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Chapter12
Conclusionsandimplications
More than a decade ago, the original Critical Citizens study brought together a distinguished
group of international scholars and seminal thinkers to consider the state of support for the political
systematthecloseofthetwentiethcentury. 1Thecoreconsensusemergingfromcontributorstothe
volumewasthatcitizensinmanycountrieshadprovedincreasinglyskepticalabouttheactualworkings
of the core institutions of representative democracy, notably political parties, parliaments, and
governments. At the same time, however, public aspirations towards democratic ideals, values, and
principles, or the demand for democracy, proved almost universal around the globe. The tensions
between unwavering support for democratic principles but skeptical evaluations about democratic
practices,wasinterpretedinthestudyastheriseofcriticalcitizens.Thepassageoftimemeansthat
the argument and evidence presented in Critical Citizens needed to be updated, to see whether the
central thesis continues to resonate today. The extensive anxieties which continue to be expressed
aboutpublicsupportfordemocraticgovernancesuggestthatthecoremessagefromtheearliervolume
has not faded, but instead seems more relevant than ever to help understand contemporary
developments. Updating and expanding the scope of the evidence, and developing more systematic
insightsintothecausesandconsequencesofthedemocraticdeficit,providesanimportantcorrectiveto
the misdiagnosis and exaggeration which is prevalent throughout so much of the literature. The
conclusion recapitulates the standard concern about contemporary levels of political support, as
expressed by numerous scholars and popular commentators over the years. It then summarizes the
main arguments presented throughout the book, provides a series of reasons challenging the
conventionalwisdom,andfinally concludesbyreflecting upon thebroaderimplicationsofdemocratic
deficitsforboththeoriesandpracticesofdemocracy.
Theconventionalanxietiesaboutestablisheddemocracies
Concernaboutpublicsupportforthepoliticalsystemrisesandfallsperiodicallyontheagenda,
reflecting contemporary hopes and fears about real world events. Hence during the late1950s and
early 1960s, historical memories of the fall of the Weimar Republic, coupled with the failure and
breakdown of many fledgling parliamentary democracies in postcolonial Africa, spurred the initial
interest in cultural theories of democratization and regime stability among early scholars of political
development. 2 Similarly during the late1960s and early1970s, the outbreak of urban riots, street
protestsandcounterculturemovementsintheUnitedStatesandWesternEuroperevivedconservative
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anxieties about the root causes of protest politics and the consequences of radical challenges to the
authorityofdemocraticgovernments.3Apprehensionfadedsomewhatduringthesubsequentdecade,
althoughthemid1990sagainsawreneweddisquietabouttheseissues,unitingdiverseconcernsabout
a supposed erosion of civic engagement occurring in established democracies; as evidence, observers
pointedtothehalfemptyballotbox,shrinkingpartyloyaltiesandmembershiprolls,andalongtermfall
insocialcapital.4Todayanewwaveofdeepconcernhasarisenaboutpublicmistrustofpoliticiansand
governmentinbothestablisheddemocraciesandinyoungerdemocracieselsewhereintheworld.5The
standardviewtodayisencapsulatedbyDaltonsconclusions:Byalmostanymeasure,publicconfidence
andtrustin,andsupport,forpoliticians,politicalparties,andpoliticalconstitutionshaserodedoverthe
pastgeneration.6
Anxietyabouttherootcausesandconsequencesofanywidespreaderosionofpoliticaltrustin
Westernsocietiesresonatesevenmoreclearlyoutsideofacademe.HenceintheUnitedStates,much
journalisticcoverageassessingtheearlyyearsoftheObamaadministrationhasfocuseduponsignsof
public dissatisfaction with the federal government. Commentary has highlighted polls showing
deepening political disaffection, notably low confidence in Congress, following partisan stalemate and
gridlock in debate over health care reform, a deep economic recession characterized by eroding
financial security, and collapsing home values.7 Increasingly populist antigovernment rhetoric has
emanatedfromtheTeaPartymovement,echoedbysomeleadersintheRepublicanPartyandinparts
ofthenewsmedia.InEurope,aswell,eventssuchastheWestminsterexpensesscandalinBritainhave
been thought to have exacerbated a culture of pervasive public anger and mistrust, where the
motivationandethicalstandardsofpoliticiansarewidelydiscredited.8Elsewheresimilarconcernsecho
aboutthedecliningimageofthepoliticalclass,forexampleinJapanandGermany.9
Many reforms have been advocated to address public disaffection. Those who favor
strengtheningopportunitiesforcollectivedeliberationanddirectcitizenengagementindecisionmaking
processes have proposed expanding the use of citizen assemblies and juries, popular referenda and
petitions,socialaudits,participatorybudgeting,public consultationexercises,townhall meetings,and
deliberative polls.10 Other reformers concerned about strengthening governance transparency and
accountability urge repeal of official secrecy acts and expanded rights to information, designing more
opendecisionmakingprocesses,reinforcingtheindependentnewsmedia,andutilizingegovernance.
The role and powers of independent monitoring and regulatory agencies can also be strengthened,
includinganticorruptioninstitutionsandelectoralcommissions,ombudsmaninstitutions,humanrights
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watchorganizations,agenciesregulatingstandardsofpubliclife,andbudgetaryauditors.11Moreradical
