Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Richard C. Koo
Chief Economist
Nomura Research Institute, Tokyo
r-koo@nri.co.jp
May 20, 2011
This paper examines the recent euro-zone crisis, which was triggered by the fiscal
problems in Greece, in the light of Japans experience with balance sheet recession from
1990 to 2005.
There are two overlapping themes to the current crisis.
artificially created euro; the other, the housing bubbles in the so-called PIIGS countries
(Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain). These bubbles resulted from the lowering
of interest rates in these countries due to the introduction of euro, and the
accommodative monetary policy adopted as the ECB tried to ease the impact of the IT
bubble collapse in 2000 on the German economy, the euro-zones largest.
The collapse of those bubbles has prompted private sectors in these economies to
delever and plunged many euro-zone economies into balance sheet recessions, a rare
type of recession that happens only after the bursting of a nation-wide asset price
bubble financed with debt. The risk is growing however, that countries spooked by the
Greek crisis will repeat the mistakes made by Japan as they pursue fiscal consolidation
in the midst of private sector deleveraging, a highly destructive combination.
Because the
eurozone policy rate was effectively a continuation of Deutschemark interest rate levels,
interest rates for most euro-zone members fell sharply.
The reduction in borrowing costs was felt most keenly in the PIIGS, and above all
in Greece. Exhibit 1 shows 10-year government bond spreads between Germany and
the PIIGS. Ten-year Greek government bonds were yielding 1,800bp more than their
German equivalents in 1993. This spread duly tightened over time and eventually
dropped to just a few dozen basis points after Greece joined the euro in 2001.
1
18
17
16
Greece
15
14
Italy
1999:
Euro launched
13
Portugal
12
Spain
11
Ireland
2001:
Greece joins
eurozone
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
-1
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Source: Nomura Research Institute, based on ECB data
90
80
Domestic financial
institutions
70
60
Overseas
Investors
50
40
30
20
10
0
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Source: Bank of Greece
One reason for the marked decline in interest rates was the sharply reduced
inflation risk promised by the ECBs inflation-fighting credentials. Another was that
2
the adoption of a unified currency made it easier for foreign investors to purchase PIIGS
debt, including Greek bonds, without concern for currency risk.
At the end of 1994, fully 85% of Greek government debt was held by domestic
financial institutions. By 2007, this ratio had almost completely reversed, with foreign
investors holding over 75% of the nations sovereign debt (Exhibit 2).
Although inflation risk and currency risk had been eliminated, Greeces bonds
still carried credit risk. But until 2008 investors were charging only a few dozen basis
points to assume this risk (Exhibit 1).
(% of nominal GDP)
-3
-6
Germany
Italy
-9
Portugal
Spain
-12
Greece
Ireland
-15
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Source: Eurostat
The deficit ceiling was introduced because it was thought that a number of
artificial conditions were required to manage this artificially created currency. The
authorities were especially concerned that a euro-zone government might take
3
advantage of the markets trust in the unified currency and the ECB to run large fiscal
deficits, thereby undermining the value of the euro. The Greek crisis and the euros
reaction to it suggest that those concerns were quite prescient, as Greeces fiscal
problems have sparked a major selloff of the joint currency.
Things were fine within the euro-zone framework as long as the market believed
that Greece was keeping its fiscal deficits at around 3% of GDP. The crisis erupted
when the new Greek government announced that the previous administration had been
issuing misleading deficit data and that actual deficits were much larger.
Greek
government bond yields moved sharply higher in response (Exhibit 1), and the 10-year
spread versus German government debt is now more than 1050bp.
Investors sold
PIIGS debt as the global financial system fell into turmoil, believing their economies to
be relatively fragile. Since last autumn, however, the sharp sovereign spread widening
experienced by Greece has not been observed to the same extent in other PIIGS.
This
difference can be attributed to the combination of two factors specific to Greece, namely
(1) large deficits and (2) an attempt to hide those deficits. None of the other PIIGS
fulfilled both conditions.
Greece ultimately lost much of its fiscal discipline as the adoption of the euro
sharply reduced its debt issuance costs and overseas investors became active buyers of
its bonds. That was the primary cause of the recent crisis. The people who created the
euro knew that the common currency would make it easier for member nations to run
large fiscal deficits. They tried to prevent this from happening with the Maastricht
Treaty, but Greece managed to wiggle out of the Treatys constraints by issuing
misleading data about its deficits.
