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Chapter1
Agrowinggapbetweendemocraticaspirationsandperformance?
Are contemporary democratic states experiencing a major legitimacy crisis? Does the general
publiclacktrustingovernmentandconfidencethepoliticalprocess?Haspublicskepticismevenspread
upwardstomakecitizensmorecriticalabouttheperformanceofdemocracy?Manythinkso.Sincethe
early1990s, a host of scholars of American politics have detected signs of a rising tide of popular
discontentandvoteranger(Dionne,Craig,Tolchin,Wood),aswellasdeepmistrustofgovernment(Nye,
ZelikowandKing,Hetherington),wheretheU.S.Congressisheldinespeciallylowregard(Hibbingand
TheissMorse). These observations are commonly coupled with behavioral indicators of civic
engagement, notably low or falling voting turnout (Teixiera), eroding social capital (Putnam), and
declining party loyalties (Aldrich), weakening connections between citizens and the state.1
Commentators point to multiple signs of contemporary discontent with American democracy, from
voterangeragainstincumbentsofbothmajorpartiesandtheoutbreakofTeaPartyrebelliontopopular
frustrationwithgridlockanddivisivepartisanshipinD.C.
During the last decade, similar anxieties have infected other postindustrial societies. 2 In
Western Europe, it is claimed that people hate politics (Hay), political parties have lost loyal voters
(Franklinetal,DaltonandWattenberg)aswellasgrassrootsmembers(MairandBiezen),whileelectoral
turnout has fallen (Franklin), and public disaffection has spread (Torcal and Montero, Dogan, Andrain
andSmith).3 Supportforpopulistandradicalrightpartiesisseenasanothersymptomoftherejection
of mainstream European politics.4 Reflecting upon the broader meaning of these entrails, haruspices
haveevenspeculatedgloomilyaboutthewinterofdemocracy(Hermet),theeraofpostdemocracy
(Crouch),aswellasthedeathofdemocracy(Keane).5Themostcomprehensiveandthoroughdiagnosis
of the crossnational survey evidence, by Russell Dalton, concludes, more cautiously, that citizens in
advancedindustrialsocietiesremainstaunchlycommittedtodemocraticprinciplesalthoughtheyhave
gradually become more distrustful of politicians, detached from parties, and doubtful about public
sectorinstitutions.6Signsofparalleldevelopmentselsewhereintheworldremainmoremixed.7Iflong
established democracies are in trouble, however, and if these problems spread, this may contribute
towardswhatsomeobservershaveidentifiedasaglobaldemocraticrecession.8
Tobesure,thepictureshouldnotbeexaggeratedoroverblown,asanxietyaboutpublictrustin
government usually ebbs and flows over the years. Not all commentators share a common
interpretation of the available indicators, by any means; indeed a longstanding debate about their
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meaningremainsunresolvedaftermorethanfourdecades.9Neverthelesstheprevailingviewsuggests
that, for reasons which continue to remain unclear, political disaffection has worsened in recent
decades,withsignificantconsequencesfordemocraticgovernance.
Thecentralargument
Whyanotherbookabouttheseissues?Isthereanythingnewtosay?Perhapssurprisingly,alot.
Thisbooklaysoutaseriesofreasons,backedbysystematicsurveyevidencedrawnfrommorethanfifty
countriesworldwide,whichchallengethe conventionaldiagnosis,reframe thedebate,andrecalibrate
the evidence about citizens attitudes towards democratic governance. There is no question that the
conventionalcrisisofdemocraticlegitimacythesisneedsrevising.
Fourclaimslieattheheartofthisbook:
Firstly, public support for the political system has not eroded consistently across a wide range of
countriesaroundtheworldincludinginestablisheddemocracies.Nationalismmaintainsidentification
withthenationstate,confidenceingovernmentdoesnotdeclineuniformly,whilepopularsupportfor
authoritiesfluctuatesamongstates.
Nevertheless, secondly, in many states today, satisfaction with the performance of democracy
divergesfrompublicaspirations.Ithaslongbeenthoughtthatregimesaremorelikelytoendureand
flourishwhereabalancedequilibriumexistsbetweencitizensaspirationsfordemocracy(measuredby
how much people value democratic ideals and reject autocratic alternatives) and its perceived supply
(monitoredbypublicsatisfactionwiththedemocraticperformanceoftheirowncountry).10
PartIpresentsthebookscentralargumentfocusingupontheconceptofdemocraticdeficits,reflecting
how far citizens aspirations for democracy are out of kilter with their satisfaction with the way
democracyworks.Thenotionofademocraticdeficitfirstaroseindebatesaboutthelegitimacyofthe
European Union. The core decisionmaking institutions in the EU have been regarded by some
commentators as falling well short of the standards of democratic accountability and transparency
which exists at nationallevel within each of the member states. 11 The original idea judged the
legitimacyofdecisionmakingprocesseswithintheEuropeanUnionagainstthedemocraticstandardsof
European nation states. But this useful concept is not confined to this context and it can be applied
more widely to any object where the perceived democratic performance fails to meet public
expectations,whetherconcerningaspecificpublicsectoragencyorinstitution,thecollectiveregimeor
constitutional arrangements governing the nationstate, or the agencies of global governance and
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multilateral organizations, including the European Union and the United Nations.12 The idea of a
democraticdeficitalsobuildsuponworkdevelopedmorethanadecadeagowhichfirstidentifiedthe
phenomenon of critical citizens.13 This group of citizens aspires to democracy as their ideal form of
government,yetatthesametimetheyremaindeeplyskepticalwhenevaluatinghowdemocracyworks
intheirowncountry.Thisbookcanbeseenasthedirectdescendentoftheearlierstudy,althoughit
seekstoupdateandexpandtheevidence,reframetheanalysis,andrefinethediagnosis.
[Figure1.1abouthere]
Whatexplainsthesizeanddistributionofdemocraticdeficitsindifferentstatesworldwide?The
extensive research literature focused on satisfaction with democracy and trust in government has
proposedalongshoppinglistofpotentialcauses,whetheradhocexplanations(includingtheimpactof
particularhistoricalevents)orelsemoresystematicgeneralizations.Thenumberofrivalhypothesiscan
prove daunting; a recent study in the Netherlands, for example, identified ten distinct propositions
whichwerethoughttoaccountforfallingpublicconfidenceandtrustintheDutchgovernment. 14This
long list can be whittled down and integrated into the more comprehensive, parsimonious, and
coherentgeneraltheorytoexplainwhysatisfactionwiththeperceiveddemocraticperformanceofany
regimedivergesfrompublicaspirations,asillustratedschematicallyinFigure1.1.Thisleadstothethird
coreclaimattheheartofthebook:
Thirdly, the democratic deficit can be explained by the interaction of rising expectations, negative
news,andfailingperformance.Eachoftheinterrelatedcomponentsgeneratescertainlogicalgeneral
propositionswhichcanbetestedagainsttheempiricalevidence.

Demandsidetheoriesfocusuponenduringculturalshiftsamongthemasscitizenry.
o

Societal modernization theories attribute rising democratic aspirations to longterm

processes of human development, especially growing levels of literacy, education, and
cognitiveskills,leadingtoemancipativevalues.Ifcorrect,thenthepubliclivinginaffluent,
postindustrial societies, especially the younger generation and bettereducated sectors,
shoulddisplaythestrongestendorsementfordemocraticvalues.

