Francisco et. al. v.

House of Representatives
(Davide Impeachment)
G.R. No. 160261
Keyword: Separation of powers between the executive,
legislative and judiciary branch of government.
Facts: 1) On July 22, 2002, the House of
Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by
Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which
directed the Committee on Justice to conduct an
investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund
(JDF).
2) On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E.
Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first
impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court
for culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of
the public trust and other high crimes. The complaint
was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico,
Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and
was referred to the House Committee on Justice on
August 5, 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of
Article XI of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may
be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be
included in the Order of Business within ten session
days, and referred to the proper Committee within
three session days thereafter. The Committee, after
hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall
submit its report to the House within sixty session days
from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for
consideration by the House within ten session days
from receipt thereof.
3) The House Committee on Justice ruled on
October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint
was sufficient in form, but voted to dismiss the same
on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.
4) Four months and three weeks since the filing
on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23,
2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice
voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint
was filed with the Secretary General of the House by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr.
5) (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B.
Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the
alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by
above-mentioned House Resolution. This second
impeachment complaint was accompanied by a
Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by
at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House
of Representatives
6) Thus arose the instant petitions against
the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which
petitions contend that the filing of the second
impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it

violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the

Constitution that [n]o impeachment proceedings shall
be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year
7) Respondent House of Representatives
through Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr. and/or its corespondents, by way of special appearance, submitted
a Manifestation asserting that this Court has no
jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the
House of Representatives,which is an independent and
co-equal branch of government under the Constitution,
from the performance of its constitutionally mandated
duty to initiate impeachment cases. On even date,
Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed
a Motion to Intervene (Ex Abudante Cautela) and
Comment, praying that the consolidated petitions be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the
issues affecting the impeachment proceedings and that
the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate
as the impeachment court to try and decide
impeachment cases, including the one where the Chief
Justice is the respondent, be recognized and upheld
pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of the
Constitution. Briefly stated, the position of
respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. that
impeachment is a political action which cannot assume
a judicial character.
Issues:
Sub issue:
1) Whether or not the power of judicial
review extends to those arising from impeachment
proceedings.
Main issues: 1) Whether or not the filing of the
second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives
falls within the one year bar provided in the
Constitution; and
2) Whether or not the resolution thereof is a
political question has resulted in a political crisis.
Ruling:
Sub issue
Yes, judicial review extends to those arising from
impeachment proceedings.
Petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of
judicial review to determine the validity of the second
impeachment complaint.
This Courts power of judicial review is conferred on the
judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article
VIII of our present 1987 Constitution:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government. (Emphasis supplied)
Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively
expounded upon by Justice Jose P. Laurel in the
definitive 1936 case of Angara v. Electoral Commission,
to wit: x x x the Constitution is a definition of the
powers of government. Who is to determine the nature,

scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution

itself has provided for the instrumentality of the
judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary
mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does
not assert any superiority over the other departments;
it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument secures
and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is
involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which
properly is the power of judicial review under the
Constitution.
x.x.x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court
as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other
departments in the exercise of its power to determine
the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative
acts void if violative of the Constitution.
There exists no constitutional basis for the contention
that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment
proceedings would upset the system of checks and
balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted
as a whole and one section is not to be allowed to
defeat another. Both are integral components of the
calibrated system of independence and
interdependence that insures that no branch of
government act beyond the powers assigned to it by
the Constitution.
Main issues:
Issue # 1
Yes, the filing of the second impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the
House of Representatives falls within the one year bar
provided in the Constitution.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the
act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral
to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action
taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article
XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint
has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another
may not be filed against the same official within a one
year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the
Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment
complaint, was filed by former President Estrada
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with
seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003
and referred to the House Committee on Justice on
August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint
filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and
Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on
October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition
against the initiation of impeachment proceedings
against the same impeachable officer within a one-year
period.
Issue # 2
No, the resolution thereof is not a political
question it has not resulted in a political crisis.

The possibility of the occurrence of a constitutional

crisis is not a reason for this Court to refrain from
upholding the Constitution in all impeachment cases.
Justices cannot abandon their constitutional duties just
because their action may start, if not precipitate, a
crisis. What lies in here is an issue of a genuine
constitutional material which only this Court can
properly and competently address and adjudicate in
accordance with the clear-cut allocation of powers
under our system of government. Face-to-face thus
with a matter or problem that squarely falls under the
Courts jurisdiction, no other course of action can be
had but for it to pass upon that problem head on.
The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially
entangling itself with the process of impeachment has
effectively set up a regime of judicial supremacy, is
patently without basis in fact and in law.
Part II - Amendment of the Constitution
A. Amendments vs. Revision
B. Proposal
1. By Congress as a constituent assembly
2. By Constitutional Convention
1
Gonzales vs. Comelec, 21 SCRA 774
(1968)
In June 1967, Republic Act 4913 was passed. This law
provided for the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite for the
proposed amendments to the Constitution. It was
provided in the said law that the plebiscite shall be
held on the same day that the general national
elections shall be held (November 14, 1967). This was
questioned by Ramon Gonzales and other concerned
groups as they argued that this was unlawful as there
would be no proper submission of the proposals to the
people who would be more interested in the issues
involved in the general election rather than in the
issues involving the plebiscite.
Gonzales also questioned the validity of the procedure
adopted by Congress when they came up with their
proposals to amend the Constitution (RA 4913). In this
regard, the COMELEC and other respondents
interposed the defense that said act of Congress
cannot be reviewed by the courts because it is a
political question.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not the act of Congress in proposing
amendments is a political question.
II. Whether or not a plebiscite may be held
simultaneously with a general election.
HELD:
I. No. The issue is a justiciable question. It must be
noted that the power to amend as well as the power to
propose amendments to the Constitution is not
included in the general grant of legislative powers to
Congress. Such powers are not constitutionally granted
to Congress. On the contrary, such powers are inherent
to the people as repository of sovereignty in a
republican state. That being, when Congress makes
amendments or proposes amendments, it is not
actually doing so as Congress; but rather, it is sitting as

a constituent assembly. Such act is not a legislative

act. Since it is not a legislative act, it is reviewable by
the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has the final
say whether or not such act of the constituent
assembly is within constitutional limitations.

Constitution is valid,considering the absence in the law

of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative.
(4) WON, the lifting of term limits of elective officials
would constitute a revision or an amendment of the
Constitution.

II. Yes. There is no prohibition to the effect that a

plebiscite must only be held on a special election. SC
held that there is nothing in this provision of the [1935]
Constitution to indicate that the election therein
referred to is a special, not a general election. The
circumstance that the previous amendment to the
Constitution had been submitted to the people for
ratification in special elections merely shows that
Congress deemed it best to do so under the
circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its
authority to submit proposed amendments for
ratification in general elections.

RULING:It was made clear during the interpellations of

the convention that it was their intention to leave the
details of carrying out Section 2 to the legislature. The
conclusion then is inevitable that the system of
initiative on the Constitution under Section 2 of Article
XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory. Without
implementing legislation the same cannot operate.
Although the Constitution has recognized or granted
the right, the people cannotexercise it if Congress does
not provide for its implementation.

Note: **Justice Sanchez and Justice JBL Reyes

dissented. Plebiscite should be scheduled on a special
date so as to facilitate Fair submission, intelligent
consent or rejection. They should be able to compare
the original proposition with the amended proposition.
3. By the people thru initiative (See R.A. 6735
August 4, 1989)
2
Santiago vs. Comelec, G.R. 127325, March
19, 1997

This mode of amending the Constitution is a mode of

amendment which bypassescongressional action.
However, in the last analysis it is still is dependent on
congressional action.The court agrees that R.A. No.
6735 was intended to cover initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. A careful scrutiny of
the Acthowever, yields a negative answer. First, Section
2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on
amendments to the Constitution. Second, the Act
doesnot provide for the contents of a petition for
initiative on the Constitution.

Miriam Defensor- Santiago vs. COMELEC

G.R No. 127325 March 19, 1997
FACTS:
On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding
member of the Movement for People's Initiative, filed
with the COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the
Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by
People's Initiative" citing Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution. Acting on the petition, the COMELEC set
the case for hearing and directed Delfin to have the
petition published. After the hearing the arguments
between petitioners and opposing parties, the
COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file
their "memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda"
within five days. On December 18, 1996, Senator
Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria
Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition
under Rule 65 raising the following arguments, among
others:
ISSUES:
(1) WON, Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a
self-executing provision.
(2) WON, R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a
System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating
Funds Therefor, was intended toinclude or cover
initiative on amendments to the Constitution; and if so,
whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers such
initiative.
(3) WON, that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300
(In re: Rules and Regulations Governing the Conduct of
Initiative on the Constitution,and Initiative and
Referendum on National and Local Laws) regarding the
conduct of initiative on amendments to the

