FABIAN VS DESIERTO, AGUSTIN EN BANC

G.R. No. 129742. September 16, 1998 [Express Limitations to Power of Legislation;
Appellate Jurisdiction of the Court]
FACTS:
PROMAT participated in the bidding for government construction project including
those under the FMED. Later, misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed
between the parties. Fabian tried to terminate their relationship but Agustin refused
and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment,
intimidation and threats. She eventually filed the aforementioned administrative
case against him in a letter-complaint dated July 24, 1995.
A complaint sought the dismissal of Agustin for violation of Section 19, R.A. No.
6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) and Section 36 of P.D. No. 807 (Civil Service
Decree), with an ancillary prayer for his preventive suspension. The case later led to
an appeal to the Ombudsman - who inhibited himself - and transferred the case to
the Deputy Ombudsman. The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and in the order
exonerated the private respondents from the administrative charges.
Fabian elevated the case to the SC, arguing that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
(Ombudsman Act of 1989) that all administrative disciplinary cases, orders,
directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the
Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of
the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for
reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court.
RULING:
No. Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this
Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary
cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the
Constitution against a law which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of this Court.
No countervailing argument has been cogently presented to justify such disregard
of the constitutional prohibition which, as correctly explained in First Leparto
Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, et al. was intended to give this Court a
measure of control over cases placed under its appellate Jurisdiction. Otherwise, the
indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would
unnecessarily burden the Court.
KUIZON v. DESIERTO
March 9, 2001 | Puno, J. | Limitations on the rule-making power of the Supreme
Court
Digester: Venturanza, Maria
SUMMARY: Three complaints were filed in the Office of the Ombudsman against
Mayor Benedicto Kuizon. In a memorandum, the Office of Chief Legal Counsel
recommended the continued prosecution of the accused, which the Ombudsman
subsequently approved. Kuizon filed a petition in the CA assailing the approval of
the Ombudsman. CA dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, which the SC
upheld, citing the doctrine enunciated in Fabian.
DOCTRINE: The appellate courts jurisdiction extends only to decisions of the Office
of the Ombudsman in administrative cases. Petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, when resorted to as a remedy for judicial review, must be filed in
the Supreme Court.
FACTS:

Melanio Saporas filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas

(OMB-Visayas) against petitioner Benedicto Kuizon, the incumbent Municipal
Mayor of Bato (Leyte) for Nepotism, which was later dropped, and Malversation
Thru Falsification of Public Documents. Attached to the complaint is an affidavit
of Zacarias Kuizon, who claimed that after the petitioner dispensed with his
service as a laborer, somebody forged his signature in the payroll and took his
salary amounting to P890.00. Later, Rosalina Tolibas, the Paymaster, and Joselito
Daan, the Timekeeper, were included in the complaint.
Saporas submitted a second complaint using the affidavits of Ceferino Cedejana
and Concordio Cedejana, who both made similar allegations to that of Zacarias
Kuizons claim.
Saporas filed a third Affidavit-Complaint for Malversation of Public Funds Thru
Falsification of Public Documents and violation of R.A. No. 3019 against
petitioners and three others for alleged connivance in including in the payrolls
names of workers whose services were already terminated.
The OMB-Visayas issued a Resolution finding sufficient grounds to hold
petitioners for trial for Malversation of Public Funds and Falsification of Public
Documents. All cases were consolidated.
17 May 1999: The Office of the Chief Legal Counsel recommended that the
continued prosecution of all the accused, there being no cogent grounds to
warrant a reversal of the finding of probable cause by OMB-Visayas. Respondent
Ombudsman Aniano Desierto approved the memorandum. Thereafter,
Sandiganbayan set the criminal cases for hearing.
Petitioner Daan filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Motion for
Reinvestigation and to Defer Arraignment. However, the motion was denied by
the Sandiganbayan and petitioners were arraigned on the same date, where
they all pleaded not guilty.
Thereafter, petitioners filed a petition before the CA assailing the approval by the
respondent Desierto of the Memorandum dated 17 May 1999. The CA
promulgated a Resolution, dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction, and
using Fabian v. Desierto as basis.
Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court at the SC.
RULING: Petition dismissed and the Sandiganbayan is ordered to continue with the
trial of the cases at bat with dispatch.
WoN the CAs dismissal of the petition was valid YES.
In the Fabian case, the Court ruled that appeals from the decision of the Office of
the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the CA
under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Where an original action for
certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to as a remedy for judicial review, such as
from an incident in a criminal action, the petition should be filed with the SC.
Thus, the instant petition should have been filed with the SC.
Following this, the instant petition was filed late. A petition for certiorari should
be filed not later than 60 days from notice of judgment, order or resolution
sought to be assailed. The present petition was filed beyond this period. The
erroneous filing of the petition with the CA did not toll the running of the period.
WoN respondent Desierto gravely abused his discretion when he simply approved
the recommendation of the Legal Counsel recommending the filing of informations
in court NO.
What is involved is merely a review and affirmation by the respondent
Ombudsman of the findings made by the investigating prosecutor. He is not
conducting anew another investigation, but is merely determining the propriety
and correctness of the recommendations given by the investigating prosecutor,
that is, whether probable cause actually exists or not, on the basis of the finding
of the latter.

It is thus discretionary upon the Ombudsman if he will rely mainly on the findings
of fact of the investigating prosecutor, or make his own findings of fact.
In case of conflict between the conclusions of the Ombudsman and the special
prosecutor, the formers decision shall prevail since the latter is under the
supervision and control of the Ombudsman.
MANUEL BAVIERA, petitioner, vs.ROLANDO B. ZOLETA, in his capacity as Graft
Investigation and Prosecution Officer II; MARY SUSAN S. GUILLERMO, in her
capacity as Director, Preliminary Investigation and Administrative Adjudication
Bureau-B; PELAGIO S. APOSTOL, in his capacity as Assistant Ombudsman, PAMO;
ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, in his capacity as Assistant Ombudsman for the Military
and Other Law Enforcement Offices; and MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ (Then)
Undersecretary, Department of Justice, respondents.
G.R. No. 169098
October 12, 2006
FACTS: Manuel V. Baviera filed several complaints against officers or directors of
the Standard Chartered Bank (SCB), Philippine Branch, including Sridhar Raman,
an Indian national who was the Chief Finance Officer of the bank, as respondents
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
(BSP), Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), and the Department of Justice (DOJ). Baviera claimed that
he was a former employee of the bank, and at the same time, an investor who
was victimized by the officers or directors of SCB, all of whom conspired with one
another in defrauding him as well as the investing public by soliciting funds in
unregistered and unauthorized foreign stocks and securities.

On September 18, 2003, Baviera requested the Secretary of Justice for the
issuance of a Hold Departure Order (HDO) against some of the officers and
directors of SCB, including Raman. Said HDO was granted by the DOJ.
Meanwhile, Secretary Datumanong went to Vienna, Austria, to attend a
conference. Undersecretary Merceditas Navarro-Gutierrez was designated as
Acting Secretary of the DOJ. When Raman arrived at the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA) for his trip to Singapore, he was apprehended by BI
agents and NAIA officials based on the HDO of the Secretary of Justice. However,
the next day, September 29, 2003, Raman was able to leave the country. It
turned out that Acting Secretary of Justice Merceditas N. Gutierrez had verbally
allowed the departure of Raman. On the same day, Raman wrote Secretary
Datumanong for the lifting of the HDO. Acting Secretary Gutierrez issued an
Order allowing Raman to leave the country. In said Order, she stated that the
Chief State Prosecutor had indicated that he interposed no objection to the
travel of Raman to Singapore. Baviera then filed a Complaint-Affidavit with the
Office of the Ombudsman charging Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez
for violation of Section 3(a), (e), and (j) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019, as
amended. This was dismissed by the Ombudsman for insufficiency of evidence.
Baviera filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied for lack of merit.
Baviera then filed a petition for certiorari under rule 65 in the CA. However, the
CA issued a Resolution dismissing the petition on the ground that the proper
remedy was to file a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, conformably with the ruling of this Court in Enemecio v.
Office of the Ombudsman. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, insisting
that his petition for certiorari in the CA under Rule 65 was in accordance with the
ruling in Fabian v. Desierto. He insisted that the Office of the Ombudsman is a
quasi-judicial agency of the government, and under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129,
the CA has concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court over a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. He asserted that the filing of his
petition for certiorari with the CA conformed to the established judicial policy of
hierarchy of courts as explained by this Court in People v. Cuaresma.
CA issued a Resolution denying the motion, holding that the ruling in Fabian v.
Desierto is not applicable, as it applies only in appeals from resolutions of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. The remedy of the aggrieved
party from resolutions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases is to file a petition for
certiorari in this Court, and not in the CA.

Baviera then filed with the SC a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
assailing, among others, that the CA seriously erred in not taking cognizant of
the petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner in the CA was the
proper remedy to assail the resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman.
HELD: No. In 1999, the SC ruled in Tirol, Jr. v. Del Rosario that the remedy of the
aggrieved party from a resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman finding the
presence or absence of probable cause in criminal cases was to file a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 in the SC. The Court reiterated its ruling in Kuizon v.
Desierto and Tirol, Jr. v. Del Rosario. And on February 22, 2006, in Pontejos v.
Office of the Ombudsman, the Court ruled that the remedy to challenge the
Resolution of the Ombudsman at the conclusion of a preliminary investigation
was to file a petition for certiorari in this Court under Rule 65.
In Estrada v. Desierto, the Court rejected the contention of petitioner therein that
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the Order/Resolution of the OMB in
criminal cases should be filed in the CA, conformably with the principle of
hierarchy of courts. The Court explained that the appellate courts jurisdiction
extends only to decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
cases. In the Fabian case, SC ruled that appeals from decisions of the Office of
the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the
Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Kuizon and
the subsequent case of Mendoza-Arce v. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas)
drove home the point that the remedy of aggrieved parties from resolutions of
the Office of the Ombudsman finding probable cause in criminal cases or nonadministrative cases, when tainted with grave abuse of discretion, is to file an
original action for certiorari with SC and not with the Court of Appeals. In cases
when the aggrieved party is questioning the Office of the Ombudsmans finding
of lack of probable cause, as in this case, there is likewise the remedy of
certiorari under Rule 65 to be filed with this Court and not with the Court of
Appeals following SC ruling in Perez v. Office of the Ombudsman.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE

OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) AND JEJOMAR
ERWIN S. BINAY, JR., Respondents.
Facts:
A complaint/affidavit was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and Nicolas "Ching"
Enciso VI before the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other
public officers and employees of the City Government of Makati (Binay, Jr., et
al), accusing them of Plunder11 and violation of Republic Act No. (RA)
3019,12 otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," in
connection with the five (5) phases of the procurement and construction of
the Makati City Hall Parking Building (Makati Parking Building).
The Ombudsman constituted a Special Panel of Investigators 14 to conduct a
fact-finding investigation, submit an investigation report, and file the
necessary complaint, if warranted (1st Special Panel). the 1st Special Panel
filed a complaint16 (OMB Complaint) against Binay, Jr., et al, charging them
with six (6) administrative cases17 for Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty,
and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and six (6)
criminal cases18 for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, Malversation of
Public Funds, and Falsification of Public Documents (OMB Cases).
Binays First Term:
o Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award21 for Phase III, IV and V of the
Makati Parking Building project to Hilmarc's Construction Corporation
(Hilmarc's), and consequently, executed the corresponding contract
without the required publication and the lack of architectural
design,24 and approved the release of funds therefor.
Binays Second Term:

Binay, Jr. approved the release of funds for the remaining balance of
contract with Hilmarc's for Phase V of the Makati Parking Building
project; and
o Approved the release of funds for the remaining balance of the
contract48 with MANA Architecture & Interior Design Co. (MANA) for the
design and architectural services covering the Makati Parking Building.
Before Binay, Jr., et al.'s filing of their counter-affidavits, the Ombudsman, the
subject preventive suspension order, placing Binay, Jr., et al. under preventive
suspension for not more than six (6) months without pay, during the
pendency of the OMB Cases.53 The Ombudsman ruled that the requisites for
the preventive suspension of a public officer are present, 54 finding that:
o (a) the evidence of Binay, Jr., et al.'s guilt was strong given that
(1) the losing bidders and members of the Bids and Awards
Committee of Makati City had attested to the irregularities
attending the Makati Parking Building project;
(2) the documents on record negated the publication of bids;
and
(3) the disbursement vouchers, checks, and official receipts
showed the release of funds; and
o (b) (1) Binay, Jr., et al. were administratively charged with Grave
Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service;
o (2) said charges, if proven to be true, warrant removal from public
service under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service (RRACCS), and
o (3) Binay, Jr., et al.'s respective positions give them access to public
records and allow them to influence possible witnesses; hence, their
continued stay in office may prejudice the investigation relative to the
OMB Cases filed against them.
Proceedings Before the Court of Appeals:
o Binay contends: that he could not be held administratively liable for
any anomalous activity attending any of the five (5) phases of the
Makati Parking Building project since: (a) Phases I and II were
undertaken before he was elected Mayor of Makati in 2010; and (b)
Phases III to V transpired during his first term and that his re-election
as City Mayor of Makati for a second term effectively condoned his
administrative liability therefor, if any, thus rendering the
administrative cases against him moot and academic. 61In any event,
Binay, Jr. claimed that the Ombudsman's preventive suspension order
failed to show that the evidence of guilt presented against him is
strong, maintaining that he did not participate in any of the purported
irregularities.62 In support of his prayer for injunctive relief, Binay, Jr.
argued that he has a clear and unmistakable right to hold public office,
having won by landslide vote in the 2010 and 2013 elections, and that,
in view of the condonation doctrine, as well as the lack of evidence to
sustain the charges against him, his suspension from office would
undeservedly deprive the electorate of the services of the person they
have conscientiously chosen and voted into office.
At noon of the same day, the CA issued a Resolution 65 (dated March 16,
2015), granting Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO, 66 notwithstanding Pena, Jr.'s
assumption of duties as Acting Mayor earlier that day.
o The OMB manifested71 that the TRO did not state what act was being
restrained and that since the preventive suspension order had already
been served and implemented, there was no longer any act to restrain
Proceedings before the SC:
o In view of the CA's supervening issuance of a WPI pursuant to its April
6, 2015 Resolution, the Ombudsman filed a supplemental
petition99 before this Court, arguing that the condonation doctrine is
irrelevant to the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is
strong for purposes of issuing preventive suspension orders. The
o

Ombudsman also maintained that a reliance on the condonation

doctrine is a matter of defense, which should have been raised by
Binay, Jr. before it during the administrative proceedings, and that, at
any rate, there is no condonation because Binay, Jr. committed acts
subject of the OMB Complaint after his re-election in 2013.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a TRO and/or
WPI enjoining the implementation of a preventive suspension order issued by
the Ombudsman;
2. Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO and
eventually, the WPI in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 enjoining the implementation of
the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. based on the condonation
doctrine
Held:
1. YES
o OMB contends that the CA has no jurisdiction to issue any provisional
injunctive writ against her office to enjoin its preventive suspension orders.
As basis, she invokes the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 in
conjunction with her office's independence under the 1987 Constitution. She
advances the idea that "[i]n order to further ensure [her office's]
independence, [RA 6770] likewise insulated it from judicial
intervention,"157particularly, "from injunctive reliefs traditionally obtainable
from the courts,"158 claiming that said writs may work "just as effectively as
direct harassment or political pressure would."
A. The concept of Ombudsman independence.

