WGSS: KGB

Chair: Maggie Zhang

Crisis Director: Alexander Moore


WGSS:KGB
DearDelegates,

WelcometoVirginiaModelUnitedNationsConferenceXXXVIandtheWilsonGlobal
SystemsSimulation!TheWilsonGlobalSystemsSimulationisanexhilaratingand
fastpacedcrisisbasedsimulation.ThisuniqueModelUNopportunityconsistsof6
crisiscommitteesthatoperatewithinthesamebroad,multiyearregionalscenario.
Actionstakenbydelegatesinonecommitteewillaffecteveryothercommitteeroom.
Morethansimplyajointcrisiscommittee(JCC),WGSSexpandsbeyondthe
interactionsbetweendifferentcountriesorgroups.Thesimulationemphasizesinterplay
betweendifferent

levelsofgovernmentand

typesofgovernmentbodies.Delegateswill
havetousetheirowninitiativetodevelopbroadlongtermpoliciesaswellasimmediate
shorttermsolutionstovariouscrises.Thissimulationhasbeenmoldedsothatmanyof
yourissueswillstemfromwhatdelegatesinthefiveotherroomsaretryingto
accomplish,notmerelysituationsdevelopedbythecrisisstaff.Thecommitteesthat
ingeniouslyrecognizethegreatersystemandinterestsoftheothercommitteeswill
succeed.Thosewholackflexibilityandforesightwillfallbehind.

Eachofthesecommitteeshassomeconnectiontothemajortopicsofinteresttothe
entiresimulation.Eachcommitteealsohasanarrayofissuesfacingitselfmoredirectly,
whichwillaffectthewayitcarriesoutitsgoalswithinthegreatersimulation.
Intercommitteeinteractionsandtherippleeffectnatureofinternationalrelationswill
besimulatedasrealisticallyaspossible.Delegatesshouldnotethecomplexityofthe
issuesatstake.Anagencymaywanttoconductacovertoperation,butfailurecouldhurt
theagencysgovernmentsimage.Twocountriesmaywanttobuildregionalresource
trade,butsuchcooperationcouldbuildtoomuchdependenceoneachother.

ThisyearsWGSSwillbecenteredintheCentralAfricanjunglesofwhatisnowcalled
theDemocraticRepublicofCongo(DRC).However,forthefirsttimetheWGSSwillbe
setinthepast:1964.Thissimulationwillcovermanytopics.Someoftheseincludethe
roleofcolonialeconomicandpoliticalinstitutionsinstatebuilding,proxywarfareand
armsracefueledresourcesextraction,andthefactorsthatfacilitateandprolong
rebellionsandcivilwars.Anoverarchingfocuswillbeontheinterplaybetweendifferent
intelligencebodies,andhowtheyaffectdiplomacyaswellastheirowngovernment.
Whiledelegatescanexpecttodealwithabroadspectrumofissues,thesimulationis
dynamic.Delegateswillnotbelinearlydealingwithonetopicatatimeuntileveryissue
hasbeensolved,norwillthesimulationbeperpetuatedbypreparedcrises.

Pleasegivethefollowingsectionsyourcarefulattention,astheywillonlyimproveyour
WGSSexperienceandsuccess.Iamthrilledabouttheopportunitytoworkwithallthe
delegateswhowillcomprisetheWGSS.Feelfreetoemailmeatmgf8zg@virginia.edu
withanyquestionsorconcernsyouhaveregardingthesimulation.

Sincerely,
MorganFeldenkris,HeadCrisisDirector


WGSS:KGB
WGSSRulesofProcedure

Wewanttoguaranteeapositiveexperienceforallbyensuringeveryparticipantisheld
tothesamestandardsofintegrityandrespect.Thereareafewgroundrulesthatweask
delegatesandadviserstokeepinmind.

1. HonorisafundamentaltenetoftheUVAcommunity.Ifyouhavemorethanone
delegatefromyourschoolparticipatinginWGSS,weaskyou,onyourHonor,to
refrainfromdiscussinganycommitteerelatedinformationbeforeorduringthe
conference.Normalcommitteeinteractionssuchascommuniques,notesending,
meetings,etc.areencouraged,butwerealizethepotentialforunfairadvantages
insituationsinvolvinginteractionsthatfalloutsideofnormalcommittee
procedures.Assuch,offensetothisrequestwillberegardedascheating.Wewill
implementaonetimewarningsystem.Multiplecheatingviolationswill
jeopardizethatdelegatesawardeligibility.
2. AtVAMUN,delegateswillnotbeallowedtousetechnologyinthecommittee
room.InWGSS,itisespeciallytemptingtousetechnologytointeractwithother
committees,butrememberthatwhiledelegatesareencouragedtocommunicate
withtheothercommitteeswithinthesimulation,theycanonlydosobysending
communiquesandarrangingmeetingsthroughcrisisstaff.Alltechnological
formsofcommunicationwillberegardedascheating,andourwarningsystem
willtakeeffect.
3. Alldelegatesandstaffmemberswillbetreatedwithrespect.Eveninalarge
simulation,onedisruptivedelegatecandetractfromeveryoneelsesexperience,
includingtheUVAstudentswhohaveworkedtirelesslytocreatethissimulation.
Studentswhoarefoundtobedisrespectfulandconsistentlydisruptivewillbe
reportedtotheiradviserandSecretariat.
4. Positionpaperswillberequiredforallcommittees,andshouldfollowthe
guidelinesforpositionpapersgivenontheVAMUNXXXVIwebsite.Anydelegate
whodoesnotturnintheirpositionpaperbytheendofthefirstcommittee
sessionwillbeineligibleforanaward.

