TORTS

2176

1. CASUPANAN VS LAROYA
CASE DIGEST G.R. No. 145391 August 26, 2002
Topic: Criminal Procedure: Rule 111, Rules of Court
FACTS: As a result of a vehicular accident between two vehicles, one driven by
Mario Llavore Laroya and the other owned by Roberto Capitulo and driven by
Avelino Casupanan, two cases were filed before the MCTC of Capas, Tarlac. Laroya
filed a criminal case against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property. This case was on its preliminary investigation stage when
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict. However,
upon motion of Laroya on the ground of forum-shopping, the MCTC dismissed the
civil case. On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan andCapitulo insisted that the
civil case is a separate civil action which can proceedindependently of the criminal
case. Casupanan and Capitulo then filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Capas, Tarlac. But the RTC ruled that the order of dismissal
issued by the MCTC is a final order which disposes of the case and therefore, the
proper remedy should have been an appeal. Hence, Casupanan and Capitulo filed
this petition.
Casupanan and Capitulos contention: that if the accused in a criminal case has a
counterclaim against the private complainant, he may file the counterclaim in a
separate civil action at the proper time. They contend that an action on quasi-delict
is different from an action resulting from the crime of reckless imprudence, and an
accused in a criminal case can be an aggrieved party in a civil case arising from the
same incident. They maintain that under Articles 31 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the
civil case can proceed independently of the criminal action. Finally, they point out
that Casupanan was not the only one who filed the independent civil action based
on quasi-delict but also Capitulo, the owner-operator of the vehicle, who was not a
party in the criminal case.
Laroyas contention: that the petition is fatally defective as it does not state the real
antecedents. Laroya further alleges that Casupanan and Capitulo forfeitedtheir right
to question the order of dismissal when they failed to avail of the proper remedy of
appeal. Laroya argues that there is no question of law to be resolved as the order of
dismissal is already final and a petition for certiorari is not a substitute for a lapsed
appeal.
ISSUE/HELD: WON an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence
can validly file, simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasidelict against the private complainant in the criminal case. AFFIRMATIVE
RATIO DICIDENDI:
The Court held that the MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict on the
ground of forum-shopping

Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property based on the Revised Penal Code while Casupanan and Capitulo filed the
civil action for damages based on Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Althoughthese two
actions arose from the same act or omission, they have different causes of action.
The criminal case is based on culpa criminal punishable under the Revised Penal
Code while the civil case is based on culpa aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176
and 2177 of the Civil Code. And par 6, sec 1 of Rule 111.
Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to file his
counterclaim in a separate civil action, there can be no forum-shopping if the
accused files such separate civil action.
Under the present Rule 111, the offended party is still given the option to file a
separate civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto by reserving such right in the
criminal action before the prosecution presents its evidence. Also, the offended
party is deemed to make such reservation if he files a separate civil action before
filing the criminal action. If the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is filed
separately but its trial has not yet commenced, the civil action may be consolidated
with the criminal action. The consolidationunder this Rule does not apply to
separate civil actions arising from the same act or omission filed under Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code.
Section 2, Rule 111 of the present Rules did not change the rule that the separate
civil action, filed to recover damages ex-delicto, is suspended upon the filing of the
criminal action. Section 2 of the present Rule 111 also prohibits the filing, after
commencement of the criminal action, of a separate civil action to recover damages
ex-delicto.
Section 3 of the present Rule 111, like its counterpart in the amended 1985 Rules,
expressly allows the "offended party" to bring an independent civil action under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code. As stated in Section 3 of the present
Rule 111, this civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal action and
shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the
"offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the
criminal action."
There is no question that the offended party in the criminal action can file an
independent civil action for quasi-delict against the accused. Section 3 of the
present Rule 111 expressly states that the "offended party" may bring such an
action but the "offended party" may not recover damages twice for the same act or
omission charged in the criminal action. Clearly, Section 3 of Rule 111 refers to the
offended party in the criminal action, not to the accused.
Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission.
The first a criminal case where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is
deemed instituted, and the other a civil case for quasi-delict without violating the
rule on non-forum shopping. The two cases can proceed simultaneously and
independently of each other. The commencement or prosecution of the criminal
action will not suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The only limitation is that the

offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of
the defendant. In most cases, the offended party will have no reason to file a
second civil action since he cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the accused. In some instances, the accused may be insolvent,
necessitating the filing of another case against his employer or guardians.
Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or
omission he is accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in
paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which states that the counterclaim
of the accused "may be litigated in a separate civil action." This is only fair for two
reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in the civil
aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal case. The accused is therefore
forced to litigate separately his counterclaim against the offended party. If the
accused does not file a separate civil action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period
may set in since the period continues to run until the civil action for quasi-delict is
filed.
Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177
of the Civil Code, in the same way that the offended party can avail of this remedy
which is independent of the criminal action. To disallow the accused from filing a
separate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his counterclaim in
the criminal case, is to deny him due process of law, access to the courts, and equal
protection of the law.Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by
Casupanan and Capitulo is proper.

2. Ramos vs. COL Realty Corporation; Proximate Cause

G.R. No. 184905

August 28, 2009

Facts:

Petitioner Ramos is the employer of Rodel Ilustrisimo. While Rodel was driving the
Ford Expedition of petitioner an accident ensued, wherein it bumped with a Corrolla
Altis driven by Aquilino Larin and owned by Respondent COL Realty. Due to the
impact of the vehicular mishap, the passenger of the sedan was injured.
A case was filed against Ramos making him solidarily liable with his driver.
Ramos in his opposition argued that he cannot be held solidarily liable since it is
Aquilnio's negligence that is the proximate cause of the accident. He further argued
that when the accident happened, Aquilino violated an MMDA order, i.e. prohibiting
the crossing is the place where the accident happened.
Issue:

Whether or not Ramos may be held liable since the proximate cause of the
accident is his employee's negligence.

Ruling:

No. There is no doubt that Aquilinos violation of the MMDA prohibition against
crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street was the proximate causeof the
accident.
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred. And more comprehensively, the
proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury
as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of
his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
If Aquilino heeded the MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue from
Rajah Matanda, the accident would not have happened. This specific untoward
event is exactly what the MMDA prohibition was intended for. Thus, a prudent and
intelligent person who resides within the vicinity where the accident occurred,
Aquilino had reasonable ground to expect that the accident would be a natural and
probable result if he crossed Katipunan Avenue since such crossing is considered
dangerous on account of the busy nature of the thoroughfare and the ongoing
construction of the Katipunan-Boni Avenue underpass. It was manifest error for the
Court of Appeals to have overlooked the principle embodied in Article 2179 of the
Civil Code, that when the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages.
As to the alleged Rodel's contributory negligence- the court finds it unnecessary to
delve into it, since it cannot overcome or defeat Aquilinos recklessness which is the
immediate and proximate cause of the accident. Rodels contributory negligence
has relevance only in the event that Ramos seeks to recover from respondent
whatever damages or injuries he may have suffered as a result; it will have the
effect of mitigating the award of damages in his favor.

Articles 2179 and 2185 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts apply in this case, viz:

Article 2179. When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate
cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only
contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants
lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate
the damages to be awarded.

Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person
driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was
violating any traffic regulation.