changesincludeconstitutionalrevisions,reformingelectoralprocessesandcampaignfunding,increasing
thesocialdiversityoflegislatures,and decentralizingdecisionmakingtolocalcommunities.12Despite
extensive popular debate, however, it remains unclear whether any of these strategies will actually
achievetheirdesiredlongtermobjectives.Thesemayallbeintrinsicallyworthyinitiativesintheirown
right.Reformswillfail,however,iftheassumedproblemofdemocraticlegitimacy,oranysocalledcrisis
oftrustingovernment,hasactuallybeenexaggeratedormisdiagnosed.
Concernaboutaglobaldemocraticrecession?
Outsideofestablisheddemocracies,globaldevelopmentssuggestmorepersuasivereasonsfor
serious concern about the retrenchment of autocracy and an active pushback against the forces of
democracy.LarryDiamond,aleadingobserver,suggeststhatthefirstdecadeofthetwentyfirstcentury
isanerawheredemocracyhasexperiencedlittlefurtheradvance(atbest),oreventhestartofanew
reversewave(atworst).13FreedomHousereportsechotheseworries.14Eachglobalregionhasdiffered
in the pace and extent of the transition from autocracy and the process of democratic consolidation
duringthethirdwaveera.InLatinAmericademocraticgovernancemadesustainedprogressduringthe
1980s, although studies suggest that even in this region, dissatisfaction with the performance of
governmenthasencouragedpoliticaldisillusionmentandcynicism.15Othershavedetectedevidenceofa
regionalbacklashagainstthewaythatliberaldemocracyandeconomicneoliberalismworks,although
not a rejection of democratic ideals per se.16 For evidence of lack of progress, Venezuela experienced
the return of strongman populist rule under Hugo Chavez, Mexico and Colombia continue to be
destabilizedbyviolentdrugcartels,whileintheCaribbean,CubaswitcheddictatorsfromFideltoRaul
Castro, and fragile Haiti was devastated by the collapse of its buildings and government in the
earthquake.
InsubSaharanAfrica,FreedomHouseestimatesthathumanrightsdeterioratedinalmostone
quarter of all states in recent years, including in Nigeria, Zimbabwe, and Mauritania. Many traditional
dictatorships,militaryoligarchies,andstrongmanrulerscontinuetoruleAfricanstates.17Elsewhereon
the continent, a series of bloody civil wars have led to the collapse of political disorder and failed
states.18 Some of the world poorest nations on the subcontinent, including Mali, Liberia, Benin, and
Ghana,experiencedaseriesofmultipartycompetitiveelectionsandrealgainsinhumanrightssincethe
early1990s,butstatesstilllackthecapacitytoliftmillionsoutofpovertyandtodeliverthetargetsfor
healthcare,educationandwelfareintheMillenniumDevelopmentGoals.19AmongArabstates,some
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concrete but limited gains for human rights and freedoms have registered in recent years, yet the
rhetoric of reform runs far ahead of realities.20 Moreover Carothers suggests that during the
administration of President George W. Bush, the association of the rhetoric of democracy promotion
with unpopular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan depressed public support for reform in the region, and
encouraged a more general pushback by oilrich plutocrats.21 Overall most Middle East autocracies
stagnated.InEasternEurope,Russiahasimposedrenewedrestrictionsonhumanrightsandchallenges
to the rule of law, Georgia has become less stabile, while Central Asia is frozen in sovietstyle
dictatorships,seeminglyisolatedfromglobalforcesofregimechange.ThecolorrevolutionsinGeorgia
and Ukraine were commonly framed as the triumph of democratic forces, but is it unclear whether
these movements actually reflected more deeprooted and widespread democratic sentiments, or
whetherinfacttheyweretriggeredbyelitecontestationforpower.22Afghanistanhasregisteredmixed
progress,experiencingunevenpresidentialelections,andsignsofrenewedinstability,whichspillover
its borders with Pakistan. Elsewhere occasional outbreaks of popular dissent seeking to topple
autocraticregimeshavealsobeenbrutallysuppressedbytheauthorities,forexample,mostrecentlyin
Burma/Myanmar,Tibet,andIran.23InAsiaPacific,democraticallyelectedleadersfellfrompowerafter
military coups in Thailand (2006) and Fiji (2006). The Obama administration has signaled that it will
downplayambitiousneocontalkofdemocracybuildingin IraqandAfghanistan,inabacklashagainst
the rhetoric of President Bush, as realists reasserted more pragmatic leadership in the U.S. State
Department.24
Cultural attitudes towards democracy are expected to be important in all these cases but
particularlysointhosecountrieswhichhaveexperiencedtheinitialtransitionfromautocracyduringthe
third wave era, but which have not yet firmly established the full panoply of legislative and judicial
institutions associated with liberal democracy. 25 Many regime transitions have occurred in world
regions lacking historical experience of democracy, as well as in low income economies, postconflict
divided societies, and fragile states, all providing unfavorable soil for the seeds of democratization to
flourish.26Theoriesoflegitimacysuggestthatregimeswillprovemostpoliticallystablewheretheyrest
on popular support.27 Hence democratic constitutions built upon cultures which strongly endorse
democratic ideals and principles are expected to weather shocks arising from any sudden economic
crisis, internal conflict, or elite challenge more successfully than societies where the public remains
indifferent, cynical, or even hostile towards the idea of democracy. Along similar lines, autocratic
regimes are expected to endure where the general public endorses the legitimacy of this form of
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governance,forexamplewherecitizensexpressdeferencetotheauthorityoftraditionalmonarchsand
