Atr 72 Procedures and Techniques

2.02.
00
PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES

P1
CONTENTS
001
APR 11
AA
2.02.00
CONTENTS
2.02.01
OPERATING SPEEDS
2.02.02
DATA CARD
2.02.03
AIR
2.02.04
AFCS
2.02.05
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
2.02.06
FLIGHT CONTROLS
2.02.07
FUEL SYSTEM
2.02.08
ADVERSE WEATHER
2.02.09
LANDING GEAR/BRAKES
2.02.10
FLIGHT PATTERNS
2.02.11
POWER PLANT
2.02.12
FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS
2.02.13
Reserved
2.02.14
FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS
2.02.15
TCAS
2.02.16
TAWS
2.02.17
Reserved
2.02.18
FMS
2.02.19
HIGH LATITUDES OPERATIONS
2.02.20
Reserved
2.02.21
MPC Multi Purpose Computer
2.02.22
ACARS Aircraft Communication Addressing and Reporting System (*)
2.02.23
VIDEO CABIN SYSTEM (*)
2.02.24
DU, General Philosophy of use
(*) : if installed
Mod 5948
2.02.01

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OPERATING SPEEDS
001
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AA
GENERAL
- Older certification rules used as a reference the minimum speed which was recorded
during defined stall penetration.
This speed was established with a load factor lower than 1g. It was used as reference for all
operational speeds.
(example V2 = 1.2 Vsmin, VREF = 1.3 Vsmin).
- New certification now uses as a reference THE ONE G STALL SPEED VSR which is
typically 6 % greater than Vsmin.
- In order to provide the same practical maneuver margin, the factors applied to VSR
have been changed to reflect the increased value of VSR relative to Vsmin.
1.2 applied to Vsmin becomes 1.13 when applied to VSR
- The ATR 72-- 212A having been certificated to the new rules, the reference stalling
speed called VSR is determined as a one G stall speed and the new (reduced) factors
apply accordingly.
Mod : 5948
2.02.01

P2
OPERATING SPEEDS
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APR 11
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DEFINITIONS
VSR
1 g stall speed for a specified configuration. It is a function of the

aircraft weight.
VMCG Minimum control speed on the ground from which a sudden failure of the
critical engine can be controlled by use of primary flight controls only, with the
other engine operating at RTO power.
V1
Speed at which the pilot can make a decision following failure of critical
engine:
. either to continue take-- off
. or to stop the aircraft
VR
Speed at which rotation is initiated to reach V2 at 35 ft height.
V2
Take off safety speed reached before 35 ft height with one engine failed and
providing second segment climb gradient not less than the minimum (2.4 %).
VMCA Minimum control speed in flight at which the aircraft can be controlled with
5 bank, in case of failure of the critical engine with the other engine at RTO
power (take off flaps setting and gear retracted.)
VMCL
Minimum flight speed at which aircraft can be controlled with 5 bank in case of
failure of the critical engine, the other being set at GA power (landing flaps
setting, gear extended) and which provides rolling capability specified by
regulations.
VFE
Maximum speed for each flaps configuration
Mod : 5948
2.02.01

P3
001
OPERATING SPEEDS
APR 11
AA
MINIMUM MANEUVER/OPERATING SPEEDS

Minimum maneuver/ operating speeds are defined in order to provide sufficient margin
against stall. They will vary with :
-
Normal or icing conditions,

weight,
configuration,
type of maneuver (HI or LO BANK).
They are defined by a minimum ratio to the appropriate stall speed given in FCOM
2.01.03 or by V2 when applicable.
NORMAL CONDITIONS
FLAPS
VmHB
0
15
VmLB
1.18 VSR
1.23 VSR and not less than

VMCL during approach
30
V2
Not used
Note : Refer to 2.02.08 for icing conditions.

UTILIZATION
- VMLB is the absolute minimum maneuver speed.
This speed
* is used for take off, and initial climb.
* must be used EN ROUTE FOR OBSTACLE LIMITED SITUATIONS (refer to chapter
3.09)
* should be used in flaps 0 configuration to obtain the best climb gradient.
In all these cases, bank angle must be restricted to 15 .
- VmHB is the minimum speed used for approach. It also provides the best two engines
rate of climb.
In this case, bank angle must be restricted to 30 .
The speeds and bank angles are automatically calculated by the FMS according to weight
and atmospheric conditions and displayed on the PFDs. These speeds are also available
in a pilot oriented manner as operating data booklet in the Quick Reference Handbook, in
which relevant maneuver/operating speeds are directly given for all weights.
Mod : 5948
2.02.01

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OPERATING SPEEDS
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AA
CONSERVATIVE MANEUVERING SPEEDS

When performance consideration does not dictate use of minimum
maneuver / operating speeds, the following conservative maneuvering speeds are
recommended.
They cover all weights, normal operational maneuver and flight conditions (normal and
icing conditions) :
Flaps 0 : 180 kt.
Flaps 15 : 150 kt.
Flaps 30 : 135 kt.
FINAL APPROACH SPEED
VAPP = VmHB + WIND FACTOR
or VMCL, whichever is higher
WIND FACTOR = The highest of
- 1/3 of the head wind velocity,
- or the gust in full,
with a maximum wind factor of 15 kt.
Wind factor is added to give extra margin against turbulence, risk of wind shear etc...
GO AROUND SPEED VGA
VmHB landing configuration + 5 kt or 1.1 VMCA, whichever is higher.
MINIMUM SPEED FOR FLAPS RETRACTION
It is VmLB of the next flap setting.
Example :
- Minimum speed to retract flaps from 15 to 0 : VmLB0.
Mod 5948
2.02.02

P1
DATA CARDS
AA
Mod : 5948
001
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Mod 5948
2.02.03

P2
080
AIR
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AIR CONDITIONING
When operating from airfields with high OAT, it is essential to cooldown the cabin
before boarding passengers: this is best achieved by use of a ground conditioning
unit, but may also be done through the use of Hotel Mode, and in that case the following
considerations will apply :
- as soon as OAT exceeds 22 C and aircraft has remained exposed to direct sun,
PRE-- CONDITIONING becomes necessary for passengers comfort, prior to boarding;
- allow a reasonable period of time for pre-- conditioning, and use up to
MAXIMUM POWER AVAILABLE ON R/H ENGINE (GUST LOCK STOP) together with
HI FLOW selection.
Note 1: HI FLOW is very effective when R/H PL is advanced beyond Gl.
Note 2: Proper orientation of the aircraft on Parking area (wind blowing from 10
oclock ideally) during Hotel Mode pre--conditioning is very favorable as it
gives better efficiency and allows to continue pre--conditioning during AFT
CARGO loading (hot air from RH engine exhaust blown away from service
door).
- If for any reasons, it has not been possible to bring cabin temperature down to
comfortable values prior to boarding, the following considerations will apply :
Packs operation during taxi should be performed with HI FLOW selected.
Switch FLOW selection to NORM prior to take-- off, but keep bleeds on, unless
performance limited.
As soon as CLB POWER is selected after take off, select HI FLOW and maintain HI
FLOW until comfortable cabin temp is obtained.
During cruise, monitor cabin temp when operating in NORM FLOW : if cabin temp
tends to increase again above comfortable values, use HI FLOW as necessary.
TEMP CONTROL
Temperature control is normally achieved in AUTO MODE, which incorporates all
necessary protections to avoid damage to packs turbines due to freezing.
In case of duct overheating, manual mode is recommended.
As manual mode does not incorporate the protections of AUTO MODE, the following
considerations apply:
- Do not use temperature selector in manual mode unless auto mode is inoperative.
- When in manual mode, monitor duct temperature and adjust rotary selector to maintain
positive duct temp : this is essential to avoid pack freezing.
Mod : 5948 + 3037
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Mod 5948
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Mod 5948
2.02.04

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AFCS
001
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GENERAL
The ATR 72 with Mod 5948 is equipped with a Thales AutoPilot/Flight Director.
Systematic use of AP/FD is recommended in order to :
- Increase the accuracy of guidance and tracking in all weather conditions, from early
climb after take off down to landing minima.
- Provide increased passenger comfort through SMOOTH AND REPEATABLE altitude
and heading changes in all atmospheric conditions.
- Reduce crew workload and increase safety.
MAIN RULES OF USE
D AP and YD cannot be engaged on ground : any attempt to do it will result in the
message YD INHIB on FMA;
D FD is available on ground as soon as DC normal buses are powered, but FD bars are in
sight only if :
- One upper mode is ACTIVE (Green indication on FMA),
- FD ON/OFF push button on FGCP is ON.
Note :
- FD ON/OFF push buttons, one on Left side and one on Right side act
only on FD DISPLAYS (FD Bars)
Left push button allows selection/deselection on Left side only. Right
push button allows selection/deselection on Right side only.
- STBY push button on FGCP deactivates all active and armed upper
modes.
- If Auto Pilot is ON, Basic Mode with associated bars are displayed.
Mod : 5948
2.02.04

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AFCS
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D The references to be flown may be coupled to left or right side by the CPL push button.
Changes of CPL side while coupled to VOR, LOC, or LNAV will revert to basic mode.
D Modes are engaged (green indication on FMA) or armed (Cyan indication on FMA) by
action on the relevant push button on FGCP.
FMA must be monitored for actual state of modes of AP/YD :
A second push on the push button associated to a mode already
engaged (or armed) disengages (or disarms) it and revert to basic
mode.
Lateral mode revert to Heading Hold, Vertical mode revert to Pitch
Hold
D ALT SEL mode is automatically armed as soon as the flight path is directed towards
the altitude set on PFD via FGCP. All altitudes clearance given by ATC should
systematically be set on PFD via FGCP to ensure automatic level off when AP is
engaged (or FD followed in case of manual fliying).
Note : After ALT mode has been engaged, the aircraft remains in level flight on the new
barometric setting.
D When HDG changes are performed with the HDG SEL mode active, maximum bank
angle is automatically selected by the system. For all lateral modes, maximum bank
angle is automatically selected by the system (15 if IAS<VmHB, 27 otherwise).
This allows AFCS maneuvring in all conditions, including early climb after take-- off or go
around where speed may be down to Vmin OPS (Vm LB).
Mod : 5948
2.02.04

P3
AFCS
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APR 11
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Note : Following engine failure, auto-- pilot may be used for climb at V 2 min only AFTER
LATERAL TRIMMING HAS BEEN ACHIEVED.
D LATERAL TRIM with auto-- pilot engaged
- Trim on ROLL axis is inhibited when there is no RETRIM ROLL request set on FMA.
- As there is no auto-- trim neither on ROLL nor YAW axis, it is the pilot task to maintain
lateral trimming when speed or power is substantially changed.
- The autopilot will indicate only roll/yaw out of trim.
- If yaw trim is requested a message :
RETRIM AIRCRAFT NOSE LEFT/RIGHT is displayed on FMA, and on the yaw trim
indicator a cyan arrow indicating in wich direction left/right trim is required.
- If roll trim is required a message :
RETRIM ROLL L(R) WING DOWN is displayed on FMA, and on the roll trim indicator
a cyan arrow indicating in wich direction (left/right) trim is required.
- If excessive lateral trim increased and last, or AILERON MISTRIM message is
displayed on FMA :
DISCONNECT AP, HOLDING FIRMLY THE CONTROLS.
FLY MANUALLY PRIOR TO ADJUSTING LATERAL TRIMS.
The auto pilot may be reengaged following adjustment of the lateral trims.
D AUTO PILOT/YD DISCONNECT
Auto pilot may be disconnected by :
-
Quick disconnect push buttons on each control wheel

Action on normal or STBY Pitch Trims
AP push button on FGCP
YD push button on FGCP
GA push buttons on Power Levers
Pilot input on left or right rudder pedals over 30 daN (66 lb)
Pilot input on the control column (push or pull on pitch axis) over 10 daN (22 lb)
Yaw Damper and consequently AP, may be disconnected by :

- YD push button on FGCP,
- Pilot input on left or right rudder pedals over 30 daN (66 lb)
- At touch down when landing.
CAUTION : Overriding the Autopilot on roll axis will not lead to A/P disconnection.
The QUICK DISCONNECT push button is recommended for all normal AP disengagement
as it leaves the YD engaged.
A second push on the QUICK DISCONNECT pb will also cancel both audio and visual
AUTO PILOT OFF warnings.
Depressing the TCS push-- button allows to regain temporary manual control of the aircraft
without disconnecting the AP.
Mod : 5948
2.02.04

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AFCS
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APR 11
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Note : Function of AP/YD are monitored on three axes.

When a monitored failure is detected, the AP/YD disengages and failure message is
displayed on FMA (AP/YD invalid or AP invalid). A new re-- engagement is possible only
if the failure message disappears.
TYPICAL AP/YD operation
D TASK sharing
- With AP engaged, PF will select references and modes.
- With FD only (AP not engaged) PF will call for references and modes to be set by PM.
D BEFORE TAKE OFF
-
Both FD ON
First cleared altitude set on PFD.
HDG bug checked on RWY HDG.
NAV Mode may be armed if SID is available in FMS.
Pitch Mode selected and pitch Bar set to 8.
D TAKE OFF
- As power is increased, lateral guidance FD bar remains centered as runway heading
is maintained, and if LNAV was preselected, LNAV Mode becomes active at 20 kt.
Vertical guidance FD bar stays at 8
- Rotation is initiated to the recommended value (8) as indicated by FD vertical
guidance bar.
- As soon as gear is retracted and IAS>VminOPS , IAS MODE must be selected (on
FGCP) plus SPEED BUG AUTO or MAN (on ICP) by PNF (SPEED BUG MAN mode
may be used but SPEED BUG AUTO is recommanded)
- 12 seconds after lift-- off, AP may be engaged : it synchronizes on FD command and
maintains HDG or LNAV if selected and IAS (Temporary certification, 12 seconds
equals to approximately 400 feet AGL at take off).
- Turn may be initiated as required using HDG sel knob or according to LNAV Mode.
- When acceleration altitude is reached, setting CLB Power according to standard
climb procedure increases the speed Bug automatically to climb speed if in SPEED
BUG AUTO Mode.
If in SPEED BUG MAN Mode, the speed Bug must be set to required climb speed
through the speed target selector on ICP.
Mod : 5948
2.02.04

P5
AFCS
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APR 11
AA
CLIMB
Use IAS mode with climb speed set through the speed target selector on the ICP. IAS
should be preferred to VS mode, unless a vertical speed constraint is given by ATC.
Note : If airspeed is not monitored during climb and VS mode is engaged with a rate
exceeding the aircraft performance the airspeed will continuously decrease : AP
will disengage automatically when stall alert is activated.
CAUTION : When VS mode is used, monitor airspeed.
LEVEL OFF
- Level off is automatic when reaching the selected altitude.
- Power must be adjusted to the new condition.
RESUME CLIMB OR DESCENT

-
First, the new cleared altitude must be set on PFD.