If the master is injured by the negligence of a third person and by the concurring
contributory negligence of his own servant or agent, the latters negligence is
imputed to his superior and will defeat the superiors action against the third person,
assuming of course that the contributory negligence was the proximate cause of
the injury of which complaint is made.[10]

Applying the foregoing principles of law to the instant case, Aquilinos act of
crossing Katipunan Avenue via Rajah Matanda constitutes negligence because it
was prohibited by law. Moreover, it was the proximate cause of the accident, and
thus precludes any recovery for any damages suffered by respondent from the
accident.

Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous

sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred. And more comprehensively, the
proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury
as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of
his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. [11]

G.R. No. 150228 July 30, 2009

3.BANK OF AMERICA NT & SA vs. PHILIPPINE RACING CLUB

INCORPORATED
Facts:
Respondent PRCI is a domestic corporation which maintains several accounts with
differentbanks in the Metro Manila area; among the accounts maintained was with
Bank of America- Theauthorize signatories are the president and the vice-president
of the corporation, respectively.

Sometime in Dec 1988. The president and the vice-president of the corporation
went abroad.So, in order to insure continuity of business operation, the president
and the vice-president ofthe corporation left a pre-signed check and entrusted to
the accountant;

It turned out that on December 16, 1988, a John Doe presented two (2) checks to
Bank ofAmerica for encashment; the two (2) checks had similar entries with similar
infirmities andirregularities.

Under the line for the payee, the upper line has a typewritten word CASH and the
lower linehas a type written word ONE HUNDRED TEN THOUSAND PESOS ONLY.
Despite the highly irregular entries on the face of the checks bank of America
encashed saidchecks.

The RTC ordered Bank of America to pay respondent PRCI the value of the two (2)
checks, plus
damages and attorneys fees.

Petitioner bank of America contended that since the instrument is incomplete but
delivered orcomplete but undelivered, it could validly presume upon presentation
of the checks, that theparty who filled up the blanks had authority and that a valid
and intentional delivery to the partypresenting the checks had taken place. And the
proximate cause of the encashment was the
respondents negligent practice of delivering pre-signed check to its accountant.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner bank is obligated to verify said checks to respondent.
Held:
Anent Petitioners contention that it could validly presume that the check was
filled up with authority and intentionally delivered:It would have been correct if the
subject checks were correctly and properly filled out by thethief and presented to
the bank in good order. In that instance, there would be nothing to give notice tothe
bank of any infirmity in the title of the holder of the checks and it could validly
presume that therewas proper delivery to the holder.The irregularities on the check
would have prompted the Bank of Americas employee to verify
it with respondent. Petitioner could have made a simple phone call to its client to
clarify theirregularities and the loss to respondent due to the encashment of the
stolen checks would have beenprevented.

PROXIMATE CAUSE
On the contention that it was respondent act of issuing pre-signed check, the
Supreme Court held that,although the respondent was also negligent, but under
the doctrine of Last clear chance, the law
provides that who had a last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but
failed to do so ischargeable with the consequences thereof . At the most,
the respondents liability is merely contributory In the interest of fairness, however,
we believe it is proper to consider respondents own negligence tomitigate
petitioners liability. Article 2179 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 2179.
When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his
injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants lack of due
care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate thedamages
to be awarded.Following established jurisprudential precedents, we believe the
allocation of sixty percent (60%) of theactual damages involved in this case
(represented by the amount of the checks with legal interest) topetitioner is proper
under the premises. Respondent should, in light of its contributory negligence,
bearforty percent (40%) of its own loss

It is well-settled that banks are engaged in a business impressed with public

interest, and it is their duty to protect in return their many clients and depositors
who transact business with them. They have the obligation to treat their clients
account meticulously and with the highest degree of care, considering the fiduciary
nature of their relationship. The diligence required of banks, therefore, is more than
that of a good father of a family.[12]

In the interest of fairness, however, we believe it is proper to consider respondents

own negligence to mitigate petitioners liability. Article 2179 of the Civil Code
provides:

Art. 2179. When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate
cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only
contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants
lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate
the damages to be awarded.

2180
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused
by the minor children who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their
authority and live in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages
caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the
damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what
is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by
their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that
they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a)

4.Libi vs. IAC

FACTS:
Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were a sweetheart until the former broke up with
the latter after she found out the Wendell was irresponsible and sadistic. Wendell
wanted reconciliation but was not granted by Julie so it prompted him to resort to
threats. One day, there were found dead from a single gunshot wound each coming
from the same gun. The parents of Julie herein private respondents filed a civil case
against the parents of Wendell to recover damages. Trial court dismissed the
complaint for insufficiency of evidence but was set aside by CA.
ISSUE: WON the parents should be held liable for such damages.
HELD:
The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children
imposed under Art 2180 of the Civil Code and Art. 101 of Revised Penal Code

covered obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses. The court
held that the civil liability of the parents for quasi-delict of their minor children is
primary and not subsidiary and that responsibility shall cease when the persons can
prove that they observe all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage. However, Wendells mother testified that her husband owns a gun which
he kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each of the
spouses had their own key. She likewise admitted that during the incident, the gun
was no longer in the safety deposit box. Wendell could not have gotten hold of the
gun unless the key was left negligently lying around and that he has free access of
the mothers bag where the key was kept. The spouses failed to observe and
exercise the required diligence of a good father to prevent such damage.
CIVIL LAW; QUASI DELICT; LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM CRIMINAL
OFFENSES COMMITTED BY THEIR MINOR CHILDREN; RULE. The parents are and should be held primarily
liable for the civil liability arising from criminal offenses committed by their minor children under their legal
authority or control, or who live in their company, unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent such damages. That primary liability is premised on the provisions of
Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code with respect to damages ex delicto caused by their children 9 years of
age or under, or over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted without discernment; and, with regard to their
children over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted with discernment, or 15 years or over but under 21
years of age, such primary liability shall be imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Under said
Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be effected against the father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother. This was amplified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code which provides that the
same shall devolve upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, upon the mother or, in case of her
death or incapacity, upon the guardian, but the liability may also be voluntarily assumed by a relative or
family friend of the youthful offender. However, under the Family Code, this civil liability is now, without such
alternative qualification, the responsibility of the parents and those who exercise parental authority over the
minor offender. For civil liability arising from quasi-delicts committed by minors, the same rules shall apply
in accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code, as so modified.

5.Salen vs. Balce

SEVERINO SALEN and ELENA SALBANERA vs. JOSE BALCE
G.R. No. L-14414. 27 April 1960.
Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Camarines Norte.
Bautista Angelo, J.:
Facts: Plaintiffs are the legitimate parents of Carlos Salen who died from wounds
caused by Gumersindo Balce, a legitimate son of defendant who was then single, 18
yrs old and was living with defendant. As a result of C. Salen's death, G. Balce was
accused and convicted of homicide and was sentenced to imprisonment and to pay
the amount of P2,000.00. Plaintiffs brought this action against defendant before CFI
to recover the sum of P2,000.00, with legal interest. Defendant, in his answer, set
up the defense that the law upon which plaintiffs predicate their right to recover
does not here apply for the reason that law refers to quasi-delicts and not to
criminal cases. CFI sustained the theory of defendant.
Issue: WON appellee can be held subsidiary liable to pay the indemnity in
accordance with Art. 2180 of the CC.

