8.

Milestone Realty v CA

9.

Villaviza v Panganiban

10. Basbas v Entena

Doctrine: Right of pre-emption and redemption
Facts: Appellee-landholder Rufino Entena sent a letter to appellant-tenant Pablo
Basbas to the effect that the subject landholding (located in Sta Rosa, Laguna) was
being put up for sale at P13,000.00 per hectare and the tenant being given 90 days
within which to communicate his intention to purchase the said landholding;
otherwise, the land would be offered to other buyers.
In his reply, tenant-petitioner Basbas, accepted the offer to sell the land but disagreed
to the quoted price. Basbas also informed Entena that he was enlisting the aid of the
government in purchasing the land, as allowed by law.
However, a sworn affidavit of Entena and his wife attest that Basbas was fully notified
of the sale of their land 90 days before said conveyance, and that the tenant had
refused, or failed to exercise, the right of pre-emption granted him under the
Agricultural Land Reform Code. The submission of this affidavit enabled the
registration of the deed of sale in favor of vendees Flaviano Tibay and Angelina
Entena (son-in-law and daughter of Rufino Entena, respectively).
Basbas filed a complaint with the Court of Agrarian Relations against landholders
Rufino Entena and Sps Flaviano and Angelina Tibay.
The Agrarian Court dismissed the case, reasoning that since plaintiff Basbas failed to
make tender of payment and consignation of the purchase price, the landowner
cannot be compelled to sell the property to him.
Issue: W/N tender of payment and judicial consignation of the purchase price are
necessary before a tenant-lessee may avail himself of the right of pre-emption or of
redemption provided in Sections 11 and 12 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code.
Ruling: YES. The SC found that no error was committed by the Agrarian Court in
dismissing the case. First, there is no showing that the Land Reform Council has
proclaimed that the government machineries and agencies in the region are already
operating, as required by section 4 of Republic Act 3844.
Second, granting that sections 11 and 12 are operative, yet in Torres de Conejero, et
al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-21812, April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 775, the SC ruled
that the timely exercise of the right of legal redemption requires either tender of the
price or valid consignation thereof.
The timely exercise of the agricultural lessee's right of redemption requires: firstly, that
the Land Reform Council has previously proclaimed that the government machineries
and agencies in the region are already operating as required by Section 4 of Republic
Act 3844; and, secondly, there must be either a tender of the redemption money or
valid consignation thereof within the specified time limit.
In the case at bar, there was neither prior tender nor did judicial consignation
accompany the filing of the suit. Furthermore, in the cases Basbas is relying on for his

appeal, the Court took into account the brevity of the periods (9 days) allowed by the
law operating at the time (Civil Code of 1889); in the case at bar the statute grants the
tenant two years to redeem.
The SC affirmed the decision of the Agrarian Court to dismiss the case.

11. Tan v Pollescas

authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after due
hearing it is shown that:

FACTS:

Petitioners Tan were co-owners of a coconut farmland.Esteban Pollescas

was the original tenant of the land. Upon Estebans death, his son Enrique
succeeded him and was appointed tenant by the landowners. However,
respondent Reynalda, Estebans surviving second spouse, demanded that
the Tans recognize her as Estebans successor.

Reynalda filed a complaint before DARAB, questioning the tenancy

relationship of Tan and Enrique. DARAB ruled in favor of Reynalda,
declaring her as the lawful tenant of the Land. DARAB apportioned the
harvests between the Tans and Reynalda based on the customary sharing
system which is 2/3 to the landowner and 1/3 to the tenant.

Reynalda failed to deliver the 2/3 of the harvest. Tan heirs demanded the
payment thereof, but Reynalda ignored such demand.

Tan heirs filed a case for estafa for her failure to pay and deliver the share.

(1) The landholding is declared by the department head

upon recommendation of the National Planning Commission to be
suited for residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban
purposes: Provided, That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to
disturbance compensation equivalent to five times the average of
the gross harvests on his landholding during the last five preceding
calendar years;
(2) The agricultural lessee failed to substantially comply
with any of the terms and conditions of the contract or any of the
provisions of this Code unless his failure is caused by fortuitous
event or force majeure;
(3) The agricultural lessee planted crops or used the landholding for
a purpose other than what had been previously agreed upon;
(4) The agricultural lessee failed to adopt proven farm practices as
determined under paragraph 3 of Section twenty-nine;
(5) The land or other substantial permanent improvement thereon is
substantially damaged or destroyed or has unreasonably
deteriorated through the fault or negligence of the agricultural
lessee;
(6) The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease rental when it
falls due: Provided, That if the non-payment of the rental shall be
due to crop failure to the extent of seventy-five per centum as a
result of a fortuitous event, the non-payment shall not be a ground
for dispossession, although the obligation to pay the rental due that
particular crop is not thereby extinguished; or
(7) The lessee employed a sub-lessee on his landholding in
violation of the terms of paragraph 2 of Section twenty-seven.