religious leaders, or where they are suckered by the heady appeals of populist dictators. If public
legitimacy is lacking, however, regimes are thought more susceptible to mass and elite challenge.
Democratic states, in particular, remain most vulnerable to this risk, as they rely upon a reservoir of
popularlegitimacyandvoluntarycompliancetogovern.Bycontrast,brutalautocracies,ifthreatenedby
massmovements,reformfactions,andoppositiondissidents,canalwaysreasserttheirgriponpowerby
callingthemilitaryoutofthebarracks.
Issues of regime change and progressive democratization, always difficult, have been
compoundedinrecentyearsbytheaftermathoftheglobalfinancialcrisis,whichgeneratedworsening
economicconditionsandpoverty,fallingemploymentandwages,andthelargestdeclineinworldtrade
foreightyyears.28Evenbeforethisdownturn,intheworldspoorestsocieties,democraticgovernments
facedparticularlysevereobstaclesindeliveringbasicpublicservicessuchascleanwater,healthclinics,
andschools.TheU.N.documentsenduringanddeeplyentrenchedpovertyforthebottombillioninthe
least developed nations, raising doubts about whether the world can achieve the Millennium
Development Goals by 2015, as planned.29 Problems of climate change exacerbate problems of food
security,cleanwaterscarcity,andthreatennewhumanitariandisastersinlowlyingcoastalregions.In
fragileorpostcrisisstates,thestruggletoreduceconflict,buildsustainablepeace,andstrengthenthe
capacity and legitimacy of democraticallyelected governments cannot be underestimated.30 In this
complex and difficult environment, it would be nave to assume that the third wave era of
democratizationcontinuestoadvancesteadily.
Explainingthedemocraticdeficit
In this context, understanding the cultural drivers of sustainable processes of democratization
represents one of the most fundamental challenges facing the international community, advocacy
agencies seeking to advance universal human rights, and domestic reformers working to strengthen
democratic governance. Often separate disciplines and research subfields in the social sciences focus
ononeofthetheoreticaldimensionswithpartialempiricaltests,withoutcontrollingforthefullrangeof
explanatory factors, or examining whether the effects of models are robust when utilizing alternative
dependentvariables.Liketheproverbialblindmenandtheelephant,eachpartofthepuzzleisusually
treatedseparatelyintheresearchliterature.Surveyanalystsfocusuponpublicopinion.Communication
scholars scrutinize the news media. Policy analysts monitor government performance. And
institutionalists examine powersharing structures. A more comprehensive general theory provides a
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more satisfactory way of understanding this phenomenon. Multilevel analysis, with evidence derived
fromsurveysofpublicopinion,mediacoverageofpublicaffairs,andaggregateindicatorsofgovernment
performance, is the most appropriate technique to determine the most plausible causes for any
democratic deficits. This book examined a wide range of empirical data, using a series of multilevel
models,toanalyzethestrengthofeachofthesepotentialexplanations.Thisstudyseekstointegratethe
separate approaches into a more coherent sequential framework where citizens, media, and
governmentsinteractasthecentralactors.
Although this study has sought to expand the scope of our knowledge on these issues, a
substantialresearchagendaremains.Forexample,westillknowremarkablylittleaboutmanytypesof
effects not examined here, including how far these democratic orientations shape the popularity of
specific types of political reforms, whether these attitudes influence support for political parties, and
thuswhethertheyalsohelptodeterminepatternsofelectoralbehaviorinmanycountries.Theglobal
expansionofsurveydataprovidesimportantopportunities,includingtheGlobalbarometersandfuture
waves of the World Values Survey. These resources allow researchers to monitor the evolution of
democratic orientations in many parts of the world, including in Arab states, Asia, and SubSaharan
Africa,wherewehavepreviouslylackedanysystematicevidencetostudypublicopinion.Moreoverthe
gradual accumulation of time series survey data, quasiexperimental before and after research
designs focused around the introduction of political reforms, and detailed historical casestudies of
countriesexperiencingbothadvancesandretreatsindemocratization,alsofacilitateimportantinsights
intothedynamicsofprocessesofculturalchange.
The analysis presented throughout this study lead to several main conclusions, which deserve
recapitulationhere.Perhapsthemostimportantsimplemessage,challengingtheconventionalwisdom,
isthatpublicsupportforthepoliticalsystemhasnoterodedconsistentlyinestablisheddemocracies,not
acrossawiderangeofcountriesaroundtheworld.Thecrisisliterature,whilefashionable,exaggerates
theextentofpoliticaldisaffectionandtoooftenfallsintothedangersoffactfreehyperbole.Ingeneral,
following in the footsteps of David Easton, support for the political system is best understood as a
multidimensionalphenomenonrangingfromthemostgeneralizedfeelingsofattachmentandbelonging
to a nationstate, through confidence and trust in the regime and its institutions, down to specific
approval of particular authorities and leaders. Chapter 4 scrutinized and dissected timeseries survey
evidence about public opinion within established democracies. Based on this analysis, this chapter
concludesthatitisessentialtodistinguishtrendsinpublicattitudeswhichoperateatdifferentlevels,
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ratherthantreatingpoliticalsupport asthoughitisallofonepiece.Careful attentionto theprecise