Ruling: Judgment reversed.

Art 2180 CC applies in the case at bar. To hold otherwise would result in the
absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or
mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her son, no
liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent. Verily, the void
that apparently exists in the RPC (art.101) is subserved by this particular provision
of our CC, as may be gleaned from some recent decisions of the SC which cover
equal or identical cases.

The particular law that governs this case is Article 2180, the pertinent portion of which provides: "The
father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for damages caused by the
minor children who lived in their company." To hold that this provision does not apply to the instant
case because it only covers obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations which
arise from criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere
negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by
his or her son, no liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent. Verily, the void
that apparently exists in the Revised Penal Code is subserved by this particular provision of our Civil
Code, as may be gleaned from some recent decisions of this Court which cover equal or identical
cases.

6.YHT Realty Corporation et al vs. CA

G.R. No. 126780

February 17, 2005

FACTS:
Respondent McLoughlin would always stay at Tropicana Hotel every time he is here
in the Philippines and would rent a safety deposit box. The safety deposit box could
only be opened through the use of 2 keys, one of which is given to the registered
guest, and the other remaining in the possession of the management of the hotel.
McLoughlin allegedly placed the following in his safety deposit box 2 envelopes
containing US Dollars, one envelope containing Australian Dollars, Letters, credit
cards, bankbooks and a checkbook.
On 12 December 1987, before leaving for a brief trip, McLoughlin took some items
from the safety box which includes the ff: envelope containing Five Thousand US
Dollars (US$5,000.00), the other envelope containing Ten Thousand Australian
Dollars (AUS$10,000.00), his passports and his credit cards. The other items were
left in the deposit box. Upon arrival, he found out that a few dollars were missing
and the jewelry he bought was likewise missing.
Eventually, he confronted Lainez and Paiyam who admitted that Tan opened the
safety deposit box with the key assigned to him. McLoughlin went up to his room
where Tan was staying and confronted her. Tan admitted that she had stolen
McLouglins key and was able to open the safety deposit box with the assistance of

Lopez, Paiyam and Lainez. Lopez also told McLoughlin that Tan stole the key
assigned to McLouglin while the latter was asleep.
McLoughlin insisted that it must be the hotel who must assume responsibility for the
loss he suffered. Lopez refused to accept responsibility relying on the conditions for
renting the safety deposit box entitled Undertaking For the Use of Safety Deposit
Box

ISSUE: WON the "Undertaking for the Use of Safety Deposit Box" admittedly
executed by private respondent is null and void.

HELD: YES
Article 2003 was incorporated in the New Civil Code as an expression of public
policy precisely to apply to situations such as that presented in this case. The hotel
business like the common carriers business is imbued with public interest. Catering
to the public, hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only lodging for hotel guests
and security to their persons and belongings. The twin duty constitutes the essence
of the business. The law in turn does not allow such duty to the public to be negated
or diluted by any contrary stipulation in so-called undertakings that ordinarily
appear in prepared forms imposed by hotel keepers on guests for their signature.
In an early case (De Los Santos v. Tan Khey), CA ruled that to hold hotelkeepers or
innkeeper liable for the effects of their guests, it is not necessary that they be
actually delivered to the innkeepers or their employees. It is enough that such
effects are within the hotel or inn. With greater reason should the liability of the
hotelkeeper be enforced when the missing items are taken without the guests
knowledge and consent from a safety deposit box provided by the hotel itself, as in
this case.
Paragraphs (2) and (4) of the undertaking manifestly contravene Article 2003, CC
for they allow Tropicana to be released from liability arising from any loss in the
contents and/or use of the safety deposit box for any cause whatsoever. Evidently,
the undertaking was intended to bar any claim against Tropicana for any loss of the
contents of the safety deposit box whether or not negligence was incurred by
Tropicana or its employees. The New Civil Code is explicit that the responsibility of
the hotel-keeper shall extend to loss of, or injury to, the personal property of the
guests even if caused by servants or employees of the keepers of hotels or inns as
well as by strangers, except as it may proceed from any force majeure.41 It is the
loss through force majeure that may spare the hotel-keeper from liability. In the
case at bar, there is no showing that the act of the thief or robber was done with the
use of arms or through an irresistible force to qualify the same as force majeure.

7.Real v Belo

VIRGINIA REAL, G.R. NO. 146224 versus SISENANDO H. BELO, Promulgated:

January 26, 2007
Petitioner owned and operated the Wasabe Fastfood stall located at the Food Center
of the Philippine Womens University (PWU) along Taft Avenue, Malate,
Manila. Sisenando H. Belo (respondent) owned and operated the BS Masters
fastfood stall, also located at the Food Center of PWU.

Around 7:00 oclock in the morning of January 25, 1996, a fire broke out at
petitioners Wasabe Fastfood stall. The fire spread and gutted other fastfood stalls in
the area, including respondents stall. An investigation on the cause of the fire by
Fire Investigator SFO1 Arnel C. Pinca (Pinca) revealed that the fire broke out due to
the leaking fumes coming from the Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) stove and tank
installed at petitioners stall. For the loss of his fastfood stall due to the fire,
respondent demanded compensation from petitioner. However, petitioner refused to
accede to respondents demand.
Petitioners bare allegation is far from sufficient proof for the Court to rule in her
favor. It is basic in the rule of evidence that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by
evidence, are not equivalent to proof.[32] In short, mere allegations are not evidence.
[33]

The Civil Code provides:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. x x
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches
in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.
Whenever an employees negligence causes damage or injury to another, there
instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to
exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection (culpa in eligiendo) or
supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its employees.[34] To avoid liability for a quasidelict committed by his employee, an employer must overcome the presumption by
presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. [35]

In this case, petitioner not only failed to show that she submitted proof that the LPG
stove and tank in her fastfood stall were maintained in good condition and
periodically checked for defects but she also failed to submit proof that she
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision
of her employees. For failing to prove care and diligence in the maintenance of her
cooking equipment and in the selection and supervision of her employees, the
necessary inference was that petitioner had been negligent. [36]

8.PSI v Agana
G.R. No. 157906 November 2, 2006
Lessons Applicable: Res ipsa loquitur (Torts and Damages)
Laws Applicable: Art. 2176 Art. 2180 and Art. 1869 of the Civil Code
FACTS:
April 4, 1984: Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical City General
Hospital because of difficulty of bowel movement and bloody anal discharge. Dr.
Miguel Ampil diagnosed her to be suffering from cancer of the sigmoid.
April 11, 1984: Dr. Ampil performed an anterior resection surgery on Natividad and
found that the malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread on her left ovary,
necessitating the removal of certain portions of it
Dr. Ampil obtained the consent of Natividads husband, Enrique Agana to perform
hysterectomy.
After a couple of days, Natividad consulted both Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes about
the excruciating pain in her anal region. Dr. Ampil recommended that she consult an
oncologist.
May 9, 1984: The Aganas went to the United States to seek further treatment and
was told she was FREE from cancer.
August 31, 1984: Natividad's daughter found a piece of gauze protruding from her
vagina. Dr. Ampil proceeded to her house and extracted by hand a piece of gauze
measuring 1.5 inches in width and assuring that the pain will vanish.
When the pain intensified, Nativided went to Polymedic General Hospital where Dr.
Ramon Gutierrez found a foul-smelling gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width which
badly infected her vaginal vault which formed a recto-vaginal fistula forcign her
stool to excrete through the vagina.
October 1984: Natividad underwent another surgery to remedy the damage
February 16, 1986: Natividad died so she was substituted by her children