Section 5, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the independence of

the Office of the Ombudsman:
Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the
Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be known as
Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for
Luzon, Visayas[,] and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military
establishment may likewise be appointed.
Gonzales III v. Office of the President is the first case which grappled with the
meaning of the Ombudsman's independence vis-a-vis the independence of
the other constitutional bodies. the concept of Ombudsman's independence
covers three (3) things:
o

First: creation by the Constitution, which means that the office cannot be
abolished, nor its constitutionally specified functions and privileges, be
removed, altered, or modified by law, unless the Constitution itself allows, or
an amendment thereto is made;cralawlawlibrary
Second: fiscal autonomy, which means that the office "may not be obstructed
from [its] freedom to use or dispose of [its] funds for purposes germane to
[its] functions;168hence, its budget cannot be strategically decreased by
officials of the political branches of government so as to impair said
functions; and
Third: insulation from executive supervision and control, which means that
those within the ranks of the office can only be disciplined by an internal
authority.
Evidently, all three aspects of independence intend to protect the Office of
the Ombudsman frompolitical harassment and pressure, so as to free it from
the "insidious tentacles of politics."

That being the case, the concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be

invoked as basis to insulate the Ombudsman from judicial power
constitutionally vested unto the courts. Courts are apolitical bodies, which are
ordained to act as impartial tribunals and apply even justice to all. Hence, the
Ombudsman's notion that it can be exempt from an incident of judicial power
- that is, a provisional writ of injunction against a preventive suspension order
- clearly strays from the concept's rationale of insulating the office from
political harassment or pressure.

B. The first paragraph of Section 14, RA

6770 in light of the powers of Congress and the
Court under the 1987 Constitution.

The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 textually prohibits courts from
extending provisional injunctive relief to delay any investigation conducted by
her office. Despite the usage of the general phrase "[n]o writ of injunction
shall be issued by any court," the Ombudsman herself concedes that the
prohibition does not cover the Supreme Court.

Despite the ostensible breach of the separation of powers principle, the Court
is not oblivious to the policy considerations behind the first paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770, as well as other statutory provisions of similar import.
Thus, pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the same, the Court,
under its sole prerogative and authority over all matters of procedure, deems
it proper to declare as ineffective the prohibition against courts other than
the Supreme Court from issuing provisional injunctive writs to enjoin
investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman, until it is adopted
as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly
issued therefor.
Hence, with Congress interfering with matters of procedure (through passing
the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770) without the Court's consent
thereto, it remains that the CA had the authority to issue the questioned
injunctive writs enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension
order against Binay, Jr. At the risk of belaboring the point, these issuances
were merely ancillary to the exercise of the CA's certiorari jurisdiction
conferred to it under Section 9 (1), Chapter I of BP 129, as amended, and
which it had already acquired over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 case.

2.
A. Subject matter of the CA's iniunctive writs is the preventive suspension order.

By nature, a preventive suspension order is not a penalty but only a

preventive measure. Its purpose is to prevent the official to be suspended
from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to
influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in
the prosecution of the case against him
The law sets forth two (2) conditions that must be satisfied to justify the
issuance of an order of preventive suspension pending an investigation,
namely:

(1) The evidence of guilt is strong; and

(2) Either of the following circumstances co-exist with the first requirement:
(a) The charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or
neglect in the performance of duty;cralawlawlibrary

(b) The charge would warrant removal from the service; or

(c) The respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case
filed against him.
B. The basis of the CA's injunctive writs is the condonation doctrine.
Examining the CA's Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 would, however, show
that the Ombudsman's non-compliance with the requisites provided in Section 24,
RA 6770 was not the basis for the issuance of the assailed injunctive writs.
The Ombudsman contends that it was inappropriate for the CA to have considered
the condonation doctrine since it was a matter of defense which should have been
raised and passed upon by her office during the administrative disciplinary
proceedings.243 However, the Court agrees with the CA that it was not precluded
from considering the same given that it was material to the propriety of according
provisional injunctive relief in conformity with the ruling in Governor Garcia, Jr.,
which was the subsisting jurisprudence at that time. Thus, since condonation was
duly raised by Binay, Jr. in his petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, 244 the CA did not
err in passing upon the same. Note that although Binay, Jr. secondarily argued that
the evidence of guilt against him was not strong in his petition in CA-G.R. SP No.
139453,245 it appears that the CA found that the application of the condonation
doctrine was already sufficient to enjoin the implementation of the preventive
suspension order. Again, there is nothing aberrant with this since, as remarked in
the same case of Governor Garcia, Jr., if it was established that the acts subject of
the administrative complaint were indeed committed during Binay, Jr.'s prior term,
then, following the condonation doctrine, he can no longer be administratively
charged. In other words, with condonation having been invoked by Binay, Jr. as an
exculpatory affirmative defense at the onset, the CA deemed it unnecessary to
determine if the evidence of guilt against him was strong, at least for the purpose of
issuing the subject injunctive writs.
With the preliminary objection resolved and the basis of the assailed writs herein
laid down, the Court now proceeds to determine if the CA gravely abused its
discretion in applying the condonation doctrine.
D. Testing the Condonation Doctrine.
Pascual's ratio decidendi may be dissected into three (3) parts:
First, the penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term in which the
public officer was elected for each term is separate and distinct:
Offenses committed, or acts done, during previous term are generally held not to
furnish cause for removal and this is especially true where the constitution provides
that the penalty in proceedings for removal shall not extend beyond the removal
from office, and disqualification from holding office for the term for which the officer
was elected or appointed.
The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms x x x.272
Second, an elective official's re-election serves as a condonation of previous
misconduct, thereby cutting the right to remove him therefor; and
[T]hat the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous
misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor.
Third, courts may not deprive the electorate, who are assumed to have known the
life and character of candidates, of their right to elect officers:

As held in Conant vs. Grogan

The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present
term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect
their officers. When the people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed
that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they
disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is
not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to practically overrule the
will of the people.274
The doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of legal bases.
To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary
requirement of accountability to the people at all times, as mandated under the
1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official's
administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped
off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of office, or even another
elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and
there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the
notion that an official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any
administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior term. In this
jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative offenses may be condoned bv the
President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which was
interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos293 to apply to administrative offenses:
Also, it cannot be inferred from Section 60 of the LGC that the grounds for discipline
enumerated therein cannot anymore be invoked against an elective local official to
hold him administratively liable once he is re-elected to office. In fact, Section 40 (b)
of the LGC precludes condonation since in the first place, an elective local official
who is meted with the penalty of removal could not be re-elected to an elective
local position due to a direct disqualification from running for such post. In similar
regard, Section 52 (a) of the RRACCS imposes a penalty of perpetual disqualification
from holding public office as an accessory to the penalty of dismissal from service.
To compare, some of the cases adopted in Pascual were decided by US State
jurisdictions wherein the doctrine of condonation of administrative liability was
supported by either a constitutional or statutory provision stating, in effect, that an
officer cannot be removed by a misconduct committed during a previous term, 294 or
that the disqualification to hold the office does not extend beyond the term in which
the official's delinquency occurred.295 In one case,296 the absence of a provision
against the re-election of an officer removed - unlike Section 40 (b) of the LGC-was
the justification behind condonation. In another case, 297 it was deemed that
condonation through re-election was a policy under their constitution - which
adoption in this jurisdiction runs counter to our present Constitution's requirements
on public accountability. There was even one case where the doctrine of
condonation was not adjudicated upon but only invoked by a party as a
ground;298 while in another case, which was not reported in full in the official series,
the crux of the disposition was that the evidence of a prior irregularity in no way
pertained to the charge at issue and therefore, was deemed to be
incompetent.299Hence, owing to either their variance or inapplicability, none of these
cases can be used as basis for the continued adoption of the condonation doctrine
under our existing laws. At best, Section 66 (b) of the LGC prohibits the enforcement
of the penalty of suspension beyond the unexpired portion of the elective local
official's prior term, and likewise allows said official to still run for re-election.
Equally infirm is Pascual's proposition that the electorate, when re-electing a local
official, are assumed to have done so with knowledge of his life and character, and
that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of
any. Suffice it to state that no such presumption exists in any statute or procedural
rule.302 Besides, it is contrary to human experience that the electorate would have

full knowledge of a public official's misdeeds. The Ombudsman correctly points out
the reality that most corrupt acts by public officers are shrouded in secrecy, and
concealed from the public.Misconduct committed by an elective official is easily
covered up, and is almost always unknown to the electorate when they cast their
votes.303 At a conceptual level, condonation presupposes that the condoner has
actual knowledge of what is to be condoned. Thus, there could be no condonation of
an act that is unknown.
It should, however, be clarified that this Court's abandonment of the condonation
doctrine should beprospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part
of the legal system of the Philippines.305 Unto this Court devolves the sole authority
to interpret what the Constitution means, and all persons are bound to follow its
interpretation. Hence, while the future may ultimately uncover a doctrine's error, it
should be, as a general rule, recognized as "good law" prior to its abandonment.
Consequently, the people's reliance thereupon should be respected.
E. Consequence of ruling.
As for this section of the Decision, the issue to be resolved is whether or not
the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the assailed injunctive writs.
It is well-settled that an act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with
grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of
law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason
of passion and hostility.311 It has also been held that "grave abuse of discretion
arises when a lower court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law or
existing jurisprudence."312
As earlier established, records disclose that the CA's resolutions directing the
issuance of the assailed injunctive writs were all hinged on cases enunciating the
condonation doctrine. To recount, the March 16, 2015 Resolution directing the
issuance of the subject TRO was based on the case of Governor Garcia, Jr., while the
April 6, 2015 Resolution directing the issuance of the subject WPI was based on the
cases of Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and again, Governor Garcia, Jr. Thus, by
merely following settled precedents on the condonation doctrine, which at that
time, unwittingly remained "good law," it cannot be concluded that the CA
committed a grave abuse of discretion based on its legal attribution above.
Accordingly, the WPI against the Ombudsman's preventive suspension order was
correctly issued.
With this, the ensuing course of action should have been for the CA to resolve the
main petition forcertiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 on the merits. However,
considering that the Ombudsman, on October 9, 2015, had already found Binay, Jr.
administratively liable and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal, which carries
the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office, for the
present administrative charges against him, the said CA petition appears to have
been mooted.313 As initially intimated, the preventive suspension order is only an
ancillary issuance that, at its core, serves the purpose of assisting the Office of the
Ombudsman in its investigation. It therefore has no more purpose - and perforce,
dissolves - upon the termination of the office's process of investigation in the instant
administrative case.
F. Exceptions to the mootness principle.
This notwithstanding, this Court deems it apt to clarify that the mootness of the
issue regarding the validity of the preventive suspension order subject of this case

does not preclude any of its foregoing determinations, particularly, its abandonment
of the condonation doctrine. As explained in Belgica, '"the moot and academic
principle' is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in
resolving a case. The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a
grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the
situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review."314 All of these scenarios obtain in this case:
First, it would be a violation of the Court's own duty to uphold and defend the
Constitution if it were not to abandon the condonation doctrine now that its
infirmities have become apparent. As extensively discussed, the continued
application of the condonation doctrine is simply impermissible under the auspices
of the present Constitution which explicitly mandates that public office is a public
trust and that public officials shall be accountable to the people at all times.
Second, the condonation doctrine is a peculiar jurisprudential creation that has
persisted as a defense of elective officials to escape administrative liability. It is the
first time that the legal intricacies of this doctrine have been brought to light; thus,
this is a situation of exceptional character which this Court must ultimately resolve.
Further, since the doctrine has served as a perennial obstacle against exacting
public accountability from the multitude of elective local officials throughout the
years, it is indubitable that paramount public interest is involved.
Third, the issue on the validity of the condonation doctrine clearly requires the
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public. The
issue does not only involve an in-depth exegesis of administrative law principles,
but also puts to the forefront of legal discourse the potency of the accountability
provisions of the 1987 Constitution. The Court owes it to the bench, the bar, and the
public to explain how this controversial doctrine came about, and now, its reasons
for abandoning the same in view of its relevance on the parameters of public office.
And fourth, the defense of condonation has been consistently invoked by elective
local officials against the administrative charges filed against them. To provide a
sample size, the Ombudsman has informed the Court that "for the period of July
2013 to December 2014 alone, 85 cases from the Luzon Office and 24 cases from
the Central Office were dismissed on the ground of condonation. Thus, in just one
and a half years, over a hundred cases of alleged misconduct - involving infractions
such as dishonesty, oppression, gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct - were
placed beyond the reach of the Ombudsman's investigatory and prosecutorial
powers."315 Evidently, this fortifies the finding that the case is capable of repetition
and must therefore, not evade review.
In any event, the abandonment of a doctrine is wholly within the prerogative of the
Court. As mentioned, it is its own jurisprudential creation and may therefore,
pursuant to its mandate to uphold and defend the Constitution, revoke it
notwithstanding supervening events that render the subject of discussion
moot.chan

A common requirement to both a petition for certiorari and a petition for prohibition
taken under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is that the petitioner has
no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Sections
1 and 2 thereof provide:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer,
and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
x

Section 2. Petition for prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal,

corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts r with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or
matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice
may
require.
x x x x (Emphases supplied)
Hence, as a general rule, a motion for reconsideration must first be filed with
the lower court prior to resorting to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari or
prohibition since a motion for reconsideration may still be considered as a
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The
rationale for the pre-requisite is to grant an opportunity for the lower court or
agency to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the reexamination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. 110
Jurisprudence states that "[i]t is [the] inadequacy, [and] not the mere
absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice
without the writ, that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari[or
prohibition]. A remedy is plain, speedy[,] and adequate if it will promptly
relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment, order, or
resolution of the lower court or agency, x x x." 111
In this light, certain exceptions were crafted to the general rule requiring a
prior motion for reconsideration before the filing of a petition
for certiorari, which exceptions also apply to a petition for prohibition. 112These
are: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have
been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as
those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent
necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would
prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject
matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a
motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was
deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in
a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of
such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the
lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings
were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is
involved.113
In this case, it is ineluctably clear that the above-highlighted exceptions
attend since, for the first time, the question on the authority of the CA - and
of this Court, for that matter - to enjoin the implementation of a preventive
suspension order issued by the Office of the Ombudsman is put to the fore.
This case tests the constitutional and statutory limits of the fundamental
powers of key government institutions - namely, the Office of the

