.

SodW

SPE

of Petroleum

Engkwem

28812

~
Pressure Relieving System Design and Evaluation
J.D. Kenez, Davy John Brown Pty. Ltd.
Copyright1994,SZxlePjof Petroleum Engm66m Inc,

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ABSTRACT

audiiable design documentation suitable for the

maintenance of ongoing plant records.

The pressure relief system in a hydrocarbon

processing plant is essential to its safe operation.
[n order to design pressure relief systems for a new
plant or to evaluate existing systems, a systematic
method should be employed taking into account
the governing codes, industry rec?mmmended
practices and the operating companys standards.
This paper describee a design procedure based on
the preparation of a project specific overpressure
design
philosophy,
which
incorporates
the
designers
interpretation
of the
codes,
recommended practices and standards.

~.
The function of a preeeire relieving system in a
hydrocarbons processing plant is to provide a
positive meams of protection for plant equipment
from overpressuration above Iimite permitted by the
relevant codes and to dispose safely of any
resultant relief of plant fluids.
Identification of the causes (or contingencies) of
overpressure, quantification
of relieving rates
required to comply with codes, eizing of relief
devices and the design of the relief disposal system
ie a complex task.

All credible causes, of equipment overpreseure are

then identified and required relieving retee
quantified using simplified calculation methods and
process simulation for fluid propertied.
The
resultant information is stored in a.data base and is
then used to design the relief disposal syetem
including relief valves, relief headers end knockout
drums. Proprietary software is used for the sizing
of relief system piping.

Use of a systematic method for the identification of

contingencies, together with a set of project specific
qualifications
of the governing
codes and
standards, provides the basis for sound relief
eystem design.
Quantification of contingencies using established
calculation methods and process simulation is then
used to size pressure relief devicee and the
associated relief header piping network.

This design procedure, which can be equally well

applied to the review of existing facilities, resuke in
a sound plant relief design as well as providing

This approach, which provides an auditable safe

design for new plant, can be equally well applied to
the review of wsting facilities against currant codes
and good engineering practice.

References and illustrations at end of paper.

667

PRESSURE RELIEVING SYSTEM DESIGN AND EVALUATION

Procese Flow Diagram (PFD) and associated

mass and energy balance

TECHNICAL DISCUSSION
APPLICABLE CODES AND STANDARDS FOR
THE OIL & GAS INDUSTRY IN 11-fE ASIA
PACIFIC REGION
There are a wide range of government codes, rules
and regulations together with industry codes,
standards end recommended practices which are
applicable to the protection ofprocess plant from
overpressure. The basic codes and standardson
which many other documents are based are as
follows
Plant

TVDE

Oftshore Production Platforms

Refineries
Gen. Hydrocarbon Processing
* Pressure Vessels
Piping

SPE 028812

Piping and Instrument Diagrams (P&lDs)

Plant layout including equipment elavatlons

Vessel dimensions and design temperatures
and pressures (including heat exchangers)

Pump and compressor performance curves

Document

Pipe specifications

APl RP14C(refl)
API RP520 (ref 2)
API RP521 (ref3)
ASME Vlll (ref 4)
ASMEB31.3(ref5)

* Note that the Australian Standard for unfired

pressure vesse!s is AS 1210 (ref6) and for relief
valve sizing is AS 1271 (ref7).
While these codes and standards provide the basis
for the safe design of relief systems there are a
number of aspects which require designer
interpretation, part[cular[y with respect to issues that
are unique to the type of facility.
On any project it is recommended to first establish
a list of all governing codes, standards and
regulations and then to develop a project specific
overpressure -design philosophy document. This
document should identify which codes apply or
take precedence for particular circumstances, and
include thedeslgners Interpretation as applicable
to the project. The contents of the overpreasure
design philosophy document would follow the
general outline presented in this paper highlighting
the basis for all decision making in the relief system
design.
DESIGN
INFORMATION
REQUIRED
OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION

Site paving and drainage layout

Control valves selected Cv (Size)

Pressure relief devices size and type for axlstlng
facilities

Physical property data Is required for process fluids

at relieving conditions.
Use can be made of
standard process simulation packages, with an
appropriate thermodynamics
package for the
procasslng fluids involved, to determine these
properties based on normal compositional data
from the mass and energy balance.
IDENTIFICATION OF POSSIBLE
EQUIPMENTOVERPRESSURE

CAUSES OF

All system renditions which could possibly result in

equipment overpressure should be examined
including:
.