Alternative theories of social capital predict that a longterm erosion of social trust and
communitynetworkshasunderminedfaithindemocraticgovernance.

Intermediary accounts emphasize the role of political communications in how people learn about
democracyandregimeperformance.

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Cognitivetheoriesofsociallearningregardthemassmediaasoneoftheprimaryagencies
for learning about democracy, alongside education and the legacy of historical political
traditions.

Theoriesofprimingandframingsuggestthat thenewsmediashapepublicperceptionsof
government performance. If true, stronger disenchantment with the way democratic
governance works should be linked with negative news about politics, government and
publicaffairs.

Supplysidetheories,bycontrast,laytheblameforpublicdissatisfactionwitheithertheprocessor
thepolicyperformanceofdemocraticgovernments,aswellastheinstitutionalarrangements.
o

Processaccountsemphasizethatrationalcitizenshavethecapacitytojudgehowdemocracy
works in their own country; it follows that public satisfaction should reflect the quality of
democraticgovernanceexistingindifferentcountries.

Policy performance explanations emphasize public dissatisfaction with the capacity of

governments to manage the delivery of public goods and services. If true, democratic
deficits should relate to perceptual and/or aggregate indicators of policy outputs and
outcomes.

Lastly, structural accounts emphasize that democratic deficits are conditioned by the
constitutional arrangements in any state, especially by powersharing arrangements. If
correct, satisfaction with democracy should prove greater among electoral winners than
losers,aswellasbeingminimizedincountrieswithpowerconcentratingregimes.

Eachofthesecomponentshasoftenbeentreatedseparatelybysubdisciplinesinthefragmentedand
scattered research literature. A more satisfactory holistic understanding arises where these are each
understoodasbuildingblocksinasequentialprocess.Inaloosemarketmodel,massculturereflectsthe
demandside, communications is the connective information environment, and government
performancerepresentsthesupplysideoftheequation.Inshort,democraticdeficitsarisefromrising
aspirations,negativenews,andfailingperformance.Thelogicalarguments,andtheempiricalevidence
supportingeachoftheseexplanations,andhowtheyfittogetherlikepiecesofacomplexjigsawpuzzle,
deservecarefulscrutinyandsystematicexamination.
Lastly,whydoesthisphenomenonmatter?Debatecontinues.Themostsanguineinterpretation
suggests any symptoms of disaffection reflect the runofthemill midterm blues and public
disgruntlementdirectedagainstspecificpoliticiansandparties,resolvedperiodicallythroughtheballot

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box.Citizendissatisfactionmayalsosparkprogressivereformmovements,catalyzecitizenactivism,and
thusserveultimatelytostrengthenprocessesofdemocratizationinallsocieties.15Someemphasizethat
any loss of public confidence and trust in government has not actually contributed towards regime
instability.16 More commonly, however, commentators regard opinion polls as the canary in the coal
mine where signs point towards pervasive doubts towards the role and powers of government,
sentiments which, it is feared, can slide into deeprooted popular aversion and hostility towards all
things political. A leaking reservoir of political trust is seen as tying policymakers hands and limiting
voluntarycompliancewithgovernmentauthority.17Dissatisfactionwithdemocraticperformanceisalso
usually regarded, at least implicitly, as an important cause of civic disengagement and an erosion of
conventional participation among citizens. At worst, fragile democratic regimes lacking a broad and
deep foundation of legitimacy among the mass public are widely believed to face serious risk of
instabilityandevenbreakdown.18Theconceptofregimelegitimacycanbebestunderstood,inSeymour
Martin Lipset words, as "the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that
existingpoliticalinstitutionsarethemostappropriateandproperonesforthesociety."19Incountries
whichhaverecentlytransitionedfromautocracy,inparticular,anydeepandenduringdemocraticdeficit
is often thought to undermine processes of regime consolidation, as the new rulers cannot count on
institutionalinertiaorthebondsofhabitualsupporttomaintainadeepreservoirofpopularlegitimacy
and to deter elite challenges. Rather than supporting into the idea that there are no serious
implications,oralternativelythattheskyisfalling,thefinalclaiminthebooksuggeststhat,fourthly,the
democratic deficit has important consequences for political activism, for allegiant forms of political
behaviorandruleoflaw,andultimatelyforprocessesofdemocratization.
Accordingly this book seeks to understand the causes and consequences of the democratic
deficit, integrating prior knowledge into a theoretical framework which challenges conventional
assumptions and provides a more complete diagnosis and prognosis. The remainder of this chapter
clarifiesthecoreargumentandprovidesaroadmaptoguidereadersthroughtherestofthebook.
Theoriesofsystemsupport
PoliticalphilosophersasdiverseasAristotle,Montesquieu,anddeTocquevillehavelongsought
tounderstandvarietiesofpoliticalculturesaroundtheglobe.Theempiricalfoundationforthisbodyof
workwasestablishedby GabrielAlmondandSidneyVerbasTheCivicCulture.20Previouslyonlyafew
othercrossnationalattitudinalsurveyshadeverbeendeployed,notablyWilliamBuchananandHadley

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Cantrils 9country How Nations See Each Other (1953), sponsored by UNESCO, sociological surveys of
socialstratification,andUSIAsurveysofattitudestowardsinternationalaffairs.21
The pathbreaking civic culture survey, conducted in 1959/60, laid the groundwork for a long
series of crossnational public opinion surveys. The series of American National Election Surveys are
commonly regarded as canonical, not least because they now facilitate analysis of more than a half
century of public opinion trends in the United States. The geographic scope of crossnational surveys
grewconsiderablyintheearly1980sand1990stofacilitatecomparisonofcitizenspoliticalandsocial
attitudes in a wide range of states worldwide. 22 This includes the Eurobarometer and related EU
surveys (which started in 1970), the European Election Study (1979), the European Values Survey and
the World Values Survey (1981), the International Social Survey Programme (1985), the Global
Barometers(includingregionalsurveysconductedinLatinAmerica,SubSaharanAfrica,Arabstates,and
Asia(1990andvarious),theComparativeNationalElectionsProject(1990),theEuropeanVoterandthe
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (1995), the European Social Survey (2002), the Transatlantic
Trends survey (2002), the Pew Global Attitudes project (2002), World Public Opinion, and the Gallup
World Poll (2005). Numerous survey datasets are also available for detailed casestudies of trends in
public opinion within particular countries, including the extensive range of academic national election
studies,generalsocialsurveys,andcommercialpublicopinionpolls.
To examine the comparative evidence, more than a decade ago, I edited a volume, Critical
Citizens. 23 This brought together a network of international scholars to consider the global state of
publicsupportfordemocraticgovernanceinthelatetwentiethcentury.DavidEastonsseminalinsights
into the conceptual framework of political support provided the classic starting point for the study. 24
Drawing upon these ideas, the earlier book understood the idea of political support broadly as a
multidimensional phenomenon ranging from the most diffuse to the most specific levels. Hence this
notionwasconceivedtoincludefivecomponents:
(i)

The most general and fundamental feelings of citizens towards belonging to the
nationalcommunity,exemplifiedbyfeelingsofnationalprideandidentity;

(ii)

Support for general regime principles, including approval of democratic and

autocraticattitudesandvalues;

(iii)

Evaluations of the overall performance of the regime, exemplified by satisfaction

withtheworkingsofdemocracy;

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(iv)

Confidence in state institutions, notably government, parliaments, parties, the civil

service,thecourts,andthesecurityforces;and

(v)

Trustinelectedandappointedofficeholders,includingpoliticiansandleaders.