For descent, engage IAS or VS mode.
For climb, engage preferably IAS mode.
In both cases, adjust power as necessary.
Mod : 5948
2.02.04

P6
AFCS
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AA
D NAVIGATION
HDG and NAV mode for VOR approach are used as required (Refer to FCOM 1.04)
Note : - Accuracy of VOR guidance is significantly improved when there is a DME
associated with the VOR.
Accuracy decreases if NAV VOR is engaged in DME HOLD mode.
D ILS approach mode
Before approach :
-
Select V/ILS source (on FGCP) on coupled (CPL) side.

Set approach course on HSI with CRS selector and tune ILS frequency.
Use HDG SEL mode to set appropriate intercept heading.
Arm both LOC and GS by depressing APP pb on FGCP.
Set SPEED BUG AUTO mode
(SPEED BUG AUTO Mode is recommended as much as possible, nevertheless
SPEED BUG MAN Mode may be used)
Note :
- LOC beam capture must be started (LOC* green on FMA before GS capture can take
place).
- LOC beam capture may lead to one initial overshoot when the capture conditions are
severe (Intercept Heading = RWY HDG 90, high IAS, reduced distance to the ILS
transmitter), but, provided the distance is at least 5 Nm at the standard instrument
capture speed of 180 Kts, this initial overshoot will be followed by an asymptotic
capture without further oscillation, even with a 90 intercept angle.
- The bank angle limit is automatically set following speed versus VMHB (15 or 27).
- When LOC capture is started:
Set RWY HDG with HDG bug
Set ILS frequency and set/check V/ILS source (on FGCP) on PM
side, check ILS course on PM side
- When GLIDE beam capture (G/S* green on FMA):
First Check glide validity (according approach chart)
Set Go around altitude
Mod : 5948
2.02.04

P7
001
AFCS
APR 11
AA
D NON PRECISION APPROACH

Use of auto-- pilot is recommended with :
- NAV mode for VOR or GNSS approach or LOC,
- HDG SEL mode for NDB approach,
- VS or IAS mode for descent.
D GO AROUND
When reaching decision height, or missed approach point after level off at MDA, if
required visual references are not established, a go-- around must be initiated.
The following procedure is recommended :
PF
(if no visual reference)
AnnounceGO AROUND,
FLAPS ONE NOTCH, SET POWER
Depress GA pbs on PLs
Advance PLs to the ramp
Rotate to GO AROUND
pitch attitude
Follow FD bars and cancel
AP Disconnect Alarm
Accelerate to or maintain
VGA (2-- 02-- 01 p4)
- Command GEAR UP
When climb is stabilized :
- Command HDG/IAS
Engage AUTO PILOT
PM
- Announce Minimum
- Retract FLAPS one notch

- Check NP= 100 %, adjust
if necessary
When positive rate of climb is
achieved :
- Announce Positive rate
- Set gear up
- Engage HDG and IAS MODE on FGCP
(if in IAS MODE+SPEED BUG AUTO
mode IAS Bug is automaticaly set to Go
Around speed
If in IAS mode+SPEED BUG MAN
mode, IAS Bug must be set manualy to
Go Around speed)
Note : GO AROUND mode gives (as a FD mode only):

- on pitch axis, a target attitude compatible with single engine performance.
- on roll axis, a steering command to maintain heading followed at GA
engagement or the FMS flight PLAN if LNAV was previously engaged.
As soon as climb is firmly established, and IAS>VminOPS use of HDG SEL / IAS
MODE+ Speed AUTO mode is recommended.
Mod : 5948
2.02.04

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AFCS
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CAT 2 OPERATIONS
" GENERAL
CAT 2 approaches are flown with AP + FD ON.
" EQUIPEMENT REQUIRED
Approach with AP
Autopilot
COURSE rotary selector
AP quick disconnect
AP OFF warning (aural)
1 (PF side)
1
ILS receiver
AHRS
IESI
PFD
Radio altimeter
DH indicator
1 (with 2 displays)
2
GA pushbutton
1 (PF side)
Windshield wipers
1 (PF side)
Yaw damper
ADC
Hydraulic system
Blue + Green
Electrical system
DC: BUS1 / BUS2 / EMER / STBY / ESS ;

AC: BUS1 / BUS2 / STBY ; ACW: BUS1 / BUS2
MFC modules
Mod : 5948
2.02.04

P9
AFCS
AA
001
APR 11
Maximum demonstrated crosswind:

AutoPilot
Headwind
29 kt
Tailwind
10 kt
Crosswind
17 kt
" TASK SHARING

The philosophy of the task sharing is based on the following considerations:
- PF(!) task is aircraft flying during all the approach, he is in charge of speed
control. Approaching DH + 100ft, he looks outside to acquire visual references.
He makes decision for landing or go-- around.
- PM (@) task is approach monitoring with permanent reference to the instruments.
(!)PF, pilot flying,
- Monitors the A/C position, the flight path parameters and the AP.
- Controls the speed.
- Requests checklist, flaps setting and gear extension.
- Selects the modes and announces changes.
(@)PM, pilot monitoring,
- Is in charge of radio communications.
- Monitors the flight path, the speed, the mode changes, the systems and
the engines.
- Reads the checklist.
- Selects flaps setting and gear extension.
"
NORMAL APPROACH AND LANDING SEQUENCE

J
Prior to approach
D
BEFORE DESCENT, DESCENT, APPROACH AND BEFORE
LANDING PROCEDURES : SEE NORMAL PROCEDURE
... / ...
Mod 5948
2.02.04

P 10
001
AFCS
AA
APR 11
Before capture
D
PF has to perform the following tasks:
- NAVAIDS set to ILS frequency, ADF set as required.
- CRS set to final approach course.
- APP armed.
- SPEED BUG AUTO mode recommanded.
D
PM has to perform the following task:

- NAVAIDS and ADF set as required
From capture to decision height

Note: The call-- outs are written in bold with ....
Tasks and call- outs
CAT 2 events
PF
J
Localizer capture
Glide slope capture
LOC STAR
GS STAR
(!): Outer marker Check altitude on RA and altimeter,

or equivalent posi- and if aircraft is stabilized
tion (not lower
WE CONTINUE
than 1000ft)
Check dual coupling and no star on LOC
and G/S modes
CHECK
500 ft RA
DH + 100 ft RA
- Set runway HDG

- Set ILS freq
- Set/check V/ILS source (on
FGCP)
- Set/check ILS CRS
- Check CAT 2 on FMA
Set GA altitude
Check GA altitude
Request normal sequence for

LDG configuration
800 ft RA (#)
PNF
Set LDG configuration in sequence

OUTER (!) ALTITUDE
CHECKED, STABILIZED(@)
Check altitude on RA and altimeter and if aircraft stabilized
800 FT, DUAL CPL, NO STAR

Check dual coupling and no star
on LOC and G/S modes
500
Looks outside for visual references
DH / auto call-- out
100 ABOVE
Monitors the instruments
DECISION
(@): Stabilized means:

- On the final approach segment flight path.
- Landing flaps selected, VAPP reached.
- Final checklist completed.
(#): Any failure that is not completely treated before 800ft AGL, or that occurs
below 800ft AGL shall always lead to a missed approach.
Mod. : 5948
2.02.04

P 11
AFCS
001
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AA
If visual references sufficient

Tasks and call- outs
CAT 2 events
Visual at DH
80 ft RA
PF
PM
LANDING
Disconnect AP
50 ft RA
80
80
50
20 ft RA
20
Reduce PL and flare
Mod : 5948
If visual references insufficient, apply GO AROUND NORMAL procedure.

(2.03.20)
2.02.04

P 12
AFCS
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AA
D If APP P/B is engaged without an ILS frequency tuned on the coupled side, the APP
mode will not arm and the FMA will display a caution message : CHCK NAV SRC. In
this case, tune ILS and reengage APP mode.
D As soon as LOC* mode is displayed, the approach capability (as seen by
the AFCS computer), will be displayed on FMA (CAT I or CAT II).
D TRACK phase, for both LOC and GS (indicated by LOC and GS green without *)take
place automatically when the aircraft is on the beam. The transition to DUAL CPL
intervenes at 1200ft.
The standard deceleration procedure described above, normally allows to
reach 800 ft RA after LOC and GS TRACK phases have been achieved. If
it is not the case (excessive initial speed, etc.), new proper capture has to
be made. If late capture, the dual coupling engagement is impossible.
D Excess deviation is armed :
- below 300 ft for LOC
- between 300 ft and 100 ft for GS.
Any excess deviation appearance must be announced by PM (call DEVIATION).
This call must lead to :
- AP disconnection by PF
- Go around decision if visual references are not sufficient.
D AP/FD behaviour must be permanently monitored by PM. In case of anomaly
(sustained input not justified by LOC and GS deviations , excessive attitude*), the
PM must immediately call GUIDANCE .
This call must lead to :
-- AP disconnection by PF
- Go around decision if visual references are not sufficient.
* excessive attitude means
bank angle > 10
pitch attitude < --4
> +4
- In case of GUIDANCE or DEVIATION callout by PM, (or AP
disconnection without visual references), a Go Around must be performed. If no
discrepancy is detected on PFD (CHECK ATT messages) PFD can be used with IESI
monitoring to set the initial missed approach attitude.
Mod : 5948
APR 11
Mod 5948
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Mod 5948
Mod
5948
2.02.06

P1
FLIGHT CONTROLS
001
APR 11
ATR 72 is equipped with classical mechanical primary flight controls on all three axis.
The following peculiarities must be highlighted :
Mod 5948
2.02.06

P2
FLIGHT CONTROLS
001
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PITCH : Both elevators are connected through a pitch uncoupling device, in order to
leave sufficient controllability in case of mechanical jamming of one control surface.
Activation of this device :
- requires heavy forces (52 daN/114 Ibs) to be applied to the control columns,
which minimizes the risk of untimely disconnection.
- indicated to the crew through the red warning PITCH DISC on the EWD.
- allows the flight to be safely achieved : refer to procedures following failures.
Note 1 : WHEN PITCH DISCONNECT takes place WITHOUT REAL JAMMING, speed
has to be limited to 180 kt and bank angle to 30 until flaps extension to avoid
overstressing the stabilizer.
Note 2 : The TWO yokes must be held once the aircraft is landed.
Once disconnected both elevators can be reconnected by applying the following
procedure:
BOTH ELEVATORS RECONNECTION ON GROUND
Conditions:
- Aircraft on ground and electrically powered.
- Both elevators disconnected.
- Red PITCH DISC alarm illuminated steady on EWD.
Procedure:
- Engage GUST LOCK and check both columns are locked.
- Depress and hold ELEV CLUTCH guarded pb (see 1.09.30) until PITCH DISC
flashes red on EWD.
- Release ELEV CLUTCH pb. After a few seconds, PITCH DISC extinguishes on EWD.
- Check both columns are effectively coupled.
Mod. :5948
2.02.06

P3
FLIGHT CONTROLS
001
APR 11
ROLL :
D Aileron spring tabs :
Flight controls are connected to the ailerons through the spring tabs, therefore,
maintaining the flight controls to neutral on the ground would not prevent the ailerons
from oscillating in case of strong tail wind (> 30 kt).
Therefore, in strong wind conditions it is recommended :
- to disengage the gust lock only when necessary before take off,
- after landing, to engage the gust lock before a turn that would expose the aircraft to
a tail wind component.
If aileron lock is not available, it is easier to maintain the ailerons fully deflected.
D Aileron trim :
Ailerons forces trimming is obtained by shifting the zero position of the left aileron
spring tab : this means that AILERON TRIM INDICATOR is only representative of the
differential loading of the spring tab and not of the aileron position.
Mod. : 5948
2.02.06

P4
FLIGHT CONTROLS
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APR 11
YAW: The rudder incorporates several particular features.

