Professional Documents
Culture Documents
IRRESPONSIBILITY:
FINANCIAL MISMANAGEMENT BY CLINTONS STATE DEPT
EXPOSED BILLIONS TO WASTE
PART 1: WASTE AND FRIVOLOUS SPENDING BY CLINTON STATE DEPT.
In 2014, the State Department Office of Inspector General (OIG) issued two Management Alerts relating to
the State Departments oversight of contracts and grants during Secretary Clintons tenure. OIG found that
oversight failures by State exposed billions of dollars to waste, fraud, and abuse. Reports by OIG document de
facto waste totaling over $600 million. Over $200 million of this waste stems from just two buildings alone.
Additionally, an RNC analysis of random samples of the State Departments line item expenditures identified
over $9 million in expenses that could be seen as frivolous or excessive. During Secretary Clintons tenure, the
State Department spent:
$450,000 - To send three comedians to India on a tour called Make Chai Not War
$53,004 - For marble polishing services at the embassy in Brasilia, Brazil during the summer
of 2010
$216, 328 - On an event coordinator for the 2011 Fourth of July party in Madrid, Spain
$125,000 For art in Tijuana, Mexico in 2010 in 2011 State would go on to spend an additional
$139,500 for art in in Tijuana, Mexico
Reason
Reason
The Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) Warned That Billions In U.S.
Funds Were Vulnerable To Waste And Fraud, And Highlighted $206 Million Of Waste In The
State Departments Police Development Program Alone
In 2010, A Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) Report Concluded That Over
$2.5 Billion In U.S. Funds Were Vulnerable To Waste And Fraud Because Of A State Department
Program In Iraq. Specifically, the State Departments International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs (INL) bureau has come under fire from SIGIR for its management of the contract with a company
called DynCorp to train police in Iraq, Afghanistan and Jordan. A 2010 SIGIR audit of the State
Departments oversight of the DynCorp contract concluded that INL lacks sufficient resources and
controls to adequately manage the task orders with DynCorp. As a result, over $2.5 billion in U.S. funds
are vulnerable to waste and fraud. (Eli Lake, State Blocks Auditor From Iraq Police Training, The Washington Times, 6/2/11)
The State Department Iraq Police Development Program Was Supposed To Be The Single Largest
State Department Program In The World, Envisioned As A Five-Year Multibillion-Dollar Program.
The Police Development Program- which was drawn up to be the single largest State Department
program in the world was envisioned as a five-year, multibillion-dollar push to train security forces
after the U.S. military left last December. But Iraqi political leaders, anxious to keep their distance from
the Americans, were unenthusiastic. (U.S. Wasted $200M On Iraq Police Training: Audit, The Associated Press, 7/30/12)
In 2012, SIGIR Issued A Report Revealing That The State Department Spent $108 Million On A
Police Training Facility In Baghdad That It Closed Only Months After It Opened. DoS [Department
of State] constructed significant training and housing facilities at BPAX [Baghdad Police College Annex] at
an estimated cost of about $108 million. But the DoS has decided to close the facility, just months after
the PDP [Police Development Program] started, due to security costs and program revisions. Although
BPAXs facilities will be given to the Iraqis, its closure amounts to a de facto waste of the estimated $108
million to be invested in its construction. (Iraq Police Development Program: Lack Of Iraqi Support And Security Problems Raise
Questions About The Continued Viability Of The Program, Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction, 7/30/12, p. ii)
Additionally, The State Department Spent $98 Million On A Police Training Facility In Basrah That
Will Not Be Used. In addition, DoS [Department of State] contributed $98 million in PDP [Police
Development Program] funds for constructing the Basrah Consulate so it could be used for PDP training.
It too will not be used because the MOI decided to terminate training at that location. (Iraq Police Development
Program: Lack Of Iraqi Support And Security Problems Raise Questions About The Continued Viability Of The Program, Special Inspector General For Iraq
Reconstruction, 7/30/12, p. ii)
The $98 Million Facility Was Only Being Used By Seven Police Advisors At The Height Of
The Training Program. As Iraqi enthusiasm for the idea has flagged, the program has been
downsized so much that the Baghdad Police College Annex -- built at an $108 million cost to help
house the program -- will be closed. The U.S. also chipped in an additional $98 million to a Basra
facility where training will be halted, making the money a de facto waste, the Special Inspector
General for Iraq Reconstruction found. Only seven police advisors used the $98 million facility at
the height of the training program. Government auditors questioned why millions were poured
into costly construction projects without a written commitment to the program from the Iraqi
Interior Ministry. (Emily Alpert, More Than $200 Million Wasted On Iraq Police Training, Audit Says, The Los Angeles Times, 7/20/12)
Those Two Buildings Alone Brought The De Facto Waste In The Police Development Program To
$206 Million. This brings the total amount of de facto waste in the PDP [Police Development Program]
that is, funds not meaningfully used for the purpose of their appropriationto about $206 million.
(Iraq Police Development Program: Lack Of Iraqi Support And Security Problems Raise Questions About The Continued Viability Of The Program, Special
Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction, 7/30/12, p. ii)
The Special Inspector General For Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) Echoed Concerns
About Poor Oversight Of U.S. Funds By Clintons State Department
The Special Inspector General For Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) Said The State
Departments Failure To Provide Guidance For Billions Of Dollars In Aid Was Exacerbating
Problems With Rampant Corruption. The governments top watchdog for Afghan reconstruction says
the State Departments failure to provide guidance over the use of billions of dollars in U.S. funds for
rebuilding projects is exacerbating problems with rampant corruption ahead of the much-anticipated U.S.
troop pullout. (Maggie Ybarra, Lax Guidance Feeds Afghan Corruption; Report Says Billions In Aid Wasted, The Washington Times, 4/2/14)
The State Department Never Finalized A U.S. Anti-Corruption Strategy In Afghanistan, Which Is
Making It Difficult To Combat Corruption And Increase Accountability. But ensuring that those
billions of dollars are going toward reconstruction efforts and not corrupt politicians has proved difficult,
he said. The Afghan government has been having difficulty combating corruption and increasing
accountability in part because the State Department never finalized a draft 2010 U.S. anti-corruption
strategy for the country. We never came up with the benchmarks specific benchmarks that the
Afghans promised to meet on corruption, womens issues, rule of law, etc. never established them, Mr.
