Letran Calamba Faculty v. NLRC | GR No.

156225 | 29 January 2008

Austria-Martinez, J

Settled is the rule that the findings of the LA, when affirmed by the NLRC and the CA, are binding on the Supreme Court,
unless patently erroneous.

FACTS: In 1992, the Letran Calamba Faculty and Employees Association filed with the NLRC a complaint against
Colegio de San Juan de Letran, Calamba for collection of various monetary claims due to its members. In 1994, the
Association held a strike.

The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and this applies with greater force in labor cases. Findings of fact of
administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to
specific matters, are generally accorded not only great respect but even finality.

On January 29, 1993, respondent filed its Position Paper denying all the allegations of petitioner.

Basic wage means all remuneration or earnings paid by an employer to a worker for services rendered on normal
working days and hours but does not include cost of living allowances, 13th month pay or other monetary benefits which
are not considered as part of or integrated into the regular salary of the workers.

On March 10, 1993, petitioner filed its Reply.

Prior to the filing of the above-mentioned complaint, petitioner filed a separate complaint against the respondent for
money claims with Regional Office No. IV of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
On the other hand, pending resolution of NLRC Case No. RAB-IV-10-4560-92-L, respondent filed with Regional
Arbitration Branch No. IV of the NLRC a petition to declare as illegal a strike staged by petitioner in January 1994.
Subsequently, these three cases were consolidated. The case for money claims was originally filed by petitioner with the
DOLE.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the Associations money claims, and also dismissed Letrans petition to declare the strike
illegal. The NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter on appeal. The CA also affirmed the NLRC.
ISSUEs:
1.
2.

W/N the CA can review the factual findings and legal conclusions of the NLRC in a special civil action for
certiorari.
W/N a teachers overload pay should be considered in the computation of his or her 13th month pay.

HELD: NO. The Court finds no error in the ruling of the CA that since nowhere in the petition is there any acceptable
demonstration that the LA or the NLRC acted either with grave abuse of discretion or without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, the appellate court has no reason to look into the correctness of the evaluation of evidence which supports
the labor tribunals findings of fact.
NO. Overload pay should be excluded in the computation of the 13th month pay of the Associations members. The
peculiarity of an overload lies in the fact that it may be performed within the normal eight-hour working day. This is the
only reason why the DOLE, in its explanatory bulletin, finds it proper to include a teachers overload pay in the
determination of his or her 13th month pay. However, the DOLE loses sight of the fact that even if it is performed within
the normal eight-hour working day, an overload is still an additional or extra teaching work which is performed after the
regular teaching load has been completed. Hence, any pay given as compensation for such additional work should be
considered as extra and not deemed as part of the regular or basic salary
RATIONALE: The appellate courts jurisdiction to review a decision of the NLRC in a petition for certiorari is confined to
issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. An extraordinary remedy, a petition for certiorari is available only and
restrictively in truly exceptional cases. The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction
including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The writ of certiorari
does not include correction of the NLRCs evaluation of the evidence or of its factual findings. Such findings are generally
accorded not only respect but also finality. A party assailing such findings bears the burden of showing that the tribunal
acted capriciously and whimsically or in total disregard of evidence material to the controversy, in order that the
extraordinary writ of certiorari will lie.

Overload vs. Overtime: Overtime work is work rendered in excess of normal working hours of eight in a day. Overload
work is additional work after completing the regular workload, may be performed either within or outside eight hours in a
day, and may or may not be considered overtime work.
What are deemed not part of the basic salary:
a. Cost of living allowances granted pursuant to PD 525 and LOI 174;
b. Profit sharing payments;
c. All allowances and monetary benefits which are not considered or integrated as part of the regular basic
salary of the employee at the time of the promulgation of the Decree;
Overtime pay, earnings, and other remunerations as provided for by PD 851s IRR.
ROMEO LAGATIC, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, CITYLAND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, STEPHEN ROXAS, JESUS GO, GRACE LIUSON, and ANDREW LIUSON, respondents | G.R. No.
121004 | January 28, 1998 | J. Romero
NATURE
Petition by certiorari
FACTS
- Petitioner Romeo Lagatic was employed by Cityland as a marketing specialist. He was tasked with soliciting sales for
the company, with the corresponding duties of accepting call-ins, referrals, and making client calls and cold calls. Cold
calls refer to the practice of prospecting for clients through the telephone directory.
- In order to assess cold calls made by the sales staff, as well as to determine the results thereof, Cityland requires the
submission of daily progress reports on the same.
- On October 22, 1991, Cityland issued a written reprimand to petitioner for his failure to submit cold call reports for
certain days of September & October 1991. This notwithstanding, petitioner again failed to submit cold call reports for
September & October 1992. Petitioner was required to explain his inaction, with a warning that further non-compliance
would result in his termination from the company. In a reply, petitioner claimed that the same was an honest omission
brought about by his concentration on other aspects of his job. Cityland found said excuse inadequate and suspended
him for three days, with a similar warning.
- Notwithstanding the aforesaid suspension and warning, petitioner again failed to submit cold call reports for February
1993. He was verbally reminded to submit the same and was even given up to February 17, 1993 to do so. Instead of
complying with said directive, petitioner wrote a note, TO HELL WITH COLD CALLS! WHO CARES? and exhibited the
same to his co-employees.
- Petitioner received a memorandum requiring him to explain why Cityland should not make good its previous warning for
his failure to submit cold call reports, as well as for issuing the written statement aforementioned. Petitioner sent a letterreply alleging that his failure to submit cold call reports should not be deemed as gross insubordination. He denied any
knowledge of the damaging statement, TO HELL WITH COLD CALLS!
- Finding petitioner guilty of gross insubordination, Cityland served a notice of dismissal upon him. Petitioner filed a
complaint against Cityland for illegal dismissal, illegal deduction, underpayment, overtime and rest day pay, damages
and attorneys fees.