RTC: PSI solidarily liable with Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes for damages for negligence
and malpractice
CA: absolved Dr. Fuentes upon the same advise from the PRC Board of Medicine for
failure to show that he placed the guages or concealed the fact from Natividad
ISSUE: W/N Dr. Fuentes may be held liable under the principle of res ipso loquitor

HELD: NO. CA affirmed

Dr. Ampil as the negligent party surgeons used gauzes as sponges to control the
bleeding of the patient during the surgical operationimmediately after the
operation, the nurses who assisted in the surgery noted in their report 2 sponges
lacking2 gauzes were extracted from the same spot of the body of Mrs. Agana
element 3 "control and management of the thing which caused the injury" to be
wanting
Dr. Fuentes performed the surgery and thereafter reported and showed his work to
Dr. Ampil who allowed Dr. Fuentes to leave the operating room
Under the "Captain of the Ship" rule, the operating surgeon is the person in
complete charge of the surgery room and all personnel connected with the
operation
res ipsa loquitur
not a rule of substantive law, hence, does not per se create or constitute an
independent or separate ground of liability, being a mere evidentiary rule
mere invocation and application of the doctrine does not dispense with the
requirement of proof of negligence
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasidelict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches
in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry.

x x x

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.
failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of a good father of
a family in the accreditation and supervision
private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting
consultant staff
control test is determining for the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical
negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between
hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians
ART. 1869. Agency may be express, or implied from the acts of the principal, from
his silence or lack of action, or his failure to repudiate the agency, knowing that
another person is acting on his behalf without authority.
By accrediting Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes and publicly advertising their qualifications,
the hospital created the impression that they were its agents, authorized to perform
medical or surgical services for its patients doctrine of corporate negligence or
corporate responsibility knowledge of any of the staff of Medical City Hospital
constitutes knowledge of PSI
It is worthy to note that Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes operated on Natividad with the
assistance of the Medical City Hospitals staff, composed of resident doctors, nurses,
and interns

That petitioner exercised control over respondents gains light from the undisputed
fact that in the emergency room, the operating room, or any department or ward for
that matter, respondents' work is monitored through its nursing supervisors, charge
nurses and orderlies. Without the approval or consent of petitioner or its medical
director, no operations can be undertaken in those areas. For control test to apply, it
is not essential for the employer to actually supervise the performance of duties of
the employee, it being enough that it has the right to wield the power.

There is, however, ample evidence that the hospital (PSI) held out to the patient
(Natividad) that the doctor (Dr. Ampil) was its agent. Present are the two factors
that determine apparent authority: first, the hospital's implied manifestation to the
patient which led the latter to conclude that the doctor was the hospital's agent;
and second, the patients reliance upon the conduct of the hospital and the doctor,
consistent with ordinary care and prudence.

While Dr. Ampil may have had the primary responsibility of notifying Natividad
about the missing gauzes, PSI imposed upon itself the separate and independent
responsibility of initiating the inquiry into the missing gauzes. The purpose of the
first would have been to apprise Natividad of what transpired during her surgery,
while the purpose of the second would have been to pinpoint any lapse in procedure
that led to the gauze count discrepancy, so as to prevent a recurrence thereof and
to determine corrective measures that would ensure the safety of Natividad. That
Dr. Ampil negligently failed to notify Natividad did not release PSI from its selfimposed separate responsibility.
13. Corollary to its non-delegable undertaking to review potential incidents of
negligence committed within its premises, PSI had the duty to take notice of
medical records prepared by its own staff and submitted to its custody, especially
when these bear earmarks of a surgery gone awry. Thus, the record taken during
the operation of Natividad which reported a gauze count discrepancy should have
given PSI sufficient reason to initiate a review. It should not have waited for
Natividad to complain.
14. As it happened, PSI took no heed of the record of operation and consequently
did not initiate a review of what transpired during Natividads operation. Rather, it
shirked its responsibility and passed it on to others to Dr. Ampil whom it expected
to inform Natividad, and to Natividad herself to complain before it took any
meaningful step. By its inaction, therefore, PSI failed its own standard of hospital
care. It committed corporate negligence.

9.SPS. BUENAVENTURA JAYME AND ROSARIO JAYME,

vs.
RODRIGO APOSTOL, FIDEL LOZANO, ERNESTO SIMBULAN, MAYOR
FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL, MUNICIPALITY OF KORONADAL (NOW CITY OF KORONADAL),
PROVINCE OF SOUTH COTABATO, represented by the MUNICIPAL TREASURER and/or
MUNICIPAL MAYOR FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL, and THE FIRST INTEGRATED BONDING
AND INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., respondents.
G.R. No. 163609

[November 27, 2008]

FACTS:

On February 5, 1989, Mayor Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato was on board the
Isuzu pick-up truck driven by Fidel Lozano, an employee of the Municipality of
Koronadal. The pick-up truck was registered under the name of Rodrigo Apostol, but
it was then in the possession of ErnestoSimbulan. Lozano borrowed the pick-up
truck from Simbulan to bring Miguel to Buayan Airport at General Santos City to
catch his Manila flight.
The pick-up truck accidentally hit Marvin C. Jayme, a minor, who was then crossing
the National Highway in South Cotabato. The intensity of the collision sent Marvin

some 50 meters away from the point of impact, a clear indication that Lozano was
driving at a very high speed at the time of the accident. Marvin sustained
severe head injuries. Despite medical attention, Marvin expired six (6) days after the
accident.
ISSUE:

MAY a municipal mayor be held solidarily liable for the negligent acts of the driver
assigned to him
MAY an LGU be held liable for the tortuous act of a government employee.
RULING:

1. It is uncontested that Lozano was employed as a driver by the municipality. That

he was subsequently assigned to Mayor Miguel during the time of the accident is of
no moment. The Municipality of Koronadal remains to be
Lozanos employer notwithstanding Lozanos assignment to Mayor Miguel. Even
assuming arguendo that Mayor Miguel had authority to give instructions or directions
to Lozano, he still cannot be held liable. In Benson v. Sorrell, the New England
Supreme Court ruled that mere giving of directions to the driver does not establish
that the passenger has control over the vehicle. Neither does it render one the
employer of the driver.
Mayor Miguel was neither Lozanos employer nor the vehicles registered owner.
There existed no causal relationship between him and Lozano or the vehicle used
that will make him accountable for Marvins death. Mayor Miguel was a mere
passenger at the time of the accident.
2. The municipality may not be sued because it is an agency of the State engaged
in governmental functions and, hence, immune from suit. This immunity is
illustrated in Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme, where the Court held
that municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the
competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts
committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can only be
held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in proprietary capacity.
In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right
to show that the defendant was not acting in governmental capacity when the injury
was committed or that the case comes under the
exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.
Liability attaches to the registered owner, the negligent driver and his
direct employer. Settled is the rule that the registered owner of a vehicle is jointly
and severally liable with the driver for damages incurred by passengers and third
persons as a consequence of injuries or death sustained in the operation of said
vehicles. Regardless of who the actual owner of the vehicle is, the operator of
record continues to be the operator of the vehicle as regards the public and third
persons, and as such is directly and primarily responsible for
the consequences incident to its operation.
The petition is DENIED.