Sopko said. So we never held the Afghans to them. (Maggie Ybarra, Lax Guidance Feeds Afghan Corruption; Report Says Billions
In Aid Wasted, The Washington Times, 4/2/14)
SIGAR Found That $236 Million Of Aid Was At Risk And Could Potentially Be Wasted Or Used For
Kickbacks Or Bribes Because The Afghan Agency In Charge Paid Salaries In Cash. The findings
were so dire that American officials fought to keep them private. But the money has continued to flow,
despite warnings from the auditors that none of the 16 Afghan ministries could be counted on to keep the
funds from being stolen or wasted. For instance, $236.5 million earmarked for the Afghan Ministry of
Public Health was in danger of misappropriation arising from payment of salaries in cash, according to a
United States Agency for International Development risk assessment cited by the inspector general. The
Afghan Mines Ministry could be paying higher prices for commodities and services to finance kickbacks
and bribes, another assessment based on the audits said. (Matthew Rosenberg and Azan Ahmed, US Aid To Afghans Flows On
Despite Warnings Of Misuse, The New York Times, 1/30/14)
SIGAR Highlighted One Example Of An Iraqi Prison The State Department Paid $11.3 Million
For That Was Riddled With Design And Construction Defects. In the letter, Mr. Sopko says
he has uncovered an issue of reconstruction gone awry in eastern Afghanistan. A prison in
Baghlan, he said, is riddled with design and construction defects because the State Department
hired an Afghan firm to build it and that Afghan firm essentially failed to comply with
international building code requirements for masonry structures. The contract for the 495-inmate
prison, begun in 2010, was valued at $8.8 million but eventually increased to about $11.3 million
after a series of contract modifications, Mr. Sopko said. (Maggie Ybarra, Lax Guidance Feeds Afghan Corruption;
Report Says Billions In Aid Wasted, The Washington Times, 4/2/14)
In June 2009, The State Department Awarded A $20.2 Million Contract To Renovate A Prison In
Afghanistan. In June 2009, the Department of States Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs (INL) awarded a contract with a modified valued of $20.2 million to Al-Watan
Construction Company (AWCC) to replace prison block holding areas with individual cells and renovate
the prisons infrastructure, including its plumbing, electrical, and septic systems. (Pol-i-Charkhi Prison: After 5
Years And $18.5 Million, Renovation Project Remains Incomplete, 15-11-IP, Special Inspector General For Afghan Reconstruction, 10/14, summary)
The State Department Terminated The Contract For Convenience In November 2010. On
November 26, 2010, the Department of State terminated the contract for convenience. (Pol-i-Charkhi
Prison: After 5 Years And $18.5 Million, Renovation Project Remains Incomplete, 15-11-IP, Special Inspector General For Afghan Reconstruction,
10/14, Summary)
The State Department Paid $18.5 Million For The Renovation Work, Even Though Only About 50%
Of The Required Work Was Completed. The Department of States (State) Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) paid Al-Watan Construction Company (AWCC) $18.5
million for work performed on a contract valued at $20.2 million, even though AWCC only completed
about 50 percent of the required work. (Pol-i-Charkhi Prison: After 5 Years And $18.5 Million, Renovation Project Remains Incomplete,
15-11-IP, Special Inspector General For Afghan Reconstruction, 10/14, summary)
An Independent Firm Also Identified Defective Workmanship In The Portions Of The Project
That Were Completed. Furthermore, an independent firm identified defective workmanship, including
the failure to backfill trenches, improper roof flashing, soil settlement issues, and the failure to connect
six back-up generators to the prisons power grid. (Pol-i-Charkhi Prison: After 5 Years And $18.5 Million, Renovation Project
Remains Incomplete, 15-11-IP, Special Inspector General For Afghan Reconstruction, 10/14, summary)
The State Departments Own Inspector General Also Warned Of Fraud And Wasteful Projects,
Like A Diplomatic Center That Was Cancelled Only After The State Department Spent $85
Million On It
The State Department Inspector General Found That The State Departments Handling Of The Iraq
Transition Exposed The Department To Waste, Fraud, Abuse, And Lax Oversight Of Contracts.
Mission management faces a daunting challenge in the transition from huge legacy DOD contracts
managed largely by military personnel, including the Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program IV, to
Department contracts to provide life support and other services by the end of December 2013. Currently,
dedicated acquisition professionals from the Defense Contract Management Agency and Defense Contract
Audit Agency monitor these contracts. The Department has not taken steps to identify and recruit an
adequate number of qualified personnel to perform these functions when the new contracts come into
force. Besides exposing the Department to waste, fraud, and abuse, lax oversight of these contracts
[REDACTED]. (Inspection Of Embassy Baghdad And Constituent Posts, Iraq, ISP-I-13-25A, State Department Office Of The Inspector General, 5/13, p.