Utility failure (heating medium, moling medium,

Instrument air, power, inert gas, fuel)

Equipment failure (pumps, fans, compressors,

check-valve real-function)
Abnormal
process
conditions
(start-up,
shutdown, washout, regeneration, alternative
feedstock or line up, runaway reaction).

FOR

Prior to undertaking an overpressure analysis of a

processing plant the following design information
must be available
.

Operator error (blocked outlet, open inlet).

Failure of automatic
open inlet).

control (blocked

Exchanger tube rupture.

66a

outlet,

-------

Svk

..
Lr2s51z

.-

,-.

J.IJ.

KkNU

correct position, shall not be considered to be

subject to operator error.

Plant fkes.. .

Although the above list covers the most usual

sources of overpressure other conditions may exist
which could reasonably lead to overpressure. It is
the responsibilii
of the planta designers to
considar all such possibilities and to list all
identified contingencies
for quantification
of
required relieving rates. When each abnormal
system condition is analysed all directly related
effects that could occur including those upstream
and downstream
of the equipment
under
consideration should be reviewed. For instance
loss of a lean oil absorbers oil supply pump will
cause an increase in vapour rate leaving the
absorber, which may overpressure downstream
equipment. Similarly loss of boil up on a distillation
column will result in light ends leaving with the
column bottoms, which if fed to a downstream
column may result in its overpressure due to
inadequate mndensing capacity.
Given the general nature of plant system failures
and the large number of possibilities, which maybe
applicable to any item of equipment, a number of
qualifications need to be applied to the analysis to
simplify the designers task. .These qualifications,
which are generally project specific and should be
clearly identified in the overpressure design
philosophy document, are based on experience,
industry codes. and good engineering practice.
Some qualifications outlined in API RP521 include
-

The possibility of two unrelated abnormal

conditions (double contingency) shall not be
considered dua to the low probability of the
conditions occurring simultaneously. Note that
this does not preclude consideration
of
consequential failure such as overhead product
pump failure leading to loss of column overhead
cooling due to mndenser flooding.

Capacity credit for control valves that are not

under consideration as causing overpressure
and which !end w reliwe the system shall be
limited io rates b.ae~cf M the valves in their
normal opertning pomktm tr.ffi.no extra credit for
a control
system
resprmding
to the
contingency).

Block valves, electric switches or other

equipment that are locked or car-sealed in the

669

Operator intervention may be assumed to be

between 10 and 30 minutes of a high level
alarm in the contingency of blocked liquid
outlets (eg in the case of a distillation column).

Since hydrocarbon processing plants may consist

of just a few items of equipment or a large
integrated complex consideration of utility failures
needs to Include the effect on a single item of
equipment es well as plant wide failure. In the case
of power supply there maybe multiple independent
sources of supply reducing the possibility of a total
power failure, however in such cases the designer
must convince himself that there Is no possibility of
total loss of power before eliminating that case.
Similarly In the case of cooling water supply, where
parallel pumps operate with independent energy
sources, credit may be taken for one of the pumps
on failure of the other pumps power source. All
such systems should be reviewed with the objective
of taking credit for a limitation in the extent of a
utility system failure where the probability of a site
wde failure can be considered to be not credible.
AS indicated above the identification of all credible
causes of equipment overpressure in processing
plant is both complex end time consuming.
Further more the designer is obliged to show that
he has been both thorough and compliant with the
relevant codes In his analysis.
One means of
meeting these obligations
is to prepare a
contingency table for the plant documenting the
designers considerations. This table (see Table 1)
is generated by first listing all items of process
equipment which could be subject to overpressure.
Note that in the case of centrifugal pumps and
compressors it is normal practice for the casing
design pressure to be higher than the maximum
possible pump shut in pressure, however this
should be verified. The designer then reviews the
plants Piping and Instrument Diagrams (P&lDs)
(see Fig 1 for a simplified P&ID) checking for all
credible overpressure contingencies, using the
contingency table to record his review. This table
then becomes the basis for the next phase of the
work, which is the quantification of relieving rates.