WGSSCrashCourse

CrisisCommittees:HowWillTheyWork?

Yourcommitteewillfunctionalmostexactlythewayaregularcrisiscommitteewould
function,withtheprimarydifferencebeingyouroptionheretointeractwithdelegates
inthefiveotherWGSScommittees.Inyourcommitteeyourrangeofactionsisas
follows:

CommitteeWideDirectives:Thisisyourtraditionalmodeofcommitteewide
action.Adelegateorgroupwritesupadirective,listingspecificactionsthatthe
directivewillbeauthorizing,alongwithaspecificnumberofsignatories(aswill
bedeterminedbyyourChair).
2


WGSS:KGB
PersonalDirectives/Powers:Thisiswhereyoutapintoyourcharacters
individualpersonalpowers.EffectiveWGSSdelegateswillbecreativeandtake
initiativewhenitcomestotakingpositionpowers.Useyourdossierandportfolio
documentasastartingpoint.Theyaremoreastartingframeworkthana
comprehensiveoutlineofyourcharactersfullrangeofpossibleactions.Ifyouare
confusedaboutwhatyoucanorcannotdoasacharacter,trytakinganaction
thatyouthinkbasedonthematerialsyouvebeengivenandyour
researchwouldbesomethingyoucoulddo,andwriteanotetoCrisis.Ifthe
actionisoutsideyourcapability,crisisstaffwillmakeyouawareofthat.Ifits
somethingyourpositionmightactuallybeabletodo,congratulations!Youjust
tookthingsintoyourownhands.
JointPersonalDirectives:ThisisthesameideaasaPersonalDirective/Power,
exceptyoutackonanotherdelegateortwotoyournote(makesuretheysignit)
tostrengthenitandmakeitmoremultilateral.Itessentiallyhasthesameeffect,
exceptwithmoresignaturesandsupport,ithasmoresignificanceandallows
bothofyourpositionpowerstocomeintoplay.Forexample,aMinisterof
ScienceandTechnologycouldcollaboratewiththeMinisterofWartotakesome
sortofjointactiondealingwithmilitarytechnology.
Communiques:Thisishowyoucommunicatetootherrooms.Youmay
individuallysendacommuniquetoanotherdelegateinotherWGSScommittee
roomsbywritinganoteaddressedtothatdelegate(statingthecommitteethey
arein),andsendingittoCrisiswhowillmakethedelivery.Ifyouwanttodeliver
amessagetoanentireothercommittee(notjustasingulardelegate)withinthe
simulation,thatcommuniquemustbepassedbyyourcommittee,justasa
directivewould.
InformationGathering:YoumaysendanotetoCrisisaskingforcertain
informationthatyourcharactermighthaveaccessto.
Meetings/Q&As:YoumaysendanotetoCrisisrequestingtoarrangeameeting
withadelegateorgroupofdelegatesfromanothercommittee.YourChairmayor
maynotletyougooutoftheroomifyourequestameetingduringimportant
timesofcommittee,suchasduringtheintroductionorvotingonofadirective.
Youmayalsosignontoarequesttobringin13delegatesfromanother
committeeforashortquestionandanswerperiodwithinyourowncommittee.
PressReleases:APressreleaseisawrittendocumentaddressedtothepublic,
andcanhelpswaypublicopinion,provokepublicreactions,andbeusedasatool
ofdiplomacyandpoliticalmaneuvering.Likeadirective,thesearewrittenup,
introduced,andvoteduponasacommittee.
NotePassing:Youmaypassindividualizedmessagesintheformofnotesto
otherdelegateswithinyourowncommitteeregardingcommitteematters.


WGSS:KGB
WGSSDelegateStrategies

Thesearestrategiesthatwillhelpyousucceedindividuallyasadelegate,andyour
committeeasawhole.Effectiveapplicationofthesestrategieswillfactorinto
determinationofawards.

Exercisethesystem.Thissimulationhasbeendesignedtobuildinteractivity
andpromoteconnectivitybetweenthedifferentcommittees.Thefiveother
committeesarethereforareason.Interactwiththem.Worktogetherwith
anothercommitteewhenitmakessenseto,workagainstanothercommittee
whenitmakessenseto.
EffectivelyuseCrisis.Crisisinasimulationaslargeasthiscanprovetobea
greatresourceinmanywaysincludinginformationgathering,beingan
intermediarybetweencommittees,andrepresentingoutsidevoices.Although
WGSSonlyhas6committees,itdoesntmeanthosecommitteesaretheonly
playerswitharoleintheissuesyouwillbedealingwith.Crisiswillrepresentany
noncommitteerepresentedactorwhetheritsTanganyika,UnitedKingdom,the
MiningUnionofUpperKatanga,orevenbodiessuchastheUNSecurity
Councilandyoushouldmakeuseofthis.Moreover,Crisiscanbeaneffective
meanstoanendforyouasadelegate.Inotherwords,developagameplanof
whatyouseektoaccomplishandhow,foryourselfasadelegateandyour
committeeasawhole.BycreativelyformulatingactionstotakethroughCrisis,
youcanadvancetowardyourgoals.
Understandthebigpicture.Especiallyifyouareinoneofourspecialized
committees,youwillhavetodeterminewhetherornottoswitchtopicswhena
newcrisiscomesup.Ifyouestablishachainofcauseandeffecttounderstand
whichissuesstemfromeachother,youwillbeabletokeepyoureyeonwhatis
important.Thisiswhereyourresearchandpreconferenceplanningcomesin.
Creativelyengagetheothercommittees.Developasstrongofanideaof
whattheothercommitteesaimsareaspossible.Avoidtakingblackandwhite
perspectivesonwhoyoucanfindcommongroundwith.Sometimesthesmallest
bitofhelpevenfromsomeonewhoyourcommitteemightdeemthatyoushould
notworkwithcanprovevitaltothesuccessofactionsyoutakeandsolutions
youpursue.Atthesametime,WGSSatitscoreisasimulationofrealworld
affairs,sodonotworkwithyourenemiesinwhatwouldbeconsideredan
unrealisticmanner.Knowingwhoyouactuallycanworkwithandhowtoengage
theirinterestareimportantdiplomaticcomponentstoasimulationlikethis.
Balanceshorttermsavvinessandlongtermvision.Haveastrongsense
ofthelongtermpoliciesandgoalsyouseektoaccomplish.Itseasywhenthere
arefiveothercommitteeswhocouldbeworkingagainstyoutobecome
shortsightedinyourcommitteesactions,focusingtoomuchontheimmediate
crisesathand.