19)
The State Department Cancelled The Erbil Diplomatic Support Center During Construction After It
Had Already Spent $85 Million On It. In the last several months, the administration made a number of
policy decisions to eliminate programs and close facilities, which resulted in the Department terminating
construction projects in whole or in part before occupancy. These policy shifts stretched the
Departments planning capacity and the missions ability to redirect resources. For example, at the Erbil
Diplomatic Support Center, the Department canceled ongoing construction in February 2013, after
expenditures of approximately $85 million, with the decision to cease Department operations at the
location by July 2013. (Inspection Of Embassy Baghdad And Constituent Posts, Iraq, ISP-I-13-25A, State Department Office Of The Inspector
General, 5/13, p. 42)
In Preparation For The Turnover To Iraqi Authorities, The State Department Halted A $32 Million
Construction Project At Embassy Annex Prosperity. During the inspection, in preparation for
turnover to the Government of Iraq, mission operations drew down at Embassy Annex Prosperity, where
a $32 million construction project was halted. The final phase of the Prosperity site closure requires
construction of a new $11.5 million heavy vehicle maintenance facility on the embassy compound.
(Inspection Of Embassy Baghdad And Constituent Posts, Iraq, ISP-I-13-25A, State Department Office Of The Inspector General, 5/13, p. 42)
In Iraq, The State Departments Accounting Was So Poor That It Lost Track Of $8.7 Million Worth
Of Equipment Transferred To It By The Department Of Defense. For example, the mission is unable
to locate 172 items valued at $8.7 million, including generators and other equipment, marked as DOD
transfers in the embassys property database. OIGs Office of Audits is conducting an audit of personal
property management in Mission Iraq. (Inspection Of Embassy Baghdad And Constituent Posts, Iraq, ISP-I-13-25A, State Department
Office Of The Inspector General, 5/13, p. 45)
In 2012, The State Department Scrapped An $80 Million Consulate Building Project In
Afghanistan, Which Was So Unsuitable That Foreign Diplomats That Were Asked To Sublet
The Property Found The Prospect Laughable
In 2012, After Signing A 10 Year Lease And Spending Over $80 Million For A Potential Diplomatic
Hub In Northern Afghanistan, State Department Officials Scrapped The Project. After signing a 10year lease and spending more than $80 million on a site envisioned as the United States diplomatic hub
in northern Afghanistan, American officials say they have abandoned their plans, deeming the location for
the proposed compound too dangerous. (Ernesto Londono, Citing Security, U.S. Abandons Consulate Site In Afghanistan, The
Washington Post, 5/5/12)
In 2009, The State Department Sought Waivers To Stringent Building Rules And Overlooked
Significant Security Problems At The Site. Eager to raise an American flag and open a consulate in a
bustling downtown district of the northern Afghan city of Mazar-e Sharif, officials in 2009 sought waivers
to stringent State Department building rules and overlooked significant security problems at the site,
documents show. (Ernesto Londono, Citing Security, U.S. Abandons Consulate Site In Afghanistan, The Washington Post, 5/5/12)
A Memo From Embassy Kabul Said That The Facility Was Far From Ideal From The Start. The
embassy memo says the facility was far from ideal from the start. (Ernesto Londono, Citing Security, U.S. Abandons
Consulate Site In Afghanistan, The Washington Post, 5/5/12)
Embassy Kabul Wrote That The Department Nonetheless Granted Exceptions To Standards
To Move Forward Quickly The Department nonetheless granted exceptions to standards to
move forward quickly, establish an interim presence and raise the flag, Kelly wrote. (Ernesto Londono,
Citing Security, U.S. Abandons Consulate Site In Afghanistan, The Washington Post, 5/5/12)
The Embassy Kabul Memo Noted That The Compound Was Incredibly Vulnerable To Attack And
Was Designed In Such A Way That An Emergency Response Would Be Next To Impossible. The
entire compound is surrounded by buildings with overwatch and there is almost no space on the
compound that cannot be watched, or fired upon, from an elevated position outside the compound, Kelly
wrote. Responding effectively to an emergency at the consulate would be next to impossible, Kelly noted,
because the facility does not have space for a Black Hawk helicopter to land. (Ernesto Londono, Citing Security, U.S.
Abandons Consulate Site In Afghanistan, The Washington Post, 5/5/12)
In December 2011, State Department Officials Began To Try And Find Other Uses For The Facility,
Including Subletting It To The German Or Swedish Governments. In December, embassy officials
began exploring alternative short-term sites for their diplomatic staff in northern Afghanistan. A Western
diplomat familiar with the situation said the United States has sought, so far in vain, to persuade the
German and Swedish governments to sublet it. (Ernesto Londono, Citing Security, U.S. Abandons Consulate Site In Afghanistan, The
Washington Post, 5/5/12)
European Diplomats Found This Prospect Laughable. The diplomat, who spoke on the
condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak about the matter, said European
diplomats have found the prospect laughable. (Ernesto Londono, Citing Security, U.S. Abandons Consulate Site In
Afghanistan, The Washington Post, 5/5/12)
Poor State Department Management Of Construction Projects At The U.S. Embassy In Kabul
Increased Costs By Almost $167.5 Million (27%) And Led To A More Than Three Year Delay
In 2009 And 2010, The State Department Awarded Two Contracts Originally Worth $625.4 Million
To Support The Growing Facility Needs Of Embassy Kabul. In fiscal years 2009 and 2010, State
awarded two contracts originally worth $625.4 million in total to meet growing facility requirements at
the U.S. embassy in Kabul. (Embassy Construction Cost And Schedule Have Increased, And Further Facilities Planning Is Needed, GAO-15-410,
Government Accountability Office, 5/15, p. 4)
By 2015, The Costs For The 2009 And 2010 Contracts For Embassy Kabul Were Almost 27%
Higher Than The Original Contract Costs And The Project Was Over 3 Years Past Its Original
Completion Date. The costs for the 2009 and 2010 contracts are now almost 27 percent higher than the
original contract costs. The completed project will be delivered just over 3 years later than originally
planned. State did not follow its cost containment and risk mitigation procedures, a fact that likely
contributed, in part, to increased cost and extended schedules. (Embassy Construction Cost And Schedule Have Increased,
And Further Facilities Planning Is Needed, GAO-15-410, Government Accountability Office, 5/15, p. 10)
As Of March 2015, The 2009 And 2010 Contracts Totaled A Combined $792.9 Million, Which
Represented An Increase Of $167.5 Million Since The Contracts Award. As of March 2015, the 2009
and 2010 contracts have a combined total cost of $792.9 million, which represents an increase of $167.5
million, or almost 27 percent, since contract award. At award, the 2009 and 2010 contracts were worth
$209.4 million and $416 million, respectively, for a total of $625.4 million. (Embassy Construction Cost And Schedule
Have Increased, And Further Facilities Planning Is Needed, GAO-15-410, Government Accountability Office, 5/15, p. 10)
The State Department Did Not Properly Follow Its Own Or The Office Of Management And
Budgets Requirements For Cost Containment Studies, A Fact That Likely Contributed To
Increased Costs And Extended Schedules In The 2009 And 2010 Contracts. The U.S. Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) and State both require cost containment studies for certain construction
projects. Also, State requires OBO to assess risks posed to its construction projects. However, State did
not properly follow these cost containment and risk assessment policies, a fact that likely contributed to
increased costs and extended schedules in the 2009 and 2010 contracts. (Embassy Construction Cost And Schedule
Have Increased, And Further Facilities Planning Is Needed, GAO-15-410, Government Accountability Office, 5/15, p. 15)
The State Department Paid $6.5 Million For Unused Communications Towers In Afghanistan,
Which State Department Senior Personnel, Defense Department Flag Officers, And Afghan
Officials Questioned The Viability Of From The Start
In 2012, The State Department Awarded A Contract To Have 6 Communications Towers Built In
Afghanistan. The contract to design and build the six towers was awarded to MNM Communications Inc.
