CASES ON ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE

Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission

The Civil Service Commission vs. Henry A. Sojor, G.R. No. 168766, May 22, 2008
The Constitution grants to the CSC administration over the entire civil service. (Constitution
(1987), Art. IX(B), Sec. 1)
As defined, the civil service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of
the government, including every government-owned or controlled corporation. (The
Administrative Code (1987), Sec. 6; id., Sec. 2)
When the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases
involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be
proved that another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both
bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter. (Enrique v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
79072, January 10, 1994, 229 SCRA 180, citing Government Service Insurance System v. Civil
Service Commission, G.R. No. 87146, December 11, 1991, 204 SCRA 826)
University of the Philippines v. Regino,G.R. No. 88167, May 3, 1993, 221 SCRA 598.
The Civil Service Law (PD 807) expressly vests in the Commission appellate jurisdiction in
administrative disciplinary cases involving members of the Civil Service. Section 9(j)
mandates that the Commission shall have the power to "hear and decide administrative
disciplinary cases instituted directly with it in accordance with Section 37 or brought to it
on appeal." And Section 37(a) provides that, "The Commission shall decide upon appeal
all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension
for more than thirty (30) days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary,
demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office." (Emphasis
supplied)
Under the 1972 Constitution, all government-owned or controlled corporations,
regardless of the manner of their creation, were considered part of the Civil Service.
Under the 1987 Constitution, only government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters fall within the scope of the Civil Service pursuant to Article IX-B, Section
2(1), which states:
"The Civil Service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of
the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters."
Camacho v. Gloria,G.R. No. 138862, August 15, 2003, 409 SCRA 174.
The Civil Service Rules embodied in Executive Order 292 recognize the power of the
Secretary and the university, through its governing board, to investigate and decide
matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their
jurisdiction. Of course under EO 292, a complaint against a state university official may
be filed either with the universitys Board of Regents or directly with the Civil Service
Commission, although the CSC may delegate the investigation of a complaint and for
that purpose, may deputize any department, agency, official or group of officials to
conduct such investigation. (Executive Order No. 292, Sec. 47)
Academic institutions and personnel are granted wide latitude of action under the principle of
academic freedom. Academic freedom encompasses the freedom to determine who may teach,
who may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study. (Miriam College
Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127930, December 15, 2000, 348 SCRA 265)
Following that doctrine, this Court has recognized that institutions of higher learning has the
freedom to decide for itself the best methods to achieve their aims and objectives, free from
outside coercion, except when the welfare of the general public so requires. [Camacho v.
Coresis, 436 Phil. 449 (2002)] They have the independence to determine who to accept to study

in their school and they cannot be compelled by mandamus to enroll a student.( Tangonan v.
Pao, G.R. No. L-45157, June 27, 1985, 137 SCRA 245)
The guaranteed academic freedom does not give an institution the unbridled authority to
perform acts without any statutory basis.( Benguet State University v. Commission on Audit, G.R.
No. 169637, June 8, 2007) For that reason, a school official, who is a member of the civil service,
may not be permitted to commit violations of civil service rules under the justification that he
was free to do so under the principle of academic freedom.
The doctrine this Court laid down in Salalima v. Guingona, Jr. (G.R. Nos. 117589-92, May 22,
1996, 257 SCRA 55) and Aguinaldo v. Santos (G.R. No. 94115, August 21, 1992, 212 SCRA 768)
are inapplicable to the present circumstances. Respondents in the mentioned cases are elective
officials, unlike respondent here who is an appointed official. Indeed, election expresses the
sovereign will of the people. (People v. Jalosjos, G.R. Nos. 132875-76, February 3, 2000, 381
SCRA 690) Under the principle of vox populi est suprema lex, the re-election of a public official
may, indeed, supersede a pending administrative case. The same cannot be said of a reappointment to a non-career position. There is no sovereign will of the people to speak of when
the BOR re-appointed respondent Sojor to the post of university president.