PRESSURE RELIEVING SYSTEM DESIGN AND EVALUATION

QUANTIFICATION

OF RE_UEVING RATES

In order to establish the size of the relieving device

required to protect plant from overpressure an
estimate must be made of the maximum rate of
fluid to be relieved.
While it is possible to
rigorously simulate every identified contingency this
is both time consuming and generally unnecessary
as in many cases one contingency is clearly the
governing case. Theplant designer usessimpliffed
calculation methods based on industry experience
todetermlne conservative relieving rates. Onceell
contingency reliiving rates aredetermlned it may
be cost &Tectivato review any large contingency
requirements with a view to reducing them by
application of more rigorous analysis, or by
changing the design.
Calculation methods for some of the more usual
contingencies together with simplifications outlined
In the API and other codes of practice are
discussed below.
Fire Exposure Vessels Containing

Liquids

In tha case of liquid containing vessels the required

relieving rate is based on. the rate of heat transfer
from fire exposure vaporizing liquid in tha vessel.
Heat absorbed in the vapour space being small In
comparison is ignored.
Note that it is normally
assumed that there is no flow path In or out of the
vessel during a fire (ie equipment is blocked in).
For an uninsulated container thetotel heat input
from fire exposure is the product of heat flux and
heat transfer area
Q=qA

SPE 028812

The 0.82 exponent on wetted area is the area

exposure factor recognizing that large vessels are
less likely to be completely exposed to the flame of
an open fire than small ones.
The environment factor F (equal to or lass than 1.0)
is interpreted differently by various industry bodias.
API RP520 allows a reduction in Q by claiming
credi for insulation depending on Its thermal
conductivity and providing it wll resist dislodgement
by fire-hose streams and can withstand fire
tamperatura. Note that credit is not usually taken
for watar sprays.
Generally processing plant design should include
adequate surface drainage facilities and a means of
preventing the spread of flammable liquids from
one operating area to another end thus aquation
(2) could apply, with equation (3) applicable for
bunded storage vessels. While this approach may
be appropriate in general terms, care is needed to
ensure the adequacy of any drainage system
provided and furthermore as its efficiency is now
implicit in the overpressure protection of the plant,
procedures must be in place to routinely test its
capabilities. Whera the designer is uncertain about
the reliability or effectiveness of a drainage system
equation (3) should be used.
AS 1210 Section 8.6.2, which covers the required
relieving rates for fire must be applied for vessels
registered in Australia. Tha committee responsible
for AS 1210 has advised that the intent of Section
8.6.2 para (a) relating to liquefied gas applies to all
vaporizable Iiqulds and not just liquefied petroleum
gas (see Appendix A).

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (1)

Based on experimental data and consideration of

the degree to which a vessel IS enveloped by
flames the API has developed the following formula
where fhere are prompt fire-fighting efforts end
drainage of flammable materials away from the
vessel:

By substituting orifice formula relationships in AS

1210 equation 8.6.2 (l), it can be shown that this
formula is equivalent to Q = 71.3A* kW (A in m?,
which is essentially the same aa API RP521 Section
A.5.I, equation A-3 (ie equation (3) above). [t is
much more useful in this form since the actual relief
rate of the fluid of interest can be calculated (see
Appendix B for the derivation).

Q = 21 ,000F~O@2 . . . . . . . . . . . ...(2)
Application of total wetted surface area is limited in
API RP520 to the normal liquid level wetted
surface area up to a height of 25 feet (7.6 metre)
above the source of flame, which is any level where
a substantial spill or pool fire could be sustained.
Other codes including AS 1210 consider the total
extarnal surface area (limited to the maximum

Where adequate drainaga and fire fighting

equipment do not etist, equation (2) becomes
Q = 34,500 F~ae2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (3)
(Note the above formula are in British units)
670

J.D. KENEZ

SPE 028812

height of fire, but not less than 7.5 metre above

ground level) which generally requkes a larger PSV
sizing.
In addiion different types of equipment require a
more explicit definition of the wetted area to be
used (see Table 2 for typical areas).
Table 2 - Typical Watted Surface Area of a
Vessel Based on Fire Heat Absorbed
T@+ of VW*J

PM
~q

UqUld nlled Vei$als

Al P to the Iwighi of 7.% melm

UqUldjVqr

Nom@ Ilquld
of 7.6 rlmtre

Vnssds

I&A

to a

hdght

Dlwl!.auon Columns

Nmal tauoms level plus Ilquld

hold P from all tre,y$, 10a
helghi of 7,6 melt. (lncl.de
Iwflm head $. S@

A, COO!*I3

use bare lube %,. WI 6s tlm-6s

area for conaw,am,g smwce, use
A1.0 In eq.atbn (2). me 7.6
nmtra height mot m.y nc+ appiy

shelf & rub.