for $7.2 million dollars. Construction of all six towers was completed during 2012. Four of these towers
are located in Helmand Province, one is located in Kandahar Province, and one is located in Ghazni
Province. (John Sopko, Letter To John Kerry et al., Office Of The Special Inspector General For Afghanistan Reconstruction, 2/25/14)
The State Department Ultimately Paid $6.5 Million For The Towers Project. How much in
total money has been spent on the media towers and associated facilities? This PAS/STRATCOM
towers project consisted of two contracts for a total amount of $6,500,568. (Michael Reinert, Letter To John
Sopko, U.S. Department Of State, 3/21/14)
After Determining It Couldnt Use The Towers For Their Intended Purpose, The State Department
Considered Other Options, But Could Find No Other Use For The Towers. After it became clear that
the towers could not be used for their originally intended purpose, the Department considered
alternatives but determined that there was no available foreign assistance or other State Department use
for the towers. (Michael Reinert, Letter To John Sopko, U.S. Department Of State, 3/21/14)
SIGAR Expressed Concern That The Projects Officials Did Not Take Into Consideration A Number
Of Apparent Red Flags Which Were Evident Prior To The Decision To Commit Over $6.5 Million In
U.S. Taxpayer Funds. Given this information, I am concerned that the officials responsible for planning
and executing this project did not take into consideration a number of apparent red flags which were
evident prior to the decision to commit over$6.5 million in U.S. taxpayer funds. (John Sopko, Letter To John Kerry,
Office Of The Special Inspector General For Afghanistan Reconstruction, 9/9/14)
These Red Flags Included Serious Concerns Expressed By Senior State Department
Personnel, Department Of Defense (DOD) Flag Officers, And Afghan Officials About The
Projects Viability. Based on the records provided to SIGAR, such red flags included serious
concerns expressed by senior State Department personnel, Department of Defense (DOD) flag
officers, and Afghan officials regarding the viability of the project. (John Sopko, Letter To John Kerry, Office Of The
Special Inspector General For Afghanistan Reconstruction, 9/9/14)
The State Department Spent $3.6 Million On TV Trucks To Broadcast Live Sports In
Afghanistan, But It Never Used Them
Three TV Production Trucks Purchased By The State Department To Broadcast Sports In
Afghanistan Were Delivered Two Years Late And For Triple The Cost. Three television production
trucks purchased by the U.S. State Department to broadcast live sporting events in Afghanistan were
delivered two years late and at triple the cost another glaring example of taxpayer waste, a
government watchdog agency says. (TV Trucks Sent To Kabul Sit Unused, Waste Of U.S. Tax Dollars: Watchdog, NBC News, 10/24/14)
The Total Cost Of The Trucks Was $3.6 Million. The trucks finally arrived in July, and the total
cost of shipping them ballooned to $3.6 million, according to a letter sent from the Office of the
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) to Secretary of State John
Kerry. (TV Trucks Sent To Kabul Sit Unused, Waste Of U.S. Tax Dollars: Watchdog, NBC News, 10/24/14)
The Contract Was Initially Authorized In August 2011. The contract, which was initially
authorized in August 2011, stipulated that the trucks needed to have been delivered within 180 to
210 days. (TV Trucks Sent To Kabul Sit Unused, Waste Of U.S. Tax Dollars: Watchdog, NBC News, 10/24/14)
SIGAR Said That Based On The Information It Had Received, It Suggests That Something Is
Seriously Wrong With The Way This Contract Was Managed. If this information is accurate, it
suggests that something is seriously wrong with the way this contract was managed. If it is true that the
State Department may still be able to cancel the contract for default, then it may be something State may
wish to consider. (John Sopko, Letter To John Kerry, Office Of The Special Inspector General For Afghanistan Reconstruction, 10/15/14)
Clintons State Department Spent Over $630,000 To Increase Its Facebook Likes
The State Department Inspector General Found That The State Department Had Spent Over
$630,000 To Increase Its Facebook Likes For Four Of Its Pages. The State Department spent over
$630,000 to increase Facebook likes for four of its pages on the social-networking site, according to an
inspector generals report. (Josh Hicks, IG Report: State Department Spent $630,000 To Increase Facebook Likes, The Washington Post,
7/3/13)
This Money Was Spent On Two Campaigns In 2011 And 2012. The coordinator initiated two
campaigns in 2011 and 2012, with the goal of building global outreach platforms for engagement
with foreign audiences by increasing the number of fans on IIPs four thematic Facebook
properties, primarily through advertising as well as through some page improvements. The
bureau spent about $630,000 on the two campaigns and succeeded in increasing the fans of the