Critical Citizens scrutinized a wide range of survey indicators for evidence concerning each of
thesedimensions,includingglobal,regionalandnationalcomparisonsofpublicopinionfromthe1960s
until the mid1990s. The volume brought together experts on diverse countries and regions, utilizing
different datasets and surveys, as well as scholars drawn from multiple theoretical perspectives and
disciplines. Despite the multiplicity of viewpoints, based on the survey evidence, a common
understandingquicklyemergedaboutthemostappropriateinterpretationoftrends.Thecollaborative
volume concluded that citizens in many countries had proved increasingly skeptical about the actual
workingsofthecoreinstitutionsofrepresentativedemocracy,notablypoliticalparties,parliaments,and
governments. At the same time, however, public aspirations towards democratic ideals, values, and
principles, or the demand for democracy, proved almost universal around the globe. The tensions
between unwavering support for democratic principles but skeptical evaluations about democratic
practices, was interpreted in the book as the rise of critical citizens. Subsequent studies have
understood this phenomenon, with perhaps an excess of alliteration, as disaffected, dissatisfied, or
disenchanted democrats.25 Each of these accounts, however, framed the central issue in terms of
individual citizens. Reframing the phenomenon to understand how socialpsychological orientations
relatetothebroaderenvironmentalcontextsetbythenewsmediaandregimeperformanceprovidesa
morecomprehensiveaccount.
Building upon this foundation, this book updates the evidence by analyzing trends in citizens
attitudes and orientations towards the nationstate, regime and authorities within established
democracies, comparing the United States and Western Europe. Support for the political system
continues to be understood as a multidimensional phenomenon ranging from the most generalized
feelingsofattachmentandbelongingtoanationstate,throughconfidenceandtrustintheregimeand
its institutions, down to specific approval of particular authorities and leaders. Trends over time are
established using survey indicators to relate this study to the broader research literature and to clear
away some of the most pervasive myths. After providing a general overview of a wide range of
indicators of system support, the book then focuses upon comparing disparities worldwide in the
democraticdeficit,understoodtocombinethecomponentsofvaluesandjudgments.

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Roadmapofthebook
PartI:Theoreticalframework
Thefirstsectionofthebookclarifiesthecoreconcepts,thecentraltheoreticalargument,and
theprimarysourcesofevidenceandmultilevelmethodsofanalysis.Scholarshavelongdebatedhow
best to understand public attitudes towards government. For example, do the available indicators
concerning trust and confidence in political institutions reflect a relatively superficial and healthy
skepticism about the performance of politicians and the normal upsanddowns in popular fortunes
expected of any party in government? Or alternatively do signs suggest more deeprooted loss of
citizens trust in all public officials, lack of faith in core institutions of representative democracy, and
ambivalence about fundamental democratic principles? Another important issue which remains
unresolvedconcernstherelationshipbetweensupportfordemocraticidealsandpractices.Inparticular,
willpublicfaithindemocraticvaluesgraduallyspreaddownwardstoencouragetrustandconfidencein
the core institutions of representative democracy? Or instead, will skepticism about the way that
democratic states work eventually diffuse upwards to corrode and undermine approval of democratic
principles?Or,alternatively,itmaybethattheseambivalenttensionsbetweenidealsandpracticeswill
persistinparallel.Thereisnothingparticularlynovelabouttheseconcerns;afterall,thepostWorldWar
IIeraiscommonlyassumedtobethehalcyoneraoftrustinthefederalgovernmentinWashingtonD.C.
yet one of the first studies of U.S. public opinion documented ambivalent attitudes during the late
1950s,concludingthatAmericancitizens:tendtoexpecttheworstinpoliticsbuthopeforthebest. 26
Followingtheturbulentstreetprotests,urbanriots,andriseofnewsocialmovementsduringthe1960s
and early1970s, a major report for the Trilateral Commission warned that a legitimacy crisis was
undermining Western democracies. 27 The latest angst is thus only the most recent of a long series of
similarwavesofconcernwhichhavemovedinandoutofintellectualfashionovertheyears.
To explore these issues, Chapter 2 unpacks the core concepts. The traditional foundation for
understandinghowcitizensorientatethemselvestowardsthenationstate,itsagenciesandactorsrests
on the idea of system support, originally developed by David Easton in the 1960s. Critical Citizens,
expandedtheEastonianconceptualframeworktodistinguishfivedimensionsofsystemsupportandthe
updated survey evidence presented in this chapter demonstrates that these distinctions continue to
prove robust. Building upon these ideas, the chapter clarifies and operationalizes the concept of
democraticdeficits.Thischapteralsooutlinesthereasonswhycertainbehavioralindicatorsadoptedby
other studies to monitor political support are rejected as inappropriate here, including evidence
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concerning partisan dealignment and declining party membership, behavioral indicators of civic
engagement such as voting turnout or campaign activism, and measures of social capital, including
associational membership and interpersonal trust. Behavioral factors are a vital part of any
comprehensiveunderstandingofdemocraticcitizenshipandcivicengagement.Butsocialpsychological
attitudes and values are treated here as analytically distinct from any behavioral consequences which
flowfromtheseorientations.
Chapter3outlinesthetechnicaldetailaboutthisstudy,includingthesourcesofevidence,the
comparative framework, the methods of multilevel analysis, and the classification of regimes used
throughoutthestudy.Unfortunatelymuchpopulardiscourseisbaseduponflimsyevidenceandpiece
mealanecdotes.Manyclaimsrestuponrealchangesincitizenbehavior,whichhaveindeedoccurred,
where commentators immediately speculate about the motivations which lie behind these
developments, rather than looking directly at public opinion. Some academic research, as well,
exaggerates any selective evidence of crisis, in the fashionable attempt to be policyrelevant, while
neglecting contrary indicators. Empirical analysis often rests unreflectively upon outdated normative
foundations. Scholars are often imprisoned by theoretical roots which can be traced back to the
textbook conventions established during the 1950s, when AngloAmerican democracies were once
regardedastheparadigm fortheworld.Untilrecently,moresystematicresearchusually reliedupon
standard regression models which combine individual and macrolevel variables, but it is now widely
recognized that these can produce misleading results, particularly by exaggerating the statistical
significanceofanycontextualeffects.28Hencemultilevelregressionmodelsareutilizedforthisstudy,as
themostappropriatetechniqueforanalyzingbothindividual(survey)andaggregate(national)data.At
thesametime,theanalysishastheadvantagethattheinterpretationoftheresultsremainssimilarto
anystandardOLSregressionmodels,dependinguponthestrengthandsignificanceofthecoefficients.
PartII:Symptoms
Toestablishthegeneralsymptoms,andtoclearawaysomepervasivemythsandaccumulated
brushwood, Part II analyzes longitudinal trends and crossnational patterns in multiple indicators of
systemsupport.UsingtheexpandedversionoftheconventionalEastonianconceptualframework,the
study examines generalized support for the national community, approval of democratic regimes and
rejection of autocratic principles, evaluations of democratic performance, confidence in public sector
institutions,andapprovalofincumbentauthorities.