Ombudsman, the Legislature, and the Judiciary - and hence, involves an issue
of transcendental public importance that demands no less than a careful but
expeditious resolution. Also raised is the equally important issue on the
propriety of the continuous application of the condonation doctrine as
invoked by a public officer who desires exculpation from administrative
liability. As such, the Ombudsman's direct resort to certiorari and prohibition
before this Court, notwithstanding her failure to move for the prior
reconsideration of the assailed issuances in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 and CAG.R. SP No. 139504 before the CA, is justified.chanrobleslaw
II.
Albeit raised for the first time by the Ombudsman in her Memorandum, 114 it is
nonetheless proper to resolve the issue on the CA's lack of subject matter
jurisdiction over the main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, in view of
the well-established rule that a court's jurisdiction over the subject matter may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings. The rationale is that subject matter
jurisdiction is conferred by law, and the lack of it affects the very authority of the
court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action. 115 Hence, it
should be preliminarily determined if the CA indeed had subject matter jurisdiction
over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, as the same determines the validity
of all subsequent proceedings relative thereto. It is noteworthy to point out that
Binay, Jr. was given the opportunity by this Court to be heard on this issue, 116 as he,
in fact, duly submitted his opposition through his comment to the Ombudsman's
Memorandum.117 That being said, the Court perceives no reasonable objection
against ruling on this issue.
The Ombudsman's argument against the CA's lack of subject matter jurisdiction
over the main petition, and her corollary prayer for its dismissal, is based on her
interpretation of Section 14, RA 6770, or the Ombudsman Act, 118 which reads in full:
Section 14. Restrictions. - No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay
an investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is
a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the
jurisdiction
of
the
Office
of
the
Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or
findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.
The subject provision may be dissected into two (2) parts.
The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is a prohibition against any court
(except the Supreme Court119) from issuing a writ of injunction to delay an
investigation being conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman. Generally
speaking, "[injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a
party is ordered to do or refrain from doing a certain act. It may be the main
action or merely a provisional remedy for and as an incident in the main
action."120 Considering the textual qualifier "to delay," which connotes a
suspension of an action while the main case remains pending, the "writ of
injunction" mentioned in this paragraph could only refer to injunctions of the
provisional kind, consistent with the nature of a provisional injunctive relief.
The exception to the no injunction policy is when there is prima
facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the
office's jurisdiction. The Office of the Ombudsman has disciplinary authority
over all elective and appointive officials of the government and its
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies, with the exception only of
impeachable officers, Members of Congress, and the Judiciary. 121Nonetheless,
the Ombudsman retains the power to investigate any serious misconduct in
office allegedly committed by officials removable by impeachment, for the
purpose of filing a verified complaint for impeachment, if warranted. 122 Note

that the Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction over certain administrative

cases which are within the jurisdiction of the regular courts or administrative
agencies, but has primary jurisdiction to investigate any act or omission of a
public officer or employee who is under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.123
On the other hand, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 provides
that no appeal or application for remedy may be heard against the decision
or findings of the Ombudsman, with the exception of the Supreme Court on
pure questions of law. This paragraph, which the Ombudsman particularly
relies on in arguing that the CA had no jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP
No. 139453 petition, as it is supposedly this Court which has the sole
jurisdiction to conduct a judicial review of its decisions or findings, is vague
for two (2) reasons: (1) it is unclear what the phrase "application for remedy"
or the word "findings" refers to; and (2) it does not specify what procedural
remedy is solely allowable to this Court, save that the same be taken only
against a pure question of law. The task then, is to apply the relevant
principles of statutory construction to resolve the ambiguity.
"The underlying principle of all construction is that the intent of the
legislature should be sought in the words employed to express it, and that
when found[,] it should be made to govern, x x x. If the words of the law
seem to be of doubtful import, it may then perhaps become necessary to look
beyond them in order to ascertain what was in the legislative mind at the
time the law was enacted; what the circumstances were, under which the
action was taken; what evil, if any, was meant to be redressed; x x x [a]nd
where the law has contemporaneously been put into operation, and in doing
so a construction has necessarily been put upon it, this construction,
especially if followed for some considerable period, is entitled to great
respect, as being very probably a true expression of the legislative purpose,
and is not lightly to be overruled, although it is not conclusive." 124
As an aid to construction, courts may avail themselves of the actual
proceedings of the legislative body in interpreting a statute of doubtful
meaning. In case of doubt as to what a provision of a statute means, the
meaning put to the provision during the legislative deliberations may be
adopted,125 albeit not controlling in the interpretation of the law. 126
A. The Senate deliberations cited by the
Ombudsman do not pertain to the second
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770.
The Ombudsman submits that the legislative intent behind Section 14, RA
6770, particularly on the matter of judicial review of her office's decisions or
findings
Upon an assiduous scrutiny of these deliberations, the Court is, however,
unconvinced that the provision debated on was Section 14, RA 6770, as the
Ombudsman invokes. Note that the exchange begins with the suggestion of Senator
Angara to delete the word "review" that comes after the phrase "petition for review"
and, in its stead, insert the word "certiorari" so that the "review or appeal from the
decision of the Ombudsman would not only be taken on a petition for review, but
on certiorari" The ensuing exchange between Senators Gonzales and Angara then
dwells on the purpose of changing the method of review from one of a petition for
review to a petition for certiorari - that is, to make "the appeal x x x more difficult."
Ultimately, the amendment to the change in wording, from "petition for review" to
"petition for certiorari" was approved.
Noticeably, these references to a "petition for review" and the proposed "petition
for certiorari" are nowhere to be found in the text of Section 14, RA 6770. In fact, it
was earlier mentioned that this provision, particularly its second paragraph, does
not indicate what specific procedural remedy one should take in assailing a decision

or finding of the Ombudsman; it only reveals that the remedy be taken to this Court
based on pure questions of law. More so, it was even commented upon during the
oral arguments of this case129 that there was no debate or clarification made on the
current formulation of the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 per the
available excerpts of the Senate deliberations. In any case, at least for the abovecited deliberations, the Court finds no adequate support to sustain the
Ombudsman's entreaty that the CA had no subject matter jurisdiction over the main
CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition.
On the contrary, it actually makes greater sense to posit that these deliberations
refer to another Ombudsman Act provision, namely Section 27, RA 6770. This is
because the latter textually reflects the approval of Senator Angara's suggested
amendment, i.e., that the Ombudsman's decision or finding may be assailed in a
petition for certiorari to this Court (fourth paragraph), and further, his comment on
the conclusive nature of the factual findings of the Ombudsman, if supported by
substantial evidence (third paragraph):
Section 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. (1) All provisionary orders of the
Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and
shall
be
entertained
only
on
any
of
the
following
grounds:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the order, directive
or
decision;cralawlawlibrary
(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest of
the movant. The motion for reconsideration shall be resolved within three (3) days
from filing: Provided, That only one motion for reconsideration shall be
entertained.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial
evidence are conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of
public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one (1) month's salary
shall
be
final
and
unappealable.
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office
of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing apetition
for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order,
directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with
Rule
45
of
the
Rules
of
Court.
The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the ' Ombudsman as
the interest of justice may require. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
At first blush, it appears that Section 27, RA 6770 is equally ambiguous in stating
that a "petition forcertiorari" should be taken in accordance with Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, as it is well-known that under the present 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, petitions for certiorari are governed by Rule 65 of the said Rules.
However, it should be discerned that the Ombudsman Act was passed way back in
1989130 and, hence, before the advent of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 131 At that
time, the governing 1964 Rules of Court,132 consistent with Section 27, RA 6770,
referred to the appeal taken thereunder as a petition forcertiorari , thus possibly
explaining the remedy's textual denomination, at least in the provision's final
approved version:
RULE 45
Appeal from Court of Appeals to Supreme Court

SECTION 1. Filing of Petition with Supreme Court. - A party may appeal

by certiorari , from a judgment of the Court of Appeals, by filing with the Supreme
Court a petition forcertiorari , within fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment or of
the denial of his motion for reconsideration filed in due time, and paying at the
same time, to the clerk of said court the corresponding docketing fee. The petition
shall not be acted upon without proof of service of a copy thereof to the Court of
Appeals. (Emphasis supplied)
B. Construing the second paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770.
The Senate deliberations' lack of discussion on the second paragraph of Section 14,
RA 6770 notwithstanding, the other principles of statutory construction can apply to
ascertain the meaning of the provision.
To recount, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 states that "[n]o court
shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of
the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law."
;cralawlawlibrary
As a general rule, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 bans the whole
range of remedies against issuances of the Ombudsman, by prohibiting: (a) an
appeal against any decision or finding of the Ombudsman, and (b) "any application
of remedy" (subject to the exception below) against the same. To clarify, the phrase
"application for remedy," being a generally worded provision, and being separated
from the term "appeal" by the disjunctive "or",133 refers to any remedy (whether
taken mainly or provisionally), except an appeal, following the maxim generalia
verba sunt generaliter intelligenda: general words are to be understood in a general
sense.134 By the same principle, the word "findings," which is also separated from
the word "decision" by the disjunctive "or", would therefore refer to any finding
made by the Ombudsman (whether final or provisional), except a decision.
The subject provision, however, crafts an exception to the foregoing general rule.
While the specific procedural vehicle is not explicit from its text, it is fairly deducible
that the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 excepts, as the only allowable
remedy against "the decision or findings of the Ombudsman,"a Rule 45 appeal, for
the reason that it is the only remedy taken to the Supreme Court on "pure questions
of law," whether under the 1964 Rules of Court or the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
Rule 45, 1964 Rules of Court
RULE 45
Appeal from Court of Appeals to Supreme Court
x

Section 2. Contents of Petition. The petition shall contain a concise statement of

the matters involved, the assignment of errors made in the court below, and the
reasons relied on for the allowance of the petition, and it should be accompanied
with a true copy of the judgment sought to be reviewed, together with twelve (12)
copies of the record on appeal, if any, and of the petitioner's brief as filed in the
Court of Appeals. A verified statement of the date when notice of judgment and
denial of the motion for reconsideration, if any, were received shall accompany the
petition.
Only questions of law may be raised in the petition and must be distinctly set forth.
If no record on appeal has been filed in the Court of Appeals, the clerk of the
Supreme Court, upon admission of the petition, shall demand from the Court of

Appeals the elevation of the whole record of the case. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
RULE 45
Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal
by certiorarifrom a judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts,
whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for
review on certiorari. The petition may include an application for a writ of preliminary
injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise only questions of law, which
must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional remedies
by verified motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any time during its
pendency. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That the remedy excepted in the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 could be
a petition for certiorariunder Rule 65 of the 1964 Rules of Court or the 1997 Rules of
Procedure is a suggestion that defies traditional norms of procedure. It is basic
procedural law that a Rule 65 petition is based on errors of jurisdiction, and not
errors of judgment to which the classifications of (a) questions of fact, (b) questions
of law, or (c) questions of mixed fact and law, relate to. In fact, there is no
procedural rule, whether in the old or new Rules, which grounds a Rule 65 petition
on pure questions of law. Indeed, it is also a statutory construction principle that the
lawmaking body cannot be said to have intended the establishment of conflicting
and hostile systems on the same subject. Such a result would render legislation a
useless and idle ceremony, and subject the laws to uncertainty and
unintelligibility.135 There should then be no confusion that the second paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770 refers to a Rule 45 appeal to this Court, and no other. In sum,
the appropriate construction of this Ombudsman Act provision is that all remedies
against issuances of the Office of the Ombudsman are prohibited, except the abovestated Rule 45 remedy to the Court on pure questions of law.
C. Validity of the second paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770.
Of course, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770's extremely limited
restriction on remedies is inappropriate since a Rule 45 appeal -which is within the
sphere of the rules of procedure promulgated by this Court - can only be taken
against final decisions or orders of lower courts, 136 and not against "findings" of
quasi-judicial agencies. As will be later elaborated upon, Congress cannot interfere
with matters of procedure; hence, it cannot alter the scope of a Rule 45 appeal so
as to apply to interlocutory "findings" issued by the Ombudsman. More
significantly, by confining the remedy to a Rule 45 appeal, the provision takes away
the remedy of certiorari, grounded on errors of jurisdiction, in denigration of the
judicial power constitutionally vested in courts. In this light, the second paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770 also increased this Court's appellate jurisdiction, without a
showing, however, that it gave its consent to the same. The provision is, in fact,
very similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 (as above-cited), which
was invalidated in the case of Fabian v. Desiertoni137 (Fabian).138
In Fabian, the Court struck down the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 as
unconstitutional since it had the effect of increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the
Court without its advice and concurrence in violation of Section 30, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.139 Moreover, this provision was found to be inconsistent with
Section 1, Rule 45 of the present 1997 Rules of Procedure which, as aboveintimated, applies only to a review of "judgments or final orders of the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court, or
other courts authorized by law;" and not of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the

Office of the Ombudsman, the remedy now being a Rule 43 appeal to the Court of
Appeals. In Ruivivar v. Office of the Ombudsman,140 the Court's ratiocinations and
ruling inFabian were recounted:
The case of Fabian v. Desierto arose from the doubt created in the application of
Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman's Act) and Section 7, Rule III of A.O.
No. 7 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman) on the availability of
appeal before the Supreme Court to assail a decision or order of the Ombudsman in
administrative cases. In Fabian, we invalidated Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (and
Section 7, Rule III of A.O. No. 7 and the other rules implementing the Act) insofar as
it provided for appeal bycertiorari under Rule 45 from the decisions or orders of the
Ombudsman in administrative cases. We held that Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 had
the effect, not only of increasing the appellate jurisdiction of this Court without its
advice and concurrence in violation of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution; it
was also inconsistent with Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which provides
that a petition for review on certiorari shall apply only to a review of "judgments or
final orders of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals,
the Regional Trial Court, or other courts authorized by law." We pointedly
said:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
should be struck down as unconstitutional, and in line with the regulatory
philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the CA under the provisions of
Rule 43.141 (Emphasis supplied)
Since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the remedy against
"decision or findings" of the Ombudsman to a Rule 45 appeal and thus - similar to
the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 142 - attempts to effectively increase the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction without its advice and concurrence, 143 it is
therefore concluded that the former provision is also unconstitutional and perforce,
invalid. Contrary to the Ombudsman's posturing, 144Fabian should squarely apply
since the above-stated Ombudsman Act provisions are in part materia in that they
"cover the same specific or particular subject matter," 145 that is, the manner of
judicial review over issuances of the Ombudsman.
Note that since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is clearly
determinative of the existence of the CA's subject matter jurisdiction over the main
CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, including all subsequent proceedings relative
thereto, as the Ombudsman herself has developed, the Court deems it proper to
resolve this issue ex mero motu (on its own motion146). This procedure, as was
similarly adopted in Fabian, finds its bearings in settled case law:
The conventional rule, however, is that a challenge on constitutional grounds must
be raised by a party to the case, neither of whom did so in this case, but that is not
an
inflexible
rule,
as
we
shall
explain.
Since the constitution is intended for the observance of the judiciary and other
departments of the government and the judges are sworn to support its provisions,
the courts are not at liberty to overlook or disregard its commands or countenance
evasions thereof. When it is clear , that a statute transgresses the authority vested
in a legislative body, it is the duty of the courts to declare that the constitution, and
not
the
statute,
governs
in
a
case
before
them
for
judgment.
Thus, while courts will not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions which are
not raised in the pleadings, the rule has been recognized to admit of certain
exceptions. It does not preclude a court from inquiring into its own jurisdiction or
compel it to enter a judgment that it lacks jurisdiction to enter. If a statute on which
a court's jurisdiction in a proceeding depends is unconstitutional, the court has no

jurisdiction in the proceeding, and since it may determine whether or not it has
jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that it may inquire into the constitutionality of the
statute.
Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial
are ordinarily rejected unless the jurisdiction of the court below or that of the
appellate court is involved in which case it may be raised at any time or on the
court's own motion. The Court ex mero motu may take cognizance of lack of
jurisdiction at any point in the case where that fact is developed. The court has a
clearly
recognized
right
to
determine
its
own
jurisdiction
in
any
proceeding.147 (Emphasis supplied)
D. Consequence of invalidity.
In this case, the Rule 65 petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 was
filed by Binay, Jr. before the CA in order to nullify the preventive suspension
order issued by the Ombudsman, an interlocutory order, 148 hence,
unappealable.149
In several cases decided after Fabian, the Court has ruled that Rule 65
petitions for certiorari against unappelable issuances150 of the Ombudsman
should be filed before the CA, and not directly before this Court:
In Office of the Ombudsman v. Capulong151 (March 12, 2014), wherein a
preventive suspension order issued by the Office of the Ombudsman was similar to this case - assailed through a Rule 65 petition forcertiorari filed by
the public officer before the CA, the Court held that "[t]here being a finding of
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman, it was certainly
imperative for the CA to grant incidental reliefs, as sanctioned by Section 1 of
Rule 65."152
In Dagan v. Office of the Ombudsman 153 (November 19, 2013), involving a
Rule 65 petition for certiorariassailing a final and unappealable order of the
Office of the Ombudsman in an administrative case, the Court remarked that
"petitioner employed the correct mode of review in this case, i.e., a special
civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals."154 In this relation, it
stated that while "a special civil action for Certiorari is within the concurrent
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, such
petition should be initially filed with the Court of Appeals in observance of the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts." Further, the Court upheld Barata v. Abalos,
Jr.155 (June 6, 2001), wherein it was ruled that the remedy against final and
unappealable orders of the Office of the Ombudsman in an administrative
case was a Rule 65 petition to the CA. The same verdict was reached
in Ruivivar156(September 16, 2008).
Thus, with the unconstitutionality of the second paragraph of Section 14, RA
6770, the Court, consistent with existing jurisprudence, concludes that the CA
has subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition.
That being said, the Court now examines the objections of the Ombudsman,
this time against the CA's authority to issue the assailed TRO and WPI against
the implementation of the preventive suspension order, incidental to that
main case.
Echegaray v Secretary G.R. No. 132601 October 12, 1998
Per Curiam
Facts:
The SC affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of
rape of the 10 year-old daughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition
upon him of the death penalty for the said crime.