English Facebook pages from about 100,000 to more than 2 million for each page. (Inspection Of The
Bureau Of International Information Programs, ISP-I-13-28, U.S. Department Of State Office Of Inspector General, 5/13, p. 21)
Between 2011 And March 2013, The State Department Increased Its Facebook Fans From About
100,000 To More Than 2 Million, But Employees Complained The Agency Was Buying Fans. The
efforts, which involved advertising initiatives between 2011 and March 2013, increased the fan numbers
for each page from about 100,000 to more than 2 million, the report said. But employees complained that
the agency was buying fans, according to the inspector general. (Josh Hicks, IG Report: State Department Spent $630,000
To Increase Facebook Likes, The Washington Post, 7/3/13)
The Inspector General Stated That The State Department Could Have Reduced Spending And
Increased Impact If It Had Moved Away From Its Focus On Numbers And Toward Accomplishing
Specific Goals. The bureau could reduce spending and increase strategic impact by focusing its
advertising not on raising overall fan numbers or general engagement statistics but on accomplishing
specific PD goals. (Inspection Of The Bureau Of International Information Programs, ISP-I-13-28, U.S. Department Of State Office Of Inspector
General, 5/13, p. 21-22)
10
In July 2013, The State Department Said That It Then Only Spent $2,500 Per Month On
Advertising, Which It Claimed Was A Clear Indication Weve Taken The [Inspector
Generals] Recommendations Seriously. Psaki said the Bureau of International Information
Programs now spends $2,500 per month on online advertising. I think thats a clear indication
weve taken the recommendations seriously and put changes in place, she added. (Josh Hicks, IG Report:
State Department Spent $630,000 To Increase Facebook Likes, The Washington Post, 7/3/13)
This Move Potentially Cost Tax Payers An Extra $1 Million. Two senior State Department
contracting officials, Randolph Bennett and Tandra Jones, successfully pushed for the contract to
go to a firm run by Denise Mathis-Gardner as a no-bid minority 8(a) contract, the source said
an action that one shut-out competitor complained cost taxpayers an extra $1 million. (Geoff Earle,
Hills Aides In Bully Crystal, The New York Post, 4/19/10)
In 2010, Embassy Algiers Spent $25,775 Renovating The Pool At The Ambassadors Residence. (USA
Spending, Accessed 3/9/16)
In 2012, Embassy Jakarta Spent $37,234 On Embassy Participation In Social Media Fest 2012.
(USA Spending, Accessed 3/9/16)
In 2012, Embassy Ljubljana In Slovenia, Spent $23,625 For The Services Of A Social Media
Coordinator. (USA Spending, Accessed 3/9/16)
In 2010, The State Department Awarded A No-Bid Contract For $8,708 To Install A DJ Booth At The
U.S. Embassy In Baghdad. (USASpending, Accessed 3/4/16)
The State Departments Bureau Of Educational And Cultural Affairs Spent Over $1,000,000
On A Website
In 2011, The State Departments Bureau Of Educational And Cultural Affairs Spent $632,295 On A
Website For The Alumni Of Its Educational Exchange Program. (USASpending, Accessed 3/29/16)
A Little Over A Month Later, The State Departments Bureau Of Educational And Cultural
Affairs Paid Another $397,338 For Website Design. (USASpending, Accessed 3/29/16)
The State Department Spent $88,000 To Send Three Comedians To Visit India On A Tour Called
Make Chai Not War. Diplomacy with a laugh, is how you might describe one of the U.S. State
Department's latest efforts to promote American culture abroad. This week, three Indian-American
comedians began a seven-city tour of India called Make Chai Not War. But apart from their shared Indian
heritage, these three comedians have very different styles The tour for the three comedians is costing
about $88,000 which might prompt questions about why the State Department is sponsoring stand-up
comedy. Macy says it's because stand-up is a unique part of American culture. (Elizabeth Blair, State Department
Sends Chai Comedy Tour To India, NPR, 1/4/12)
In September 2011, The State Department Paid $30,000 To Send Eight Members Of A Dance
Company On A Weeklong Trip To Indonesia. In September 2011, the U.S. Department of State
awarded New York Citys Battery Dance Company $30,000 in taxpayer money to send eight members of
the dance company on a weeklong trip to Indonesia. The groups activities will include performances and
workshops. (2011 Wastebook, Office Of Senator Coburn, 12/11, p. 50)
In 2010, The State Department Spent Nearly Half A Million Dollars On A Pair Of Art And
Architecture Exhibitions In Italy. The State Department is poised to spend nearly a half-million dollars
on a pair of upcoming art and architecture exhibitions in Italy, an expense that fiscal watchdogs criticize
with the nations budget picture stuck in the red. (Jim McElhatton, Feds Defend $450K For Art, Design Shows, The Washington
Times, 3/18/10)
This Included $350,000 So That U.S. Artists Could Showcase Their Works And Another
$100,000 So That U.S.-Based Curators Could Travel And Display Their Works In Venice.