That is why Germany and some other nations were heavily opposed to aid for
Greece. Why, they asked, should we have to help out a country that did not follow the
rules?
German households and corporations were deeply involved in the global IT bubble
of 19982000, and the bubbles collapse left both facing severe balance sheet damage.
The Neumarkt, Germanys answer to the NASDAQ, fell 98% from its peak. Individuals
and companies with large investments in IT-related businesses were left holding assets
that were virtually worthless, while their debts remained.
Consequently, savings and deleveraging by the German corporate and household
sectors amounted to a combined 12.8% of GDP in the four years from 2000 to 2005
(10.0% for the corporate sector and 2.8% for the household sector). The corresponding
loss of aggregate demand triggered a balance sheet recession.
In this type of recession, the collapse in asset prices forces the private sector to
minimize debt in order to repair its battered balance sheets. That makes monetary
policy largely powerless because those with balance sheets underwater are not
interested in borrowings at any interest rate, and there will not be many lenders either
especially when the lenders themselves have balance sheet problems. But if everybody
is saving and nobody is borrowing and spending those saved funds, the economy will
continue to lose demand equivalent to the amount of unborrowed savings.
Households
(Financial Surplus)
IT Bubble
4
2
0
Non-financial
Corporations
-6
General Government
-8
(Financial Deficit)
-10
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
Sectors located above the zero line in the diagram have a financial surplus, which
means they are either increasing savings or paying down debt. Sectors located below
the zero line are characterized by a financial deficit, which means they are borrowing
and investing by that amount. The four lines are supposed to add up to zero.
Exhibit 4 shows that German businesses were borrowing and investing 6.6% of
GDP at the peak of the bubble in 2000. By 2005, however, they were paying down debt
to the tune of 3.4% of GDP a year. In other words, demand for funds in the German
corporate sector dropped by 10.0% of GDP over the five-year period. Over the same
span, household savings grew by 2.8% of GDP, resulting in a total loss of private sector
demand for Germanys economy of some 13% of GDP.
To stem the resulting economic weakness, the German government needed to
borrow and spend the increase in private savings (13% of GDP).
But German
policymakers had yet to understand the concept of a balance sheet recession, and in any
case, the Maastricht Treaty itself forbade Germany from running a fiscal deficit of more
than 3% of GDP. Absent the necessary fiscal stimulus, the German economy weakened
sharply.
money supply growth remained extremely slow. These developments are also seen in
the U.S. and Europe since the Lehman shock.
250
225
Euro zone
200
Germany
175
150
125
Lehman Shock
100
75
95
96
97
98
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
Exhibit 6. Japans de-leveraging with zero interest rates lasted for 10 years
Funds Raised by Non-Financial Corporate Sector
(% Nominal GDP, 4Q Moving Average)
(%)
25
10
CD 3M rate
(right scale)
20
-5
Debt-financed
bubble
(4 years)
Balance sheet
recession
(16 years)
-2
-10
-4
-15
-6
85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
Thus Europes
housing bubbles developed in precisely the same way as in the US, where Fed chairman
Alan Greenspan had slashed interest rates in response to the collapse of the Internet
bubble. The size of the US and European bubbles was also comparable.
Greek house prices rose from a rebased 100 in 1997 to 280 in Athens and 260 in
all urban areas at the peak in 2008. Still, these increases were mild in comparison
with the gains seen in Spain, Italy, and Ireland (Exhibit 7).
280
260
Italy
Spain
240
Greece
220
Ireland
US
200
180
160
140
120
100
80
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Source: Nomura Research Institute, based on Bank of Greece, Ministerio de Vivienda, Spain, Bloomberg, BIS, S&P, and
Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government, Ireland
Note: Greek prices are in urban areas. Irish f igures are new houses' prices.
suddenly became super price-competitive. After all, Germanys trade surplus with the
US grew only moderately during this period, and the country ran steady deficits with its
Asian trading partners (Exhibit 8).
12000
Eurozone (EU16)
10000
8000
6000
US
4000
2000
-2000
Asia
-4000
95
96
97
98
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
Instead,
the rate cuts fueled housing bubbles in the PIIGS. Germany, in turn, was able to pull
itself out of the balance sheet recession by vastly increasing its exports to these booming
economies.