Third, while the Act provides subtitles for National

Initiative and Referendum(Subtitle II) and for Local
Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is
provided for initiative on the Constitution. This simply
means that the mainthrust of the Act is initiative and
referendum on national and local laws. If Congress
intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the
implementation ofthe initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle
therefor, considering that in the order of things, the
primacy ofinterest, or hierarchy of values, the right of
the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution is far more important than the initiative
onnational and local laws. The foregoing brings us to
the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete,
inadequate, or wanting in essential terms
andconditions insofar as initiative on amendments to
the Constitution is concerned.R.A. No. 6735 is thus
found to be inadequate to cover the system of initiative
on amendments to the Constitution, and have failed to
providesufficient standard for subordinate
legislation.
This deficiency cannot be cured by
"empowering" the COMELEC "to promulgate such
rules andregulations as may be necessary to carry out
the purposes of [the] Act. The delegation of the power
to the COMELEC is then INVALID.The foregoing
considered, further discussion on the issue of whether
the proposal to lift the term limits of elective national
and local officials is an amendment to, and not a
revision of, the Constitution is rendered unnecessary.
Note that the lifting of the term limits was held to be
that of a revision,as it would affect other
provisions of the Constitution such as the
synchronization of elections, the constitutional
guarantee of equal access toopportunities for

public service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A

revision cannot be done by initiative.
WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED.
C. Submission
3
Tolentino vs. Comelec, 41 SCRA 702
(1971)
The 1971 Constitutional Convention came into being by
virtue of two resolutions of the Congress approved in
its capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the
purpose of calling a convention to propose
amendments to the Constitution. After election of
delegates held on November 10, 1970, the Convention
held its inaugural session on June 1, 1971. In the
morning of September 28, 1970, the Convention
approved Organic Resolution No. 1 which is entitled as,
"A RESOLUTION AMENDING SECTION 1 OF ARTICLE V
OF THE CONSTITUTION SO AS TO LOWER THE VOTING
AGE TO 18." On September 30, 1971, the COMELEC
"resolved" to follow the mandate of the Convention,
that it will hold the said plebiscite together with the
senatorial elections on November 8, 1971 .
Petitioner, Arturo Tolentino, filed a petition for
prohibition, its main thrust being that Organic
Resolution No. 1 and the necessary implementing
resolutions subsequently approved have no force and
effect as laws in so far as they provide for the holding
of a plebiscite co-incident with the senatorial elections,
on the ground that the calling and holding of such a
plebiscite is, by the Constitution, a power lodged
exclusively in Congress as a legislative body and may
not be exercised by the Convention, and that, under
Article XV Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, the
proposed amendment in question cannot be presented
to the people for ratification separately from each and
all other amendments to be drafted and proposed by
the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Organic Resolution No. 1 of the
1971 Constitutional Convention violative to the
Constitution.
HELD:
NO. All the amendments to be proposed by the same
Convention must be submitted to the people in a single
"election" or plebiscite. In order that a plebiscite for the
ratification of a Constitutional amendment may be
validly held, it must provide the voter not only
sufficient time but ample basis for an intelligent
appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se but as
well as its relation to the other parts of the Constitution
with which it has to form a harmonious whole. In the
present context, where the Convention has hardly
started considering the merits, if not thousands, of
proposals to amend the existing Constitution, to
present to the people any single proposal or a few of
them cannot comply with this requirement. Read full
text
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D. Ratification
Part III - Judicial Review

A. Separation of Powers
1
In Re: Laureta and Maravilla, 148 SCRA
382 (1987)
Facts: Eva Maravilla-Ilustre sent letters to Justices
Andres R. Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera, Isagani A.
Cruz and Florentino P. Feliciano, all members of the
First Division. Ilustre using contemptuous language
claimed that members of the court rendered unjust
decision on the case GR 68635: Eva Maravilla Ilustre
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court. Ilustre claimed that
the Court acted unjustly when Justice Pedro Yap failed
to inhibit himself from participating when in fact he is a
law-partner of the defense counsel Atty Sedfrey
Ordonez. On 27 October 1986, the Court en banc
reviewed the history of the case and found no reason
to take action, stating that Justice Yap inhibited himself
from the case and was only designated as Chairman of
First Division on 14 July 1986 after the resolution of
dismissal was issued on 14 May 1986. Petitioner again
addressed letters to Justices Narvasa, Herrera and Cruz
with a warning of exposing the case to another forum
of justice, to which she made true by filing an AffidavitComplaint to Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) on 16
Decemeber 1986. Atty. Laureta himself reportedly
circulated copies of the Complaint to the press.
Tanodbayan dismissed petitioners Complaint
Issue:
Decision: Eva Maravilla Ilustre is hereby held in
contempt and Atty. Wenceslao Laureta is found guilty
of grave professional misconduct and is suspended
from the practice of law until further Orders.
Resolutions of the Supreme Court as a collegiate court,
whether en banc or division, speak for themselves and
are entitled to full faith and credence and are beyond
investigation or inquiry under the same principle of
conclusiveness of enrolled bills of the legislature. The
supremacy of the Supreme Courts judicial power is a
restatement of the fundamental principle of separation
of powers and checks and balances under a republican
form of government such that the three co-equal
branches of government are each supreme and
independent within the limits of its own sphere. Neither
one can interfere with the performance of the duties of
the other.
2

Demetria vs. Alba, 148 SCRA 208 (1987)

Synopsis
The constitutionality of the Budget
Reform Decree of 1977 was being challenged on the
ground that it infringes upon the fundamental law by
authorizing the illegal transfer of public money. The
provision is unconstitutional because it violates the
Constitutional provisions on appropriations.
Section 26
(1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof.
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law
unless it has passed three readings on separate days,
and printed copies thereof in its final form have been
distributed to its Members three days before its

passage, except when the President certifies to the

necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public
calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill,
no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote
thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the
yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
Subject and Title of Bills
The requirement that every bill shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof is
both directory and mandatory and compliance with this
requirement is essential to the validity of legislation.
B. Theory and Justification of Judicial Review
3
Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63
Phil.139 (1936)
Facts Angara was elected to the National Assembly
on December 3, 1935. On December 9, 1935, the
Electoral Commission by resolution fixed that as the
date of the last day of filing prostests against elections,
returns, and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly.
Held
The National Assembly has in effect cut off the
power of the Electoral Commission to entertain
protests because the Electoral Commission has the
sole power of regulating its proceedings to the
exclusion of the National Assembly
The judicial department has the obligation of
interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional
boundaries.
The Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission and the subject matter of the case at bar
for the purpose of determining the character, scope,
and extent of the Constitutional grant to the Electoral
Commission as the sole judge of contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of the members
of the National Assembly.

therefore, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago is

unnecessary. They also questioned the standing of
petitioners to file the petition and argued that the
petition raises a political question over which the Court
lacks jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over
the petition at bar.
RULING:
Yes. RA No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional. That
Supreme Court has the jurisdiction over said petition
because it involves not a political question but a
justiciable issue, and of which only the court could
decide whether or not a law passed by the Congress is
unconstitutional.
That when an amendment of the law involves creation,
merger, division, abolition or substantial alteration of
boundaries of local government units, a plebiscite in
the political units directly affected is mandatory.
Petitioners are directly affected in the imple-mentation
of RA No. 8528. Miranda was the mayor of Santiago
City, Afiado was the President of the Sangguniang Liga,
together with 3 other petitioners were all residents and
voters in the City of Santiago. It is their right to be
heard in the conversion of their city through a
plebiscite to be conducted by the COMELEC. Thus,
denial of their right in RA No. 8528 gives them proper
standing to strike down the law as unconstitutional.
Sec. 1 of Art. VIII of the Constitution states that: the
judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instru-mentality of the
Government.
5

C. Justiciable and Political Questions

4
Miranda vs. Aguirre, G.R. No. 133064,
September 16, 1999
FACTS:
1994, RA No. 7720 effected the conversion of the
municipality of Santiago, Isabela, into an independent
component city. July 4th, RA No. 7720 was approved by
the people of Santiago in a plebiscite. 1998, RA No.
8528 was enacted and it amended RA No. 7720 that
practically downgraded the City of Santiago from an
independent component city to a component city.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA No. 8528
for the lack of provision to submit the law for the
approval of the people of Santiago in a proper
plebiscite.
Respondents defended the constitutionality of RA No.
8528 saying that the said act merely reclassified the
City of Santiago from an independent component city
into a component city. It allegedly did not involve any
creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial
alteration of boundaries of local government units,

Franciso vs. House of Rep., supra

6
La Bugal-BLaan v. Ramos, G.R. No.
127882 Dec. 01, 2004
LA BUGAL BLAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC., et. al. v.
VICTOR O. RAMOS, Secretary Department of
Environment and Natural Resources; HORACIO RAMOS,
Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB-DENR);
RUBEN TORRES, Executive Secretary; and WMC
(PHILIPPINES) INC.
G.R. No. 127882, 27 January 2004, En Banc (CarpioMorales, J.)
The constitutional provision allowing the President to
enter into FTAA is a exception to the rule that
participation in the nations natural resources is
reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Provision must be
construed strictly against their enjoyment by nonFilipinos.
FACTS: RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect
on April 9, 1995. Before the effectivity of RA 7942, or
on March 30, 1995, the President signed a Financial
and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with
WMCP, a corporation organized under Philippine laws,