Plans call for the State Department to spend $350,000 so that U.S. artists can showcase their
works at the 54th edition of the Venice Biennale next year, an international event thats been
dubbed the Olympics of modern art. Department officials plan to spend an additional $100,000 so
U.S.-based curators at nonprofit museums, galleries and arts and architecture schools can travel
and display their works at the Venice Biennale of Architecture, scheduled for later this year. (Jim
McElhatton, Feds Defend $450K For Art, Design Shows, The Washington Times, 3/18/10)
Clinton Spent $250,000 To Celebrate The 50th Anniversary Of The Art In Embassies Program,
A Program Through Which The State Department Spent $4.5 Million Annually On Art That
May Not Be Something Specifically The American Citizen Can Experience
In 2012, The State Department Paid $375,000 For Art In Rabat, Morocco. (USASpending, Accessed 3/24/16)
In 2011, The Art In Embassies Program Spent $250,000 On Art In China. (USASpending, Accessed 3/24/16)
In 2011, The Art In Embassies Program Spent $160,000 On Art In China. (USASpending, Accessed 3/24/16)
In 2012, The State Department Paid $155,000 For Art In Bucharest, Romania. (USASpending, Accessed
3/24/16)
In 2011, The State Department Paid $139,500 For Art In Tijuana, Mexico. (USASpending, Accessed 3/24/16)
In 2010, The State Department Paid $125,000 For Art In Tijuana, Mexico. (USASpending, Accessed 3/24/16)
In 2011, The State Department Paid $112,500 For Art In Dakar, Senegal. (USASpending, Accessed 3/24/16)
In 2009, The State Departments Spent $34,889 To Renovate The Tennis Courts At The U.S.
Embassy In New Delhi. (USASpending, Accessed 9/20/16)
In 2011, The State Department Defended Spending $79,000 To Purchase Copies Of Obamas
Books. The U.S. State Department is defending its purchase of $79,000 worth of President Obama's bestselling books, telling reporters on Wednesday that it's not an unusual practice to provide books to
distribute in diplomats' host countries. (State Department Defends $79,000 Purchase Of Obama Memoirs, Fox News, 10/26/11)
State Department Spending On International Polling Rose Significantly During The Years Clinton
Served As Secretary Of State. According to the data, the department spent significantly more on
international polling during the years that Mrs. Clinton served as secretary of state. (Kellan Howell, State
Department Spent $36.5 Million Polling Foreigners Opinions, The Washington Times, 11/19/15)
The State Department Went From Spending $3.8 Million In 2008, To Over $7.5 Million In 2012,
Before Falling Back To $2.7 Million In 2014. That number nearly doubled in 2008 to over $3.8
million. The spending continued to increase in 2009, Mrs. Clintons first year as secretary, to over $5
million. In FY2012 alone the height of Mrs. Clintons term as secretary and the year of President
Obamas re-election the State Department spent over $7.5 million on international polls. And during
Mrs. Clintons tenure as secretary, the polling contracts became less transparent. Many of the projects
were simply described with one word, survey, and were billed to miscellaneous foreign contractors.
But in 2014, after Mrs. Clinton left the department, international survey spending fell to $2.7 million.
(Kellan Howell, State Department Spent $36.5 Million Polling Foreigners Opinions, The Washington Times, 11/19/15)
In 2010, The State Department Spent $70,767 On Archaeological Excavation In Norway. (USA
Spending, Accessed 3/9/16)
In 2010, Norway Was The 4th Richest Country In The World, With A Per Capita Income Of
Nearly $52,000. In Norway, which ranks fourth, petroleum accounts for nearly half of exports
and is the main contributor to its PPP-adjusted GDP per capita of nearly $52,000; the country is
also one of the worlds largest gas exporters. (Beth Greenfield, The Worlds Richest Countries, Forbes, 2/22/12)
Between 2010-2012, The State Department Spent $160,376 On Fireworks. (USASpending, Accessed 3/28/16)
In 2011, The State Department Spent $216, 328 On An Event Coordinator For A Fourth Of July
Celebration In Madrid, Spain. (USASpending, Accessed 3/29/16)
In 2011, The State Department Spent An Additional $126,888 To Cater That Fourth Of July
Celebration In Madrid, Spain. (USASpending, Accessed 3/29/16)
In 2012, The State Department Spent $107,219 On The Design Layout For Its Fourth Of July
Celebration In Madrid, Spain. (USASpending, Accessed 3/29/16)
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In March 2014, The State Departments Inspector General Released An Audit Of The State
Departments Management Of Contract Files Over The Previous Six Years, Which Included All Of
Clintons Tenure. The Office of Inspector General (OIG), in recent audits, investigations, and
inspections, has identified significant vulnerabilities in the management of contract file documentation
that could expose the Department to substantial financial losses. Specifically, over the past 6 years, OIG
has identified Department of State (Department) contracts with a total value of more than $6 billion in
which contract files were incomplete or could not be located at all. (Management Alert (Contract File Management
Deficiencies), State Department Office Of The Inspector General, 3/20/14, p.1)
The Inspector General Report Noted That The State Department Could Not Properly Account For
Over $6 Billion In Contract Funding. Specifically, over the past 6 years, OIG has identified Department
of State (Department) contracts with a total value of more than $6 billion in which contract files were
incomplete or could not be located at all. (Management Alert (Contract File Management Deficiencies), State Department Office Of The
Inspector General, 3/20/14, p.1)
The Report Found That There Was More Than $6 Billion Worth Of Contract Files That Were
Incomplete Or Could Not Be Located At All. Specifically, over the past 6 years, OIG has identified
Department of State (Department) contracts with a total value of more than $6 billion in which
contract files were incomplete or could not be located at all. (Management Alert (Contract File Management
Deficiencies), State Department Office Of The Inspector General, 3/20/14, p.1)
The Inspector Generals Report Identified Significant Vulnerabilities That Could Expose The
Department To Substantial Financial Loses. The Office of Inspector General (OIG), in recent audits,
investigations, and inspections, has identified significant vulnerabilities in the management of contract
file documentation that could expose the Department to substantial financial losses. (Management Alert (Contract
File Management Deficiencies), State Department Office Of The Inspector General, 3/20/14, p.1)
The Inspector General Found That The State Departments Failure To Maintain Contract Files
Adequately Creates Significant Financial Risk And Demonstrates A Lack Of Internal Control. The
failure to maintain contract files adequately creates significant financial risk and demonstrates a lack of
internal control over the Department's contract actions. (Management Alert (Contract File Management Deficiencies), State
Department Office Of The Inspector General, 3/20/14, p.2)
The Inspector General Designated Contract Management As One Of The State Departments Major
Management Challenges. Therefore, OIG has designated contract management as one of the
Department's major management challenges for the past several years. (Management Alert (Contract File Management
Deficiencies), State Department Office Of The Inspector General, 3/20/14, p.2)
The Report Concluded That The State Department Created Conditions Conducive To Fraud And
That Limited The Governments Ability To Hold Criminals Accountable. It creates conditions
conducive to fraud, as corrupt individuals may attempt to conceal evidence of illicit behavior by omitting
key documents from the contract file. Finally, it limits the ability of the Government to punish and deter
criminal behavior. (Management Alert (Contract File Management Deficiencies), State Department Office Of The Inspector General, 3/20/14, p.4)
One Investigation By The Inspector General Found That A Contract Specialist Overseeing A
Contract Worth $52 Million Did Not Disclose That Some Of The Contract Work Was Awarded
To The Specialists Spouse. In the case of work undertaken by OIG's Office of Investigations, one
14
investigation revealed that a contract file did not contain documentation reflecting that modifications
and task orders were awarded to the company owned by the spouse of a contractor employee
performing as a Contract Specialist for the contract. This contract was valued at $52 million.