- The labor arbiter dismissed the petition for lack of merit. On appeal, the same was affirmed by the NLRC; hence the
present recourse.
ISSUE
1. WON respondent NLRC gravely abused its discretion in not finding that petitioner was illegally dismissed
2. WON respondent NLRC gravely abused its discretion in ruling that petitioner is not entitled to salary differentials,
backwages, separation pay, overtime pay, rest day pay, unpaid commissions, moral and exemplary damages and
attorneys fees
HELD
1. NO
Ratio Except as provided for, or limited by, special laws, an employer is free to regulate, according to his discretion and
judgment, all aspects of employment. Employers may, thus, make reasonable rules and regulations for the government
of their employees, and when employees, with knowledge of an established rule, enter the service, the rule becomes a
part of the contract of employment. It is also generally recognized that company policies and regulations, unless shown
to be grossly oppressive or contrary to law, are generally valid and binding on the parties and must be complied with.
Reasoning
- Said company policy of requiring cold calls and the concomitant reports thereon is clearly reasonable and lawful,
sufficiently known to petitioner, and in connection with the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. There is,
thus, just cause for his dismissal.
- Based on the foregoing, we find petitioner guilty of willful disobedience. Willful disobedience requires the concurrence
of at least two requisites: the employees assailed conduct must have been willful or intentional, the willfulness being
characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made
known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge.
- Well settled is the dictum that the twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the elements of due process in the
dismissal of employees. Thus, the employer must furnish the employee with two written notices before the termination of
employment can be effected. The first apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal
is sought; the second informs him of the employers decision to dismiss him.
- The chronology of events clearly shows that petitioner was served with the required written notices.
- The requirement of a hearing is complied with as long as there was an opportunity to be heard, and not necessarily that
an actual hearing be conducted. Petitioner had an opportunity to be heard as he submitted a letter-reply to the charge.
He, however, adduced no other evidence on his behalf. In fact, he admitted his failure to submit cold call reports, praying
that the same be not considered as gross insubordination.
- Denials are weak forms of defenses, particularly when they are not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.
Given the foregoing, we hold that petitioners constitutional right to due process has not been violated.
2. NO
- There is no law which requires employers to pay commissions, and when they do so, there is no law which prescribes a
method for computing commissions. The determination of the amount of commissions is the result of collective
bargaining negotiations, individual employment contracts or established employer practice. Since the formula for the
computation of commissions was presented to and accepted by petitioner, such prescribed formula is in order.
- Petitioner failed to show his entitlement to overtime and rest day pay due, to the lack of sufficient evidence as to the
number of days and hours when he rendered overtime and rest day work. Entitlement to overtime pay must first be
established by proof that said overtime work was actually performed, before an employee may avail of said benefit.
- Lastly, with the finding that petitioners dismissal was for a just and valid cause, his claims for moral and exemplary
damages, as well as attorneys fees, must fail.
Disposition AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 122240. November 18, 1999 | Legahi v. NLRC | KAPUNAN, J.:
Facts: In a complaint filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), Cristonico B. Legahi
alleged that he was hired as Chief Cook aboard M/V Federal Nord by the Northsouth Ship Management (PTE), Ltd.,
Singapore and represented by its local agent United Philippine Lines, Inc. (UPLI).

The contract of employment stipulated that his term of employment was for ten months beginning October 9, 1992 with a
basic monthly salary of US$450.00 with 44 hours weekly as minimum number of hours worked with a fixed overtime pay
(OT) of $185.00 and three (3) days leave with pay every month.
Sometime in November, 1992 petitioner was asked by the Shipmaster to prepare a victualling cost statement for the
month of October, 1992. After learning that such preparation involves mathematical skills, as it would require estimation
of food cost, value of stocks, etc. he intimated that he did not know how to do such work as it was not part of the duties
of a chief cook. He was told that it was not a difficult job and that he only needed to copy the previous forms. After much
reluctance, petitioner nonetheless prepared the statement in deference to the Shipmaster.
In December, petitioner was requested again to prepare the victualling cost statement for the month of November. He
obeyed since he was afraid he would earn the ire of his superiors if he refused.
Sometime in January, 1993, the Shipmaster asked petitioner to do the victualling cost statement for December which he
complied. On January 6, 1993, the Shipmaster requested the petitioner to prepare a corrected victualling statement for
the same month of December. Petitioner asked the Shipmaster if he could defer the correction as he was busy doing his
chores. The response certainly did not sit well with the Shipmaster so he was called for a meeting which petitioner did
not attend.
On January 14, 1993, a committee was formed headed by the Shipmaster himself with the Chief Officer, Chief Engineer
and Bosun as members.
In this meeting, the Shipmaster read to him the offenses he committed on board. He was asked to answer the charges
but petitioner opted to remain silent. Thereafter, petitioner was informed that he was dismissed.
The next day, petitioner was repatriated to the Philippine through the assistance of the Philippine Consulate.
Upon arrival or on February 16, 1993, petitioner filed with the POEA a complaint for illegal dismissal against private
respondents. He sought the payment of his salary corresponding to the unexpired portion of his contract, unpaid
overtime pay, leave pay, salary differential and damages.
In answer to the complaint, private respondent stated that prior to petitioners deployment, he was asked if he knew how
to prepare the victualling cost statement which he answered yes. On January 6, 1993, petitioner was asked to prepare
the statement. He refused and even arrogantly replied that the Shipmaster should let some other officer do the job since
he only came to the ship to cook. On January 13, 1993, petitioner left the vessel without permission and did not perform
his job that day. On January 14, 1993, a committee was formed to hear the case of petitioner. Petitioner remained silent
so the committee decided to send him home. Contrary to petitioners allegation, it was not the Philippine Consulate, but
the shipowners agent, Navios Ship Agencies, which arranged his repatriation. The respondent noticed petitioner to be
very homesick and surmised that he deliberately committed the offenses just so he could be sent home. Upon his return,
petitioner did not even report to the local representative UPLI implying that he had no cause of action against them.
Petitioner was terminated for just cause and must, therefore, reimburse private respondent for the cost of repatriation.
On April 6, 1994, the POEA promulgated a decision finding that there was just cause for petitioners dismissal.
On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), the Commission affirmed in toto the POEA decision.
Issue: The validity of petitioners dismissal from his employment

Held: To constitute a valid dismissal from employment, two (2) requisites must concur: (a) the dismissal must be for any
of the causes provided in Article 282 of the Labor Code, and (b) the employee must be accorded due process, the
elements of which are notice and the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.
Procedural due process requires that the employee must be apprised of the charges against him. He must be given
reasonable time to answer the charges, allowed ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself, and assisted by a
representative if the employee so desires. Two written notices are required before termination of employment can be
legally effected. They are: (1) notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his
dismissal is sought, and (2) the subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employers decision to dismiss him;
not to mention the opportunity to answer and rebut the charges against him, in between such notices.
In the case at bar, the evidence on record belies private respondents claim that petitioner was afforded due process. It
is rather apparent that as early as January 6, 1993, the employer had already decided to dismiss petitioner and sent
home for his alleged refusal to obey the orders of his superiors. On January 14, 1993, the committee read to petitioner
his alleged offenses which were his refusal to take orders from his superior on January 6 and his leaving the vessel
without permission on January 13. When petitioner remained silent, the committee informed him that he was dismissed.
He was sent home that same day. Petitioner was not given reasonable time to answer the charges hurled against him or
to defend himself. The notice apprising him of the charges and the notice of dismissal were done in one morning all in
the January 14 committee hearing. The submission that the entry in the logbook made on January 6 which stated that for
petitioners refusal to take orders from the master of the ship he will be sent home in first possible port was sufficient
compliance of the first notice requirement is not well-taken. This is not the kind of notice that satisfies due process
contemplated by law.
On the substantive issue, we find no just cause for petitioners dismissal. According to the POEA, petitioner was found
guilty for insubordination for his refusal to obey the order of the master to prepare the victual statement on January 6,
1993,[6 which was presumably for the month of January.
The NLRC, which simply adopted in toto the findings of the POEA, concluded that complainant refused albeit in a bad
manner the request of the Shipmaster to prepare a correct victualling cost statement for the month of December. Based
on the POEA findings, petitioner was dismissed because of his refusal to prepare the victualling statement for the month
of January, 1993. The facts as found by the POEA are all muddled up.
On the other hand, the NLRCs conclusion that petitioner refused to correct the victualling statement for the month of
December as ordered to, was also not sufficient basis for his dismissal. There is no doubt that petitioner had complied
with his superiors orders to prepare the statement for December. It was only the correction of the December statement
that he requested to defer which the Shipmaster took as a downright refusal to make and considered such act as a
serious and gross insubordination.
For willful disobedience to be considered as just cause for dismissal, the employees conduct must be willful or
intentional, the willfulness being characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude and the order violated must have
been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he has been engaged to
discharge.
In the instant case, it was actually not petitioners duty to prepare the victualling statement. The allegation that this was
part of his duty as chief cook and the fact that he was aware of such duty when he was interviewed for the post is only
self-serving and without basis. The employment contract does not mention anything that this was part of his duty as chief
cook. Even assuming that petitioner refused to obey the order of his superior to prepare a corrected victualling cost
statement for December, although he maintained that he just asked for time to do it, as he was then busy performing his
usual duty, which we believe to be the case, his refusal cannot be considered as one being characterized by a wrongful

and perverse attitude. From the beginning, petitioner already intimated that he did not know how to accomplish the
victual cost statement since it entailed some mathematical skills which he admittedly did not have.
Petitioners dismissal without a valid cause constitute a breach of contract. Consequently, he should only be paid the
unexpired portion of his employment contract. In the same vein, the claim for the days leave pay for the unexpired
portion of the contract is unwarranted since the same is given during the actual service of the seamen.
The claim for moral and exemplary damages are deleted for lack of sufficient basis. Considering that petitioner was
forced to litigate, we hold that the amount of P10,000.00 is a reasonable and fair compensation for the legal services
rendered by counsel. The petition is GRANTED.
G.R. No. 169434, March 28, 2008 | Dacut v. CA | QUISUMBING, J.
Facts: Petitioners Lazaro V. Dacut, Cesario G. Cajote, Romerlo F. Tungala, Lowel Z. Zubista, and Orlando P. Taboy were
crew members of the LCT "BASILISA", an inter-island cargo vessel owned by private respondent Sta. Clara International
Transport and Equipment Corporation.
On November 29, 1998, Dacut discovered a hole in the vessel's engine room. The company had the hole patched up
with a piece of iron and cement. Despite the repair, Dacut and Tungala resigned in July 1999 due to the vessel's alleged
unseaworthiness.
On the other hand, Cajote went on leave from April 12-28, 1999 to undergo eye treatment. Since then, he has incurred
several unauthorized absences. Fearing that he will be charged as Absent Without Leave (AWOL), Cajote resigned in
June 1999.
On September 22, 1999, petitioners filed a complaint for constructive dismissal amounting to illegal dismissal (except for
Zubista and Taboy); underpayment of wages, special and regular holidays; non-payment of rest days, sick and vacation
leaves, night shift differentials, subsistence allowance, and fixed overtime pay; actual, moral and exemplary damages;
and litigation costs and attorney's fees.
Dacut and Tungala claimed that they resigned after Reynalyn G. Orlina, the secretary of the Personnel Manager, told
them that they will be paid their separation pay if they voluntarily resigned. They also resigned because the vessel has
become unseaworthy after the company refused to have it repaired properly. Meanwhile, Cajote alleged that he resigned
because the company hired a replacement while he was still on leave. When he returned, the Operations Manager told
him that he will be paid his separation pay if he voluntarily resigned; otherwise, he would be charged for being AWOL.
On the other hand, Zubista claimed that his wage was below the minimum set by the Regional Tripartite Wages and
Productivity Board. Finally, petitioners alleged that they were not paid their rest days, sick and vacation leaves, night shift
differentials, subsistence allowance, and fixed overtime pay.
After the Labor Arbiter declared the case submitted for decision, the company filed its reply to petitioners' position paper.
It countered that Dacut and Tungala voluntarily resigned due to the vessel's alleged unseaworthiness while Cajote
resigned to avoid being charged as AWOL. It also claimed that petitioners' monetary claims had no basis.
On August 2, 2000, the Labor Arbiter dismissed petitioners' complaint. The Labor Arbiter ruled that there was sufficient
evidence to prove that the vessel was seaworthy. The Labor Arbiter noted that except for the holiday pay, accrued sick
and vacation leaves, and wage differential, petitioners failed to substantiate their monetary claims.
Petitioners appealed to the NLRC alleging that the Labor Arbiter erred: (1) in entertaining the company's reply after the
case had been submitted for decision; (2) in not finding that Dacut, Cajote and Tungala were constructively dismissed;
(3) in not finding that petitioners were entitled to their monetary claims; and (4) in not finding that petitioners were entitled
to actual, moral and exemplary damages as well as litigation costs and attorney's fees. At this point, Dacut and Tungala
further contended that they resigned because they were being harassed by the company due to a complaint for violation

of labor standards they had filed earlier against it.

On May 20, 2002, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter's decision.
Issues: WON petitioners voluntarily resigned from employment and WON they are entitled to money claims
Held: The fact that the Labor Arbiter admitted the company's reply after the case had been submitted for decision did not
make the proceedings before him irregular. Petitioners were given adequate opportunity in the NLRC and the Court of
Appeals to rebut the company's evidence against them.
A petition for review on certiorari shall only raise questions of law considering that the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are, as a general rule, conclusive upon and binding on this Court. This doctrine applies with greater force in
labor cases where the factual findings of the labor tribunals are affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The reason is that labor
officials are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their jurisdiction and therefore, their factual findings are
generally accorded not only respect but also finality.
Here, the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the Court of Appeals were unanimous in finding that the primary reason why
Dacut and Tungala resigned was the vessel's alleged unseaworthiness as borne by their pleadings before the Labor
Arbiter. Dacut and Tungala never mentioned that they resigned because they were being harassed by the company due
to a complaint for violation of labor standards they had filed against it. This ground was alleged only before the NLRC
and not a single act or incident was cited to prove this point. Even the alleged assurance by Orlina, that they would be
given separation pay, served merely as a secondary reason why they resigned. In fact, we doubt that such assurance
was even made considering that as secretary of the Personnel Manager, it was not shown under what authority Orlina
acted when she told Dacut and Tungala to resign.
Likewise deserving scant consideration is Cajote's claim that the Operations Manager told him that he will be paid
separation pay if he resigned voluntarily; otherwise, he would be charged as AWOL. Although the company already hired
a replacement, Cajote admitted that he was still employed at the time he resigned. In fact, the company tried to give him
another assignment but he refused it. Thus, the only reason why Cajote resigned was his long unauthorized absences
which would have warranted his dismissal in any case.
We find no reason to disturb all these factual findings because they are amply supported by substantial evidence.
Apropos the monetary claims, there is insufficient evidence to prove petitioners' entitlement thereto. As crew members,
petitioners were required to stay on board the vessel by the very nature of their duties, and it is for this reason that, in
addition to their regular compensation, they are given free living quarters and subsistence allowances when required to
be on board. It could not have been the purpose of our law to require their employers to give them overtime pay or night
shift differential, even when they are not actually working. Thus, the correct criterion in determining whether they are
entitled to overtime pay or night shift differential is not whether they were on board and cannot leave ship beyond the
regular eight working hours a day, but whether they actually rendered service in excess of said number of hours. In this
case, petitioners failed to submit sufficient proof that overtime and night shift work were actually performed to entitle
them to the corresponding pay. Petition is denied.
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION v. CAROLINE C. DEL ROSARIO | G.R. Nos. 168194 & 168603 | J. Ynares-Santiago
Facts: Respondent was hired by the petitioner as an account specialist, allegedly as a probationary employee, but was
dismissed because of a reconstruction scheme and over employment in the company. Labor arbiter (her employment
exceeded six months and holding that she was illegally dismissed as there was no authorized cause to terminate her
employment. The Arbiter further ruled that petitioner's failure to rebut respondent's claim that it hired additional
employees after she was dismissed belie the company's alleged redundancy), NLRC (respondent is a regular employee
whose termination from employment was valid but ineffectual for petitioner's failure to comply with the 30-day notice to
the employee and the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), ) and CA ruled that she is a regular employee and
was illegally dismissed thus entitled to payment for damages and back wages.

Issues: (1) Whether or not respondent is a regular employee of petitioner; and (2) whether or not respondent was
illegally dismissed; and (3) if so, whether or not respondent is entitled to any monetary benefit.
Held:

In termination cases, like the present controversy, the burden of proving the circumstances that would justify
the employee's dismissal rests with the employer.[18] The best proof that petitioner should have presented to
prove the probationary status of respondent is her employment contract.
Having ruled that respondent is a regular employee, her termination from employment must be for a just or
authorized cause, otherwise, her dismissal would be illegal.

The Court finds that petitioner was not able to discharge the burden of proving that the dismissal of respondent was
valid.
ARTICLE 279. Security of tenure. In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the
services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly
dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and
to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent
computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
(Emphasis, supplied)
Considering that respondent was illegally dismissed, she is entitled not only to reinstatement but also to payment of full
back wages, computed from the time her compensation was actually withheld from her on March 13, 2001, up to her
actual reinstatement.
Respondent is not, however, entitled to holiday pay because the records reveal that she is a monthly paid regular
employee. Under Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, employees who are
uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the number of working days therein, shall be presumed to be paid for all the
days in the month whether worked or not. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly deleted said award.
G.R. No. 144664 | March 15, 2004 | ASIAN TRANSMISSION CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. The Hon. COURT OF
APPEALS | J. Carpio-Morales
Facts: The Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), through Undersecretary Cresenciano B. Trajano, issued an
Explanatory Bulletin dated March 11, 1993 wherein it clarified, inter alia, that employees are entitled to 200% of their
basic wage on April 9, 1993, whether unworked, which, apart from being Good Friday [and, therefore, a legal holiday],
is also Araw ng Kagitingan [which is also a legal holiday]. Said bulletin was reproduced on January 23, 1998, when
April 9, 1998 was both Maundy Thursday and Araw ng Kagitingan.
Petitioner [Asian Transmission Corporation] opted to pay its daily paid employees only 100% of their basic pay on April
9, 1998. Respondent Bisig ng Asian Transmission Labor Union (BATLU) protested, saying:
ART. 94. Right to holiday pay. - (a) Every worker shall be paid his regular daily wage during regular holidays, except in
retail and service establishments regularly employing less than ten (10) workers;
(b) The employer may require an employee to work on any holiday but such employee shall be paid a
compensation equivalent to twice his regular rate; and
(c) As used in this Article, "holiday" includes: New Years Day, Maundy Thursday, Good Friday, the ninth of
April, the first of May, the twelfth of June, the fourth of July, the thirtieth of November, the twenty-fifth and
thirtieth of December and the day designated by law for holding a general election, which was amended by
Executive Order No. 203 issued on June 30, 1987

The Court of Appeals upheld the findings of the Voluntary Arbitrator, holding that the Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA) between petitioner and BATLU, the law governing the relations between them, clearly recognizes their intent to
consider Araw ng Kagitingan and Maundy Thursday, on whatever date they may fall in any calendar year, as paid legal
holidays during the effectivity of the CBA and that "[t]here is no condition, qualification or exception for any variance from
the clear intent that all holidays shall be compensated."

if a regular week day is declared a holiday, the school calendar is extended to compensate for that day. Thus petitioner
argues that the advent of any of the legal holidays within the semester will not affect the faculty's salary because this day
is not included in their schedule while the calendar is extended to compensate for special holidays.

Issue: WON the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in its decision

Regular holidays specified as such by law are known to both school and faculty members as no class days;" certainly the
latter do not expect payment for said unworked days, and this was clearly in their minds when they entered into the
teaching contracts.

Held: Holiday pay is a legislated benefit enacted as part of the Constitutional imperative that the State shall afford
protection to labor.7 Its purpose is not merely "to prevent diminution of the monthly income of the workers on account of
work interruptions. In other words, although the worker is forced to take a rest, he earns what he should earn, that is, his
holiday pay."

On the other hand, both the law and the Implementing Rules governing holiday pay are silent as to payment on Special
Public Holidays.

It is also intended to enable the worker to participate in the national celebrations held during the days identified as with
great historical and cultural significance.

Declared purpose of the holiday pay which is the prevention of diminution of the monthly income of the employees on
account of work interruptions is defeated when a regular class day is cancelled on account of a special public holiday
and class hours are held on another working day to make up for time lost in the school calendar.

As reflected above, Art. 94 of the Labor Code, as amended, affords a worker the enjoyment of ten paid regular holidays.
The provision is mandatory, regardless of whether an employee is paid on a monthly or daily basis.
Unlike a bonus, which is a management prerogative, holiday pay is a statutory benefit demandable under the law. Since
a worker is entitled to the enjoyment of ten paid regular holidays, the fact that two holidays fall on the same date should
not operate to reduce to nine the ten holiday pay benefits a worker is entitled to receive.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is hereby set aside, and a
new one is hereby RENDERED:

In Wellington, the issue was whether monthly-paid employees are entitled to an additional days pay if a holiday falls on
a Sunday. This Court, in answering the issue in the negative, observed that in fixing the monthly salary of its employees,
Wellington took into account "every working day of the year including the holidays specified by law and excluding only
Sunday." In the instant case, the issue is whether daily-paid employees are entitled to be paid for two regular holidays
which fall on the same day.
Art. 4 of the Labor Code provides that all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of its provisions, including its
implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor.

(a) exempting petitioner from paying hourly paid faculty members their pay for regular holidays, whether the same be
during the regular semesters of the school year or during semestral, Christmas, or Holy Week vacations;
(b) but ordering petitioner to pay said faculty members their regular hourly rate on days declared as special holidays or
for some reason classes are called off or shortened for the hours they are supposed to have taught, whether extensions
of class days be ordered or not; in case of extensions said faculty members shall likewise be paid their hourly rates
should they teach during said extensions.
JOSE RIZAL COLLEGE V NLRC | 156 SCRA 27 | PARAS; 1987

G.R. No. L-65482 December 1, 1987 | JOSE RIZAL COLLEGE, petitioner vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION AND NATIONAL ALLIANCE OF TEACHERS/OFFICE WORKERS, respondents | J. Paras

NATURE
- Petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction to review the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission

Facts: Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines. It has three groups of employees categorized as follows: (a) personnel on monthly basis, who receive their
monthly salary uniformly throughout the year, irrespective of the actual number of working days in a month without
deduction for holidays; (b) personnel on daily basis who are paid on actual days worked and they receive unworked
holiday pay and (c) collegiate faculty who are paid on the basis of student contract hour. Before the start of the semester
they sign contracts with the college undertaking to meet their classes as per schedule. Unable to receive their
corresponding holiday pay, as claimed, from 1975 to 1977.

FACTS
- Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines.
It has three groups of employees categorized as follows: (a) personnel on monthly basis, who receive their monthly
salary uniformly throughout the year, irrespective of the actual number of working days in a month without deduction for
holidays; (b) personnel on daily basis who are paid on actual days worked and they receive unworked holiday pay and
(c) collegiate faculty who are paid on the basis of student contract hour. Before the start of the semester they sign
contracts with the college undertaking to meet their classes as per schedule.
- Unable to receive their corresponding holiday pay, as claimed, from 1975 to 1977, private respondent National Alliance
of Teachers and Office Workers (NATOW) in behalf of the faculty and personnel of Jose Rizal College filed with the
Ministry of Labor a complaint against the college for said alleged non-payment of holiday pay
- After the parties had submitted their respective position papers, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on February 5,
1979:
1. The faculty and personnel of the respondent Jose Rizal College who are paid their salary by the month uniformly in
a school year, irrespective of the number of working days in a month, without deduction for holidays, are presumed to
be already paid the 10 paid legal holidays and are no longer entitled to separate payment for the said regular
holidays;
2. The personnel of the respondent Jose Rizal College who are paid their wages daily are entitled to be paid the 10
unworked regular holidays according to the pertinent provisions of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor
Code;

Issue: The sole issue in this case is whether or not the school faculty who according to their contracts are paid per
lecture hour are entitled to unworked holiday pay.
Held: Petitioner maintains the position among others, that it is not covered by Book V of the Labor Code on Labor
Relations considering that it is a non- profit institution and that its hourly paid faculty members are paid on a "contract"
basis because they are required to hold classes for a particular number of hours.

3. Collegiate faculty of the respondent Jose Rizal College who by contract are paid compensation per student contract
hour are not entitled to unworked regular holiday pay considering that these regular holidays have been excluded in
the programming of the student contact hours.
- On appeal, respondent National Labor Relations Commission in a decision promulgated on June 2, 1982, modified the
decision appealed from, in the sense that teaching personnel paid by the hour are declared to be entitled to holiday pay
ISSUE
WON the school faculty who according to their contracts are paid per lecture hour are entitled to unworked holiday pay
HELD
NO (for regular holidays)/YES(for special holidays)
- Labor Arbiter sustains the view that said instructors and professors are not entitled to holiday pay, his decision was
modified by the National Labor Relations Commission holding the contrary. Petitioner maintains the position among
others, that it is not covered by Book V of the Labor Code on Labor Relations considering that it is a non-profit institution
and that its hourly paid faculty members are paid on a "contract" basis because they are required to hold classes for a
particular number of hours. In the programming of these student contract hours, legal holidays are excluded and labelled
in the schedule as "no class day." On the other hand, if a regular week day is declared a holiday, the school calendar is
extended to compensate for that day. Thus petitioner argues that the advent of any of the legal holidays within the
semester will not affect the faculty's salary because this day is not included in their schedule while the calendar is
extended to compensate for special holidays. Thus the programmed number of lecture hours is not diminished.
- The Solicitor General on the other hand, argues that under Article 94 of the Labor Code, holiday pay applies to all
employees except those in retail and service establishments. To deprive therefore employees paid at an hourly rate of
unworked holiday pay is contrary to the policy considerations underlying such presidential enactment, apart from the
constitutional mandate to grant greater rights to labor. And under Article 94 of the Labor Code, the petitioner, although a
nonprofit institution is under obligation to give pay even on unworked regular holidays to hourly paid faculty members
subject to the terms and conditions provided for therein.
- The Court held that the aforementioned implementing rule is not justified by the provisions of the law which after all is
silent with respect to faculty members paid by the hour who because of their teaching contracts are obliged to work and
consent to be paid only for work actually done.
- On the other hand, both the law and the Implementing Rules governing holiday pay are silent as to payment on
Special Public Holidays.
- It is readily apparent that the declared purpose of the holiday pay which is the prevention of diminution of the monthly
income of the employees on account of work interruptions is defeated when a regular class day is cancelled on account
of a special public holiday and class hours are held on another working day to make up for time lost in the school
calendar. Otherwise stated, the faculty member, although forced to take a rest, does not earn what he should earn on
that day. Be it noted that when a special public holiday is declared, the faculty member paid by the hour is deprived of
expected income, and it does not matter that the school calendar is extended in view of the days or hours lost, for their
income that could be earned from other sources is lost during the extended days. Similarly, when classes are called off
or shortened on account of typhoons, floods, rallies, and the like, these faculty members must likewise be paid, whether
or not extensions are ordered.
Disposition Decisions set aside. New decision rendered:
(a) exempting petitioner from paying hourly paid faculty members their pay for regular holidays, whether the same be
during the regular semesters of the school year or during semestral, Christmas, or Holy Week vacations;
(b) but ordering petitioner to pay said faculty members their regular hourly rate on days declared as special holidays or
for some reason classes are called off or shortened for the hours they are supposed to have taught, whether extensions
of class days be ordered or not; in case of extensions said faculty members shall likewise be paid their hourly rates
should they teach during said extensions.
SAN MIGUEL V CA | 375 SCRA 311 | KAPUNAN; January 30, 2002
NATURE
Petition for a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals

FACTS
- 17 October 1992: the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), Iligan District Office, conducted a routine
inspection in the premises of San Miguel Corporation (SMC) in Sta. Filomena, Iligan City. In the course of the inspection,
it was discovered that there was underpayment of regular Muslim holiday pay to its employees.
- SMC failed to submit proof that it was paying regular Muslim holiday pay to its employees. Alan M. Macaraya, Director
IV of DOLE Iligan District Office issued a compliance order directing SMC to consider Muslim holidays as regular
holidays and to pay both its Muslim and non-Muslim employees holiday pay within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the
order.
ISSUES
1. WON CA erred in granting non-Muslim employees Muslim holiday pay
2. WON Macaraya and Espaol have jurisdiction in issuing compliance orders over said labor standard case
HELD
1. NO
Ratio Wages and other emoluments granted by law to the working man are determined on the basis of the criteria laid
down by laws and certainly not on the basis of the workers faith or religion.
Reasoning
- Muslim holidays are provided under Articles 169 and 170, Title I, Book V, of Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise
known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws. The aforementioned provisions should be read in conjunction with Art. 94
of the Labor Code:
Art. 94. Right to holiday pay:
(a) Every worker shall be paid his regular daily wage during regular holidays, except in retail and service
establishments regularly employing less than ten (10) workers;
(b) The employer may require an employee to work on any holiday but such employee shall be paid a compensation
equivalent to twice his regular rate; x x x.
- There should be no distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims as regards payment of benefits for Muslim holidays.
Petitioner asserts that Article 3(3) of Presidential Decree No. 1083 provides that (t)he provisions of this Code shall be
applicable only to Muslims x x x. However, said article also declares that x x x nothing herein shall be construed to
operate to the prejudice of a non-Muslim.
1999 Handbook on Workers Statutory Benefits:
Considering that all private corporations, offices, agencies, and entities or establishments operating within the
designated Muslim provinces and cities are required to observe Muslim holidays, both Muslim and Christians working
within the Muslim areas may not report for work on the days designated by law as Muslim holidays.
- As regards the allegation that the issue on Muslim holiday pay was already resolved in Napoleon E. Fernan vs. San
Miguel Corporation Beer Division and Leopoldo Zaldarriaga, the Court notes that the case was primarily for illegal
dismissal and the claim for benefits was only incidental to the main case.
2. YES
- Regional Director Macaraya acted as the duly authorized representative of the Secretary of Labor and Employment and
it was within his power to issue the compliance order to SMC.
Reasoning
- Article 128. Visitorial and enforcement power.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 129 and 217 of this Code to the contrary, and in cases where the
relationship of employer-employee still exists, the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized
representatives shall have the power to issue compliance orders to give effect to the labor standards provisions of this
Code and other labor legislation based on the findings of labor employment and enforcement officers or industrial
safety engineers made in the course of the inspection.
- Petitioner merely contends that its non-Muslim employees are not entitled to Muslim holiday pay. The issue could be
resolved even without documentary proofs. In any case, there was no indication that Regional Director Macaraya failed
to consider any documentary proof presented by SMC in the course of the inspection.
Disposition The petition is dismissed.
WELLINGTON INVESTMENT V TRAJANO | 245 SCRA 561 | NARVASA; July 3, 1995

NATURE
Special Civil Action for Certiorari
FACTS
- A labor Enforcement Officer conducted a routine inspection of the Wellington Flour Mills, owned and operated by
Wellington Investment and Manufacturing Corporation, and reported the non-payment of regular holidays falling on a
Sunday for monthly-paid employees. A copy of the report was explained to and received by Wellingtons personnel
manager.
- Wellington sought reconsideration and argued that "the monthly salary of the company's monthly-salaried employees
already includes holiday pay for all regular holidays and hence there is no legal basis for the finding of alleged nonpayment of regular holidays falling on a Sunday." In a position paper subsequently submitted to the Regional Director, it
asserted that it pays its monthly-paid employees a fixed monthly compensation "using the 314 factor which undeniably
covers and already includes payment for all the working days in a month as well as all the 10 unworked regular holidays
within a year."
- July 28, 1992: the Regional Director ruled that "when a regular holiday falls on a Sunday, an extra or additional working
day is created and the employer has the obligation to pay the employees for the extra day except the last Sunday of
August since the payment for the said holiday is already included in the 314 factor," and accordingly directed Wellington
to pay its employees compensation corresponding 4 extra working days.
- September 22: the Undersecretary affirmed the challenged order, holding that "the divisor being used by Wellington
does not reliably reflect the actual working days in a year," and consequently commanded Wellington to pay its
employees the "six additional working days resulting from regular holidays falling on Sundays in 1988, 1989 and 1990."
He said that whenever a regular holiday coincides with a Sunday, an additional working day is created and left unpaid. In
other words, while the said divisor may be utilized as proof evidencing payment of 302 working days, 2 special days and
the ten regular holidays in a calendar year, the same does not cover or include payment of additional working days
created as a result of some regular holidays falling on Sundays.
ISSUE
WON a monthly-paid employee, receiving a fixed monthly compensation, is entitled to an additional pay aside from his
usual holiday pay, whenever a regular holiday falls on a Sunday
HELD
NO
- Wellington simply deducts 51 Sundays from the 365 days normally comprising a year and used the difference, 314, as
basis for determining the monthly salary. The monthly salary thus fixed actually covers payment for 314 days of the year,
including regular and special holidays, as well as days when no work is done by reason of fortuitous cause, as above
specified, or causes not attributable to the employees.
- The monthly salary in Wellington for all 365 days of a year. The respondents' theory would make each of the years in
question, a year of 368 days. Pursuant to this theory, no employer opting to pay his employees by the month would have
any definite basis to determine the number of days in a year for which compensation should be given to his work force.
- There is no provision of law requiring any employer to make such adjustments in the monthly salary rate set by him to
take account of legal holidays falling on Sundays in a given year, or, contrary to the legal provisions bearing on the point,
otherwise to reckon a year at more than 365 days. What the law requires of employers opting to pay by the month is to
assure that "the monthly minimum wage shall not be less than the statutory minimum wage multiplied by 365 days
divided by twelve," and to pay that salary "for all days in the month whether worked or not," and "irrespective of the
number of working days therein." That salary is due and payable regardless of the declaration of any special holiday in
the entire country or a particular place therein, or any fortuitous cause precluding work on any particular day or days
(such as transportation strikes, riots, or typhoons or other natural calamities), or cause not imputable to the worker. The
legal provisions governing monthly compensation are evidently intended precisely to avoid re-computations and
alterations in salary on account of the contingencies just mentioned, which, by the way, are routinely made between
employer and employees when the wages are paid on daily basis.

Disposition The orders complained of, namely: that of the respondent Undersecretary dated September 22, 1993, and
that of the Regional Director dated July 30, 1992, are NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE, and the proceeding against
petitioner DISMISSED.