WGSS:KGB
DearDelegates,

Hi!MynameisMaggieZhangandIama3rdyearintheMcIntireSchoolof
Commerce.ImfromRichmond,VirginiaandmyfirstconferencewasVAMUN30!At
UVA,IamtheheaddelegateforVirginiasModelUNtravelteamandmytaglinehas
beenMUNisFUN.OutsideofModelUN,IaminUniversityProgramsCouncil,GirlUp,
andSmartWomenSecurities.Inmyfreetime,IliketowatchatonofTV(Greys
Anatomy,Chopped,GameofThrones,NewGirl,andmore)andIoccasionallyplay
tennis.
ImAlexMoree,a4thyeardoublemajoringinRussian&EasternEuropeanStudies
andForeignAffairs.IliveinSpringfield,Virginia,thoughmyrootslieinSouthKorea.
ThoughthisisonlymysecondyearbeinginvolvedwithModelUN,Ihavebeen
interestedininternationalrelationsmyentirelifeandhavetraveledandstudiedin
nationsalloverAsia,includingtheKyrgyzRepublic,NepalandSoutheastAsia.Iwasthe
CrisisDirectorfortheNicaraguaCanalatVICSXXIandastafferatVAMUNXXXV.In
myfreetime,IgohikingandcampingintheBlueRidgeMountainsaround
Charlottesville,playthepiano,andcook.
Withoutfurtherado,welcometoVAMUNXXXVI!Wereexcitedtoseethe
creativityandenthusiasmthatyouwillbringtotheKGBCommitteeduringtheWilson
GlobalSystemsSimulation.

MaggieZhangAlexMoree
ChairCrisisDirector
mhz5hb@virginia.eduacm6wj@virignia.edu


WGSS:KGB
CommitteeOverview

Inearly1964,theRepublicofCongoseemstohavefinallyreachedaperiodof
peace.AfterfouryearsofcivilwarnecessitatingthefirsteverlargescaleUN
peacekeepingoperation,thenationisunitedforthefirsttimesinceitsindependence
wasdeclaredin1960.JustasUNforcesarebeginningtowithdraw,criesofasecond
independencecanbeheardthroughouttheCongolesejungle.Rumorsofariseof
freedomfighterscallingthemselvesLionsareeagerlydiscussedincampsandmarkets
fromMataditoGaramba.Thetimeagainlooksripeforapeoplesrevolutioninthe
CongoandthatrevolutionmustbenurturedbytheguidinghandoftheSovietUnion.
TheCommitteeforStateSecurity,knownbyitsRussianacronymasKGB,has
intervenedinCongoleseaffairstwiceinthepastfiveyearsforthecharismaticand
idealisticPatriceLumumbaandhisprotgAntoineGizengaafterhim.KGB
interventionshavefailedtwice.However,theforthcomingmovementpromisestobeled
notbytheeducatedeliteofCongoleseSociety,butfromtheheartandsoulofevery
CommunistRevolutionbefore:theproletariat(whointheCongohastoiledin
backbreakingworkunderBelgiancolonialrule).Asthesayinggoes:isthethirdtime
thecharm?
ThisCommitteewillapproximatewhatwouldbeconsideredaworkinggroup
withintheKGBonCongoleseAffairsthatbringstogetherofficialsandagentsfrom
differentdepartmentsoftheKGBandSovietgovernment.Committeememberswill
representnotonlytheKGBleadershipinMoscow,butalsoinfluentialSovietpoliticians,
residentsinofficesacrossAfrica,andtheactualagentsinthefieldintheCongo.Each


WGSS:KGB
memberwillbringtheirowninterestsandthoughtstothecommitteeregardingthe
SovietinvolvementintheCongo,SovietforeignpolicyvisvistheWest,andeventhe
leadershipoftheSovietUnionitself.

HistoryoftheKGB
In1954,theKGB,whichstandsfortheKomitetGosudarstvenoiBezopasnosti
(CommitteeforStateSecurity),wascreatedinitscurrentformbythejoiningtogetherof
themilitarybranchoftheChekawiththeMinistryoftheInterior.Asitsnamesuggests,
itsprimaryfunctionistoperformsecretpoliceandcounterintelligencetoprotectthe
Sovietgovernmentathome.Inthiscapacity,italsoprovidesarmedbodyguardsfor
Sovietleadership.DuringtheStalinistera,itpreventedrivalstoJosefStalinfrom
amassingpower.Internationally,theKGBistaskedwithcollectingintelligencefrom
capitalistnationsaswellasensuringthecooperationandobedienceoffellow
communistnations.

