of the
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required allegation on earnest efforts at a compromise, the appellate court
unquestionably did not have any authority or basis to motu propio order the
dismissal of petitioners complaint.
Facts:
Claiming that the donation made prejudiced their legitime, Dr. Favis children
with Capitolina filed an action for annulment of the Deed of Donation, inventory,
liquidation and partition of property before the RTC. The latter nullified the said deed.
On appeal, the CA motu proprio ordered the dismissal of the complaint for failure of
petitioners to make an averment that earnest efforts toward a compromise have
been made, as mandated by Article 151 of the Family Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellate court may dismiss the order of dismissal of the
complaint for failure to allege therein that earnest efforts towards a compromise have
been made.
Ruling:
NO. A failure to allege earnest but failed efforts at a compromise in a
complaint among members of the same family is not a jurisdictional defect but
merely a defect in the statement of a cause of action. The defect may however be
waived by failing to make seasonable objection, in a motion to dismiss or answer, the
defect being a mere procedural imperfection which does not affect the jurisdiction of
the court. In the case at hand, no motion to dismiss the complaint based on the
failure to comply with a condition precedent was filed in the trial court; neither was
such failure assigned as error in the appeal that respondent brought before the CA.
Therefore, the rule on deemed waiver of the nonjurisdictional defense or objection is
wholly applicable to respondent. If the respondents as partiesdefendants could not,
and did not, after filing their answer to petitioners complaint, invoke the objection of
absence of the required allegation on earnest efforts at a compromise, the appellate
court unquestionably did not have any authority or basis to motu propio order the
dismissal of petitioners complaint.
GAUDENCIO GUERRERO v. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ILOCOS NORTE, BR.

XVI, JUDGE LUIS B. BELLO, JR., PRESIDING, and PEDRO G. HERNANDO
G.R. No. 109068 January 10, 1994, BELLOSILLO, J.
"Sisters-in-law" (hence, also "brothers-in-law") are not listed under Art. 217 of
the New Civil Code as members of the same family.
Facts:
A complaint was filed against Pedro Hernando. However the same was
dismissed by the RTC on the ground that the parties being brother-in-law, the
complaint should have alleged that earnest efforts were first exerted towards a
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compromise. Gaudencio Guerrero argued however that since brothers by affinity are
not members of the same family, he was not required to exert efforts towards a
compromise.
Issue:
Whether brothers by affinity are considered members of the same family
contemplated in Art. 217, par. (4), and Art. 222 of the New Civil Code, as well as
under Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, of the Rules of Court requiring earnest efforts towards
a compromise before a suit between them may be instituted and maintained.
Ruling:
No. The Court already ruled in Gayon v. Gayon that the enumeration of
"brothers and sisters" as members of the same family does not comprehend "sistersin-law". In that case, then Chief Justice Concepcion emphasized that "sisters-in-law"
(hence, also "brothers-in-law") are not listed under Art. 217 of the New Civil Code as
members of the same family. Since Art. 150 of the Family Code repeats essentially
the same enumeration of "members of the family", the Court find no reason to alter
existing jurisprudence on the matter. Consequently, the court a quo erred in ruling
that Guerrero, being a brother-in-law of Hernando, was required to exert earnest
efforts towards a compromise before filing the present suit.
HIYAS SAVINGS and LOAN BANK, INC. v. HON. EDMUNDO T. ACUA, in his
capacity as Pairing Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 122, Caloocan City,
and ALBERTO MORENO
G.R. NO. 154132 August 31, 2006, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of the same

family, the law no longer makes it a condition precedent that earnest efforts be made
towards a compromise before the action can prosper.
Facts:
Alberto Moreno filed with the RTC a complaint against Hiyas Savings and Loan
Bank, Inc., his wife Remedios, the spouses Felipe and Maria Owe and the Register of
Deeds of Caloocan City for cancellation of mortgage. Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Moreno failed to comply with Article 151
of the Family Code wherein it is provided that no suit between members of the same
family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition
that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have
failed. The RTC however denied the motion and agreed with Moreno that earnest
efforts towards a compromise is not required before the filing of the instant case
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considering that the above-entitled case involves parties who are strangers to the
family. Also, as it is Remedios who stands to be benefited by Art. 151 of the Family
Code, being a member of the same family as that of Alberto, only she may invoke
said Art. 151.
Issue:
herein.
Whether or not earnest efforts towards a compromise is required in the case
Ruling:
NO. In Magbaleta, the Court ruled that once a stranger becomes a party to a
suit involving members of the same family, the law no longer makes it a condition
precedent that earnest efforts be made towards a compromise before the action can
prosper. Article 151 of the Family Code applies to cover when the suit is exclusively
between or among family members. Petitioner makes much of the fact that the
present case involves a husband and his wife while Magbaleta is a case between
brothers. However, the Court finds no specific, unique, or special circumstance that
would make the ruling in Magbaleta inapplicable to suits involving a husband and his
wife, as in the present case. In the first place, Article 151 of the Family Code and
Article 222 of the Civil Code are clear that the provisions therein apply to suits
involving "members of the same family" as contemplated under Article 150 of the
Family Code. Since the Court has ruled that the requirement under Article 151 of the
Family Code is applicable only in cases which are exclusively between or among
members of the same family, it necessarily follows that the same may be invoked
only by a party who is a member of that same family.
Family Home
FLORANTE F. MANACOP v. COURT OF APPEALS and E & L MERCANTILE, INC.
G.R. No. 97898. August 11, 1997, PANGANIBAN, J.
There being absolutely no proof that the subject property was judicially or
extrajudicially constituted as a family home, it follows that the laws protective
mantle cannot be availed of by Manacop.
Facts:
Jose Manacop and his wife purchased on March 10, 1972 a residential lot with
a bungalow. E & L Mercantile, Inc. filed a complaint against petitioner and F.F.
Manacop Construction Co., Inc. before the RTC to collect indebtedness. Instead of
filing an answer, Manacop and his company entered into a compromise agreement
which was approved by the court. A motion for execution was filed which the lower
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court granted. Manacop and his company filed a motion to quash the alias writs of
execution and to stop the sheriff from continuing to enforce them.
Issue:
Whether or not a final and executory decision promulgated and a writ of
execution issued before the effectivity of the Family Code can be executed on a
family home constituted under the provisions of the said Code.
Ruling:
Yes. True, under the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988, the
subject property became his family home under the simplified process embodied in
Article 153 of said Code. However, Modequillo ruling explicitly enunciated that said
provision of the Family Code does not have retroactive effect. In other words, prior to
August 3, 1988, the procedure mandated by the Civil Code had to be followed for a
family home to be constituted as such. There being absolutely no proof that the
subject property was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home, it
follows that the laws protective mantle cannot be availed of by Manacop. Since the
debt involved herein was incurred and the assailed orders of the trial court issued
prior to August 3, 1988, Manacop cannot be shielded by the benevolent provisions of
the Family Code.
JOSE MODEQUILLO v. HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA, ET. AL

G.R. No. 86355 May 31, 1990, GANCAYCO, J.
Article 162 simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the
effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively
entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. Article 162
does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.
Facts:
A judgment against Jose Modequillo was rendered by the CA. The said
judgment having become final and executory, a writ of execution was issued. The
sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land owned by Modequillo. A motion to quash
and/or to set aside levy of execution was filed by defendant Jose Modequillo alleging
therein that the residential land is where the family home is built since 1969 prior to
the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment under Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code except for liabilities
mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment debt sought to be enforced
against the family home of defendant is not one of those enumerated under Article
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Issue:
Whether or not the final judgment of the CA in an action for damages may be
satisfied by way of execution of the subject residential property.
Ruling:
Yes. In the present case, the residential house and lot of Modequillo was not
constituted as a family home whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil
Code. It became a family home by operation of law only under Article 153 of the
Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its publication in the
Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987 (1988 being a leap year). Under Article 162 of the
Family Code, it is provided that "the provisions of this Chapter shall also govern
existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable." It does not mean
that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a retroactive effect such that all existing
family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time
of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from
execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family
Code. Thus, the family home of Modequillo is not exempt from execution of the
money judgment. The debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment arose or
was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the money
judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate court on January 29, 1988.
Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. This case does
not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the Family Code.
PERLA G. PATRICIO v. MARCELINO G. DARIO III and