E%mlngem

CalCulae total melt tide and

tube s[de expand area (chmel
and covers) Separeldy alla meal
89 m. ves$els

8P~ms

dtiw
UC. 10 m.idmm im!lwntti
or a hek!hl of 7.6 rmtre. $./Mm
ever Is &3atw

and SPheroMs

W = 3600 Q/L

thel if may be appropriate to use a minimum latent

heat value of 116 kJ/kg (50 Btu/lb). Altematiiely a
more rigorous process simulation utilising a
depreesuring calculation can check a selected
PSVS adequacy.
Finally, when considering
tha required fire
contingency
relieving
rates
for
multipie
interconnected items of equipment, such as a
dk~liation COhJMn, its reboiler, condenser and
overhead accumulator (providing there is an open
relief path between the items), as the extent of a
fire zona is generally considered to be ilmited, it is
possible that some of the equipment may fali in a
different fire zone. Thus for instance it may not be
necessary to consider the relief requirements for
the column and its reboiler to be coincident with
those of the overhead condenser and the
accumulator depending on layout. For Sizing a
PSV protecting multiple equipment items average
fluid properties should be used. The identification
of fire zones based on phyeical plant layout and
osntred on vessels with large fiquid hydrocarbon
inventories is an important tool in the design of the
relief header (see later) as well as the layout of
drainage sumps and paving high points.
Vessels Con~ning

For liquid vaporisation due to fire exposure the

required relieving rate can be calculated by dividing
total heat input by latent heat
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (4)

Letant heat is strictly only applicable to pure singlecomponent liquids although approximations can be
made for a simple mixture of similar components.
For real fluids a pseudo latent heat can be
estimated by utilisation of a process simulation with
an appropriate
thermodynamioe
package to
undertake a flash of the normal liquid composition
at the relieving pressure. The vapour temperature
and physical properties from this flaeh can be usad
for pressure safety valve (PSV) sizing. In the case
of distillation columns the bottoms composition can
be used for the normal liquid composition as this
has been found to result in conservative PSVsizing.
Where the calculated latent heat is iess than 100
kJ/kg and/or relieving conditions are near or above
the thermodynamic critical point, API 520 suggests

871

Gas OnIy

Forvessals containing gas only the simple equation

outlined in Section A.5.2 of APi RP521 for gas
expansion as it is heated may be used, limiting the
maximum relieving temperature to about 340C as
Implied by equation A.5 in API RP521. This,
temperature limitation can be interpreted as being
equivalent to consideration of the normai operating
gas pressure as being relatively close to the
relieving pressure. For example in the case of a
compressor suction drum it ie likely that the drum
is actually subject to the compressor settle out
preseure during a fire, rather then the lower normal
pressure.
In the Nov 1990 amendment to Clause 8.6.2 item
(b) in AS 1210, the simple relief sizing thermal
expansion equation for gas fiiied veesels has been
repiaced by a more compiex method.
In
correspondence with the committee responsible for
the maintenance of AS 1210 It hae been suggested
that this procedure is for sizing vessel depressuring
vafvee designed to prevent rupture of a vessel due
to over temperature and is therefore not necessarily
appropriate for PSV sizing.

PRESSURE RELIEVING SYSTEM DESIGN AND EVALUATION

be determined at the relieving conditions ~.e. credit

may be taken for reduced inflow at the relieving
pressure, except where the control action on the
inlet valve operates to maintain flow). Credit may
be taken for flows out of the system through control
valves which are at their normally open position
and are not part of the contingency. The effect of
friction loss between the source of overpressure
and the system being protected may be also taken
into account when determining the relieving
requirement. Generetly all control valves should be
considered as capable of moving to their shut
position, independent of their failure mode.