(Management Alert (Contract File Management Deficiencies), State Department Office Of The Inspector General, 3/20/14, p.3)
Another Investigation Found That The State Department Paid A Contractor Almost $800,000
Even Though There Was No Documents To Justify The Payment. In a third investigation, OIG
found that a COR allowed the payment of $792,782 to a contractor even though the contract file did
not contain documents to support the payment. (Management Alert (Contract File Management Deficiencies), State
Department Office Of The Inspector General, 3/20/14, p.3)
In September 2014, The State Department Inspector General Issued A Management Alert
Regarding The State Departments Management And Oversight Of Grants. SUBJECT: Management
Alert (Grants Management Deficiencies) The management and oversight of grants poses heightened
financial risk to the Department of State (Department). (Steve A. Linick, Management Alert (Grants Management Deficiencies),
State Department Office Of Inspector General, 9/26/14, p. 1)
State Department Grants Amount To A Significant Amount Of Funding - $1.6 Billion Just In
2012. In FY 2012, the Department obligated more than $1.6 billion for approximately 14,000
grants and cooperative agreements worldwide. (Steve A. Linick, Management Alert (Grants Management Deficiencies),
State Department Office Of Inspector General, 9/26/14, p. 1)
The Inspector General Concluded That The Department Needs To Take Immediate Action
Because There Is An Unacceptable Lack Of Internal Control And Exposes The Department To
Significant Financial Risk. The Department should take immediate action to ensure that adequate
numbers of properly trained GOs and GORs are assigned, required documentation is maintained in grant
files, and expired grants are closed out in a timely manner. The failure to maintain appropriate oversight
over grants results in an unacceptable lack of internal control and exposes the Department to significant
financial risk. (Steve A. Linick, Management Alert (Grants Management Deficiencies), State Department Office Of Inspector General, 9/26/14, p. 5)
The State Departments Poor Oversight Of Grants Creates Conditions Conducive To Fraud. These
conditions could lead to the misuse or misappropriation of grant funds, failure to meet grant program
objectives, or the inability to use unobligated grant funds before they expire. Furthermore, the lack of
documentation impairs OIG oversight of Department programs and operations that administer or finance
grants, and it creates conditions conducive to fraud, where corrupt individuals may attempt to conceal
evidence of illicit behavior by omitting key documents from grant files. (Steve A. Linick, Management Alert (Grants
Management Deficiencies), State Department Office Of Inspector General, 9/26/14, p. 5)
By March 1, 2012 The State Dept. Let Over $80 Million In Grant Money Expire. OIG noted that, as of
March 1, 2012, $81.9 million in unspent funds were linked to 955 grant accounts for which the period of
performance had ended. (Steve A. Linick, Management Alert (Grants Management Deficiencies), State Department Office Of Inspector General,
9/26/14, p. 5)
Grants Can Be Used To Help Refugees, Combat Human Trafficking, And Promote Democracy.
The Department uses them to award assistance to individuals and organizations for a variety of
purposes, such as fostering educational and cultural exchanges with citizens of other countries,
promoting democracy and civil society, facilitating refugee resettlement, combating human
trafficking, and developing the law-enforcement and justice-system capabilities of other nations. (Steve
A. Linick, Management Alert (Grants Management Deficiencies), State Department Office Of Inspector General, 9/26/14, p. 1)
15
2009
In FY 2009, Audits Of The Departments Financial Statements Found Material Weaknesses
With The State Departments Internal Financial Controls And Other Significant Deficiencies
(Kearney & Company, Report Of Independent Auditors, U.S. Department Of State, 11/14/10)
NOTE: Click Here For The 2009 Auditors Report Of The State Departments Financial
Statements.