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Second Division
G.R. No. 170829, November 20, 2006, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Despite residing in the family home and his being a descendant of Marcelino
Dario, Marcelino Lorenzo Dario IV cannot be considered as beneficiary contemplated
under Article 154 because he did not fulfill the third requisite of being dependent on
his grandmother for legal support.
Facts:
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Perla Patricio and her two sons inherited from her husband several properties
including a parcel of land with a residential house. Marcelino Marc, one of her sons,
instituted an action for partition before the RTC which was granted. Upon a motion for
reconsideration filed by Dario III on appeal, the CA dismissed the complaint for
partition filed by Patricio and Marcelino Marc for lack of merit. It held that the family
home should continue despite the death of one or both spouses as long as there is a
minor beneficiary thereof. The heirs could not partition the property unless the court
found compelling reasons to rule otherwise. The appellate court also held that the
minor son of private respondent, who is a grandson of spouses Marcelino Dario and
Perla Patricio, was a minor beneficiary of the family home.
Issue:
Whether or not partition of the family home is proper where one of the coowners refuse to accede to such partition on the ground that a minor beneficiary still
resides in the said home.
Ruling:
Yes. The rule is that if there are beneficiaries who survive and are living in the
family home, it will continue for 10 years, unless at the expiration of 10 years, there
is still a minor beneficiary, in which case the family home continues until that
beneficiary becomes of age. Marcelino Lorenzo Dario IV is dependent on legal support
not from his grandmother, but from his father. Thus, despite residing in the family
home and his being a descendant of Marcelino Dario, Marcelino Lorenzo Dario IV
cannot be considered as beneficiary contemplated under Article 154 because he did
not fulfill the third requisite of being dependent on his grandmother for legal support.
It is his father whom he is dependent on legal support, and who must now establish
his own family home separate and distinct from that of his parents, being of legal
age.
Paternity and Filiation
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MARIANO ANDAL, assisted by mother Maria Dueas as guardian ad litem,
and MARIA DUEAS v. EDUVIGIS MACARAIG
G.R. No. L-2474, May 30, 1951, BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.
As a rule, a child presumed to be legitimate if he was born within three
hundred (300) days following the dissolution of the marriage. This presumption can
only be rebutted by proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to have
had access to his wife during the first 120 days of the 300 next preceding the birth of
the child.
Facts:
Emiliano Andal became sick of tuberculosis in January 1941. Sometime
thereafter, his brother, Felix, went to live in his house to help him work his house to
help him work his farm. His sickness became worse that on or about September 10,
1942, he became so weak that he could hardly move and get up from his bed. On
September 10, 1942, Maria Duenas, his wife, eloped with Felix, and both went to live
in the house of Maria's father, until the middle of 1943. Since May, 1942, Felix and
Maria had sexual intercourse and treated each other as husband and wife. On January
1, 1943, Emiliano died without the presence of his wife, who did not even attend his
funeral. On June 17, 1943, Maria Dueas gave birth to a boy, who was given the
name of Mariano Andal.
Issue:
Whether or not Mariano can be considered as the legitimate son of Emiliano.
Ruling:
Yes. Since the boy was born on June 17, 1943, and Emiliano Andal died on
January 1, 1943, that boy is presumed to be the legitimate son of Emiliano and his
wife, he having been born within three hundred (300) days following the dissolution
of the marriage. This presumption can only be rebutted by proof that it was physically
impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the first 120 days of
the 300 next preceding the birth of the child.
There was no evidence presented that Emiliano was absent during the initial
period of conception, specially during the period comprised between August 21, 1942
and September 10, 1942, which is included in the 120 days of the 300 next preceding
the birth of the child Mariano. On the contrary, there is enough evidence to show that
during that initial period, Emiliano and his wife were still living under the marital roof.
Even if Felix, the brother, was living in the same house, and he and the wife were
indulging in illicit intercourse since May, 1942, that does not preclude cohabitation
between Emiliano and his wife. The Court admit that Emiliano was already suffering
from tuberculosis and his condition then was so serious that he could hardly move
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and get up from bed, his feet were swollen and his voice hoarse. But experience
shows that this does not prevent carnal intercourse. There are cases where persons
suffering from this sickness can do the carnal act even in the most crucial stage
because they are more inclined to sexual intercourse. There is neither evidence to
show that Emiliano was suffering from impotency, patent, continuous and incurable,
nor was there evidence that he was imprisoned. The presumption of legitimacy under
the Civil Code in favor of the child has not, therefore, been overcome.
TEOFISTA BABIERA v. PRESENTACION B. CATOTAL

G.R. No. 138493. June 15, 2000, PANGANIBAN, J.
The present action involves the cancellation of Babiera's Birth Certificate, it
does not impugn her legitimacy. The specific attendant in the case at bar and the
totality of the evidence presented during trial, sufficiently negates the presumption
of regularity in the issuance of birth certificate.
Facts:
Presentacion Catotal questioned the authenticity of the entry of birth of
Teofista Babiera. She asserted that the birth certificate is void ab initio, as it was
totally a simulated birth, the signature of informant forged, and contained false
entries. Catotal ask the court to declare Babiera's certificate of birth void and
ineffective, and to order the City Civil Registrar to cancel the same as it affect the
hereditary rights of Catotal who inherited the estate. Babiera countered that she and
Catotal are full-blooded sisters, as showed therein her certificate of birth, Certificate
of Baptism, and her School Report Card.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Catotal has legal capacity to file the special proceedings
pursuant to Art. 171.
(2) Whether or not the special proceedings is improper and barred by the
statute of limitation.
(3) Whether or not the public record of Babiera's birth is superior to the oral
testimony of Catotal.
Ruling:
(1) No. Article 171 is not applicable in this case. Article 171 of the Family Code
shows that it applies to instances which the father impugns the legitimacy of his
wife's child. The provision, however, presupposes that the child was the undisputed
child of the mother. Present case alleges and shows that the alleged mother,
Hermogena, did not give birth to Babiera. The present action does not impugn
Babiera's filiation to Eugenio and Hermogena, be there is no blood relation to impugn
in the first place. The reason why Catotal took interest on Babiera's status is to
protect the former's successional rights.
(2) No. Article 170 of the FC does not apply. The provision provides a
prescriptive period for action to impugn the legitimacy of the child. The present
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action involves the cancellation of Babiera's Birth Certificate, it does not impugn her
legitimacy. The action to nullify the birth certificate does not prescribe because it was
allegedly declared void ab initio.
(3) No. The specific attendant in the case at bar and the totality of the
evidence presented during trial, sufficiently negates the presumption of regularity in
the issuance of birth certificate. First, the birth certificate was not signed by the local
civil registrar, and the mother's signature was different from other signatures.
Second, no medical records or doctor's prescription that provide as evidence of
Hermogena's pregnancy. It was impossible for her to have given birth at 54 years of
age. Third, the disposition of Hermogena which states that she did not give birth to
Teofista and that the latter was not hers of Eugenio.
MARISSA BENITEZ-BADUA v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET. AL

G.R. No. 105625, January 24, 1994, PUNO, J.
Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code cannot be applied in the
case at bar because said provisions do not contemplate a situation where a child is
alleged not to be the biological child of a certain couple.
Facts:
Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian had various properties. They
both died intestate. The special proceedings for administration of the properties were
filed with the trial court. Vicentes sister, Victoria Lirio, filed for issuance of letters of
administration in favor of the nephew. Marissa Badua opposed the petition, saying
that she is the sole heir of deceased Marissa and that she is capable of administering
his estate. She submitted the pieces of documentary evidence and testified that the
spouses treated her as their own daughter. The relatives of Vicente tried to prove
through testimonial evidence, that the spouses failed to beget a child during their
marriage. Victoria categorically declared that Marissa was not the biological child of
the spouses who were unable to physically procreate. The RTC relied on Arts. 166 and
170 of the Family Code and ruled in favor of Marissa. On appeal, the CA reversed the
lower court decision and declared Marissa Benitez-Badua is not the biological child of
the late spouses.
Issue:
Whether or not Marissa is the legitimate child and the sole heir of the late
spouses.
Ruling:
NO. Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code cannot be applied in
the case at bar. The above provisions do not contemplate a situation where a child is
alleged not to be the biological child of a certain couple. In Article 166, it is the
husband who can impugn the legitimacy of the child by: (1) it was physically
impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days
of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for
biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child; and (3)
that in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written
authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud,
violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171 speak of the
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prescription period within which the husband or any of his heirs should file an action
impugning the legitimacy of the child. In this case, it is not where the heirs of the late
Benitez are contending that Marissa is not his child or a child by Isabel, but they are
contending that Marissa was not born to Vicente and Isabel.
Marissa was not the biological child of the dead spouses. Marissa's Certificate
of Live Birth was repudiated by the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of
the late Isabel by Vicente, saying that he and his brother-in-law are the sole heirs of
the estate.
ARTEMIO G. ILANO v. THE COURT OF APPEALS and MERCEDITAS (sic) S.