Protection against Excessive Temperature

In the case of prolonged fire where there is a
likelihood of vessel rupture due to excessive
temperature (in some cases even prior to reaching
the PSV set pressure) then consideration should be
given to the provision of adepressurlng syetem,
water sprays or a fire protection system. Note that
the provision of PSVS to prevent overpressure due
to fire exposure, and the protection against failure
due to excessive temperature, are different issues
which have different code requirements.
For
example water deluge systems are acceptable as a
means of protecting against excessive temperature,
but no credit is recommended for PSV sizing.

Cooling/Reflux Faifure for Dlstiilation Towera

The required relieving rate 1s determined by mass
and energy balance on the system at the relleving
pressure. While this may be undertaken rigorously,
it 1s often sufficient to simplify the analysis based
on the fype of system. For instance ioss of reflux
may be treated as total loss of condensing on the
basis that the accumulator and condenser are
rapidly flooded. Compositional changes caused by
loss of reflux may result in different vapour
properties affecting the relieving requirements,
however fhia is usually not a significant factor. In
the case of ah cooied condensers credit for a
partial condensing capacity of 20-30% of normal
duty due to natural convection cooling is often
usad. Credit.may also be taken for reduced vapour
generation in a column reboiler due to the
increased tower pressure and thus bottoms
temperature at relieving conditions, although this
credit should only be taken after consideration of
the reboiler control system. For failure of pump
around coolers it may be assumed that the extra
vapour generated is equivalent to the loss of heat
removal using top tray latent heat at relieving
condtions, If cooiing Is provided by an external
source (ie not preheating column feed).

Heat Exchanger Tube Rupture

API RP521 considers that except for very high
operating pressures (above 6695 kPa (g)) pressure
reiief is not required on the low pressure side of an
exchanger providing its design pressure is at [east
two-thirds of the design pressure of the high
pressure side.
AS 1210, however requires
protection in all cases where the shell design
pressure Is lower than the tube design pressure.
This encourages the designer to design for equal
pressures on both sides of an exchanger where this
is economically viable. In quantifying escape from
a tube rupture it is usually considered as a sharp
break in one tube with high pressure fluid flowing
out through openings equal to twice the crosssectlonal area of a single tube. AS 1210 Section
8.8.3 outlines a method for sizing relief devices In
the case of tube rupture, however a calculation of
relieving rate using conventional fluid hydraulic
analysis may still be required for rellef disposal
system sizing.
Tube rupture
analysis is
complicated by the likelihood of both transient and
steady state overpressure conditions with the
former requklng consideration of the use of a
bursting disc in place of a PSV for rapid response.
The possibility of two phase flow both in the
exchanger shell and across the relief valve should
alsa be evaluated.
Blocked Exit
API RP521 requires tha capacity of the relief device
to be at [east as great as the capacity of all sources
of overpressure. Flow rates should be assumed to
be at the design (maximum operating) feed flow
although the quantity of material to be reiieved may

SPE 02=12

Gas Blow Through

Where loss of liquid level in an upstream vessel
may resuit in gas blow through, consideration must
be given to the possible overpressure
of
downstream equipment. API RP521 states that the
upstream vessel shouid be considered at its normal
operating pressure, and that normal Ilquid flow into
the vessel continues to pass through the valve with
the gas. When a control valve has a bypass,
consideration should be given to the possibility of
672

SPE 028812

J.D. KENEZ

the bypass being open, since this could

significantly increase the. required relief rate.
Therefore the requirement for control valve
bypasses should be carefully considered during
design of a new plant to ensure that it is justified on
an operational basis.
Contingency

Summary

Utilising the calculation methods outlined above

relieving rates are determined for each identified
contingency and are tabulated in the contingency
table (eee Table 1).
Whera a number of
interconnected equipment items may be protected
by a single relief device this may be indicated by
notes attached to the table. The contingency table
provides a summary of all the relevant information
needed to size the relieving device including mass
flow rate, relieving pressure, temperature, fluid
state, molecular weight (gases), density and
viscosity (liquids). [t also provides the basis for
flare header design (see later). Prior to undertaking
final relief valve sizing, consideration should be
given to a more rigorous. calculation for the
governing contingency, where this requires a
significantly larger relief valve size, then the next
largest contingency.
SELECTION
DEVICES