He filed an MFR and a supplemental MFR raising for the first time the issue of the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 and the death penalty for rape. The Court
denied both motions.
In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of execution of the
death penalty from electrocution to lethal injection, and passed Republic Act No.
8177, AN ACT DESIGNATING DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION AS THE METHOD OF
CARRYING OUT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO.
7659.
The convict filed a Petition for prohibition from carrying out the lethal injection
against him under the grounds that it constituted cruel, degrading, or unusual
punishment, being violative of due process, a violation of the Philippines' obligations
under international covenants, an undue delegation of legislative power by
Congress, an unlawful exercise by respondent Secretary of the power to legislate,
and an unlawful delegation of delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice to
respondent Director.
In his motion to amend, the petitioner added equal protection as a ground.
The Office of the Solicitor General stated that this Court has already upheld the
constitutionality of the Death Penalty Law, and has repeatedly declared that the
death penalty is not cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment; execution by
lethal injection, as authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the questioned rules, is
constitutional, lethal injection being the most modern, more humane, more
economical, safer and easier to apply (than electrocution or the gas chamber); the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not expressly or impliedly
prohibit the imposition of the death penalty; R.A. No. 8177 properly delegated
legislative power to respondent Director; and that R.A. No. 8177 confers the power
to promulgate the implementing rules to the Secretary of Justice, Secretary of
Health and the Bureau of Corrections.
The Commission on Human Rights filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene
and/or Appear as Amicus Curiae with the attached Petition to Intervene and/or
Appear as Amicus Curiae. They alleged similarly with Echegarays arguments.
The petitioner filed a reply similar to his first arguments. The court gave due course
to the petition.
Concisely put, petitioner argues that R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules do
not pass constitutional muster for: (a) violation of the constitutional proscription
against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, (b) violation of our international
treaty obligations, (c) being an undue delegation of legislative power, and (d) being
discriminatory.
Issue:
1. Is it a violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment?
2. Is it a violation of our international treaty obligations?
3. Is it an undue delegation of legislative power?
4. Is it discriminatory and contrary to law?
Held:
No 1st three. Yes to last. Petition denied.
Ratio:
1. Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection constitutes cruel, degrading and
inhuman punishment considering that (1) R.A. No. 8177 fails to provide for the
drugs to be used in carrying out lethal injection, the dosage for each drug to be
administered, and the procedure in administering said drug/s into the accused; (2)
R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules are uncertain as to the date of the
execution, time of notification, the court which will fix the date of execution, which
uncertainties cause the greatest pain and suffering for the convict; and (3) the
possibility of "botched executions" or mistakes in administering the drugs renders
lethal injection inherently cruel.
Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment.

Harden v. Director of Prisons- "punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a
lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that
word as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and
barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life." Would the lack
in particularity then as to the details involved in the execution by lethal injection
render said law "cruel, degrading or inhuman"? The Court believes not. For reasons
discussed, the implementing details of R.A. No. 8177 are matters which are properly
left to the competence and expertise of administrative officials.
Petitioner contends that Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 8177 is uncertain as to which "court" will
fix the time and date of execution, and the date of execution and time
of notification of the death convict. As petitioner already knows, the "court" which
designates the date of execution is the trial court which convicted the accused. The
procedure is that the "judgment is entered fifteen (15) days after its promulgation,
and 10 days thereafter, the records are remanded to the court below including a
certified copy of the judgment for execution. Neither is there any uncertainty as to
the date of execution nor the time of notification. As to the date of execution,
Section 15 of the implementing rules must be read in conjunction with the last
sentence of Section 1 of R.A. No. 8177 which provides that the death sentence shall
be carried out "not earlier than one (1) year nor later then eighteen (18) months
from the time the judgment imposing the death penalty became final and
executory, without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his
executive clemency powers at all times." Hence, the death convict is in effect
assured of eighteen (18) months from the time the judgment imposing the death
penalty became final and executor wherein he can seek executive clemency and
attend to all his temporal and spiritual affairs.
Petitioner further contends that the infliction of "wanton pain" in case of possible
complications in the intravenous injection that respondent Director is an untrained
and untested person insofar as the choice and administration of lethal injection is
concerned, renders lethal injection a cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment.
This is unsubstantiated.
First. Petitioner has neither alleged nor presented evidence that lethal injection
required the expertise only of phlebotomists and not trained personnel and that the
drugs to be administered are unsafe or ineffective. Petitioner simply cites situations
in the United States wherein execution by lethal injection allegedly resulted in
prolonged and agonizing death for the convict, without any other evidence
whatsoever.
Second. Petitioner overlooked Section 1, third paragraph of R.A. No. 8177 which
requires that all personnel involved in the execution proceedings should be trained
prior to the performance of such task. We must presume that the public officials
entrusted with the implementation of the death penalty will carefully avoid inflicting
cruel punishment.
Third. Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out the
execution of death penalty and does not fall within the constitutional proscription
against cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. "In a limited sense, anything is
cruel which is calculated to give pain or distress, and since punishment imports pain
or suffering to the convict, it may be said that all punishments are cruel. But of
course the Constitution does not mean that crime, for this reason, is to go
unpunished." The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is
cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved
in any method employed to extinguish life humanely.
What is cruel and unusual "is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning
as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice" and "must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society."
2. International Covenant on Civil And Political Rights states:
2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may
be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at
the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the
present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final
judgment rendered by a competent court."

The punishment was subject to the limitation that it be imposed for the "most
serious crimes".
Included with the declaration was the Second Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty
was adopted by the General Assembly on December 15, 1989. The Philippines
neither signed nor ratified said document.
3. R.A. No. 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative policy,
mark its limits, map out its boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will
apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative purpose may be
carried out. R.A. No. 8177 specifically requires that "the death sentence shall be
executed under the authority of the Director of the Bureau of Corrections,
endeavoring so far as possible to mitigate the sufferings of the person under the
sentence during the lethal injection as well as during the proceedings prior to the
execution." Further, "the Director of the Bureau of Corrections shall take steps to
ensure that the lethal injection to be administered is sufficient to cause the
instantaneous death of the convict." The legislature also mandated that "all
personnel involved in the administration of lethal injection shall be trained prior to
the performance of such task." The Court cannot see that any useful purpose would
be served by requiring greater detail. The question raised is not the definition of
what constitutes a criminal offense, but the mode of carrying out the penalty
already imposed by the Courts. In this sense, R.A. No. 8177 is sufficiently definite
and the exercise of discretion by the administrative officials concerned is, canalized
within banks that keep it from overflowing.
However, the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 suffer
serious flaws that could not be overlooked. To begin with, something basic appears
missing in Section 19 of the implementing rules which provides a manual for the
execution procedure. It was supposed to be confidential.
The Court finds in the first paragraph of Section 19 of the implementing rules a
vacuum. The Secretary of Justice has practically abdicated the power to promulgate
the manual on the execution procedure to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections,
by not providing for a mode of review and approval. Being a mere constituent unit
of the Department of Justice, the Bureau of Corrections could not promulgate a
manual that would not bear the imprimatur of the administrative superior, the
Secretary of Justice as the rule-making authority under R.A. No. 8177. Such
apparent abdication of departmental responsibility renders the said paragraph
invalid.
4. Petitioner contends that Section 17 of the Implementing Rules is unconstitutional
for being discriminatory as well as for being an invalid exercise of the power to
legislate by respondent Secretary. Petitioner insists that Section 17 amends the
instances when lethal injection may be suspended, without an express amendment
of Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659.
"SEC. 17. SUSPENSION OF THE EXECUTION OF THE DEATH SENTENCE. Execution
by lethal injection shall not be inflicted upon a woman within the three years next
following the date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, nor upon any person
over seventy (70) years of age. In this latter case, the death penalty shall be
commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties
provided in Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code."
Petitioner contends that Section 17 is unconstitutional for being discriminatory as
well as for being an invalid exercise of the power to legislate by respondent
Secretary. Petitioner insists that Section 17 amends the instances when lethal
injection may be suspended, without an express amendment of Article 83 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659, stating that the
death sentence shall not be inflicted upon a woman while she is pregnant or within
one (1) year after delivery, nor upon any person over seventy years of age.
While Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic
Act No. 7659, suspends the implementation of the death penalty while a woman is
pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, Section 17 of the implementing rules
omits the one (1) year period following delivery as an instance when the death
sentence is suspended, and adds a ground for suspension of sentence no longer
found under Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, which is the threeyear reprieve after a woman is sentenced. This addition is, in petitioner's view,

tantamount to a gender-based discrimination sans statutory basis, while the

omission is an impermissible contravention of the applicable law.
Being merely an implementing rule, Section 17 aforecited must not override, but
instead remain consistent and in harmony with the law it seeks to apply and
implement.
DOMINGO NEYPES, ET AL. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 141524 (September 14, 2005)
N.B. I AM ACTUALLY SICK RIGHT NOW AND THIS CASE IS QUITE DIFFICULT TO
DIGEST. I RESEARCHED AND FOUND A GOOD DIGEST (BUT STILL DIFFICULT TO
INTERNALIZE COZ IT INCLUDEs DATES, PERIODS ETC.). BUT I RESEARCHED ON
SOME NOTES ON NEYPES RULE WHICH IS AT THE END OF THIS DIGEST. KINDLY
READ THAT FIRST SO THAT YOU WILL UNDERSTAND THE CONCEPT OF NEYPES RULE
BEFORE READING THIS CASE, JUST A SUGGESTION.- NAOMI
FACTS:
Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or
reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the RTC against
the private respondents. Later, in an order, the trial court dismissed petitioners
complaint on the ground that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners
allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the
15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July
1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for
reconsideration which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July
27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3,
1998.
On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was
filed eight days late. This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated
September 3, 1998. Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65,
petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the CA. In the
appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of
appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run
only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final order of the trial
court denying their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of
appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well within the
reglementary period for appeal. On September 16, 1999, the CA dismissed the
petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned from
March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their
complaint. According to the appellate court, the order was the final order
appealable under the Rules.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not receipt of a final order triggers the start of the 15-day
reglmentary period to appeal, the February 12, 1998 order dismissing the complaint
or the July 1, 1998 order dismissing the Motion for Reconsideration.
(2) Whether or not petitioners file their notice of appeal on time.
HELD:
(1) The July 1, 1998 order dismissing the motion for reconsideration should be

deemed as the final order. In the case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., the trial
court declared petitioner non-suited and accordingly dismissed his complaint. Upon
receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed an omnibus motion to set it aside. When
the omnibus motion was filed, 12 days of the 15-day period to appeal the order had
lapsed. He later on received another order, this time dismissing his omnibus motion.
He then filed his notice of appeal. But this was likewise dismissed for having been
filed out of time. The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within
15 days after the dismissal of his complaint since this was the final order that was
appealable under the Rules. The SC reversed the trial court and declared that it was
the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint
which constituted the final order as it was what ended the issues raised there. This
pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v. Haldeman et al.
where the SC again considered the order denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration as the final order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the
case. Based on the aforementioned cases, the SC sustained petitioners view that
the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for reconsideration was the final
order contemplated in the Rules.
(2) YES. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford
litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow
a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC,
counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration. Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40, Rule
42, Rule 43 and Rule 45. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period
uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial,
motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.
The SC thus held that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the
fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice
denying their motion for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent
with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken
within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the
disjunctive word or signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from
another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies.
Hence, the use of or in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal
may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from
notice of the final order, which we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998
order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.
Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which
shortened the appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of
cases. The original period of appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the
requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh period of 15 days becomes
significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision
is given another opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or
rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to
have judgments of courts become final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to
deliver justice fairly.
To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days
from receipt of the RTCs decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order
(the final order) denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed;
otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original
appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3. Petitioners here filed their notice of
appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the order denying their motion
for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was well within the
fresh
appeal
period
of
15
days,
as
already
discussed.

IMPORTANT NOTES:
The FRESH PERIOD RULE do not apply to Rule 64 (Review of Judgments and Final
Orders or Resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit)
because Rule 64 is derived from the Constitution. It is likewise doubtful whether it
will
apply
to
criminal
cases.
SOURCE: http://mclaw08.wordpress.com/2009/10/01/neypes-vs-court-of-appeals/
IMPORTANT NOTES:
The Neypes Rule
STATEMENT OF THE RULE
The "Neypes Rule," otherwise known as the Fresh Period Rule, states that
a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of
the Regional Trial Courts decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order
(the "final order") denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
(Domingo Neypes versus Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141524 September 14, 2005)
PURPOSE OF THE RULE
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh
period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court,
counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration. (supra)
The raison dtre for the "fresh period rule" is to standardize the appeal period
provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal
period should be counted. Thus, the 15-day period to appeal is no longer
interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration;
litigants today need not concern themselves with counting the balance of the 15day period to appeal since the 15-day period is now counted from receipt of the
order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final
order or resolution. (Judith Yu versus Hon. Rosa Samson-Tatad, G.R. No. 170979, 09
Feb. 2011)
THE RULE PRIOR TO NEYPES
Before the Supreme Court prmulgated Neypes, the rules mandate that the filing of a
motion for reconsideration interrupts the running of the period to appeal; and that
an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final order
appealed from. While the period to file an appeal is counted from the denial of the
motion for reconsideration, the appellant does not have the full fifteen (15) days.
The appellant only has the remaining time of the 15-day appeal period to file the
notice of appeal. Thus, some rules on appeals are:
Sec. 39. [B.P. 129] Appeals. The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions,
awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all these cases shall be fifteen (15)
days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or
decision appealed from. Provided, however, that in habeas corpus cases, the period
for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from the notice of judgment appealed
from. x x x
SEC. 3. [Rule 41] Period of ordinary appeal. - The appeal shall be taken within fifteen
(15) days from the notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a
record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record
on appeal within thirty (30) days from the notice of judgment or final order.