ILANO, represented by her mother, LEONCIA DE LOS SANTOS
G.R. No. 104376, February 23, 1994, NOCON, J.
The possession of illegitimate status means that the father has treated the
child as his own, directly and not through other, spontaneously and without
concealment though without publicity.
Facts:
While Leoncia De Los Santos and Artemio Ilano were living together,
Merceditas Ilano was born. Her birth was recorded as Merceditas de los Santos Ilano,
child of Leoncia Aguinaldo de los Santos and Artemio Geluz Ilano. During the time
that Artemio and Leoncia were living as husband and wife, he showed concern as the
father of Merceditas. When Merceditas was in Grade I at the St. Joseph Parochial
School, he signed her Report Card for the fourth and fifth grading periods as her
parent. Those signatures were both identified by Leoncia and Merceditas because he
signed them in their residence in their presence and of Elynia. Since Merceditas
started to have discernment, he was already the one whom she recognized as her
Daddy. He treated her as a father would to his child. He would bring home candies,
toys, and anything a child enjoys. He would take her for a drive, eat at restaurants,
and even cuddle her to sleep.
Issue:
Whether or not Merceditas is a duly acknowledged and recognized illegitimate
child.
Ruling:
Yes. Since Artemio had a subsisting marriage to another at the time
Merceditas was conceived, she is a spurious child. The possession of illegitimate
status means that the father has treated the child as his own, directly and not
through other, spontaneously and without concealment though without publicity.
There must be a showing of the permanent intention of the supposed father to
consider the child as his own, by continuous and clear manifestation of paternal
affection and care.
The mere denial by Artemio of his signature is not sufficient to offset the
totality of the evidence indubitably showing that the signature thereon belongs to
him. The entry in the Certificate of Live Birth that Leoncia and Artemio was falsely
stated therein as married does not mean that Merceditas is not appellee's daughter.
This particular entry was caused to be made by Artemio himself in order to avoid
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embarrassment. It is difficult to believe that plaintiffs mother, who is a mere
dressmaker, had long beforehand diabolically conceived of a plan to make it appear
that defendant, who claims to be a total stranger to be a total stranger, was the
father of her child, and in the process falsified the latter's signatures and handwriting.
The natural, logical and coherent evidence of plaintiff from the genesis of the
relationship between Leoncia and Artemio, their living together as circumstances of
Merceditas birth, the acts of Artemio in recognizing and supporting Merceditas, find
ample support from the testimonial and documentary evidence which leaves no room
to reasonably doubt his paternity which may not be infirmed by his belated denials.
JANICE MARIE JAO v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO V.

JAO
G.R. No. L-49162, July 28, 1987, PADILLA, J.
There is now almost universal scientific agreement that blood grouping tests
are conclusive as to non-paternity, although inconclusive as to paternity.
Facts:
Arlene Salgado, Janice Marie's mother, filed a case for recognition and support
against Perico Jao. Perico denied the paternity so they agreed to a blood grouping
test which was in due course conducted by the NBI. The test came out indicating that
Janice could not have been the possible offspring of Perico and Arlene. Upon
Salgado's motion for reconsideration, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
declared the child the offspring of Jao. Jao appealed to the CA, arguing that the blood
grouping test could have been conclusive and disputable evidence of his nonpaternity, because there was no showing of irregularity or mistake in the conduct of
the tests. CA upheld Perico's contention and reversed the trial court decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the result of blood grouping test is admissible and conclusive
to prove paternity.
Ruling:
Yes. As held by the Court in the case of Co Tao v. CA, the NBI experts report of
the blood tests stated that "from their blood groups and types, the defendant Co Tao
is a possible father of the child." From this statement the defendant contended that
the child must have been the child of another man. The Court noted: "For obvious
reasons, the NBI expert cannot give assurance that the appellant was the father of
the child; he can only give his opinion that he is a "possible father." This possibility,
coupled with the other facts and circumstances brought out during the trial, tends to
definitely establish that appellant is the father of the child."
Where the issue is admissibility and conclusiveness of blood grouping tests to
disprove paternity, rulings have been much more definite in their conclusions. For the
past three decades, the use of blood typing in cases of disputed parentage has
already become an important legal procedure. There is now almost universal
scientific agreement that blood grouping tests are conclusive as to non-paternity,
although inconclusive as to paternity that is, the fact that the blood type of the
child is a possible product of the mother and alleged father does not conclusively
prove that the child is born by such parents; but, if the blood type of the child is not
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the possible blood type when the blood of the mother and that of the alleged father
are crossmatched, then the child cannot possibly be that of the alleged father. Thus,
the Court holds that the result of the blood grouping tests involved in the case at bar,
are admissible and conclusive on the non-paternity of respondent Jao vis-a-vis
petitioner Janice. No evidence has been presented showing any defect in the testing
methods employed or failure to provide adequate safeguards for the proper conduct
of the tests. The result of such tests is to be accepted therefore as accurately
reflecting a scientific fact.
ARNEL L. AGUSTIN v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND MINOR MARTIN JOSE

PROLLAMANTE, REPRESENTED BY HIS MOTHER/GUARDIAN FE ANGELA
PROLLAMANTE
G.R. No. 162571, June 15, 2005, CORONA, J.
DNA testing is a valid means of determining paternity. In Rafferty v. Perkins,
the Supreme Court of Mississippi ruled that DNA test results showing paternity were
sufficient to overthrow the presumption of legitimacy of a child born during the
course of a marriage.
Facts:
Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martins alleged
biological father, petitioner Arnel L. Agustin, for support and support pendente
lite before the RTC. In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe,
after which they entered into an intimate relationship and impregnated Fe. Arnel,
however, denied having sired Martin. Fe and Martin, as a result moved for the
issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity
testing.
Issues:
Whether or not DNA testing is a valid means to prove paternity.
Ruling:
Yes. For too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who
choose to deny their existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing technology
finally provides a much needed equalizer for such ostracized and abandoned
progeny. The Court has long believed in the merits of DNA testing and have
repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This case comes at a perfect time when
DNA testing has finally evolved into a dependable and authoritative form of evidence
gathering. The Court therefore reiterated that DNA testing is a valid means of
determining paternity.
The case of Wilson v. Lumb shows that DNA testing is so commonly accepted
that, in some instances, ordering the procedure has become a ministerial act. The
Supreme Court of St. Lawrence County, New York pointed out that a determination of
paternity made by any other state, whether established through the parents
acknowledgment of paternity or through an administrative or judicial process, must
be accorded full faith and credit, if and only if such acknowledgment meets the
requirements set forth in section 452(a)(7) of the social security act.
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In Rafferty v. Perkins, the Supreme Court of Mississippi ruled that DNA test
results showing paternity were sufficient to overthrow the presumption of legitimacy
of a child born during the course of a marriage: The presumption of legitimacy having
been rebutted by the results of the blood test eliminating Perkins as Justin's father,
even considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Perkins, we find that no
reasonable jury could find that Easter is not Justin's father based upon the 99.94%
probability of paternity concluded by the DNA testing.
JOEY D. BRIONES v. MARICEL P. MIGUEL, FRANCISCA P. MIGUEL and LORETA

P. MIGUEL, G.R. No. 156343. October 18, 2004, PANGANIBAN, J.
An illegitimate child is under the sole parental authority of the mother. In the
exercise of that authority, she is entitled to keep the child in her company. The Court
will not deprive her of custody, absent any imperative cause showing her unfitness to
exercise such authority and care.
Facts:
Petitioner Joey D. Briones alleged that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his
illegitimate son with respondent Loreta P. Miguel and that he wanted to obtain
custody of his minor child. Respondent Miguel, however, prayed that the custody of
her minor child be given to her by reason of the minors illegitimacy.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner, as the natural father, may be denied the custody
and parental care of his own child.
Ruling:
Yes. Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an
illegitimate child of petitioner and Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the Family Code
of the Philippines explicitly provides that illegitimate children shall use the surname
and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to
support in conformity with this Code. This is the rule regardless of whether the father
admits paternity.
The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have
been eliminated in the Family Code. Now, there are only two classes of children -legitimate (and those who, like the legally adopted, have the rights of legitimate
children) and illegitimate. All children conceived and born outside a valid marriage
are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them legitimate status. Under Article 176
of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally placed under one category,
without any distinction between natural and spurious. The concept of natural child is
important only for purposes of legitimation. Without the subsequent marriage, a
natural child remains an illegitimate child.
Obviously, Michael is a natural (illegitimate, under the Family Code) child, as
there is nothing in the records showing that his parents were suffering from a legal
impediment to marry at the time of his birth. Both acknowledge that Michael is their
son. As earlier explained and pursuant to Article 176, parental authority over him
resides in his mother, Respondent Loreta, notwithstanding his fathers recognition of
him.
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CAMELO CABATANIA v. COURT OF APPEALS and CAMELO

REGODOS, respondents. [G.R. No. 124814. October 21, 2004, CORONA, J.
A high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and filiation. A
certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent
evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand
in the preparation of said certificate.
Facts:
Florencia Regodos filed a petition in behalf of her minor son for recognition
and support from petitioner Camelo Cabatania. Cabatania, however, denied the
alleged paternity and insisted that Florencia was already pregnant when they had
sex. The RTC gave more probative weight to the testimony of Florencia despite its
discovery that she misrepresented herself as a widow when, in reality, her husband
was alive.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner should be compelled to acknowledge private
respondent Camelo Regodos as his illegitimate son and to give support to the latter.
Ruling:
No. Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is
required to establish paternity and filiation. An order for recognition and support may
create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the
parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear
and convincing evidence.
The applicable provisions of the law are Articles 172 and 175 of the Civil Code.
Private respondent presented a copy of his birth and baptismal certificates, the
preparation of which was without the knowledge or consent of petitioner. A certificate
of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of
paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the
preparation of said certificate. In the same vein, the Court ruled that, while a
baptismal certificate may be considered a public document, it can only serve as
evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not the
veracity of the entries with respect to the childs paternity. Thus, certificates issued
by the local civil registrar and baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in
evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial
evidence to prove the same.
The fact that Florencias husband is living and there is a valid subsisting
marriage between them gives rise to the presumption that a child born within that
marriage is legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. The presumption of
legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on the
broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The
presumption is grounded on the policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium
of illegitimacy.
128 | P a g e