AND

SIZING

OF

PROTECTIVE

Safety Relief Valves

A safety relief valve Is a. spring loaded pressure
relief device usually called a pressure relief valve,
relief valve or pressure safety valve. Technically
there isadifference
between safety valves (pop
action for vapour service), relief valves (liquid
service) and safe~ relief valvea (either vapour or
Iiquid service). Thedifference isinthemnstruction
and behaviour of the valves which is described in
API RP520 Section 2.
Conventional

Balanced Relief Valves

Balanced relief valves overcome the superimposed
back pressure limitation of a conventional valve and
may be suitable for use with built up back
pressures upto50-60%
ofset pressure. At high
back pressures a correction for reduced capacity
may be required in accordance
with the
manufacturers guidelines.
Pilot Operated Relief Valves
In a pilot operated relief valve the process pressure
is utilised instead of a spring to keep the seat disk
closed below set pressure, allowing the use of a
larger orifice with a hfgher set pressure then can be
used foraconventionel
valve. Pilot valves maybe
used with built up back pressures of upto80Y~of
set pressure and where set pressure is close to the
operating pressure. Careisneeded in determining
process temperature and fluld compatibility with
valve internals, and pilot valves are not usually used
in fouling service or in the presence of solids.
Rupture Disks
..Although the most widely used overpressure
protective device is the safety relief valve, rupture
disks arepreferred in some applications. Rupture
disks era specified where very rapid pressura relief
is required such as a tube rupture, whare the low
pressure side is liquid filled. Rupture disks are
sometimes used upstream of relief valves in
corrosive or fouling service to protect the relief
valve internals, or to minimise losses of valuable,
noxious or hazardous materials that may leak
through the relief valve.
SIZING CALCULATIONS
The applicable codes and standards Include
detailed calculations for the sizing of relief devices.
Manufactures should also be consulted to confirm
sizing calculations, actual valve orifice areas end
coefficients of discharge.

Relief Valves

Conventional relief valves have a limitation on built

up back pressure (ie pressure developed due to
flow) of amaximum of 10%ofset
pressure, end
their opening pressure is also affected by
superimposed backpressure.
Therefore they are
usually used for low back pressure applications
Such asatmospheric discharges, or forhlgh PSV
set pressures into a low pressure relief header.
673

Although the codee euggest a method for handling

two phase flow, a more rigorous method is the
homogeneous equilibrium method (HEM) given by
LL Simpson (ref 8) which can be used to
determine the theoretical mmmum mass flux.
Again reference should be made to valve
manufacturers. for an appropriate coefficient of

.. .

PRESSURE RELIEVING SYSTEM DESIGN AND EVALUATION

multiple PSV relief cases should be considered

including fire (limited to single fire zones as
described ebova) and plant utWy failures (eg power
failure or cooling water failure),

discharge to be used with the maximum mass flux

for relief valve orifice sizing.
RELIEF DISPOSAL SYSTEM DESIGN

Other outlet
include:

[n many hydrocarbon
processing
plants a
dedicated relief disposal system is provided for the
Inputs to the
safe disposal of hydrocarbons.
system may include process f[ows from pressure
control or blowdown valves as well se discharges
from relief devices. Arelief disposel system may
include ,indivldual piping from the process sources,
subheadere, main headers, knockout drums and
seals leading to a flare stack, burn pit or open vent.
PSV In[et Lines
Sizing of Inlet lines to PSVS should be in
accordance with the codes which require a
maximum total pressure drop of3 percent of set
pressure calculated on the maximum rated capacity
This requirement Is to prevent
of the valve.
chattering of the valve which may reduce the
valves relieving capacity and damage seat
surfaces.
Othar inlet pipe design requirements includ8
.

Internal cross-sectional areaequal toorgreater

than thetotal of the required relief valves inlet
area.

Free draining ufromvalve,

Noisolating

with nopockets.

valves unless suitably interlocked.

SPE 028812

pipe/header

design

requirements

Internal cross-sectional area equal or greater

than the total of the requirad relief valves outlet
area.

Free draining away from valve (note this may

require the elevation of PSVS, installation of
subheader
drains
or the
provision
of
intermediate knock out drums).
Velocity [imitation (often about 0.7 Mach).
No isolating valves unless suitably interlocked.

