Attempt- doesnt have to work

EFFECTIVENESS IS NOT THE MAIN CONSIDERATION IN HI LEGITIMACY -HUMANITARIAN ACTION TRUMPS MOST EFFECTIVE ACTION
James Pattison, Senior Lecturer in Politics-University of Manchester, 2010,
Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: Who Should Intervene?, p. 112
those undertaking humanitarian intervention should follow a number of
principles of external and internal jus in bello. An intervener's likely fidelity to these principles, is I
claim, a key factor in its legitimacy and should guide the decision on who should intervene. The Extreme
We have seen, then, that

Instrumentalist Approach outlined at the end of the last chapter cannot fully account for these principles of just

By placing all moral weight on an intervener's

effectiveness, it marginalizes the importance of an intervener's expected fidelity to these
principles of jus in bello. In this context, Heinze claims that a purely consequentialist account "has
serious problems when employed as part of a theory of the morality of war based on human
rights, because it suggests that aggregate human suffering is the only moral concern that
need be addressed" (2004). He claims that if, for instance, a purely consequentialist principle alone were used
conduct in war in its conception of legitimacy.

to determine proportionality in NATO's intervention in Kosovo, NATO would have been permitted to pursue its
primary end of the capitulation of the Milosevic regime unconditionally, regardless of civilian casualties (Heinze
2004: 550).

Not forcingHUMAN RIGHTS ARE THOSE RIGHTS THAT APPLY UNIVERSALLY

Joel Krieger, 2001, Oxford Companion to Politics of the World, 2nd Edition, p. 368
By contrast, under our modern definition, human rights are universal, a term introduced during the final
drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to emphasize that it was not just the new member states of

the concept of human rights has attained

increasingly broad support and is now firmly established under international law.
Universality in this context also means that human rights apply to everyone -- by virtue of
their humanity -- everywhere, and at all times.
the United Nations who had to respect these rights. Since then,

V: morality

K: Human worth

Morality Can Only be Weighed by Human Worth

Arthur Isak

Applbaum Are Violations of Rights Ever Right? Arthur Isak Applbaum. Ethics, Vol. 108, No. 2 (Jan., 1998), pp. 341-2

Morality is possible, says Nagel, only for

beings capable of seeing themselves as one individual among others more
or less similar in general respectscapable, in other words, of seeing themselves as others see them. Our lives matter to us,
but we realize that the lives of billions of others matter to them . Either we concede
Although Kamms is the earlier account, let us begin with Nagels.

that, from an impersonal point of view, no one really matters, or we recognize the fact that each life matters to the one who is living it does matter, in
some way, from an impersonal perspective. If one ought to matter to no one but oneself, then one cannot continue to think of oneself that matters very
much at all. Since we think of ourselves as beings that matter, consistency demands that we extend that status to others. Says Nagel, I believe, as did
Kant, that what drives us in the direction of universalizability is the difficulty each person has in regarding himself as having value only for himself, but not

If one wishes
to view and value oneself as a being that is an end in itself, and not as a
means to be used for the ends of others, then the status of an end must be extended to others. The
violation of other personsusing them as meanstherefore is an impersonal bad,
in himself. If people are not ends in themselvesi.e. impersonally valuablethen they have a much lower order of worth.

something we all have reason to avoid and prevent.

C1-

a)
united States is universal protector

Cicero argues for a moral obligation to prevent harm to others

Glanville, Luke. "The Responsibility to Protect Beyond Borders." Human Rights
Law Review (2012): html version. Web.
the Roman philosopher Cicero argued that there were two types of injustice: men
may inflict injury; or else, when it is being inflicted upon others, they may fail to
deflect it, even though they could. Justice was said to entail not merely negative
duties to refrain from perpetrating harm but also positive duties to protect
others from harm: the man who does not defend someone, or obstruct the
injustice when he can, is at fault just as if he had abandoned his parents
or his friends or his country. He insisted that duties were not only owed to those
close to us but also to strangers and foreigners. Those who suggested
otherwise were said to tear apart the common fellowship of the human race.

The utility of a society only has value when its individuals

are treated with dignity.