D The releasable centering unit (threshold cam) :
This threshold cam automatically synchronizes to actual rudder pedal position each
time the rudder trim switch is activated.
Therefore before take-- off, rudder trim setting to zero must be made with rudder pedals
in neutral position.
D The rudder surface damper :
Structural protection of the rudder assembly against effect of wind gusts on ground is
ensured by a rudder surface damper, which is designed to prevent excessive speed of
deviations of the rudder surface.
When taxiing with strong winds, very large rudder forces would be required to control
the rudder surface: this is not necessary and rudder should be left floating in the
wind as the damper will effectively prevent any structural damage.
D The rudder trim :
Rudder forces trimming is obtained by shifting the zero position of the spring tab: this
means that RUDDER TRIM INDICATIONS are only representative of the
differential loading of the spring tab, AND NOT OF THE RUDDER POSITION.
Note : As speed increases, rudder trim deviation as large as 3 dots on the right may be
noted while rudder surface remains substantially at neutral.
D The yaw damper :
Yaw damper function is provided through the YAW CHANNEL of the AP and should
always be engaged in flight to improve passenger comfort.
The yaw damper provides in addition a sideslip cancellation function: its goal is to
keep the side slip indication centered. This can produce sustained rudder input, which
can lead to the display of a RETRIM NOSE LEFT or RETRIM NOSE RIGHT message
on FMA, and an arrow on the rudder trim indicator. In this case, the crew has to act
manually on the rudder trim in the displayed direction until the message disappears, in
order to reduce the effort sustained by the rudder actuator.
If the input required by the yaw damper is too important (more than 15daN/33lbs at
rudder pedals level), the command will be saturated, and the lateral acceleration will
be released (the side slip indicator will not be centered). In some cases (engine
failure), the yaw damper can disconnect automatically.
If the system detects a too important effort (more than 15daN/33lbs) the message
RUDDER MISTRIM will be displayed on the FMA, and a caution will be triggered by
the FWS. The procedure is to hold firmly the commands, and disconnect the AP/YD.
After lateral trimming, AP/YD can be engaged again.
In order to let the rudder axis free for pilot inputs (engine failure) without the need to
disconnect the YAW DAMPER on the FGCP, a force sensor has been implemented
and any pilot force exceeding 30 daN/66 Ibs applied on rudder will cause the YD
disengagement.
Mod 5948
2.02.06

P5
FLIGHT CONTROLS
001
APR 11
AA
In order to avoid exceeding structural loads on the rudder and vertical stabilizer, the
following recommendations must be observed.
1) THE RUDDER IS DESIGNED TO CONTROL THE AIRCRAFT, IN THE FOLLOWING
CIRCUMSTANCIES:
a) In normal operations, for directional control
- During the takeoff roll, especially in crosswind condition.
- During landing flare with crosswind, for decrab maneuver.
- During the landing roll.
- The rudder may be used as deemed necessary, for turn coordination to prevent
excessive sideslip.
b) To counteract thrust asymmetry
Full rudder authority can be used to compensate for the yawing moment of asymmetric
thrust.
Note : at high speed (i.e. flaps up), thrust asymmetry (i.e. due to an engine failure) has
relatively small effect on lateral control of the aircraft. The amount of rudder
required to counter an engine failure and center the sideslip is small.
c) In some other abnormal situations
The rudder may also be used in some abnormal situations such as:
- Runaway rudder trim. The rudder pedals may be used to return the rudder to neutral.
- Aileron jam. The rudder may be used to smoothly control the roll.
- Landing gear unsafe indication (gear not downlocked). When a main landing gear is not
downlocked, the rudder may be used to establish sideslip in an attempt to downlock the
landing gear by aerodynamic side forces.
- Landing with landing gear not downlocked. The rudder can be used for directional control
on ground.
In all these normal or abnormal circumstances, proper rudder maneuvers will not affect
the aircrafts structural integrity.
2) RUDDER SHOULD NOT BE USED:
- To induce roll, except in the previous case( Aileron jam) or
- To counter roll, induced by any type of turbulence.
Whatever the airborne flight condition may be, aggressive, full or nearly full, opposite
rudder inputs must not be applied. Such inputs can lead to loads higher than the limit, or
possibly the ultimate loads and can result in structural damage or failure.
Note : Rudder reversals must never be incorporated into airline policy, including
so-- called aircraft defensive maneuvers to disable or incapacitate hijackers.
As far as dutch roll is concerned, yaw damper action (if selected) or RCU (Releasable
Centering Unit) are sufficient to adequately dampen dutch roll oscillations. The rudder
should not be used to complement the yaw damper action.
Mod 5948
2.02.07

P1
FUEL SYSTEM
001
APR 11
AA
FUEL CROSSFEED
Allows feeding of 1 or 2 engines from either side tank, especially for fuel balancing.
PROCEDURE :
Intended tank to be used :
PUMP RUN and OFF LT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . extinguished
X FEED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IN LINE
Opposite tank :
PUMP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . OFF
When asymmetrical feeding is completed:
PUMPS both . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ON
X FEED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X LINE
R Note: Each electrical pump is able to supply one engine in the whole flight
R
envelope.
R
One electrical pump and associated jet pump are able to supply both engines in
R
the whole flight envelope.
R
When X FEED is selected in line , both electrical pumps are forced to run
R
(both RUN lights illuminate green) as long as associated PUMP pb is selected
ON.
R
CAUTION : When X FEED procedure is applied, some fuel transfer from the wing tank
where the pump is running to the other wing tank (where the pump is OFF)
may occur. This transfer is particularly noticeable at low power settings (X
FEED in Hotel mode is the worst case).
FUEL QUANTITY INDICATIONS
IN FLIGHT
Accurate readings require aircraft levelled without side slip and pitch attitude close to zero
degree.
ON GROUND
Accurate readings should be made with aircraft static (not taxiing) and fuel pumps running
for more than 4 minutes.
This procedure should be applied each time a comparative reading before and after flight
is intended with correlation to fuel used.
COMMENTS
- Fuel quantity indications are affected by excessive longitudinal and lateral attitudes
and accelerations.
- Fuel quantity indications are affected by the level of fuel in the feed tank. With pumps
running, the feed tanks are filled within a few minutes. This is the normal flight case.
Mod 5948
2.02.08

P1
ADVERSE WEATHER
001
APR 11
This chapter is divided in 4 parts :

- Icing
- Cold weather operations,
- Operations in wind conditions.
- Volcanic Ash encounter
ICING
I - GENERAL
Icing conditions are defined as follows :
" Atmospheric icing conditions
Atmospheric icing conditions exist when OAT on ground and for take-- off is at or
below 5C or when TAT in flight is at or below 7C and visible moisture in the air
in any form is present (such as clouds, fog with visibility of one mile or less, rain,
snow sleet and ice crystals).
" Ground icing conditions
Ground icing conditions exist when the OAT is at or below 5C when operating on
ramps, taxiways and runways where surface snow, standing water or slush is
present.
" Regulatory requirements
Certification requirements defined in JAR/FAR 25 appendix C consider droplet sizes
up to 50 microns in diameter. No aircraft is certified for flight in conditions with
droplets larger than this diameter.
However, dedicated flight tests have linked unique ice accretion patterns to
conditions of droplet sizes up to 400 microns. Procedures have been defined in
case of inadvertent encounter of severe icing.
" Organization of this subchapter
It will address the following areas :
D Operations within the certified envelope.
D Information about severe icing beyond the certified envelope.
D Good operating practices.
Mod 5948
APR 11
(duplicated on the FMA).
Accordingly, the minimum maneuver / operating speeds defined for normal (no icing)
conditions (refer to FCOM 2.02.21) will automatically be increased and must be
respected as long as ICING AOA is illuminated.
These new minimum speeds are called MINIMUM ICING SPEEDS. They are defined
further in paragraph B.
Mod: 5948
APR 11
Mod 5948
2.02.08

P4
001
ADVERSE WEATHER
APR 11
AA
B) MINIMUM ICING SPEEDS

- The minimum maneuver/operating speeds defined for normal conditions
(2.02.01) MUST BE INCREASED and the new value enforced whenever
ICE ACCRETION
is possible (FIight in atmospheric icing conditions),

or exists (ice accretion developing or residual ice).
They are defined by the following table where VSR is the non affected 1G stall speed
as given in 2.01.03.
FLAPS
VmHB
VmLB
1.46 VSR
1.40 VSR
1.22 VSR
T/O - 2d segment
15
1.35 VSR
1.27 VSR
Final Take-- Off
1.30 VSR
EN ROUTE
1.24 VSR
GO AROUND
30
1.32 VSR
CAUTION : For obstacle clearance, the en-- route configuration with engine failure is
FLAPS 15 at a minimum speed of 1.30 VSR if ice accretion is observed.
- Relevant MINIMUM ICING SPEEDS are displayed on the PFD as soon as the
ICING AOA is illuminated (refer to 1.10.22). The icing speeds can be found for
reference in the Quick Reference Handbook for all weights.
Mod 5948
APR 11
(ICING on FMA + MC + SC + ICING amber on EWD)
Mod 5948
2.02.08

P6
ADVERSE WEATHER
001
APR 11
AA
E) PROCEDURES IN ATMOSPHERIC ICING CONDITIONS

During operations with AP ON during climb and descent, vertical speed mode should not
be used unless the airspeed is carefully monitored.
The recommended procedure is to use IAS mode with a speed selected which is equal to
or greater than the appropriate minimum speed (VmLB or VmHB). If the selected speed is
below VmHB, the autopilot will automatically limit the bank angle to 15.
CAUTION : Close attention should be paid to the appearance of an AILERON MISTRIM
message flashing on the FMA and EWD: if the message appears, apply the
AILERON MISTRIM procedure.
Note : Permanent heating (Probes/windshield) is Always selected ON.
ENTERING ICING CONDITIONS
ANTI ICING (PROP - HORNS - SIDE WINDOWS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ON
Note : horns anti icing selection triggers the illumination of the ICING AOA green
light and green display on FMA, and lowers the AOA stall warning threshold.
MODE SEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Confirm AUTO
MINIMUM Maneuver/Operating ICING SPEED . . . . . . . . . . . . . OBSERVED
ICE ACCRETION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MONITOR
Note : 1.These procedures are applicable TO ALL FLIGHT PHASES including take off.
Mod : 5948
2.02.08

P7
ADVERSE WEATHER
001
APR 11
AA
AT FIRST VISUAL INDICATION OF ICE ACCRETION, AND

AS LONG AS ATMOSPHERIC ICING CONDITIONS EXIST
F
ANTI ICING (PROP - HORNS - SIDE WINDOWS) . . . . . . . . . . . . Confirm ON
MODE SEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Confirm AUTO
ENG DE ICING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ON
AIRFRAME DE ICING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ON
MINIMUM Maneuver/Operating ICING SPEED . . . . . . . . . . . . . OBSERVED

BE ALERT TO SEVERE ICING DETECTION.
In case of severe icing, refer to 2.04.05.
Notes:1. When ice accretion is visually observed, DE ICERS MUST BE SELECTED and
maintained ON as long as icing conditions exist.
2. The ice detector may not detect certain ice accretion form (see FCOM
1.13.20).
3. If a noticeable performance decrease and (or) significant vibrations occur
due to propeller residual icing then, in order to improve the deicing of the
blades, it is recommended :
D To check that the MODE SEL is AUTO, or that the MAN mode is selected
in accordance with SAT.
D To set CLs on 100 OVRD for continuous periods of not less than 5 minutes
in order to benefit from an increased centrifugal effect.
4. If ice accretion is seen by the detector with HORNS ANTI ICING and/or
AIRFRAME DE ICING still OFF, the ICING label will flash until corrective
actions are taken.
5. Engines de-- icing must be selected ON prior to airframe de-- icing to take
benefit of an immediate engines de-- icing.
If not, engines de-- icing will be effective 60 or 240 seconds later depending
on MODE SEL selection.
Mod : 5948
2.02.08

P8
ADVERSE WEATHER
001
APR 11
AA
WHEN LEAVING ICING CONDITIONS

DE ICING and ANTI ICING may be switched OFF.
Note : Leaving DE ICING in operation UNNECESSARILY is detrimental to boots life.
AIRFRAME cyan message is displayed flashing when the airframe deicing
system is still selected on five minutes after last ice accretion detection.
WHEN THE AIRCRAFT IS VISUALLY VERIFIED CLEAR OF ICE
ICING AOA caption may be cancelled and normal speeds used.
Note : Experience has shown that the last part to clear is the ice evidence probe. As
long as this condition is not reached, the icing speeds must be observed and the
ICING AOA caption must not be cancelled.
Mod : 5948
001
APR 11
Mod 5948
2.02.08

P 10
ADVERSE WEATHER
AA
001
APR 11
G) SUMMARY
DEFINITIONS : . ICING CONDITIONS : See Definition page 1. There is a risk of
ice accretion.
. ICE ACCRETION : Ice is building up on the airframe. ICING amber
light illuminates and flashing yellow ICING message is displayed
on the FMA.
. RESIDUAL ICE : Some ice is remaining on the airframe. May be in
or out of icing conditions.
Mod : 5948
APR 11
Mod : 5948
2.02.08

P 12
ADVERSE WEATHER
001
APR 11
AA
3) Mixed icing condition

Mixed icing condition may be encountered in the range of temperatures
- 10C/0C. It is basically an unstable condition, it is extremely temperature
dependent and it may change quite rapidly. This condition may surpass the ice
protection capabilities because the aggregate of impinging ice crystal/snow
and water droplet can adhere rapidly to the airframe surpassing the system
capabilities to shed ice, causing significant reduction in airplane performance
as in case of system failure.
C) CONSEQUENCES OF SEVERE ICE ACCRETION
The consequences of severe ice accretions are ice location dependent.
If the pollution extension occurs on the lower surface of the wing, it increases the
drag and the airplane speed decreases. It may lead to stall if no action is taken to
recover a correct speed.
If the pollution occurs first on the upper part of the wing, the drag is not affected
noticeably but controllability anomalies may be encountered.
Severe roll anomalies may be encountered with flaps 15 accretions flown with
flaps 0 setting. It should be emphasized that it is not the flaps 15 configuration itself
that is detrimental, but the low angle of attack that may result from such a setting,
especially close to VFE. This low or negative AOA increases the wing upper side
exposure to large droplet impingement. This is why holding with any flaps extended
is prohibited in icing conditions (except for single engine operations).
... / ...
Mod 5948
2.02.08

P 13
ADVERSE WEATHER
001
APR 11
AA
D) DETECTION
- During flight, severe icing conditions that exceed those for which the airplane is
certificated shall be determined by the following :
Severe icing is characterized by ice covering all or a substantial part of the unheated
portion of either side window,
Note : This cue is visible after a very short exposure (about 30 seconds).
and / or
Unexpected decrease in speed or rate of climb,
and / or
The following secondary indications :
. Water splashing and streaming on the windshield.
. Unusually extensive ice accreted on the airframe in areas not normally observed
to collect ice.
. Accumulation of ice on the lower surface of the wing aft of the protected areas.
. Accumulation of ice on the propeller spinner farther aft than normally observed.
- The following weather conditions may be conducive to severe in-- flight icing :
. Visible rain at temperatures close to 0C ambient air temperature (SAT).
. Droplets that splash or splatter on impact at temperatures close to 0C ambient
air temperature (SAT).
- The occurence of rain when SAT is below freezing temperature should always trigger
the alertness of the crew.
EXIT THE SEVERE ICING ENVIRONMENT
There are no regulatory requirements to certify an aircraft beyond CS/FAR 25
Appendix C. However, in case of inadvertent encounter with such conditions severe
icing procedure must be applied (refer to 2.04.05).
Mod 5948
APR 11
Mod 5948
2.02.08

