Cases in State Immunity

1. Bishop Arigo vs SWIFT

GR.no. 206510
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/sep2014/gr_206510_2014.html
DIGEST
Facts:
In 2013, the USS Guardian of the US Navy ran aground on an area near the
Tubbataha Reefs, a marine habitat of which entry and certain human activities are
prevented and afforded protection by a Philippine law. The grounding incident
prompted the petitioners to seek for issuance of Writ of Kalikasan with TEPO from
the SC.
Among those impleaded are US officials in their capacity as commanding officers of
the US Navy. As petitioners argued, they were impleaded because there was a
waiver of immunity from suit between US and PH pursuant to the VFA terms.
Petitioners claimed that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of
the USS Guardian violated their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology since these events caused and continue to cause environmental damage of
such magnitude as to affect other provinces surrounding the Tubbataha Reefs. Aside
from damages, they sought a directive from the SC for the institution of civil,
administrative and criminal suits for acts committed in violation of environmental
laws and regulations in connection with the grounding incident. They also prayed for
the annulment of some VFA provisions for being unconstitutional.
Issue 1: W/N the US Government has given its consent to be sued through the VFA
No. The general rule on states immunity from suit applies in this case.
First, any waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to criminal
jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as for the issuance of the writ of
kalikasan. Hence, contrary to petitioners claim, the US government could not be
deemed to have waived its immunity from suit.
Second, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding
officers of the US Navy who have control and supervision over the USS Guardian
and its crew. Since the satisfaction of any judgment against these officials would
require remedial actions and the appropriation of funds by the US government, the
suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. Thus, the principle of State Immunity
from suit bars the exercise of jurisdiction by the court over their persons.
Issue 2: W/N the US government may still be held liable for damages caused to the
Tubbataha Reefs

Yes. The US government is liable for damages in relation to the grounding incident
under the customary laws of navigation.
The conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted area in
violation of RA 10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the
matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the UNCLOS. While historically, warships
enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the
UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the
rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding passage through the latters
internal waters and the territorial sea.
Although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of long-standing
policy, the US considers itself bound by customary international rules on the
traditional uses of the oceans, which is codified in UNCLOS.
As to the non-ratification by the US, it must be noted that the US refusal to join the
UNCLOS was centered on its disagreement with UNCLOS regime of deep seabed
mining (Part XI) which considers the oceans and deep seabed commonly owned by
mankind. Such has nothing to do with the acceptance by the US of customary
international rules on navigation. (Justice Carpio)
Hence, non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard
the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial
sea. It is thus expected of the US to bear international responsibility under Art. 31
in connection with the USS Guardian grounding which adversely affected the
Tubbataha reefs. ##
Other Issues
Claim for Damages Caused by Violation of Environmental Laws Must be Filed
Separately
The invocation of US federal tort laws and even common law is improper
considering that it is the VFA which governs disputes involving US military ships and
crew navigating Philippine waters in pursuance of the objectives of the agreement.
As it is, the waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to criminal
jurisdiction and not to special civil actions. Since jurisdiction cannot be had over the
respondents for being immuned from suit, there is no way damages which resulted
from violation of environmental laws could be awarded to petitioners.
In any case, the Rules on Writ of Kalikasan provides that a criminal case against a
person charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be filed separately.

Hence, a ruling on the application or non-application of criminal jurisdiction

provisions of the VFA to a US personnel who may be found responsible for the
grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province of a
petition for a writ of Kalikasan.
Challenging the Constitutionality of a Treaty Via a Petition for the Issuance of Writ of
Kalikasan is Not Proper
The VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as
a treaty by the US as attested and certified by the duly authorized representative of
the US government. The VFA being a valid and binding agreement, the parties are
required as a matter of international law to abide by its terms and provisions. A
petition under the Rules on Writ of Kalikasan is not the proper remedy to assail the
constitutionality of its provisions.
2. Holy See vs Del Rosario
GR. No. 101949
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1994/dec1994/gr_101949_1994.html
DIGEST
FACTS: Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in
Rome, Italy, and is represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio; Private
respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporation engaged in
the real estate business.
This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000
square meters located in the Municipality of Paranaque registered in the name of
petitioner. Said lot was contiguous with two other lots registered in the name of the
Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).
The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr.,
acting as agent to the sellers. Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private
respondent.
In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private respondent,
a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and
clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale
by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation
(Tropicana).
private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61,
Makati, Metro Manila for annulment of the sale of the three parcels of land, and
specific performance and damages against petitioner, represented by the Papal
Nuncio, and three other defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the PRC
and Tropicana
petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the complaint petitioner
for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit, and Msgr. Cirilos for
being an improper party. An opposition to the motion was filed by private
respondent.