Shue

89 Professor of Ethics and Public Life, Princeton University (Henry, Nuclear Deterrence and Moral Restraint, pp. 141-2)

Given the philosophical obstacles to resolving moral disputes, there are

at least two approaches one can take in dealing with the issue of the
morality of nuclear strategy. One approach is to stick doggedly with one of the established moral theories constructed by philosophers to
rationalize or make sense of everyday moral intuitions, and to accept the verdict of the theory, whatever it might be, on the morality of nuclear
weapons use. A more pragmatic alternative approach assumes that trade-offs in moral values and principles are inevitable in response to constantly
changing threats, and that the emergence of novel, unforeseen challenges may impel citizens of Western societies to adjust the way they rank their
values and principles to ensure that the moral order survives. Nuclear weapons are putting just such a strain on our moral beliefs. Before the emergence
of a nuclear-armed communist state capable of threatening the existence of Western civilization, the slaughter of millions of innocent human beings to

Today, however, it may

be that Western democracies, if they are to survive as guardians of
individual freedom, can no longer afford to provide innocent life the full
protection demanded by Just War morality. It might be objected that the freedoms of
Western society have value only on the assumption that human beings
are treated with the full dignity and respect assumed by Just War theory. Innocent human life is not just
preserve Western values may have appeared wholly unjustifiable under any possible circumstances.

another value to be balanced side by side with others in moral calculations. It is the raison detre of Western political, economic, and social institutions.

A free society based on individual rights that sanctioned mass slaughter

of innocent human beings to save itself from extinction would be morally
corrupt, no better than soviet society, and not worth defending. The only morally right and respectable
policy for such a society would be to accept destruction at the hands of
tyranny, if need be. This objection is partly right in that a society based on individual rights that casually sacrifices innocent human lives for the
sake of common social goods is a contradiction in terms. On the other hand, even Just War doctrine allows for the unintentional sacrifice of some
innocent human life under certain hard-pressing circumstances. It is essentially a consequentialist moral doctrine that ascribes extremely high but not
absolute value to innocent human life. The problem for any nonabsolute moral theory, of course, is where to draw the line.

PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS JUSTIFIES INTERVENTION

Catherine Lu, Political Science Professor-McGill University, 2006, Just and Unjust
Interventions in World Politics: Public and Private, p. 129
the rise of human rights doctrine "as an acceptable justification for various
kinds of international intervention, ranging from diplomatic and economic sanctions to
military action, in the view of global injustice that includes violations of common rights and
duties owed to all human beings by virtue of their humanity, irrespective of whether these
violations are committed by governments within or beyond the boundaries of a sovereign
state. Beitz also notes that beyond justifying coercive measures against offending governments,
human rights play an important "public role...beyond the sphere of intergovernmental
relations. Human rights have served as bases for standard setting, monitoring, reporting
and advocacy by nongovernmental organizations at both the domestic and the international
levels of world politics."
According to Bietz,

Official UN endorsement of the responsibility to protect

Glanville, Luke. "The Responsibility to Protect Beyond Borders." Human Rights
Law Review (2012): html version. Web.
In December 2004, the responsibility to protect was adopted by a High-Level Panel
of experts commissioned by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan The Panel wrote of
a growing recognition that the issue is not the right to intervene of any State, but

the responsibility to protect of every State when it comes to people suffering from
avoidable catastrophe. And it tied this notion of shared responsibility to the
Security Council: We endorse the emerging norm that there is a collective
international responsibility to protect, exercisable by the Security Council
authorizing military intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other
large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international
humanitarian law which sovereign Governments have proved powerless or unwilling
to prevent. Three months later, the Secretary-General endorsed the principle in his
own agenda for UN reform

Member states unanimously endorsed the responsibility to protect at the UN World

Summit in September 2005 Several states expressed concern that endorsement
of the concept would facilitate self-interested interference by powerful states in the
domestic affairs of the weak and some suggested that its interventionist provisions
were incompatible with international law. Consequently, the agreement expressly
tied intervention to the authority of the Security Council, and the responsibility to
protect was expressly limited to the specific crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity.