10.SPOUSES FONTANILLA VS HON. MALIAMAN,

GR # 55963 and 61045, Feb. 27, 1991 (Constitutional Law Government Agency,
Proprietary Functions)
FACTS: National Irrigation Administration (NIA), a government agency, was held
liable for damages resulting to the death of the son of herein petitioner spouses
caused by the fault and/or negligence of the driver of the said agency. NIA
maintains that it is not liable for the act of its driver because the former does not
perform primarily proprietorship functions but governmental functions.
ISSUE: Whether or not NIA may be held liable for damages caused by its driver.
HELD: Yes. NIA is a government agency with a corporate personality separate and
distinct from the government, because its community services are only incidental
functions to the principal aim which is irrigation of lands, thus, making it an agency
with proprietary functions governed by Corporation Law and is liable for actions of
their employees.
The sole legal question on whether or not petitioners may be entitled to an award of
moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees can very well be answered with
the application of Arts. 2176 and 2180 of theNew Civil Code.
Art. 2176 thus provides:
Whoever by act omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing cotractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter
Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Art. 21 80 read as follows:
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even the though
the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent.; but
not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done
properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Art. 2176 shall be applicable.
The liability of the State has two aspects. namely:
1. Its public or governmental aspects where it is liable for the tortious acts of special
agents only.
2. Its private or business aspects (as when it engages in private enterprises) where
it becomes liable as an ordinary employer. (p. 961, Civil Code of the Philippines;
Annotated, Paras; 1986 Ed. ).

In this jurisdiction, the State assumes a limited liability for the damage caused by
the tortious acts or conduct of its special agent.
Under the aforequoted paragrah 6 of Art. 2180, the State has voluntarily assumed
liability for acts done through special agents. The State's agent, if a public official,
must not only be specially commissioned to do a particular task but that such task
must be foreign to said official's usual governmental functions. If the State's agent
is not a public official, and is commissioned to perform non-governmental functions,
then the State assumes the role of an ordinary employer and will be held liable as
such for its agent's tort. Where the government commissions a private individual for
a special governmental task, it is acting through a special agent within the meaning
of the provision. (Torts and Damages, Sangco, p. 347, 1984 Ed.)
Certain functions and activities, which can be performed only by the government,
are more or less generally agreed to be "governmental" in character, and so the
State is immune from tort liability. On the other hand, a service which might as well
be provided by a private corporation, and particularly when it collects revenues
from it, the function is considered a "proprietary" one, as to which there may be
liability for the torts of agents within the scope of their employment.
The National Irrigation Administration is an agency of the government exercising
proprietary functions, by express provision of Rep. Act No. 3601. Section 1 of said
Act provides:
Section 1. Name and domicile.-A body corporate is hereby created which shall be
known as the National Irrigation Administration, hereinafter called the NIA for short,
which shall be organized immediately after the approval of this Act. It shall have its
principal seat of business in the City of Manila and shall have representatives in all
provinces for the proper conduct of its business.
Section 2 of said law spells out some of the NIA's proprietary functions. ThusSec. 2. Powers and objectives.-The NIA shall have the following powers and
objectives:
(c) To collect from the users of each irrigation system constructed by it such fees as
may be necessary to finance the continuous operation of the system and reimburse
within a certain period not less than twenty-five years cost of construction thereof;
and
(d) To do all such other things and to transact all such business as are directly or
indirectly necessary, incidental or conducive to the attainment of the above
objectives.
Indubitably, the NIA is a government corporation with juridical personality and not a
mere agency of the government. Since it is a corporate body performing nongovernmental functions, it now becomes liable for the damage caused by the
accident resulting from the tortious act of its driver-employee. In this particular
case, the NIA assumes the responsibility of an ordinary employer and as such, it
becomes answerable for damages.

This assumption of liability, however, is predicated upon the existence of negligence

on the part of respondent NIA. The negligence referred to here is the negligence of
supervision.
At this juncture, the matter of due diligence on the part of respondent NIA becomes
a crucial issue in determining its liability since it has been established that
respondent is a government agency performing proprietary functions and as such, it
assumes the posture of an ordinary employer which, under Par. 5 of Art. 2180, is
responsible for the damages caused by its employees provided that it has failed to
observe or exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of the driver.
It will be noted from the assailed decision of the trial court that "as a result of the
impact, Francisco Fontanilla was thrown to a distance 50 meters away from the
point of impact while Restituto Deligo was thrown a little bit further away. The
impact took place almost at the edge of the cemented portion of the road.

2181

11.MMTC v CA
G.R. No. 116617 November 16, 1998METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORPORATION (MMTC), PEDRO
A. MUSA, CONRADO TOLENTINO,FELICIANA CELEBRADO and THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM, petitioners,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, SPS. RODOLFO V. ROSALES and LILY
R. ROSALES, respondents.G.R. No. 126395 November 16, 1998RODOLFO V. ROSALES, and
LILY R. ROSALES, petitioners,vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS, METRO MANILA
TRANSIT CORPORATION, (MMTC) PEDRO A. MUSA,CONRADO TOLENTINO, FELICIANA
CELEBRADO and THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCESYSTEM, respondents.
Facts:
Musa was the driver of MMTC bus no. 27 (MMTC an operator of a passenger busses within
the Metro Manila area). The spouses Rosales were parents of Liza Rosalie who was hit by
Musa, when crossing Katipunan Avenue in Quezon City. A witness said that that Liza was
already near the center of the street when the bus hit her. Musa is found guilty of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide and sentenced imprisonment to maximum penalty by the
Regional Trial Court. The spouses Rosales filed an independent civil action for damages
againstMMTC, Musa, MMTC Acting General Manager Conrado Tolentino, and the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS). The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City found MMTC and
Musa guiltyof negligence and ordered them to pay damages and attorneys fees.The
parties appealed both to the Court of Appeals. The court affirmed the decision of the trial
court with the modification of deleting the Actual damages and awarding in lieu thereof the
death indemnity. The spouses filed a motion for reconsideration in a resolution to partly
granted by increasing the indemnity for the death of Liza Rosalie. Musa and MMTCassailed
the decision of Court of Appeals. The spouses Rosales contended that the death indemnity
set at Actual damages, increasing the amount of damages awarded, and to hold allthe
defendants-respondents solidarily liable. The conclusions of the Court of Appeals affirm
thetrial court bars a reversal of the finding of liability against petitioners MMTC and Musa,
thatsuch findings are whimsical, capricious, and arbitrary can they be overturned. To the
contrary both the Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court are anchored on the evidence
submitted bythe parties.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not the employers are held liable for the damages caused by their employees
(art. 2180 of Civil Code)