Determination of the required design temperature

for PSV outlet pipe and relief headers should
consider the low temperature effects of both
adiebaficf lashinge ndJouIe-Thomsonc oo[lng
aa
well asanymaximum
temperature contingencies.
This analysis may lead to a requirement for low
temperature materials in subheaders or relief
header heating. Thehigh temperatures which may
occur in relief headers during a fire contingency are
not normally considered for the mechanical design
of the headers, other than for piping flexibility
analysis with the allowable thermal expansion
stress under emergency conditions higher than the
normal ANSI 631.3 allowed stress.

PSV Outlet Lines & Relief Headers

Refief Knock Out Drums

The sizing of outlet pipes discharging into a closed

flare header may be undertaken ufilising proprietary
software developed specifically for this teak. As
discussed above the allowable back pressure on
PSVS is dependent on the type of valve used and
this requirement IS a key factor in sizing discharge
lines. While the maximum rated capacity of the
PSV should be used for the outlet piping lateral
(particularly
for
conventional
valves)
the
contingency relieving rates summarised in the
contingency table are suitable for relief header and
flare sizing on the basis that this rate represents an
average sustainable relieving requirement andfhe
relief system has considerable volumetric capacky
to smooth out the relieving rate. A number of

Knock out drums are provided on relief systems to

separate liquids from relieving streams. Separation
of liquids prevents large liquid droplets being
carried over with vapour to the final disposal device
(usually a flare). Vessel sizing is based on a
reduction of vapour velocity to separate droplets in
the range of 300 to 600 gm, as smaller droplets can
be burnt by flares. Provision is also made to
provida a liquid inventory of 20-30 minutes (based
on the largest Ilquid producing contingency) without
reducing the design vapour-disengaging space in
the drum.

874

.,,

SPE 028812

J.D. KENEZ

Flares
The most common form ,of.final disposal device for
a preseure relieving system is a flare. The selection
of flere type depends on the flow rate and fluid
propertlee
of relieving
loads as well ae
environmental considerations. While discussion of
flares is beyond the scope of this paper the
contingency table forme the basis for flare design.
APPLICABILITY TO THE STUDY OF EXISTING
FACILITIES
While the design methods discussed herein are
primarily intended
for the development
of
overpressure protection fornewplant
they can be
equally well applied to the study of existing
facilities. In particular, where there is a need to
review an older plant, which has undergone a
series of retrofits and upgrades, the rigorous
approaches outlined above protidesanaudtab[e
basis for any requked relief system upgrade. In
dealing with an older plant a number of special
issues must be addressed.
First the issue of compliance with current codes
may be importent where the plant was designed to
Ae a general rule
leas rigorous standards.
providing that wsting relief valves are of sufficient
size to still comply with their original design intent,
then an upgrade 1s not mandatory.
If, however
PSVS are found to be undersized (perhaps due to
a change in plant feed rates) then any replacement
valves should be designed in accordance mth
current codes. Theissue isparticularly relevantto
Australian plant designed prior to the introduction of
the Australian Standard for unfired pressure vessels
(AS 1210) in 1972 es this standard has more
stringent requirements for fire contingencies than
APl RP520/521. Given thatthe likelihood ofefire
contingency occurring should be relatively remote,
then anyrequirement for increasing PSV sizes for
this contingency alone should be carefully reviewed.
Second
it must
be recognised
that the
quantification ofcontingencies
is not precise, but
requires analysis andjudgement. Usually simpliied
worst case situations are used since the time to
fully analyse the dynamic response of systems for
Thus where the
contingencies is prohibitive.
simplified approach resu[te in the need for
significant upgrade of relieving capability a more
detailed review should be made of the relevant

contingencies testing all assumptions for validity.