covering close to 100,000 hectares of land in South

Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North
Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, the Environment
Secretary Victor Ramos issued DENR Administrative
Order 95-23, which was later repealed by DENR
Administrative Order 96-40, adopted on December 20,
1996.
Petitioners prayed that RA 7942, its implementing
rules, and the FTAA between the government and
WMCP be declared unconstitutional on ground that
they allow fully foreign owned corporations like WMCP
to exploit, explore and develop Philippine mineral
resources in contravention of Article XII Section 2
paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Charter.
In January 2001, WMC - a publicly listed Australian
mining and exploration company - sold its whole stake
in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, 60% of which is owned
by Filipinos while 40% of which is owned by Indophil
Resources, an Australian company. DENR approved the
transfer and registration of the FTAA in Sagittarius
name but Lepanto Consolidated assailed the same. The
latter case is still pending before the Court of Appeals.
EO 279, issued by former President Aquino on July 25,
1987, authorizes the DENR to accept, consider and
evaluate proposals from foreign owned corporations or
foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving
wither technical or financial assistance for large scale
exploration, development and utilization of minerals
which upon appropriate recommendation of the (DENR)
Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign
proponent. WMCP likewise contended that the
annulment of the FTAA would violate a treaty between
the Philippines and Australia which provides for the
protection of Australian investments.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is
unconstitutional for allowing fully foreign-owned
corporations to exploit the Philippine mineral
resources.
Whether or not the FTAA between the government and
WMCP is a service contract that permits fully foreign
owned companies to exploit the Philippine mineral
resources.
HELD:
First Issue: RA 7942 is Unconstitutional
RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is
unconstitutional for permitting fully foreign owned
corporations to exploit the Philippine natural resources.
Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained
the Regalian Doctrine which states that All lands of
the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum,
and other minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. The same section
also states that, the exploration and development
and utilization of natural resources shall be under the
full control and supervision of the State.
Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in
the 1935 and 1973 Constitution authorizing the State

to grant licenses, concessions, or leases for the

exploration, exploitation, development, or utilization of
natural resources. By such omission, the utilization of
inalienable lands of the public domain through license,
concession or lease is no longer allowed under the
1987 Constitution.
Under the concession system, the concessionaire
makes a direct equity investment for the purpose of
exploiting a particular natural resource within a given
area. The concession amounts to complete control by
the concessionaire over the countrys natural resource,
for it is given exclusive and plenary rights to exploit a
particular resource at the point of extraction.
The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the
phrase management or other forms of assistance in
the 1973 Charter. The present Constitution now allows
only technical and financial assistance. The
management and the operation of the mining activities
by foreign contractors, the primary feature of the
service contracts was precisely the evil the drafters of
the 1987 Constitution sought to avoid.
The constitutional provision allowing the President to
enter into FTAAs is an exception to the rule that
participation in the nations natural resources is
reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly, such
provision must be construed strictly against their
enjoyment by non-Filipinos. Therefore, RA 7942 is
invalid insofar as the said act authorizes service
contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase
financial and technical agreements in accordance
with the 1987 Constitution, its pertinent provisions
actually treat these agreements as service contracts
that grant beneficial ownership to foreign contractors
contrary to the fundamental law.
The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law
is that the foreign contractor manages the mineral
resources just like the foreign contractor in a service
contract. By allowing foreign contractors to manage or
operate all the aspects of the mining operation, RA
7942 has, in effect, conveyed beneficial ownership over
the nations mineral resources to these contractors,
leaving the State with nothing but bare title thereto.
The same provisions, whether by design or
inadvertence, permit a circumvention of the
constitutionally ordained 60-40% capitalization
requirement for corporations or associations engaged
in the exploitation, development and utilization of
Philippine natural resources.
When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and
connected as conditions, considerations, inducements
or compensations for each other as to warrant a belief
that the legislature intended them as a whole, then if
some parts are unconstitutional, all provisions that are
thus dependent, conditional or connected, must fail
with them.
Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign
owned corporations are limited only to merely technical
or financial assistance to the State for large scale
exploration, development and utilization of minerals,
petroleum and other mineral oils.

Second Issue: RP Government-WMCP FTAA is a Service

Contract
The FTAA between he WMCP and the Philippine
government is likewise unconstitutional since the
agreement itself is a service contract.
Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP a fully foreign
owned corporation, the exclusive right to explore,
exploit, utilize and dispose of all minerals and byproducts that may be produced from the contract
area. Section 1.2 of the same agreement provides that
EMCP shall provide all financing, technology,
management, and personnel necessary for the Mining
Operations.
These contractual stipulations and related provisions in
the FTAA taken together, grant WMCP beneficial
ownership over natural resources that properly belong
to the State and are intended for the benefit of its
citizens. These stipulations are abhorrent to the 1987
Constitution. They are precisely the vices that the
fundamental law seeks to avoid, the evils that it aims
to suppress. Consequently, the contract from which
they spring must be struck down.
D. Requisites of Judicial Review
1. Actual Case or Controversy
Prematurity:
7
PACU vs. Secretary of Education, 97 Phil.
806 (1955)
Facts PACU requests that Act No. 2706 as amended
by Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutional because
A.
It deprives owners of schools and colleges as
well as teachers and parents of liberty and property
without due process of law
B.
It deprives parents of their natural right and
duty to rear their children for civic efficiency
C.
Their provisions conferring on the Secretary of
Education unlimited power to prescribe rules and
standards is an unlawful delegation of legislative
power.
Issue Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction
Held
When a law has been treated as constitutional,
the Court may refuse to consider an attack on its
validity. (Whether or not there is justiciable controversy
to be settled by the Court)
The petitioners here have suffered no wrong from the
enforcement of the criticized statutes.
Judicial power is limited to actual cases and
controversies. The Court does not sit to adjudicate
mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest.
Gonzales v. Marcos
Facts Gonzales raised a constitutional question
regarding an impermissible encroachment of President
Marcos on the legislative prerogative. The issue is
centered on the validity of the creation of EO 30, a
trust for the benefit of the Filipino people under the
name and style of the CCP, entrusted with the task of
constructing a national theater and music hall, an arts

building and facilities to awaken the peoples

consciousness in our cultural heritage and to
encourage assistance in its preservation.
The respondents contend that the petitioner has no
personality to contest the case since the funds to
construct the CCP came from donations and gifts and
not from taxation.
Issue Meanwhile, President Marcos issued PD 15 and
179 creating the CCP, defined its functions, and since
the PDs were issued during Martial Law, the
constitutionality of EO 30 is rendered moot and
academic.
--FACTS:
President Marcos issued Executive Order No. 30, which
is a trust that provides for the construction of a
national theater, a national music hall and an arts
building and facilities that would be collectively known
as the Cultural Center of the Philippines. The project
aimed to promote, preserve, enhance, and develop the
Philippines' cultural heritage. First Lady Imelda Marcos
headed the Board of Trustees entrusted in building the
project and they were also the respondents in this
petition for certiorari alleging the encroachment of EO
30 on the legislative powers of the executive branch
and the question of whether the funds would come
from taxpayers' money.
ISSUE:
Whether the creation of Executive Order No. 30 is
constitutional.
RULING:
Yes. The Court ruled that the President did not
encroach on the legislative power in issuing EO 30
because he was merely acting in accordance with the
constitutional provision to promote arts and letters
(Sec. 4, Art. XIV of the Constitution). Therefore, the
creation of the Cultural Center through the funding of
donations from private entities and the United States
gives the President the authority, under the doctrine of
parens patriae, to implement the project for the benefit
of the Filipino people.
LOCUS STANDI
Tolentino v. Sec. of Finance
Facts VAT is issued on the sale, barter, or exchange
of goods and properties as well as on the sale or
exchange of services. It is equivalent to the 10 percent
of the gross selling prices of gross value in money of
goods or properties sold, bartered, or exchanged or
from the gross receipts from the sale or exchange of
services.
RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing
VAT system and enhance its administration by
amending the NIRC role.

The substantive issues raised in some of the cases are

presented in abstract and hypothetical form because of
lack of concrete record.
Held
The Court has no power to render advisory
opinions or even jurisdiction over petitions for
declaratory judgment. In the case at bar, the Court is
being asked to sit as a 3rd legislative chamber to view
the law.
-Tolentino et al is questioning the constitutionality of RA
7716 otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added
Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill
did not exclusively originate from the House of
Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of
the Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated as
HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR,
the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for
after the 1st reading it was referred to the Senate Ways
& Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its own
version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred
that what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197
by striking out its text and substituting it w/ the text of
SB 1630 in that way the bill remains a House Bill and
the Senate version just becomes the text (only the
text) of the HB. Tolentino and co-petitioner Roco
[however] even signed the said Senate Bill.

They contend that section 51 collides with section 8,

Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution
where elective local officials, including Members of the
House of Representative, have a term of three (3)
years and are prohibited from serving for more than
three (3) consecutive terms. They argue that by
providing that the new city shall acquire a new
corporate existence, section 51 of R.A. No. 7854
restarts the term of the present municipal elective
officials of Makati and disregards the terms previously
served by them. In particular, petitioners point that
section 51 favors the incumbent Makati Mayor,
respondent Jejomar Binay, who has already served for
two (2) consecutive terms. They further argue that
should Mayor Binay decide to run and eventually win
as city mayor in the coming elections, he can still run
for the same position in 1998 and seek another threeyear consecutive term since his previous three-year
consecutive term as municipal mayor would not be
counted. Thus, petitioners conclude that said section
51 has been conveniently crafted to suit the political
ambitions of respondent Mayor Binay.
Issue:
Whether petitioners arguments are tenable for
litigation

ISSUE: Whether or not EVAT originated in the HoR.