In the final negotiated document, member states declared that The international
community should, as appropriate, encourage and help states to protect their
populations and that it bears the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic,
humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of
the Charter, to help to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity.

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION CONDUCTED ACCORDING TO STRICT DEFINITIONS

IS MORALLY LEGITIMATE
Michael Newman, European Studies and Professor of Politics at London
Metropolitan University, 2009, Humanitarian Intervention: confronting the
contradictions, p. 88-90
Those who advocate intervention on human rights grounds therefore need to demonstrate
both that some rights are more relevant than others and quantify the scale of the violations
that could, in principle, justify military action. Building on work by Henry Shue in Basic Rights: Subsistence,
Affluence and US Foreign Policy (Shue, 1980: 1996), Eric Heinze has attempted to provide a precise
account of the gross violations of a restricted number of rights that could legitimately trigger
humanitarian intervention. This is very helpful in distinguishing between genuine humanitarian intervention
and abuses of the argument. Heinze argued that the literature on rights (including material in UN proceedings)
showed a moral and practical consensus that the right to life was essential for the enjoyment of all other rights and
therefore the most in need of protection.

Violating people's right to life through outright murder,

starvation, or by any other means was permanently to deprive them of the possibility of
enjoying any other right. Similarly, to violate, or threaten to violate, their physical person, through
rape, torture or other abuse -- potentially deprived them of this possibility. For no individual could
fully enjoy any right that was theoretically guaranteed by society if there was a credible
threat of bodily harm of any kind if he or she attempted to exercise such a right. On the other
hand the denial of a civil or political right -- such as the right to vote -- was not per se a denial of personal bodily
integrity.

From this Heinze concluded that it was violation of bodily rights, rather than of civil or
political rights, that could, in some circumstances, warrant intervention. He also sought to identify those
circumstances more precisely by defining the notion of a "gross violation." Quantifying human suffering or
"counting the dead" was unacceptable, for this would imply that a gross violation could not be identified until after
the fact. This would also preclude preventive action when there was good evidence as to what was likely to

he suggested three conditions under which abuses of such rights might be

considered "gross violations." First, there needed to be evidence of planning , so that there was
happen. Instead

a consistent pattern of human rights violations that was the result of an intentional, coherent structure or design;
normally this meant that it would be the policy of the government in question, or tolerated by the government.

Secondly, there needed to be breadth, in the sense that the abusive elements constituted a
consistent pattern with a coherent structure. Thirdl y, the violation needed to occur over
time, with repeated occurrence. This led to an overall definition of gross violations as "The threatened or actual
violations of life or physical bodily integrity perpetuated or tolerated by authorities in a consistent, deliberate, and
widespread manner in order to establish a certain intended social, political, or economic arrangement" (Heinze,
2004, p. 477).

Heinze argued that if other threshold criteria were met, there was a moral case for
intervention. But a particular strength of his argument was that he maintained that there was also the basis for
a legal case. This arose from the very substantial agreement about both the hierarchy of rights and the definition of
"gross violations" in the overwhelming body of international law and jurisprudence. This included definitions from
the principle of universal jurisdiction, the Convention on Torture, the Genocide Convention, the Geneva Convention
and additional Protocols, and also jurisprudence and rulings and statuses of the post-war Military Tribunals, the
Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals and the International Criminal Court.

b) Everyone
FAILURE TO INTERVENE TO STOP HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES -- SUCH AS IN
RWANADA-- UNDERMINES HUMAN RIGHTS VALUE FOR EVERYONE
Amy Gutmann, Political Science Professor and President of University of
Pennsylvania , 2001, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry, ed. A. Gutmann, p. xvi
The most controversial -- and sometimes the only potentially effective -- response to persistent human
rights violations by states is intervention. Under what conditions, Ignatieff therefore asks, is intervention
justified to reverse human rights abuses within states? Like nationalism, intervention is a double-edged
sword. It must be used sparingly lest it become an unintended excuse for human rights
violations on the part of intervening states. Yet it must be used when it can be effective to
stop (or at least significantly reduce) systematic and pervasive human rights abuses. This standard is
far harder to apply than it is to articulate, and it is controversial in both theory and application. " Human rights
may be universal, but support for coercive enforcement of their norms will never be
universal." If this is realism, it is no recipe for isolationism. The failure to intervene in Rwanda, for

where many lives could have been saved, was far from inevitable or justifiable. Such
failures have "undermined the credibility of human rights values in zones of danger around
the world."
example,