2010
In FY 2010, Audits Of The Departments Financial Statements Found Significant Deficiencies
With The State Departments Financial Controls
16
(Kearney & Company, Report Of Independent Auditors, U.S. Department Of State, 11/14/10)
2011
In FY 2011, Auditors Upgraded The Severity Of The State Departments Financial Reporting
Issue To A Material Weakness And Continued To Report Other Significant Deficiencies
(Kearney & Company, Report Of Independent Auditors, U.S. Department Of State, 11/14/11)
2012
In FY 2012, Auditors Continued To Classify The Severity Of The State Departments Financial
Reporting Issue As A Material Weakness And Continued To Report Other Significant
Deficiencies
(Kearney & Company, Report Of Independent Auditors, U.S. Department Of State, 11/15/12)
DURING CLINTONS TENURE, AUDITORS REPORTED PERSISTENT ISSUES WITH NONCOMPLIANCE OF FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS
Violations Of The Anti-Deficiency Act
17
In 2009, Auditors Found Instances Of The State Department Potentially In Violation Of The
Antideficiency Act. Antideficiency Act. This act prohibits the Department from completing the
following: (1) Making or authorizing an expenditure from, or creating or authorizing an obligation under,
any appropriation or fund in excess of the amount available in the appropriation or fund unless
authorized by law; (2) Involving the Government in any obligation to pay money before funds have been
appropriated for that purpose, unless otherwise allowed by law; and (3) Making obligations or
expenditures in excess of an apportionment or reapportionment, or in excess of the amount permitted by
agency regulations. Our audit procedures identified Treasury fund symbols with negative balances
potentially in violation of the Antideficiency Act. The Department had previously identified some of the
potential violations and was researching others as of the end of our fieldwork. (Kearney & Company, Report Of
Independent Auditors, U.S. Department Of State, 12/14/09)
In 2010, Auditors Found Negative Balances On State Department Financial Records That Could
Constitute A Violation Of The Antideficiency Act. Antideficiency Act. This act prohibits the
Department from (1) making or authorizing an expenditure from, or creating or authorizing an obligation
under, any appropriation or fund in excess of the amount available in the appropriation or fund unless
authorized by law; (2) involving the Government in any obligation to pay money before funds have been
appropriated for that purpose, unless otherwise allowed by law; and (3) making obligations or
expenditures in excess of an apportionment or reapportionment, or in excess of the amount permitted by
agency regulations. Our audit procedures identified Department of the Treasury (Treasury) fund symbols
with negative balances potentially in violation of the Antideficiency Act. (Kearney & Company, Report Of Independent
Auditors, U.S. Department Of State, 11/14/10)
In 2011, Auditors Continued To Find Negative Balances On State Department Financial Records
That Could Constitute Violations Of The Anti-Deficiency Act. Antideficiency Act. This act prohibits
the Department from (1) making or authorizing an expenditure from, or creating or authorizing an
obligation under, any appropriation or fund in excess of the amount available in the appropriation or
fund unless authorized by law; (2) involving the Government in any obligation to pay money before funds
have been appropriated for that purpose, unless otherwise allowed by law; and (3) making obligations or
expenditures in excess of an apportionment or reapportionment, or in excess of the amount permitted by
agency regulations. Our audit procedures identified Department of the Treasury (Treasury) fund symbols
with negative balances that were potentially in violation of the Antideficiency Act. (Kearney & Company, Report Of
Independent Auditors, U.S. Department Of State, 11/14/11)
In 2012, Auditors Continued To Find Negative Balances On State Department Financial Records
That Could Constitute Violations Of The Anti-Deficiency Act. Antideficiency Act. This act prohibits
the Department from (1) making or authorizing an expenditure from, or creating or authorizing an
obligation under, any appropriation or fund in excess of the amount available in the appropriation or
fund unless authorized by law; (2) involving the Government in any obligation to pay money before funds
have been appropriated for that purpose, unless otherwise allowed by law; and (3) making obligations or
expenditures in excess of an apportionment or reapportionment, or in excess of the amount permitted by
agency regulations. Our audit procedures identified Department of the Treasury fund symbols with
negative balances that were potentially in violation of the Antideficiency Act. (Kearney & Company, Report Of
Independent Auditors, U.S. Department Of State, 11/15/12)
misappropriation; and (3) revenues and expenditures applicable to Department operations are properly
recorded and accounted for to permit the preparation of accounts and reliable financial and statistical
reports, and to maintain accountability over the assets. However, as discussed in our report on internal
controls, we found that the Department does not have effective controls over property, unliquidated
obligations, and financial reporting. (Kearney & Company, Report Of Independent Auditors, U.S. Department Of State, 12/14/09)
In 2010, Auditors Found The State Departments Ineffective Control Over Property, Budgetary
Accounting, And Financial Reporting Could Violate The OMB Circular A-127 Regulation. OMB
Circular A-127, Financial Management Systems. This circular requires the Department to establish and
maintain an accounting system that provides for (1) complete disclosure of the financial results of the
activities of the Department; (2) adequate financial information for Department management, and for
formulation and execution of the budget; and (3) effective control over revenue, expenditure, funds,
19
property, and other assets. However, we found that the financial system did not maintain effective
control over property, budgetary accounting, and financial reporting. (Kearney & Company, Report Of Independent
Auditors, U.S. Department Of State, 11/14/10)
In 2010, Auditors Found The State Departments Continued Lack Of Control Over Property And
Unliquidated Obligations Could Violate The Budget And Accounting Procedures Act Of 1950.
Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950. This act requires an accounting system to provide full
disclosure of the results of financial operations, adequate financial information needed in the
management of operations and the formulation and execution of the budget, and effective control over
income, expenditures, funds, property, and other assets. The Department lacks a budgetary financial
reporting system that is integrated with the financial management system general ledger, which forces
the Department to use a manual, labor-intensive process to develop the statement of budgetary
resources. In addition, we found that the Departments financial system does not provide effective control
over property and unliquidated obligations. (Kearney & Company, Report Of Independent Auditors, U.S. Department Of State,
11/14/10)
make payments within 30 days, as required. Additionally, we found that the Department did not
consistently pay interest penalties for domestic and overseas payments in accordance with the Prompt
Payment Act. (Kearney & Company, Report Of Independent Auditors, U.S. Department Of State, 11/15/12)
21