If Germany had not belonged to the euro-zone, the ECB would not likely have
lowered interest rates as far as it did, and the housing bubbles in the PIIGS would not
have grown as large as they did. In that hypothetical world, Germany would have had
to address the balance sheet recession, which was not responsive to monetary easing, on
its own.
per year (of which about 6 percent was due to corporate debt repayment, and 4 percent
due to savings by the household sector) between 1995 to 2005 in response to a
devastating 87 percent decline in commercial real estate values nation-wide. But the
Japanese government was able to maintain the GDP at above the bubble-peak levels for
the entire period by borrowing and spending the unborrowed savings in the private
sector. Although this government action added 460 trillion yen to the public debt
between 1990 to 2005, it managed to maintain at least 2000 trillion yen of Japans GDP
during the 15-year period compared to the case where the government took no such
action.
In that sense, Germany benefited more than any other country from the adoption
of the euro. Germanys fiscal deficits did not increase substantially after the bubble
burst only because the ECB fostered housing bubbles in other euro-zone nations (which
had not participated in the IT bubble) in an attempt to save the German economy.
Today the resulting housing bubbles have collapsed, and the PIIGS fiscal deficits
have widened as their economies weaken. Against this background it is open to debate
whether Germany is qualified to criticize these countries for running budget deficits.
After all, it was largely because the ECB lowered interest rates to 2% to save the
German economy that the PIIGS are now experiencing balance sheet recessions.
corporate sector was characterized by a massive financial surplus (i.e., it was paying
down debt). German households also increased their savings during this period. The
German government, meanwhile, was prevented by the Maastricht Treaty from
borrowing more than 3% of GDP, although in the end its fiscal deficits slightly exceeded
that threshold. German banks therefore saw a huge inflow of savings from households
and businesses that could not be invested domestically.
Their only option was to lend the money overseas.
destinations was the PIIGS, whose economies were booming as a result of the housing
bubbles. German banks also did not need to worry about currency risk lending to the
PIIGS because these countries were also members of the euro-zone.
10
The last time this type of deflationary spiral was allowed to develop was during
the Great Depression in the U.S. where the private sector was deleveraging massively
following the collapse of share prices starting in October 1929 but the public sector
refused to borrow money. As a result, the U.S. economy lost 46 percent of its GDP in
just four years from 1929 to 1933.
A number of European countries have experienced a skyrocketing increase in
private savings over the past year or two. The increase in savings is so large that even
government loan demandfiscal deficitswhich has increased sharply since the
Lehman crisis, are not large enough to absorb it.
(Financial Surplus)
Households
Corporate: 11.92%
Households: 5.18%
-4
Corporate Sector
(Non-Financial Sector +
Financial Sector)
General Government
-8
(Financial Deficit)
-12
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Sources: Banco de Espaa and National Statistics Institute (INE),Spain, and Eurostat
happening with the lowest interest rate in Spanish history indicates that Spain is
clearly in a balance sheet recession. If the Spanish government had stood by and done
nothing, the economy could have contracted by 17%, leading to Great Depression-like
conditions.
12
Spain and Ireland need and can finance more fiscal stimulus
The Spanish government responded with an economic package that transformed
the nations fiscal surplus in 2007 into a substantial fiscal deficit. At 11.15% of GDP
over two years, however, the stimulus was unable to offset the full 17.11% decline in
private demand. Spains unemployment rate is over 20%, the highest in the euro-zone.
In other words, Spanish deficit is large, but is not large enough to stabilize the Spanish
economy.
Corporate Sector
(Financial Surplus)
10
Corporate: 7.29%
Households: 14.26%
General
Government
-5
-10
Households
(Financial Deficit)
-15
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
The flow of funds data from Ireland (Exhibit 10) shows that from 2006 to 2009, its
private sector (households, non-financial and financial corporations) increased savings
to the tune of 21.55% of GDP, the largest jump in savings as a percentage of GDP in
Europe if not in the world. Furthermore, this deleveraging was happening with lowest
interest rates in Irish history, indicating that Ireland is clearly in a balance sheet
recession.