Petitioner: The agreement was extinguished due to non-payment of lease (the 2/3 of
the harvest).
Respondent: The Tans demand excessive amount
ISSUE:

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY RULED THAT

REYNALDA IS OBLIGED TO PAY ONLY 1/4 OR 25% OF THE NORMAL
HARVEST AND NOT 2/3 WHEN THE SUBJECT LAND WAS NOT YET
PLACED UNDER THE LEASEHOLD SYSTEM PURSUANT TO SECTION
12 OF RA 6657
HELD: YES
In this case, the Tans seek ejectement of Reynalda from the Land due to nonpayment of lease rental. In order for non-payment of the lease rental to be a valid
ground to dispossess the agricultural lessee of the landholding, the amount of the
lease rental must first of all be lawful. If the amount of lease rental claimed exceeds
the limit allowed by law, non-payment of lease rental cannot be a ground to
dispossess the agricultural lessee of the landholding.
Section 34 of RA 3844 as amended mandates that not x x x more than 25% of the
average normal harvest shall constitute the just and fair rental for leasehold. In this
case, the Tan Heirs demanded Reynalda to deliver 2/3 of the harvest as lease rental,
which clearly exceeded the 25% maximum amount prescribed by law. Therefore, the
Tan Heirs cannot validly dispossess Reynalda of the landholding for non-payment of
rental precisely because the lease rental claimed by the Tan Heirs is unlawful.

SEC. 28. Termination of Leasehold by Agricultural Lessee During Agricultural

Year.The agricultural lessee may terminate the leasehold during the
agricultural year for any of the following causes:

1.

Cruel, inhuman or offensive treatment of the agricultural lessee or any

member of his immediate farm household by the agricultural lessor or his
representative with the knowledge and consent of the lessor;

2.

Non-compliance on the part of the agricultural lessor with any of the

obligations imposed upon him by the provisions of this Code or by his
contract with the agricultural lessee;

3.

Compulsion of the agricultural lessee or any member of his immediate farm

household by the agricultural lessor to do any work or render any service not
in any way connected with farm work or even without compulsion if no
compensation is paid;

4.

Commission of a crime by the agricultural lessor or his representative

against the agricultural lessee or any member of his immediate farm
household; or

DOCTRINE:

Section 36 of RA 3844 as amended enumerates the grounds for

dispossession of the tenants landholding, to wit:
SEC. 36. Possession of Landholding;
Exceptions.Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future
surrender of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment
and possession of his landholding except when his dispossession has been

5.

Voluntary surrender due to circumstances more advantageous to him and

his family.

12. Hidalgo v Hidalgo

DOCTRINE: Where the true intent of the law is clear, such intent or spirit must prevail
over the letter thereof. Whatever is within the spirit of a statue is within the statute,
since adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice, and contradictions
and would defeat the plain and vital purpose of the statute.
FACTS:
Case jointly decided two petitions for review of decisions with the same
issue involving the same landowners and vendees which dismissed
petitioners actions as share tenants for the enforcement of the right to
redeem agricultural lands. Petitioners have been working on the lands as
share tenants for several years.
1. First case: respondent-vendor Policarpio Hidalgo owned lands and
sold it with two other parcels of land for 4,000. Igmidio Hidalgo and
Martina Rosales as tenants alleged that the area of land they
worked on is worth 1, 500 and thus they seek the execution of a
deed of sale for the same amount by respondents-vendee in their
favor by way of redemption.
2. Second case: parcel of land worth 750 was sold by respondent.
Petitioner-spouses Hilario Aguila and Adela Hidalgo sought the
execution of a deed of sale for the same price by way of
redemption.
Sec12 of the Land Reform Code or RA 3844 is available to leasehold
tenants only but not to share tenants. It provides that:
Lessees Right of RedemptionIn case the landholding is sold to a
third person without the knowledge of agricultural lessee, the latter
shall have the right to redeem the same at a reasonable price and
consideration.; Provided: further, that where there are two or more
agricultural lessees, each shall be entitled to said right of
redemption only to the extent of the area actually cultivated by him.
The right of redemption under this Section may be exercised within
two years from the registration of the sale, and shall have the
priority over any right of legal redemption.
No 90-day notice of intention to sell the lands for the exercise of the preemption prescribed by Sex11 of the Agricultural Land Reform was given
ISSUE: WON the right of redemption granted by Sec12 of RA 3844 is applicable to
share tenants also. Or, WON the plaintiffs, as share tenants are entitled to redeem
the parcel of land they are working from the purchasers thereof where no notice was
previously given to them by the vendor, who was their landholder, of the latters
intention to sell their property and where the vendor did not execute the affidavit
required by Sec13 of RA 3844 before the registration of the deed of sale.
RATIO:
The agrarian court erred in dismissing the petition on the basis of its conclusion that
the right of redemption granted by Sec12 of Land Reform Code is available to