the trial court issued an order denying, among others, petitioners motion to dismiss
after finding that petitioner shed off [its] sovereign immunity by entering into the
business contract in question Petitioner forthwith elevated the matter to us. In its
petition, petitioner invokes the privilege of sovereign immunity only on its own
behalf and on behalf of its official representative, the Papal Nuncio.
ISSUE:
Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations regarding
selling a lot to a private entity
RULING:
The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign
sovereign. The Holy See, through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had
diplomatic representations with the Philippine government since 1957 (Rollo, p. 87).
This appears to be the universal practice in international relations.
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and
firmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot,
without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign.
According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is
recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with
regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis
If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act
jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.
In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course
of a real estate business, surely the said transaction can be categorized as an act
jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent
disposal of Lot 5-A were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property
for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. Private
respondent failed to dispute said claim.
Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila.
The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to
construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The right of a
foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in a receiving state,
necessary for the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized
in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Arts. 20-22). This treaty
was concurred in by the Philippine Senate and entered into force in the Philippines
on November 15, 1965.
The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are
likewise clothed with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell Lot 5-A for
profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose off the same because the squatters living
thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the
donation. The fact that squatters have occupied and are still occupying the lot, and
that they stubbornly refuse to leave the premises, has been admitted by private
respondent in its complaint

Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its
grievances. Under both Public International Law and Transnational Law, a person
who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign can ask his own government
to espouse his cause through diplomatic channels.
Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign Office,
to espouse its claims against the Holy See. Its first task is to persuade the Philippine
government to take up with the Holy See the validity of its claims. Of course, the
Foreign Office shall first make a determination of the impact of its espousal on the
relations between the Philippine government and the Holy See (Young, Remedies of
Private Claimants Against Foreign States, Selected Readings on Protection by Law of
Private Foreign Investments 905, 919 [1964]). Once the Philippine government
decides to espouse the claim, the latter ceases to be a private cause.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the complaint in Civil Case
No. 90-183 against petitioner is DISMISSED.

3. Republic vs Sandoval
GR.No. 84607
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1993/mar1993/gr_84607_1993.html
DIGEST
FACTS:
The doctrines of immunity of the government from suit is expressly provided in the
Constitution under Article XVI, Section 3. It is provided that the State may not be
sued without its consent. Some instances when a suit against the State is proper
are: (1) When the Republic is sued by name; (2) When the suit is against an
unincorporated government agency; (3) When the suit is, on its face, against a
government officer but the case is such that ultimate liability will belong not to the
officer but to the government.With respect to the incident that happened in
Mendiola on January 22, 1987 that befell twelve rallyists, the the case filed against
the military officers was dismissed by the lower court. The defendants were held
liable but it would not result in financial responsibility to the government. The
petitioner (CaylaoGroup) filed a suit against the State that for them the State has
waived its immunity when the Mendiola Commission recommended the government
to indemnify the victims of the Mendiola incident and the acts and utterances of
President Aquino which is sympathetic to the cause is indicative of State's waiver of
immunity and therefore, the government should also be liable and should be
compensated by the government. The case has been dismissed that State has not
waived its immunity. On the other hand, the Military Officer filed a petition for
certiorari to review the orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the State has waived its immunity from suit and therefore should
the State be liable for the incident?

HELD:
No. The recommendation made by the Mendiola Commission regarding the
indemnification of the heirs of the deceased and the victims of the incident does not
in any way mean liability automatically attaches to the State. The purpose of which
is to investigate of the disorders that took place and the recommendation it makes
cannot in any way bind the State. The acts and utterances of President Aquino does
not mean admission of the State of its liability. Moreover, the case does not qualify
as suit against the State. While the Republic in this case is sued by name, the
ultimate liability does not pertain to the government. The military officials are held
liable for the damages for their official functions ceased the moment they have
exceeded to their authority. They were deployed to ensure that the rally would be
peaceful and orderly and should guarantee the safety of the people. The court has
made it quite clear that even a high position in the government does not confer a
license to persecute or recklessly injure another. The court rules that there is no
reversible error and no grave abuse of discretion committed by the respondent
Judge in issuing the questioned orders.