(2) Whether or not the question of damages are subject of the appeal
(3) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in absolving the GSIS liability
Held:
(1) The Supreme Court cannot consider the same as sufficiently persuasive proof that there
was observance of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees, they fail to
submit any other evidence which might obviate the nature of the testimony. MMTC
is primarily liable for damages for the negligence of its employee in view of Art. 2180.
Pursuant to Art. 2181 it can recover from its employee what it may pay; the spouses have
the option of enforcing the judgment against either MMTC or Musa. The court held that the
responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi delict is solidary, in view
of Art. 2194.
(2) The court held the question of damages. (1) As to the indemnity for Death, it is fixed at
P50,000 to conform the Court of Appeals increased the indemnity. (2) Actual Damages,
based on Article 2199 that one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such
pecuniary loss suffered by as duly proved. The spouses Rosales only submitted receipts
showing that the expenses were only P60, 226.65. Hence the spouses Rosales are entitled to
recover only theP60, 226.65. (3) Moral Damages under Art. 2206 the ascendants of the
deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of
the deceased. The spouses Rosales presented evidence of the intense moral suffering they
had gone through as a result of the loss of Liza Rosalie who was their youngest child; (People
v Teehankee) the Court awardedP1 million as moral damages for the loss of a minor child.
Hence the Court holds that the MMTC and Musa are solidarily liable to the spouses Rosales in
the amount of P1 million as Moral damages for the death of Liza Rosalie. (4) Exemplary
damages. It is recovered upon the case involving quasi-delicts if the defendants acted with
gross negligence, the records indicate that there was a pending criminal case against Musa
with another branch of the Regional TrialCourt, Quezon City for reckless imprudence
resulting in slight physical injuries; it also showsthat he failed to stop his vehicle at once
after the eye witnesses shouted at him. Under the circumstances the Court deemed it
reasonable to award the spouses Rosales Exemplary damages in the amount of P5000, 000.
(5) Attorneys Fees. In pursuant of Article 2208,attorneys fees may be recovered when,
exemplary damages are awarded. We held an award of attorneys fees to be reasonable
(Sulpicio Lines V Court of Appeals) the death of a minor child inthe sinking of the vessel. (6)
Compensation for Loss of Earning Capacity. The compensation of this nature is awarded not
for loss of earnings but for loss of capacity to earn money. (People vTeehankee)
compensation should be allowed for loss of earning capacity resulting from the death of a
minor. Evidence shows that Liza Rosalie was a good student, promising artist, and obedient
child. The total net earning capacity (life expectancy is equivalent to 2/3 multiply bythe
difference of eighty (80) and the age of the deceased) amounts to P321, 870.12.(3) With
respect to the GSIS, they contended that it was the insurer in a contract for third party
liability it had with the MMTC. In Article 2180 (4) mentions managers this term is used
in the sense of employers. Thus, Tolentino and Celebrado cannot be held for the tort of
PedroMusa. The GSIS admitted in its answer that it was the insurer of the MMTC for the
third party liability with respect to MMTC Bus no. 27 to the extent of P 50,000. Hence the
spouses have the option to claim the said amount from the GSIS

The reason for the law is obvious. It is indeed difficult for any person injured by the carelessness of a
driver to prove the negligence or lack of due diligence of the owner of the vehicle in the choice of the
driver. Were we to require the injured party to prove the owner's lack of diligence, the right will in
many cases prove illusory, as seldom does a person in the community, especially in the cities, have
the opportunity to observe the conduct of all possible car owners therein. So the law imposes the
burden of proof of innocence on the vehicle owner. If the driver is negligent and causes damage, the

law presumes that the owner was negligent and imposes upon him the burden of proving the
contrary.
One last word. The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City erred in holding MMTC primarily and Musa
secondarily liable for damages arising from the death of Liza Rosalie. It was error for the appellate
court to affirm this aspect of the trial court's decision.
As already stated, MMTC is primarily liable for damages for the negligence of its employee in view of
Art. 2180. Pursuant to Art. 2181, it can recover from its employee what it may pay. This does not
make the employee's liability subsidiary. It only means that if the judgment for damages is satisfied
by the common carrier, the latter has a right to recover what it has paid from its employee who
committed the fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based on quasi-delict. 59 Hence, the
spouses Rosales have the option of enforcing the judgment against either MMTC or Musa.
From another point of view, Art. 2194 provides that "the responsibility of two or more persons who
are liable for aquasi-delict is solidary." We ruled in Gelisan v. Alday 60 that "the registered
owner/operator of a public service vehicle is jointly and severally liable with the driver for damages
incurred by passengers or third persons as a consequence of injuries sustained in the operation of said
vehicle." In Baliwag Transit Inc. v. Court of Appeals 61 it was held that "to escape solidaryliability for
a quasi-delict committed by an employee, the employer must adduce sufficient proof that it exercised
such degree of care." Finally, we held in the recent case of Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals 62 that "the liability of the registered owner of a public service vehicle . . . for damages arising
from the tortious acts of the driver is primary, direct, and joint and several or solidary with the driver."

12. Vestil vs. IAC

G.R. No. 74431 November 6 ,

1989

FACTS
On July 29, 1915, Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of thepetitioners in the
house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita Vestil.
She was rushed to the hospital but although she was discharged after nine days, she wasreadmitted one
week later. She died of bronchopneumonia.
U y s s u e d v e s t a l s f o r d a m a g e r.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N Vestil is responsible for the dog bite.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
Yes. Art. 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same irresponsible for the
damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case
the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage.
Vestil is not really the owner of the house, which was still part of Vicente Mirandas estate. Sheand her
husband were its possessors at the time of the incident in question. There is evidence showing that she and
her family regularly went to the house, once or twice weekly and used it virtually as a second house.
Interestingly, her own daughter was playing in the house withTheness when she was bitten by the dog. The

dog remained in the house even after the death of Vicente Miranda in 1973and until 1975, when the
incident in question occurred. Also, the vestils offered to assist the Uys with their hospitalization expenses
although Purita said sheknew them only casually.
The contention that broncho pneumonia is not related to the dog bite is belied by the statementof the
doctors that it is a complication which may arise from rabies. Theness showed signs of hydrophobia, a
symptom of rabies.
Lastly, the court ruled that for 2183 applies not only to wild and vicious animals but also tame According
to Manresa the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the
presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural
equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service
must answer for the damage which such animal may cause.