During the same period, Irish government deficit increased by 16.78% of GDP. In
other words, 78% (17 divided by 22) of excess savings in the private sector was put back
into the economys income stream by the government borrowing and spending.
However, that still left a deflationary gap of nearly 5% of GDP which threw the Irish
economy into the deflationary spiral. The recent fiscal consolidation measures made
the matter far worse by widening already formidable deflationary gap even wider. As a
result, the Irish GDP is now 20 percent below its peak. In other words, even though
13
Irish deficit was large, in view of the magnitude of private sector deleveraging, it was
not large enough.
The vicious cycle Ireland has found itself in recently may be repeated in other
European countries if the lessons from the country are not incorporated into policy
making in the rest of Europe. In particular, Ireland has shown that when the countrys
private sector is deleveraging, any attempt at fiscal consolidation will result in
disastrous economy with rising, not falling fiscal deficit. Those results, in turn, bring
about lower bond prices and higher CDS spreads.
(Financial Surplus)
Rest of the World
Households
Corporate: 5.56%
Households: 2.03%
General Government
Shift from 2008
in public sector:
5.08% of GDP
-3
-6
Corporate Sector
-9
(Non-Financial Sector +
Financial Sector)
(Financial Deficit)
-12
95
96
97
98
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
Although not a member of the euro-zone, the UK has seen private savings grow by
8.71% of GDP since 2006 (Exhibit 12). This amount exceeds the 7.29% increase in the
fiscal deficit (as a percentage of GDP) over the same period. The fact that U.K. house
prices are still falling and its money supply growth still stagnating in spite of massive
quantitative easing combined with the lowest interest rates in the U.K. history suggests
14
Households
(Financial Surplus)
Corporate Sector
(Non-Financial Sector +
Financial Sector)
4
2
0
-2
-4
-6
-8
General Government
-10
(Financial Deficit)
-12
87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
Source: Of f ice f or National Statistics, UK
It should also be noted that in balance sheet recessions, private sector has no
choice but to repair its battered balance sheets. In other words it will continue to
repair its balance sheets whether the government is running a deficit or a surplus.
This means so-called Ricardian Equivalence, where the private sector increases savings
in response to public sector running large deficits, is entirely irrelevant during balance
sheet recessions.
There will also be no crowding out problems with fiscal stimulus during balance
sheet recessions. This is because, during this type of recession, the government is
simply trying to put the unborrowed savings in the private sector back to the economys
income stream. The resource misallocation problem of fiscal stimulus is not an issue
either because, in balance sheet recessions, the resources not employed by the
government will most likely go unemployed which is the worst form of resource
15
allocation.
Rest of the
World
(Financial Surplus)
12
Households
8
Corporate: 3.04%
Households: -0.11%
General
Government
-4
-8
Corporate Sector
(Non-Financial Sector +
Financial Sector)
-12
(Financial Deficit)
-16
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Greece differs from the examples above in that it actively took advantage of
foreign investors appetite for local debt after the euro was adopted to engage in
profligate fiscal spending by publishing inaccurate budget deficit numbers.
Even
though there was a temporary corporate deleveraging from 2008 to 2009, it was far from
sufficient to finance the increases in fiscal deficits. This means the Greek government
has no choice but to restore fiscal discipline.
Greece, however, now depends on foreign investors to absorb more than 75% of its
government debt. Given this reality, its only option in the short term is to rely on
support from the IMF and other EU countries while making improvements in the fiscal
balance.
government may want to consider the option mentioned at the end of this paper, i.e.,
16
announce that in not-too-distant future (for example five years), the Greek government
will sell government bonds only to Greek nationals. Such a drastic and game-changing
commitment to fiscal discipline may win the credibility of its foreign creditors for the
transition period.
For Italy, there was some deleveraging by the private sector from 2007 to 2009
when the increase in private sector savings outstripped the increase in government
deficit. This is shown in Exhibit 14. Recently, however, the private sector lines have
come down again. This may indicate that the balance sheet damage to Italian private
sector was minimal and that the things are returning to normal in the country.
(Financial Surplus)
10
Households
6
4
Corporate: 4.35%
Households: -3.48%
0
-2
-4
-6
-8
Corporate Sector
General
Government
(Financial Deficit)
(Non-Financial Sector +
Financial Sector)
-10
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Sources: Banca d'Italia, Eurostat
Note: For 2010 f igures, 4 quarter averages ending with Q3/'10 are used.