Misconduct
Rolando Ganzon vs. Fernando Arlos, G.R. No. 174321, October 22, 2013
Misconduct is intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of
behavior. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected
with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer. In grave misconduct,
as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the
law, or flagrant disregard of an established rule must be manifest. (Narvasa v. Sanchez, Jr., G.R.
No. 169449, March 26, 2010, 616 SCRA 586, 591)
In accordance with Section 46 of Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987
(Executive Order No. 292), misconduct is among the grounds for disciplinary action, but no
officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as
provided by law and after due process. It is cogent to mention that the Revised Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service , which governs the conduct of disciplinary and nondisciplinary proceedings in administrative cases, classifies grave misconduct as a grave
administrative offense. (Rule IV, Section 5, Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service, Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular 19, Series of 1999, August 31,
1999)
Largo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 177244, November 20, 2007, 537 SCRA 721
the criteria that an act, to constitute a misconduct, must not be committed in his private
capacity and should bear a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of his
official duties.
Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 136806, August 22, 2000, 338 SCRA 485, 497.
An act is intimately connected to the office of the offender if it is committed as the consequence
of the performance of the office by him, or if it cannot exist without the office even if public
office is not an element of the crime in the abstract.
an administrative case is not dependent on the conviction or acquittal of the criminal case
because the evidence required in the proceedings therein is only substantial and not proof
beyond reasonable doubt.
An administrative case is, as a rule, independent from criminal proceedings.1wphi1 The
dismissal of a criminal case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence or the acquittal of an
accused who is also a respondent in an administrative case does not necessarily preclude the
administrative proceeding nor carry with it relief from administrative liability. This is because the
quantum of proof required in administrative proceedings is substantial evidence, unlike in
criminal cases which require proof beyond reasonable doubt. Substantial evidence, according to
Section 5 of Rule 133, Rules of Court, is "that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion." In contrast, proof beyond reasonable
doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute
certainty; moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in
an unprejudiced mind. (Section 2, Rule 133, Rules of Court)
Section 56 and Section 58 of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service respectively state that the penalty of dismissal shall result in the permanent separation
of the respondent from the service, with or without prejudice to criminal or civil liability, and
shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits and the perpetual
disqualification from re-employment in the government service, unless otherwise provided in the
decision.

Back Salary
City Mayor of Zamboanga, vs. Court of Appeals and Eustaquio C. Argana, G.R. No.
80270 February 27, 1990
Under Memorandum Circular No. 30, series of 1989 issued by the Civil Service Commission,
"Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct" and "Grave Misconduct" are classified as grave offenses
punishable by dismissal.

In a long line of cases, [Gonzales vs. Hernandez, 2 SCRA 228 (1961); Villamar vs. Lacson, 12
SCRA 418 (1964); Abellera vs. City of Baguio, 19 SCRA 601 (1967); Avila vs. Gimenez, 27 SCRA
321 (1969)] this Court reiterated the principle that back salaries may be ordered paid to an
officer or employee only if he is exonerated of the charge against him and his suspension or
dismissal is found and declared to be illegal.

Oppression, Grave Abuse of Authority, Substantial Evidence, Presumption of Regularity

Ombudsman vs Caberoy, G.R. No. 188066, October 22, 2014

Oppression is also known as grave abuse of authority, which is a misdemeanor committed by a

public officer, who under color of his office, wrongfully inflict upon any person any bodily harm,
imprisonment or other injury. It is an act of cruelty, severity, or excessive use of authority.
[Romero v. Villarosa, Jr., A.M. No. P-11-2913, April 12, 2011, 648 SCRA 32, 41-42; Spouses
Stilgrove v. Sabas, 538 Phil. 232, 244 (2006)]

To be held administratively liable for Oppression or Grave Abuse of Authority, there must be
substantial evidence presented proving the complainants allegations. [Nedia v. Judge Lavia,
508 Phil. 9, 19 (2005)]

Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion. [Miro v. Mendoza Vda. de Erederos, G.R. Nos. 172532
and 172544-45, November 20, 2013, 710 SCRA 371, 387]

Entries in the payroll, being entries in the course of business, enjoy the presumption of
regularity under Section 43, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, [KAR ASIA, Inc. v. Corona, 480 Phil.
627, 636 (2004)] Absent any evidence presented by Tuares showing the contrary, good faith
must be presumed in the preparation and signing of such payrolls.[Sapio v. Undaloc
Construction and/or Engr. Undaloc, 577 Phil. 39, 47 (2008)]
It must be stressed that like other grave offenses classified under the Civil Service laws, bad
faith must attend the act complained of. Bad faith connotes a dishonest purpose or some moral
obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent
or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud.[Andrade v. Court of Appeals, 423 Phil. 30, 43 (2001)]

in administrative cases, to be disciplined for grave misconduct or any grave offense, the
evidence against the respondent should be competent and must be derived from direct
knowledge. [Litonjua v. Justices Enriquez, Jr. and Abesamis, 482 Phil. 73, 100-101 (2004)]