13.SERRA v MUMAR
QUASI-DELICT; EMPLOYERS LIABILITY
FACTS:
around 780 in the evening of *pril #000, there was a vehicular accident along thenational 9ighwa& in !aranga& *popong, :eneral $antos Cit&, which resulted in
the death of *rmando Mumar, husband of respondent.!
a s e d o n t h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d , o n e * r m a n d o Te n e r i f e w a s d r i v i n g h i s T
o & o t a Corolla sedan on the -ational 9ighwa& heading in the direction of
"olomolok, $outhCotabato. Tenerife noticed the van owned b& petitioner $erra coming
from
the opposited i r e c t i o n , w h i c h w a s t r & i n g t o o v e r t a k e a p a s s e n g e r ' e e
p , a n d i n t h e p r o c e s s encroached on his lane. The left side of the sedan was
hit b& the van, causing the sedan to swerve to the left and end up on the other side of
the road. The van collided head on with the motorcycle, which was about 1# meters behind
the sedan on the outer lane, causing injuries to Mumar, which eventually & led to his death. Petitioner
denied that her van was overtaking the 'jeepney at the time of the incident. He claimed that
the left tire of Tenerife2s sedan burst, causing it to sideswipe her van. Consequently &, the
left front tire of the van also burst and the van2s driver, Marciano
deC a s t r o , l o s t c o n t r o l o f t h e v e h i c l e . T h e v a n s w e r v e d t o t h e l e f t t o w a r d
s M u m a r 2 s motorc&cle. The impact resulted in the death of Mumar.respondent filed a complaint
against petitioner for +damages b& Reason of reckless Imprudence
resulting to 9omicide before the General $antos City TC. The TC,General $antos
Cit& promulgated a judgment against defendant. "Petitioner appealed the TC ruling to
the C* which denied the appeal and affi rmed with modifi cation the TC2s
ruling.9ence, this petition. Petitioner prays that the assailed C* decision and resolution be
reversed and set aside. In the alternative, petitioner prays that, should the Court sustain the
finding of negligence, that the award of damages for loss of earning capacity& in the sum of
"1,##4,000.00 be complete& deleted for lack of evidential& basis.
ISSUE:
I1 . W h e t h e r o r n o t b o t h t h e l o w e r c o u r t a n d t h e C o u r t o f
*appeals
committedreversible error in holding ;ditha $erra as liable for d
a m a g e s a n d i n n o t appreciating that she was not negligent in the selection and
supervision of the driver of the van, Marciano de Castro
#.6hether or not the Court of *appeals erred in awarding to herein respondent <loss of
earning capacity&= despite complete absence of documentary& evidence that the deceased Mumar

was self->employed and earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws in force at
the time of his death
HELD$
1.
NO.
"Petitioner failed to show that she exercised the level of diligence required in
supervising her driver in order to prevent the accident. $he admitted that de Castro hadonl&
been her driver for one &ear and she had no knowledge of his driving e)perience orrecord of previous
accidents. $he also admitted that it was de Castro who maintainedthe vehicle and would even
remind her <to pa& the installment of the car.=Under *rticle #1?0 of the Civil Code, emplo&ers are
liable for the damages
caused b&t h e i r e m p l o & e e s a c t i n g w i t h i n t h e s c o p e o f t h e i r a s s i g n e
d t a s k s . 6 h e n e v e r a n emplo&ee2s negligence causes damage or in'ur& to
another, there instantl& arises a presumption that the emplo&er failed to e)ercise the
due diligence of a good father ofthe famil& in the selection or supervision of its emplo&ees. The
liabilit& of the emplo&er isdirect or immediate. It is not conditioned upon prior recourse
against the negligentemplo&ee and a prior showing of insolvenc& of such emplo&ee.Moreover,
under *rticle #1?4 of the Civil Code, if the causative factor was the driver2snegligence, the owner of the
vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he couldhave prevented the mishap b& the e)ercise of due
diligence.#.
The Court holds that the C* erred in awarding damages for loss of earningcapacit& in the absence of
documentar& evidence to support the claim.
Daa-s /or 0oss o/ arnn- aa4 s n ! na5r o/ a5a0 daas
, which asa rule must be dul& proven b& documentar& evidence, not merel& b&
the self>servingtestimon& of the widow. !& wa& of e)ception, damages for loss of earning
capacit& ma&be awarded despite the absence of documentar& evidence when (1 the
deceased
isself>emplo&ed earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws,
and 'udicial notice ma& be taken of the fact that in the deceased2s line of work nodocument
ar& evidence is available or (# the deceased is emplo&ed as a dail& wage worker earning
less than the minimum wage under current labor laws.!ased solel& on -elfa2s testimony&, the C*
determined that the deceased falls within oneof these e)ceptions. -elfa testified that her husband was in the
business of contracting and manufacturing grills, fences and gates, and his earnings <e)ceed "7,000.00=
permonth prior to his death. $he presented no documentary& proof of her claims.

It was error for the C* to have awarded damages for loss of earning capacit& based onelfa2s testimon& alone. @irst, while it is conceded that the deceased w
a s s e l f > emplo&ed, the Court cannot accept that in his line of work there was no
documentar&proof available to prove his income from such occupation. There
would have
beenr e c e i p t s , ' o b o r d e r s , o r s o m e f o r m o f w r i t t e n c o n t r a c t o r a g r e e m e n t
between thed e c e a s e d a n d h i s c l i e n t s w h e n h e i s c o n t r a c t e d f o r a
' o b . $ e c o n d , a n d m o r e importantl&, decedent was not earning <less than the
minimum wage= at the time of hisdeath.espondent testified that her husband was earning
not less than "7,000.00 per month.3n the other hand, the highest minimum wage rate at the time of
the accident, based on6age 3rder -o. T6"!>AI>0B, was "14?.00. *t that rate, the monthl&
minimum wagewould be ",# 7.00, clearl& an amount less than what respondent
testifi ed to as
herh u s b a n d 2 s m o n t h l & e a r n i n g s . T h e d e c e a s e d w o u l d n o t f a l l w i t h i n t h e
r e c o g n i e d e)ceptions. There is therefore no basis for the C*2s computation for Mumar2s
supposednet earning capacit& and the subsequent award of damages due to loss

of earningcapacit&.The petition is partly& granted. The Court affirms the decision of the C*, but modifies
the award for damages

Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, employers are liable for the damages caused by
their employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. Whenever an
employees negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a
presumption that the employer failed to exercise the due diligence of a good father of
the family in the selection or supervision of its employees. 22 The liability of the
employer is direct or immediate. It is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the
negligent employee and a prior showing of insolvency of such employee. 23

Moreover, under Article 2184 of the Civil Code,24 if the causative factor was the
drivers negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if
he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence.

Petitioner failed to show that she exercised the level of diligence required in
supervising her driver in order to prevent the accident. She admitted that de Castro
had only been her driver for one year and she had no knowledge of his driving
experience or record of previous accidents. She also admitted that it was de Castro
who maintained the vehicle and would even remind her to pay the installment of the
car.25

Petitioner also admitted that, at the time of the accident, she did not know what was
happening and only knew they bumped into another vehicle when the driver shouted.
She then closed her eyes and a moment later felt something heavy fall on the roof of
the car. When the vehicle stopped, petitioner left the scene purportedly to ask help
from her brother, leaving the other passengers to come to the aid of her injured driver.

Damages for loss of earning capacity is in the nature of

actual damages,26 which as a rule must be duly proven27 by

documentary evidence, not merely by the self-serving testimony of

the widow.
By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite
the absence of documentary evidence when (1) the deceased is self-employed earning
less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, and judicial notice may be
taken of the fact that in the deceaseds line of work no documentary evidence is
available; or (2) the deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than
the minimum wage under current labor laws. 28

14.Mendoza v Soriano
On July 14, 2007, Sonny Soriano, while crossing Commonwealth Avenue, was hit by a
speeding FX driven by Lomer Macasasa. Macasasa fled the scene. Soriano was brought by a
school bus to East Avenue Medical Center where he later died.
On August 20, 1997, respondents (Sorianos wife and daughter) filed a complaint for
damages against Macasasa and petitioner Mendoza, the registered owner of the vehicle. In
her answer, petitioner maintained that she was not liable as owner of the vehicle, because
she had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family over her employee, Macasasa.
Upon respondents motion, the complaint for damages against Macasasa was
dismissed.
After trial, trial court dismissed the complaint. It found Soriano negligent for
crossing Commonwealth Avenue by using a gap in the islands fencing rather the pedestrian
overpass. Also, the complainants presented no evidence to support their allegation of
petitioners negligence.
CA reversed trial courts decision.