HELD: By a 9-6 vote, the SC rejected the challenge,
holding that such consolidation was consistent with the
power of the Senate to propose or concur with
amendments to the version originated in the HoR.
What the Constitution simply means, according to the 9
justices, is that the initiative must come from the HoR.
Note also that there were several instances before
where Senate passed its own version rather than
having the HoR version as far as revenue and other
such bills are concerned. This practice of amendment
by substitution has always been accepted. The
proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of
form. There is no showing that it would make a
significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over
what has been done.
8 Mariano vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 119694 March
07, 1995
Synopsis
RA 7854 provided for the conversion of
Makati into a highly urbanized city. The act was
assailed on the fact that it did not properly identify the
land area by metes and bounds in violation of the
Constitution. It was also assailed on the basis that the
increase in legislative districts as provided for in the
act is not in accord with Section 5(3) of the
Constitution. The Court held that the districts may be
increased and apportionment of legislative districts
may be made by special law. The Court also held that
the description was sufficient enough to describe the
land.
Facts:
Two (2) petitions assail sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A.
No. 7854 entitled An Act Converting the Municipality
of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as
the City of Makati as unconstitutional.

Held:
No. The court dismissed the petitions.
The court cannot entertain this challenge to the
constitutionality of section 51. The requirements before
a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law
are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an
actual case or controversy; (2) the question of
constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3)
the constitutional question must be raised at the
earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on
the constitutional question must be necessary to the
determination of the case itself.
Petitioners have far from complied with these
requirements. The petition is premised on the
occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor
Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections;
that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that
he would seek re-election for the same position in the
1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies
may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a
hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual
case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of
Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties
to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this
futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over
which this Court has no jurisdiction.
9
Montesclaros v. Comelec, G.R. No.
152295, July 09, 2002
Mootness:
Facts: The Local Government Code of 1991 renamed
the Kabataang Barangay to Sangguniang Kabataan and
limited its membership to youths at least 15 but no
more than 21 years of age. On 18 February 2002,
Antoniette VC Montesclaros demanded from COMELEC

that SK elections be held as scheduled on 6 May 2002.

COMELEC Chairman Alfredo Benipayo wrote to the
House of Representatives and the Senate on 20
February 2002 inquiring on the status of pending bills
on SK and Barangay elections and expressed support
to postpone the SK election on November 2002. On 11
March 2002 the Bicameral Committee consolidated
Senate Bill 2050 and House Bill 4456, resetting the SK
election to 15 July 2002 and lowered the membership
age to at least 15 but no more than 18 years of age.
This was approved by the Senate and House of
Representative on 11 March and 13 March 2002
respectively and signed by the President on 19 March
2002. The petitioners filed prohibition and mandamus
for temporary restraining order seeking the prevention
of postponement of the SK election and reduction of
age requirement on 11 March 2002.
Issue: Whether or not the proposed bill is
unconstitutional.
Decision: Petition dismissed for utter lack of merit. This
petition presents no actual justiciable controversy.
Petitioners do not cite any provision of law that is
alleged to be unconstitutional. Petitioners perayer to
prevent Congress from enacting into law a proposed
bill does not present actual controversy. A proposed bill
is not subject to judicial review because it is not a law.
A proposed bill creates no right and imposes no duty
legally enforceable by the Court. Having no legal effect
it violates no constitutional right or duty. At the time
petitioners filed this petition, RA No. 9164 was not yet
enacted into law. After its passage petitioners failed to
assail any provision in RA No. 9164 that could be
unconstitutional.
10
Atlas Fertilizer v. Sec, DAR, G.R. No.
93100, June 19,1997
Facts: Petitioner, Atlas Fertilizer engaged in the
aquaculture industry utilizing fishponds and prawn
farms. Assailed Sections 3 (b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and
32 of R.A. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law),
as well as the implementing guidelines and procedures
contained in Administrative Order Nos. 8 and 10 Series
of 1988 issued by public respondent Secretary of the
Department of Agrarian Reform as unconstitutional.
They contend that R.A. 6657, by including the raising of
fish and aquaculture operations including fishponds
and prawn ponds, treating them as in the same class or
classification as agriculture or farming violates the
equal protection clause of the Constitution and
therefore void.
Issue: Whether or not RA 6657 is unconstitutional.
Decision: Petition dismissed. R.A. No. 7881 approved by
Congress on 20 February 1995 expressly state that
fishponds and prawn farms are excluded from the
coverage of CARL. In view of the foregoing, the
question concerning the constitutionality of the
assailed provisions has become moot and academic
with the passage of R.A. No. 7881.
11
2001
FACTS:

Lacson v. Perez, G.R. No. 147780, May 10,

On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by

an armed mob assaulting andattempting to break into
Malacaang, issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that
there was a state of rebellion in NCR. She also issued
General Order No. 1 directing the AFP and the PNP to
suppress therebellion. Warrantless arrests of several
alleged leaders and promoters of the "rebellion"
followed. Aggrieved, 4 related petitions were filed
before the Court. The case at bar is for
prohibition,injunction,
mandamus
, and
habeas corpus
(with an urgent application for the issuance of
temporaryrestraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction). Petitioners assail the declaration of a state
of rebellion by PGMA and the warrantless arrests
allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no
basisboth in fact and in law.On May 6, 2001, PGMA
ordered the lifting of the declaration of a "state of
rebellion" in MetroManila. Accordingly, the instant
petitions have been rendered moot and academic. As
to petitioners'claim that the proclamation of a "state of
rebellion" is being used by the authorities to
justifywarrantless arrests, the Secretary of Justice
denies that it has issued a particular order to arrest
specificpersons in connection with the "rebellion."
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a valid warrantless arrest
against the petitioners.
HELD:
No. In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the
authorities may only resort to warrantlessarrests of
persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if the
circumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest
feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on
thedeclaration of a "state of rebellion." Petitioners'
contention that they are under imminent danger of
being arrested without warrant do not justify their
resort to the extraordinary remediesof
mandamus
and prohibition, since an individual subjected to
warrantless arrest is not withoutadequate remedies in
the ordinary course of law. The prayer for prohibition
and
mandamus
is improperat this time. As regards petitioners' prayer
that the hold departure orders issued against them be
declarednull and void
ab initio
, it is to be noted that petitioners are not directly
assailing the validity of thesubject hold departure
orders in their petition. They are not even expressing
intention to leave thecountry in the near future. The
prayer to set aside the same must be made in proper
proceedingsinitiated for that purpose. Anent
petitioners' allegations
ex abundante ad cautelam
in support of their application for theissuance of a writ
of
habeas corpus
, it is manifest that the writ is not called for since its
purpose is torelieve petitioners from unlawful restraint,
a matter which remains speculative up to this very day.
Petition is DISMISSED. However, respondents,

consistent and congruent with their undertakingearlier

adverted to, together with their agents,
representatives, and all persons acting for and in
theirbehalf, are hereby enjoined from arresting
petitioners therein without the required judicial warrant
forall acts committed in relation to or in connection
with the May 1, 2001 siege of Malacaang.
Exceptions to Mootness:
12
Sanlakas vs. Executive Secretary, G.R.
159085, February 03, 2004
Facts:
During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some threehundred junior officers and enlisted menof the AFP,
acting upon instigation, command and direction of
known and unknown leaders haveseized the Oakwood
Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the
corruption in the AFP anddeclared their withdrawal of
support for the government, demanding the
resignation of the President,Secretary of Defense and
the PNP Chief. These acts constitute a violation of
Article 134 of theRevised Penal Code, and by virtue of
Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4,
thePhilippines was declared under the State of
Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers
wentback to their barracks in the evening of the same
day. On August 1, 2003, both the Proclamationand
General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435,
declaring the Cessation of the State of Rebellion was
issued.In the interim, however, the following petitions
were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO
NGMANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of the
Constitution does not require the declaration of a state
of rebellion to call out the AFP, and thatthere is no
factual basis for such proclamation. (2)SJS
Officers/Members v. Hon. ExecutiveSecretary, et al,
petitioners contending that the proclamation is a
circumvention of the reportrequirement under the
same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President
to submit a report toCongress within 48 hours from the
proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that
thepresidential issuances cannot be construed as an
exercise of emergency powers as Congress hasnot
delegated any such power to the President. (3) Rep.
Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal- Arroyo and
Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending
that there was usurpation of thepower of Congress
granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution.
(4) Pimentel v. Romulo,et al, petitioner fears that the
declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to
theunconstitutional implementation of warrantless
arrests" for the crime of rebellion.
Issue:
Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General
Order No. 4 are constitutional? Whether or Not the
petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to
bring suit?
Held:
The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No.
427 and General Order No. 4 areconstitutional. Section
18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring
state or rebellion. ThePresident in addition to its
Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the
Constitution executivepowers. It is not disputed that

the President has full discretionary power to call out

the armed forcesand to determine the necessity for the
exercise of such power. While the Court may
examinewhether the power was exercised within
constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave
abuseof discretion, none of the petitioners here have,
by way of proof, supported their assertion that the
President acted without factual basis. The issue of the
circumvention of the report is of no merit asthere was
no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil
courts or that military authorities have taken over the
functions of Civil Courts. The issue of usurpation of the
legislative power of the Congress is of no moment
since the President, in declaring a state of rebellion and
in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a
wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-inChief powers. These are purely executive powers,
vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18,
ArticleVII, as opposed to the delegated legislative
powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The
fear on warrantless arrest is unreasonable. since any
person may be subject to this whether there is
rebellion or not as this is a crime punishable under the
Revised Penal Code, and as long as a valid warrantless
arrest is present.
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the govemmental act that is being challenged.
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party
alleges such personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of Issue upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Based
on the foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS
Officers/Members have
no legal standing to sue. Only petitioners Rep. Suplico
et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have
standing to challenge the subject issuances. It
sustained its decision in Philippine..
13
Pimentel v. Ermita, G.R. 164978, October
13, 2005
(Public Officer, Difference Between Ad-Interim and
Acting Appointments)
Facts: President Arroyo issued appointments to
respondents as acting secretaries of their respective
departments without the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, while Congress is in their regular
session.
Subsequently after the Congress had adjourned,
President Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to
respondents as secretaries of the departments to
which they were previously appointed in an acting
capacity.
Petitioners senators assailing the constitutionality of
the appointments, assert that while Congress is in
session, there can be no appointments, whether
regular or acting, to a vacant position of an office
needing confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, without first having obtained its
consent.