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Chapter4focusesoncomparingsystemsupportinarangeofestablisheddemocracies.TheU.S.
analysis draws upon survey evidence in from the American National Election Study (ANES), which has
measuredtrustinpoliticiansandgovernmentsince1958,andfromtheAmericanGeneralSocialSurvey
(GSS),whichhasmonitoredconfidenceintheleadersofpublicandprivatesectorinstitutionssincethe
early1970s. The EuroBarometer provides comparable timeseries indicators for EU member states.
The results challenge the claim that established democracies have experienced a rising tidal wave of
political disillusionment or growing disaffection with government during the third wave era; instead
confidence in public sector institutions ebbs and flows during these decades. Neighboring European
Union member states, sharing relatively similar postindustrial economies, modern societies, and
democraticinstitutions,displaypersistentandenduringcontrastsintheirpoliticalcultures,ratherthan
anyconvergence.EvenintheUnitedStateswhereperhapsmostconcernhasbeenexpressedrecently
about the breakdown of civil discourse blamed on growing political cynicism, extreme ideological
polarization, and teaparty confrontations with elected representatives in fact support for
government institutions and leaders has both risen and fallen over time in recent decades. Far from
confidence in political institutions being all of one piece, Americans differentiate among the major
branches of the federal government. The standard interpretation of evergrowing public
disenchantmentwithpoliticsandgovernmentinestablisheddemocraciesisoversimpleandmisleading,
requiringsignificantrevision.
Chapter 5 broadens the comparison by analyzing crossnational patterns of system support in
more than fifty countries around the world. Most comparative survey analysis of trends in public
opinionhasfocusedupontheUnitedStatesandWesternEurope,inpartbecausesomeofthelongest
timeseries evidence is available in these societies. Today, however, it is possible to analyze survey
evidenceofcontemporaryattitudestowardspoliticsandgovernmentinmanyglobalregions,including
around fifty societies covering a wide range of developing societies and thirdwave democracies. The
evidence presented in this chapter, derived from the World Values Survey, compares indicators of
system support ranging from the specific to the most diffuse, including confidence in public sector
institutions,evaluationsofdemocraticperformance,supportfordemocracyandrejectionofautocratic
formsofgovernment,thesaliencyofdemocraticvalues,andfeelingsofnationalism.
Chapter6expandsuponthisfoundationbydocumentingthetimeseriesevidenceavailablein
elevennationscontainedinthefivesuccessivewavesoftheWorldValuesSurveyconductedsincethe
early1980s. These cases include several countries which have experienced regime change during this

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period including South Africa, South Korea, and Argentina providing before and after natural
experiments to monitor the impact of regime change and democratization on system support. This
chapter also operationalizes the notion of the democratic deficit and thus highlights the disparities
whichexistbetweendemocraticaspirationsanddemocraticsatisfactionaprocesswhichallowsusto
documentthesizeanddistributionofthisphenomenonacrossandwithincountriesaroundtheworld.
PartIII:Diagnosis
Buildinguponthisfoundation,thethirdpartofthebookdiagnosesthecausesofthedemocratic
deficit. Chapter 7 examines the role of culture as the main demandside explanation of this
phenomenon. Modernization theories suggest that citizens orientations towards democratic
governance have evolved over time, with rising aspirations fuelled by social structural changes in the
spreadofeducationinpostindustrialsocieties,andthuscitizenscognitiveandcivicskills,aswellasin
termsoftheirculturalvaluesandorientationstowardsauthority.29Thesedevelopmentsarebelievedto
haveoccurredinresponsetolongtermprocessesofsocietalmodernization,humandevelopment,and
generationalchange.Evenifthestatedoesnotalter,inthisperspective,culturalaccountscontendthat
citizens have evolved in their social psychological orientations, becoming more informed, less
deferential, and more demanding in their expectations about the democratic performance of
government. If correct, then strong links should be evident at individual level between democratic
orientationsandthedistributionofeducationalskills,aswellaswiththeendorsementofpostmaterial
andselfexpressionvalues.Moreoveratmacrolevel,democraticaspirationsandsatisfactionshouldbe
predictable by levels of societal modernization, using aggregate indicators of economic and human
development.Alternativetheoriesofsocialcapital,associatedwiththeseminalworkofRobertPutnam,
emphasize the importance of generalized interpersonal trust and associational networks on trust in
government.30Ifsocialcapitalaccountsareright,thenpatternsofsocialtrustandassociationalactivism
shouldhelptoaccountforthedemocraticdeficit.
Chapter 8 focuses on understanding knowledge about democracy. The general publics
judgmentcanbebasedonarationalunderstandingofdemocracy,comparedagainststandardideasof
liberaldemocracy.Alternatively,aswithmanyothercomplexissues,suchasratesofcrime,thedegree
of global warming, or the size of the federal deficit, awareness about democracy may be incoherent,
partial,biased,inflated,shallow,orfactuallyerroneous.Thebookseekstoestablishcitizensknowledge
and beliefs about democracy, as well as understanding their values and judgments. Awareness about
how liberal democracy works is expected to be influenced by the historical political traditions within
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each state, as well as by access to the independent news media, and by levels of literacy and formal
education.Abatteryofsurveyitemsconcerningtheessentialcharacteristicsofdemocracyareanalyzed
toseewhetheracommonmeaningofthisconceptissharedindifferentculturalregions.Evidenceis
derivedfromthe5thwaveoftheWorldValuesSurvey(20057)inmorethanfiftysocietiesworldwide.
Enlightenedknowledgeaboutdemocracyisdefinedinthisbookbythecapacitytoidentifyaccuratelya
fewofthebasicproceduresandprinciples,orrulesofthegame,whichcharacterizeliberaldemocracies.
Democracyisanabstractandcomplexidea,andthemeaningcontinuestobecontestedamongexperts.
Evenillinformedpublicperceptionsaremeaningfulforthoseholdingthesebeliefs,providingthesocial
construction of reality. But citizens need to demonstrate at least some minimal cognitive awareness
aboutthebasicproceduralcharacteristicsandcoreinstitutionsofliberaldemocracyiftheyaretomake
rational and enlightened judgments about both the quality of democratic performance and the
importanceofdemocracy astheidealregimeforgoverningtheirowncountry.Theevidenceconfirms
that knowledge about the essential characteristics of liberal democracy is greatest in states with the
longesthistoricalexperienceofthisformofgovernance,aswellasbeingstrengthenedbyeducationand
accesstotheindependentmedia.Inyoungerdemocracies,however,contemporarypublicopinionlags
behindprocessesofregimechange.
Chapter9examinestheinfluenceofthecoverageprovidedbythenewsmediainshapingpublic
perceptionsofpoliticsandgovernment.31Theoriesofmediaframingsuggestthatpublicevaluationsof
democratic performance are often influenced by journalism. In particular, excessively negative news,
and in particular extensive coverage of sexual scandals and financial corruption, are both widely
believed to tarnish the reputation of the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government,
leading to broader disillusionment with how democracy works.32 Despite the popular appeal of this
account,littlecrossnationalevidencehasdemonstratedasystematicconnectionbetweennewsmedia
coverage of scandals and corruption and subsequent levels of trust and confidence in government or
satisfactionwithdemocracy.33Evidenceisunavailabletoexaminemediacoverageinallthecountries
under comparison, but detailed casestudies can be analyzed in two established democracies with
similar cultural roots but with different types of media environments and political systems namely
Britain and the United States. This chapter therefore uses longitudinal evidence, derived from annual
contentanalysisofthemediacoverageofpoliticalscandalsinrecentdecades,comparedagainstpublic
opinion trends in institutional confidence and satisfaction with democratic performance in these
countries.