GERARDO B. CONCEPCION, v. COURT OF APPEALS and MA. THERESA
ALMONTE, G.R. No. 123450, August 31, 2005, CORONA, J.
The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
Facts:
Gerardo Concepcion filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa
Almonte annulled on the ground of bigamy. He alleged that nine years before he
married Ma. Theresa, she had married one Mario Gopiao, which marriage was never
annulled. The RTC annulled Ma. Theresas marriage to Gerardo for being bigamous
and as a result declared Jose Gerardo as an illegitimate child. The custody of the child
was awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was granted visitation rights. Ma.
Theresa argued that there was nothing in the law granting visitation rights in favor of
the putative father of an illegitimate child. She further maintained that Jose Gerardos
surname should be changed from Concepcion to Almonte, her maiden name,
following the rule that an illegitimate child shall use the mothers surname. When
brought to the appellate court, it held that Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma.
Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during her first marriage.
Issue:
Whether or not Jose Gerardo was the son of Mario during Ma. Theresas first
marriage.
Ruling:
Yes. Article 164 of the Family Code is clear. A child who is conceived or born
during the marriage of his parents is legitimate. As a guaranty in favor of the child
and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides:
Article 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of
legitimacy. The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in
the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed
virtue of the mother. It is grounded on the policy to protect the innocent offspring
from the odium of illegitimacy. Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly
personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. Since the marriage
of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning; he never became her
husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.
Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence sufficient to defeat the
assumption should be presented by him who asserts the contrary. There is no such
evidence here. Thus, the presumption of legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo, as the
issue of the marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario, stands. As a legitimate child,
Jose Gerardo shall have the right to bear the surnames of his father Mario and mother
Ma. Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on surnames. A
persons surname or family name identifies the family to which he belongs and is
passed on from parent to child. Hence, Gerardo cannot impose his surname on Jose
Gerardo who is, in the eyes of the law, not related to him in any way.
129 | P a g e

JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and JACQUELINE A. DE JESUS, represented by
their mother, CAROLINA A. DE JESUS v. THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN
GAMBOA DIZON, ANGELINA V. DIZON, CARLOS DIZON, FELIPE DIZON, JUAN
DIZON, JR. and MARYLIN DIZON and FORMS MEDIA CORP., QUAD
MANAGEMENT CORP., FILIPINAS PAPER SALES CO., INC. and AMITY
CONSTRUCTION & INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, INC.
G.R. No. 142877, October 2, 2001, VITUG, J.
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and
founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that
children born in wedlock are legitimate.
Facts:
Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married and it was during this
marriage that Jacqueline de Jesus and Jinkie Christie de Jesus, herein petitioners, were
born. In a notarized document, a certain Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and
Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. When
Juan G. Dizon died intestate, petitioners filed a complaint for Partition with Inventory
and Accounting of the Dizon estate with the RTC. Respondents sought the dismissal
of the case, arguing that the complaint would call for altering the status of petitioners
from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de
Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan
Dizon.
Issue:
Whether or not Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus is Juan G. Dizons own
illegitimate children.
Ruling:
No. A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the
marriage of their parents. The certificates of live birth would also identify Danilo de
Jesus as being their father. There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly
established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the
presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed
becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of
access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the
husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and
wife are living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c)
serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. Quite
remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170, and in proper
cases Article 171, of the Family Code (which took effect on 03 August 1988), the
action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally feasible and the
status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable.
The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock,
and only the father, or in exceptional instances the latters heirs, can contest in an
appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the
legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that the paternity of the
husband can be rejected.
130 | P a g e
MARIA ROSARIO DE SANTOS, v. HON. ADORACION G. ANGELES, JUDGE,

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CALOOCAN CITY, BRANCH 121 and CONCHITA
TALAG DE SANTOS
G.R. No. 105619, December 12, 1995, ROMERO, J.
Although natural children can be legitimized, and natural children by legal
fiction enjoy the rights of acknowledged natural children, this does not necessarily
lead to the conclusion that natural children by legal fiction can likewise be
legitimized.
Facts:
Dr. Antonio de Santos married Sofia Bona, which union was blessed with a
daughter, herein petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos. After some time, Antonio fell in
love and married Conchita Talag de Santos, herein private respondent in another
country. This union produced eleven children. Less than a month later, after the
death of Sophia, Antonio and private respondent contracted another marriage
celebrated under Philippine laws.
After the death of Antonio, private respondent went to court asking for the
issuance of letters of administration in her favor in connection with the settlement of
her late husband's estate. After six years, petitioner Santos decided to intervene. She
argued that private respondent's children were illegitimate. The RTC declared private
respondent's ten children legitimated and thereupon instituted and declared them,
along with petitioner and private respondent, as the heirs of Antonio de Santos.
Petitioner sought reconsideration but this was denied. Hence, she filed the instant
petition contending that since only natural children can be legitimized, the trial court
mistakenly declared as legitimated her half brothers and sisters.
Issue:
Whether or not natural children by legal fiction can be legitimized.
Ruling:
No. Article 269 itself clearly limits the privilege of legitimation to natural
children as defined thereunder. There was, therefore, from the outset, an intent to
exclude children conceived or born out of illicit relations from the purview of the law.
Another point to be considered is that although natural children can be
legitimized, and natural children by legal fiction enjoy the rights of acknowledged
natural children, this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that natural children
by legal fiction can likewise be legitimized. As has been pointed out, much more is
involved here than the mere privilege to be legitimized. The rights of other children,
like the petitioner in the case at bench, may be adversely affected as her
testamentary share may well be reduced in the event that her ten surviving half
siblings should be placed on par with her, when each of them is rightfully entitled to
only half of her share.
Finally, attention must be drawn to the fact that this case has been decided
under the provisions of the Civil Code, not the Family Code which now recognizes
131 | P a g e

only two classes of children: legitimate and illegitimate. "Natural children by legal
fiction" are nothing if not pure fiction.
JOHN PAUL E. FERNANDEZ, ET AL. v. THE COURT OF APPEALS and CARLITO

S. FERNANDEZ, G.R. No. 108366, February 16, 1994 PUNO, J.
While baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they can
only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the dates so
specified. They are not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries
therein with respect to the child's paternity.
Facts:
Petitioners filed an action for recognition and support against private
respondent Carlito. Violeta, the mother of the two petitioners pointed Carlito as the
father of her two sons. She averred they were married in civil rites and discovered
that the marriage license which they used was spurious. To bolster their case,
petitioners presented the following documentary evidence: their certificates of live
birth, identifying respondent Carlito as their father; the baptismal certificate of
petitioner Claro which also states that his father is respondent Carlito; photographs of
Carlito taken during the baptism of petitioner Claro; and pictures of respondent
Carlito and Claro taken at the home of Violeta Esguerra. Respondent Carlito,
however, denied Violeta's allegations that he sired the two petitioners. Based on the
evidence adduced by the parties, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioners. On
appeal, the CA found that the "proof relied upon by the RTC is inadequate to prove
the private respondent's paternity and filiation of petitioners."
Issue:
Whether or not proof relied upon by the RTC is inadequate to prove the private
respondent's paternity and filiation of petitioners.
Ruling:
Yes. Firstly, petitioners cannot rely on the photographs showing the presence
of the private respondent in the baptism of petitioner Claro. These photographs are
far from proofs that private respondent is the father of petitioner Claro. As explained
by the private respondent, he was in the baptism as one of the sponsors of petitioner
Claro. His testimony was corroborated by Rodante Pagtakhan.
Secondly, the pictures taken in the house of Violeta showing private
respondent showering affection to Claro fall short of the evidence required to prove
paternity.
Thirdly, the baptismal certificates of petitioner Claro naming private
respondent as his father has scant evidentiary value. There is no showing that private
respondent participated in its preparation. In Macandang vs. Court of Appeals, 100
SCRA 73 (1980), we ruled that while baptismal certificates may be considered public
documents, they can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacraments
on the dates so specified. They are not necessarily competent evidence of the
veracity of entries therein with respect to the child's paternity.
132 | P a g e

Fourth, the certificates of live of the petitioners identifying private respondent
as their father are not also competent evidence on the issue of their paternity. Again,
the records do no show that private respondent had a hand in the preparation of said
certificates.
GRACE M. GRANDE v. PATRICIO T. ANTONIO

G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014, VELASCO, JR., J.
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the
surname of their father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother
(herein petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their
illegitimate children.
Facts:
Petitioner Grace Grande and respondent Patricio Antonio for a period of time
lived together as husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time already
married to someone else. Out of this illicit relationship, two sons were born. The
children were not expressly recognized by respondent as his own in the Record of
Births of the children in the Civil Registry. Respondent soon filed a petition for judicial
approval of recognition of the filiation of the two children with Prayer to take Parental
Authority, Parental Physical Custody, and Correction/Change of Surname of Minors
before the RTC. Petitioner on the other hand, speculated that Article 176 of the Family
Code as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 9255, may not be invoked by a father to
compel the use by his illegitimate children of his surname without the consent of
their mother.
Issue:
Whether or not the father has a right to compel the use of his surname by his
illegitimate children upon his recognition of their filiation.
Ruling:
No. Central to the core issue is the application of Art. 176 of the Family Code.
It is clear that the general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the surname of
his or her mother. The exception provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is
expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten
instrument is made by the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child may use
the surname of the father.
Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother;
hence, respondents prayer has no legal mooring. Since parental authority is given to
the mother, then custody over the minor children also goes to the mother, unless she
is shown to be unfit. Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they
want to use the surname of their father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent)
or the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the
surname of their illegitimate children.
On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is
no ambiguity, one must abide by its words. The use of the word "may" in the
provision readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no
133 | P a g e

compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may" is
permissive and operates to confer discretion upon the illegitimate children.
IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR

CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY OF JULIAN LIN
CARULASAN WANG also known as JULIAN LIN WANG, to be
amended/corrected as JULIAN LIN WANG,
JULIAN LIN WANG, duly represented by his mother ANNA LISA WANG v.
CEBU CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR, duly represented by the Registrar OSCAR B.
MOLO
Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as
well as further distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and
surname as he has.
Facts:
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City to parents Anna Lisa Wang
and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married to each other. When his parents
subsequently got married, they executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that
the childs name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.
Petitioner, however sought to drop his middle name and have his registered
name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang because he may be
discriminated against in Singapore. The RTC ruled that under Article 174 of the Family
Code, legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of the father and the
mother, and there is no reason why this right should now be taken from petitioner
Julian, considering that he is still a minor. The trial court added that when petitioner
Julian reaches the age of majority, he could then decide whether he will change his
name by dropping his middle name.
Issue:
Whether or not the law allows one to drop the middle name from his
registered name.
Ruling:
No. Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person
as well as further distinguish him from others who may have the same given name
and surname as he has. Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and
legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father. The Family Code
gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the father and the
mother, while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother, unless their
father recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the fathers surname.
Accordingly, the registration in the civil registry of the birth of such individuals
requires that the middle name be indicated in the certificate. The registered name of
a legitimate, legitimated and recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given or
proper name, a middle name, and a surname.
134 | P a g e

In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his
middle name is convenience. However, how such change of name would make his
integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly established.
That the continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does
not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete
name.
WILLIAM LIYAO, JR. v. JUANITA TANHOTI-LIYAO, PEARL MARGARET L. TAN,

TITA ROSE L. TAN AND LINDA CHRISTINA LIYAO
G.R. No. 138961, March 7, 2002, DE LEON, JR., J.
It is settled that the legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct
action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties and within the period limited
by law.
Facts:
William Liyao, Jr., represented by his mother Corazon, filed an action for
compulsory recognition as the illegitimate (spurious) child of the late William Liyao
against herein respondents before the RTC. Petitioner Liyao, jr. insisted that his
mother, Corazon, had been living separately for ten (10) years from her husband,
Ramon Yulo, at the time that she cohabited with the late William Liyao and it was
physically impossible for her to have sexual relations with Ramon Yulo when
petitioner was conceived and born.
Respondents, on the other hand, stated that their parents, William Liyao and
Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, were legally married and that Corazon Garcia is still married to
Ramon Yulo and was not legally separated from her husband.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner may impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim
from the estate of his supposed father, William Liyao.
Ruling:
No. Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the
husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one
directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife
produces and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or
expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional
cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases,
none - even his heirs - can impugn legitimacy; that would amount o an insult to his
memory.
It is therefor clear that the present petition initiated by Corazon G. Garcia as
guardian ad litem of the then minor, herein petitioner, to compel recognition by
respondents of petitioner William Liyao, Jr, as the illegitimate son of the late William
Liyao cannot prosper. It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage is
presumed legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. We cannot allow petitioner
to maintain his present petition and subvert the clear mandate of the law that only
the husband, or in exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy
135 | P a g e

of a child born in a valid and subsisting marriage. The child himself cannot choose his
own filiation.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. TRINIDAD R.A. CAPOTE

G.R. No. 157043, February 2, 2007, CORONA, J.
Illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father bears only a
given name and his mother surname, and does not have a middle name. The name
of the unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such.
Facts:
Respondent Trinidad Capote filed a petition for change of name of her ward
from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores. Respondent Capote claimed that
Giovanni Gallamaso is the illegitimate natural child of Corazon P. Nadores and
Diosdado Gallamaso and was born prior to the effectivity of the New Family Code and
as such, his mother used the surname of the natural father despite the absence of
marriage between them. The father, Diosdado Gallamaso, from the time Giovanni
was born and up to the present, failed to take up his responsibilities to him on
matters of financial, physical, emotional and spiritual concerns. Giovanni is now fully
aware of how he stands with his father and he desires to have his surname changed
to that of his mothers surname.
Issue:
Whether or not the minor Giovanni is entitled to have his surname changed to
that of his mothers surname.
Ruling:
Yes. An illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father bears
only a given name and his mother surname, and does not have a middle name. The
name of the unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. It is only
when the illegitimate child is legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents
or acknowledged by the father in a public document or private handwritten
instrument that he bears both his mothers surname as his middle name and his
fathers surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an
acknowledged child.
The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovannis petition. Giovanni availed of
the proper remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court, and complied with all the procedural requirements. After hearing, the trial
court found (and the appellate court affirmed) that the evidence presented during the
hearing of Giovannis petition sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil
Code, Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never recognized by his
father while his mother has always recognized him as her child. A change of name
will erase the impression that he was ever recognized by his father. It is also to his
best interest as it will facilitate his mothers intended petition to have him join her in
the United States. This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification of mother
and son.
NARCISO SALAS v. ANNABELLE MATUSALEM
136 | P a g e

G.R. No. 180284, September 11, 2013, VILLARAMA, JR., J.
A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not
competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father
had a hand in the preparation of the certificate.
Facts:
Respondent Annabelle Matusalem filed a complaint for Support/Damages
against petitioner Narciso Salas. Respondent Matusalem claimed that petitioner is the
father of her son. Petitioner Salas, however, denied paternity of the child Christian
Paulo. The RTC rendered its decision in favor of respondent. On appeal, the CA
affirmed the trial courts ruling that respondent satisfactorily established the
illegitimate filiation of her son Christian Paulo. Respondent presented the Certificate
of Live Birth of Christian Paulo Salas in which the name of petitioner appears as his
father but which is not signed by him.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial and appellate courts erred in ruling that respondents
evidence sufficiently proved that her son Christian Paulo is the illegitimate child of
petitioner.
Ruling:
Yes. A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not
competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father
had a hand in the preparation of the certificate. Thus, if the father did not sign in the
birth certificate, the placing of his name by the mother, doctor, registrar, or other
person is incompetent evidence of paternity. Neither can such birth certificate be
taken as a recognition in a public instrument and it has no probative value to
establish filiation to the alleged father.
As to the Baptismal Certificate of Christian Paulo Salas also indicating
petitioner as the father, we have ruled that while baptismal certificates may be
considered public documents, they can only serve as evidence of the administration
of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not necessarily competent
evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the childs paternity.
Pictures taken of the mother and her child together with the alleged father are
inconclusive evidence to prove paternity. As to the handwritten notes of petitioner
and respondent showing their exchange of affectionate words and romantic trysts,
these, too, are not sufficient to establish Christian Paulos filiation to petitioner as
they were not signed by petitioner and contained no statement of admission by
petitioner that he is the father of said child. Thus, even if these notes were authentic,
they do not qualify under Article 172 (2) vis-- vis Article 175 of the Family Code
which admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation
in a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned.
MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO SAYSON-MALONDA, BASILISA SAYSON-LIRIO,

REMEDIOS SAYSON-REYES and JUANA C. BAUTISTA v. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA SAYSON, assisted by her husband, CIRILO CEDO,
JR., EDMUNDO SAYSON AND DORIBEL SAYSON
137 | P a g e

G.R. Nos. 89224-25, January 23, 1992, CRUZ, J.
Doribel's birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence. It is one of the
prescribed means of recognition under Article 265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of
the Family Code.
Facts:
When spouses Teodoro and Isabel Bautista died, their properties were left in
the possession of Private respondents Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed
Sayson, who claimed to be their children. Petitioners, however, filed a complaint for
partition and accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. The
petitioners, in addition, argued that Doribel is not the legitimate daughter of Teodoro
and Isabel but was in fact born to one Edita Abila, who manifested in a petition for
guardianship of the child that she was her natural mother. The action was resisted by
private respondents.
Issue:
Whether or not Doribel is the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel.
Ruling:
Yes. Doribel's birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence. It is one of the
prescribed means of recognition under Article 265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of
the Family Code. It is true, as the petitioners stress, that the birth certificate offers
only prima facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence.
However, such evidence is lacking in the case at bar.
Mauricio's testimony that he was present when Doribel was born to Edita Abila
was understandbly suspect, coming as it did from an interested party. The affidavit of
Abila denying her earlier statement in the petition for the guardianship of Doribel is
of course hearsay, let alone the fact that it was never offered in evidence in the lower
courts. Even without it, however, the birth certificate must be upheld in line
with Legaspi v. Court of Appeals, where we ruled that "the evidentiary nature of
public documents must be sustained in the absence of strong, complete and
conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity."
Another reason why the petitioners' challenge must fail is the impropriety of
the present proceedings for that purpose. Doribel's legitimacy cannot be questioned
in a complaint for partition and accounting but in a direct action seasonably filed by
the proper party.
CORITO OCAMPO TAYAG v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIE DAYRIT