Respondent secretaries maintain that the President can

issue appointments in an acting capacity to
department secretaries without the consent of the
Commission on Appointments even while Congress is in
session.
EO 292, which devotes a chapter to the Presidents
power of appointment. Sections 16 and 17, Chapter 5,
Title I, Book III of EO 292 read:
SEC. 16. Power of Appointment. The President shall
exercise the power to appoint such officials as provided
for in the Constitution and laws.
SEC. 17. Power to Issue Temporary Designation. (1)
The President may temporarily designate an officer
already in the government service or any other
competent person to perform the functions of an office
in the executive branch, appointment to which is
vested in him by law, when: (a) the officer regularly
appointed to the office is unable to perform his duties
by reason of illness, absence or any other cause; or (b)
there exists a vacancy[.]
Issue: WON the President can issue appointments in an
acting capacity to department secretaries while
Congress is in session.
Held: Yes. The essence of an appointment in an acting
capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap
measure intended to fill an office for a limited time
until the appointment of a permanent occupant to the
office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an
alter ego of the President, such as the office of a
department secretary, the President must necessarily
appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary
before the permanent appointee of her choice could
assume office.
The office of a department secretary may become
vacant while Congress is in session. Since a
department secretary is the alter ego of the President,
the acting appointee to the office must necessarily
have the Presidents confidence. Thus, by the very
nature of the office of a department secretary, the
President must appoint in an acting capacity a person
of her choice even while Congress is in session.
Ad interim appointments and acting appointments are
both effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim
appointments are extended only during a recess of
Congress, whereas acting appointments may be
extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover adinterim appointments are submitted to the Commission
on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting
appointments are not submitted to the Commission on
Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of
temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they
can also be a way of circumventing the need for
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
The absence of abuse is readily apparent from
President Arroyos issuance of ad interim appointments
to respondents immediately upon the recess of
Congress, way before the lapse of one year.
Note: Can Congress impose the automatic appointment
of the undersecretary?

Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the

President the obligation to appoint automatically the
undersecretary as her temporary alter ego.
The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature,
and the legislature may not interfere with the exercise
of this executive power except in those instances when
the Constitution expressly allows it to interfere.
Limitations on the executive power to appoint are
construed strictly against the legislature. The scope of
the legislatures interference in the executives power
to appoint is limited to the power to prescribe the
qualifications to an appointive office. Congress cannot
appoint a person to an office in the guise of prescribing
qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress
impose on the President the duty to appoint any
particular person to an office.

14
1993

2. Proper Party
Joya vs. PCGG, G.R. 96541, August 24,

Facts 35 Petitioners in the special civil action for

prohibition and mandamus and preliminary injunction
to stop the PCGG from proceeding with the auction sale
scheduled on January 11, 1991 by Christies of New
York of the Old Masters Painting and 18th and 19th
century silverware seized from the Marcoses.
Issue Whether or not the Court had the power to
review the case
Held

In this case, the Court Held

1.
The paintings and the silverware are not public
property. The paintings were donated to the
Metropolitan Museum. The silverware was seized from
the Marcoses.
2.
The writ of mandamus cannot prosper because
the petitioners are not after the fulfillment of a positive
duty in light of an enforceable right.
3.
It cannot prosper also as a taxpayer suit
because the artwork and the silverware were not
purchased with public funds.
4.
There is no actual case, because the auction
happened already. The case is moot.
--Facts:

Special Civil Action for Prohibition and

Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Injuction and/or
Restraining Order seek to enjoin the PCGG from
proceeding with the auction sale scheduled on January
11, 1991 by Christies of New York of the following:
o
82 Old Masters Paintings
o
18th and 19th century silverware contained in
71 cartons

The items were seized from Malacanang and

the Metropolitan Museum of manila and place in
custody of the Central Bank and alleged to be part of
the ill-gotten wealth of the late President Marcos, his
relatives and cronies

August 9, 1990 Mateo Caparas, the Chairman

of PCGG wrote then President Aquino requesting her for
authority to sign the proposed Consignment Agreement
between the Republic of the Phil and Christie, Manson

and Woods International Inc (Christies of New York)

concerning the sale

August 14, 1990 Pres Aquino, through former

Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr. authorized
PCGG to sign the agreement

August 15, 1990 PCGG signed the

Consignment Agreement with Christies of New York

October 26, 1990 COA submitted to Pres

Aquino the audit findings and observations on the
Consignment Agreement to the effect that:
o
The authority of PCGG Chairman Caparas was
of doubtful legality
o
Contract was highly disadvantageous to the
government
o
PCGG had a poor track record in asset disposal
by auction in the US
o
Assets subject of auction were historical relics
and had cultural significance hence their disposal was
prohibited by law

November 15, 1990 PCGG, through its new

Chairman David Castro, wrote Pres Aquino defending
the Consignment Agreement and refuting the
allegations of COA Chairman Domingo; Director of
National Museum Gabriel Casal issued a certification
that the items subject on the Consignment Agreement
did not fall within the classification of protected cultural
properties and did not specifically qualify as part of the
Filipino cultural heritage
Issue/s:

Whether the instant petition complies with the

legal requisites for this Court to exercise its power of
judicial review over this case
Ratio and Reasoning:

The Court shall exercise its power of judicial

review only if the case is brought before it by a party
who has legal standing to raise the constitutional or
legal question
o
Legal Standing personal and substantial
interest in the case such that the party has sustained
or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged
o
Interest material interest, an interest in issue
and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from
mere interest in the question involved, or mere
incidental interest; must be personal and not one
based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right
of some third and unrelated party
o
There are certain instances when the Court has
allowed exceptions to the rule on legal standing, as
when a citizen brings a case for mandamus to procure
the enforcement of a public duty for the fulfilment of a
public right recognized by the Constitution and when a
taxpayer questions the validity of a governmental act
authorizing the disbursement of public funds
o
Petitioners claim that as Filipino citizens and
taxpayers and artists deeply concerned with the
preservation and protection of the countrys artistic
wealth, they have legal personality
o
However, the paintings were donated by
private persons to the Metropolitan Museum of Manila
Foundation and the pieces of antique silverware were
given to the Marcos couple as gifts from friends and
dignitaries from foreign countries. The confiscation of
these properties by the Aquino administration should
not be understood to mean that the ownership of these
items has automatically passed on to the govt.

Petitioners failed to establish that they are the legal

owners of the artworks or that the pieces have become
publicly owned and thus they do not possess any clear
legal right to question their alleged unauthorized
disposition

The Court shall exercise its power of judicial

review only if there is an actual case or controversy
o
Since the purpose of this petition for prohibition
is to enjoin respondent public officials from holding the
auction sale, which is long past, the issues raised have
become moot and academic
They submit that the resolution by the Court of the
issues in this case will establish future guiding
principles and doctrines on the preservation of the
nation's priceless artistic and cultural possessions for
the benefit of the public as a whole.
Section 2 of R.A. 4846, as amended by P.D. 374,
declares it to be the policy of the state to preserve and
protect the important cultural properties and national
cultural treasures of the nation and to safeguard their
intrinsic value. As to what kind of artistic and cultural
properties are considered by the State as involving
public interest which should therefore be protected, the
answer can be gleaned from reading of the reasons
behind the enactment of R.A. 4846:
Held: Petition is dismissed for lack of merit
15
2003

Agan v. PIATCO, G.R. No. 155001, May 05,

FACTS:
On October 5, 1994, AEDC submitted an unsolicited
proposal to the Government through the DOTC/MIAA
for the development of NAIA International Passenger
Terminal III (NAIA IPT III).
DOTC constituted the Prequalification Bids and Awards
Committee (PBAC) for the implementation of the
project and submitted with its endorsement proposal to
the NEDA, which approved the project.
On June 7, 14, and 21, 1996, DOTC/MIAA caused the
publication in two daily newspapers of an invitation for
competitive or comparative proposals on AEDCs
unsolicited proposal, in accordance with Sec. 4-A of RA
6957, as amended.
On September 20, 1996, the consortium composed of
Peoples Air Cargo and Warehousing Co., Inc.
(Paircargo), Phil. Air and Grounds Services, Inc. (PAGS)
and Security Bank Corp. (Security Bank) (collectively,
Paircargo Consortium) submitted their competitive
proposal to the PBAC. PBAC awarded the project to
Paircargo Consortium. Because of that, it was
incorporated into Philippine International Airport
Terminals Co., Inc.
AEDC subsequently protested the alleged undue
preference given to PIATCO and reiterated its
objections as regards the prequalification of PIATCO.
On July 12, 1997, the Government and PIATCO signed
the Concession Agreement for the Build-Operate-andTransfer Arrangement of the NAIA Passenger Terminal
III (1997 Concession Agreement). The Government