An examination of
private savings trends demonstrates that, at the very least, Spain, Ireland and Portugal
are now in balance sheet recessions and are generating substantial quantities of private
savings that should go a long way in financing their government deficits. In fact,
country such as Ireland can no longer be considered low savings country.
Businesses and households in these countries are rushing to deleverage which
17
means that the money multiplier at the margins is zero or negative. As Exhibit 5
shows, the euro-zone money supply has increased very slowly since the Lehman crisis
despite massive injections of liquidity by the ECB.
deleveraging process continues, monetary policy is largely impotent and only fiscal
stimulus can prop up the economy. Premature attempts at fiscal consolidation are
likely to end in disaster, as did the deficit-reduction efforts of Japans Hashimoto
government in 1997.
After the Hashimoto administration pushed ahead with its fiscal consolidation
plans, ignoring the private sectors rush to minimize debt, Japans GDP contracted for
five consecutive quarters (based on data at the time).
sharply as shown in Exhibit 15. Far from achieving the planned 15trn reduction in
the fiscal deficit (3% of GDP), the government actually increased the deficit by 16trn
or 68%. Subsequent fiscal deficits required for Japan to recover from this policy error
easily exceeded 100trn or 20% of Japans GDP, and the recession was prolonged
accordingly.
Exhibit 15. Premature fiscal reforms in 1997 and 2001 weakened economy,
reduced tax revenue and increased deficit
(Yen tril.)
(Yen tril.)
70
70
reform
stimulus
Koizumi
fiscal
reform
Global
Financial
Crisis
60
50
50
*
unnecessary
increase in
deficit:
103.3 tril.
40
40
30
30
20
20
10
10
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11
(FY)
Source: Ministry of Finance, Japan
*: estimated by MOF
midst of severe balance sheet recessions would repeat Japans 1997 policy blunder.
The fact that a number of countries are attempting to do so simultaneously makes the
situation even more precarious.
These countries should not try to trim their deficits until it can be confirmed that
private loan demand has recovered and the private sector will support the economy by
borrowing and spending the (private) savings that the government is no longer
borrowing in the form of tax hikes and spending cuts.
This discussion should also make it clear how foolish it is for these nations to
observe the Maastricht Treatys 3% ceiling on fiscal deficits during balance sheet
recessions. If they abide by this rule while their private sectors continue to deleverage,
their economies will weaken and their fiscal deficits will actually increase, just as
happened in Japan in 1997.
The
biggest problem in this regard, however, is Germanys own private sector, as German
households and businesses have stopped borrowing since the IT bubble burst.
Household savings in Germany have hovered around the elevated level of 6% of
GDP since climbing to 6.5% in 2005 and are now rising again. Meanwhile, net savings
(including debt repayments) by the corporate sectorwhich is normally responsible for
the lions share of borrowing in an economyhave remained around 23% of GDP after
peaking at 3.4% in 2005. This means on a net basis, the German private sector is not
borrowing money at all.
This aversion to borrowing is a replica of the Japanese aversion to borrowing ever
since the latter cleaned up its balance sheets around 2005.
By 2005, Japanese
corporate balance sheets were fully repaired and the corporate deleveraging also came
to an end. But the businesses are only borrowing minimal amounts even with very
willing bankers and interest rates that have been the lowest in human history (Exhibit
6). This is because they were so traumatized by the horrible experience of paying down
debt under most difficult circumstances and are now saying to themselves never again.
German companies are now in the same mind set.
This aversion to borrowing may be considered the exit problem of balance sheet
recession. This is in contrast to the entrance problem of balance sheet recession
which consists of paying down debt in order to repair balance sheets in the midst of
shrinking economy and falling asset prices.
19
Given a situation in which households are saving a great deal and businesses are
saving instead of borrowing, the only way for Germany to sustain its economy is for (1)
the government to absorb surplus private savings by running massive fiscal deficits or
(2) other nations to continue running large trade deficits with Germany.
Neither of
these options is sustainable in the long run. Accordingly, if Germany hopes to sustain
its economy it must either persuade households to reduce their savings or persuade
businesses to borrow more.