RecentEvents
SinceStalinsdeathin1953andtheascensionofNikitaKhrushchev,theKGBhas
undergonearadicalchangeinpower.DuringtheStalinistera,Sovietsecurityagencies
experiencedaprivilegedpositionclosetoleadership.Theyweretrustedtoremoverivals
1

toStalinandweregrantedrewardsandpromotionsinreturn. Khrushchev,however,as
partofhiswiderpolicyofdeStalinization,soughttodiminishtheprominenceofthe

Andrew,ChristopherM.,andVasiliMitrokhin,TheSwordandtheShield:TheMitrokhinArchiveandtheSecret
HistoryoftheKGB,(NewYork:BasicBooks,1999).


WGSS:KGB
KGBintheSovietleadershipandtoreturnittothestatusofatraditionalintelligence
2

agency. Asaresult,KhrushchevremovedthepowerfulandinfluentialAlexander
Shelepinin1961fromthepostofChairmanoftheKGBandreplacedhimwithVladimir
Semichastny.Semichastny,aged37,istheyoungestandmostinexperiencedChairman
3

oftheKGB. KhrushchevhopesthatSemichastnywillbecontrolledbyoldersoviet
officialsloyaltohimandwillexcludetheChairmanfromPolitburoandCentral
Committeemeetings.Tothisdate,SemichastnyhasbeeninvitedtotheKremlintogive
briefingsonlytwice.Despitehisyouthandinexperience,Semichastnymaintainsclose
tieswithhisambitiousandmoreinfluentialpredecessor,Shelepin,whoremains
resentfulbyhisappointmentawayfromtheKGB.

ConflictwithintheCommunistParty
Meanwhile,significantmovementsareafootwithintheCommunistParty.
Khrushchev'sreputationasareformerisdrowningunderperceptionsofineptitudedue
tohisfickletemperandpenchantforimprovisation,whichmanyblameforthefailureof
4

theCubanMissileCrisisin1962. Manymembersintheoldguardresentthereformsof
KhrushchevandbelievethatareturntoStalinismwouldbringrenewedsuccessfor
Communismabroad,aswellasathome.
LeadingthisdisgruntledgroupisthepowerfulChairmanofthePresidium,
LeonidBrezhnev.Hehasbeenactivelycourtingmilitaryandsecuritypersonneltohis

Andrew,TheSwordandtheShield.
Andrew,TheSwordandtheShield.
4
Arbatov,G.A.,"TheYearsofDecline(19751982)",InTheSystem:AnInsider'sLifeinSovietPolitics,190294,
(NewYork:TimesBooks,1992).
3


WGSS:KGB
5

cause,andthereareevenrumorsofacoupdtat. Inearlieryears,theKGBwouldhave
swiftlyrespondedtosuchrumorswithforceintheformofassassinationsandthreats
duringthenight.However,BrezhnevhascourtedShelepintothecause,andShelepin
hasadvisedSemichastnytowaitforthemomenttoseeifKhrushchevwillrespond
himselftotherumors.
WithitscontrolofthebodyguardsofSovietofficialsandwidespreadapparatusof
bugsandwiretaps,theKGBisperfectlypositionedtobekingmakerinthemonthsto
come.BeforetheKGBliesachoicenotsimplybetweentwoleaders,buttwoschoolsof
thoughtwithintheCommunistParty.Thefirst,ReformCommunismchampionedby
Khrushchev,believesthateffortsshouldbeinvestedintotheeconomyinordertoreach
paritywiththeUnitedStates.ReformCommunismisconfidentthathistoryisonour
6

side,becausetheeconomiesoftheWestwilleventuallycollapse. Untilthattime,
ReformCommunismquietlypromotesanagendafortheKGBcenteredoneconomic
andscientificespionagesothattheSovieteconomycangainaccesstothetechnological
7

innovationscurrentlytakingholdintheWest. ReformCommunismalsotakesaless
hostileattitudetodissidence.Thereisanexplicitbanonthepurgesoncecarriedoutby
StalinandliberalmindedwritersareencouragedtosharetheirideaswithSoviet
8

officialsinordertoimproveadministration. ContinuingReformCommunismwould
mostlikelyresultinamoreopensocietyathomeandlessactiveforeignpolicy,atthe

Arbatov,G.A.,TheSystem:AnInsider'sLifeinSovietPolitics.
Arbatov,G.A.,TheSystem:AnInsider'sLifeinSovietPolitics.
7
Taubman,William,"Chapter11:FromtheSecretSpeechtotheHungarianRevolution",InKhrushchev:TheMan
andHisEra,27099,(NewYork:Norton,2003).
8
Taubman,William,Khrushchev:TheManandHisEra.
5
6


WGSS:KGB
costofopeninguptheCommunistRegimeandKGBtocriticismandevensubstantial
reform.
Thesecondschool,ledbyBrezhnev,believesinareturntothemilitaristand
authoritarianphilosophyofStalinism.DissidencediscreditsCommunisminthepublic's
eyesandshouldbecrushed.Themilitaryandthenucleararsenalshouldbebuiltupin
ordertocheckthethreatofinvasionfromtheWest,whichhasalwaysexistedforRussia.
Afterall,inWorldWarII,theGermaneconomyoutperformedtheUnion,butwestill
prevailed.Brezhnevbelievesthatthereisnoguaranteebasedonhistoryfortheeventual
successofCommunism.TheSovietUnion,throughtheKGB,shouldaidcommunistand
revolutionarymovementsintheThirdWorldinordertodenytheWestthevast
resourcesofitscolonies.ThelogicgoesthatthelessresourcesavailabletotheWestin
9

relationtotheCommunistbloc,thesoonertheWest'scollapsewilloccur. Returningto
avariantofStalinismwouldensureaprominentplacefortheKGBinSoviet
decisionmakingatthecostofprovokingtheWestandunsureeconomicperformance.
ThecurrentcrisisintheCongoprovidestheperfecttestinggroundforthesetwo
visionsofSovietandKGBpolicy.WhiletheKGBnavigatestheCongocrisis,its
leadershipmustremainvigilantofthesituationathomesothatitsactionscanmaintain
abalanceortiltthescalesinoneschool'sfavor.