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Chapter 10 turns to supplyside explanations emphasizing how satisfaction with democracy

responds to the process and policy performance of governments, and to the institutional structure of
regimes. Process accounts assume that citizens are capable of making informed and rational
assessments about whether regimes meet standards of transparency, accountability, effectiveness,
socialjustice,andparticipation.Alternativetheoriessuggestthatdemocraticsatisfactionisaproductof
the governments record and public policy performance, especially the governments management of
breadandbutter economic issues, including growth, jobs, and prices.34 Output performance is not
confinedtotheeconomy,however,sincethegovernmentsforeignpolicyrecordisalsothoughttobe
important,includinghowleadershandleaninternationalcrisisortheoutbreakofarmedconflict.Rally
roundtheflag effects, with a temporary burst of government popularity, are commonly registered in
opinionpollsfollowingtheoutbreakofcrisisormajorwars.35Theshockof9/11,forexample,generated
asharpbutshortlivedspikeinAmericanconfidenceintheexecutiveandCongress.36Moreoverbeyond
policy output and outcomes, process accounts suggest that perceptions of procedural fairness in how
decisionmaking process work also shapes how much people are willing to trust the authorities,
including the importance of issues of social justice and welfare.

37

Theorists emphasize that the

traditionalscopeandautonomyofthemodernstateshasdiminishedduetoprocessesofglobalization,
privatization, and deregulation.38 Moreover policy problems are thought to have become increasingly
complex,whileissuepublicshavesimultaneouslybecomemorefragmented.39Forthesereasons,policy
performancemayhavegraduallyfallenovertime.
Inaddition,anotherrelatedstrandoftheresearchliteratureisprovidedbyinstitutionaltheories
whichemphasizehowpowersharingdemocraticregimesinfluencedemocraticsatisfaction.40Thisthesis
suggests that the pattern of winners and losers from the political system is structured by the
constitutionalarrangements,meaningthecoreinstitutionsofstateandtherulesofthegame,both
written and unwritten. Some citizens win, others lose. Some parties and groups are mobilized into
power, others are mobilized out. Over a long period of time, this accumulated experience can be
expectedtoshapegeneralorientationstowardsthepoliticalregime.Atthesimplestlevel,ifcitizensfeel
thattherulesofthegameallowthepartytheyendorsetobeelectedtopower,theyaremorelikelyto
feel that representative institutions are responsive to their needs, so that they can trust the political
system. On the other hand, if they feel that the party they prefer persistently loses, over successive
elections, they are more likely to feel that their voice is excluded from the decisionmaking process,
producing generalized dissatisfaction with political institutions. Over time, where constitutional
arrangements succeed in channeling popular demands into government outcomes, then we would
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DEMOCRATICDEFICITS:CHAPTER1

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expect this to be reflected in diffuse support for the political process. The structure of powersharing
and powerconcentrating democratic institutions can be compared along with levels of institutional
confidenceamongpartisanwinnersandloserswithineachcontext.
PartIV:Prognosis
Chapter 11 identifies the consequences of this phenomenon. What is the impact of any
democratic deficit and why does this matter including for political activism, for the capacity of
governmentstoensurecompliantbehaviorandruleoflaw,andforprocessesofdemocratization?
Thebroadestconsensusamongscholarsconcernstheimplicationsforcitizenactivismatmicro
level. It is widely assumed that more critical evaluations of democratic governance will deter
conventional forms of political participation and civic engagement. Ever since Almond and Verba, an
extensive body of evidence has examined how social psychological attitudes influence why and how
citizenschoosetoengageinpublicaffairs.41Hencepositivefeelingsofpoliticaltrust,internalefficacy,
and institutional confidence in parties, legislatures and the government are widely assumed to
strengthen conventional activism such as voting participation, party membership, and belonging to
voluntary associations. Conversely, indicators such as falling voter turnout and declining party
membership in established European democracies are commonly regarded as signs of citizen
disenchantmentorcynicismabout politics. 42Moreoverpolitical disaffectionis commonlyexpected to
affectprotestpolitics,iflackoftrustinthedemocraticprocessfostersunconventionalactivism,support
forantistateradicalmovements,andevenoccasionaloutbreaksofradicalviolenceseekingtochallenge
state authorities.43 Yet in fact the actual evidence linking democratic orientations with patterns of
politicalactivismisfarfromstraightforward;disenchantmentwiththeperformanceofdemocracymay
depress conventional forms of participation, but it may also mobilize people, for example to support
reform movements.44 In Latin America, for example, Booth and Seligson report that citizens who are
unhappywiththeirgovernmentsperformancedonotdropoutofpoliticsorresorttoprotestpolitics.
Rather, disaffected citizens in Latin America participate at high rates in conventional and alternative
politicalarenas.45
This chapter also examines the significant consequences arising from this phenomenon for
compliant behavior, including whether citizens obey the law, and also the broader implications for
processesofdemocratization.Thethirdwaveofdemocratizationrepresentsaremarkablehistoricalera.
Duringthelatetwentiethcentury,humanrightsstrengthenedinallpartsoftheglobe.FreedomHouse
estimatethatthenumberofliberaldemocraciesdoubledfromtheearly1970suntil2000.46Inthelast
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DEMOCRATICDEFICITS:CHAPTER1

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decade, however, progress slowed to a sluggish and uncertain pace.47 Electoral democracies where
progress once appeared promising such as Kenya, Honduras, Afghanistan, Thailand, and Fiji have
beenunderminedanddestabilizedbydiverseevents,whetherinconclusiveordisputedelectionresults,
partisan strife, recurrent corruption scandals, internal conflicts, overpowerful executives, or coups
dtats.48 Freedom Houses 2009 survey of democracy around the world noted further erosion:
Accordingtothesurveysfindings,2009markedthefourthconsecutiveyearinwhichglobalfreedom
sufferedadeclinethelongestconsecutiveperiodofsetbacksforfreedominthenearly40yearhistory
ofthereport.ThesedeclinesweremostpronouncedinSubSaharanAfrica,althoughtheyalsooccurred
in most other regions of the world. Furthermore, the erosion in freedom took place during a year
marked by intensified repression against human rights defenders and democracy activists by many of
the worlds most powerful authoritarian regimes, including Russia and China.