leasehold tenants only and not shares tenants and that their respective rights and
obligations are not coextensive or coequal.
The very essence of Agricultural Land Reform Code is the abolition of
agricultural share tenancy. It was error of the agrarian court to state that the
systems of agricultural tenancy recognized in this jurisdiction are share
tenancy and leasehold tenancy even after the enactment of the Land
Reform Code.
The difference between share and leasehold tenancy as premised in the
agrarian courts decision refers to the contractual relationship between the
tenant and the landowner, but the Land Reform Code forges by operation of
law a vinculum juris (civil obligation)whether for a leasehold tenant or
temporarily a share tenant. Juridical consequences coming from thus are
security of tenure of the tenant and the tenants right to continue in
possession of the land he works despite the expiration of the contract or the
sale or transfer of the land to third persons, and the farmers pre-emptive
right to buy the land he cultivates as well as the right to redeem the land if
sold to a third person without his knowledge.
The Code did not mention tenants, whether leaseholds or share tenants,
because it outlaws share tenancy and envisions the agricultural leasehold
system as its replacement, and the agrarian courts literal construction would
wreak havoc on and defeat the proclaimed and announced legislative intent
and policy of the State of establishing owner-cultivatorship for the farmers
who invariable were all share tenants before the enactment of the Code and
whom the Code would now uplift to the status of the lessees.
Where the true intent of the law is clear, such intent or spirit must prevail
over the letter thereof. Whatever is within the spirit of a statue is within the
statute, since adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice, and
contradictions and would defeat the plain and vital purpose of the statute.
Basbas v Entena is not applicable, as there, the tenant-redemptioner was
shown by the evidence to have no funds and had merely applied for them to
the Land Authority which was not yet operating in the locality and hence, the
Court held that no part of the Code indicates or even hints that the 2-year
redemption period will not commence to run until the tenant obtains
financing from the Land Bank, or stops the tenant from securing redemption
funds from some other source. In the present case, the sole legal issue is
the right of redemption being available to the redemption of the share
tenants.
The historical background for the enactment of the Codes provisions on preemption and redemption further strengthens the Courts opinion
RULING: Decisions appealed are REVERSED, petitions to redeem the subject
landholdings are GRANTED.

Reform Code have been superseded by the Code of Agrarian Reforms, Rep. Act
6389, which the trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to cite and apply.

ISSUE:
13. Guerrero v CA

In 1969, Apolinario Benitez was asked by spouses Manuel and Maria

Guerrero to take care of their 60 heads of cows and to clean the already fruit-bearing
coconut trees and burn dried leaves and grass and, during harvest time, which is
usually every three months, to pick coconuts and gather the fallen ones from a 16hectare portion of the 21-hectare plantation and process the meat of the coconut in
the copra kiln of the defendants. He had a 1/3 share of the proceeds from the copra
that he processed and sold in the market and a P500 a year salary for attending the
cows. In 1973, Benitez was keep from doing the job he had always done for almost
four years. Thus, he brought the matter to the attention of the Office of Special Unit in
the Office of the President in Malacanang, Manila, where spouses Manuel and Maria
Guerrero agreed to let Benitez continue working on the 16-hectare portion of the
plantation as tenant and that their relationship will be guided by the provisions of RA
No. 1199, known as The Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines. However, on July
of 1973, he was again refrained from gathering nuts from the 10-hectare and was
threatened if he persists. Benitez filed a case for reinstatement with damages. The
lower court decided in favor of Benitez, ordering spouses Manuel and Maria Guerrero
to reinstate Benitez to the 10-hectare portion of the 16-hectare coconut plantation.
Hence, this petition, claiming that Benitez is a mere farmhand and not a tenant. The
petitioners contend that the courts applied erroneous definitions of tenancy found in
repealed laws. They assert that the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the Agricultural Land

Whether a tenancy relationship exists between Manuel Guerrero et al and

Apolinario Benitez et al as to determine their respective rights and obligations to one
another.

RULING:
Although Republic Act 3844 abolished and outlawed share tenancy and
replaced it with the agricultural leasehold system and Republic Act 6389 amending
Republic Act 3844 declared share tenancy relationships as contrary to public policy,
the Court contends that the phasing out of share tenancy was never intended to
mean a reversion of tenants into mere farmhands or hired laborers with no tenurial
rights. Thus, the respondent has been unlawfully deprived of his right to security of
tenure.
Therefore, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. The decision of the appellate
court is affirmed.