Arbatov,G.A.,TheSystem:AnInsider'sLifeinSovietPolitics.

10


WGSS:KGB
OrganizationandMethodsoftheKGB
Widelyregardedbythemediaandevenrivalagenciesastheworldspremier
10

intelligencegatheringbody, theKGBhasperfectedtheartofspycraft.Intelligence
11

gatheringissplitinto5lines:
PRActivemeasures:Disseminatinginformationagainstspecifictargetsin
ordertodiscreditthem.Forexample,KGBagentsinAmericaactivelyspread
rumorsthatFBIDirector,J.EdgarHoover,andMartinLutherKing,Jr.were
homosexuals.
KRCounterintelligenceandsecurity:Surveillanceofforeignnationalsin
ordertocatchenemyspiesaswellasattemptingtoconvertenemyagentsinto
doubles.
XScientifictechnologicalintelligence:Infiltratinguniversitiesand
technologycompaniesinordertolearntechnologicalinnovationsthatcanbe
usedbytheSovietUnion.Forexample,onenotableKGBAgent,ALVAR,helda
seniorpostinIBMandregularlysentplansofIBMtechnologytoUnion
Scientists.
RPSignalsIntelligence(SIGINT):Interceptingandmonitoringenemy
communications.Forexample,interceptinglettersandtappingphones.
NIllegalsupport:Providingweapons,training,andlogisticalsupportto
revolutionarymovementsabroad,whichwoulddrawtheireofothernationsif
doneopenly.TheKGBalsonotablyutilizedfriendofthecauseagentswho

10

Andrew,TheSwordandtheShield.
Andrew,TheSwordandtheShield.

11

11


WGSS:KGB
wouldjoinrevolutionarymovementsagainstCommunismandspreaddissension
orotherwisehinderoperations.MostofKGBoperationsintheCongohavebeen
donethroughNline.

ForeignintelligencegatheringintheKGBcentersonlegalandillegalresidencies
inforeigncountries.LegalresidentsoftenperformaceremonialfunctionintheSoviet
embassyofaforeigncountryandcanbeprotectedbydiplomaticimmunityshouldtheir
activitybediscoveredbythehostcountry.Illegalresidents,however,liveascitizensof
thehostcountryandarenotprotectedbydiplomaticimmunityshouldtheybe
discovered.Ingeneral,illegalresidentshaveproventhemosteffectiveatextracting
12

secretsandinfiltratingforeignmovements. ExamplesincludeAlgerHiss,alongtime
13

USStateDepartmentofficial,whodivulgedstatesecretstoKGBcontrollers.
Eachresidence,whetherlegalorillegal,maintainsnetworksofagentsand
controllersineachofthe5lines.Agentsactivelygatherintelligencethroughinfiltration
orSIGINT,whilecontrollersrelaytheinformationbacktoMoscow.Bothagentsand
14

controllersdevelopalegend,theirfalseidentity. Legendscanbebasedeitheroffalive
doubleoradeaddouble.Alivedoubleisanactualpersonwholendstheiridentitytothe
agent,whothenlivesitoutinthetargetcountry.Adeaddouble,incontrast,istailor
madefortheagent,whomustliveitoutinaforeigncountrytoestablishtheidentity,
beforemovingontothetargetcountry.Whereasalivedoubleisharderfortheenemyto
detect,theidentitiesarelimitedtoSovietandforeignnationalsthatwearecertainthe
Andrew,TheSwordandtheShield.
Andrew,TheSwordandtheShield.
14
Andrew,TheSwordandtheShield.
12
13

12


WGSS:KGB
enemycannotobserve.Conversely,whileadeaddoubleiseasiertodetect,theidentities
canbetailormadefortheagentscharacteristicsandtherequirementsofthemission.
Informationismostlyobtainedthroughphotographingandhandcopying
documents,recruitingdoubleagentsinforeignorganizationsandbefriendinglocal
officials.Informationistypicallyrelayedthroughdeadletterdropsinordertoprevent
interceptionofradiowavesandtelegraphlinesonlyinemergenciesiscovert
15

informationsentelectronically. Ultimately,theseareyourtoolsforcollecting
informationanddisseminatingdisinformationintheCongo.Theywillbecriticalto
maintainingakeenunderstandingofarapidlydevelopingsituationfarawayfromthe
SovietUnion.
Forprovidingillegalsupport,theKGBpossessesseveralSpecialPurposeteams,
(SpetzialnogoNaznacheniya,Spetsnazforshort),whicharetrainedincovertwarfare
andspecialoperations.Theyareusedtoassassinateandsabotageforeigntargetsaswell
astoprovidestateoftheartmilitarytrainingtosympatheticrebelmovements.Inmany
cases,trainingbySpetsnazteamshasbeenthedifferencebetweenadisorganizedand
16

amateurrebelliontoanorganizedandwellsuppliedresistance. Spetsnazforceswillbe
criticaltosupportingrevolutionarymovementsintheCongo,shouldhighleadership
believethatitisintheUnionsinterest.