granted PIATCO the franchise to operate and maintain

the said terminal during the concession period and to
collect the fees, rentals and other charges in
accordance with the rates or schedules stipulated in
the 1997 Concession Agreement. The Agreement
provided that the concession period shall be for
twenty-five (25) years commencing from the in-service
date, and may be renewed at the option of the
Government for a period not exceeding twenty-five
(25) years. At the end of the concession period,
PIATCO shall transfer the development facility to MIAA.
Meanwhile, the MIAA which is charged with the
maintenance and operation of the NAIA Terminals I and
II, had existing concession contracts with various
service providers to offer international airline airport
services, such as in-flight catering, passenger handling,
ramp and ground support, aircraft maintenance and
provisions, cargo handling and warehousing, and other
services, to several international airlines at the NAIA.
On September 17, 2002, the workers of the
international airline service providers, claiming that
they would lose their job upon the implementation of
the questioned agreements, filed a petition for
prohibition. Several employees of MIAA likewise filed a
petition assailing the legality of the various
agreements.
During the pendency of the cases, PGMA, on her
speech, stated that she will not honor (PIATCO)
contracts which the Executive Branchs legal offices
have concluded (as) null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the State can temporarily take over a
business affected with public interest.
RULING:
Yes. PIATCO cannot, by mere contractual stipulation,
contravene the Constitutional provision on temporary
government takeover and obligate the government to
pay reasonable cost for the use of the Terminal and/or
Terminal Complex.
Article XII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution
provides:
Section 17. In times of national emergency, when the
public interest so requires, the State may, during the
emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by
it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any
privately owned public utility or business affected with
public interest.
The above provision pertains to the right of the State in
times of national emergency, and in the exercise of its
police power, to temporarily take over the operation of
any business affected with public interest. The duration
of the emergency itself is the determining factor as to
how long the temporary takeover by the government
would last. The temporary takeover by the government
extends only to the operation of the business and not
to the ownership thereof. As such the government is
not required to compensate the private entity-owner of
the said business as there is no transfer of ownership,
whether permanent or temporary. The private entityowner affected by the temporary takeover cannot,
likewise, claim just compensation for the use of the

said business and its properties as the temporary

takeover by the government is in exercise of its police
power and not of its power of eminent domain.
Article XII, section 17 of the 1987 Constitution
envisions a situation wherein the exigencies of the
times necessitate the government to temporarily take
over or direct the operation of any privately owned
public utility or business affected with public interest.
It is the welfare and interest of the public which is the
paramount consideration in determining whether or not
to temporarily take over a particular business. Clearly,
the State in effecting the temporary takeover is
exercising its police power. Police power is the most
essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. Its
exercise therefore must not be unreasonably hampered
nor its exercise be a source of obligation by the
government in the absence of damage due to
arbitrariness of its exercise. Thus, requiring the
government to pay reasonable compensation for the
reasonable use of the property pursuant to the
operation of the business contravenes the Constitution.
16
CHR Employees Assoc. v. CHR, G.R. No.
155336, Nov. 25, 2004
FACTS: Congress passed RA 8522, otherwise known as
the General Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for
Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional
Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. On the strength of
these special provisions, the CHR promulgated
Resolution No. A98-047 adopting an upgrading and
reclassification scheme among selected positions in the
Commission.
By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062, the CHR
collapsed the vacant positions in the body to provide
additional source of funding for said staffing
modification.
The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and
upgrading scheme to the DBM with a request for its
approval, but the then DBM secretary denied the
request.
In light of the DBMs disapproval of the proposed
personnel modification scheme, the CSC-National
Capital Region Office, through a memorandum,
recommended to the CSC-Central Office that the
subject appointments be rejected owing to the DBMs
disapproval of the plantilla reclassification.
Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner CHR-employees
association (CHREA) in representation of the rank and
file employees of the CHR, requested the CSC-Central
Office to affirm the recommendation of the CSCRegional Office.
The CSC-Central Office denied CHREAs request in a
Resolution and reversed the recommendation of the
CSC-Regional Office that the upgrading scheme be
censured. CHREA filed a motion for reconsideration, but
the CSC-Central Office denied the same.
CHREA elevated the matter to the CA, which affirmed
the pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office and
upheld the validity of the upgrading, retitling, and
reclassification scheme in the CHR on the justification

that such action is within the ambit of CHRs fiscal

autonomy.
ISSUE: Can the CHR validly implement an upgrading,
reclassification, creation, and collapsing of plantilla
positions in the Commission without the prior approval
of the Department of Budget and Management?
HELD: the petition is GRANTED, the Decision of the CA
and its are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
ruling CSC-National Capital Region is REINSTATED. The
3 CHR Resolutions, without the approval of the DBM are
disallowed.
1. RA 6758, An Act Prescribing a Revised
Compensation and Position Classification System in the
Government and For Other Purposes, or the Salary
Standardization Law, provides that it is the DBM that
shall establish and administer a unified Compensation
and Position Classification System.
The disputation of the CA that the CHR is exempt from
the long arm of the Salary Standardization Law is
flawed considering that the coverage thereof
encompasses the entire gamut of government offices,
sans qualification.
This power to administer is not purely ministerial in
character as erroneously held by the CA. The word to
administer means to control or regulate in behalf of
others; to direct or superintend the execution,
application or conduct of; and to manage or conduct
public affairs, as to administer the government of the
state.
2. The regulatory power of the DBM on matters of
compensation is encrypted not only in law, but in
jurisprudence as well. In the recent case of PRA v.
Buag, this Court ruled that compensation, allowances,
and other benefits received by PRA officials and
employees without the requisite approval or authority
of the DBM are unauthorized and irregular
In Victorina Cruz v. CA , we held that the DBM has the
sole power and discretion to administer the
compensation and position classification system of the
national government.
In Intia, Jr. v. COA the Court held that although the
charter of the PPC grants it the power to fix the
compensation and benefits of its employees and
exempts PPC from the coverage of the rules and
regulations of the Compensation and Position
Classification Office, by virtue of Section 6 of P.D. No.
1597, the compensation system established by the PPC
is, nonetheless, subject to the review of the DBM.
(It should be emphasized that the review by the DBM of
any PPC resolution affecting the compensation
structure of its personnel should not be interpreted to
mean that the DBM can dictate upon the PPC Board of
Directors and deprive the latter of its discretion on the
matter. Rather, the DBMs function is merely to ensure
that the action taken by the Board of Directors
complies with the requirements of the law, specifically,
that PPCs compensation system conforms as closely
as possible with that provided for under R.A. No. 6758.
)

3. As measured by the foregoing legal and

jurisprudential yardsticks, the imprimatur of the DBM
must first be sought prior to implementation of any
reclassification or upgrading of positions in
government. This is consonant to the mandate of the
DBM under the RAC of 1987, Section 3, Chapter 1, Title
XVII, to wit:
SEC. 3. Powers and Functions. The Department of
Budget and Management shall assist the President in
the preparation of a national resources and
expenditures budget, preparation, execution and
control of the National Budget, preparation and
maintenance of accounting systems essential to the
budgetary process, achievement of more economy and
efficiency in the management of government
operations, administration of compensation and
position classification systems, assessment of
organizational effectiveness and review and evaluation
of legislative proposals having budgetary or
organizational implications.
Irrefragably, it is within the turf of the DBM Secretary to
disallow the upgrading, reclassification, and creation of
additional plantilla positions in the CHR based on its
finding that such scheme lacks legal justification.
Notably, the CHR itself recognizes the authority of the
DBM to deny or approve the proposed reclassification
of positions as evidenced by its three letters to the
DBM requesting approval thereof. As such, it is now
estopped from now claiming that the nod of approval it
has previously sought from the DBM is a superfluity
4. The CA incorrectly relied on the pronouncement of
the CSC-Central Office that the CHR is a constitutional
commission, and as such enjoys fiscal autonomy.
Palpably, the CAs Decision was based on the mistaken
premise that the CHR belongs to the species of
constitutional commissions. But the Constitution states
in no uncertain terms that only the CSC, the COMELEC,
and the COA shall be tagged as Constitutional
Commissions with the appurtenant right to fiscal
autonomy.
Along the same vein, the Administrative Code, on
Distribution of Powers of Government, the
constitutional commissions shall include only the CSC,
the COMELEC, and the COA, which are granted
independence and fiscal autonomy. In contrast,
Chapter 5, Section 29 thereof, is silent on the grant of
similar powers to the other bodies including the CHR.
Thus:
SEC. 24. Constitutional Commissions. The
Constitutional Commissions, which shall be
independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Elections, and the Commission on
Audit.
SEC. 26. Fiscal Autonomy. The Constitutional
Commissions shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. The approved
annual appropriations shall be automatically and
regularly released.

SEC. 29. Other Bodies. There shall be in accordance

with the Constitution, an Office of the Ombudsman, a
Commission on Human Rights, and independent central
monetary authority, and a national police commission.
Likewise, as provided in the Constitution, Congress
may establish an independent economic and planning
agency.