RIGHTS ABUSES
James Pattison, Senior Lecturer in Politics-University of Manchester, 2010,
Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: Who Should Intervene?, p 19
From an interactional cosmopolitan approach, Carla Bagnoli (2006) argues that the duty to
intervene stems from the moral obligation to respect humanity, independent of any consideration of
special relationships. To flesh this out further, we can say that there is a duty to prevent, to halt, and to
decrease substantial human suffering, such as that found in large-scale violations of basic
human rights. This duty to prevent human suffering is not dependent on high levels of
interdependence. Instead, it is universal, generated from the fundamental moral premise that human
suffering ought to be tackled. This duty to prevent human suffering translates firstly, into an
unassigned, general duty to intervene for sufficiently legitimated interveners (i.e. for those that
meet the threshold level). Second, it translates into an assigned duty for those whose intervention would possess
the greatest legitimacy according to the Moderate Instrumentalist Approach.

COSMOPOLITANISM PROVIDES A MORAL CONDEMNATION OF CRUELTY AND DUTY

TO ALLEVIATE SUFFERING
Catherine Lu, Political Science Professor-McGill University, 2006, Just and Unjust
Interventions in World Politics: Public and Private, p. 97
Cosmopolitanism's moral condemnation of cruelty translates at a minimum into a moral
obligation to uphold the principle of humanity, to do our best "to prevent and alleviate human
suffering wherever it can be found." Cosmopolitanism requires us to pay attention to the cries of victims in
the flesh, a difficult task given how suffering usually takes place, "while someone else is eating or opening a

Individuals and societies attempt to manage personal and

public responsibility for suffering by making a distinction between misfortune and injustice .
window or just walking dully along."

At the international level, until very recently, the suffering of individuals and some groups --whether the cause be
famine, civil war or pestilence -- tended to be discounted as misfortunes, for international society could only admit

The normal model of justice in international is in

domestic society, however, can be a terrible burden to anyone whose suffering cannot be
acknowledged or redressed within its bounds . Shkar's appeal to "take the victim's view" is thus at least
claims of justice and injustice between states.

potentially cosmopolitan in enabling us to recognize the suffering of the exile, refugee, enemy and stranger.

c) Ourselves

HUMAN RIGHTS LEADERSHIP KEY TO US HEGEMONY

Roth 2000 [Chicago Journal of International Law, "AEI conference trends in global
governance: do they threaten American Sovereignty?"]
Washington's cynical attitude toward international human rights law has begun to weaken
the US government's voice as an advocate for human rights around the [*353] world.
Increasingly at UN human rights gatherings, other governments privately criticize Washington's "a la
carte" approach to human rights. They see this approach reflected not only in the US government's narrow
formula for ratifying human rights treaties but also in its refusal to join the recent treaty banning anti-personnel
landmines and its opposition to the treaty establishing the International Criminal Court unless a mechanism can be
found to exempt US citizens. For example, at the March-April 2000 session of the UN Commission on Human Rights,
many governments privately cited Washington's inconsistent interest in international human rights standards to
explain their lukewarm response to a US-sponsored resolution criticizing China's deteriorating human rights record.

The US government should be concerned with its diminishing stature as a standard-bearer

for human rights. US influence is built not solely on its military and economic power.
At a time when US administrations seem preoccupied with avoiding any American casualties,
the projection of US military power is not easy. US economic power, for its part, can engender
as much resentment as influence. Much of why people worldwide admire the United States is
because of the moral example it sets. That allure risks being tarnished if the US
government is understood to believe that international human rights standards are only for
other people, not for US citizens.