Andrew,TheSwordandtheShield.
Primakov,E.M.,OcherkiIstoriiRossiskoVneshneRazvedki:VShestiTomakh,(Moscow:International
Relations,1996).
15
16

13


WGSS:KGB
KGBInvolvementinAfrica
1960wasaseminalyearforAfrica.SeventeenAfricanstatesdeclaredtheir
independencefromEuropeancolonialruleandAfricansbeganriotingagainstthe
apartheidpracticesofSouthAfrica.Inasingleyear,thevastmajorityofpeoplesand
resourcesonthecontinentpassedfrombeingsafewithinthecapitalistworldto
essentiallybeingupforgrabs.In1960also,theKGBestablisheditsAfricandepartment,
taskedwith:
1. Facilitatingthequickestliquidationofremnantsofthecolonialsystem
2. Helpingnationalliberationmovementsinremainingcolonies
3. Trackingthepoliciesofformerandcurrentcolonizers:Britain,France,Belgium,
andPortugal
4. MakingsenseofUSpolicyinrelationtoAfrica
5. AnalyzingthesituationineachAfricancountrywillitremainintheorbitofthe
oldsystemortakeanewpath?
17

6. AcquiringfriendsandalliesamongAfricans
Essentially,theKGBwasnottosupportonlyMarxistmovements,buttosupport
18

independencemovementswhereverpossible. AtthisstageintheColdWar,
CommunistPartyhighleadershipbelievedthatabsolutelyanythingmustbedoneto
reducetheeconomicstrengthoftheWestwhichinAfricameanstakingawaythe
naturalresourcesoftheirformercolonies.Since1960,KGBoperativeshaveoffered
tangiblesupporttoindependencemovementsandnascentgovernmentsacrossthe

17
18

Primakov,OcherkiIstoriiRossiskoVneshneRazvedki:VShestiTomakh.
Primakov,OcherkiIstoriiRossiskoVneshneRazvedki:VShestiTomakh.

14


WGSS:KGB
continenttopreventthesenewlyindependentnationsfromfallingbackintotheorbitof
theWest.

EarlyTroublesintheCongo
OneofthenewlyindependentnationstotakeuptheKGBofferwastheRepublic
oftheCongounderPatriceLumumba.AfterhavingdeclaredindependenceinJuneof
1960,theCongowasrockedfirstbythesecessionofSouthKasaiandthenKatanga
provinceinJuly.SeparatistsinKatangaprovinceweresupportedbyBelgian
paratroopersinanactionwidelyperceivedbyCongoleseandtheSovietBlocasamove
byWesternpowerstosecurethevaluablenaturalresourcesthere,(Katangawasthe
19

sourceofuraniumusedintheatomicbombdroppedonHiroshima). Inaneffortto
removeBelgiantroopsandcrushtherebellion,LumumbatraveledtoAmericatoseek
supportincrushingtherebellions.DuetoBelgianpropagandacharacterizingLumumba
asacommunist,theAmericansrefusedtolendanyaidtotheLumumbagovernment.
However,DagHammarskjold,theUNSecretaryGeneral,pushedthroughaSecurity
CouncilresolutiontocreateapeacekeepingforceinCongo.
RefusedbytheAmericansandencouragedbyAndreeBlouinandSergeMichel,
LumumbamettheSovietMinisterofForeignAffairsandNikitaKhrushchevinNew
York.KhrushchevagreedtosendmilitaryandfinancialaidtotheCongo,comprisingof

Osterrmann,Christian,JeanMuke,GeorgesNzongolaNtalaja,TatianaCarayannis,LiseNamikas,SergeiMazov,
JeanOmasombo,ThomasKanza,HerbertWeiss,CleophasKamitatu,andLawrenceDevlin.ProceedingsofThe
CongoCrisis19601961:ACriticalOralHistoryConference,TheWoodrowWilsonInternationalCenterfor
Scholars,WashingtonD.C.,2324September2004.
19

15


WGSS:KGB
20

26planes,6helicoptersandhundredsoftrucks. Additionally,Khrushchevorderedthe
creationoftheKGBstwoAfricandepartments:the9thand10thdepartmentsforEnglish
andFrenchspeakingAfrica,respectively.UponLumumbasinvitation,Sovietdiplomats
andmilitaryadvisersarrivedinAugustof1960.WithSovietaid,therebellioninSouth
Kasaiwascrushed,buttheuseofSovietaidalienatedPresidentJosephKasavubuand
HeadoftheArmedForcesJosephDesireMobutu.InSeptember,PresidentKasavubu
announcedtheoustingofLumumbaasprimeministerandsubsequently,Mobutu
21

launchedabloodlesscoupinsupportofKasavubu. Lumumbawasplacedunderhouse
arrestandeventuallykilled.Hissupporters,underAntoineGizenga,establishedanew
governmentinStanleyvilleopposedtotheKasavuburegimeinLeopoldville.
GizengarequestedSovietsupport,butwaryfromtheresultofaidgivento
Lumumba,KhrushchevwascautiousofantagonizingtheWestagaininAfricaand
22

limitedSovietaidtoonlyfinancialresourceschanneledthroughPierreMulele.
Withoutadequatearmsandfuel,theStanleyvillegovernmentcollapsedafterlittlemore
thanayearinJanuaryof1962.
Meanwhile,theKatangeseSeparatistscontinuedtoholdoutagainstthe
Leopoldvillegovernment,nowunderthedefactoleadershipofJosephDesireMobutu,
(KasavuburemainedasPresidenthowever),andnowbackedbytheUN.InSeptember
of1961,DagHammarskjoldwaskilledinanairplanecrashonhiswaytotheCongoto
negotiatearesolutiontotheKatangaSecession.Hissuccessor,UThant,tookonamore