The past experience of numerous nations shows that it is extremely difficult to
alter household savings rate with government policy. The only remaining option, then,
is to modify the behavior of businesses. But if German businesses are experiencing the
same kind of debt aversion characterizing Japanese companies that went through the
post-bubble debt hell, overcoming those attitudes will be no easy task.
Rising
corporate savings and continued debt repayments at a time of historically low interest
rates in Germany suggest that the trauma is quite severe. If German companies are in
fact experiencing the trauma of debt aversion, the government will have to provide
incentives large enough to cure that trauma.
Germany has benefited from euro in very different sense from Greece
Recently pundits in Europe have been debating the question of whether Germany
or Greece would be the first to leave the euro-zone. If Germany were to abandon the
euro, in the face of massive German trade surpluses, its new currency would likely rise
sharply.
But if currency appreciation cut off the nations exports and large trade
surpluses at a time of net savings by both the household and corporate sectors, the only
way the government could sustain GDP and employment would be to run massive fiscal
deficits.
In that sense, Germany has benefited from the euro in the exact opposite sense
from Greece. Being part of the euro-zone enabled Germany to curb its fiscal deficits by
boosting exports to euro-zone markets. Greeces euro-zone membership, on the other
hand, enabled it to continue to engage in profligate fiscal policy by selling its debt to
foreign investors, especially those in Germany. Viewed in this light, the economies of
Germany and Greece are both unhealthy, but in very different ways.
a textbook world in which private-sector agents are always striving to maximize profits.
It does not consider the balance sheet recession world, in which households and
businesses are striving to minimize debt in spite of zero interest rates.
This is understandable inasmuch as the concept of a balance sheet recession did
not exist in the economics profession when the Maastricht Treaty was being discussed
in the 1990s. Had people known about it and incorporated their understanding of this
recession in the Treaty, policy responses by the ECB and Germany after the IT bubble
collapsed would probably have been very different.
If the Maastricht Treaty had required countries in balance sheet recessions to
respond with adequate fiscal stimulus and thereby prevent the damage from spreading
to other euro-zone nations, Germany would not have needed to depend on exports as
much as it did after the bursting of its telecom bubble. Nor would the ECB have had to
lower interest rates to the extent that it did, sparking housing bubbles in Spain and
Portugal in the process.
And if German banks had been able to invest in their own governments debt, they
would not have had to acquire so many Greek government bonds and US subprime
securities. In that sense, the policy distortions brought about by the Maastricht Treaty
are one of the underlying causes of the current crisis and that this omission in the
Treaty should be rectified without further delay.
protesting in the streets of Athens can no longer afford to do so because they can no
longer blame everything on rich and fat German and French bankers.
Limiting the sale of government bonds to own citizens is a miniscule constraint on
free capital flows because the citizens of euro-zone will still be able to buy corporate
paper of other member countries where the efficiency gains from free capital
movements really matter. Indeed it is difficult to see any efficiency gain in allowing
German banks to buy Greek government bonds. On the contrary, the German bank
purchases of Greek government bonds allowed the latter to run ever more profligate
fiscal policy which, in the end, reduced efficiency gains for everyone.
Artificial constraints are required to maintain the artificially created currency
zone called euro-zone.
percentage of GDP represented a first attempt at such a constraint. The current crisis,
however, has made it clear that this constraint (1) cannot deal with a balance sheet
recession and (2) cannot address a situation like the one we saw in Greece.
Replacing the 3% cap with a rule stating that only domestic investors may buy
government bonds would restore fiscal discipline in these countries and enable
authorities to respond appropriately to balance sheet recessions. It will also free the
ECB from worrying about fiscal conditions of member governments and concentrate its
efforts on running the monetary policy.
The ECB of course should be able to buy and sell government bonds of member
countries in its execution of monetary policy.
Facility (EFSF) should also be able to purchase member countries government debt
during crisis situations. But no private sector entities should be allowed to buy public
22
sector debt of another member country to prevent the latter from running irresponsible
fiscal policies.
In retrospect, limiting the sales of government bonds to own citizens should have
been the key provision of the Maastricht Treaty from the very beginning of euro. If all
member countries adopted this provision instead of the 3 percent rule in 2000, none of
the problems we are facing today would have materialized.
This deterioration
23