49

The muscular

democracy promotion initiatives advocated by the Bush administration, notably attempts at state
buildinginIraqandAfghanistan,encouragedanactivepushbackamongoilrichemergingeconomies,
includingRussia,Venezuela,andChina.50Itisprematureandundulypessimistictoclaimthatamajor
reverse wave or democratic recession is underway, as some observers believe.51 Huntington
emphasizedacyclicalhistoricalpattern,notingthattwopreviouslongwavesofdemocratizationwere
followed by regressive eras.52 But it can be questioned whether distinct historical eras or waves of
democratization can be identified, rather than understanding change as a more incremental and non
linear process.53 Nevertheless, in marked contrast to the heady revolutions which occurred with one
autocracyafteranotherrapidlytopplingaroundthetimeofthefalloftheBerlinWallin1989,thereisan
emerging consensus that multiple challenges continue to limit further dramatic global advances in
democratization. Accordingly this chapter evaluates how far democratic orientations help us to
understand the underlying processes leading towards the advance and breakdown of democratic
governance.
Finally the conclusion in Chapter 12 summarizes the major findings and considers their
implicationsforrevisingtheoriesaboutthelegitimacyandstabilityofdemocraticregimes,andforthe
broaderpublicpolicyagenda.

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DEMOCRATICDEFICITS:CHAPTER1

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Figure1.1:Generalmodelofdemocraticdeficits

DEMANDSIDE:
Risingpublicaspirations
fordemocracy,dueto
growingcognitiveand
civicskillsandevolving
selfexpressionvalues

INTERMEDIARY:

SUPPLYSIDE:

DEMOCRATICDEFICIT:

CONSEQUENCES:

Negativecoverageof
governmentandpublic
affairsbythenews
media

Failureofdemocraticor
policyperformanceof
thestatetomatch
publicexpectations.

Disparitiesbetweenthe
perceiveddemocratic
performanceand
publicaspirations

Forpoliticalbehavior,
government
policymaking,and
regimelegitimacy

16

DEMOCRATICDEFICITS:CHAPTER1

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1
ThisconcerngeneratedanextensiveAmericanliteratureduringtheearlytomid1990s.See,for
example,E.J.Dionne,Jr.1991.WhyAmericansHatePolitics.NewYork:SimonandSchuster;RuyA.
Teixeira.1992.TheDisappearingAmericanVoter.Washington,DC:TheBrookingsInstitution;Stephen
Craig.1993.TheMalevolentLeaders:PopularDiscontentinAmerica.Boulder,CO:WestviewPress;John
R.HibbingandElizabethTheissMorse.1995.CongressasPublicEnemy.NewYork:CambridgeUniversity
Press;JohnH.Aldrich.1995.WhyParties?TheOriginandTransformationofPartyPoliticsinAmerica.
Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress;SusanJ.Tolchin.1996.TheAngryAmerican:HowVoterRageIs
ChangingtheNation.Boulder,CO:WestviewPress;JosephS.Nye,PhilipD.Zelikow,andDavidC.King.
Eds.1997.WhyPeopleDon'tTrustGovernment.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress;RobertD.
Putnam.2000.BowlingAlone:TheCollapseandRevivalofAmericanCommunity.NY:Simonand
Schuster;JohnR.HibbingandElizabethTheissMorse.Eds.2001.WhatIsItAboutGovernmentThat
AmericansDislike?Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress;PeterWood.2004.ABeeintheMouth:
AngerinAmericaNow.EncounterBooks.
2

PippaNorris.Ed.1999.CriticalCitizens:GlobalSupportforDemocraticGovernance.NewYork:Oxford

UniversityPress;SusanPharrandRobertPutnam.(Eds.)2000.DisaffectedDemocracies:what'stroubling
thetrilateralcountries?Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress;RussellJ.Dalton.2004.Democratic
Challenges,DemocraticChoices:TheErosionofPoliticalSupportinAdvancedIndustrialDemocracies.
NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress;MarianoTorcalandJosR.Montero.2006.PoliticalDisaffectionin
ContemporaryDemocracies:SocialCapital,Institutions,andPolitics.London:Routledge.
3

ColinHay.2007.WhyWeHatePolitics.Cambridge:PolityPress;PeterMairandIngridvanBiezen.

2001.PartymembershipintwentyEuropeandemocracies19802000.PartyPolitics7(1):522;Ingrid
vanBiezen,PeterMairandThomasPoguntke.2009.Going,Going,Gone?PartyMembershipinthe
21stCentury.PaperpresentedattheJointWorkshopsattheEuropeanConsortiumforPolitical
Research,Lisbon;MarkN.Franklin,ThomasT.Mackie,andHenryValen.1991.Electoralchange:
responsestoevolvingsocialandattitudinalstructuresinWesterncountries.NewYork:Cambridge
UniversityPress;RussellJ.DaltonandMartyP.Wattenberg.2000.Partieswithoutpartisans:political
changeinadvancedindustrialdemocracies.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress;MarkN.Franklin.2004.
Voterturnoutandthedynamicsofelectoralcompetitioninestablisheddemocraciessince1945.New
York:CambridgeUniversityPress;ColinCrouch.2004.PostDemocracy.Cambridge:PolityPress;Susan

17

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PharrandRobertPutnam.(Eds.)2000.DisaffectedDemocracies:what'stroublingthetrilateral
countries?Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress;MarianoTorcalandJosR.Montero.2006.Political
DisaffectioninContemporaryDemocracies:SocialCapital,Institutions,andPolitics.London:Routledge;
MatteiDogan.Ed.2005.PoliticalMistrustandtheDiscreditingofPoliticians.TheNetherlands:Brill;Jan
VanDeth,JoseR.Montero,andAndersWestholm.2007.CitizenshipandinvolvementinEuropean
democracies:acomparativeanalysis.NewYork:Routledge.
4

PippaNorris.2005.RadicalRight:VotersandPartiesintheElectoralMarket.NewYork:Cambridge

UniversityPress.
5

ColinCrouch.2004.PostDemocracyCambridge:PolityPress;GuyHermet.2007.LHiverdela

Dmocratie.Paris:ArmandColin;JohnKeane.2009.TheLifeandDeathofDemocracy.NewYork:W.W.
Norton&Co.
6

RussellJ.Dalton.2004.DemocraticChallenges,DemocraticChoices:TheErosionofPoliticalSupportin

AdvancedIndustrialDemocracies.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.
7

HansDieterKlingemann.1999.Mappingpoliticalsupportinthe1990s.InPippaNorris(ed).1999.