Mazov,Segei."SovietAidtotheGizengaGovernmentintheFormerBelgianCongo(19601961)asReflectedin
RussianArchives."ColdWarHistory7,no.2(August2007).
21
Osterrmannetal.ProceedingsofTheCongoCrisis19601961:ACriticalOralHistoryConference.
22
Osterrmannetal.ProceedingsofTheCongoCrisis19601961:ACriticalOralHistoryConference.
20

16


WGSS:KGB
aggressivestanceagainsttheKatangeseandauthorizedUNpeacekeeperstouseall
necessaryforcetoassisttheCentralGovernmentoftheCongointherestorationand
23

maintenanceoflawandorder. Afterlittlemorethanayearoffighting,theKatangese
surrenderedandacceptedtheauthorityoftheLeopoldvillegovernmentinJanuaryof
1963.
Sincethen,therehavebeenseveralattemptsatpoliticalreconciliation,including
anewconstitution,whichcentralizedmorepowerintheofficeofthePresident.
Surprisingly,KasavubuandMoiseTshombe,theformerleaderoftheKatangese
Secession,areintalksofpossiblyappointingTshombetoPrimeMinister.Asaresultof
theserumorsandremainingsympathyfortheLumumbistcause,callsforasecond
independencehaveemergedamongstthepeoplelivinginEastCongo,wherethe
LumumbistStanleyvilleGovernmentonceruled.AfterthefailureofLumumbaandthen
Gizenga,thisnewmovementcouldprovetobeanotheropportunityfortheSovietsto
denytheWestthevaluableresourcesoftheCongo.

AnalysisofSituationinSpring1964
Asitstands,theLeopoldvilleGovernmentmaintainsuncontested,albeittenuous,
controlofthecountry.TheircontrolissupportedbytheUnitedNationspeacekeeping
forceundertheaegisoftheOperationdesNationsUniesauCongo,(ONUC)andthe
CongoleseNationalArmy.ONUCcompriseseightbattalions:sixstationedinKatanga,
oneinSouthKasai,andoneinLeopoldvillealongwithadministrativepersonnel

23

Osterrmannetal.ProceedingsofTheCongoCrisis19601961:ACriticalOralHistoryConference.

17


WGSS:KGB
24

amountingtoabout20,000soldiers. TheCongoleseNationalArmyamountsto12,000
fightingpersonnelandissupportedbythe10,000fightersoftheKatangaGendarmerie
25

loyaltoMoiseTshombe. However,theONUCswithdrawaliscurrentlyscheduledin
Mayof1964.TheLeopoldvillegovernmentenjoysthesupportoftheUnitedStatesand
theBelgians,whosupportedTshombesbreakawayattemptinKatanga.Asofnow,
UnitedStatesandBelgianoperationsremainpartofUnitedNationsoperations.
Asmentionedabove,asecondindependencemovementisunderwayinthe
NortheastaroundStanleyvilleandalreadysomearecallingthemselvesSimba(the
SwahiliwordforLion).TheirleadersappeartoincludePierreMuleleandAntoine
Gizenga,bothminorleadersunderLumumbaandbothhighlyreceptiveofSoviet
supportinthepast.TheamountofSovietAidtoCongoifanyisdecidedtobegivento
MuleleandGizengawillbelimited,asbothGhanaandSudanpreventSovietaccessto
26

Congobyseaandland,respectively. Thesepowerswillhavetobepersuadedtoallow
SovietplanesandshipstoreachCongo,oranewroutewillneedtobefound.
ShouldSovietsupportnotbegrantedtothenewmovement,theriskoftherebels
turningtootherrevolutionarypowers,suchasChinaandCuba,increase.Thoughthese
nationsmaybeCommunist,Sovietrelationswithbothhavesouredduetothe
leadershipofComradeKhrushchev.OurbotchingoftheCubaMissileCrisishas
discreditedSovietReputationintheeyesofFidelCastro,whileMaoZedongsand
27

Khrushchevspersonalanimosityhasspilledoverintotheinternationalstage. Solong

Andrew,ChristopherM.,andVasiliMitrokhin.TheWorldwasGoingourWay:TheKGBandtheBattleforthe
ThirdWorld.(NewYork:BasicBooks,2006.)
25
Andrew,TheWorldwasGoingourWay:TheKGBandtheBattlefortheThirdWorld.
26
Osterrmannetal.ProceedingsofTheCongoCrisis19601961:ACriticalOralHistoryConference.
27
Taubman,William,Khrushchev:TheManandHisEra.
24

18


WGSS:KGB
asKhrushchevremainsLeader,thepossibilityofrepairingrelationswiththesestates
willbelow.
Finally,somethingmustbesaidaboutthepeopleoftheCongoitself.Thoughthe
UnitedStates,andespeciallyBelgium,appeartobeconcernedwithprotectingtheir
accesstothebountifulnaturalresourcesoftheCongo,theSovietUnionisless
interested.TheSovietUnionisalreadyrichinthemineralwealththattheCongooffers.
28

Asaresult,themaingoalfortheSovietUnionisnottoobtaintheresourcesofthe

Congo,buttopreventtheWestfromobtainingthem.Bythislogic,theSovietUnionis
moregenuinelyinterestedinsupportingindependenceandanticolonialismamongst
thepeople.Andthatpeopleisoneofthemostdiverseintheworldstilldividedinto
29

myriadtribalandethnicgroupings,themostimportantofwhicharedescribedbelow:
KikongoSpeakers:TribesspeakingthekiKongolanguage,mostprominentlythe
Bakongos,arethelargestethnicgroupandincludetheeliteofCongolesesociety.
TheirethnicgroupservedasthebasisforthehistoricalKingdomofKongo,for
whichtheRepublicofCongoisnamed.KiKongospeakers,whopopulatethe
westernhalfofthecountry,arelargelysupportiveoftheLeopoldville
government,thoughtheirbrethreninneighboringAngolahavebeenreceptiveof
Marxistideology.
TshilubaSpeakers:TheTshilubapopulatetheformerbreakawayregionsof
SouthKasaiandKatanga.HistoricallytheBakongohaveoppressedthem,though
thisrepressionendedunderBelgianrule,whichleftmanysupportiveoftheWest.