CUYUGAN
G.R. No. 95229, June 9, 1992, REGALADO, J.
138 | P a g e

Article 285 of the Civil Code provides that the action for the recognition of
natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents,
except in the following cases: (1) If the father or mother died during the minority of
the child, in which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four
years from the attainment of his majority.
Facts:
Private respondent Emilie Cuyugan, in her capacity as mother and legal

guardian of minor Chad D. Cuyugan filed a complaint denominated "Claim for
Inheritance" against herein petitioner, the administrator of the estate of the late Atty.
Ricardo Ocampo. Petitioner submitted that Article 175 of the Family Code applies in
which case the complaint should have been filed during the lifetime of the putative
father, failing which the same must be dismissed on the ground of prescription.
Private respondent, however, insisted that Article 285 of the Civil Code is controlling
and, since the alleged parent died during the minority of the child, the action for
filiation may be filed within four years from the attainment of majority of the minor
child.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 285 of the Civil Code applies in this case.
Ruling:
Yes. Article 285 of the Civil Code provides that the action for the recognition of
natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents,
except in the following cases: (1) If the father or mother died during the minority of
the child, in which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four
years from the attainment of his majority.
Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper application to the
instant case since it will ineluctably affect adversely a right of private respondent
139 | P a g e

and, consequentially, of the mind child she represents, both of which have been
vested with the filing of the complaint in court. The trial court is therefore, correct in
applying the provisions of Article 285 of the Civil Code and in holding that private
respondent's cause of action has not yet prescribed.
Adoption
HERBERT CANG v. COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses RONALD V. CLAVANO
and
MARIA CLARA CLAVANO
G.R. No. 105308, September 25, 1998, ROMERO, J.
In cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily because his consent
thereto was not sought, the matter of whether he had abandoned his child becomes
a proper issue for determination.
Facts:
Keith, Charmaine, and Joseph Anthony are the natural children of Herbert
Cang and Anna Marie Clavano. Later due to the extramarital affairs of Herbert, Anna
filed a petition for legal separation which was granted. The decree of legal
separation conferred Anna the custody of the children. Meanwhile, Ronald V. Clavano
and Maria Clara Diago Clavano, respectively the brother and sister-in-law of Anna
Marie, filed a petition for adoption the three children before the Branch 14 of RTC
Cebu City. This petition was accompanied by an affidavit of consent executed by
Anna. The affidavit further alleged that Herbert had long forfeited his parental rights
over their children.
Herbert, upon knowing the institution of such petition for adoption, went home
to the Philippines and interposed his opposition to the adoption claiming that the
petition was defective since it lacks his consent. He also moved for the reacquisition
of his custody over his children and the same was later granted by Branch 19 of RTC
Cebu City. Later, the RTC Branch 14, issued a decree granting the petition for
adoption and in doing so, the RTC ruled that Herbert has abandoned his children and
such abandonment is a ground for dispensing with his consent to the adoption. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the decree of adoption. Motion for reconsideration filed by
Herbert was likewise denied. Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for adoption was defective for lack of Herberts
consent.
Ruling:
Yes. Based on Article 188 of the Family Code, the written consent of the
natural parent to the adoption is a requisite for its validity. Nevertheless, the
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requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned
the child or that such parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate." However, in cases
where the father opposes the adoption primarily because his consent thereto was not
sought, the matter of whether he had abandoned his child becomes a proper issue
for determination. The issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is a
preliminary issue that an adoption court must first confront. In reference to
abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports "any conduct
of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and
relinquish all parental claims to the child." It means "neglect or refusal to perform the
natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe their children."
In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner's conduct did not manifest
a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over
his children as to, constitute abandonment. Physical estrangement alone, without
financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OF

MINOR ANGELIE ANNE C. CERVANTES, NELSON L. CERVANTES and ZENAIDA
CARREON CERVANTES v. GINA CARREON FAJARDO and CONRADO FAJARDO
G.R. No. 79955, January 27, 1989, PADILLA, J. (Resolution)
A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority
vested in natural parents over the adopted child.
Facts:
Angelie Anne Fajardo, the child of Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon out of
their common law marriage, was offered for adoption to Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes
and Nelson Cervantes. Affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child was also
executed by Gina Carreon. Later, Spouses Cervantes filed a petition for adoption
before the RTC of Rizal which granted the petition making Angelie Anne Cervantes
the child of the spouses Cervantes.
Later, the spouses Cervantes received a letter from the biological parents of
Angelie demanding a sum of money to which they never heeded. The biological
parents threatened to get back the child in case of non-payment. True to their word,
Gina Carreon took the child and brought her to her residence. Demand to return the
child were also unheeded. This prompted spouses Cervantes to file a petition for a
writ of Habeas Corpus before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Gina Carreon is entitled to the custody of the child.
Ruling:
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No. The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under five (5)
years of age, will not apply where the Court finds compelling reasons to rule
otherwise. In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the foremost
consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare of the child concerned, taking
into account the resources and moral as well as social standing of the contending
parents. It is undisputed that respondent Conrado Fajardo is legally married to a
woman other than respondent Gina Carreon, and his relationship with the latter is a
common-law husband and wife relationship. His open cohabitation with corespondent Gina Carreon will not accord the minor that desirable atmosphere where
she can grow and develop into an upright and moral-minded person.
Besides, the minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full
knowledge and consent of respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect, among
others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural parents over the adopted child,
except where the adopting parent is the spouse of the natural parent of the adopted,
in which case, parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both
spouses. The adopting parents have the right to the care and custody of the adopted
child and exercise parental authority and responsibility over him.
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA

G.R. No. 148311, March 31, 2005, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should
be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption.
Facts:
Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is the biological child of Honorato B. Catindig
and Gemma Astorga Garcia out of wed-lock. Due to the demise of Gemma, Honorato
filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child and prayed that Stephanies
middle name Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her mothers surname, and that her
surname "Garcia" be changed to "Catindig," his surname. The trial court granted the
petition and pronounced Stephanie as the child of Honorato and shall be known as
Stephanie Nathy Catindig. Later, Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or
reconsideration praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her
natural mother as her middle name. The trial court, however, denied the same
holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the
surname of his biological mother as his middle name. Hence, this present petition.
Issue:
Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as
her middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father.
Ruling:
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Yes. Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that
Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and
her mother. This is consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and
Family Law Committees. Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanies
continued use of her mothers surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her
maternal lineage. Furthermore, to allow Stephanie to use her mothers surname as
her middle name will not only sustain her continued loving relationship with her
mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.
Furthermore, it is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and
salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of
adoption. The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and
paramount consideration, hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained
to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.
ISABELITA S. LAHOM v. JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (previously referred to as "DR.

MELVIN S. LAHOM")
G.R. No. 143989, July 14, 2003, VITUG, J.
The jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time
of the commencement of the action.
Facts:
In an order granting the petition for adoption filed by spouses Dr. Diosdado
Lahom and Isabelita Lahom, Jose Melvin Sibulo became the child of spouses Lahom.
Later, however, Mrs. Lahom, filed a petition to rescind the decree of adoption before
the RTC on the grounds of strained relationship and utter disregard of Jose Melvin
Sibulo of the needs and feelings of Mrs. Lahom who was then sick. However before
the institution of the case, RA 8552 (Domestic Adoption Act) took effect and such law
deleted the right of the adopter to rescind a decree of adoption. The RTC dismissed
the petition holding that by virtue of RA 8552, petitions lack of cause of action. Hence
this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972, may still be revoked or
rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552.
Ruling:
No. It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner
filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new
law, had already abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter under the Civil Code
and the Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. The Court should now hold that
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the action for rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by petitioner
after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer could be pursued.
MACARIO TAMARGO et al. v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS et al.

G.R. No. 85044, June 3, 1992, FELICIANO, J.
Retroactive effect may not be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose

a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when adopting parents had
no actual or physically custody over the adopted child.
Facts:
Due to a shooting incident that led to the death of Jennifer Tamargo, a civil
case for damages was filed by Macario Tamargo and spouses Celso and Aurelia
Tamargo, the adopting parent and natural parents of Jennifer Tamargo, respectively,
against spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, natural parents of Adelberto Bundoc, a
minor. Prior to the incident, there is pending petition to adopt Adelberto Bundoc filed
by spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura before the RTC of Ilocos Sur. The said petition
was granted after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer. In their Answer, the spouses
Bundoc contended that due to the approval of the petition for adoption, parental
authority over Adelberto has already shifted to the spouses Rapisura, hence they the
indispensable party to the case. The RTC dismissed the petition holding that Spouses
Bundoc is not the indispensable party. Motion for reconsideration was likewise denied
due to failure to file it within the reglementary period and failure to observe the 3-day
notice rule. The Tamargos then elevated the case to the CA via petition
for mandamus and certiorari however the same was also dismissed. Hence this
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the effects of adoption, insofar as parental authority is
concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make the adopting parents the
indispensable parties in a damage case filed against their adopted child, for acts
committed by the latter, when actual custody was yet lodged with the biological
parents.
Ruling:
No. The shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle occured when
parental authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural parents
of the minor Adelberto. It would thus follow that the natural parents who had then
actual custody of the minor Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for
damages. The Court does not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as
having been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, the
Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting happened. Retroactive effect may
not be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting
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parents accruing at a time when adopting parents had no actual or physically
custody over the adopted child. Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the
granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of
some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case,
however, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the
Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could
not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented (since they were at the
time in the United States and had no physical custody over the child Adelberto)
would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a result, moreover, would be inconsistent
with the philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability.
Put a little differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the
adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was not in
fact subject to their control at the time the tort was committed.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COURT OF APPEALS and ZENAIDA C.