"Reliance on mere allegations, conjectures and suppositions will leave an administrative

complaint with no leg to stand on." [SPO2 Alcover, Sr. v. Bacatan, 513 Phil. 77, 83 (2005), citing
Alfonso v. Ignacio, 487 Phil. 1, 7 (2004). Seealso Borromeo-Garcia v. Judge Pagayatan, 588 Phil.
11, 18 (2008)]

Neglect of Duty

Ombudsman vs de Leon, G.R. No. 154083, February 27, 2013

Gross neglect of duty or gross negligence "refers to negligence characterized by the want of
even slight care, or by acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to the consequences,
insofar as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care that even inattentive
and thoughtless men never fail to give to their own property." (Fernandez v. Office of the
Ombudsman, G.R. No. 193983. March 14, 2012, 668 SCRA 351, 364)
It denotes a flagrant and culpable refusal or unwillingness of a person to perform a duty.
(Philippine Retirement Authority v. Rupa, G.R. No. 140519, August 21, 2001, 363 SCRA 480, 487)
In cases involving public officials, gross negligence occurs when a breach of duty is flagrant and
palpable. (Fernandez v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 193983. March 14, 2012, 668 SCRA
351, 364)
In contrast, simple neglect of duty means the failure of an employee or official to give proper
attention to a task expected of him or her, signifying a "disregard of a duty resulting from
carelessness or indifference." (Republic v. Canastillo, G.R. No. 172729, June 8, 2007, 524 SCRA
546, 555)

Nepotism, Party Adversely Affected

Civil Service Commission, vs. Pedro O. Dacoycoy, G.R. No. 135805, April 29, 1999
Sec. 59. Nepotism. (1) All appointments to the national, provincial, city and municipal
governments or in any branch or instrumentality thereof, including government owned or
controlled corporations, made in favor of a relative of the appointing or recommending

authority, or of the chief of the bureau or office, or of the persons exercising immediate
supervision over him, are hereby prohibited.
As used in this Section, the word "relative" and members of the family referred to are those
related within the third degree either of consanguinity or of affinity. (Sec. 59, Executive Order
292, dated July 25, 1987)
Clearly, there are four situations covered. In the last two mentioned situations, it is immaterial
who the appointing or recommending authority is. To constitute a violation of the law, it suffices
that an appointment is extended or issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity of the chief of the bureau or office, or the person exercising immediate
supervision over the appointee.
By this ruling, we now expressly abandon and overrule extant jurisprudence that "the phrase
'party adversely affected by the decision' refers to the government employee against whom the
administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which, may take the form of
suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office" (Mendez vs.
Civil Service Commission, 204 SCRA 965, 967)and not included are "cases where the penalty
imposed is suspension for not more than thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not exceeding
thirty days salary" (Paredes vs. Civil Service Commission, 192 SCRA 84, 85) or "when the
respondent is exonerated of the charges, there is no occasion for appeal." (Mendez vs. Civil
Service Commission, 204 SCRA 965, 968) In other words, we overrule prior decisions holding
that the Civil Service Law "does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or
employees from administrative charges" enunciated in Paredes v. Civil Service Commission, 192
SCRA 84; Mendez v. Civil Service Commission, 204 SCRA 965; Magpale v. Civil Service
Commission, 215 SCRA 398; Navarro v. Civil Service Commission and Export Processing Zone
Authority, 226 SCRA 207; and more recently Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission, 241 SCRA
317.

Administrative Due Proces

PO2 Ruel C. Montoya, vs. Police Director Reynaldo P. Varilla, Regional Director,
National Capital Region, Police Office and Atty. Rufino Jeffrey L. Manere, Regional
Legal Affairs Service, G.R. No. 180146, December 18, 2008
Though procedural rules in administrative proceedings are less stringent and often applied more
liberally, administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental procedural
principles, such as the right to due process in investigations and hearings. The right to
substantive and procedural due process is applicable to administrative proceedings. [Civil
Service Commission v. Lucas, 361 Phil. 486, 491 (1999)]
Well-settled is the rule that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or,
as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity
to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. [Westmont Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
v. Samaniego, G.R. Nos. 146653-54, 20 February 2006, 482 SCRA 611, 619] Unarguably, this
rule, as it is stated, strips down administrative due process to its most fundamental nature and
sufficiently justifies freeing administrative proceedings from the rigidity of procedural
requirements. In particular, however, due process in administrative proceedings has also been
recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the
institution of proceedings which may affect a respondents legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to
be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in
ones favor, and to defend ones rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so
constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as
well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence
submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the
parties affected. [Fabella v. Court of Appeals, 346 Phil. 940, 952-953 (1997)]
Hence, even if administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers are not strictly bound by
procedural requirements, they are still bound by law and equity to observe the fundamental
requirements of due process. Notice to enable the other party to be heard and to present
evidence is not a mere technicality or a trivial matter in any administrative or judicial
proceedings. [National Power Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 339 Phil. 89,