Engineering judgement is required to ensure that
enY ProPosed plant upgrades actually provide an
improved level of plant safety and are not just a
blind adherence to simplified design methods.
It is also possible to limit the probability of a
contingency occurrence by locking open or dosed
valves, by changing plant operating procedures, or
byproviding improved inetrumentetion, These may
be considered as an alternative to the installation of
new or larger PSVS.
Based on a number of recent studies the major
area of concern in older pfant is often the PSV Inlet
and outlet piping and associated relief headers.
Sometimes plant revamps do not consider the
special dralnege and pressure drop requirem@e of
such piping, resulting in undersized lines with
pockets ordraining towards the PSV. Notethatin
low pressure systems the pressure drop acroes a
pipe inlet at 0.5 of a velocity head can be close to
3% of the PSV set pressure even though the inlet
llnesize matches the PSVinlet nozzle size. Thus
in such cases there is no scope for elbows or long
In[et pipe runs.
The benefits of undertaking an overpressure relief
system study on an existing plant not only ensures
the adequacy of the facilities with respeot to the
possibility of overpressure.
It also provides a
sound basis for evaluating the impact on the relief
system of any future
plant additions
or
modifications. If executed in a thorough manner
the relief system study provides an up to date plant
date base. This data base includes information on
all pressure vessels end overpressure relief devices
in the plant.
Use of standard data base PC
software during the study provides a fully
documented description of the plants overpressure
protetion system, which can then be maintained
for the Iiie of the plant. This type of documentation
and a meana to keep it up to date is becoming a
requirement both at a government regulatory level
as well as within companies.

675

10

PRESSURE RELIEVING SYSTEM DESIGN AND EVALUATION

NCSMENCLATURE

A=
p:
L=.
q=
Q=
w=

Heat Transfer Area (~

Total Wetted Surface Area (~
Environment Factor
Latent Heat (Btu/lb)
Heat Flux (Btu/hr-~
Heat Input (Btu/hr)
Relieving Rate (lb/hr)

7. AS 1271-1990:

Safety
Valves,
other
Valves,
Liquid
Level
Gauges, and other Fittings
for Boilers and Unfired
Pressure Vessels

8. L.L Simpsoru

Estimate Two-phase Flow

in
Safety
Devices-,
Chemical
Engineering,
August 1991.

The technical review and editorial eesistenca from

Rick Whitelaw is gratefully acknowledged.
The
author also wishes to thank Mark Sloma and the
management of Davy John Brown for their
encouragement and permission to publish this
paper.
~EFERENCES.

1. API RP14C-1994

Recommended
Practice
for
Analysis,
Design,
Installation, and Testing of
Basic
Surface
Safety
Systems
for Offshore
Production Platforms.

2. API RP520-I 993

Design and installation of

Pressura
Relieving
in Refineries
Systems
Parts
1 Sizing
and
Selection
(1993) & Ii
Installation (1988).

3. API RP521-1990

Guide
for
Pressure
Ralieving
and
Depressuring Systems.

4. ASME .B&PVCode
1992

Boiler end Pressure Vessel

Code Section Vlll Pressure
Vessels.

5. ASME B31.3-1993

Chemical
Piant
and
Petroleum Refinery Piping.

6. AS 1210-1989:

SAA Unfired
Vessels Code

SPE 028812

----

Pressure

676

--

OFFGAS

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Table 1 - PRESSURE

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SPL28812
Appendix A

STANDARDSAUSTRALIA
M
Outi

Ref:

STANDARDS ASSOCIATION
OF AUSTRALIA
HEAD OFFICE
STANDARDS HOUSE
80 ARTHUR STREET
NORTH
SYDNEY NSW
MAIL
PO BOX 458
NORTH SYDNEY
NSW 2059
TELEPHONE (02] 9634111
TELEX 26514
FAX (02) 9593896

MSII13
KAM:am

1991-10-03

&

J Dimech

Process Engineer
PO BOX 2255
ST KILDA WEST

VIC

3182

Dear Sir,
CLAUSE 8.6 .2(a) OF AS 1210, UNFIRED PSRSSURE VKSSELS
Further to our response of 13 December 1990 to your letter of 6 December 1990,
we advise that your letter was discussed at the first meeting of the relevant
Subcommittee held since receipt of your letter.
In respect to your request for clarificationof liquefied gas as used in
Clause 8.6.2, the Subcommittee interpreted the intent to be as follows:
,..

Liquefied gas - any substancethat is liquid at design conditions and

evaporates to vapour within the vessel under fire conditions, i.e. the
latent heat of vaporization of the substance is available to absorb part of
the heat.input.
We trust tiiit
this interpretationprovides the clarification that you
requested.

YOUtS faithfully,

K A Murphy
Sxecutive Officer
SUBCOI+SITTEEME/1/3 - UNFIRKD PRESSURE V&SELS

67S

. .

Appendi4%E288 12

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CALCULATION

SHEET