BOBILES
G.R. No. 92326, January 24, 1992, REGALADO, J.
Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare
of the child to be of paramount consideration.
Facts:
Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat before the RTC.
Petitioner contended that the petition for adoption should be dismissed for it was
filed solely by private respondent without joining her husband, in violation of Article
185 of the Family Code which requires joint adoption by the spouses. It argued that
the Family Code must be applied retroactively to the petition filed by Mrs. Bobiles, as
the latter did not acquire a vested right to adopt Jason Condat by the mere filing of
her petition for adoption.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for adoption should be dismissed.
Ruling:
No. A petition cannot be dismissed by reason of failure to comply with a law
which was not yet in force and effect at the time. As long as the petition for adoption
was sufficient in form and substance in accordance with the law in governance at the
time it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it fully disposes of
the case.
In the case at bar, the rights concomitant to and conferred by the decree of
adoption will be for the best interests of the child. His adoption is with the consent of
his natural parents. The representative of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development unqualifiedly recommended the approval of the petition for
adoption and the trial court dispensed with the trial custody for several
commendatory reasons, especially since the child had been living with the adopting
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parents since infancy. Further, the said petition was with the sworn written consent
of the children of the adopters.
Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare
of the child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes,
parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give
them the protection of society and family in the person of the adopted, as well as to
allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give
them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural
parental instincts.
Support
EDWARD V. LACSON v. MAOWEE DABAN LACSON and MAONAA DABAN
LACSON, represented by their mother and guardian ad-litem, LEA DABAN
LACSON
G.R. No. 150644, August 28, 2006, GARCIA, J.
Asking one to comply with his obligation to support owing to the urgency of
the situation is no less a demand because it came by way of a request or a plea.
Facts:
Edward V. Lacson and Lea Daban Lacson are the parents of Maowee Daban
Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson. For unknown reason, Edward left their conjugal
home thereby leaving Leah to fend for their children. For a period of 18 years, Leah
and her children transferred from one dwelling place to another not their own.
Records reveal that in a note dated December 10, 1975, Edward promise to give
support to his daughters however, aside from occasional giving of some amount,
Edward failed to fulfill his promise.
In 1995, Leah instituted an action for support in behalf of her daughter before
the RTC of Iloilo City demanding the amount of the support her daughters should
have received. The RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiff sisters and ordered Edward to
pay them the amount equivalent to 216-month worth of support in arrears. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The motion for reconsideration filed
by Edward was likewise dismissed. Hence this appeal. Before the SC, Edward
contended that the demand required by law was never complied with by Leah thus
the award of support in arrears is not proper.
Issue:
Whether or not the mother of the petitioner failed to make a demand for
support as required by law.
Ruling:
No. The requisite demand for support appears to have been made sometime
in 1975. It may be that Lea made no extrajudicial demand in the sense of a formal
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written demand in terms and in the imperious tenor commonly used by legal
advocates in a demand letter. Nonetheless, what would pass as a demand was,
however, definitely made. Asking one to comply with his obligation to support owing
to the urgency of the situation is no less a demand because it came by way of a
request or a plea.
Edwards insistence on requiring a formal demand from his wife is truly
pointless, in the face of his acknowledgment of and commitment to comply with such
obligation through a note in his own handwriting. Said note stating that he will
"sustain his two daughters Maowee and Maonaa" also stated "as requested by their
mother" thus practically confirming the fact of such demand having been made by
mother. The trial court thus correctly ruled that Edwards obligation to pay support in
arrears should commence from 1976.
Parental Authority
NERISSA Z. PEREZ v. THE COURT OF APPEALS (Ninth Division) and RAY C.
PEREZ,
G.R. No. 118870, March 29, 1996, ROMERO, J.
The laws clearly mandate that a child under seven years of age shall not be
separated from his mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise.
Facts:
Ray Perez II (Ray Junior or RJ) is the only child of Spouses Ray and Nerissa
Perez and was born after successive miscarriage suffered by Nerissa. Nerissa is a
resident alien of United States while Ray only had tourist visa. The spouses and the
child later went home to the Philippines for a vacation however after the lapse of
such period, Ray decided to stay together with RJ to take care of his sick mother but
has promised to follow Nerissa. However, this never happened. Later the relationship
of the spouses went sour. Despite church mediation, reconciliation has failed.
Subsequently, Nerissa filed a petition for habeas corpus asking Ray to surrender the
custody of their son to her.
The RTC ruled in favor of Nerissa holding that no child under seven years of
age shall be separated from the mother. However on appeal, the CA reversed the RTC
decision holding that granting custody to the boy's father would be for the child's
best interest and welfare. Nerissa filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was
denied. Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the custody of the child should be given to Nerissa.
Ruling:
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Yes. When the parents of the child are separated, Article 213 of the Family
Code is the applicable law. The laws clearly mandate that a child under seven years
of age shall not be separated from his mother unless the court finds compelling
reasons to order otherwise. The use of the word "shall" in Article 213 of the Family
Code and Rule 99, section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court connotes a mandatory
character. The general rule that a child under seven years of age shall not be
separated from his mother finds its raison d'tre in the basic need of a child for his
mother's loving care. Only the most compelling of reasons shall justify the court's
awarding the custody of such a child to someone other than his mother, such as her
unfitness to exercise sole parental authority.
DAISIE T. DAVID v. COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON R. VILLAR

G.R. No. 111180, November 16, 1995, MENDOZA, J.
While it is true that the determination of the right to the custody of minor
children is relevant in cases where the parents, who are married to each other, are
for some reason separated from each other, it does not follow, however, that it
cannot arise in any other situation.
Facts:
Ramon R. Villar, a married man, had three children with Daisie T. David out of
their amorous relationship namely; Christopher J, Christine and Cathy Mae. Such
relationship became known to the legal wife and family of Villar. Later, the legal
family of Villar accepted the children. During one of Villars family vacation, they
invited Christopher J., then six years of age, with Daisies permission. However after
such vacation, Villar refused to give back the child. This prompted Daisie to file a
petition for habeas corpus.
The RTC ruled in favor of Daisie and ruled that she has the rightful custody
over Christopher J. However on appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The
CA ruled that the petition for habeas corpus is not proper and that the question of
custody and the question of custody should be brought in a case singularly filed for
the purpose. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is proper to recover the
custody of a child.
Ruling:
Yes. Rule 102, 1 of the Rules of Court provides that "the writ of habeas
corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any
person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto."
148 | P a g e

While it is true that the determination of the right to the custody of minor
children is relevant in cases where the parents, who are married to each other, are
for some reason separated from each other, it does not follow, however, that it
cannot arise in any other situation. In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate
child since at the time of his conception, his father, Ramon R. Villar, was married to
another woman other than the child's mother. As such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the
Family Code, Christopher J. is under the parental authority of his mother, who, as a
consequence of such authority, is entitled to have custody of him. Since, admittedly,
petitioner has been deprived of her rightful custody of her child by private
respondent, she is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
Rule 1021 1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother who is
separated from her husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that of a
mother of an illegitimate child who, by law, is vested with sole parental authority, but
is deprived of her rightful custody of her child.
REYNALDO ESPIRITU and GUILLERMA LAYUG v. COURT OF APPEALS and