107 (1997); citing Philippine National Construction Corporation v. Ferrer-Calleja, G.R. No. L80485, 11 November 1988, 167 SCRA 294, 301]
In the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of
previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard. [Vda. de Emnas v. Emnas, 184
Phil. 419, 424 (1980)]
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are
ousted from their jurisdiction. The violation of a partys right to due process raises a serious
jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the
fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is
void for lack of jurisdiction. (State Prosecutors v. Muro, Adm. Matter No. RTJ-92-876, 19
September 1994, 236 SCRA 505, 522-523; see also Paulin v. Gimenez, G.R. No. 103323, 21
January 1993, 217 SCRA 386, 392) The rule must be equally true for quasi-judicial administrative
bodies, for the constitutional guarantee that no man shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process is unqualified by what type of proceedings (whether judicial or
administrative) he stands to lose the same.
Section 45 of Republic Act No. 6975, otherwise known as the DILG Act of 1990, provides:
SEC. 45. Finality of Disciplinary Action. The disciplinary action imposed upon a member
of the PNP shall be final and executory: Provided, That a disciplinary action imposed by
the Regional Director or by the PLEB involving demotion or dismissal from the service
may be appealed to the Regional Appellate Board within ten (10) days from receipt of the
copy of the notice of decision: Provided, further, That the disciplinary action imposed by
the Chief of the PNP involving demotion or dismissal may be appealed to the National
Appellate Board within ten (10) days from receipt thereof: Provided, furthermore, That,
the Regional or National Appellate Board, as the case may be, shall decide the appeal
within sixty (60) days from receipt of the notice of appeal: Provided, finally, That failure
of the Regional Appellate Board to act on the appeal within said period shall render the
decision final and executory without prejudice, however, to the filing of an appeal by
either party with the Secretary. (Underscoring supplied.)
As a general rule, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by
law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional, and the failure to perfect the appeal renders
the judgment of the court final and executory. [Videogram Regulatory Board v. Court of Appeals,
332 Phil. 820, 828 (1996)]
A decision of the court (or, in this case, a quasi-judicial administrative body) without jurisdiction
is null and void; hence, it can never logically become final and executory. Such a judgment may
be attacked directly or collaterally. (Laresma v. Abellana, G.R. No. 140973, 11 November 2004,
442 SCRA 156, 169)
Any judgment or decision rendered notwithstanding the violation of due
process may be regarded as a "lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at
sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its head." (People v. Bocar, G.R. No. L-27935, 16 August
1985, 138 SCRA 166, 171)
Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy.13
At this point, we have necessarily to resolve the question of the party adversely affected
who may take an appeal from an adverse decision of the appellate court in an
administrative civil service disciplinary case. There is no question that respondent
Dacoycoy may appeal to the Court of Appeals from the decision of the Civil Service
Commission adverse to him. He was the respondent official meted out the penalty of
dismissal from the service. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the court required the
petitioner therein, herein respondent Dacoycoy, to implead the Civil Service Commission
as public respondent as the government agency tasked with the duty to enforce the
constitutional and statutory provisions on the civil service.
Subsequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Civil Service Commission
and held respondent not guilty of nepotism. Who now may appeal the decision of the
Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court? Certainly not the respondent, who was declared
not guilty of the charge. Nor the complainant George P. Suan, who was merely a witness
for the government. Consequently, the Civil Service Commission has become the party
adversely affected by such ruling, which seriously prejudices the civil service system.