P 15
ADVERSE WEATHER
001
APR 11
AA
IV - GOOD OPERATING PRACTICES

Aircraft certification requirements describe the icing conditions likely to be encountered
in commercial aviation. However, as demonstrated by experience, icing remains one of
the major causes of incidents and accidents, and good airmanship prohibit any
complacency in this area.
The following basic rules should therefore be applied :
" Know as much about your operating environment as you can.
Carefully review weather packages for Pilot reports of icing conditions, tops reports,
temperatures aloft forecasts and forecasts of icing, freezing drizzle and freezing rain.
Monitor both Total Air Temperature and Static Air Temperature during climb and
while en route. Use the weather radar. Areas of precipitation which will paint on the
radar will be of sufficient droplet size to produce freezing rain when encountered in
freezing temperatures or on a cold soaked aircraft.
" Marginal freezing temperatures and icing conditions should create a heightened state
of awareness. Remember, severe ice can still be incurred at temperatures down to
approximately - 18 C, at high altitude.
" Be alert to severe icing cues defined pages 12/13.
" When severe icing is encountered, take appropriate steps to leave the conditions.
Since these unique conditions are usually small in area and associated with very
specific temperatures conditions, a change in altitude of just a couple thousand
feet may place you in a totally different environment.
" Make reports to ATC and Company.
There is no better operational tool available today than first hand reports of these
conditions. Remember that because these are localized areas and extremely temperature
dependent, another aircraft passing through the same area at a different airspeed
may experience different conditions. For example, a laboratory test showed for a
specific, yet normal condition, rime ice up to about 150 kt, mixed ice as speed was
increased to about 200 kt, glaze ice between 200 and 360 kt, and no accretion above
360 kt.
Note : Reporting of icing conditions as defined in the FAAs Airmans information
Manual (AIM) :
Trace : Ice becomes perceptible. Rate of accumulation is slightly greater
than the rate of sublimation. It is not hazardous even though
de-- icing/anti - icing equipment is not utilized unless encountered for an
extended period of time (over 1 hour).
Light : The rate of accumulation may create a problem if flight is prolonged
in this environment (over 1 hour). Occasional use of de-- icing/anti - icing
equipment removes/prevents accumulation. It does not present a problem if
the de-- icing/anti - icing equipement is used.
Moderate : The rate of accumulation is such that even short encounters
become potentially hazardous and use of de-- icing/anti - icing equipment or
flight diversion is necessary.
Severe : The rate of accumulation is such that de-- icing/anti - icing equipment
fails to reduce or control the hazard. Immediate flight diversion is necessary.
Mod 5948
2.02.08

P 16
ADVERSE WEATHER
AA
LEFT INTENTIONALLY BLANK
Mod : 5948
001
APR 11
2.02.08

P 17
ADVERSE WEATHER
AA
Mod : 5948
001
APR 11
2.02.08

P 18
ADVERSE WEATHER
AA
Mod : 5948
001
APR 11
2.02.08

P 19
ADVERSE WEATHER
AA
Mod : 5948
001
APR 11
2.02.08

P 20
ADVERSE WEATHER
AA
Mod : 5948
001
APR 11
2.02.08

P 21
ADVERSE WEATHER
001
APR 11
AA
OPERATIONS IN WINDY CONDITIONS

Landing
The recommended landing flap configuration is the same as the standard landing flap
setting, even with strong crosswind. Large flaps extension does not impair the
controllability in any manner. Moreover it minimizes the flare duration and allows a quicker
speed decrease down to the taxi speed.
General
Precautions or special instructions may be necessary depending on the force and
direction of the wind. The following FCOM pages deal with this subject :
Tail wind limit and demonstrated cross wind
2 01 03
Final approach speed and wind factor
2 02 01
Cat II maximum demonstrated wind
2 02 04
Parking aircraft orientation
2 02 03 and 2 03 20
Aileron spring tabs (when equipped)
2 02 06
Taxiing with strong wind
2 02 06
Take off run
2 02 12
Rejected take off
2 02 12
Hotel mode limitation
2 03 06 and 2 05 02
Taxiing with tail wind component
2 03 09
Ditching
2 04 05
NAC OVHT
2 05 02
ELEVATOR JAM
2 05 06
PITCH DISCONNECT
2 05 06
AILERON JAM
2 05 06
SPOILER JAM
2 05 06
Mod : 5948
2.02.08

P 22
ADVERSE WEATHER
001
APR 11
AA
Windshear
This phenomenon may be defined as a notable change in wind direction and/or speed over
a short distance.
Windshear can be encountered in the vicinity of thunderstorms, into rain showers (even
without thunderstorms), during a frontal passage or on coastal airports (sea breeze
fronts).
Severe windshear encountered above 1000 feet, whilst unpleasant, can generally be
negociated safely. However if it is encountered below 500 feet on take off or
approach/landing it is potentially dangerous.
As far as possible this phenomenon must be avoided.
Procedure at take off :
Delay the take off. If a low level windshear is reported calculate VR, V2 at the maximum
take off weight available for the day.
When clear of obstacles accelerate as much as possible and clean up the aircraft.
Climb at the normal climb speed.
Procedure during an approach : If a windshear is encountered,
Initiate a normal go around procedure with 10 pitch .
When positively climbing at a safe altitude, retract the gear and complete the normal
go around procedure.
CAUTION :
The positive rate of climb must be verified on at least two instruments.
COMMENTS :
1. Leaving the gear down until the climb is established will allow to
absorb some energy on impact, should the microburst exceed the
aircraft capability to climb.
2. Ten degrees pitch attitude is the best compromise to ensure a
climbing path together with an acceptable maximum AOA.
Mod : 5948
2.02.08

P 23
ADVERSE WEATHER
001
APR 11
VOLCANIC ASH ENCOUNTER

1- VOLCANIC ASH DESCRIPTION
Volcanic ash is, essentially, extremely fine particles of glass shards and pulverized rock,
the composition of which reflects the composition of the magma inside the volcano.
It is composed predominantly of siliceous materials (> 50%) that are both very hard and
very abrasive. The melting point of glassy silicates is around 1100_C that is close to the
operating temperature of the engine at cruise thrust.
The ash is accompanied by gaseous solutions of sulphur dioxide (sulphuric acid) and
chlorine (hydrochloric acid).
2- AVOIDANCE
Flight operations in volcanic ash are extremely hazardous and must be avoided. Flights in
areas of known volcanic activity must be avoided.
When a flight is planned into an area with known potential for volcanic activity:
- All NOTAMS and air traffic advisories have to be checked for current status of volcanic
activity.
- The planned route has to well avoid the area of volcanic activity.
- If possible, stay upwind of volcanic ash.
The first two or three days following an explosive eruption are especially critical because
high concentration of gas with hazardous concentration could be encountered at cruise
levels some considerable distance from the volcano. Beyond three days, it is assume that
if the ash is still visible by eye or from a satellite data, it still presents a hazard to aircraft.
3- DETECTION
Volcanic ash cloud does not produce return or echoes on the airborne weather radar.
Volcanic ash may be difficult to detect visually, especially at night or on instrumental
meteorological conditions. However, the following have been reported by flight crew:
- Acrid odor, similar to electrical smell, burned dust or sulfur.
- Smoke or dust appearing in the cabin and cockpit, leaving a coating on cabin and
cockpit surfaces.
- Multiple engine malfunctions, such as stall, increase ITT, flameout.
- Airspeed fluctuating erratically.
- At night, static electric discharges (St. Elmos fire) visible around the cockpit
windshields.
- At night, landing lights cast sharp, distinct shadows on the volcanic ash clouds as
opposed to the normally fuzzy, indistinct shadows cast on water / ice clouds.
4- EFFECTS ON POWERPLANT
The melting point of volcanic ash is close to the operating temperature of the engine at
cruise power. This can cause serious damage in hot section of the engine that could result
in engine thrust loss and possible flame out.
(.../...)
Mod : 5948
2.02.08

P 24
ADVERSE WEATHER
001
APR 11
4- EFFECTS ON POWERPLANT (CONTD)

Pilots are therefore asked to reduce engine power settings to flight idle when possible to
lower the engine operating temperature below the melting point of volcanic ash.
The volcanic ash, being abrasive, also damage engine components causing loss of
engine thrust. The erosion also results in a decrease in the engine stall margin. Although
this abrasion effect takes longer than the melting fusion of volcanic ash to shut down the
engine, the abrasion damage is permanent and irreversible. Reduction of engine thrust to
idle slows the rate of erosion by the compressor blades but can not eliminate it entirely
while the engine is still ingesting air contaminated by volcanic ash.
Propeller blades may also be degraded by erosion inducing loss of traction efficiency.
Oil cooler efficiency may also be decreased either due to excessive erosion of the cooler
or due to blockage of the air intake by ashes.
5 - EFFECTS ON THE AIRFRAME AND EQUIPMENT
Volcanic ash abrades cockpit windows, airframe and flight surfaces. Any parts protruding
from airframe such as antennas, probes, ice detectors can be damaged and may be
rendered inoperable.
- The abrasion of the cockpit window reduces the pilots forward visibility. This can lead
to serious problems during landing phase.
- The abrasion damage of the wing or horizontal stabilizer leading edges can either
prevent the correct operation of the de-- icing boots or even detached parts of the boots
with subsequent drag increase.
- The abrasion damage of the landing lights can significantly reduce landing light
effectiveness.
- Damage to the antennas can lead to a complete loss of HF communications and a
degradation of VHF communications.
- Damage to the various sensors can seriously degrade the information available to the
pilot through the instrument.
Volcanic ash can obstruct probes and penetrate into air conditioning and equipment
cooling system. It can contaminates electrical and avionic units, fuel and hydraulic
system and smoke detection system.
- Pitot probe can be blocked by volcanic ash resulting in unreliable airspeed indications
or complete loss of airspeed indication in the cockpit.
Volcanic ash columns are highly charged electrically. The static charge on the aircraft
creates a cocoon effect which may cause a temporary defection, or even complete loss
of VHF or HF communication with ground stations.
(.../...)
Mod : 5948
2.02.08

P 25
ADVERSE WEATHER
100
APR 11
6 - PROCEDURE
VOLCANIC ASH ENCOUNTER

FOLLOWING ITEMS HAVE TO BE APPLIED WHILE MAKING A 180 DEGREES
TURN AND STARTING DESCENT (IF MSA PERMITS)
ATC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NOTIFY
PL 1 + 2 (if conditions permit) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . RETARD
MAN SPEED BUG TO VmHB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SET
HDG MODE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . HDG SEL
CREW OXY MASKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ON / 100%
CABIN CREW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NOTIFY
PASSENGER OXYGEN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AS RQD
AIR FLOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . HIGH
ENG PARAMETERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MONITOR
AIRPEED INDICATORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MONITOR
Note: Reducing TQ reduces ash ingestion, maximizes engine surge margin and
lowers engine turbine temperature. Monitor particularly ITT; it may become
necessary to set PL to Flight Idle, if conditions permit.
Note: In extreme case, it may be necessary to consider precautionary engine shut
down and engine restart in flight. If both engines flame out, refer to
BOTH ENGINE FLAME OUT procedure (2.04.02)
Note: Volcanic ash may clog the pitot probes resulting in unreliable speed
indications.If airspeed is unreliable or lost, adjust airplane attitude and torque.
Mod : 4111 + 5948
2.02.09

P1
001
LANDING GEAR/BRAKES
APR 11
AA
This chapter deals with the following points :

-
RUNWAY STATUS
NORMAL TAXI
TAXI WITH FAILURES
EMERGENCY BRAKING
RUNWAY STATUS
The following table gives for take-- off and landing the equivalent runway status
corresponding to the braking action or the friction coefficient.
This runway status may be used for the computation of the performances.
EQUIVALENT RUNWAY
STATUS
TAKE- OFF
LANDING
BRAKING
ACTION
GOOD
FRICTION
COEFFICIENT
0,40 and above
GOOD/MEDIUM
MEDIUM
0,39 to 0,36
0,35 to 0,30
2
3/6
2
5/6
MEDIUM/POOR
POOR
UNRELIABLE
0,29 to 0,26
0,25 and below
UNRELIABLE
4
7
8
5
7
8
EQUIVALENT RUNWAY STATUS :

1 : Dry runway
2 : Wet up to 3 mm depth
3 : Slush or water for depths between 3 and 6 mm
6 : Compact snow
7 : Ice
8 : Runway with high risk of hydroplaning
Mod 5948
2.02.09

P2
LANDING GEAR/BRAKES
001
APR 11
AA
NORMAL TAXI
CAUTION : If blue hydraulic circuit is pressurized, nose wheel steering has to be
switched off for towing by a ground vehicle.
- The ATR 72 is particularly easy to taxi, and even on one engine, there are no
limitations to go either forward or rearward : this flexibility should be systematically
used and is reflected in the standard operating procedure which assumes HOTEL
MODE operation of engine 2 prior to and during passenger boarding followed by initial
taxi on engine 2 only (including back track if taxi backwards required).
This procedure is highly recommended as GI power is quite sufficient on one engine only
to perform all taxiing (OUT and IN) and very obviously reduces block fuel by an amount
which may become VERY SIGNIFICANT on large airports.
CAUTION : Start up of engine 1 should be performed in a portion of taxi where captain
workload is low enough to allow an efficient monitoring of the start up.
- Use of brakes during taxiing may be very much reduced by systematic use of a small
amount of reverse when deceleration is needed.
- Radius of turn with nose wheel steering is very good and does not require any braking
ON THE INNER WHEELS.
CAUTION : PIVOTING (Sharp turns) UPON A LANDING GEAR WITH FULLY BRAKED
WHEELS IS NOT ALLOWED, except in emergency.
TAXI WITH FAILURES
TAXI WITH NOSE WHEEL STEERING OFF (or without blue HYD pressure)
D Obviously SINGLE ENGINE TAXI is no more possible
D Taxiing remains very easy with both engines operating EEC ON :
directional control is achieved primarily with differential power on engines, possibly
augmented by use of differential braking.
D Avoid sharp turns : turn radius without nose wheel steering should be limited to
about half turn radius with nose wheel steering.
TAXI WITH EEC OFF
On ground EEC off, engine response is somewhat degraded. Nevertheless, as long as at
least one engine is maintained at or below GI, the corresponding NP should remain high
enough to keep associated ACW GEN available and thus maintain both HYD pumps.
CAUTION : When taxiing with both EEC OFF, AVOID pushing both PL above GI to avoid
transient loss of ACW and MAIN HYD PUMPS.
Note : NOSE WHEEL steering remains available in all cases together with STBY
braking, through DC AUX pump.
Mod 5948
2.02.09