TERESITA MASAUDING
G.R. No. 115640, March 15, 1995, MELO, J.
The task of choosing the parent to whom custody shall be awarded is not a
ministerial function to be determined by a simple determination of the age of a minor
child. Whether a child is under or over seven years of age, the paramount criterion
must always be the child's interests.
Facts:
While Teresita Masauding was still in a subsisting marriage, she maintained a
common law relationship with Reynaldo Espiritu which begot two children, Rosalind
and Reginald. Later the Espiritu and Masauding got married. The marriage went sour
and Teresita left their conjugal home and went to California. Due to his assignment
abroad, Reynaldo has to leave his children with his sister, Guillerma Layug.
Later, Teresita went back to the Philippines and filed a petition for habeas
corpus against Reynaldo and Guillerma to gain custody over the children. The petition
was, however, dismissed thus conferring upon Reynaldo the sole parental authority
over the children subject to the visitation rights granted to Teresita. On appeal, the
CA reversed the RTC decision and gave Teresita the custody of the children. The CA
relied on the presumption that the custody of a child below seven years of age will be
lodged to the mother. Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not custody of the children should be given to Reynaldo.
Ruling:
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Yes. The task of choosing the parent to whom custody shall be awarded is not
a ministerial function to be determined by a simple determination of the age of a
minor child. Whether a child is under or over seven years of age, the paramount
criterion must always be the child's interests. In ascertaining the welfare and best
interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family Code to take into
account all relevant considerations. If a child is under seven years of age, the law
presumes that the mother is the best custodian. The presumption is strong but it is
not conclusive. It can be overcome by "compelling reasons". If a child is over seven,
his choice is paramount but, again, the court is not bound by that choice. In its
discretion, the court may find the chosen parent unfit and award custody to the other
parent, or even to a third party as it deems fit under the circumstances.
Then too, it must be noted that both Rosalind and Reginald are now over 7
years of age. They understand the difference between right and wrong, ethical
behavior and deviant immorality. Their best interests would be better served in an
environment characterized by emotional stability and a certain degree of material
sufficiency. There is nothing in the records to show that Reynaldo is an "unfit" person
under Article 213 of the Family Code. Not only are the children over seven years old
and their clear choice is the father, but the illicit or immoral activities of the mother
had already caused emotional disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to
conflicting moral values, at least in Rosalind.
CRESENCIO LIBI * and AMELIA YAP LIBI v. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE

COURT, FELIPE GOTIONG and SHIRLEY GOTIONG
G.R. No. 70890, September 18, 1992, REGALADO, J.
Parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising
from criminal offenses committed by their minor children under their legal authority
or control, or who live in their company, unless it is proven that the former acted with
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent such damages.
Facts:
Due to an incident that led to the death of Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi,
a case for damages was filed by Spouses Felipe and Shirley Gotiong, parents of Julie
Ann, against Spouses Cresencio Libi and Amelia Yap Libi, parents of Wendell. Prior to
the incident, Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were sweethearts however eventually
their relationship went sour. Attempt of Wendell for reconciliation likewise failed
which led to threats against Julie Ann. Both Julie Ann and Wendell died due to
gunshots. The gun recovered in the crime scene was licensed under the name of
Cresencio Libi, the father of Wendell.
Spouses Gotiong contends that it was Wendell who shot their daughter and thereafter
committed suicide. As such, Spouses Gotiong wanted to claim damages against
Spouses Libi arising from the latters vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code. The RTC dismissed the petition for lack of merit. On appeal, the IAC reversed
the RTC decision. Hence this appeal.
Issue:
150 | P a g e

Whether or not Spouses Libi are liable for vicarious laiability.
Ruling:
Yes. Parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising
from criminal offenses committed by their minor children under their legal authority
or control, or who live in their company, unless it is proven that the former acted with
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent such damages. That primary
liability is premised on the provisions of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code with
respect to damages ex delicto caused by their children 9 years of age or under, or
over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted without discernment; and, with regard to
their children over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted with discernment, or 15
years or over but under 21 years of age, such primary liability shall be imposed
pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
In the case at bar, whether the death of the hapless Julie Ann Gotiong was
caused by a felony or a quasi-delict committed by Wendell Libi, respondent court did
not err in holding petitioners liable for damages arising therefrom. Spouses Libi failed
to duly exercise the requisite diligentissimi patris familias to prevent such damages.
LEOUEL SANTOS, SR. v. COURT OF APPEALS, and SPOUSES LEOPOLDO and

OFELIA BEDIA
G.R. No. 113054, March 16, 1995, ROMERO, J.
Only in case of the parents' death, absence or unsuitability may substitute

parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent.
Facts:
Leouel Santos, Jr. is the only child of spouses Leouel Santos, Sr., and Julia
Bedia. After his birth, he had been under the care and custody of Spouses Leopoldo
and Ofelia Bedia, his maternal grandparents. Since then, spouses Bedia are the ones
providing for the support for the child. Before Julia went abroad to work, she
entrusted the custody of her son to her parents. Later, Spouses Bedia alleged that
Santos, Sr abducted the child which prompted the former to file a "Petition for Care,
Custody and Control of Minor Ward Leouel Santos Jr.," before the RTC of Iloilo City,
After an ex-parte hearing, the RTC granted the petition and awarded the
custody of the child to spouses Bedia. On appeal, the CA affirmed such decision. The
motion for reconsideration filed by Leouel Santos, Sr was likewise denied. Before the
SC, Leouel Sr. contended that since Spouses Bedia failed to show that he is unfit and
unsuitable father, the grant of substitute parental authority to them is inappropriate.
Issue:
Whether or not custody of the child should be given to Spouses Bedia.
Ruling:
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No. The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated
children, are duty-bound and entitled to keep them in their custody and company.
The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons of
their common children. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent
present shall continue exercising parental authority. Only in case of the parents'
death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the
surviving grandparent.
The consideration where the decision of CA is couched upon is insufficient to
defeat petitioner's parental authority and the concomitant right to have custody over
the minor Leouel Santos, Jr., particularly since he has not been shown to be an
unsuitable and unfit parent.
ST. MARYS ACADEMY v. WILLIAM CARPITANOS et al.

G.R. No. 143363, February 6, 2002, PARDO, J.
To be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as
negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence must
have a causal connection to the accident.
Facts
During an enrollment drive conducted by St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City,
the vehicle used by its student turned turtle and caused the death of Sherwin
Carpitanos. Records showed that the vehicle used was then driven recklessly by
James Daniel II, a minor. Later, Spouses William and Lucia Carpitanos, parents of
Sherwin Carpitanos, filed a case against James Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel
Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St. Marys Academy
before the RTC of Dipolog City.
The RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Capistrano. St. Marys Academy was ordered
to pay damages and in case of its insolvency, James Daniel, Sr. and Guada Daniel,
parents of James Daniel II, shall be subsidiary liable. On appeal, the CA affirmed the
RTC decision but reduced the amount of actual damages. Motion for reconsideration
to this decision was likewise denied. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not St. Marys Academy is liable for damages for the death of
Sherwin Carpitanos.
Ruling:
No. For petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission
considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the
negligence must have a causal connection to the accident. In this case, the
respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner was the proximate cause
of the death of the victim. Significantly, respondents did not present any evidence to
show that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school
authorities, or the reckless driving of James Daniel II. Hence, the respondents reliance
on Article 219 of the Family Code that those given the authority and responsibility
152 | P a g e

under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages
caused by acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor was unfounded.
Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor
driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be
pinned on the minors parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner St. Marys
Academy was only a remote cause of the accident.
Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the
steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over
which St. Marys Academy had no control, and which was the proximate cause of the
accident, petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident.
BONIFACIA P. VANCIL v. HELEN G. BELMES

G.R. No. 13222, June 19, 2001, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
Helen Belmes, being the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential
right over that of petitioner to be Vincents guardian.
Facts:
Reeder C. Vancil and Helen G. Belmes are common law husband and wife and
they had two children out of such relationship namely Valerie and Vincent. Due to the
death of Reeder, a US-based Navy serviceman, Bonifacia Vancil, the mother of
Reeder, filed a guardianship proceeding over the persons and properties of minors
Valerie and Vincent before the RTC of Cebu City.
Later, the RTC appointed Bonifacia as the legal and judicial guardian of the
persons and estate of Valerie Vancil and Vincent Vancil Jr. Subsequently, Helen
Belmes filed an opposition to such proceeding contending that she initiated a similar
proceeding. Belmes also filed a motion for the Removal of Guardian and Appointment
of a New One, asserting that she is the natural mother in actual custody of and
exercising parental authority over the subject minors
The RTC denied the motion of Belmes and directed Bonifacia to perform her
duties. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision and ruled that
under the law, parents are ipso facto the guardian ad litem of their minor child.
During the pendency of the petition, Valerie attained the age of majority thus making
the guardianship proceeding, in so far as she is concern, moot and academic.
Issue:
Whether or not Helen Belmes should be the guardian of Vincent Vancil.
Ruling:
153 | P a g e

Yes. Helen Belmes, being the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential
right over that of petitioner to be Vincents guardian. This ruling finds support in
Article 211 of the Family Code. Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise
substitute parental authority only in case of death, absence or unsuitability of
respondent. Considering that respondent is very much alive and has exercised
continuously parental authority over Vincent, petitioner has to prove, in asserting her
right to be the minors guardian, respondents unsuitability. Petitioner, however, has
not proffered convincing evidence showing that respondent is not suited to be the
guardian of Vincent. Petitioner merely insists that respondent is morally unfit as
guardian of Valerie considering that her (respondents) live-in partner raped Valerie
several times. But Valerie, being now of major age, is no longer a subject of this
guardianship proceeding.
Even assuming that respondent is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still
petitioner cannot qualify as a substitute guardian. It bears stressing that she is an
American citizen and a resident of Colorado. Obviously, she will not be able to
perform the responsibilities and obligations required of a guardian. Courts should not
appoint persons as guardians who are not within the jurisdiction of our courts for they
will find it difficult to protect the wards.
154 | P a g e

Persons and Family Relations Case Digest (2016 Collation)

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Persons and Family Relations Law

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