Held:
Yes. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, employers are liable for the damages caused by
their employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. The liability arises due to
the presumed negligence of the employers in supervising their employees unless they prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. In
this case, petitioner failed to prove that she exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in supervising Macasasa
However, Soriano was guilty of contributory negligence for not using the pedestrian
overpass while crossing Commonwealth Avenue. Hence, the reduction by 20% of the
damages awarded, based on Article 2179 of the Civil Code which reads: When the plaintiff's
own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury,he cannot recover
damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and
proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may
recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.

Petition denied for lack of merit. Decision of CA affirmed

In this case, we hold petitioner primarily and solidarily liable for the damages
caused by Macasasa.[23] Respondents could recover directly from petitioner[24] since
petitioner failed to prove that she exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
in supervisingMacasasa.[25] Indeed, it is unfortunate that petitioner harbored the
notion that the Regional Trial Court did not have jurisdiction over the case and opted
not to present her evidence on this point.
Lastly, we agree that the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling
that Soriano was guilty of contributory negligence for not using the pedestrian
overpass while crossing Commonwealth Avenue. We even note that the respondents
now admit this point, and concede that the appellate court had properly reduced by
20% the amount of damages it awarded. Hence, we affirm the reduction[26] of the
amount earlier awarded, based on Article 2179 of the Civil Code which reads:
When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate
cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only
contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the
defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts
shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.

15.Navida v Dizon
1. On whether the act occurred in the Philippines, the Court held YES. Thus, civil code
article 2176 which provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done..xxx is applicable
in the case at bar and therefore, RTC obviously has jurisdiction over the matter.
1. Also, the case at bar is a personal case, not a criminal, hence, lex situs theory is
not necessarily applicable.
2. The facts clearly shows that the claim for damages is the cause of action and that the
RTC unmistakably has jurisdiction over the matter.

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.

Art. 2187. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods shall
be liable for death or injuries caused by any noxious or harmful substances used, although no
contractual relation exists between them and the consumers.

16.City of Manila vs. Teotico

City of Manila vs. Genaro N. Teotico and CA
G.R. No. L-23052. 29 January 1968.
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CA

Facts: On January 27, 1958, Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos
Avenue, Manila, within a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney. As he stepped
down from the curb to board the jeepney he hailed, and took a few steps, he fell inside an
uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall,
Teotico suffered injuries. Teotico filed with the CFI Mla complaint against the City which
dismissed the same. On appeal, CA sentenced the City of Manila to pay damages.
Issue: WON the City of Manila have control or supervision over P. Burgos Ave making it
responsible for the damages suffered by Teotico.
Ruling: Decision affirmed.
In its answer to the complaint, the City, alleged that "the streets aforementioned were and
have been constantly kept in good conditionand manholes thereof covered by the
defendant City and the officers concerned" Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted that P.
Burgos Avenue was and is under its control and supervision.
Under Article 2189 CC, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach that
the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which
responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality
have either "control or supervision" over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue were,
therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not necessarily detract from the
City's "control or supervision."

17. R TRANSPORT CORPORATION, v. LUISITO G. YU, .

G.R. No. 174161, February 18, 2015

At around 8:45 in the morning of December 12, 1993, Loreta J. Yu, after having alighted from a
passenger bus in front of Robinson's Galleria along the north-bound lane of Epifanio de los Santos
Avenue (EDSA), was hit and run over by a bus driven by Antonio P. Gimena, who was then
employed by petitioner R Transport Corporation. Loreta was immediately rushed to Medical City
Hospital where she was pronounced dead on arrival.
3

MMTC denied its liability reasoning that it is merely the registered owner of the bus involved in the
incident, the actual owner, being petitioner R Transport. It explained that under the Bus Installment
Purchase Program of the government, MMTC merely purchased the subject bus, among several
others, for resale to petitioner R Transport, which will in turn operate the same within Metro Manila.
Since it was not actually operating the bus which killed respondents wife, nor was it the employer of
the driver thereof, MMTC alleged that the complaint against it should be dismissed.
4

the records show that driver Gimena was clearly running at a reckless speed. As testified by the
police officer on duty at the time of the incident and indicated in the Autopsy Report, not only were
the deceaseds clothes ripped off from her body, her brain even spewed out from her skull and
spilled over the road. Indeed, this Court is not prepared to believe petitioners contention that its bus
was travelling at a "normal speed" in preparation for a full stop in view of the fatal injuries sustained
by the deceased.
16

17

Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, employers are liable for the damages caused by their
employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. Once negligence on the part of the
employee is established, a presumption instantly arises that the employer was remiss in the
selection and/or supervision of the negligent employee. To avoid liability for the quasi-delict
committed by its employee, it is incumbent upon the employer to rebut this presumption by
presenting adequate and convincing proof that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of
a family in the selection and supervision of its employees.
18

Unfortunately, however, the records of this case are bereft of any proof showing the exercise by
petitioner of the required diligence. As aptly observed by the CA, no evidence of whatever nature
was ever presented depicting petitioners due diligence in the selection and supervision of its driver,
Gimena, despite several opportunities to do so. In fact, in its petition, apart from denying the
negligence of its employee and imputing the same to the bus from which the victim alighted,
petitioner merely reiterates its argument that since it is not the registered owner of the bus which
bumped the victim, it cannot be held liable for the damage caused by the same. Nowhere was it
even remotely alleged that petitioner had exercised the required diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employee. Because of this failure, petitioner cannot now avoid liability for the
quasi-delict committed by its negligent employee.

Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. But
the action instituted in the case at bar is one for breach of contract, for failure of the defendant to
carry safely the deceased for her destination. The liability for which he is made responsible, i.e., for
the death of the passenger, may not be considered as arising from a quasi-delict.
1wphi1

However, it must be noted that the case at hand does not involve a breach of contract of carriage, as
in Tamayo, but a tort or quasi-delict under Article 2176, in relation to Article 2180 of the New Civil
Code. As such, the liability for which petitioner is being made responsible actually arises not from a
pre-existing contractual relation between petitioner and the deceased, but from a damage caused by
the negligence of its employee. Petitioner cannot, therefore, rely on our ruling in Tamayo and escape
25

26

its solidary liability for the liability of the employer for the negligent conduct of its subordinate is direct
and primary, subject only to the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the
employee.
27

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants

Rizal Transport and Metro Manila Transport Corporation to be primarily and solidarily liable and
defendant Antonio Parraba Gimena subsidiarily liable to plaintiff Luisito Yu

defendant Antonio Gimena is made solidarily liable for the damages caused to respondent.
According to the appellate court, considering that the negligence of Antonio Gimena was sufficiently
proven by the records of the case, and that no evidence of whatever nature was presented by
petitioner to support its defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees,
petitioner, as the employer of Gimena, may be held liable for the damage caused. The CA noted that
the fact that petitioner is not the registered owner of the bus which caused the death of the victim
does not exculpate it from liability.