5. The most lucid argument against the stand of

respondent, however, is the provision of Rep. Act No.
8522 that the implementation hereof shall be in
accordance with salary rates, allowances and other
benefits authorized under compensation
standardization laws.26
NOTES:

From the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative

Code, it is abundantly clear that the CHR is not among
the class of Constitutional Commissions. As expressed
in the oft-repeated maxim expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, the express mention of one person, thing, act
or consequence excludes all others. Stated otherwise,
expressium facit cessare tacitum what is expressed
puts an end to what is implied.
Nor is there any legal basis to support the contention
that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy. In essence, fiscal
autonomy entails freedom from outside control and
limitations, other than those provided by law. It is the
freedom to allocate and utilize funds granted by law, in
accordance with law, and pursuant to the wisdom and
dispatch its needs may require from time to time.22 In
Blaquera v. Alcala and Bengzon v. Drilon,23 it is
understood that it is only the Judiciary, the CSC, the
COA, the COMELEC, and the Office of the Ombudsman,
which enjoy fiscal autonomy.
Neither does the fact that the CHR was admitted as a
member by the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group
(CFAG) ipso facto clothed it with fiscal autonomy. Fiscal
autonomy is a constitutional grant, not a tag obtainable
by membership.
We note with interest that the special provision under
Rep. Act No. 8522, while cited under the heading of the
CHR, did not specifically mention CHR as among those
offices to which the special provision to formulate and
implement organizational structures apply, but merely
states its coverage to include Constitutional
Commissions and Offices enjoying fiscal autonomy
All told, the CHR, although admittedly a constitutional
creation is, nonetheless, not included in the genus of
offices accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or
legislative fiat.
Even assuming en arguendo that the CHR enjoys fiscal
autonomy, we share the stance of the DBM that the
grant of fiscal autonomy notwithstanding, all
government offices must, all the same, kowtow to the
Salary Standardization Law. We are of the same mind
with the DBM on its standpoint, thusBeing a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not
vest the agency with the authority to reclassify,
upgrade, and create positions without approval of the
DBM. While the members of the Group are authorized
to formulate and implement the organizational
structures of their respective offices and determine the
compensation of their personnel, such authority is not
absolute and must be exercised within the parameters
of the Unified Position Classification and Compensation
System established under RA 6758 more popularly
known as the Compensation Standardization Law.

1. Respondent CHR sharply retorts that petitioner has

no locus standi considering that there exists no official
written record in the Commission recognizing petitioner
as a bona fide organization of its employees nor is
there anything in the records to show that its president
has the authority to sue the CHR.
On petitioners personality to bring this suit, we held in
a multitude of cases that a proper party is one who has
sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an
injury as a result of the act complained of. Here,
petitioner, which consists of rank and file employees of
respondent CHR, protests that the upgrading and
collapsing of positions benefited only a select few in
the upper level positions in the Commission resulting to
the demoralization of the rank and file employees. This
sufficiently meets the injury test. Indeed, the CHRs
upgrading scheme, if found to be valid, potentially
entails eating up the Commissions savings or that
portion of its budgetary pie otherwise allocated for
Personnel Services, from which the benefits of the
employees, including those in the rank and file, are
derived.
Further, the personality of petitioner to file this case
was recognized by the CSC when it took cognizance of
the CHREAs request to affirm the recommendation of
the CSC-National Capital Region Office. CHREAs
personality to bring the suit was a non-issue in the CA
when it passed upon the merits of this case. Thus,
neither should our hands be tied by this technical
concern. Indeed, it is settled jurisprudence that an
issue that was neither raised in the complaint nor in
the court below cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal, as to do so would be offensive to the basic
rules of fair play, justice, and due process.
2. In line with its role to breathe life into the policy
behind the Salary Standardization Law of providing
equal pay for substantially equal work and to base
differences in pay upon substantive differences in
duties and responsibilities, and qualification
requirements of the positions, the DBM, in the case
under review, made a determination, after a thorough
evaluation, that the reclassification and upgrading
scheme proposed by the CHR lacks legal
rationalization.
The DBM expounded that Section 78 of the general
provisions of the General Appropriations Act FY 1998,
which the CHR heavily relies upon to justify its
reclassification scheme, explicitly provides that no
organizational unit or changes in key positions shall be
authorized unless provided by law or directed by the
President. Here, the DBM discerned that there is no
law authorizing the creation of a Finance Management
Office and a Public Affairs Office in the CHR. Anent
CHRs proposal to upgrade twelve positions of Attorney
VI, SG-26 to Director IV, SG-28, and four positions of

Director III, SG-27 to Director IV, SG-28, in the Central

Office, the DBM denied the same as this would change
the context from support to substantive without actual
change in functions.
This view of the DBM, as the laws designated body to
implement and administer a unified compensation
system, is beyond cavil. The interpretation of an
administrative government agency, which is tasked to
implement a statute is accorded great respect and
ordinarily controls the construction of the courts. In
Energy Regulatory Board v. CA, we echoed the basic
rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which
are addressed to the sound discretion of government
agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities
coming under the special technical knowledge and
training of such agencies.
Automotive Industry Workers Alliance v. Romulo,
G.R. 157509, Jan. 18, 2005
Facts: Automotive Industry Workers Alliance (AIWA) and
its affiliated unions call upon the Supreme Court to
exercise its power of judicial review to declare as
unconstitutional an executive order assailed to be in
derogation of the constitutional doctrine of separation
of powers. In an original action for certiorari, they
invoke their status as labor unions and as taxpayers
whose rights and interests are allegedly violated and
prejudiced by Executive Order 185 dated 10 March
2003 whereby administrative supervision over the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), its
regional branches and all its personnel including the
executive labor arbiters and labor arbiters was
transferred from the NLRC Chairperson to the Secretary
of Labor and Employment. In support of their position,
the Unions argue that the NLRC -- created by
Presidential Decree 442, otherwise known as the Labor
Code, during Martial Law was an integral part of the
Department (then Ministry) of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) under the administrative supervision of the
Secretary of Justice. During the time of President
Corazon C. Aquino, and while she was endowed with
legislative functions after EDSA I, Executive Order 292
was issued whereby the NLRC became an agency
attached to the DOLE for policy and program
coordination and for administrative supervision. On 2
March 1989, Article 213 of the Labor Code was
expressly amended by Republic Act 6715 declaring that
the NLRC was to be attached to the DOLE for program
and policy coordination only while the administrative
supervision over the NLRC, its regional branches and
personnel, was turned over to the NLRC Chairman. The
subject EO 185, in authorizing the Secretary of Labor to
exercise administrative supervision over the NLRC, its
regional branches and personnel, allegedly reverted to
the pre-RA 6715 set-up, amending the latter law which
only Congress can do. Alberto Romulo (in his capacity
as Executive Secretary) and Patricia Sto. Tomas (in her
capacity as Secretary of Labor and Employment), as
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General,
opposed the petition on procedural and substantive
grounds.
Issue: Whether the Unions -- which contend that they
are suing for and in behalf of their members (more or
less 50,000 workers) -- has the requisite standing.

Held: NO. Legal standing or locus standi is defined as a

personal and substantial interest in the case such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. For a citizen to have standing, he must
establish that he has suffered some actual or
threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government; the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is
likely to be redressed by a favorable action. Herein, the
Unions have not shown that they have sustained or are
in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable
to the enactment of EO 185. As labor unions
representing their members, it cannot be said that EO
185 will prejudice their rights and interests considering
that the scope of the authority conferred upon the
Secretary of Labor does not extend to the power to
review, reverse, revise or modify the decisions of the
NLRC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.
Thus, only NLRC personnel who may find themselves
the subject of the Secretary of Labors disciplinary
authority, conferred by Section 1(d) of the subject
executive order, may be said to have a direct and
specific interest in raising the substantive issue herein.
Moreover, and if at all, only Congress, and not the
Unions herein, can claim any injury from the alleged
executive encroachment of the legislative function to
amend, modify and/or repeal laws. Neither can
standing be conferred on the Unions as taxpayers since
they have not established disbursement of public funds
in contravention of law or the Constitution. A
taxpayers suit is properly brought only when there is
an exercise of the spending or taxing power of
Congress. EO 185 does not even require for its
implementation additional appropriation. All told, if the
Court was to follow the strict rule on locus standi, the
petition should be forthwith dismissed on that score.
The rule on standing, however, is a matter of
procedure, hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional
plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and
legislators when the public interest so requires, such as
when the matter is of transcendental importance, of
overarching significance to society, or of paramount
public interest. However, the issue posed in the present
petition did not meet the exacting standard required
for the Court to take the liberal approach and recognize
the standing of the Unions. The subject matter of EO
185 is the grant of authority by the President to the
Secretary of Labor to exercise administrative
supervision over the NLRC, its regional branches and all
its personnel, including the Executive Labor Arbiters
and Labor Arbiters. Its impact, sans the challenge to its
constitutionality, is thereby limited to the departments
to which it is addressed. Considering that the
governmental act being questioned has a limited
reach, its impact confined to corridors of the executive
department, this is not one of those exceptional
occasions where the Court is justified in sweeping aside
a critical procedural requirement, rooted as it is in the
constitutionally enshrined principle of separation of
powers Citizen Standing:
17

Tanada vs. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 (1985)

FACTS:
Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus to compel
respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the

publication in the Official Gazette of various

presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general
orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders, invoking the
right to be informed on matters of public concern as
recognized by the 1973 constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the publication of presidential decrees,
letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letter of implementation and
administrative orders is necessary before its
enforcement.
RULING:
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall take
effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided The Court has ruled that
publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those
cases where the legislation itself does not provide for
its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is
material for determining its date of effectivity, which is
the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when
the law itself provides for the date when it goes into
effect. Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of
publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity.
The publication of all presidential issuances of a public
nature or of general applicability is mandated by
law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for
fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or
otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax
and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other
presidential issuances which apply only to particular
persons or class of persons such as administrative and
executive orders need not be published on the
assumption that they have been circularized to all
concerned.
Publication is, therefore, mandatory.
18
Chavez v. PEA and Amari, G.R. 133250,
July 09, 2002
Chavez v. Pea and Amari
Fact:
In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered
into a contract to reclaim areas of Manila Bay with the
Construction and Development Corportion of the
Philippines (CDCP).