P3
LANDING GEAR/BRAKES
001
APR 11
AA
EMERGENCY BRAKING
- Emergency braking has been made operationally easier by design of the parking brake
lever which incorporates an EMER BRAKE notch : when the parking brake lever
is set in this notch, the regulator delivers a limited pressure which :
D allows the use of EMER BRAKING for abort take-- off at max V1 or at touch down
for landings after GREEN pressure has been completely lost.
D provides repeatable, smooth deceleration whilst minimizing the risk of blown up
tires.
CAUTION : Use of EMER BRAKE beyond the EMER BRAKE NOTCH ABOVE 60 Kts
MUST BE AVOIDED TOPREVENT WHEELSLOCK UPAND DAMAGESTO
WHEELS AND TIRES.
BELOW 60 Kts, a SMALL further travel ( 1 cm) IS AVAILABLE WITHOUT
RISKS OF DAMAGE WHEN MAXIMUM STOPPING PERFORMANCE IS
REQUIRED.
- A deflated tire is not easily noticeable from the cockpit : NO TAKE OFF should be
started after EMER BRAKE has been used at speeds in excess of a maximum taxiing
speed of 20 Kt without prior visual inspection of the main landing gear tires.
Mod : 5948
2.02.10

P1
FLIGHT PATTERNS
APR 11
CLB procedure:
AA
Mod : 5948
001
2.02.10

P2
FLIGHT PATTERNS
AA
Mod : 5948
001
APR 11
2.02.10

P3
FLIGHT PATTERNS
AA
Mod : 5948
001
APR 11
2.02.10

P4
FLIGHT PATTERNS
AA
Mod : 5948
001
APR 11
2.02.10

P5
FLIGHT PATTERNS
AA
Mod : 5948
001
APR 11
2.02.10

P6
FLIGHT PATTERNS
AA
Mod : 5948
001
APR 11
2.02.10

P7
FLIGHT PATTERNS
AA
Mod : 5948
001
APR 11
2.02.10

P8
FLIGHT PATTERNS
AA
Mod : 5948
001
APR 11
2.02.10

P9
FLIGHT PATTERNS
AA
Mod : 5948
001
APR 11
2.02.11

P1
001
POWER PLANT
APR 11
AA
START UP PROCEDURE
Prior to initiating start sequence EEC FAULT light must be extinguished, if EEC
FAULT is lit try to reset ; if unsuccessful, deselect EEC.
During engine start or relighting, the following items must be monitored.
- Correct NH increase when starting the sequence.
- Starter disconnection at 45 % NH.
- Maximum ITT : during a battery start one or two ITT peaks not exceeding 800C may
usually be observed. ITT peaks are of lower value if a suitable GPU is used.
This example shows the start sequence of engine N 1 on ground (engine 2 running)
NH %
Parameters
START 1
10
ON illuminated
STARTER/GENERATOR
CLA
25
45
62
(ON extinguished)
Starter
FUEL SO
generator
* FTR
IGNITION
EEC
ELECTRICAL SUPPLY OF
STARTER/GENERATOR
PLA
EEC ON
MAIN BAT.
(MAIN BAT.
+ GEN 2)
GI
* Passing from FUEL SO to FTR is possible between 10 and 19 % NH if ITT > 200 C.
ENG OIL LO PR FWS alarm is 30 seconds time delayed to avoid untimely ENG OIL LO PR
during engine start. Refer to 2.02.08 p18 for specific cold weather behaviour.
Note : This alert is inhibited when affected CL is in FUEL SO position.
Mod 5948
2.02.11

P2
POWER PLANT
AA
001
APR 11
TAKE OFF: USE OF BLEED VALVES

The aircraft is fitted with an automatic bleed valve closing in case of engine failure at
take off.
The closing signal is given by MFCs when uptrim is triggered. BLEED FAULT light also
illuminates on the operative engine. Engine bleed valves may be routinely selected ON
(NORM FLOW) for take off. However, performance decrement has to be considered for
the ground phase. This decrement is given in chapter 3.03 and may be computed by the
FOS.
POWER SETTING AT TAKE OFF
Engine control normally uses temperature, altitude and speed data from the selected
ADC but reverts to its own sensors in case of detected failure or significant offset.
TAT/SAT information are valid only when the engine (propeller unfeathered)
corresponding to the selected ADC is running.
RTO torques must be computed using altitude and temperature information independant
from aircraft sources and compared to values displayed by torque bugs.
Take off power is routinely obtained by setting the power levers and the condition levers
into the notches. If needed, in order to match target torque bugs set according to
dependable data, it may be necessary to adjust the throttles out of the notches.
UNFEATHERING AFTER AN ENGINE RESTART IN FLIGHT
Unfeathering the propeller induces a limited lateral disturbance.
ENGINE PARAMETERS FLUCTUATION
The variation tolerances of engine parameters are shown in Figure. These tolerances
must be taken into account only in stabilized flight phases.
PARAMETERS
TQ
NH
ITT
NP
FLUCTUATION
AMPLITUDE
+/- 2 %
+/- 0.25 %
+/- 10_C
+/- 2.5 %
In case of engine parameters fluctuation it can be helpful to select the corresponding EEC
OFF then On according to EEC FAULT C/L before shutting the engine down.
If this action cures the problem, the flight can be continued accordingly.
MAN IGNITION
When one or both EEC (s) has (have) been deselected, the use of MAN ignition is
required when the aircraft penetrates heavy precipitation or severe turbulence areas,
when ice accretion develops or when using contaminated runway for take off or landing.
GO AROUND - POWER SET UP PROCEDURE
The throttle movement (PF) is to be applied accross the notch up to the ramp (beginning
of amber sector).
WARNING : Overriding the ramp threshold up to the absolute full travel will allow to
reach 1.15 x RTO TQ (EEC ON).
This should be used only is case of emergency.
CLs should routinely stay into the notches. Np is automatically set at 100 % provided PWR
MGT is on TO position and PLA is sufficient (see 1.16.40).
Mod 5948
2.02.11

P 2A
POWER PLANT
001
APR 11
PUSH BACK AND POWER BACK OPERATIONS

Push- back (with towbar)
- Push-- back is done after ATC clearance.
- Specific phraseology is used.
- Ground staff remains connected with the aircraft by using conventional signs and/or
headphones with several persons according to airline policy
- Parking brake released and steering OFF.
- Each crew member keeps his feet on the floor. NEVER USE BRAKES during push back
(to avoid tail strike and/or strain on towing system). Wait for disconnection of the tow bar
by the ground staff before switching the steering ON.
- Set nose wheel steering to ON. Caution: never set the hydraulic of the steering before the
disconnection of the tow bar.
Note:NAC OVHT and ENG FIRE can be triggered during push-- back in hotel mode, with a
tail wind greater than 10kts, including aircraft direction changes throughout the
procedure.
If the tail wind is above this limit, the push-- back has to be done, with the propeller(s)
running and unfeathered, and respecting ground safety rules and airport local rules.
Power back
- Before power back, both propellers are running and are unfeathered.
- Power back is done after ATC clearance.
- Ground staff area checked cleared before and during power back, by using conventional
signs and/or headphones with several people, as per prevailing airlines policy.
- Nose wheel steering remains ON.
- To avoid moving forward, apply slight power back just before releasing brake.
- Each crew member keeps his feet on the floor. NEVER USE BRAKES during power back
(to avoid tail strike).
- Power back is performed at low speed.
- Use Ground Idle or positive power to decrease speed or stop.
Note: NAC OVHT and ENG FIRE can be triggered, if a prolonged power-- back is
maintained with a tail wind greater than 10kts, including aircraft direction changes
throughout the procedure
Note: In Ground Idle, after parking brake release, the aircraft moves forward. The power
lever has to be retarded slightly to power back just before releasing the brake.
Note: Safety glasses have to be used by the ground staff, because of the possibility of
projection during power back operation.
Mod 5948
2.02.11

P3
POWER PLANT
001
APR 11
AA
ADAPTED FLIGHT IDLE

A low flight idle rating is associated with a significant increase of aerodynamic drag
profitable to the descent performance (approach and landing).
On the other hand, this increased drag penalises the lift at a high angle of attack.
The fulfillment of these two requirements has led to an adapted flight idle providing two
power settings.
The FI position being selected by the pilot, the power level (high or low) is set by the
EECs, as a function of an information provided by the MFCs.
This information is associated with a limit angle of attack equal to stall warning - 4.
In case of high flight idle loss the aircraft behaviour during stall unchanged and the
decrease of lift is negligible and covered by the regulatory margins.
PROPELLER BRAKE USE
Propeller brake must be used only when READY light on propeller brake control panel is
illuminated.
1 - BRAKING SEQUENCE (ENG 2 Running)
Notes : The DC AUX pump runs automatically as soon as

- blue hydraulic pressure is below 1500 PSI and,
- gear is down and,
- one engine is running
and stops 15 seconds after the end of prop braking sequence (PROP BRK lights
illuminated).
Mod 5948
2.02.11

P4
POWER PLANT
001
APR 11
2 - RELEASING SEQUENCE (ENG2 in hotel mode)
R
R
Note : A pulse on AUX HYD PUMP pb starts the auxiliary hydraulic pump for
30 seconds. Selecting. Selecting propeller brake sw to OFF position within this 30 s
temporization allows to keep the DC AUX PUMP running overriding the
30 seconds temporization.
Mod 5948
2.02.11

P5
001
POWER PLANT
APR 11
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AN EEC FAULT CONDITION AND AN

ENGINE FLAME OUT IN FLIGHT
ENGINE FLAME OUT(*)
EEC FAULT
POWER EVOLUTION
Immediate power
loss
Moderate variation
(either way)
EEC FAULT
LIGHT
Not lit
Immediate illumination
NH
Rapidly below 74 %
Always above 74 %
ITT
rapidly below 350 C
Always above 350 C
POWER LEVER
Totally inefficient
Generally inefficient
refer to FCOM 1.16.30
ASSOCIATED DC
GEN LT
DC GEN Fault illuminates

rapidly
Normal
BLEED/PACK
FAULT illuminates rapidly
Normal
(*) If automatic relight has not operated

ENGINE OPERATION WITH EEC OFF
- EEC deactivation may lead to an important power variation at constant throttle
position. Power recovery will necessitate throttle readjustment.
- Maintaining target torque may necessitate positions out of the notch since constant
throttle position feature is lost. Some throttle readjustements will be necessary
during climb.
Engine response may be more sluggish when increasing power and a
temporary throttle overtravel may be necessary to obtain a fast power response.
- If EEC is selected from OFF to ON, an important power variation may result. That is
why the throttle has to be reduced below 52 prior to such an action.
- Landing with both EEC OFF will lead to a big propeller speed decay as the speed
decreases, so that ACW power may be lost at the end of the landing run. Be ready to
use nose wheel steering and emergency braking as required.
Engine response during taxi will be slower.
- Reverse power is reduced. Moreover, in case of acceleration stop, a one second stop
must be observed at Fl before setting PLs below.
Mod 5948
2.02.11

P6
POWER PLANT
001
APR 11
AA
ENGINE FAILURE SIMULATION FOR TRAINING PURPOSES

Flight training requires to simulate engine failure in a representative manner for both
controllability and performance aspects but without feathering engine (safety and
cooling of nacelle).
For a given PL position, the propeller THRUST (+) / DRAG (-- ) VARIES VERY
SIGNIFICANTLY WITH IAS, particularly at low speeds, as shown by the following table.
(Zp = 0 (ISA/NP max = 100%)
PL Position
0 kt
50 kt
100 kt
125 kt
150 kt
40
1300 daN
710 daN
200 daN
0 daN
~0 daN
36
1270 daN
670 daN
- 240 daN
- 600 daN
- 530 daN
Fl
1240 daN
640 daN
- 460 daN
- 850 daN
- 750 daN
Gl
140 daN
- 610 daN
- 2070 daN
Max Rev
- 610 daN
- 1370 daN
- 2900 daN
- The drag of a feathered engine is negligible between 0 and 150 kt.

- The maximum drag of a failed, unfeathered, engine varies with IAS and PL position
as follow :
PL Position
0 kt
50 kt
100 kt
125 kt
150 kt
TO
0 daN
80 daN
310 daN
470 daN
700 daN
Fl (B = 14)
0 daN
80 daN
400 daN
620 daN
750 daN
The procedure for simulating engine failure is based on retarding PL to fixed positions,
optimised to cover correctly the T/O and approach phases i.e. for IAS around 110/
125 kts.
IN FLIGHT - To simulate an UNFEATHERED failed engine retard PL at Fl.
- To simulate a FEATHERED engine set PL to 39 for IAS 110/125 kt.
Note : ISA and altitude effects are negligible.
- For continued take-- off with simulated engine failure, retard PL to 39 for
IAS 110/125 kt in order to simulate auto feather action.
ON GROUND - Aborted T/O: Retard INITIALLY to Fl.
CAUTION : - On ground, in all cases, (single engine landing or aborted T/O), the
trainee must retard BOTH PL at Gl, then use reverse on LIVE
engine only, as necessary.
- Leaving the simulated engine failed PL at 39 or more (for single
engine landings) or Fl (for aborted T/O) would lead to non
representative controllability problems as the failed engine thrust
would change its initial drag into a big increase of forward thrust as IAS
decreases.
- To be exact, these values request a perfect rigging of engine controls.
A slight mismatch may induce a significant drag change. Pilot should
monitor performances and increase PLA as necessary.
Mod 5948
2.02.11

P7
POWER PLANT
001
APR 11
REVERSE PHASES
NP is the parameter to be monitored during reverse phases. (NP is the only regulated
parameter in these phases)
OPERATIONS OUT OF THE NOTCH
When PL are retarded, during descent and approach, trim efficiency is reduced (reference
point being notch), and cannot correct built-- in discrepencies between engines and their
associated controls. Tolerances due to PL rigging cannot be compensated in that area.
TQ split up to 8% (8 counts) can be evidenced between engines in stabilised conditions.
This is built-- in and results from requirement of TQ accuracy in notch, which is the power
setting used for about 90% of flight time.
TQ differences are allowable and can be eventually compensated manually by crew with
PL adjustment.
Mod 5948
2.02.12