timingandbreadthofanytrendsisalsocriticalforanaccuratediagnosisofdevelopments.
Themostdiffuselevelofpoliticalsupportconcernsthemostfundamentalorientationstowards
the nation state, exemplified by deeprooted feelings of national pride and national identity.
Globalizationmightbeexpectedtohaveweakenedthesefeelingsbutthesurveyevidencedemonstrates
thatnationalismremainsstrongandrelativelystable,evenamongWest Europeansocietieswhichare
longstanding members of the EU. Trust in political institutions such as national governments,
parliaments andpartiesdisplaysystematicandpersistentcontrastsamongestablisheddemocraciesin
WesternEuropeandtheU.S.Thelongitudinalevidenceclearlydemonstratesthatfluctuationsovertime
usually prove far more common than straightforward linear or uniform downward trends.
Notwithstanding all the headlines exaggerating the decline in trust, there is little actual evidence of a
longtermdecline,eitherintheUnitedStatesorinWesternEuropeacrosstheboard.31Contrastsare
also evident in public attitudes towards different branches of government within each country; for
exampletheU.S.hasseenalongtermsignificanterosionofsupportforthelegislature,butthishasnot
affected public support for the Supreme Court or the Executive. Persistent differences in institutional
trust can also be observed among relatively similar nations, such as between Italy and Spain, or
Germany and France. A few European countries have experienced growing trust in state institutions,
whileafewhaveseenthereversesituation.Perhapsmostimportantly,inEuropediffusesupportforthe
nationstateremainsstrongandstable,andEuropeansatisfactionwiththeperformanceofdemocracy
hasusuallystrengthenedovertime,notweakened.
Nevertheless the second major lesson arising from this study is that in many states today,
satisfaction with the performance of democracy continues to diverge from public aspirations. This
pattern was first observed in Critical Citizens and this book provides further confirmation about the
persistence of the democratic deficit. The comparison of multiple dimensions of system support in
contemporarysocietiesworldwide,presentedinchapter6,showedthatcomparedwithothertypesof
regimes, autocracies display stronger confidence in public sector agencies and also feelings of
nationalism. Yet if we focus upon prodemocratic attitudes, in particular, it is clear that these are
strongeramongolderliberaldemocracieswhichhaveexperiencedthisformofgovernanceovermany
decades,orevencenturies,includinglevelsofsatisfactionwithdemocracy,endorsementofdemocratic
attitudes, and the rejection of autocracy. In terms of democratic aspirations, however, today these
attitudesarealmostuniversal,irrespectiveofthetypeofregimegoverningthestate.
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Building upon this foundation, the study compared the democratic deficit in each society,
conceptualized as the tensions which arise from the imbalance between the publics demand for
democracy (measured by strong adherence to democratic values and rejection of authoritarian
alternatives) and the perceived supply of democracy (monitored by public dissatisfaction with the
democratic performance of governments in each country). The evidence demonstrated that people
living in older liberal democracies expressed strong endorsement of democratic values, but also
relativelycontentevaluationsabouthowdemocracyworksintheirowncountry.Stateswhichhaveonly
democratizedduringthethirdwaveeraprovefarmorediverseintheirorientations,withthegreatest
congruencebetweenaspirationsandperceivedperformancedisplayedincasessuchasGhana,Uruguay,
and South Africa, which observers rate as relatively successful democracies. By contrast, larger
disparities between expectations and perceived performance are evident in many postCommunist
states,includinginRussia,Ukraine,BulgariaandSerbia.