The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed.
SEC. 6. [Rule 122] When appeal to be taken. An appeal must be taken within
fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order
appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be suspended from the
time a motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed until notice of the order
overruling the motion has been served upon the accused or his counsel at which
time the balance of the period begins to run.
IN WHAT CASES APPLICABLE
`Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals
from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for
review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals
from quasi-judicial agencies31 to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing
appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court.32 The new rule aims to regiment or
make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying
the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any
final order or resolution. (Neypes, supra)
Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed;
otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original
appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3. (Neypes, supra)
The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court
which rendered the assailed decision is given another opportunity to review the
case and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment. While we
aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have judgments of courts become final at
some definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly. (Neypes, supra)
APPLICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES
While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Courts
pronouncement of a "fresh period" to appeal should equally apply to the period for
appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, for the following reasons:
First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of Court is based,
makes no distinction between the periods to appeal in a civil case and in a criminal
case. Section 39 of BP 129 categorically states that "[t]he period for appeal from
final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases
shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution,
award, judgment, or decision appealed from." Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we (this Court) also ought
not to recognize any distinction.17
Second, the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, though
differently worded, mean exactly the same. There is no substantial difference
between the two provisions insofar as legal results are concerned the appeal
period stops running upon the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration and
starts to run again upon receipt of the order denying said motion for new trial or
reconsideration. It was this situation that Neypes addressed in civil cases. No reason
exists why this situation in criminal cases cannot be similarly addressed.
Third, while the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal period in
criminal cases under Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

since it involved a purely civil case, it did include Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure on petitions for review from the RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA), and
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governing appeals by certiorari to this
Court, both of which also apply to appeals in criminal cases, as provided by Section
3 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus:
SEC. 3. How appeal taken. x x x x
(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court
in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review under Rule
42.
xxxx
Except as provided in the last paragraph of section 13, Rule 124, all other appeals
to the Supreme Court shall be by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Clearly, if the modes of appeal to the CA (in cases where the RTC exercised its
appellate jurisdiction) and to this Court in civil and criminal cases are the same, no
cogent reason exists why the periods to appeal from the RTC (in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction) to the CA in civil and criminal cases under Section 3 of Rule 41
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure should be treated differently.
Were we to strictly interpret the "fresh period rule" in Neypes and make it applicable
only to the period to appeal in civil cases, we shall effectively foster and encourage
an absurd situation where a litigant in a civil case will have a better right to appeal
than an accused in a criminal case a situation that gives undue favor to civil
litigants and unjustly discriminates against the accused-appellants. It suggests a
double standard of treatment when we favor a situation where property interests
are at stake, as against a situation where liberty stands to be prejudiced. We must
emphatically reject this double and unequal standard for being contrary to reason.
Over time, courts have recognized with almost pedantic adherence that what is
contrary to reason is not allowed in law Quod est inconveniens, aut contra
rationem non permissum est in lege.18 (Judith Yu versus Hon. Rosa Samson-Tatad,
G.R. No. 170979, 09 Feb. 2011)
RETROACTIVE EFFECT
The determinative issue is whether the "fresh period" rule announced
in Neypes could retroactively apply in cases where the period for appeal had lapsed
prior to 14 September 2005 when Neypes was promulgated. That question may be
answered with the guidance of the general rule that procedural laws may be given
retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage,
there being no vested rights in the rules of procedure. 17 Amendments to procedural
rules are procedural or remedial in character as they do not create new or remove
vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of
rights already existing.18
Sps. De los Santos reaffirms these principles and categorically warrants
that Neypes bears the quested retroactive effect, to wit:
Procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of
procedure in order that courts may be able to administer justice. Procedural laws do
not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule
against the retroactive operation of statues they may be given retroactive effect
on actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not
violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, insomuch
as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.
The "fresh period rule" is a procedural law as it prescribes a fresh period of 15 days
within which an appeal may be made in the event that the motion for

reconsideration is denied by the lower court. Following the rule on retroactivity of

procedural laws, the "fresh period rule" should be applied to pending actions, such
as the present case.
Also, to deny herein petitioners the benefit of the "fresh period rule" will amount to
injustice, if not absurdity, since the subject notice of judgment and final order were
issued two years later or in the year 2000, as compared to the notice of judgment
and final order in Neypes which were issued in 1998. It will be incongruous and
illogical that parties receiving notices of judgment and final orders issued in the
year 1998 will enjoy the benefit of the "fresh period rule" while those later rulings of
the lower courts such as in the instant case, will not. 19
Notably, the subject incidents in Sps. De los Santos occurred in August 2000, at the
same month as the relevant incidents at bar. There is no reason to adopt herein a
rule that is divergent from that in Sps. De los Santos. (Fil-Estate Properties, Inc.
versus Hon. Marietta Homena J. Valencia, G.R. No. 173942, 25 June 2008)
NOT INCONSISTENT WITH RULES OF COURT
This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which
states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final
order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word "or" signifies disassociation
and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in
the sense in which it ordinarily implies.33 Hence, the use of "or" in the above
provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the
notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the "final order," which we
already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new
trial or reconsideration. (Neypes, supra)
NEYPES RULE NOT APPLIED
Petitioner was charged with and found guilty of perjury. He was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of 4 months and 1 day to 1 year, a period which is considered as a
correctional penalty. Under Article 9 of the Revised Penal Code, light felonies are
those infractions of law for the commission of which the penalty of arresto menor
(one to thirty days of imprisonment) or a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos
(P200), or both are imposable. Thus, perjury is not a light felony or offense
contemplated by Rule 120, Sec. 6. It was therefore mandatory for petitioner to be
present at the promulgation of the judgment.
To recall, despite notice, petitioner was absent when the MTCC promulgated its
judgment on 25 August 2009. Pursuant to Rule 120, Sec. 6, it is only when the
accused is convicted of a light offense that a promulgation may be pronounced in
the presence of his counsel or representative. In case the accused failed to appear
on the scheduled date of promulgation despite notice, and the failure to appear was
without justifiable cause, the accused shall lose all the remedies available in the
Rules against the judgment. One such remedy was the Motion for Reconsideration of
the judgment of the MTCC filed by petitioner on 28 August 2009. Absent a motion
for leave to avail of the remedies against the judgment, the MTCC should not have
entertained petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, petitioner had only 15
days from 25 August 2009 or until 9 September 2009 to file his Motion for Probation.
The MTCC thus committed grave abuse of discretion when it entertained the motion
instead of immediately denying it. xxx
Petitioner, however, did not file a motion for leave to avail himself of the remedies
prior to filing his Motion for Reconsideration. The hearing on the motion for leave
would have been the proper opportunity for the parties to allege and contest
whatever cause prevented petitioner from appearing on 25 August 2009, and
whether that cause was indeed justifiable. If granted, petitioner would have been

allowed to avail himself of other remedies under the Rules of Court, including a
motion for reconsideration. xxx
As a final point, while we held in Yu v. Samson-Tatad that the rule in Neypes is also
applicable to criminal cases regarding appeals from convictions in criminal cases
under Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, nevertheless, the doctrine is not applicable to
this case, considering that petitioners Motion for Probation was filed out of time.
(Anselmo de Leon Cuyo versus People of the Phils., G.R. No. 192164
October
12,
2011)
EDGARDO PINGA, Petitioner vs. THE HEIRS OF GERMAN, SANTIAGO, Respondents
G.R. No. 170354

June 30, 2006

Facts:
The Heirs of Santiago filed an injunction against Pinga alleging that Pinga had been
unlawfully entering the coco lands of the respondent cutting wood and bamboos
and harvesting the fruits of the coconut trees. As a counterclaim, Pinga contests the
ownership of the lands to which Pinga was harvesting the fruits. However, due to
failures of Heirs of Santiago to attend the hearings, the court ordered the dismissal
of said case.
Respondents thus filed an MR not to reinstate the case but to ask for the entire
action to be dismissed and not to allow petitioner to present evidence ex parte.
RTC granted the MR, hence the counterclaim was dismissed. RTC ruled that
compulsory counterclaims cannot be adjudicated independently of plaintiffs cause
of action vis a vis the dismissal of the complaint carries with it the dismissal of the
counterclaim.
Petitioner then elevates it to the SC by way of Rule 45 on pure questions of law.
(Santiagos motive: They just asked for the dismissal of their entire case so that
their ownership wouldnt be put in controversy in the counterclaim)
Issue:
Whether or not dismissal of original complaint affects that of the compulsory
counter claims?
Ruling:
NO the counterclaims, in this case, can stand on its own.
Rule 17 Sec 3 provides: If for any cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of
his presentation of his evidence x x x the complaint may be dismissed upon motion
of the defendant or upon the courts own motion, without prejudice to the right of
the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action
The dismissal of the complaint does not carry with the dismissal of the
counterclaim, compulsory or otherwise. In fact, the dismissal of the complaint is
without prejudice to the right of defendants to prosecute his counterclaim. Section 3
contemplates a dismissal not procured by plaintiff, albeit justified by causes
imputable to him and which, in the present case, was petitioner's failure to appear
at the pre-trial.
This situation is also covered by Section 3, as extended by judicial interpretation,
and is ordered upon motion of defendant or motu proprio by the court. Here, the

issue of whether defendant has a pending counterclaim, permissive or compulsory,

is not of determinative significance. The dismissal of plaintiff's complaint is
evidently a confirmation of the failure of evidence to prove his cause of action
outlined therein, hence the dismissal is considered, as a matter of evidence, an
adjudication on the merits.
This does not, however, mean that there is likewise such absence of evidence to
prove defendant's counterclaim although the same arises out of the subject matter
of the complaint which was merely terminated for lack of proof. To hold otherwise
would not only work injustice to defendant but would be reading a further provision
into Section 3 and wresting a meaning therefrom although neither exists even by
mere implication.
Thus understood, the complaint can accordingly be dismissed, but relief can
nevertheless be granted as a matter of course to defendant on his counterclaim as
alleged and proved, with or without any reservation therefor on his part, unless from
his conduct, express or implied, he has virtually consented to the concomitant
dismissal of his counterclaim.The present rule embodied in Sections 2 and 3 of Rule
17 ordains a more equitable disposition of the counterclaims by ensuring that any
judgment thereon is based on the merit of the counterclaim itself and not on the
survival of the main complaint.
Certainly, if the counterclaim is palpably without merit or suffers jurisdictional flaws
which stand independent of the complaint, the trial court is not precluded from
dismissing it under the amended rules, provided that the judgment or order
dismissing the counterclaim is premised on those defects. At the same time, if the
counterclaim is justified, the amended rules now unequivocally protect such
counterclaim from peremptory dismissal by reason of the dismissal of the
complaint.
Petition granted.
VDA. DE BARRERA VS HEIRS OF VICENTE LEGASPI, G.R. NO. 174346, SEP. 12, 2008
(ACCION PUBLICIANA/ACCION REIVENDICATORIA)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Under review before this Court is the July 31, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed that of the RTC of Tangub City, ordering the defendants-petitioners
herein, to return possession of the subject property to the plaintiffs-herein
respondents, Heirs of Vicente Legaspi.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On Oct. 1, 1996, petitioner Johnny Oco Jr., said to be a pace officer connected with
the PNP accompanied by unidentified CAFGU members, forced his way into
respondents irrigated farmland located at Liloan, Bonifacio, Misamis Occidental.
After dispossessing respondents of the property, Oco and company used a tractor to
destroy the planted crops, took possession of the land, and had since tended it.
Respondents thus filed on feb. 7, 1997 a complaint before the RTC of Tangub City
for Reconveyance of Possession with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and
Damages against the petitioners.
In their Answer, petitioners claimed that the subject land forms part of a threehectare property described in the OCT issued on Feb. 10, a956 in the name of
Andrea lacson who sold a 2-hectare portion thereof to Elueterio Geonzon who, in
turn, sold 1.1148 thereof to his sister petitioner Fernanda Geonzon vda. de Barrera.
Respondents, on the other hand, asserted that the land was occupied, possessed
and cultivated by their predecessor-in-interest Vicente Legaspi and his wife Lorenza
since 1935; after a subdivision survey was conducted in Nov. 30, 1976, it was found
out that the land formed part of the titled property of Andrea Lacson; and despite of
their discovery, they never filed any action to recover ownership thereof since they
were left undisturbed in the possession until petitioners forced their way into it.

Petitioners raised the issue of ownership as special affirmative defense. In their

Memorandum, however, they questioned the jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject
matter of the complaing, the assessed value of the land being only 11,160.00Php as
reflected in a Tax Declaration.
On the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the trial court, was not
persuaded the defendants arguments, stating that what determines the nature of
the action as well as the jurisdiction of the court are the facts alleged in the
complaint not those alleged in the answer of the defendants.
Petitioners thereupon appealed to the CA which affirmed the trial courts
disposition of the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
The appellate court emphasized that in an accion publiciana, the only issue
involved is the determination of possession de jure.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE/S
Whether the RTC or the MTC had jurisdiction over the case.
Whether the value to be considered for purposes of determining jurisdiction is the
assessed value or the fair market value.
RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT
The petition is meritorious.
Before the amendments introduced by RA No. 7691, the plenary action of accion
publiciana was brought before the RTC. With modifications introduced by RA 7691 in
1994, the jurisdiction of the first level courts has been expanded to include
jurisdiction over other real actions where the assessed value does not exceed
20,000.00Php, 50,000.00Php where the action is filed in Metro Manila. The first level
courts thus have exclusive original jurisdiction over accion publiciana and accion
reivindicatoria where the assessed value of the real property does not exceed the
aforestated amoounts. Accordingly the jurisdictional element is the assessed value
of the property.
Assessed value is understood to be the worth or value of property established
by taxing authorities on the basis of which the tax rate is applied. Commonly,
however, it does not represent the true or market value of the property.
The subject land has an assessed value of 11,160.00Php as reflected in Tax
Declaration No. 7565, a common exhibit of the parties. The bare claim of
repondents that it has a value of 50,000.00 thus fails. The case, therefore, falls
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC.
It was error then for the RTC to take cognizance of the complaint based on the
allegation tht the present estimated value is 50,000.00Php, which allegation is,
oddly, handwritten on the printed pleading. The estimated value, commonly
referred to as fair market value, is entirely different from the assessed value of the
property.

G.R. No. 175723, February 4, 2014 THE CITY OF MANILA ETC., ET AL. v. HON.
CARIDAD H. GRECIA-CUERDO ETC., ET AL
G.R. No. 175723,
February 4, 2014
THE CITY OF MANILA ETC., ET AL. v. HON. CARIDAD H. GRECIA-CUERDO ETC., ET AL
PERALTA, J.:
NATURE:

This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking
to reverse and set aside the Resolutions1 dated April 6, 2006 and November 29,
2006 of the Court of Appeals.
FACTS:
Petitioner City of Manila, through its treasurer, petitioner Liberty Toledo, assessed
taxes for the taxable period from January to December 2002 against the private
respondents.In addition to the taxes purportedly due from private respondents
pursuant to Section 14, 15, 16, 17 of the Revised Revenue Code of Manila (RRCM),
said assessment covered the local business taxes. private respondents were
constrained to pay the P 19,316,458.77 assessment under protest.
On January 24, 2004, private respondents filed before the RTC of Pasay City the
complaint denominated as one for Refund or Recovery of Illegally and/or
ErroneouslyCollected Local Business Tax, Prohibition with Prayer to Issue TRO and
Writ of Preliminary Injunction
The RTC granted private respondents application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration4 but the RTC denied. Petitioners then
filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA but the CA dismissed petitioners
petition for certiorari holding that it has no jurisdiction over the said petition. The CA
ruled that since appellate jurisdiction over private respondents complaint for tax
refund, which was filed with the RTC, is vested in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA),
pursuant to its expanded jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 9282 (RA 9282), it
follows that a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory order
issued in the said case should, likewise, be filed with the CTA.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,7 but the CA denied it in its Resolution
hence, this petition
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action
for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case.
HELD:
The CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an
interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case. In order for any appellate
court to effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it must have the authority to
issue, among others, a writ of certiorari. In transferring exclusive jurisdiction over
appealed tax cases to the CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the law intended
to transfer also such power as is deemed necessary, if not indispensable, in aid of
such appellate jurisdiction. There is no perceivable reason why the transfer should
only be considered as partial, not total.
Consistent with the above pronouncement, the Court has held as early as the case
of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al. [118 Phil. 1022 (1963)] that if a case
may be appealed to a particular court or judicial tribunal or body, then said court or
judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari,
in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This principle was affirmed in De Jesus v. Court of
Appeals (G.R. No. 101630, August 24, 1992) where the Court stated that a court
may issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction if said court has
jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ of error, the final orders or decisions of the
lower court.
FALLO: petition is denied