P1
001
APR 11
AA
TAKE OFF AND LANDING RUNS

- Proper crew coordination is required in order to hold the control column at all times
and prevent excessive elevator or aileron deflections due to wind and/or reversed air
flow from propellers.
The control column is initially held.
D in pitch : fully nose down, then slowly relaxed as speed increases.
D in roll : neutral or deflected TOWARD the wind in case of crosswind component, as
appropriate to maintain wings essentially level.
Note : Excessive aileron deflections should be avoided as they affect directional
control.
- For take-- off, use of nose wheel steering guidance is only recommended for the very
first portion of the take off run as rudder becomes very rapidly efficient when airspeed
increases (~ 40 kts) and ATR 72 exhibits a natural tendency to go straight.
- Action on nose wheel tiller should be smooth and progressive, particularly as ground
speed increases.
- Rudder must not be cycled during take-- off, particularly the first portion where nose
wheel is used: combination of unnecessary rudder cycling (with an increasingly
efficient rudder) and nose wheel control would then lead to
uncomfortable oscillations.
- Rolling take-- off technique
In order not to increase the take-- off distances, power must be set quickly during the
last phase of the line up turn.
- for landing or aborted take off, control column holding must be transferred to the
co-- pilot when the captain takes the nose wheel steering.
If reverse is used, at low speeds and with high power, the reversed air flow may
shake violently the flight controls, particularly with no crosswind: the control column
must be held very firmly and/or, below 30 kts, the GUST LOCK may be engaged.
Narrow Runways :
When the aircraft is operated on a narrow runway (width < 30 m (98 ft)), whoever
is the PF (CM1 or CM2), the CM1 should be ready to use Nose Wheel Steering as soon
as the nose wheel is on the ground.
If reverse is used, at low speeds and with high power, the reversed air flow may
shake violently the flight controls, particularly with no crosswind : the control column
must be held very firmly and/or, below 30 kts, the GUST LOCK may be engaged.
Refer to 3.11.10
Mod 5948
2.02.12

P2
001
APR 11
AA
ENGINE FAILURE
AT TAKE OFF BELOW V1
Abort is mandatory: both PLs are retarded to Gl and full braking applied if needed.
Reverse is available even on single engine down to full stop: again, control column is
transferred to the co-- pilot when captain takes nose wheel steering and, in case of single
reverse operation roll control must be applied (possibly to full travel) in order to
minimize the tendency to bank on the side of the operating engine.
AT TAKE OFF ABOVE V1
Take off must be continued. Directional control must be maintained with rudder and, as
soon as aircraft becomes airborne, aileron input to stabilize heading with about 2 of
bank toward the operating engine is highly recommended in order to decrease rudder
deflection thence improve climb performance.
Both rudder and aileron forces may be completely trimmed out, even at minimum
scheduled V2. Once both yaw and roll axis are trimmed out, autopilot may be engaged.
IN APPROACH
Directional control must be maintained with rudder, (which disengages
automatically YD and AP if previously engaged) and aileron, in a manner similar to what
was described for the continued take off case.
The ATPCS functioning is different between approach and take-- off.
Even if TO position is selected:
- Uptrim function is never available
- Auto feather function may be available depending on PL position at the time of the
failure.
If autofeather has not operated (windmilling), the drag depends on the engine failed PL
position. For this reason :
- In approach, do not reduce the affected PL below 45 PLA before manually feathering
the engine.
- If a go around is performed, advance both PLs to the ramp. When appropriate,
manually feather the failed engine.
LANDING (PROPELLER FEATHERED)
- Flare technique remains unchanged and rudder input required to
compensate the asymmetric reduction at 20 ft is more smoothly achieved if YAW
DAMPER has been disconnected in short final.
- After main gear touch down, it is recommended to first lower nose wheel to ground
contact before reducing PL from Fl to Gl: this allows to better control the large
asymmetric associated drag increase on the live engine side. PL may be then
retarded to full reverse as required but roll attitude must be controlled which requires
large control wheel deflection by PNF.
Mod 5948
2.02.12

P3
001
APR 11
AA
STALLS
STALL WITHOUT ICE ACCRETION
In all configurations, when approaching the stall, the aircraft does not exhibit any
noticeable change in flight characteristics: control effectiveness and stability remains
good and there is no significant buffet down to CL max ; this is the reason why both the
stall alert (audio cricket and shaker) and stall identification (stick pusher) are
artificial devices based on angle of attack measurement.
Recovery of stall approaches should normally be started as soon as stall alert is
perceived : a gentle pilot push (together with power increase if applicable) will then allow
instantaneous recovery. If the stall penetration attempt is maintained after stall alert has
been activated, the STICK PUSHER may be activated : this is clearly unmistakable as the
control column is suddenly and abruptly pushed forward, which in itself initiates
recovery.
Note : The pushing action is equivalent to 40daN/88 lbs applied in 0.1 second and
it lasts as long as angle of attack exceeds the critical value.
CAUTION : Stall training excercices without stick pusher are prohibited.
STALL WITH ICE ACCRETION
Even with airframe de-- icers used according to procedure (i.e. as soon as and as long as
ice accretion develops on airframe), the leading edges cannot be completely cleared of
ice accretion because of existence of unprotected elements on the leading edges and
continued accretion between two consecutive boots cycles.
This residual ice on leading edges changes noticeably the characteristics of flight
BELOW the minimum operating speeds defined for ice accretion, as follows :
- Control effectiveness remains good, but forces to manoeuver in roll and to a lesser
degree in pitch, may increase somewhat.
- Above the reduced angle of attack :
. An aerodynamic buffeting may be felt which will increase with the amount of ice
accumulated and angle of attack increase.
. Stability may be slightly affected in roll, but stick pusher should prevent angle of
attack increase before wing rocking tend to develop (Refer to FCOM 1.02.30 for
stall alarm threshold definition).
Recovery of stall in such conditions must be started as soon as stall warning is
activated or buffeting and/or beginning of lateral instability and/or sudden roll off is
perceived.
Recovery will be best accomplished by :
- A pilot push on the wheel as necessary to regain control.
- Selection of flaps 15.
- Increase in power, up to MCT if needed.
Mod 5948
2.02.12

P4
001
APR 11
AA
APPROACH
- The deceleration capabilities of the ATR 72 provide a good operational
advantage which should be used extensively: decelerated approaches reduce noise,
minimize time and fuel burn and allow better integration in big airports. This is why
they have been described as the standard approaches in section 2.02.10 (flight
patterns).
- Initial approach speed will vary with ATC constrainsts and turbulence, but may be up
to 240 Kts.
- Initial approach speed may be maintained on a typical 3 glide slope down to the
following height above runway:
NP
DECELARATION HEIGHT
82 %
(IAS x 10) ft
Configuration changes should be made at VLE VFE when decelerating. This procedure
allows to reach VAPP speed at 500 ft above runway.
Note : If deceleration rate on approach appears unsufficient, it is always possible to
increase it by setting NPs on 100 OVRD, but at the expense of an increased
interior noise.
R STEEP SLOPE APPROACH
R Refer to 3.11.17
Mod 5948
2.02.12

P5
001
APR 11
AA
LANDING
In order to minimize landing distance variations the following procedure is
recommended :
D Maintain standard final approach slope (3) and final VAPP until 20 ft is called on
radioaltimeter.
D At 20ft call by PM, reduce to FI and flare visually as required.
Note : 20 ft leaves ample time for flare control from a standard 3 final slope.
- During this flare the airspeed will necessary decrease, leading to a touch down
speed of 5 to 10 kt lower than the stabilized approach speed.
D As soon as main landing gear is on ground.
- Control nose wheel impact
- Both PL : GI
- Both LO PITCH labels: check illuminated green.
CAUTION : If a thrust dissymetry occurs or if one NO REV red reverse video label
on EWD is illuminated, the use of any reverser is not allowed.
In this case the propeller pitch change mechanism is probably locked
at a positive blade angle, leading to a positive thrust for any PL
position.
- use feet brakes as required
- as speed reduces, and not later than about 40 kt (estimated) Capt takes NWS
control, co-- pilot hold control column fully forward.
Notes : 1. Max reverse is usable down to full stop if required, but to minimize flight
control shaking due to reverse operation at high powers, it is helpful to
release slowly PL back to GI when reaching low ground speeds (below
40 kt estimated).
2. Max braking is usable without restriction down to full stop, whatever the
runway conditions may be, provided ANTISKID is operative.
3. The tail bumper (with damping capabilities) effectively protect the tail in case
of excessive attitude (resulting from prolonged/floating flares) provided the
rate of sink at touchdown does not exceed 5 ft/sec.
4. In case of a significant bounce, a go around must be initiated.
Mod 5948
2.02.14

FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS
AHRS
P1
001
APR 11
AA
AHRS
AHRS alignment sequence takes place as soon as the battery is switched ON, and it takes
nominally 1 MINUTES DURING WHICH AIRCRAFT MUST NOT BE MOVED (on
ground).
AHRS are normally not affected by electrical transients asociated with engine start.
Note : during AHRS alignment, the alert AHRS NOT ALIGN is dispalyed on FWS, and
AHRS DEGRADED is diplayed on the corresponding PFD.
ON GROUND ONLY, if needed, AHRS reset may be performed by cycling all relevant C/B
OFF-- ON.
CAUTION : resetting AHRS C/B in flight is not recommended as in flight realignment
requires 1 minutes and 30 seconds of very stable flight (which may be
impossible to get in turbulences) and possibility of pulling the wrong C/B
could lead to complete AHRS failure unrecoverable for the rest of the flight.
CAUTION : Pilots must be aware of possible induced attitudes and heading errors in case
of continuous turns, specially in high latitudes countries; therefore racetrack
holding patterns are to be flown rather than circles.
Mod : 5948
2.02.14

FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS
WEATHER RADAR
P2
001
APR 11
AA
WEATHER RADAR
THe weather radar radiates power when operating in any mode other than STBY. Use of
weather radar on ground in a mode other than STBY requires special care :
- make certain that no personnel is working in front of aircraft within a sector of 3 meters
radius and 130_ left or right of the aircraft axis.
- direct aircraft nose so that no large size metal object (hangar, aircraft ...) is located
within a 30 meters radius.
- avoid operating radar during refueling operation of radiating aircraft or any other
aircraft within a 30 meters radius.
Mod : 5948
2.02.15

P1
TCAS
001
APR 11
AA
TCAS
GENERAL
TCAS is an airborne Traffic alert and Collision Avoidance System that interrogates ATC
transponders in nearby aircraft and generates appropriate aural and visual advisories to
the flight crew to provide adequate separation.
Air to Air communications for coordinating maneuvers between TCAS equipped aircraft is
provided by mode S ATC transponder.
Note 1 : TCAS system can only generate resolution advisories for intruders equipped
with operative mode S or mode C transponders (providing valid intruders
altitude information).
Note 2 : Traffic advisories can only be generated for intruders equipped with operative
mode S, C or A transponders (TCAS system provides no indication of aircraft
without operative transponders).
CAUTION
The TCAS equipment
q p
is viewed as a supplement
pp
to the pilot
p who,, with the aid of
the Air Traffic Control, has the primary responsability for avoiding mid-- air collisions.
START UP AND TEST
TRAFFIC display on ND:
- On MCP press ND.
- On VCP select ND OVLY tab, then select TRAFFIC NORM
TCAS/ XPDR mode selection:
- On MCP press SURV, select TCAS tab and select STBY mode
- Select XPDR tab and select STBY mode
To launch TCAS/XPDR Test :
- Through MCDU, launch TCAS/XPDR self test and check proper aural message and
visual display.
GROUND OPERATION
TCAS test should be carried out during cockpit preparation.
Unless otherwise instructed by ATC:
- on MCP press SURV, select XPDR tab on VCP, set ALT mode and check
XPDR1 selected; then on MCP press SURV, select TCAS tab and select AUTO
mode. On PFD / TCAS status indication, green message TCAS ABOVE is displayed .
On PFD / TTransponder status indication, green message XPDR1(2) ALT is
displayed
Mod : 5948
2.02.15

P2
TCAS
001
APR 11
AA
TCAS (CONTD)
FLIGHT PROCEDURES
Procedure is initiated by a TCAS Traffic Advisory : TA.
TRAFFIC - TRAFFIC
CPT
- Decide task sharing and announce : TCAS, I (you) have the controls..
PF
- Be minded for maneuver. Follow traffic evolution on the TCAS indicator.
PM
- Recall minimum safety altitude. Try to visually acquire the intruding aircraft.
Then may occur a Resolution Advisory : RA. Some RA will only advise to monitor vertical
speed (preventive RA). Others will advise to maneuver the aircraft.
The following procedures should then apply :
Sense of Resolution Advisory asking to maneuver
DESCEND
CLIMB
CPT
- Confirm We descend..
PF
- Disconnect Auto Pilot

PM - Select proper rating on PWR MGT
- Descent at a rate in the green
rotary selector (MCT en route or TO in
(fly to) band on PFD vertical.
other phases e.g. take off, approach
speed scale
and landing)
- Ask for eventual configuration
changes.
PF - Disconnect Auto Pilot
Advise ATC
- Apply roughly the bugged power
- Monitor IAS compared to VLE,
- Climb at a rate in the green (fly to)
VFE, VMO pointer
band on PFD vertical speed scale.
- Monitor Aircraft altitude
- Ask for eventual configuration
compared to minimum
changes.
safety altitude.
PM - Adjust power to TQ objectives
- Advise ATC
- Monitor IAS compared VS.
PM -
CPT - Confirm We climb..
Note : When a climb or increase climb RA occurs with the airplane in the landing
configuration or in the go - around phase, a normal go - around procedure
should be followed including the appropriate power increase and
configuration changes.
After separation has become adequate (range increasing), TCAS will issue following RA.
CLEAR OF CONFLICT
Return promptly to last assigned ATC clearance.
Mod : 5948
2.02.16

P1
TAWS
001
APR 11
AA
GPWS WARNING
Note : When flying under daylight VMC conditions, should a warning threshold be
deliberately exceeded or encountered due to known specific terrain at certain
locations, the warning may be regarded as cautionary and the approach may be
continued
A go around shall be initiated in case warning cause cannot be identified
immediately.
J
TERRAIN - PULL UP
- POWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . GO AROUND
- A/P . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . OFF
F When flight path is safe and caution/ warning cease :
Decrease pitch attitude and accelerate.
F When speed above minimum required and V/S positive :
Clean up aircraft as necessary.
J SINK RATE
Adjust pitch attitude and power to silence the warning.
J DONT SINK
Adjust pitch attitude and power to maintain level or climbing flight.
J TOO LOW GEAR - TOO LOW FLAPS :
Perform a go around.
J GLIDE SLOPE
- Establish the airplane on the glide slope.
J BANK ANGLE
- Ajust roll attitude to silence the warning,
Mod 5948
2.02.16