Diagnosingthecausesofthedemocraticdeficit
Themarketmodelusedforanalysisinthisbookcomparedthreedistincttypesofexplanation
for the democratic deficit. The most common account of rising aspirations towards democratic
governance emphasizes longterm cultural developments among citizens, on the demandside,
associatedwiththestructuralexpansionincognitiveandcivicskillsrelatedtorisingeducationallevels
and societal modernization (Dalton), generational shifts towards selfexpression values in post
industrialsocieties(InglehartandWelzel),andtheoriesofsocialcapital(Putnam).32Theroleofthenews
media as the intermediary channel of information between citizens and the state is another common
explanationforlevelsofdemocraticknowledgeandforpublicperceptionsofgovernmentperformance.
Moreoverarangeofsupplysidetheorieshavealsobeensuggestedintheliterature,emphasizingthat
public opinion is responding more rationally and instrumentally to the institutional context, including
the enduring impact of historical political traditions on democratic cultures, government performance
whendeliveringbasicpublicgoodsandservices,andtheunevendistributionofpartisanwinnersand
losers arising from institutional structures.33 Each explanation generates a series of testable
propositionswhicharescrutinizedagainsttheavailableempiricalevidenceinsectionIIIofthebook.
Severalmainpointsarisefromtheautopsy.Thethirdcorelessonisthatthedemocraticdeficitis
bestunderstoodintermsofrisingaspirations(fuelledstronglybyeducation),combinedwithnegative
newsaboutgovernment,andshortfallsingovernmentperformance(particularlyprocessperformance).
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Culturalaccountsemphasizethatmajorchangesinsystemsupportaredrivenprimarilybysociological
changes, whether glacial processes of value change eroding respect for traditional authorities and
fuellingemancipativedemandsfordemocracy,or bythewearingawayofgeneralizedsocialtrustand
the facetoface bonds of community associations. The extensive crossnational evidence examined in
this study suggests no confirmation for the bolder claims in the societal modernization theory; in
particular, democratic aspirations were not found to be associated with processes of human
development nor with age effects. Contrary to theoretical expectations, democratic aspirations were
slightlystrongeramongsttheoldergeneration,nottheyoung.Evenmorestrikingly,thesevalueswere
not related to contemporary levels of human development in each society; today both rich and poor
nationsemphasizetheimportanceoflivingindemocraticstates.Butthebabyshouldnotbethrowout
withthebathwater;culturaltheoriesfurnishapartialanswertosomeoftheissuesattheheartofthis
study;inparticular,educationallevels,selfexpressionvalues,socialtrust,andassociationalactivismall
helptopredicthigherdemocraticaspirations.Onlytheeffectsofeducation,however,actuallywidened
thedemocraticdeficit.
There is the need for considerable caution, however, when interpreting the almost universal
supportfordemocraticvalues,anditneedstobeestablishedwhatpeopleunderstandbythecomplex
concept of democracy. The study draws a distinction between procedural, instrumental and
authoritarian notions of democracy. We develop the notion of enlightened democratic knowledge
which is defined and measured by awareness of some basic principles at the heart of democratic
regimesaswellastheabilitytodistinguishthosewhichareincompatible.Drawinguponsocialization
theories of political learning, chapter 8 confirmed that enlightened democratic knowledge was
significantly strengthened at macrolevel by longer historical experience of democratic governance in
any state, cosmopolitan communications, and levels of economic development. At microlevel, the
cognitive skills and knowledge derived from education, and access to news media information, also
strengthenedenlightenedpoliticalknowledge.
Communicationstheoriesprovideanalternativeperspectiveonthedemocraticdeficitalthough
scholars differ in whether they expect that exposure and attention to the news media (especially TV
news) will encourage more cynical attitudes towards politics, government and democracy (the
traditional videomalaise thesis), or whether they predict that this process will reinforce democratic
orientations and civic engagement (the virtuous circle thesis). The analysis presented in chapter 9
provides further confirmation of the latter perspective; exposure to news and information from
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newspapers, television and radio news, and the internet was found to have strengthened democratic
values and aspirations, even after controlling for factors such as age, income and education which
characterizenewsusers.Theeffectsondemocraticsatisfactionprovedmoremixed,butcontrarytothe