The Value of the Subject Matter Cannot be Estimated

On the claim that the complaint had for its objective the nullification of the issuance
of 600,000 shares of stock of LLDC, the real value of which based on underlying real
estate values, as alleged in the complaint, stands atP1,087,055,105, the Courts
assailed August 4, 2009 Resolution found:
Upon deeper reflection, we find that the movants [Lu Ym father & sons] claim has
merit. The 600,000 shares of stock were, indeed, properties in litigation. They were
the subject matter of the complaint, and the relief prayed for entailed the
nullification of the transfer thereof and their return to LLDC. David, et al., are
minority shareholders of the corporation who claim to have been prejudiced by the
sale of the shares of stock to the Lu Ym father and sons. Thus, to the extent of the
damage or injury they allegedly have suffered from this sale of the shares of stock,
the action they filed can be characterized as one capable of pecuniary estimation.
The shares of stock have a definite value, which was declared by plaintiffs [David
Lu, et al.] themselves in their complaint. Accordingly, the docket fees should have
been computed based on this amount. This is clear from the following version of
Rule 141, Section 7, which was in effect at the time the complaint was
filed[.]21 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The said Resolution added that the value of the 600,000 shares of stock, which are
the properties in litigation, should be the basis for the computation of the filing fees.
It bears noting, however, that David, et al. are not claiming to own these shares.
They do not claim to be the owners thereof entitled to be the transferees of the
shares of stock. The mention of the real value of the shares of stock, over which
David, et al. do not, it bears emphasis, interpose a claim of right to recovery,
is merely narrative or descriptive in order to emphasize the inequitable price at
which the transfer was effected.
The assailed August 4, 2009 Resolution also stated that "to the extent of the
damage or injury [David, et al.] allegedly have suffered from this sale," the action
"can be characterized as one capable of pecuniary estimation." The Resolution does
not, however, explore the value of the extent of the damage or injury. Could it be
the pro rata decrease (e.g., from 20% to 15%) of the percentage shareholding of
David, et al. vis--vis to the whole?
Whatever property, real or personal, that would be distributed to the stockholders
would be a mere consequence of the main action. In the end, in the event LLDC is
dissolved, David, et al. would not be getting the value of the 600,000 shares, but
only the value of their minority number of shares, which are theirs to begin with.
The complaint filed by David, et al. is one for declaration of nullity of share
issuance. The main relief prayed for both in the original complaint and the amended
complaint is the same, that is, to declare null and void the issuance of 600,000
unsubscribed and unissued shares to Lu Ym father and sons, et al. for a price of
1/18 of their real value, for being inequitable, having been done in breach of
directors fiduciarys duty to stockholders, in violation of the minority stockholders
rights, and with unjust enrichment.
As judiciously discussed in the Courts August 26, 2008 Decision, the test in
determining whether the subject matter of an action is incapable of pecuniary
estimation is by ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. It
explained:
x x x To be sure, the annulment of the shares, the dissolution of the corporation and
the appointment of receivers/management committee are actions which do not
consist in the recovery of a sum of money. If, in the end, a sum of money or real
property would be recovered, it would simply be the consequence of such principal
action. Therefore, the case before the RTC was incapable of pecuniary
estimation.22 (italics in the original, emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Actions which the Court has recognized as being incapable of pecuniary estimation
include legality of conveyances. In a case involving annulment of contract, the Court
found it to be one which cannot be estimated:
Petitioners argue that an action for annulment or rescission of a contract of sale of
real property is a real action and, therefore, the amount of the docket fees to be
paid by private respondent should be based either on the assessed value of the
property, subject matter of the action, or its estimated value as alleged in the
complaint, pursuant to the last paragraph of 7(b) of Rule 141, as amended by the
Resolution of the Court dated September 12, 1990. Since private respondents
alleged that the land, in which they claimed an interest as heirs, had been sold for
P4,378,000.00 to petitioners, this amount should be considered the estimated value
of the land for the purpose of determining the docket fees.
On the other hand, private respondents counter that an action for annulment or
rescission of a contract of sale of real property is incapable of pecuniary estimation
and, so, the docket fees should be the fixed amount of P400.00 in Rule 141, 7(b)
(1). In support of their argument, they cite the cases of Lapitan v. Scandia,
Inc. and Bautista v. Lim. In Lapitan this Court, in an opinion by Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
held:
A review of the jurisprudence of this Court indicates that in determining whether an
action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, this
Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal
action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the
claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in
the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount
of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to
recover a sum of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the principal relief sought, like in suits to have the defendant
perform his part of the contract (specific performance) and in actions for support, or
for annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered
such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in
terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance. The
rationale of the rule is plainly that the second class cases, besides the
determination of damages, demand an inquiry into other factors which the law has
deemed to be more within the competence of courts of first instance, which were
the lowest courts of record at the time that the first organic laws of the Judiciary
were enacted allocating jurisdiction (Act 136 of the Philippine Commission of June
11, 1901).
Actions for specific performance of contracts have been expressly pronounced to be
exclusively cognizable by courts of first instance: De Jesus vs. Judge Garcia, L26816, February 28, 1967; Manufacturer's Distributors, Inc. vs. Yu Siu Liong, L21285, April 29, 1966. And no cogent reason appears, and none is here advanced
by the parties, why an action for rescission (or resolution) should be differently
treated, a "rescission" being a counterpart, so to speak, of "specific performance".
In both cases, the court would certainly have to undertake an investigation into
facts that would justify one act or the other. No award for damages may be had in
an action for rescission without first conducting an inquiry into matters which would
justify the setting aside of a contract, in the same manner that courts of first
instance would have to make findings of fact and law in actions not capable of
pecuniary estimation expressly held to be so by this Court, arising from issues like
those raised in Arroz v. Alojado, et al., L-22153, March 31, 1967 (the legality or
illegality of the conveyance sought for and the determination of the validity of the
money deposit made); De Ursua v. Pelayo, L-13285, April 18, 1950 (validity of a
judgment); Bunayog v. Tunas, L-12707, December 23, 1959 (validity of a
mortgage); Baito v. Sarmiento, L-13105, August 25, 1960 (the relations of the
parties, the right to support created by the relation, etc., in actions for support), De
Rivera, et al. v. Halili, L-15159, September 30, 1963 (the validity or nullity of
documents upon which claims are predicated). Issues of the same nature may be

raised by a party against whom an action for rescission has been brought, or by the
plaintiff himself. It is, therefore, difficult to see why a prayer for damages in an
action for rescission should be taken as the basis for concluding such action as one
capable of pecuniary estimation a prayer which must be included in the main
action if plaintiff is to be compensated for what he may have suffered as a result of
the breach committed by defendant, and not later on precluded from recovering
damages by the rule against splitting a cause of action and discouraging multiplicity
of suits.23 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
IN FINE, the Court holds that David Lu, et al.s complaint is one incapable of
pecuniary estimation, hence, the correct docket fees were paid. The Court thus
proceeds to tackle the arguments on estoppel and lien, mindful that the succeeding
discussions rest merely on a contrary assumption, viz., that there was deficient
payment.
Estoppel Has Set In
Assuming arguendo that the docket fees were insufficiently paid, the doctrine of
estoppel already applies.
The assailed August 4, 2009 Resolution cited Vargas v. Caminas24 on the nonapplicability of the Tijam doctrinewhere the issue of jurisdiction was, in fact, raised
before the trial court rendered its decision. Thus the Resolution explained:
Next, the Lu Ym father and sons filed a motion for the lifting of the receivership
order, which the trial court had issued in the interim. David, et al., brought the
matter up to the CA even before the trial court could resolve the motion. Thereafter,
David, at al., filed their Motion to Admit Complaint to Conform to the Interim Rules
Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies. It was at this point that the Lu Ym father
and sons raised the question of the amount of filing fees paid. They also raised this
point again in the CA when they appealed the trial courts decision in the case
below.
We find that, in the circumstances, the Lu Ym father and sons are not estopped from
challenging the jurisdiction of the trial court. They raised the insufficiency of the
docket fees before the trial court rendered judgment and continuously maintained
their position even on appeal to the CA. Although the manner of challenge
waserroneous they should have addressed this issue directly to the trial court
instead of the OCA they should not be deemed to have waived their right to assail
the jurisdiction of the trial court. 25 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Lu Ym father and sons did not raise the issue before the trial court. The narration of
facts in the Courts original decision shows that Lu Ym father and sons merely
inquired from the Clerk of Court on the amount of paid docket fees on January 23,
2004. They thereafter still "speculat[ed] on the fortune of litigation." 26 Thirty-seven
days later or on March 1, 2004 the trial court rendered its decision adverse to them.
Meanwhile, Lu Ym father and sons attempted to verify the matter of docket fees
from the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). In their Application for the
issuance a writ of preliminary injunction filed with the Court of Appeals, they still
failed to question the amount of docket fees paid by David Lu, et al. It was only in
their Motion for Reconsideration of the denial by the appellate court of their
application for injunctive writ that they raised such issue.
Lu Ym father and sons further inquiry from the OCA cannot redeem them. A mere
inquiry from an improper officeat that, could not, by any stretch, be considered as
an act of having raised the jurisdictional question prior to the rendition of the trial
courts decision. In one case, it was held:

Here it is beyond dispute that respondents paid the full amount of docket fees as
assessed by the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch 17, where they filed the complaint. If petitioners believed that the
assessment was incorrect, they should have questioned it before the trial
court. Instead, petitioners belatedly question the alleged underpayment of docket
fees through this petition, attempting to support their position with the opinion and
certification of the Clerk of Court of another judicial region. Needless to state, such
certification has no bearing on the instant case.27 (italics in the original; emphasis
and underscoring in the original)
The inequity resulting from the abrogation of the whole proceedings at this late
stage when the decision subsequently rendered was adverse to the father and sons
is precisely the evil being avoided by the equitable principle of estoppel.
No Intent to Defraud the Government
Assuming arguendo that the docket fees paid were insufficient, there is no proof of
bad faith to warrant a dismissal of the complaint, hence, the following doctrine
applies:
x x x In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., (SIOL) v. Asuncion, this Court ruled that the filing
of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the
prescribed docket fee vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or
nature of the action. If the amount of docket fees paid is insufficient considering the
amount of the claim, the clerk of court of the lower court involved or his duly
authorized deputy has the responsibility of making a deficiency assessment. The
party filing the case will be required to pay the deficiency, but jurisdiction is not
automatically lost.28 (underscoring supplied)
The assailed Resolution of August 4, 2009 held, however, that the above-quoted
doctrine does not apply since there was intent to defraud the government, citing
one attendant circumstance the annotation of notices of lis pendens on real
properties owned by LLDC. It deduced:
From the foregoing, it is clear that a notice of lis pendens is availed of mainly in real
actions. Hence, when David,et al., sought the annotation of notices of lis
pendens on the titles of LLDC, they acknowledged that the complaint they had filed
affected a title to or a right to possession of real properties. At the very least, they
must have been fully aware that the docket fees would be based on the value of the
realties involved. Their silence or inaction to point this out to the Clerk of Court who
computed their docket fees, therefore, becomes highly suspect, and thus, sufficient
for this Court to conclude that they have crossed beyond the threshold of good faith
and into the area of fraud. Clearly, there was an effort to defraud the government in
avoiding to pay the correct docket fees. Consequently, the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case.29
All findings of fraud should begin the exposition with the presumption of good faith.
The inquiry is not whether there was good faith on the part of David, et al., but
whether there was bad faith on their part.
The erroneous annotation of a notice of lis pendens does not negate good faith. The
overzealousness of a party in protecting pendente lite his perceived interest,
inchoate or otherwise, in the corporations properties from depletion or dissipation,
should not be lightly equated to bad faith.
That notices of lis pendens were erroneously annotated on the titles does not have
the effect of changing the nature of the action. The aggrieved party is not left
without a remedy, for they can move to cancel the annotations. The assailed August
4, 2009 Resolution, however, deemed such act as an acknowledgement that the
case they filed was a real action, concerning as it indirectly does the corporate
realties, the titles of which were allegedly annotated. This conclusion does not help

much in ascertaining the filing fees because the value of these real properties and
the value of the 600,000 shares of stock are different.
Further, good faith can be gathered from the series of amendments on the
provisions on filing fees, that the Court was even prompted to make a
clarification.1avvphi1
When David Lu, et al. filed the Complaint on August 14, 2000 or five days after the
effectivity of the Securities Regulation Code or Republic Act No. 8799, 30 the then
Section 7 of Rule 141 was the applicable provision, without any restricted reference
to paragraphs (a) and (b) 1 & 3 or paragraph (a) alone. Said section then provided:
SEC. 7. Clerks of Regional Trial Courts.
(a) For filing an action or a permissive counterclaim or money claim against
an estate not based on judgment, or for filing with leave of court a thirdparty, fourth-party, etc. complaint, or a complaint in intervention, and for all
clerical services in the same, if the total sum claimed, exclusive of
interest, or thestated value of the property in litigation, is:
xxxx
(b) For filing:
1.

Actions where the value of the subject

matter cannot be estimated

.
.. x x
x

2. Special civil actions except judicial

foreclosure of mortgage which shall be
governed by paragraph (a) above

....
. x x
x

3.

.
x x
x

All other actions not involving property

In a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the
estimated value thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in
computing the fees.
x x x x31 (emphasis supplied)
The Court, by Resolution of September 4, 2001 in A. M. No. 00-8-10-SC, 32 clarified
the matter of legal fees to be collected in cases formerly cognizable by the
Securities and Exchange Commission following their transfer to the RTC.
Clarification has been sought on the legal fees to be collected and the period of
appeal applicable in cases formerly cognizable by the Securities and Exchange
Commission. It appears that the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate
Rehabilitation and the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies
do not provide the basis for the assessment of filing fees and the period of appeal in
cases transferred from the Securities and Exchange Commission to particular
Regional Trial Courts.
The nature of the above mentioned cases should first be ascertained. Section 3(a),
Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action as one by which a
party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong. It further states that a civil action may either be ordinary or
special, both being governed by the rules for ordinary civil actions subject to the
special rules prescribed for special civil actions. Section 3(c) of the same Rule,

defines a special proceeding as a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a

status, a right, or a particular fact.
Applying these definitions, the cases covered by the Interim Rules for IntraCorporate Controversies should be considered as ordinary civil actions. These cases
either seek the recovery of damages/property or specific performance of an act
against a party for the violation or protection of a right. These cases are:
(1) Devices or schemes employed by, or any act of, the board of directors,
business associates, officers or partners, amounting to fraud or
misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the interest of the public
and/or of the stockholders, partners, or members of any corporation,
partnership, or association;
(2) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate, partnership, or association
relations, between and among stockholders, members or associates; and
between, any or all of them and the corporation, partnership, or association
of which they are stockholders, members or associates, respectively;
(3) Controversies in the election or appointment of directors, trustees,
officers, or managers of corporations, partnerships, or associations;
(4) Derivative suits; and
(5) Inspection of corporate books.
On the other hand, a petition for rehabilitation, the procedure for which is provided
in the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Recovery, should be considered as a
special proceeding. It is one that seeks to establish the status of a party or a
particular fact. As provided in section 1, Rule 4 of the Interim Rules on Corporate
Recovery, the status or fact sought to be established is the inability of the corporate
debtor to pay its debts when they fall due so that a rehabilitation plan, containing
the formula for the successful recovery of the corporation, may be approved in the
end. It does not seek a relief from an injury caused by another party.
Section 7 of Rule 141 (Legal Fees) of the Revised Rules of Court lays the amount of
filing fees to be assessed for actions or proceedings filed with the Regional Trial
Court. Section 7(a) and (b) apply to ordinary civil actionswhile 7(d) and (g) apply to
special proceedings.
In fine, the basis for computing the filing fees in intra-corporate cases shall
be section 7(a) and (b) l & 3of Rule 141. For petitions for rehabilitation, section 7(d)
shall be applied. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The new Section 21(k) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No.
04-2-04-SC33 (July 20, 2004), expressly provides that "[f]or petitions for insolvency
or other cases involving intra-corporate controversies, the fees prescribed
under Section 7(a) shall apply." Notatu dignum is that paragraph (b) 1 & 3 of
Section 7 thereof was omitted from the reference. Said paragraph34 refers to docket
fees for filing "[a]ctions where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated"
and "all other actions not involving property."
By referring the computation of such docket fees to paragraph (a) only, it denotes
that an intra-corporate controversy always involves a property in litigation, the
value of which is always the basis for computing the applicable filing fees. The
latest amendments seem to imply that there can be no case of intra-corporate
controversy where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated. Even one
for a mere inspection of corporate books.