P2
TAWS
001
APR 11
AA
PREDICTIVE WARNINGS
OBSTACLE AHEAD
Verify the aeroplane flight path, correct it if required, if in doubt,

perform a climb until the caution alert ceases.
J TERRAIN AHEAD, PULL UP
Verify the aeroplane flight path and correct it if required, if in doubt,
perform a climb until the caution alert ceases.
J AVOID TERRAIN
Immediately initiate a climb and then, based on any available information but
preferably external visual reference. continue to maneuver until warning ceases.
Mod 5948
2.02.18

P1
FMS
AA
Refer to Thales FMS 220 user Guide.
Mod : 5948
001
APR 11
2.02.19

P1
HIGH LATITUDES OPERATIONS
001
APR 11
AA
CONDITIONS
Anomalous heading errors may occur on aircraft equipped with the SAGEM APIRS
AHRS during high latitude operations, where the earths magnetic lines of force have
inclinations of greater than 75 degrees.
PROCEDURES
- Take special care to keep the slip indicator centered in order to minimize heading
errors.
- Crosscheck AHRS heading information with GPS/GNSS.
- Continous turn of more than 360_ must be avoided; for holding, it is recommended to
fly racetrack patterns with straight flight legs of at least one minute between the U
turns.
Mod 5948
2.02.20

P1
OPERATIONS BELOW --35_C GROUND TEMPERATURE
001
APR 11
AA
Operating the aircraft at ground temperatures below - 35_C requires modification of

certain instructions or procedures beyond the scope of the cold weather operations
chapter of this manual (2.02.08 page 16) :
GENERAL
S Preheating of engines and flight deck is required.
S Taxying must be achieved with both engines operating.
S Propeller brake (if applicable) must not be engaged after the last flight of the day or for
prolonged stops.
S Aileron gust lock system(If applicable) must not be used in extreme cold temperature
condition.Associated breakers (FLT CTL/ GUST LOCK AIL 10CE) to be pulled and
tagged.
S The first operation of any system using hydraulic fluid may be slower than normal.
S It is recommended to use the HOTEL mode (if applicable) for short turnarounds.
S Passenger, service and cargo doors should not be opened unnecessarily.
HOTEL MODE (If applicable)
2,900 PSI blue hydraulic pressure is required to engage or to release the propeller brake.
Therefore it may be necessary either to connect an AC GPU or to start up and unfeather
the left engine prior to operate the propeller brake.
START UP
S During start of the second engine, the X START FAIL system may fail. Therefore the DC
GPU must be kept connected until both engines have been started.
S CL should be advanced to FTR between 15 and 20% NH instead of the usual 10% value.
S Oil pressure indication raising time is considerably increased : OIL LO PR red warning
may be activated for three minutes. During this period the engine must be maintained at
IDLE condition.
TAKE OFF
Oil temperature must be over 0_C before TO power is applied.
Mod : 5948
2.02.21

MPC
MULTI PURPOSE COMPUTER
P1
001
APR 11
AA
CONTENT
1-- APM FUNCTION LIMITATIONS/PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1 - LIMITATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.1.1 - OPERATIONS AND TECHNIQUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.1.1.1 - APM PRINCIPLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.1.1.2 - APM INTERFACES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.1.1.3 - APM TEST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.1.2 - NORMAL PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.1.2.1 - WEIGHT SELECTION AND COMPUTATION . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.1.2.2 - CRUISE SPEED LOW PROCEDURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.1.3 - EMERGENCY PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.1.4 - ABNORMAL AND FOLLOWING FAILURES PROCEDURES . . . .
1.1.4.1 - APM FAULT PROCEDURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.1.4.2 - DEGRADED PERF PROCEDURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.1.4.3 - INCREASE SPEED PROCEDURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2
2
2
3
4
5
5
6
6
6
6
7
7
1.2 - FLIGHT TIME MANAGEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

2 - DMU PART . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Mod 5948
2.02.21

MPC
P2
001
APR 11
AA
1 - APM FUNCTION LIMITATIONS/PROCEDURES

1.1 - LIMITATIONS
APM does not induce any specific limitation.
1.1.1 - OPERATIONS AND TECHNIQUES
1.1.1.1 - APM principle
The APM analysis is performed when the aircraft is in icing conditions: the ICING
AOA is illuminated and/or if the airframe de-- icing is selected ON and/or if ice
accretion has been detected at least once during the flight.
The APM analysis principle is to compare the aircraft theoretical drag with an
in-- flight drag computed with measured parameters available.
Measured parameters used by the APM are acquired each second and are
smoothed over a rolling average of 30 seconds to limit noise and error
measurements. Then, the drag is calculated over a rolling average of 60 seconds.
This means that the drag analysis alert would start after at least 90 seconds of
parameter acquisition.
The drag analysis starts as soon as the aircraft enters in icing conditions with
landing gears and flaps retracted. The APM analysis will only be done with both
engines operating.
A cruise speed monitoring will also be conducted by comparing the measured IAS to
the theoretical maximum cruise IASth.
Different alarm messages will be delivered to the crew depending on the drag
difference between computed drag and theoretical drag, and the speed difference
between measured IAS and theoretical IASth.
The alarm messages will not be delivered if the static air temperature is above 10
degrees Celsius.
Mod 5948
2.02.21

MPC
AA
1 - APM FUNCTION LIMITATIONS/PROCEDURES (contd)

1.1.1.2. - APM Interfaces
Mod 5948
P3
001
APR 11
2.02.21

MPC
P4
001
APR 11
AA

1.1.1.3 - APM test
The APM test is activated by the crew daily, to check if all the APM components
works properly.
When the crew activated APM test and if the discrete APM ON/OFF is ON
The following test sequence shall be broadcasted to CAC1/CAC2:
APM Aircrat Test
Cruise Speed Low (CSL)
Degraded Perf (DP)
Increase Speed (IS)
APM Fault
FDR Fail
FDAU Fail
Cruise Speed Low alarm is activated 1 second after activation of the APM Test
Then Degraded Perf alarm is activated 1 second after activation of Cruise Speed
Low alarm.
The other alarms are activated following the diagram here above.
All discrete outputs shall come back to inactive state when APM Aircraft Test is
deactivated.
Mod 5948
2.02.21

MPC
P5
001
APR 11
AA

1.1.2 - NORMAL PROCEDURES
1.1.2.1 - Weight Selection and Computation
Selection
To determine the aircraft theoretical and in-- flight performances the aircraft weight
must be known.
On ground just before flight and as soon as the crew has computed the gross weight
on the load sheet, the crew must enter the corresponding weight in FMS
corresponding data sheet through the MCDU.
This parameter is available as Gross weight parameter from two different sources
DU2/FMS1 and DU4/FMS2. Until take off, the Gross weight is continuously
acquired.
- if TOW1 (from FMS1) is valid, it shall be selected.
- If TOW1 is invalid, then TOW2 (from FMS2) shall be selected if valid.
Computation
If the crew doesnt select the take off weight before take off, then the APM shall
perform a take off weight computation at the beginning of the flight. This
computation is performed during the first minutes of the flight and before the APM
starts the drag analysis.
The actual weight is then updated in flight by internal computation.
Mod 5948
2.02.21

MPC
P6
001
APR 11
AA

1.1.2.2 - CRUISE SPEED LOW PROCEDURE
CRUISE SPEED LOW on FMA
- Appears in cruise only, to inform the crew that an abnormal drag increase induces
a speed decrease of more than 10kt compared with the expected speed.
ICING CONDITIONS and SPEED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MONITOR
1.1.3 - EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
No specific Emergency Procedures linked to APM detection.
1.1.4 - ABNORMAL AND FOLLOWING FAILURE PROCEDURES
1.1.4.1 - APM FAULT PROCEDURE
The APM Fault light function is to inform the crew that there is a problem in the APM
computation, either in the MPC or in the aircraft wiring:
The Fault can be triggered by MPC in the following conditions:
- Invalid aircraft configuration,
- Unable to retrieve input APM parameter,
- MPC internal failure,
- TOW estimation failed.
In case of APM Fault light illumination, the crew has to select the APM OFF by
pushing on the Fault light button.
Note: As APM computation is not operative on Ground, the APM Fault is inhibited by
the computer on Ground.
Mod 5948
2.02.21

MPC
P7
001
APR 11
AA

1.1.4.2 - DEGRADED PERF PROCEDURE
DEGRADED PERF amber message on EWD with CAUTION light and Single Chime
and on FMA.
- Mainly appears in level flight after CRUISE SPEED LOW or in climb to inform the
crew that an abnormal drag increase induces a speed decrease or a loss of rate of
climb.
- The most probable reason is an abnormal ice accretion
AIRFRAME DE-- ICING ON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CHECK
IAS > ICING BUG + 10 KT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MONITOR
AP (if engaged) . . . . . . FIRMLY HOLD CONTROL WHEEL and DISENGAGE
H SEVERE ICING Conditions confirmed
(unexpected decrease in speed or rate of climb, visual cues)
Or
H Impossibility to maintain IAS > ICING BUG + 10 KT in level flight
Or
H Abnormal aircraft handling feeling
SEVERE ICING procedure (2.04.05) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . APPLY
H If not
SCHEDULED FLIGHT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CONTINUE
ICING CONDITIONS and SPEED. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MONITOR
1.1.4.3 - INCREASE SPEED PROCEDURE
INCREASE SPEED light illuminated flashing with CAUTION on EWD and on FMA
and Single Chime.
- Appears after DEGRADED PERF to inform the crew that the drag is abnormally
high and IAS is lower than ICING BUG + 10 KT
H If abnormal conditions confirmed
IMMEDIATELY PUSH THE STICK TO INCREASE SPEED
TO RECOVER MINIMUM IAS = ICING BUG + 10 KT
SEVERE ICING procedure (2.04.05) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . APPLY
Mod 5948
2.02.21

MPC
P8
001
APR 11
AA
1.2 - FLIGHT TIME MANAGEMENT

The FDAU computes the flight time, computation starts with detection of ground/air
condition (confirmation > 1sec) and stops with detection of air/ground condition
(confirmation > 10sec).
The current Flight Number is initialized automatically from AVIONICS system (FMS1 and
FMS2) if available, otherwise manually from MCDU menu (through ACMS /MPC /INIT
TIME and FLIGHT NUMBER).
The following priority order is as follows:
(1) Initialization from FMS1,
(2) Initialization from FMS2,
(3) Initialization from DMU using parameters initialized with MCDU,
(4) Initialization with last Flight Number or null if never defined.
Mod 5948
2.02.21

MPC
P9
001
APR 11
AA
2 - DMU (DATA MANAGEMENT UNIT) PART

The DMU system is dedicated to the aircraft maintenance.
The DMU has been designed to allow the user to customize the system according to his
specific application, requirements, operating environment and logistics. Programming
capabilities are provided, to allow modification of monitoring functions or implementation
of additional monitoring functions.
Mod 5948
2.02.22

ACARS
Aircraft Communication Addressing and Reporting System
P1
100
APR 11
AA
CONTENT
1 - GENERAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2 - LIMITATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3 - DESCRIPTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1 - SYSTEM DESCRIPTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2 - FUNCTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4 - OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.1 - COMMON FEATURES FOR USE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.2 - DEPARTURE CLEARANCE DCL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3 - DIGITAL ATIS D-- ATIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6
6
6
7
5 - ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Mod : 5948 and 5959
2.02.22

ACARS
AA
LEFT INTENTIONALY BLANK
Mod : 5948 and 5959
P2
100
APR 11
2.02.22

ACARS
P3
100
APR 11
AA
1- GENERAL
The ACARS system is optional.
It may be customized by the operator to meet their requirements.
This chapter provides a generic description of system.
Refer to Collins Operators Guide for detailed description of all features.
The ACARS (Aircraft Communication Addressing and Reporting System) is a data link
system which enables exchange of data between an aircraft and a ground based station
over an ARINC or SITA network.
2- LIMITATIONS
ACARS is approved as a non essential system for the transmission of Departure
Clearance (DCL) and Digital Automatic Terminal Information Service (D-- ATIS) in
accordance with ED-- 85 and ED-- 89A.
This approval does not constitute an operational approval. DCL and D-- ATIS messages
can be transmitted and received over ACARS if they are verified per approved
operational procedures.
Terminal Weather Information for Pilots (TWIP) and Oceanic Clearance (OCL)
functions are not certified and must not be used for flight management.
Mod : 5948 and 5959
2.02.22

ACARS
P4
100
APR 11
AA
3- DESCRIPTION
The ACARS system is optional.
It may be customized by the operator to meet their requirements.
This chapter provides a generic description of system.
Refer to Collins Operators Guide for detailed description of all features.
3- 1 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The airborne ACARS system consists of :
- a CMU (Communication Management Unit) installed in one 80VU avionics shelf,
- Two MCDU (Multifunction Control Display Unit) installed on the pedestal ; the MCDU are
the main interface for preparing, sending downlink messages and reading uplink
messages; MCDUs are shared between FMS 1/2, RMS 1/2, MPC and ACARS.
- a printer for printing out, if necessary, messages received and displayed on MCDU,
- a VHF (VHF3); this VHF is dedicated to ACARS and cannot be used for voice
communications,
- two ACARS MSG attention getter lights which illuminates upon reception of ATS
messages,
- aircraft discretes for OOOI (Out of gate, take Off, a/c On ground, a/c In gate) information.
The system is interfaced with:
- MPC for engine parameters and Fuel On Board,
- GPS for position and time,
- ATC control panel for Flight Identification.
Mod : 5948 and 5959
2.02.22