core claim in the videomalaise thesis, users of television and radio news proved more satisfied with
democracy,notless.Moreoverregularuseofallthesemediareducedthedemocraticdeficit,orthegap
betweenexpectationsandperceivedperformance.
An alternative account is provided by rational choice theories which suggest that regime
performancematters,atleastatsomelevel,forpublicsatisfactionwiththeworkingsofdemocracy.The
underlying assumptions and claims embodied in these accounts were considered in chapter 10,
comparing the evidence supporting process accounts, which emphasize that judgments of regime
performancearebasedprimarilyuponretrospectiveevaluationsofthequalityofunderlyingdemocratic
procedures,policyaccounts,suggestingthatretrospectiveevaluationsoftheoverallsubstantivepolicy
recordofsuccessivegovernmentsareimportant,andinstitutionalaccounts,whichtheorizethatregime
evaluationsareconditionedbytheinterveningeffectsofpowersharingarrangements,determiningthe
distribution of winners and losers in any state. The results of analyzing a comprehensive range of
measuressuggestthatprocessperformance,includingbothindicesofdemocracyandgoodgovernance,
helpstoexplainsatisfactionwiththewaythatdemocraticgovernmentworks.Amongthepolicyindices,
economic development and a subjective sense of wellbeing also proved equally important, although
mostoftheothermorespecificeconomic,socialandenvironmentalperformanceindicatorswerenot
significant. Lastly among the institutional factors, the only measure which predicted satisfaction with
democracywassupportforthewinningparty.Bycontrast,theoverallinstitutionalarrangementsinany
regime did not appear to be important. Closing the democratic deficit is therefore largely about
strengthening processes of democracy and good governance so that they meet rising citizen
expectations.
Theimpactofdemocraticorientations
Scholars continue to debate the potential consequences of any democratic deficits both for
political behavior at individuallevel and also for democratic governance in the nationstate. Critical
Citizens concluded, somewhat cautiously and ambivalently, that the tensions between ideals and
practices could be regarded in a positive light, if the diffusion of democratic aspirations around the
world will eventually spread downwards to strengthen public confidence and generalized trust in the
workings of representative institutions essential for democratic governance. Critical citizens may
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thereby be a positive force for reform in the world, fuelling popular demands that states with poor
humanrightsrecordscometoresembledemocraticprinciplesmorefully.Adegreeofskepticismabout
the trustworthiness of government authorities is healthy for democracy; after all, classical liberal
politicaltheorywasfoundedontheneedforcitizenvigilanceaboutthepotentialabuseofpowerbythe
state. These ideas led the framers of the U.S. constitution to establish a set of institutions explicitly
designedtolimitgovernmentpower.34AsHardinemphasizes,trustshouldbereservedfortrustworthy
actors. Yet substantial and enduring democratic deficits are more commonly regarded with concern,
however,triggeringalarmthatprolongedanddeepdisenchantmentwiththeperformanceofparticular
politicalleaders,lackofconfidencewithgoverningparties,anddisillusionmentwithcorerepresentative
institutionswilleventuallyspreadupwardstocorrodefaithindemocracyitself,likedryrotweakening
the foundations from below, with the capacity to undermine popular support for fragile democratic
regimes.
This book provides a more detailed examination about many of these issues, allowing firmer
conclusions to be offered in this volume. The results presented in chapter 11 demonstrate that
democratic orientations matter for patterns and types of political participation, for the willingness of
citizens to comply voluntarily with the authorities and thus for the capacity of states to implement
decisions, and ultimately for strengthening processes of democratization. In particular, democratic
aspirations played a significant role in bolstering indicators of citizen interest and protest activism, as
wellasreinforcingcompliantbehaviorbycitizensinaccordancewiththelaw.Lastlythelaggedmodel
monitoredtheeffectsofcultureonsubsequentprocessesofdemocratization,showingthatdemocratic
aspirations contributed towards sustainable democratic regimes. Therefore, as this book has
demonstrated,democraticorientationsarefarfromirrelevanttotherealworld;theymatterforpolitical
participation,forthewillingnessofcitizenstocomplyvoluntarilywiththeauthoritiesandthustobuild
capablestatesandruleoflaw,andultimatelyfortheprocessofstrengtheningdemocracyaroundthe
world.