CriticalCitizens:GlobalSupportforDemocraticGovernance.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress;Marta
Lagos.2003.Supportforandsatisfactionwithdemocracy.InternationalJournalofPublicOpinion
Research15(4):471487;Latinobarometro2008Report.http://www.latinobarometro.org/;Gabriela
CatterbergandAlejandroMoreno.2006.Theindividualbasesofpoliticaltrust:Trendsinnewand
establisheddemocracies.InternationalJournalofPublicOpinionResearch18(1):3148.
8

LarryDiamond.2008.TheSpiritofDemocracy:TheStruggletoBuildFreeSocietiesthroughoutthe

World.NewYork:TimesBooks;ArchPuddington.2009.Freedomintheworld2009:setbacksand
resilience.FreedomintheWorld,2009.Washington,DC:FreedomHouse.
9

JackCitrin.1974.Comment:Thepoliticalrelevanceoftrustingovernment.AmericanPoliticalScience

Review68:97388;ArthurH.Miller.1974.Politicalissuesandtrustingovernment,19641970.
AmericanPoliticalScienceReview68:95172.
10

Forarelatedargument,seeRichardRose,WilliamMishlerandChristianHaerpfer.1998.Democracy

anditsAlternatives:UnderstandingPostCommunistSocieties.Cambridge:PolityPress.
11

Forthedebate,seeAndrewMoravcsik.2002.Indefenceofthe'democraticdeficit':Reassessing

legitimacyintheEuropeanUnion.JournalofCommonMarketStudies40:603;LiviaDoor.2008.The
18

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DemocraticDeficitDebateintheEuropeanUnion.Berlin:VDMVerlag;PeterJanrik.2009;
UnderstandingDemocracyintheEuropeanUnion:DemocraticDeficitasaPowerfulMyth?Berlin:VDM
Verlag;JacquesThomassen.Ed.2009.TheLegitimacyoftheEuropeanUnionafterEnlargement.Oxford:
OxfordUniversityPress.
12

VictorBekkers,GeskeDijkstra,ArthurEdwards,andMennoFenger(Editors).2007.Governanceand

theDemocraticDeficit:AssessingtheDemocraticLegitimacyofGovernancePractices.Ashgate
Publishing.
13

PippaNorris.Ed.1999.CriticalCitizens:GlobalSupportforDemocraticGovernance.NewYork:Oxford

UniversityPress.
14

MarkBovensandAnchritWille.2008.DecipheringtheDutchdrop:tenexplanationsfordecreasing

politicaltrustintheNetherlands.InternationalReviewofAdministrativeSciences74:283305.
15

BruceCain,RussellJ.DaltonandSusanScarrow.Eds.2003.DemocracyTransformed?TheExpansionof

PoliticalAccessinAdvancedIndustrializedDemocracies.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress;RussellJ.
Dalton.2004.DemocraticChallenges,DemocraticChoices:TheErosionofPoliticalSupportinAdvanced
IndustrialDemocracies.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.Ch9;JohnA.BoothandMitchellA.
Seligson.2009.TheLegitimacyPuzzleinLatinAmerica:PoliticalSupportandDemocracyinEight
Nations.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.
16

See.,however,JohnA.BoothandMitchellA.Seligson.2009.TheLegitimacyPuzzleinLatinAmerica.

NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.
17

MarcJ.Hetherington.1998.Thepoliticalrelevanceofpoliticaltrust.TheAmericanPoliticalScience

Review92(4):791808;MarcJ.Hetherington.2005.WhyTrustMatters.Princeton,NJ:Princeton
UniversityPress;J.T.Scholz.2000.Trust,taxes,andcompliance.InV.BraithwaiteandMargaretLevi.
(Eds),TrustandGovernance.NewYork:RussellSage.
18

ThecrisisalarmwarningsaremostclearlyexemplifiedbyMichelCrozier,SamuelP.Huntington,and

JojiWatanuki.1975.TheCrisisofDemocracy:ReportontheGovernabilityofDemocraciestothe
TrilateralCommission.NewYork:NewYorkUniversityPress.
19

SeymourMartinLipset.1983.PoliticalMan:TheSocialBasesofPolitics(2nded.)(p.64)London:

Heinemann.TheconceptoflegitimacyisalsodiscussedinStephenM.Weatherford.1992.Measuring
politicallegitimacy.AmericanPoliticalScienceReview86:14966;BruceGilley.2006.Themeaningand
19

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measureofstatelegitimacy:Resultsfor72countries.EuropeanJournalofPoliticalResearch45:499
525.
20

GabrielA.AlmondandSidneyVerba.1963.TheCivicCulture.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.

21

Acomprehensivechronologicallistofcomparativesurveyresearchresourcesanddatasetsisavailable

athttp://www.gesis.org/en/data_service/eurobarometer/handbook/index.htm;seealsoWolfgang
DonsbachandMichaelTraugotts(2008)TheSAGEHandbookofPublicOpinionResearch.London:Sage
Publications.
22

PippaNorris.2010.Theglobalizationofcomparativepublicopinionresearch.TheSageHandbookof

ComparativePoliticseds.NeilRobinsonandToddLandman.London:SagePublications.Seealsothe
usefulwebsitemaintainedbyGESIS.TabularHistoryofInternationalComparativeSurveyResearch
Projects.http://www.gesis.org/en/services/data/portalslinks/comparativesurveyprojects/
23

PippaNorris.Ed.1999.CriticalCitizens:GlobalSupportforDemocraticGovernance.NewYork:Oxford

UniversityPress.
24

DavidEaston.1965.Aframeworkforpoliticalanalysis.EnglewoodCliffs,N.J.:PrenticeHall;David

Easton.1975.Reassessmentoftheconceptofpoliticalsupport.BritishJournalofPoliticalScience5:
435457.
25

SusanPharrandRobertPutnam.(Eds.)2000.DisaffectedDemocracies:what'stroublingthetrilateral

countries?Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress;MarianoTorcalandJosR.Montero.2006.Political
DisaffectioninContemporaryDemocracies:SocialCapital,Institutions,andPolitics.London:Routledge;
RichardI.HofferbertandHansDieterKlingemann.2001.DemocracyandItsDiscontentsinPostWall
Germany.InternationalPoliticalScienceReview22(4):363378.
26

SeeStephenEarlBennett.2001.Werethehalcyondaysreallygolden?InJohnR.Hibbingand

ElizabethTheissMorse.Eds.2001.WhatIsItAboutGovernmentThatAmericansDislike?Cambridge:
CambridgeUniversityPress.
27

MichelCrozier,SamuelP.Huntington,andJojiWatanuki.1975.TheCrisisofDemocracy:Reportonthe

GovernabilityofDemocraciestotheTrilateralCommission.NewYork:NewYorkUniversityPress.See
alsoSamuelP.Huntington.1981.AmericanPolitics:ThePromiseofDisharmony.Cambridge:Harvard
UniversityPress.

20

DEMOCRATICDEFICITS:CHAPTER1

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28
JasonM.WellsandJonathanKrieckhaus.2006.Doesnationalcontextinfluencedemocratic
satisfaction?Amultilevelanalysis.PoliticalResearchQuarterly59(4):569578.
29

RonaldInglehartandChristianWelzel.2005.Modernization,culturalchange,anddemocracy:the

humandevelopmentsequence.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress;RussellJ.Dalton.2004.
DemocraticChallenges,DemocraticChoices:TheErosionofPoliticalSupportinAdvancedIndustrial
Democracies.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.
30

RobertD.Putnam.2000.BowlingAlone:TheCollapseandRevivalofAmericanCommunity.NY:Simon

andSchuster.
31

MatteiDogan.Ed.2005.PoliticalMistrustandtheDiscreditingofPoliticians.TheNetherlands:Brill.