Hence, as an aggrieved party, it may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the
Supreme Court. By this ruling, we now expressly abandon and overrule extant
jurisprudence that "the phrase party adversely affected by the decision refers to the
government employee against whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of
disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary,
transfer, removal or dismissal from office" and not included are "cases where the penalty
imposed is suspension for not more than thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not
exceeding thirty days salary" or "when the respondent is exonerated of the charges,
there is no occasion for appeal." In other words, we overrule prior decisions holding that
the Civil Service Law "does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or
employees from administrative charges" enunciated in Paredes v. Civil Service
Commission; Mendez v. Civil Service Commission; Magpale v. Civil Service Commission;
Navarro v. Civil Service Commission and Export Processing Zone Authority and more
recently Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission.(Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy)
National Appellate Board of the National Police Commission v. Mamauag,G.R. No. 149999,
12 August 2005, 466 SCRA 624, 641-642, citing Mathay, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil.
466, 483-484 (1999)]
RA 6975 itself does not authorize a private complainant to appeal a decision of
the disciplining authority.Sections 43 and 45 of RA 6975 authorize "either party"
to appeal in the instances that the law allows appeal. One party is the PNP
member-respondent when the disciplining authority imposes the penalty of
demotion or dismissal from the service. The other party is the government when
the disciplining authority imposes the penalty of demotion but the government
believes that dismissal from the services is the proper penalty.
However, the government party that can appeal is not the disciplining authority or
tribunal which previously heard the case and imposed the penalty of demotion or
dismissal from the service. The government party appealing must be one that is
prosecuting the administrative case against the respondent. Otherwise, an
anomalous situation will result where the disciplining authority or tribunal hearing
the case, instead of being impartial and detached, becomes an active participant
in prosecuting the respondent.
Mathay, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, (decided after Dacoycoy)
To be sure, when the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission were
brought before the Court of Appeals, the Civil Service Commission was
included only as a nominal party. As a quasi-judicial body, the Civil Service
Commission can be likened to a judge who should "detach himself from
cases where his decision is appealed to a higher court for review."
In instituting G.R. No. 126354, the Civil Service Commission dangerously departed
from its role as adjudicator and became an advocate. Its mandated function is to
"hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or
on appeal, including contested appointments and to review decisions and actions
of its offices and agencies," not to litigate.
Pleyto v. Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, [G.R. No.
169982, 23 November 2007, 538 SCRA 534, 549]
It is a well-known doctrine that a judge should detach himself from cases where
his decision is appealed to a higher court for review. The raison d'etre for such
doctrine is the fact that a judge is not an active combatant in such proceeding
and must leave the opposing parties to contend their individual positions and the
appellate court to decide the issues without his active participation. When a judge
actively participates in the appeal of his judgment, he, in a way, ceases to be
judicial and has become adversarial instead.
The court or the quasi-judicial agency must be detached and impartial, not only
when hearing and resolving the case before it, but even when its judgment is
brought on appeal before a higher court. The judge of a court or the officer of a
quasi-judicial agency must keep in mind that he is an adjudicator who must settle

the controversies between parties in accordance with the evidence and the
applicable laws, regulations, and/or jurisprudence. His judgment should already
clearly and completely state his findings of fact and law. There must be no more
need for him to justify further his judgment when it is appealed before appellate
courts. When the court judge or the quasi-judicial officer intervenes as a party in
the appealed case, he inevitably forsakes his detachment and impartiality, and his
interest in the case becomes personal since his objective now is no longer only to
settle the controversy between the original parties (which he had already
accomplished by rendering his judgment), but more significantly, to refute the
appellants assignment of errors, defend his judgment, and prevent it from being
overturned on appeal.
Go v. National Police Commission, 338 Phil. 162, 171 (1997)
We conclude that petitioner was denied the due process of law and that not even
the fact that the charge against him is serious and evidence of his guilt is in the
opinion of his superiors strong can compensate for the procedural shortcut
evident in the record of this case. It is precisely in cases such as this that the
utmost care be exercised lest in the drive to clean up the ranks of the police those
who are innocent are denied justice or, through blunder, those who are guilty are
allowed to escape punishment.
Mendoza v. NAPOLCOM,G.R. No. 139658, 21 June 2005, 460 SCRA 399.
The Court settled that the one and only Philippine police force, the PNP, shall be
civilian in character (Section 6, Article XVI of the Constitution) and, consequently,
falls under the civil service pursuant to Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the
Constitution, which states:
Section 2. (1). The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned
or controlled corporations with original charters.
It is already explicitly provided in Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990 that the decision of the
Regional Director imposing upon a PNP member the administrative penalty of demotion or
dismissal from the service is appealable to the RAB. From the RAB Decision, the aggrieved party
may then appeal to the DILG Secretary.
Section 91 of the DILG Act of 1990 provides:
SEC. 91. Application of Civil Service Laws. The Civil Service Law and its implementing
rules and regulations shall apply to all personnel of the Department [DILG].
Consequently, case law on administrative disciplinary proceedings under the Civil Service Law
also applies to administrative disciplinary proceedings against PNP members. The Civil Service
Law referred to in Section 91 of the DILG Act of 1990 is Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292). Section 47 of Chapter 6 thereof provides, inter alia,
that in cases where the decision rendered by a bureau or office (i.e., RAB of the PNP) is
appealable to the Commission, the same may initially be appealed to the department (i.e.,
DILG)and finally to the Commission (i.e., CSC). (Cabada v. Alunan III, 329 Phil. 669 [1996])