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PippaNorris.Ed.1999.CriticalCitizens:GlobalSupportforDemocraticGovernance.NewYork:Oxford

UniversityPress.
2

GabrielA.AlmondandSidneyVerba.1963.TheCivicCulture.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress;

LucianPyeandSidneyVerba.Eds.1965.PoliticalCultureandPoliticalDevelopment.Princeton,NJ:
PrincetonUniversityPress.
3

MichelCrozier,SamuelP.Huntington,andJojiWatanuki.1975.TheCrisisofDemocracy:Reportonthe

GovernabilityofDemocraciestotheTrilateralCommission.NewYork:NewYorkUniversityPress.See
alsoSamuelP.Huntington.1981.AmericanPolitics:ThePromiseofDisharmony.Cambridge:Harvard
UniversityPress.
4

Foradiscussion,seePippaNorris.2007.Politicalactivism:Newchallenges,newopportunities.The

OxfordHandbookofComparativePolitics.EditedbyCarlesBoixandSusanStokes.Oxford:Oxford
UniversityPress.Pp.628652;PippaNorris.2009.Politicalactivism.DevelopmentsinEuropeanPolitics
ed.PaulHeywood.London:Palgrave.
5

Forthecomparativeliterature,seeSusanPharrandRobertPutnam.(Eds.)2000.Disaffected

Democracies:what'stroublingthetrilateralcountries?Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress;RussellJ.
Dalton.2004.DemocraticChallenges,DemocraticChoices:TheErosionofPoliticalSupportinAdvanced
IndustrialDemocracies.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress;MatteiDogan.Ed.2005.PoliticalMistrust
andtheDiscreditingofPoliticians.TheNetherlands:Brill;MarianoTorcalandJosR.Montero.2006.
PoliticalDisaffectioninContemporaryDemocracies:SocialCapital,Institutions,andPolitics.London:
Routledge.FortheU.S.literature,seeJosephS.Nye,PhilipD.Zelikow,andDavidC.King.Eds.1997.
WhyPeopleDon'tTrustGovernment.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress;RobertD.Putnam.
2000.BowlingAlone:TheCollapseandRevivalofAmericanCommunity.NY:SimonandSchuster;JohnR.
HibbingandElizabethTheissMorse.Eds.2001.WhatIsItAboutGovernmentThatAmericansDislike?
Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress;PeterWood.2004.ABeeintheMouth:AngerinAmericaNow.
EncounterBooks.
6

RussellJ.Dalton.2004.DemocraticChallenges,DemocraticChoices:TheErosionofPoliticalSupportin

AdvancedIndustrialDemocracies.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.p191.
7

See,forexample,theNewYorkTimes/CBSPollFebruary2010.

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/12/us/politics/12poll.html?ref=politics
12

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GerryStoker.2006.WhyPoliticsMatters:MakingDemocracyWork.London:Palgrave/Macmillan;Colin

Hay.2007.WhyWeHatePolitics.Cambridge:PolityPress;MichaelKenny.2009.Takingthe
TemperatureoftheBritishPoliticalElite3:WhenGrubbyistheOrderoftheDay..Parliamentary
Affairs.62(4):663672.
9

HansMathiasKepplinger.2000.ThedecliningimageoftheGermanpoliticalelite.Harvard

InternationalJournalofPressPolitics5(4):7180;SusanJ.Pharr.2000.Officialsmisconductandpublic
distrust:JapanandtheTrilateraldemocracies.InSusanJ.PharrandRobertD.Putnam,Eds.2000.
Disaffecteddemocracies:what'stroublingthetrilateralcountries?2000,Princeton,N.J.:Princeton
UniversityPress.
10

Forreviewsofsomeoftheseinitiatives,seeBruceCain,RussellJ.DaltonandSusanScarrow.Eds.

2003.DemocracyTransformed?TheExpansionofPoliticalAccessinAdvancedIndustrialized
Democracies.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress;BoaventuradeSousaSantos.Ed.2007.Democratizing
Democracy:BeyondtheLiberalDemocraticCannon.London:Verso;GrahamSmith.2009.Democratic
Innovations:Designinginstitutionsforcitizenparticipation.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress;Joan
DeBardelebenandJonH.Pammett.Eds.2009.ActivatingtheCitizen:DilemmasofParticipationin
EuropeandCanada.NewYork:Palgrave/Macmillan.
11

ChristopherHoodandDavidHeald.Eds.2006.Transparency:TheKeytoBetterGovernance.Oxford:

OxfordUniversityPress;KristinM.Lord.2007.ThePerilsAndPromiseofGlobalTransparency:Whythe
InformationRevolutionMayNotLeadtoSecurity,Democracy,orPeace.NewYork:SUNYPress;Ann
Florini.2007.TheRighttoKnow:TransparencyforanOpenWorld.NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress;
JohnKeane.2009.TheLifeandDeathofDemocracy.NewYork:W.W.Norton&Co.
12

MichaelGallagherandPaulMitchell.Eds.ThePoliticsofElectoralSystems.Oxford:OxfordUniversity

Press;JosephM.Colomer.Ed.2004.HandbookofElectoralSystemChoice.NewYork:Palgrave
Macmillan;ZacharyElkins,TomGinsburgandJamesMelton.2009.TheEnduranceofNational
Constitutions.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.
13

LarryDiamond.2008.TheSpiritofDemocracy:TheStruggletoBuildFreeSocietiesThroughoutthe

World.NewYork:TimesBooks;LarryDiamond.2008.Thedemocraticrollback:Theresurgenceofthe
predatorystate.ForeignAffairs87(2):3648.

13

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14

ArchPuddington.2009.Freedomintheworld2009:setbacksandresilience.FreedomintheWorld,

2009.Washington,DC:FreedomHouse.
15

RodericCamp.ed.2001.CitizenViewsofDemocracyinLatinAmericaPittsburgh:Universityof

PittsburghPress;MartaLagos.2003.Supportforandsatisfactionwithdemocracy.InternationalJournal
ofPublicOpinionResearch15(4):471487;MartaLagos.2003.PublicOpinionInJorgeI.Dominguez
andMichaelShifter.Eds.ConstructingDemocraticGovernanceinLatinAmerica.Baltimore,MD:Johns
HopkinsUniversityPress;RodolfoSarsfieldandF.Echegaray.2006.Openingtheblackbox:How
satisfactionwithdemocracyanditsperceivedefficacyaffectregimepreferenceinLatinAmerica.
InternationalJournalofPublicOpinionResearch18(2):153173.
16

C.GrahamandA.Sukhtankar.2004.Doeseconomiccrisisreducesupportformarketsand

democracyinLatinAmerica?Someevidencefromsurveysofpublicopinionandwellbeing.Journalof
LatinAmericanStudies36(2):349377;F.Panizza.2005.Unarmedutopiarevisited:Theresurgenceof
leftofcentrepoliticsinLatinAmerica.PoliticalStudies53(4):716734.
17

RobertRotberg.Ed.2007.WorstoftheWorst:DealingwithRepressiveandRogueNations.