US HUMAN RIGHTS LEADERSHIP IS KEY TO NATIONAL SECURITY AND STOPPING

TERRORISM
Lorne W. Craner, Asst. Sec. Of State For Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, October 31,
2001
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/rm/2001/6378.htm
The world has changed dramatically for all of us since September 11, and some people have expressed the concern that, as a result of the attacks on America, the Bush Administration

maintaining the focus on human

rights and democracy worldwide is an integral part of our response to the attack and is even
more essential today than before September 11th. They remain in our national interest in
promoting a stable and democratic world. As Dr. [Condoleezza] Rice said only a week after
the horrific attack, "Civil liberties matter to this President very much, and our values
matter to us abroad. We are not going to stop talking about the things that matter to us, human rights, religious freedom and so forth and so on. We're going to
will abandon human rights and democracy work. To those people I say boldly that this is not the case. In fact,

continue to press those things; we would not be American if we did not." In practical terms, we continue to raise human rights issues at the highest levels of governments worldwide and

there is often a direct link between the absence of

human rights and democracy and seeds of terrorism. Promoting human rights and
democracy addresses the fear, frustration, hatred, and violence that is the breeding ground
for the next generation of terrorists. We cannot win a war against terrorism by halting our
work promoting the universal observance of human rights. To do so would be merely to set
the stage for a resurgence of terrorism in another generation. As Thomas Jefferson said: that government is the strongest
have made it clear that these issues remain important to us. We do so because

of which everyone may feel a part. At the very least, the brutality of the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon and the fact that it was completely unprovoked suggest that
models based on what we used to call the "rational actor" are far from fully comprehensive -- unless, of course, you are willing to take Clausewitz one step further and suggest that not
only is war politics by another means, but so, too, is terrorism. But that would be to give it a legitimacy that it clearly does not merit. Even so, what drives individuals -- not states, but
men, individual, independent actors -- to assume the cloak of moral or religious rectitude and declare holy war on a country?

This is not an attack on

armies, but on symbols.

Obviously, we need to learn how to fight the perceptions and misperceptions that lie behind all that better than we do. The question that

we all are asking ourselves since that terrible day last month is this: how do we, who have the responsibility for promoting and protecting the values that underpin civil society at home
and throughout the world, pick our way through all the causes and effects of that and make sure that it does not happen again? Obviously, there is much we can do: in intelligencegathering and information sharing, in civil defense and homeland security, in diplomacy and economic leveraging, in international cooperation and coalition-building, in pressure and in
force. All this the Administration is doing, and much, much more. My point is not to venture into the realm of military strategy. That is not my responsibility in this administration.
Fortunately for all of us, the President has assembled a very experienced and capable team for that. This country is not the cause of all the problems of this world -- quite the contrary.

. We cannot solve every regional

dispute and ethnic conflict. And yet, we are the sole superpower. Our reach is global and
unprecedented. People look to us. Our power and our potential are immense. We have
interests and we have obligations to our friends and allies. As the head of the bureau charged with
advising the President and Secretary of State on human rights, I have to worry about the causes and
consequences of conflicts wherever they take place, for all of them involve human rights
in one way or another -- whether in Sudan or Sierra Leone, Indonesia, Macedonia, or the
Middle East. I suspect most of you are looking to hear something about this administration's priorities within the field of human rights, especially after the September 11th
We spend a great deal of time and effort trying to solve them. But still, we cannot be everywhere at once

attacks. Let me begin by outlining the general principles that I think will guide us. First, over the past 20 years, both political parties -- Republicans and Democrats -- have firmly
embraced the belief that

America has an obligation to advance fundamental freedoms around the world.

Thus human rights have the deep and strong backing of both parties, all branches of government, and, most importantly, the American people. This will not change. In a multilateral
sense, the United States has been the unquestioned leader of the movement to expand human rights since the Second World War. We pushed it in the UN Charter, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and into the conventions and treaty bodies that have ensued. And when I say "we," I do not just mean the U.S. government. For it was our people,
Americans from every walk of life, who gave the international non-governmental organization (NGO) movement so much of its intellectual force, its financial muscle, and its firm

are proud to bear the mantle of

leadership in international human rights into this new century.
commitment to civil society. This, too, will not change. We in this administration are conscious of our history and