ACARS
P5
100
APR 11
AA
3- DESCRIPTION (contd)
3- 2 SYSTEM FUNCTIONS
The ACARS system main pages are the following:
- AOC STD (Airline Operation Control Standard) pages : these pages are identified by
DL in page header; they give access to predefined report pages and free text page.
- ATS (Air Traffic Services) pages : these pages are identified by ATS in page header;
ATS Departure Clearances and D-- ATIS are available in ATS MENU page.
- TECHNICAL pages : these pages are used for system initialisation and identified by
ACARS in header.
All functions are detailled in Collins Operators Guide.
Mod : 5948 and 5959
2.02.22

ACARS
P6
100
APR 11
AA
4- OPERATIONS
4- 1 COMMON FEATURES FOR USE
The Departure Clearance and D-- ATIS requests are to be prepared on MCDU in relevant
ATS pages.
In case of loss of data link capability, usual voice procedures will be used.
When the crew is notified that there is no link with the ground station, NOCOMM
message, or in case of system failure, he must revert to voice procedures.
Upon illumination of ACARS MSG attention getter lights, the crew should check
messages on MCDUs.
The crew may have to send a new request or revert to voice procedures as required by
ATS.
4- 2 DEPARTURE CLEARANCE DCL
This service provides pilot with a data link departure clearance (DCL) within the scope
of preset operational procedures.
The DCL service should be initiated by the aircrew between 10 min and 3 min (or
otherwise specified) before the clearance is needed.
If DCL is not completed 3 min (or otherwise specified) before departure, the crew must
revert to voice procedure.
The Reclearance capability must not be performed by the DCL service. In the event of
datalink reclearance being received, the Aircrew must ignore it and must revert to voice
procedures.
If the Aircrew is not able to accept the operational contents of the DCL message, he
must revert to voice procedures otherwise he must send the Clearance Echoback
message.
A negative message may be sent back; in that case, the crew has to revert to voice
procedure.
Message content consistency
The aircrew before take-- off must check the consistency of the SID delivered in the
DCL message with departure runway and flight plan information. He must revert to
voice procedures in case of inconsistency.
Departure Clearance frequency has to be monitored in case a voice DCL back-- up
procedure is necessary.
All Departure Clearance delivered by voice supersede any datalink Departure
Clearance message.
Mod : 5948 and 5959
2.02.22

ACARS
P7
100
APR 11
AA
4- OPERATIONS (contd)
4- 3 DIGITAL ATIS D- ATIS
Where a D-- ATIS is available, it supplements the existing Voice-- ATIS, the information
are identical in both content and format and are updated simultaneously.
The crew, after sending an ATIS request, must complete the ATIS service (reception)
within 4 minutes or otherwise indicated.
Otherwise, the crew must resubmit his ATIS request or revert to voice procedures.
The crew must acknowledge receipt of the D-- ATIS answer at contact with ATC.
For the crew, the voice procedures will be the back up of the D-- ATIS service.
Message content consistency
The crew must cross check the global consistency between D-- ATIS information
parameters.
In particular, the crew must check the name of the ATC airfield in the D-- ATIS request
and in the ATIS message received
The crew must check that radio communication and radio navigation means
frequencies required by D-- ATIS are operational.
The following data must be cross-- checked with Voice-- ATIS:
- bird presence and presence of artificial obstacle on selected runway,
- meteorological and wind data for landing,
- type of approach,
- active runway,
- dew point temperature,
- altimeter setting.
Mod : 5948 and 5959
2.02.22

ACARS
P8

AA
LIST OF SPECIFIC ABBREVIATIONS (see also 0.50.00) :

ACARS
AOC STD
ARINC
(D-- )ATIS
ATC
ATS
CMU
DCL
FMS
GPS
MCDU
MPC
OCL
OOOI
SID
TWIP
Mod : 5948 and 5959

Airline Operation Control Standard
Aeronautical Radio Inc
(Digital-- ) Automatic Terminal Information Service
Air Traffic Control
Air Traffic Services
Communication Management Unit
Departure Clearance
Flight Management System
Global Positioning System
Multifunction Control Display Unit
Multi-- Purpose Computer
Oceanic Clearance
Out of gate, Take Off, A/C O Ground, A/C In Gate
Standard Instrument Departure
Terminal Weather Information for Pilots
100
APR 11
2.02.24

DU
General Philosophy of use
P1
001
APR 11
AA
CONTENT
1 - NORMAL OPERATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2 - DEGRADED OPERATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3 - DISPATCH WITH ONE DU INOPERATIVE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3-- 1 - DISPATCH WITH DU 1 INOPERATIVE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4 - DUAL DC GEN LOSS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Mod 5948
2.02.24

DU
P2
001
APR 11
AA
1- GENERAL
ATR 600 instrument panel is fitted with five Display Units (DU), named DU 1 to 5 from
left to right.
Different formats may be displayed on these DU: PFD (Primary Flight Display), MFD
(Multi Function Display) or EWD (Engine and Warning Display); in MFD format, the
choice exists between different pages depending on the flight phase, such as ND
(Navigation Display), SD (System Display), PERF, or other options. In normal
operation, the configuration is the following:
DU 1 (5) is dedicated to CM1 (2) PFD;
DU 3 on central panel is dedicated to EWD;
DU 2 (4) is normally dedicated to CM 1 (2) MFD.
A DISPLAY push button is located on the CAPT (F/O) SWITCHING lateral console in
order to cycle the three formats on DU 2 (4). In case of DU 2 (4) failure, this button is
switching the DU 1 (5) format.
In most of the formats, the lower part of the MFD is dedicated to VCP.
On the VCP, VHF page should be selected by default, as it is the most frequently used
page.
Mod 5948
Mod 5948
2.02.24

DU
P3
001
APR 11
AA
2- DEGRADED OPERATION
In case of DU failure, the consequence will depend on the DU position and an automatic
reversion logic is implemented so as to immediately guarantee the safety of the flight;
the highest priority is given to PFD, and then to EWD.
Then the crew remains free to choose the configuration via the DISPLAY pushbuttons,
and the Captain will decide who is PF and PM according to failure assessment and
company policy.
DU2 or 4 failure is inducing the loss of the hosted FMS and RMS functions; there is no
operational impact as the remaining FMS and RMS are taking over.
Hereunder are presented the different failure cases, and the ATR recommended policy.
DU1 failure:
PFD is automatically displayed on DU2.
ATR recommends PF is CM1, and CM2 keeps a normal configuration with two DU (PFD
and MFD).
DU2 failure:
The automatic reversion has no effect; FMS1 and RMS1 are lost.
and MFD).
DU3 failure:
The automatic reversion depends on the coupling side selected on the FGCP (the
system takes the information of PF/PNF side via the FGCP coupling selection): there is
no change on the PF side, but the EWD is displayed in place of PNF MFD.
PF can be CM1 as well as CM2; both pilots may display EWD on DU 2 or 4, thanks to the
DISPLAY pushbuttons; in case EWD is not displayed on any DU and should a Warning
or Caution occure, there will be an automatic reversion of EWD on the PM side.
ATR recommends to keep EWD displayed on PF side most of the time, and PM keeps a
normal configuration with two DU (PFD and MFD). Thanks to the high quality of the DU,
EWD remains easily readable by PM in cross view.
Mod 5948
2.02.24

DU
P4
001
APR 11
AA
DU4 failure:
(Symmetrical to DU2 failure)
The automatic reversion has no effect; FMS2 and RMS2 are lost.
and MFD).
DU5 failure:
(Symmetrical to DU1 failure)
PFD is automatically displayed on DU4.
and MFD).
Mod 5948
2.02.24

DU
P5
001
APR 11
AA
3- DISPATCH WITH ONE DU INOPERATIVE

According to MMEL, one DU among DU1, DU3 and DU5 may be inoperative for
dispatch, but DU2 and 4 must be operative as they are hosting FMS and RMS functions.
However all DU have the same P/N and are interchangeable; if DU2 (4) is inoperative, a
maintenance action is required to swap with DU1 (5), and dispatch is then possible
(refer to MEL).
In case of a second DU failure, several cases have to be considered, and for each case,
several solutions are possible; hereafter are presented ATR recommendations with the
objectives of providing PF with the optimal displays to fly and navigate, and PM with the
displays to communicate and monitor systems.
3.1. Dispatch with DU 1 INOP.

PF is CM1 with PFD on DU2, and CM2 keeps a normal configuration with two DU (PFD
and MFD).
In case DU2 fails, the automatic reversion has no effect; FMS1 and RMS1 are lost.
CM2 becomes PF, and CM1 tunes COM and NAV via MCDU; he/she can still monitor
navigation and systems by cross-- view on DU4 with the recommended following
configuration: DU3: EWD / DU4: MFD / DU5: PFD.
In case DU3 fails, PFD remains on DU2, and EWD is automatically displayed on DU4
(PM side). PF remains CM1.
ATR recommends the following: DU2: PFD / DU4: MFD (cruise)-- EWD (approach)/
DU5: PFD.
The recommended configuration is the following: DU2: PFD / DU3: EWD / DU5: PFD.
PNF tunes COM and NAV via MCDU, and in VMC cruise PNF may occasionally switch
to MFD format.
In case DU5 fails, PFD is automatically displayed on DU4.
PM tunes COM and NAV via MCDU, and in VMC cruise PM may occasionally switch to
MFD format.
CAUTION : a full flexibility is offered for display selection on DU2 and DU4 via
both DISPLAY pushbuttons, and in case of DU1 and DU5 failure, the crew must
avoid any configuration without any PFD.
Mod 5948
2.02.24

DU
P6
001
APR 11
AA

PF can be CM1 as well as CM2; both pilots may display EWD on DU 2 or 4, thanks to the
DISPLAY pushbuttons; in case EWD is not displayed on any DU and should a Warning
or Caution occure, there will be an automatic reversion of EWD on the PM side (the
system takes the information of PF/PM side via the FGCP coupling selection).
ATR recommends to keep EWD displayed on PF side most of the time, and PM keeps a
normal configuration with two DU (PFD and MFD). Thanks to the high quality of the DU,
EWD remains easily readable by PM in cross view.
In case DU1 fails, PFD is automatically displayed on DU2 and EWD on DU4.
ATR recommends PF is CM1 and the following configuration: DU2: PFD / DU4: MFD
(cruise)-- EWD (approach)/ DU5: PFD.
In case DU2 fails, EWD is automatically displayed on DU4; FMS1 and RMS1 are lost.
In case DU4 fails, EWD is automatically displayed on DU2; FMS2 and RMS2 are lost.
In case DU5 fails, PFD is automatically displayed on DU4, and EWD on DU2.
Mod 5948
2.02.24

DU
P7
001
APR 11
AA

PF is CM2 with PFD on DU4, and CM1 keeps a normal configuration with two DU (PFD
and MFD).
In case DU1 fails, PFD is automatically displayed on DU2.
MFD format.
both DISPLAY pushbuttons, and in case of DU1 and DU5 failure, the crew must
avoid any configuration without any PFD.
MFD format.
In case DU3 fails, PFD remains on DU4, and EWD is automatically displayed on DU2
(PM side). PF remains CM2.
ATR recommends the following configuration: DU1: PFD / DU2: MFD (cruise)-- EWD
(approach)/ DU4: PFD.
PF must switch to CM1, and CM2 tunes COM and NAV via MCDU; he/she can still
monitor navigation and systems by cross-- view on DU2 with the recommended
following configuration: DU1: PFD / DU2: MFD / DU3: EWD.
Mod 5948
2.02.24

DU
P8
001
APR 11
AA
4- DUAL DC GEN LOSS

In case of dual DC GEN loss, only DU2 and DU4 are operative.
PFD is automatically displayed on PF side and EWD on PM side; CM2 must switch
AHRS and ADC to SYS 1 to recover a normal PFD format on DU4.
ATR recommends the following configuration:
both-- CM1 is PF and always keeps PFD on DU2; he/she monitors navigation on mini
bothboND;
both-- CM2 mainly uses DU4 in PFD format, and may temporarily switch to EWD and
bothboMFD ; he/she tunes VHF1 via VCP on MFD or MCDU1;
both - IESI is used for attitudes, IAS and altitude monitoring, and may be used to tune
bothbo VHF1 and V/ILS1; VOR, LOC and GLIDE deviations may also be displayed.
In case EWD is not displayed on any DU and should a Warning or Caution occure, there
will be an automatic reversion of EWD on PM side.
both DISPLAY pushbuttons, and the crew must avoid configuration without any
PFD.
Mod 5948

Atr 72 Procedures and Techniques

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Atr 72 Procedures and Techniques

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2.02.

PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES

HIGH LATITUDES OPERATIONS

MPC Multi Purpose Computer

ACARS Aircraft Communication Addressing and Reporting System (*)

VIDEO CABIN SYSTEM (*)

DU, General Philosophy of use

PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES

PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES

1 g stall speed for a specified configuration. It is a function of the

Speed at which rotation is initiated to reach V2 at 35 ft height.

Maximum speed for each flaps configuration

PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES

MINIMUM MANEUVER/OPERATING SPEEDS

Normal or icing conditions,

1.23 VSR and not less than

Note : Refer to 2.02.08 for icing conditions.

PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES

CONSERVATIVE MANEUVERING SPEEDS

PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES

PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES

PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES

PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES

PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES

Quick disconnect push buttons on each control wheel

Yaw Damper and consequently AP, may be disconnected by :

PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES

Note : Function of AP/YD are monitored on three axes.

PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES

RESUME CLIMB OR DESCENT

First, the new cleared altitude must be set on PFD.

PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES

Select V/ILS source (on FGCP) on coupled (CPL) side.

PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES

D NON PRECISION APPROACH

- Retract FLAPS one notch

Note : GO AROUND mode gives (as a FD mode only):

PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES

COURSE rotary selector

AP OFF warning (aural)

DC: BUS1 / BUS2 / EMER / STBY / ESS ;

PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES

Maximum demonstrated crosswind:

" TASK SHARING

NORMAL APPROACH AND LANDING SEQUENCE

PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES

PM has to perform the following task:

From capture to decision height

Glide slope capture

(!): Outer marker Check altitude on RA and altimeter,

- Set runway HDG

Request normal sequence for

Set LDG configuration in sequence

800 FT, DUAL CPL, NO STAR

Looks outside for visual references

DH / auto call-- out

(@): Stabilized means:

PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES

If visual references sufficient

If visual references insufficient, apply GO AROUND NORMAL procedure.

PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES

PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES

PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES

PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES