Last Updated: Mon Jan 27 11:18:09 UTC 2014

Air Combat:
Russias PAK-FA versus the F-22 and F-35
Air Power Australia - Australia's Independent Defence Think Tank

Air Power Australia NOTAM

30th March, 2009
WGCDR Chris Mills, AM, BSc, MSc(AFIT ), RAAF (Retd)

Contacts:

Peter Goon
Mob: 0419-806-476

Carlo Kopp
Mob: 0437-478-224

converted by W eb2PDFConvert.com

T he F-22 Raptor is the only U S fighter design w ith the stealth, speed and agility to defeat
the new Russian P A K-FA design. T o be highly effective against the P A K-FA, it w ill need a
range of upgrades, including a new technology infrared sensor. Depicted technicians at the
U SA F A EDC performing low observables testing on an electro-optical sensor fairing,
developed for the A I RST sensor. T he A I RST w as deleted from the F-22 avionic suite during
development as a cost saving measure (US Air Force image).
February 2010 APA Analyses Journal
Assessing the Sukhoi PAK-FA
Imagine an apocryphal story of three fighter pilots meeting in the bar at an air combat
conference in Stockholm, in the year 2015. Chuck is a NAT O F-22A Raptor pilot based in
G ermany, Boris an Su-35-1 Flanker E P lus pilot flying from one of the bases protecting
Moscow, and Johan, a F-35A Lightning II pilot from the Netherlands. All are masters of
their craft and after drinks, merely to lubricate the vocal chords, they do what fighter
pilots all over the world do swap stories and make claims about their beloved aircraft.
Chuck starts. Im king of the skies, he claims. I supercruise at 52,000 feet and Mach 1.7.
Boris, I can see you from ~100 nm, and my A I M-120D launch range at this Mach is 70 nm.
You are one dead Flanker. Boris acknowledges the performance of the A P G-77 and the
Raptor, but replies, Y our missiles are easy to avoid. W hen you fire, my O L S-35 will see the
flare, and I will turn away to out-run the missile. You need to fire closer than 50 nm even
then at 50,000 feet and Mach 1.2, my Flanker can out-turn your missile. If you are side or
rear on I can get a lock-on at ~40 nm and I have a choice of seeker heads, so you might
wear an R-77M in the backside. No way Boris, Chuck replies, I know that game. Im head
on and you cant see me until about ~15 nm. If I have not killed you at 50 nautical, Im outa
there at the speed of heat. Boris and Chuck concede that there might be a nil-all draw, with
Chuck being untouchable because of the Raptors stealth, altitude and speed and the well
defended Su-35-1 defeating the Raptors missiles [1].
Now Boris makes his point. Comrade Johan, I have something special for you. My I RB I S-E
will see you head-on at ~25nm, but I fly my boys very wide and share the paints on our
digital network. At side and rear looks, I see you at ~45 nm and my ramjet RV V-A E-P Ds can
get you at that range. No way, Johan responds, my A P G-81 radar will see you at ~75 nm
and I can launch at 50 nm. If you fire, my DAS will see the missile at launch, so Ill turn
away to break lock. And my wingman will see you in the turn, computer network will still
know where you are, and we will skewer you in the cross-fire is Boriss riposte, and you
will run out of missiles before I do, If I duck your A I M-120D shots, I will win easily. They
bicker about the strengths of their own aircraft and weaknesses of the others and Johan
converted by W eb2PDFConvert.com

grudgingly agrees the Flanker might be the winner.

Chuck and Johan stay in the bar after Boris is unexpectedly called away by men in dark
coats, and agree that work needs to be done on improving the AIM-120Ds terminal lethality.
Essentially, this is a deadly play between stealth, agility, sensors and missiles. From the
front quarter the Raptors 0.0001 square meter Radar Cross Section (RCS) and the Lightning
I Is 0.001 square metres make them difficult targets. The Flanker-E P lus, while having a
reduced radar signature, still has a residual RCS of about 2 square metres, such that the F22A and the F-35 will see the Su-35-1 way beyond their missile launch range. The Su-35-1
struggles to see the F-22A on radar, but can find the F-35s 0.01 square metre lower side
and rear RCS. The A I M-120D is a fine missile, but the Su-35-1 has finer defences, so the
missile kill probabilities are likely to be low. W hen out of missiles, the F-22 Raptor can
escape. The F-35 Lightning II cannot.
A more likely future scenario is that Boris will be banned from subsequent air combat
conferences, so we must rely on more conventional air combat operations analyses. If we
move forward just a couple of years, say to the year 2017, and the PA K-FA is operational,
there is a profound change in air combat engagements.
Suppose the Russians dont quite master stealth to the degree of the F-22A, but manage a
RCS of 0.01 square metres from all aspects. The F-22As A P G-77 will detect the PA K-FA at
~40 nm and the F-35s A P G-81 at ~30 nm. Passive electronic surveillance might increase
detection ranges, but this still makes long-range missile shots problematic, as tracking
depends upon the opponent emitting, which smart opponents will try not to do.
The PA K-FAs radar can be expected to be an improvement on the I RB I S-E so at front-on
aspects might detect the F-22A at ~15 nautical miles and the F-35 at ~28 nautical miles;
and from side and rear aspects, the F-22A at ~43 nautical miles and the F-35 at ~51
nautical miles.
Infrared sensors are the next growth area in air combat. Every air combat jet has
unavoidable infrared signatures converting kerosene into thrust at prodigious rates does
that. The existing O L S-35, developed for the Su-35B M, is credited with the ability to detect
a fighter type target head on from 27 nautical miles, and from behind at around 50 nautical
miles, through a 90 sector. It uses conventional detector technology, and provides similar
performance to the Eurofighter Typhoon P I RAT E infrared sensor. It is likely the PA K-FA will
have infrared signature management as is found on the designs of the Y F-23A, B-2A and the
F-22A, but not on the F-35 [2].
The emerging technology of Q uantum W ell Imaging P hotodetectors (Q W I P ) is set to cause
an upset in this market sector.

Quantum Well Imaging Photodetectors

converted by W eb2PDFConvert.com

Advances in Q WI P technology single chip imagers w ill see a new generation of infrared
sensors deploy over the next decade. Not limited in infrared colour sensitivity like legacy
bandgap imagers, Q WI P imagers offer the potential to detect cooler targets are greater
distances, and provide the high resolution required for standoff identification of targets.
Above 10.2 micron band 10242 pixel longw ave image produced by a U S Army Research Lab /
L-3 Cincinnati corrugated Q WI P [no image enhancement applied], depicted below . Q WI P
technology is now available in the U S, EU and Russia (I mages refer Choi and Forrai,
Corrugated quantum-well I R photodetectors see light in higher definition, 16 September
2008, SPI E New sroom. DOI : 10.1117/2.1200808.1237.).

converted by W eb2PDFConvert.com

Legacy bandgap detector imagers cannot compete against the emerging higher resolution
colour tuned Q WI P imagers. Above: current podded variant of the longw ave L M A A S-42
I nfraRed Search T rack sensor (C. Kopp image). Below : A A S-42 installation on the F-14D
T omcat, now retired (US Navy image).

Q W I P based imaging Infra Red Search and Track (I RST) detectors can be tuned by design
for sensitivity in a particular infrared band, using a fundamentally different detection
technique to conventional band gap detectors where the material determines the colour
sensitivity of the detector. First commercialised by Germanys A I M/Diehl-B GT, Q W I P s have
since been adapted for ballistic missile defence applications. Q W I P s have also been built to
operate not only in the conventional midwave and longwave infrared bands, but also in the
very longwave 15 micron band to detect very cool targets. Q W I P s capable of
simultaneously imaging in two, three or four infrared bands have also been manufactured
and marketed. Q W I P technology, therefore, opens up the potential for even greater
detection ranges against targets cooler than what current production infrared sensors can
track, and provide for much better infrared background rejection.
Consider a Q W I P technology O L S-50M installed in the PA K-FA. Such a device could be
design-optimised for simultaneous detection and tracking of aircraft exhausts, jet-plumes
and missile flares to ranges of 70 nm and beyond the limiting factors are the size of the
optics, cooling system and detector area. Russia has decades of experience in the

converted by W eb2PDFConvert.com

integration of infrared sensors into its weapons systems, and Q W I P s could well become the
primary sensor and radar the secondary. This means that the F-22A A N/A L R-94 will be
denied signals to detect and track the PAK-FA.
The shooting match shifts from radar-centric to infrared centric. The problem here is that
the PA K-FA will have it, the F-22A does not, and the ability of the F-35 EOTS and DAS to
make long range aircraft detections and guide weapons is at best unproven. The F-35
systems have not been designed to be highly sensitive at the task of searching and tracking
distant aircraft at those infrared colours where aircraft and their jet engines emit most of
their infrared energy. An understanding of the physics, or for the ever-hopeful, a simple
Developmental Test and Evaluation exercise will demonstrate this.
W ith the Beyond-Visual-Range (B V R) radar detections being reduced to distances below 60
nautical miles and infrared sensor detection ranges growing beyond 50 nautical miles, a new
generation of missiles will be required to dominate the battlespace.
Russian missile companies have shown much more flexibility and adaptability in the design
of missiles, so the PA K-FA could have a new-generation of shorter range, but higher agility
missiles a fusion of the ideas in the R-74 and R-77M, with a diverse mix of seeker heads.
These missiles will likely be cued by the I RST sensor, be equipped with inertial midcourse
guidance and, probably, mid-course guidance update capability transmitted either by radio,
or possibly infra-red laser or millimetric wave links.
Expect the PA K-FA to have vectored thrust and high levels of agility like the Flankers it is to
either replace or complement. Long missile range requires large rocket or ram-jet motors
and these heavy weapons lack the agility to pull high terminal G, and may be ducked by
the PAK-FA as easily as by the Su-35-1.
The PA K-FA will use a new super-cruising engine, based on technology from the Al-41F
series, so its tactic might be to maintain combat speeds of about Mach 1.5 and use a more
compact version of the ramjet RV V-A E-P D. A supersonic launch enables a ramjet to light
without a powerful booster thereby denying an opponent the detection of the usual missile
launch flare.
Fights between the F-22A and the PA K-FA will be close, high, fast and lethal. The F-22A
may get first look with the A P G-77, the Advanced Infra Red Search and Track (A I RST)
sensor having been deleted to save money, but the PA K-FA may get first look using its
advanced infrared sensor. Then, the engagement becomes a supersonic equivalent of the
Battle of Britain or air combat over North Korea. The outcome will be difficult to predict as
it will depend a lot on the combat skills of the pilots and the capabilities of the missiles for
end-game kills. There is no guarantee that the F-22 will prevail every time.
The fate of the F-35 Lightning I I would be far worse in an air combat environment
challenged by the PAK-FA. If the Mach 1.5 PAK-FA is using its infrared sensor as the primary
sensor and observes radio frequency emission control (EMCO N), then the first detection by
the F-35s A P G-81 radar could be at ~20 nautical miles or less with a missile launched by
the PA K-FAs infrared sensors already inbound from 60 to 70 nautical miles away. The PA KFA could easily break to a direction outside the F-35s AIM-120 engagement zone.
The sustained turning performance of the F-35A Lightning I I was recently disclosed as 4.95
G at Mach 0.8 and 15,000 ft. A 1969 F-4E P hantom I I could sustain 5.5 Gs at 0.8 Mach with
40 percent internal fuel at 20,000 feet. The F-35 is also much slower than the 1960s F-4E or
F-105D. So the F-35As aerodynamic performance is retrograde when compared with 1960s
legacy fighters. The consequence of such inferior JSF performance is that its DAS might
detect an incoming missile, but the aircraft lacks the turn-rate to out-fly it. As the F-35 also
lacks the performance to engage or escape, repeated freebie shots from the PA K-FA could
inflict high losses. Expect the exchange rate to be of the order of 4:1 in favour of the PA KFA, possibly much higher[3].
Russian aerospace companies have demonstrated an ability to outpace U S aerospace
manufacturers in terms of delivery of an operational capability and also the diversity of the
capabilities of their weapons systems. The cumbersome U S acquisition system, and
marketing rather than technology driven aerospace industry, put the U S at a distinct
competitive disadvantage in rapidly adapting to an evolving threat environment.
The most dangerous situation the U S could face, is where the high and upwardly spiralling
development and production costs of the JSF cuckoo the available resources, which are
needed to develop the advanced capabilities necessary to counter the new Russian PA K-FA,
and the generation of new weapons which the PAK-FA will inevitably be armed with.

converted by W eb2PDFConvert.com

Complacency is not an option. Having ruled the roost for the decade out to 2015, the F-22A
may be knocked off its perch by a new comer, unless the U S invests in new sensors,
especially, and advanced technology I nfra-Red Search and T rack, stealth improvements and
a new generation of missiles for the F-22 assuming it even builds more than the token
number of F-22s currently planned. T he F-35 has already been neutralised and negated by
the Su-35-1/35B M and w ill be substantively overmatched by the P A K-FA. T he West needs to
think long, hard and fast about the P A K-FA, as the current and retrograde F-35 centric
future fighter fleet model guarantees certain defeat in future combat.
February 2010 APA Analyses Journal
Assessing the Sukhoi PAK-FA

P A K-FA rendering by N P O Saturn. U nlike the JSF, the stealthy P A K-FA is being designed w ith
air superiority performance and high agility as the primary consideration. T o date only
speculative renderings have been released, making assessments difficult (Saturn NPO).

Endnotes:
[1] Radar Parameters
Radar Cross Sections cited (X-band):
F-22A Front Aspect = 0.0001 m2, Side and Rear Aspect = 0.01 0.001 m2 (0.005 used in
converted by W eb2PDFConvert.com

this analysis);
F-35A Front Aspect = 0.001 m 2, Side and Rear Aspect = 0.01 m 2;
PAK-FA All Aspect = 0.01 m 2;
Su-35-1 Front Aspect= 2 m 2.
Radar Range Figures used are:
F-22A APG-77 = published figures (AW &ST - pessimistic);
F-35A APG-81 = published figures (AW &ST - pessimistic);
PAK-FA IRBIS-E N035 Best Case published figures (Tikhomirov NIIP);
Su-35-1 IRBIS-E N035 W orst Case published figures (Tikhomirov NIIP)
[2] Boyd Cook, PIRATE: the IRST for Eurofighter TYPHOON, Proc. SPIE, Vol. 4820, 897 (2003), URL:
http://spiedl.aip.org/getabs/servlet/GetabsServlet?prog=normal&id=
PSISDG004820000001000897000001&idtype=cvips&gifs=yes
[3] Boeing F-15SE Silent Eagle. This low-signature version of the F-15 Eagle was assessed during the compilation
of this NOTAM. Its radar cross section, while claimed to be comparable to the export configuration of the F-35
from nose-on is likely to be substantially inferior from other aspects. Its infrared signature will be similar to the
standard F-15 Eagle. Thus, the PAK-FA using radar will detect the Silent Eagle at a range sufficient to launch BVR
missiles and at similar or greater ranges to the F-35 for infrared-based engagements. Flying wide sweeps and
distributing sensor detections as is done for the legacy Sukhois will enhance radar detections and enable IRST
ranging. The advantage the F-15SE Silent Eagle has over the F-35 JSF is that it has the aerodynamic performance
and fuel reserves to egress from a dangerous air combat engagement.

Related Reading
W hen Americas Stealth Monopoly Ends, W hat's Next? [Click for more...]
Surviving the Modern Integrated Air Defence System [Click for more ...]
The Russian Philosophy of Beyond Visual Range Air Combat [Click for more ...]
F/A-18E/F Super Hornet vs. Sukhoi Flanker Analysis [Click for more ...]
Sukhoi Flanker Analysis [Click for more ...]
F-22A Raptor Analysis [Click for more ...]
Joint Strike Fighter Analysis [Click for more ...]

Air Power Australia Website - http://www.ausairpower.net/

Air Power Australia Research and Analysis - http://www.ausairpower.net/research.html

converted by W eb2PDFConvert.com

Artwork, graphic design, layout and text 2004 - 2014 Carlo Kopp; Text 2004 - 2014 Peter Goon; All rights
reserved. Recommended browsers. Contact webmaster. Site navigation hints. Current hot topics.
Site Update Status: $Revision: 1.753 $ Site History: Notices and Updates / NLA Pandora Archive
Save Page as PDF

Follow
@APA_Updates

Tweet
Select Language
Powered by

Translate

converted by W eb2PDFConvert.com