If the complaint were filed today, one could safely find refuge in the express
phraseology of Section 21 (k) of Rule 141 that paragraph (a) alone applies.
In the present case, however, the original Complaint was filed on August 14, 2000
during which time Section 7, without qualification, was the applicable provision.
Even the Amended Complaint was filed on March 31, 2003 during which time the
applicable rule expressed that paragraphs (a) and (b) l & 3 shall be the basis for
computing the filing fees in intra-corporate cases, recognizing that there could be
an intra-corporate controversy where the value of the subject matter cannot be
estimated, such as an action for inspection of corporate books. The immediate
illustration shows that no mistake can even be attributed to the RTC clerk of court in
the assessment of the docket fees.
Finally, assuming there was deficiency in paying the docket fees and assuming
further that there was a mistake in computation, the deficiency may be considered
a lien on the judgment that may be rendered, there being no established intent to
defraud the government.

Villagracia vs. Fifth (5th) Shari'a District Court, G.R. No. 188832, April 23, 2014
REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; SHARI'A COURTS: Shari' a District Courts have no
jurisdiction over real actions where one of the parties is not a Muslim. All told,
Sharia District Courts have jurisdiction over a real action only when the parties
involved are Muslims. Respondent Fifth Sharia District Court acted without
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of Roldan E. Malas action for recovery of
possession considering that Vivencio B. Villagracia is not a Muslim. Accordingly, the
proceedings in SDC Special Proceedings Case No. 07-200, including the judgment
rendered, are void.
REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; CONFERRED BY LAW: Jurisdiction over the subject
matter is "the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the
proceedings in question belong." This power is conferred by law, which may either
be the Constitution or a statute. Since subject matter jurisdiction is a matter of law,
parties cannot choose, consent to, or agree as to what court or tribunal should
decide their disputes. If a court hears, tries, and decides an action in which it has no
jurisdiction, all its proceedings, including the judgment rendered, are void.
REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT: To determine
whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, the material
allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought are examined.

Quinagoran v CA
Facts:

The heirs of Juan dela Cruz, represented by Senen dela Cruz filed a Complaint for
Recovery of Portion of Registered Land with Compensation and Damages
against Victorino Quinagoran before the RTC Cagayan. They alleged that they are
the co-owners of a a parcel of land at Centro, Piat, Cagayan, which they inherited
from the late Juan dela Cruz.
Quinagoran started occupying a house on the north-west portion of the property, by
tolerance of the heirs. The heirs asked petitioner to remove the house as they
planned to construct a commercial building on the property but petitioner refused,
claiming ownership over the lot.
The heirs prayed for the reconveyance and surrender of the disputed lot and to be
paid the amount of P5,000.00 monthly until the property is vacated.
Quinagoran filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming that the RTC has no jurisdiction over
the case under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, which expanded the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) to include all civil actions which
involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein which does
not exceed P20,000.00. He argued that since the lot which he owns adjacent to the
contested property has an assessed value of P1,730, the assessed value of the lot
under controversy would not be more than the said amount. He likewise avers that
it is an indispensable requirement that the complaint should allege the assessed
value of the property involved.
The heirs maintain that the contention of petitioner in his Motion to Dismiss before
the RTC that the assessed value of the disputed lot is below P20,000.00 is based on
the assessed value of an adjacent property and no documentary proof was shown to
support the said allegation. It also contended that the tax declaration which
petitioner presented, together with his Supplemental Reply before the CA, and on
the basis of which he claims that the disputed property's assessed value is
only P551.00, should also not be given credence as the said tax declaration reflects
the amount of P56,100.or the entire property.
The RTC denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss on the basis that the action is accion
publicciana and therefore, its jurisdiction lies in the RTC, regardless of the value of
the property. The CA affirmed decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over all cases of recovery of possession
regardless of the value of the property involved?
Held:
NO. Jurisdiction lies in the MTC.
The doctrine that all cases of recovery of possession or accion publiciana lies with
the RTC regardless of the value of the property -- no longer holds true. As things
now stand, a distinction must be made between those properties the assessed
value of which is below P20,000.00, if outside Metro Manila; and P50,000.00, if
within.
Republic Act No. 7691 expressly provides:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of, real property, or
any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds
Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred
upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts.

In Atuel v. Valdez, the Court likewise expressly stated that:

Jurisdiction over an accion publiciana is vested in a court of general
jurisdiction. Specifically, the regional trial court exercises exclusive original
jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve x x x possession of real
property. However, if the assessed value of the real property involved does not
exceed P50,000.00 in Metro Manila, and P20,000.00 outside of Metro Manila, the
municipal trial court exercises jurisdiction over actions to recover possession of real
property.
In the case, Quinagoran maintains that there should be such an allegation of
the assessed value of the real property to determine jurisdiction. However, nowhere
in said complaint was the assessed value of the subject property ever
mentioned. There is therefore no showing on the face of the complaint that the RTC
has exclusive jurisdiction over the action of the respondents. Absent any allegation
in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, it cannot be determined
whether the RTC or the MTC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
petitioner's action. The courts cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or market
value of the land.
Considering that the respondents failed to allege in their complaint the
assessed value of the subject property, the RTC seriously erred in denying the
motion to dismiss. Consequently, all proceedings in the RTC are null and void. The
CA also erred in affirming the RTC.

BALLATAN vs. CA
G.R. No. 125683 March 2, 1999
FACTS: The parties herein are owners of adjacent lots located at Block No. 3,
Poinsettia Street, Araneta University Village, Malabon, Metro Manila. Lot No. 24, is
registered in the name of petitioners Eden Ballatan and spouses Betty Martinez and
Chong Chy Ling. Lots Nos. 25 and 26, are registered in the name of respondent
Gonzalo Go, Sr. On Lot No. 25, respondent Winston Go, son of Gonzalo Go, Sr.,
constructed his house. Adjacent to Lot No. 26 is Lot No. 27, and is registered in the
name of respondent Li Ching Yao. In 1985, petitioner Ballatan constructed her house
on Lot No. 24. During the construction, she noticed that the concrete fence and side
pathway of the adjoining house of respondent Winston Go encroached on the entire
length of the eastern side of her property. Petitioner Ballatan called the attention of
the AIA to the discrepancy of the land area in her title and the actual land area
received from them. The AIA authorized another survey of the land by Engineer Jose

N. Quedding. On June 2, 1985, Engineer Quedding found that Lot No. 24 lost
approximately 25 square meters on its eastern boundary that Lot No. 25, although
found to have encroached on Lot No. 24, did not lose nor gain any area; that Lot No.
26 lost some three (3) square meters which, however, were gained by Lot No. 27 on
its western boundary. In short, Lots Nos. 25, 26 and 27 moved westward to the
eastern boundary of Lot No. 24. On the basis of this survey, petitioner Ballatan
made a written demand on respondents Go to remove and dismantle their
improvements on Lot No. 24. Respondents Go refused. The parties including Li
Ching Yao, however, met several times to reach an agreement one matter. On April
1, 1986, petitioner Ballatan instituted against respondents Go a Civil Case for
recovery of possession before the RTC, Malabon. The Go's filed their "Answer with
Third-Party Complaint" impleading as third-party defendants respondents Li Ching
Yao, the AIA and Engineer Quedding. On August 23, 1990, RTC decided in favor of
petitioners. Respondents Go appealed. On March 25, 1996, the CA modified the
decision of the trial court. It affirmed the dismissal of the third-party complaint
against the AIA but reinstated the complaint against Li Ching Yao and Jose
Quedding. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners question the
admission by respondent CA of the third-party complaint by respondents Go against
the AIA, Jose Quedding and Li Ching Yao. Petitioners claim that the third-party
complaint should not have been considered by the Court of Appeals for lack of
jurisdiction due to third-party plaintiffs' failure to pay the docket and filing fees
before the trial court.
ISSUE: WON CA erred in admitting the third-party complaint despite the failure of
respondents GOs to pay the docket and filing fees before the trial court.
RULING: The third-party complaint in the instant case arose from the complaint of
petitioners against respondents Go. The complaint filed was for accion
publiciana, i.e., the recovery of possession of real property which is a real action.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that when an action is filed in court, the complaint
must be accompanied the payment of the requisite docket and filing fees. In real
actions, the docket and filing fees are based on the value of the property and the
amount of damages claimed, if any If the complaint is filed but the fees are not
paid at the time of filing, the court acquires jurisdiction upon full payment of the
fees within a reasonable time as the court may grant, barring prescription. Where
the fees prescribed for the real action have been paid but the fees of certain related
damages are not, the court, although having jurisdiction over the real action, may
not
have
acquired
jurisdiction
over
the
accompanying
claim
for
damages. Accordingly, the court may expunge those claims for damages, or allow,
on motion, a reasonable time for amendment of the complaint so as to allege the
precise amount of damages and accept payment of the requisite legal fee. If there
are unspecified claims, the determination of which may arise after the filing of the
complaint or similar pleading, the additional filing fee thereon shall constitute a lien
on the judgment award. The same rule also applies to third-party claims and other
similar pleadings. In the case at bar, the third-party complaint filed by respondents
Go was incorporated in their answer to the complaint. The third-party complaint
sought the same remedy as the principal complaint but added a prayer for
attorney's fees and costs without specifying their amounts. The Court of Appeal did
not err in awarding damages despite the Go's failure to specify the amount prayed
for and pay the corresponding additional filing fees thereon. The claim for attorney's
fees refers to damages arising after the filing of the complaint against the Go's. The
additional filing fee on this claim is deemed to constitute a lien on the judgment
award.

GEORGE LEONARD S. UMALE v. CANOGA PARK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, G.R.

No.
167246,
July
20,
2011
Generally, a suit may only be instituted for a single cause of action. If two or more
suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a
judgment on the merits in any one is ground for the dismissal of the others. Several

tests exist to ascertain whether two suits relate to a single or common cause of
action, such as whether the same evidence would support and sustain both the first
and second causes of action (also known as the same evidence test) or whether
the defenses in one case may be used to substantiate the complaint in the other.
Also fundamental is the test of determining whether the cause of action in the
second case existed at the time of the filing of the first complaint. The facts clearly
show that the filing of the first ejectment case was grounded on the petitioners
violation of stipulations in the lease contract, while the filing of the second case was
based on the expiration of the lease contract.

GEORGE LEONARD S. UMALE vs CANOGA PARK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION G.R.

No. 167246 July 20, 2011
Facts:
On January 4, 2000, the parties entered into a Contract of Lease on an eight
hundred sixty (860)-square-meter prime lot located in Ortigas Center, Pasig City
owned by the respondent. The respondent acquired the subject lot from Ortigas &
Co. Ltd. Partnership through a Deed of Absolute Sale, subject to the some
conditions
On October 10, 2000, before the lease contract expired, the respondent filed
an unlawful detainer case against the petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MTC)-Branch 68, Pasig City. The respondent used as a ground for ejectment the
petitioners violation of stipulations in the lease contract regarding the use of the
property. MTC decide in favor of the respondent. RTC-Branch 155 affirmed. The case,
however, was re-raffled to the RTC-Branch 267, granted the petitioners motion,
thereby reversing and setting aside the MTC-Branch 68 decision. Accordingly, Civil
Case No. 8084 was dismissed for being prematurely filed. Thus, the respondent filed
a petition for review with the CA. During the pendency of the petition for review, the
respondent filed on May 3, 2002 another case for unlawful detainer against the
petitioner before the MTC. Respondent used as a ground for ejectment the
expiration of the parties lease contract. MTC rendered a decision in favor of the
respondent. On appeal, the RTC-Branch 68 reversed and set aside the decision of
the MTC-Branch 71, and dismissed Civil Case No. 9210 on the ground of litis
pendentia.
Issue:
Whether Civil Case Nos. 8084 and 9210 involve the same cause of action.
Held:
We rule that Civil Case Nos. 8084 and 9210 involve different causes of action.
Generally, a suit may only be instituted for a single cause of action. If two or more
suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a
judgment on the merits in any one is ground for the dismissal of the others. Several
tests exist to ascertain whether two suits relate to a single or common cause of
action, such as whether the same evidence would support and sustain both the first
and second causes of action (also known as the same evidence test),or whether
the defenses in one case may be used to substantiate the complaint in the other.
Also fundamental is the test of determining whether the cause of action in the
second case existed at the time of the filing of the first complaint.
Of the three tests cited, the third one is especially applicable to the present
case, i.e., whether the cause of action in the second case existed at the time of the
filing of the first complaint and to which we answer in the negative. The facts
clearly show that the filing of the first ejectment case was grounded on the
petitioners violation of stipulations in the lease contract, while the filing of the
second case was based on the expiration of the lease contract. At the time the
respondent filed the first ejectment complaint on October 10, 2000, the lease
contract between the parties was still in effect. The lease was fixed for a period of
two (2) years, from January 16, 2000, and in the absence of a renewal agreed upon
by the parties, the lease remained effective until January 15, 2002. It was only at
the expiration of the lease contract that the cause of action in the second ejectment

complaint accrued and made available to the respondent as a ground for ejecting
the petitioner. Thus, the cause of action in the second case was not yet in existence
at the time of filing of the first ejectment case. Thus, the respondent cannot be said
to have committed a willful and deliberate forum shopping. Hence, petition is
DENIED.
ROGER V. NAVARRO vs. HON. JOSE L. ESCOBIDO

FACTS: Respondent Karen T. Go filed two complaints before the RTC for replevin
and/or sum of money with damages against Navarro. In these complaints, Karen Go
prayed that the RTC issue writs of replevin for the seizure of two (2) motor vehicles
in Navarros possession. In his Answers, Navarro alleged as a special affirmative
defense that the two complaints stated no cause of action, since Karen Go was not a
party to the Lease Agreements with Option to Purchase (collectively, the lease
agreements) the actionable documents on which the complaints were based. RTC
dismissed the case but set aside the dismissal on the presumption that Glenn Gos
(husband) leasing business is a conjugal property and thus ordered Karen Go to file
a motion for the inclusion of Glenn Go as co-plaintiff as per Rule 4, Section 3 of the
Rules of Court. Navarro filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. According to
Navarro, a complaint which failed to state a cause of action could not be converted
into one with a cause of action by mere amendment or supplemental pleading. CA
denied petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Karen Go is a real party in interest.
HELD: YES. Karen Go is the registered owner of the business name Kargo
Enterprises, as the registered owner of Kargo Enterprises, Karen Go is the party who
will directly benefit from or be injured by a judgment in this case. Thus, contrary to
Navarros contention, Karen Go is the real party-in-interest, and it is legally incorrect
to say that her Complaint does not state a cause of action because her name did
not appear in the Lease Agreement that her husband signed in behalf of Kargo
Enterprises.
Glenn and Karen Go are effectively co-owners of Kargo Enterprises and the
properties registered under this name; hence, both have an equal right to seek
possession of these properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the
co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an
indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners are not indispensable parties.
They are not even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be accorded in the
suit even without their participation, since the suit is presumed to have been filed
for the benefit of all co-owners.
We hold that since Glenn Go is not strictly an indispensable party in the action to
recover possession of the leased vehicles, he only needs to be impleaded as a proforma party to the suit, based on Section 4, Rule 4 of the Rules, which states:
Section 4.Spouses as parties. Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly,
except as provided by law.
Even assuming that Glenn Go is an indispensable party to the action, misjoinder or
non-joinder of indispensable parties in a complaint is not a ground for dismissal of
action as per Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court.
SEPULVEDA vs. PELAEZ
January 31, 2005
SUMMARY: Atty. Pelaez filed a complaint against his granduncle Pedro Sepulveda, Sr.
for the recovery of
possession and ownership of his undivided share of several parcels of land. RTC and
CA decided in favor of Pelaez,
but the SC ordered the case dismissed for the failure of Pelaez to implead the ff.
indispensable parties in his

complaint: his father, Rodolfo Pelaez; the heirs of Santiago Sepulveda, namely, Paz
Sepulveda and their children;
and the City of Danao.
DOCTRINE: The presence of all indispensable parties is a condition sine qua non for
the exercise of judicial power.
It is precisely when an indispensable party is not before the court that the action
should be dismissed. Thus, the
plaintiff is mandated to implead all the indispensable parties, considering that the
absence of one such party
renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act,
not only as to the absent
parties but even as to those present.

FACTS: On December 6, 1972, private respondent Atty. Pacifico Pelaez filed a

complaint against his granduncle,Pedro Sepulveda, Sr., for the recovery of
possession and ownership of his 1/2 undivided share of several parcels ofland; his
undivided 1/3 share in several other lots; and for the partition thereof among the
co-owners.
The 11 lots were among the 25 parcels of land, which Dulce (private respondent's
mother) and her uncles Pedro andSantiago co-owned, each with an undivided 1/3
share thereof.
In his complaint, the private respondent claims that his grandmother Carlota
repeatedly demanded the delivery of her mothers share in the 11 parcels of land,
but Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. who by then was the Municipal Mayor of Tudela, refused to
do so. Dulce, likewise, later demanded the delivery of her share in the eleven
parcels of land, but Pedro still refused. The private respondent alleged that he
himself demanded the delivery of his mothers share in the subject properties on so
many occasions, the last of which was in 1972, to no avail.
The private respondent further narrated that his granduncle executed an affidavit
stating that he was the sole heir of Dionisia when she died intestate in 1921, when,
in fact, the latter was survived by her three sons, Santiago, Pedro and Vicente.
Pedro also executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property covered by T.D. No.
19804 in favor of the City of Danao, and received P7,492 without his (private
respondents) knowledge.
The private respondent prayed that he be declared the absolute owner of his
portions of the parcels of land, that said parcels of land be partitioned and
segregated, and that he be given his share of P7,492 representing the purchase
price of the parcel of land sold to the City of Danao.
In his answer to the complaint, Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. admitted having executed a
deed of sale over the parcel of land covered by T.D. No. 19804 in favor of Danao
City, but averred that the latter failed to pay the purchase price thereof; besides,
the private respondent had no right to share in the proceeds of the said sale. He
likewise denied having received any demand for the delivery of Dulces share of the
subject properties from the latters mother Carlota, or from the private respondent.
During the trial, Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. died intestate. A petition for the settlement of
his estate was filed with the RTC of Cebu. His daughter, petitioner Socorro
Sepulveda Lawas, was appointed administratrix of his estate and substituted the
deceased in this case.
According to the petitioner, Dulce and Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. had a verbal agreement
wherein the eleven parcels of land covered by the complaint would serve as the
latters compensation for his services as administrator of Dionisias estate. Thus,
upon the termination of Special Proceeding No. 778-0, and subsequent to the
distribution of the shares of Dionisias heirs, Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. then became the
sole owner of Dulces shares.
The petitioner likewise adduced evidence that Santiago Sepulveda died intestate
and was survived by his wife, Paz Velez Sepulveda and their then minor children. It
was pointed out that the private respondent failed to implead Paz Sepulveda and
her minor children as parties-defendants in the complaint.

It was further claimed that Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. declared the property covered by
T.D. No. 18199 under his name for taxation purposes since the beginning of 1948. It
was likewise alleged that the 11 parcels of land deeded to Dulce under the Project
of Partition had been declared for taxation purposes under the name of Pedro
Sepulveda since 1974, and that he and his heirs paid the realty taxes thereon.
TC in favor of the private respondent: The private respondents action for
reconveyance based on constructive trust had not yet prescribed when the
complaint was filed; that he was entitled to a share in the proceeds of the sale of
the property to Danao City; and that the partition of the subject property among the
adjudicatees thereof was in order.
Petitioner appealed the decision to the CA.
CA affirmed the appealed decision with modification. The petitioner now comes to
the Court via a petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: WON private respondent's action will prosper, despite having failed to
implead all the indispensable
parties in his complaint - NO
RATIO: It appears that when the private respondent filed the complaint, his father,
Rodolfo Pelaez, was still alive.
Thus, when his mother Dulce Pelaez died intestate on March 2, 1944, she was
survived by her husband Rodolfo and their son, the private respondent.
Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court provides that in an action for partition, all
persons interested in the property shall be joined as defendants.
Section 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate.- A person having the right
to compel the partition of real estate may do so as in this rule prescribed, setting
forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate description
of the real estate of which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all the
other persons interested in the property.
Thus, all the co-heirs and persons having an interest in the property are
indispensable parties; as such, an action for partition will not lie without the joinder
of the said parties.
In the present action, the private respondent failed to implead the following
indispensable parties: his father,
Rodolfo Pelaez; the heirs of Santiago Sepulveda, namely, Paz Sepulveda and their
children; and the City of Danao which purchased the property from Pedro
Sepulveda, Sr. and maintained that it had failed to pay for the purchase price of the
property.
Rodolfo Pelaez is an indispensable party he being entitled to a share in usufruct,
equal to the share of the respondent in the subject properties. There is no showing
that Rodolfo Pelaez had waived his right to usufruct.
Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court reads:
SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. Parties in interest without
whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as
plaintiffs or defendants.
Indeed, the presence of all indispensable parties is a condition sine qua non for the
exercise of judicial power. It is precisely when an indispensable party is not before
the court that the action should be dismissed. Thus, the plaintiff is mandated to
implead all the indispensable parties, considering that the absence of one such
party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority
to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. One who is a
party to a case is not bound by any decision of the court, otherwise, he will be
deprived of his right to due process. Without the presence of all the other heirs as
plaintiffs, the trial court could not validly render judgment and grant relief in favor
of the private respondent. The failure of the private respondent to implead the other
heirs as parties-plaintiffs constituted a legal obstacle to the trial court and the
appellate courts exercise of judicial power over the said case, and rendered any
orders or judgments rendered therein a nullity.
To reiterate, the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of
the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties
but even as to those present. Hence, the trial court should have ordered the
dismissal of the complaint.

Petition is GRANTED. RTC and CA decisions are set aside. RTC is ordered to dismiss
the complaint without prejudice

Section 7, Rule 3 of the New Rules of Court defines indispensable parties as partiesin-interest without whom there can be no final determination of an action and who,
for this reason, must be joined either as plaintiffs or as defendants.
Jurisprudence further holds that a party is indispensable, not only if he has an
interest in the subject matter of the controversy, but also if his interest is such that
a final decree cannot be made without affecting this interest or without placing the
controversy in a situation where the final determination may be wholly inconsistent
with equity and good conscience. He is a person whose absence disallows the court
from making an effective, complete, or equitable determination of the controversy
between or among the contending parties (See Moldes v. Villanueva, G.R. No.
161955, August 31, 2005, 468 SCRA 697

G.R. No. 174582

October 11, 2012

THE HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES LAURA YADNO

vs.
THE HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES MAURO and ELISA ANCHALES
On December 1, 1982, the Spouses Mauro and Elisa Anchales (Spouses Anchales),
respondents' predecessors, filed with the then Court of First Instance, Branch 9, now
Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, of Urdaneta, Pangasinan (Urdaneta RTC), a
Complaint3 for ownership, delivery of possession, damages with preliminary
injunction and attachment against the spouses Augusto and Rosalia Yadno (Spouses
Yadno), Orani Tacay (Orani), and the spouses Laura Yadno and Pugsong Mat-an
(Spouses Mat-an), petitioners' predecessors, docketed as Civil Case No. U- 3882.
The Spouses Mat-an and Orani did not file their Answer, thus, they were declared in
default. The Spouses Yadno were also declared in default so the Spouses Anchales
were allowed to present their evidence ex-parte. The Spouses Yadno filed a motion
for reconsideration of the Order declaring them in default, but the RTC denied the
motion and submitted the case for decision. On September 14, 1987, the Urdaneta
RTC rendered its Decision
We find that the Baguio RTC correctly dismissed the case for injunction with
damages filed with it, since it had no jurisdiction over the nature of the action.
Petitioners' predecessors could not in an action for injunction with damages filed
with the Baguio RTC sought the nullification of a final and executory decision
rendered by the Urdaneta RTC and its subsequent orders issued pursuant thereto for
the satisfaction of the said judgment. This would go against the principle of judicial
stability where the judgment or order of a court of competent jurisdiction, the
Urdaneta RTC, may not be interfered with by any court of concurrent jurisdiction
(i.e., another RTC), for the simple reason that the power to open, modify or vacate

the said judgment or order is not only possessed by but is restricted to the court in
which the judgment or order is rendered or issued. 27
The long standing doctrine is that no court has the power to interfere by injunction
with the judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction.
The various trial courts of a province or city, having the same or equal authority,
should not, cannot, and are not permitted to interfere with their respective cases,
much less with their orders or judgments. 28 A contrary rule would obviously lead to
confusion and seriously hamper the administration of justice. 29
This argument should have been presented before the Urdaneta RTC as it was the
court which rendered the decision and ordered the execution sale of the Orani
property and thus should settle the whole controversy. 30Moreover, it appears that
the Urdaneta RTC was not apprised at all of Orani's death, since there was no notice
of her death filed with it. In fact, in their Comment filed with us, respondents allege
that:
The defendants spouses Mauro Anchales and Elisa Anchales pointed out in
paragraph 4 of their Answer to the original Complaint and in paragraph 11 of their
Answer to the supplemental complaint that the plaintiff spouses Laura Yadno Mat-an
and Pugsong Mat-an never informed the trial court (RTC, Branch 46, Urdaneta,
Pangasinan) about such alleged death of Orani Tacay.
In fine, it is the fault of spouses Laura Yadno Mat-an and Pugsong Mat-an (now
substituted by petitioners) in not informing the trial court (RTC 46, Urdaneta,
Pangasinan) about the alleged death of Orani Tacay.1wphi1
Petitioners never rebutted these allegations in their Rejoinder. The Baguio RTC had
no jurisdiction to nullify the final and executory decision of the Urdaneta RTC. To
allow it would open the floodgates to protracted and endless litigations, since the
counsel or the parties, in an action for recovery of money, in case said defendant
dies before final judgment in a regional trial court, is to conceal such death from the
court and thereafter pretend to go through the motions of trial, and after judgment
is rendered against his client, to question such judgment by raising the matter that
the defendant was not substituted by her intestate heirs. 31
Moreover, it also appears that petitioners' predecessors admitted that Orani's only
legal heirs were Laura Yadno, petitioner's predecessor, and Augusto Yadno, who
both became the absolute owners of the property from the moment of Orani's
death. Notably, Laura and Augusto, together with Orani, were the original
defendants in the case of recovery of sum of money filed with the Urdaneta RTC and
who were adjudged jointly and severally liable to the Spouses Anchales. Thus, they
cannot claim that they were deprived of such property, since the sale was done in
accordance with the rules on the execution of judgment rendered against them.
There is no dispute that the Orani property had been in custodia legis of the
Urdaneta RTC when it was levied on October 10, 1988 and sold under a writ of
execution for the satisfaction of the judgment rendered by the said court. The
subsequent issuance of a new title of the Orani property in the name of Mauro
Anchales was by virtue of a levy and an execution sale of the said property which
was not redeemed within the one-year period. Thus, the Baguio RTC correctly ruled
that it cannot, in an injunction case with damages filed with it, interfere with the
judgment of the Urdaneta RTC and the subsequent orders issued pursuant thereto
since it is beyond the former's authority as a co-equal court. It is the Urdaneta RTC
which has a general supervisory control over its processes in the execution of its
judgment with a right to determine every question of fact and law which may be
involved in the execution.32
G R. No. 190071
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner

Versus
MAUNLAD HOMES, INC. and all other persons or entities claiming rights under it,
Respondents
August 15, 2012
Facts:
In the event of recession due to failure to pay or to comply with the terms of the
contract, Maunlad Homes required to immediately vacate the property and
voluntarily turn possession over the Union Bank.
Under Rule 4 of the Rules of Court Forcible entry and detainer action shall be
commenced and tried in the municipal trial court of the municipality or city wherein
the real property involved, or a portion thereof is situated.
The CA affirmed the RTC decision. The dismissal of the ejectment suit was prosper.
Issue:
Whether the issue of ownership shall be resolved to determine the issue of
possession.
Whether or not the right to possession of property was extinguished when the
contract to sell failed to materialized.
Held:
Respondent ordered to vacate the Maunlad Shopping Mall and further ordered
to pay the rentals accruing in the interim until it vacates the property.
Respondent ordered to pay the legal interest per anum on the total amount due
until full payment is made.
GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION v
TIRSO UYTENGSU
Respondents Tirso Uytengsu III,

Kathleen Uytengsu-Tan

and

Barbara Uytengsu-Tan instituted Civil Case No. 6570 for the recovery of possession
of duplicate original copies of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) Nos. 6612 and
6613[6] against Luis Wee, George Young and the Registrar of Deeds of General
Santos City.
Petitioner General

Milling

Corporation

was impleaded as

defendant on

September 15, 1999 in a second amended complaint setting forth the new
allegation that petitioner had possession of the OCTs. After petitioner filed its
answer, respondents filed a third amended complaint stating that petitioner
fraudulently obtained the OCTs and petitioners refusal to surrender the same caused
great damage and prejudice to the respondents. [7]

On June 19, 2001, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss [8] the third amended
complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. RA 7691 [9]vested the RTCs with
jurisdiction over all civil actions involving title to or possession of real property or
any interest therein where the assessed value of the property involved exceeded
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000):
The failure to allege such jurisdictional fact is fatal because
absent the amount of the assessed value there is no way the court can
acquire jurisdiction over the amended complaint. [10]

On August 28, 2001, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss. [11] The
motion for reconsideration was denied on April 25, 2002.
In

petition

for

certiorari[12] to

the

Court

of

Appeals,

petitioner assailed the trial courts resolution denying the

motion to dismiss as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.

In this case, the trial court and the Court of Appeals found no such allegation in the
complaint.
Settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the
relevant allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought. [17] It
cannot be made to depend on the defenses made by the defendant in his answer or
motion to dismiss. If such were the rule, the question of jurisdiction would depend
almost entirely on the defendant.[18]
The complaint based its cause of action on petitioners refusal to surrender
the OCTs. As primary relief, the complaint sought the delivery by petitioner of the
said OCTs. Clearly, the subject matter of the case at bar was not a real action
requiring an allegation of the assessed value of the property but one which was
incapable of pecuniary estimation. Hence, it was within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Any other consequence of the primary relief sought in the complaint could not
properly be a basis for impugning the jurisdiction of the trial court.

In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of

which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted
the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or
remedy sought. Where the basic issue is something other than the
right to recover a sum of money this Court has considered such actions
as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in
terms of money and are cognizable by [the regional trial courts]. [19]

The denial of the motion to dismiss was based on a correct appreciation of

the relevant allegations in the complaint. We agree with the Court of Appeals that
petitioner failed to establish a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment on the
part of the trial court as to merit the grant of the extraordinary writ of certiorari.
After many years of delay, it is time this issue was laid to rest. Let the
proceedings before the trial court continue with dispatch for a just resolution of the
case.