28
29

Arbatov,G.A.,TheSystem:AnInsider'sLifeinSovietPolitics.
Andrew,TheWorldwasGoingourWay:TheKGBandtheBattlefortheThirdWorld.

19


WGSS:KGB
Fornow,theyremainloyaltotheCentralGovernmentduetoMoiseTshombes
rumoredappointingtoPrimeMinister.
SwahiliSpeakers:Populatingtheeastofthecountry,Swahilispeakershavebeen
themostsupportiveofindependenceandLumumba.Theyhaveservedasthe
baseofsupportforLumumbasruleandthenGizengasStanleyvillegovernment.
ManySwahilispeakersviewthecentralgovernmentwithsuspicionandregard
MoiseTshombeasjustapuppetfortheBelgians.
Despitelinguisticandethnicdifferences,Lingala,atradelanguagepredominant
inthenorthofthecountry,remainsthelinguafrancaofCongolesegovernment
andmilitary.Itsnativespeakerscomprisesmallandminorethnicgroups.

QuestionstoConsider
1. ShouldtheKGBhelpshapeSovietforeignpolicyasithadunderStalin,oris
KhrushchevrighttolimittheKGBtoinformationgatheringand
counterintelligence?
2. Aftercommittingresourcesandcashtonotjustone,buttwoSovietleaning
governmentsintheCongointhepast,isthisnewrebelmovementworththe
investment?
3. ColonialisminAfricahasmademostAfricanswaryofEuropeans.Willthis
stigmaagainstwhitenessextendtoRussians?IsRussiaanimperialistpowerlike
thenationsofWesternEurope?

20


WGSS:KGB
4. Thoughtheirpresenceiswellhidden,theCIAisinCongo.Doyouthinktheymay
haveinfluencedcertainrecenteventsleadingtothecrisis?
5. AretheCongoleseasapeoplewellsuitedtoMarxistgovernment?Howelse
couldtheybepreventedfromlookingtotheWestasanindependentpeople?
6. GiventhedivisionsamongsttheCongolesepeopleandtherecentpastofseveral
breakawaystates,shouldtheCongoremainasingleunitednation?
7. WhatreasonswouldbringstateslikeChinaandCubaintotheCongo?

GuidelinesforResearch
WilsonCenterColdWarInternationalHistoryProjectPortalforanonline
digitalarchivetoprimarysourcesandscholarlyworksonColdWarevents
InternationalSpyMuseumAninteractivewebsiteofthemuseumin
Washington,D.C.thatshowcasesthemethodsandtoolsofespionage
organizations,includingtheKGB,fromthroughouthistory.
MitrokhinArchiveThelargestcollectionofKGBdocumentsavailableinthe
West.VasiliMitrokhinwasaKGBanalystwhobecamedisillusionedwiththe
SovietSystemandhandcopiedthousandsofdocumentstosmuggleoutofthe
Union.ThebookswrittenabouttheKGBfromthisarchiveinformedthisreport
andareavailableonAmazon(seeWorkCitedbelow).
MessengersfromMoscowA4partBBCminiseriesthatfocusesontheevents
oftheColdWarasperceivedbytheSoviets.

21


WGSS:KGB
ChiefofStation,Congo:FightingtheColdWarinaHotZoneThememoirsof
LarryDevlin,CIAChiefofStationinCongofrom1960to1965.Hisbookremains
themostcompletefirsthandaccountoftheeventsinCongofromtheperspective
oftheCIA.Hismemoirscomehighlyrecommendedastheyhaveeveninformed
theresearchofprominentRussianscholarsontheCongoconflictduetomost
Sovietdocumentsfromtheeraremainingclassified.

22


WGSS:KGB
Bibliography
Andrew,ChristopherM.,andVasiliMitrokhin.TheSwordandtheShield:The
MitrokhinArchiveandtheSecretHistoryoftheKGB.NewYork:BasicBooks,
1999.
Andrew,ChristopherM.,andVasiliMitrokhin.TheWorldwasGoingourWay:The
KGBandtheBattlefortheThirdWorld.NewYork:BasicBooks,2006.
Arbatov,G.A."TheYearsofDecline(19751982)."InTheSystem:AnInsider'sLifein
SovietPolitics,190294.NewYork:TimesBooks,1992.
Mazov,Segei."SovietAidtotheGizengaGovernmentintheFormerBelgianCongo
(19601961)asReflectedinRussianArchives."ColdWarHistory7,no.2(August
2007):42537.
Osterrmann,Christian,JeanMuke,GeorgesNzongolaNtalaja,TatianaCarayannis,Lise
Namikas,SergeiMazov,JeanOmasombo,ThomasKanza,HerbertWeiss,
CleophasKamitatu,andLawrenceDevlin.ProceedingsofTheCongoCrisis1960
1961:ACriticalOralHistoryConference,TheWoodrowWilsonInternational
CenterforScholars,Washington,D.C,2324September2004.
Primakov,E.M.OcherkiIstoriiRossiskoVneshneRazvedki:VShestiTomakh.
Moscow:InternationalRelations,1996.
Taubman,William."Chapter11:FromtheSecretSpeechtotheHungarianRevolution."
InKhrushchev:TheManandHisEra,27099.NewYork:Norton,2003.

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