32

SuzanneGarment.1991.Scandal:TheCrisisofMistrustinAmericanPolitics.NewYork:Random

House;GaryOrren1997.Fallfromgrace:Thepublicslossoffaithingovernment.InWhyPeopleDont
TrustGovernment.Ed.JosephS.Nye,Jr,PhilipD.ZelikowandDavidC.King.Chicago:Universityof
ChicagoPress.
33

FortimeseriesanalysisofAmericanpublicopinion,however,seeV.A.Chanley,T.J.Rudolph,and

W.M.Rahn,2000.Theoriginsandconsequencesofpublictrustingovernment:Atimeseriesanalysis.
PublicOpinionQuarterly,64(3):239256.Forcrossnationalanalysis,seeChristopherJ.Andersonand
YuliyaV.Tverdova.2003.Corruption,politicalallegiances,andattitudestowardgovernmentin
contemporarydemocracies.AmericanJournalofPoliticalScience47(1):91109;AlejandroMoreno.
2002.Corruptionanddemocracy:Aculturalassessment.ComparativeSociology1(34):495507.
34

HaroldD.Clarke,EuelW.Elliott,WilliamMishler,MarianneC.Stewart,PaulF.Whiteley,andGary

Zuk.1992.ControversiesinPoliticalEconomy.Boulder,CO.:WestviewPress;ChristopherJ.Anderson.
1995.BlamingtheGovernment:CitizensandtheEconomyinFiveEuropeanDemocracies.NewYork:
M.E.Sharpe.
35

TimGroelingandMatthewA.Baum.2008.CrossingtheWater'sEdge:EliteRhetoric,MediaCoverage,

andtheRallyRoundtheFlagPhenomenon.JournalofPolitics70(4):10651085.
36

KimberlyGross,PaulR.BrewerandSeanAday.2001.Confidenceingovernmentandemotional

responsestoterrorismafterSeptember11,2001.AmericanPoliticsReview37(1):107128;V.A.Chaney.
2002.Trustingovernmentintheaftermathof9/11:Determinantsandconsequences.Political
Psychology23(3):469483.
21

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37
M.Grimes.2006,Organizingconsent:Theroleofproceduralfairnessinpoliticaltrustand
compliance.EuropeanJournalofPoliticalResearch45(2):285315;CharlesF.AndrainandJamesT.
Smith.2006.PoliticalDemocracy,TrustandSocialJustice.Boston:NortheasternUniversityPress.
38

ColinHay.2007.WhyWeHatePolitics.Cambridge:PolityPress.

39

RussellJ.Dalton.2004.DemocraticChallenges,DemocraticChoices:TheErosionofPoliticalSupportin

AdvancedIndustrialDemocracies.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.
40

ChristopherJ.Anderson.1995.BlamingtheGovernment:CitizensandtheEconomyinFiveEuropean

Democracies.NewYork:M.E.Sharpe;ChristopherJ.AndersonandChristineA.Guillory.1997.Political
institutionsandsatisfactionwithDemocracy.AmericanPoliticalScienceReview91(1):6681;
ChristopherJ.Anderson,AndreBlais,ShaunBowler,ToddDonovanandOlaListhaug.2005.Losers
Consent:ElectionsandDemocraticLegitimacy.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress;HenarCriadoand
FranciscoHerreros.2007.Politicalsupporttakingintoaccounttheinstitutionalcontext.Comparative
PoliticalStudies40(2):15111532;KeesAartsandJacquesThomassen.2008.Satisfactionwith
democracy:Doinstitutionsmatter?ElectoralStudies27(1):518.
41

GabrielA.AlmondandSidneyVerba.1963.TheCivicCulture.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.

42

See,forexample,ColinHay.2007.WhyWeHatePolitics.Cambridge:PolityPress;GerryStoker.2006.

WhyPoliticsMatters:MakingDemocracyWork.London:Palgrave/Macmillan.
43

SamuelBarnesandMaxKaase.1979.PoliticalAction:MassParticipationinFiveWesternDemocracies.

BeverlyHills:Sage;EdwardN.Muller,ThomasO.Jukam,andMitchellA.Seligson.1982.DiffusePolitical
SupportandAntisystemPoliticalBehavior.AmericanJournalofPoliticalScience26(3):240264.
44

PippaNorris.2005.DemocraticPhoenix.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

45

JohnA.BoothandMitchellA.Seligson.2009.TheLegitimacyPuzzleinLatinAmerica:PoliticalSupport

andDemocracyinEightNations.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.
46

FreedomHouse.2009.FreedomintheWorld2009.Washington,DC:FreedomHouse.

www.freedomhouse.org.Foradetaileddiscussionoftrendsandindicators,seePippaNorris.2008.
DrivingDemocracy:DoPowerSharingInstitutionsWork?Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.
Chapter3.

22

DEMOCRATICDEFICITS:CHAPTER1

2/17/201012:50PM

47
ArchPuddington.2009.Freedomintheworld2009:setbacksandresilience.FreedomintheWorld,
2009.Washington,DC:FreedomHouse.
http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw09/FIW09_OverviewEssay_Final.pdf
48

Foradiscussionabouttheconditionsleadingtowardsthederailmentofdemocraticregimes,seeM.

StevenFishandJasonWittenberg.Faileddemocratization.InChristianW.Haerpfer,PatrickBernhagen,
RonaldInglehartandChristianWelzel.(eds).2009.Democratization.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.
SeealsoEthanB.KapsteinandNathanConverse.2008.TheFateofYoungDemocracies.NewYork:
CambridgeUniversityPress;EthanB.KapsteinandNathanConverse.2008.Whydemocraciesfail.
JournalofDemocracy19(4):5768.
49

FreedomHouse.2009.FreedomintheWorld,2009.Washington,DC:FreedomHouse.

50

ThomasCarothers.2006.TheBacklashagainstdemocracypromotion.ForeignAffairs85(2):5568;

ScottN.Cole.2007.HugoChavezandPresidentBush'scredibilitygap:ThestruggleagainstUS
democracypromotion.InternationalPoliticalScienceReview28(4):493507.
51

LarryDiamond.2008.TheSpiritofDemocracy:TheStruggletoBuildFreeSocietiesThroughoutthe

World.NewYork:TimesBooks;LarryDiamond.2008.ThedemocraticrollbackTheresurgenceofthe
predatorystate.ForeignAffairs87(2):3648;ArchPuddington.2008.Freedominretreat:isthetide
turning?FindingsofFreedomintheWorld2008.WashingtonDC:FreedomHouse.
(www.freedomhouse.org).
52

SamuelP.Huntington.1991.TheThirdWave:DemocratizationintheLateTwentiethCentury.Norman:

TheUniversityofOklahomaPress.Seealso,RenskeDoorenspleet.2000.Reassessingthethreewavesof
democratization.WorldPolitics52:384406;RenskeDoorenspleet.2005.DemocraticTransitions:
ExploringtheStructuralSourcesduringtheFourthWave.Boulder:LynneRiennerPublishers.
53

ZacharyElkinsandBethSimmons.2005.Onwaves,clusters,anddiffusion:Aconceptualframework.

AnnalsoftheAmericanAcademyofPoliticalandSocialScience598:3351.

23