WashingtonDC:BrookingsInstitutionPress.
18

RobertE.Bates.2009.Whenthingsfallapart:StatefailureinlatecenturyAfrica.Cambridge:

CambridgeUniversityPress.
19

MichaelBratton,Michael,andNicholasVanDeWalle.1997.DemocraticExperimentsinAfrica.New

York:CambridgeUniversityPress.
20

MarinaOttowayandThomasCaothers.Eds.2005.UnchartedJourney:PromotingDemocracyinthe

MiddleEast.WashingtonDC:Carnegie;MarinaOttowayandJuliaChoucairVizoso.Eds.2008.Beyond
theFaade:PoliticalReformintheArabWorld.WashingtonDC:Carnegie.
21

K.Dalacoura.2005.USdemocracypromotionintheArabMiddleEastsince11September2001:a

critique.InternationalAffairs81(5):963+;ThomasCarothers.2006.TheBacklashagainstdemocracy
promotion.ForeignAffairs85(2):5568.
22

MichaelMcFaul.2005.TransitionsfromPostcommunism.JournalofDemocracy16:519;Gerhard

Simon.2006.AnorangetingedrevolutionTheUkrainianpathtodemocracy.RussianPoliticsandLaw
44(2):527;P.D'Anieri.2005.WhathaschangedinUkrainianpolitics?Assessingtheimplicationsofthe
14

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OrangeRevolution.ProblemsofPostCommunism52(5):8291;RobertK.Christensen,EdwardR.
RakhimkulovandCharlesR.Wise.2005.TheUkrainianOrangeRevolutionbroughtmorethananew
president:Whatkindofdemocracywilltheinstitutionalchangesbring?CommunistandPost
CommunistStudies38(2):207230;CharlesFairbanks,Jr.2007.Revolutionreconsidered.Journalof
Democracy.18(1):4256.
23

AdamRobertsandTimothyGartonAsh.2009.CivilResistanceandPowerPolitics:TheExperienceof

NonviolentActionfromGandhitothePresent.OxfordUniversityPress.
24

ThomasCarothers.2009.DemocracyPromotionunderObama:FindingaWayForward.Carnegie

FoundationPolicyBrief77(February2009).
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/democracy_promotion_obama.pdf
25

HarryEckstein.1961.ATheoryofStableDemocracy.Princeton,NJ:WoodrowWilsonCenter,

PrincetonUniversity.
26

PippaNorris.2008.DrivingDemocracy.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.

27

StephenM.Weatherford.1992.Measuringpoliticallegitimacy.AmericanPoliticalScienceReview

86:14966.
28

TheWorldBank.2009.Swimmingagainstthetide:howdevelopingcountriesarecopingwiththe

globalcrisis.BackgroundPaperpreparedbyWorldBankStafffortheG20FinanceMinistersandCentral
BankGovernorsMeeting,Horsham,UnitedKingdomonMarch1314,2009.
29

UnitedNations.2008.TheMillenniumDevelopmentGoalsReport2008.NewYork:UnitedNations;

PaulCollier.2007.TheBottomBillion.NewYork/Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.
30

MichaelDoyleandNicholasSambanis.2006.MakingWarandBuildingPeace.Princeton:Princeton

UniversityPress.
31

SimilarconclusionswerereachedinthereviewoftheliteraturebyMargaretLeviandLauraStoker.

2000.Politicaltrustandtrustworthiness.AnnualReviewofPoliticalScience3:475508.
32

RonaldInglehartandChristianWelzel.2005.Modernization,culturalchange,anddemocracy:the

humandevelopmentsequence.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress;RobertD.Putnam.2000.
BowlingAlone:TheCollapseandRevivalofAmericanCommunity.NY:SimonandSchuster;RussellJ.
15

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Dalton.2004.DemocraticChallenges,DemocraticChoices:TheErosionofPoliticalSupportinAdvanced
IndustrialDemocracies.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.
33

RussellJ.Dalton.2004.DemocraticChallenges,DemocraticChoices:TheErosionofPoliticalSupportin

AdvancedIndustrialDemocracies.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.
34

MarkE.Warren.Ed.1999.DemocracyandTrust.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress;Russell

Hardin.Ed.2004.TrustandTrustworthiness.NewYork:RussellSageFoundation.

16