three reclaimed islands known as the FREEDOM

ISLANDS.
Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture
agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a Thai-Philippine
corporation to develop the Freedom Islands. Along with
another 250 hectares, PEA and AMARI entered the JVA
which would later transfer said lands to AMARI. This
caused a stir especially when Sen. Maceda assailed the
agreement, claiming that such lands were part of
public domain (famously known as the mother of all
scams).
Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer
praying for mandamus, a writ of preliminary injunction
and a TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA
to AMARI and from implementing the JVA. Following
these events, under President Estradas admin, PEA
and AMARI entered into an Amended JVA and Mr.
Chaves claim that the contract is null and void.
Issue:
w/n: the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be
reclaimed as part of the stipulations in the (Amended)
JVA between AMARI and PEA violate Sec. 3 Art. XII of
the 1987 Constitution
w/n: the court is the proper forum for raising the issue
of whether the amended joint venture agreement is
grossly disadvantageous to the government.
Held:
On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the
constitution:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising
the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of
title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the
public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private
corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of
these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell
these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the
ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and
existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila
Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public
domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands
open to disposition and declared no longer needed for
public service. The government can make such
classification and declaration only after PEA has
reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these
lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain,
which are the only natural resources the government
can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15
hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and
outside the commerce of man.

PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President

Marcos under P.D. 1084, tasked with developing and
leasing reclaimed lands. These lands were transferred
to the care of PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of the Manila
Cavite Road and Reclamation Project (MCRRP). CDCP
and PEA entered into an agreement that all future
projects under the MCRRP would be funded and owned
by PEA.

3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a

private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares110 of
the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain.

By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No.

3517 transferring lands to PEA. It was followed by the
transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the
Register of Deeds of Paranaque to PEA covering the

4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to

AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares111 of still
submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void
for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987

Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural

resources other than agricultural lands of the public
domain.
PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter,
the government can classify the reclaimed lands as
alienable or disposable, and further declare them no
longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of
such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to
AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the
1987Constitution which prohibits private corporations
from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain.
Associational Standing:
19
KMU Labor Center vs. Garcia, G.R.
115381, Dec. 23, 1994
KILUSANG MAYO UNO LABOR CENTER vs.HON. JESUS B.
GARCIA, JR., the LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING
AND REGULATORY BOARD, and the PROVINCIAL BUS
OPERATORS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No.
115381 December 23, 1994
FACTS :
Then Secretary of DOTC, Oscar M. Orbos, issued
Memorandum Circular No. 90-395 to then LTFRB
Chairman, Remedios A.S. Fernando allowing provincial
bus operators to charge passengers rates within a
range of 15% above and 15% below the LTFRB official
rate for a period of one (1) year.
This range was later increased by LTFRB thru a
Memorandum Circular No. 92-009 providing, among
others, that The existing authorized fare range system
of plus or minus 15 per cent for provincial buses and
jeepneys shall be widened to 20% and -25% limit in
1994 with the authorized fare to be replaced by an
indicative or reference rate as the basis for the
expanded fare range.
Sometime in March, 1994, private respondent PBOAP,
availing itself of the deregulation policy of the DOTC
allowing provincial bus operators to collect plus 20%
and minus 25% of the prescribed fare without first
having filed a petition for the purpose and without the
benefit of a public hearing, announced a fare increase
of twenty (20%) percent of the existing fares.
On March 16, 1994, petitioner KMU filed a petition
before the LTFRB opposing the upward adjustment of
bus fares, which the LTFRB dismissed for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the authority given by respondent
LTFRB to provincial bus operators to set a fare range of
plus or minus fifteen (15%) percent, later increased to
plus twenty (20%) and minus twenty-five (-25%)
percent, over and above the existing authorized fare
without having to file a petition for the purpose, is
unconstitutional, invalid and illegal.
20
IBP v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August
15, 2000
IBP v. Zamora

Facts President Estrada deployed Marines to help the

PNP in patrolling malls after the Rizal pay LRT
bombings. The IBP challenged the validity of the
Executive Order as unconstitutional.
The Executire Secretary contends that the respondents
have no standing because they have no ''real party"
interest in the case.
Issue
case.

Whether or not the IBP has locus standi in the

Held
IBP has no locus standi but the Court brushed
aside the rule following Kilosbayan v. Guingona; where
it was held that locus standi is merely procedural & the
courts may take a liberal approach and brush
FACTS:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec
18, Art. VII of the Constitution, President Estrada, in
verbal directive, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and
PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper
deployment and campaign for a temporary period only.
The IBP questioned the validity of the deployment and
utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law
enforcement.
ISSUE:
1. WoN the President's factual determination of the
necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to
judicial review.
2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint
visibility patrols violate the constitutional provisions on
civilian supremacy over the military.
RULING:
1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are
raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial
review only if the following requisites are complied
with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and
appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial
interest of the party raising the constitutional question;
(3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the
earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question
is the lis mota of the case.
2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a
breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of
the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of
military assets for civilian law enforcement. The
participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint
visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. It is
their responsibility to direct and manage the

deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to

provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and
render logistical support to these soldiers. In view of
the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that
military authority is supreme over civilian authority.
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the
PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the
police force. Neither does it amount to an insidious
incursion of the military in the task of law enforcement
in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the
Constitution.
21
Executive Secretary vs. CA, 429 SCRA 781, May
25, 2004
Facts:
Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, took effect
on July 15, 1995. Before the law took effect, ARCO-Phil
filed a petition asking the court to declare some
provisions of the law unconstitutional. The law required
that only skilled workers were to be deployed for
employed abroad. According to the respondent, the
right of unskilled workers to due process is violated
because they are prevented from finding employment
and earning a living abroad. It cannot be argued that
skilled workers are immune from abuses by employers,
while unskilled workers are merely prone to such
abuses. It was pointed out that both skilled and
unskilled workers are subjected to abuses by foreign
employers. Furthermore, the prohibition of the
deployment of unskilled workers abroad would only
encourage fly-by-night illegal recruiters. The
respondent, likewise, alleged that Section 6,
subsections (a) to (m) is unconstitutional because
licensed and authorized recruitment agencies are
placed on equal footing with illegal recruiters. It
contended that while the Labor Code distinguished
between recruiters who are holders of licenses and
non-holders thereof in the imposition of penalties, Rep.
Act No. 8042 does not make any distinction. The
penalties in Section 7(a) and (b) being based on an
invalid classification are, therefore, repugnant to the
equal protection clause, besides being excessive;
hence, such penalties are violative of Section 19(1),
Article III of the Constitution. 9 It was also pointed out
that the penalty for officers/officials/employees of
recruitment agencies who are found guilty of economic
sabotage or large-scale illegal recruitment under Rep.
Act No. 8042 is life imprisonment.
Issue: Whether or not RA 8042 is valid
Held:
Section 6 of RA 8042 was previously upheld as valid. It
provides that employees of recruitment agencies may
be criminally liable for illegal recruitment.
Penalizing unlicensed and licensed recruitment
agencies and their officers and employees and their
relatives employed in government agencies charged
with the enforcement of the law for illegal recruitment
and imposing life imprisonment for those who commit
large scale illegal recruitment is not offensive to the
Constitution. The accused may be convicted of illegal
recruitment and large scale illegal recruitment only if,

after trial, the prosecution is able to prove all the

elements of the crime charged.
The respondent merely speculated and surmised that
licensed and registered recruitment agencies would
close shop and stop business operations because of the
assailed penal provisions of the law. A writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of
penal laws cannot be based on such conjectures or
speculations. The respondent even failed to adduce
any evidence to prove irreparable injury because of the
enforcement of Section 10(1)(2) of Rep. Act No. 8042.
Its fear or apprehension that, because of time
constraints, its members would have to defend foreign
employees in cases before the Labor Arbiter is based
on speculations. Even if true, such inconvenience or
difficulty is hardly irreparable injury.
Preliminarily, the proliferation of illegal job recruiters
and syndicates preying on innocent people anxious to
obtain employment abroad is one of the primary
considerations that led to the enactment of The
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.
Aimed at affording greater protection to overseas
Filipino workers, it is a significant improvement on
existing laws in the recruitment and placement of
workers for overseas employment.
By issuing the writ of preliminary injunction against the
petitioners sans any evidence, the trial court
frustrated, albeit temporarily, the prosecution of illegal
recruiters and allowed them to continue victimizing
hapless and innocent people desiring to obtain
employment abroad as overseas workers, and blocked
the attainment of the salutary policies 52 embedded in
Rep. Act No. 8042.
The trial court committed a grave abuse of its
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
issuing the assailed order and writ of preliminary
injunction. It is for this reason that the Court issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining the enforcement
of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial
court.
22

Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994)

Facts This case seeks to prohibit and restrain the

implementation of a Contract of Lease executed by the
PCSO and PGMC in connection with the online lottery
system, also known as the lotto.
Kilosbayan, a nonstock demestic corporation composed
of civic-spirited citizens, nuns, priests, pastors, and lay
leaders are suing in their capacity as taxpayers and
concerned citizens. Senators Freddie Webb and
Wigberto Taada and Representative Joker Arroyo are
suing as members of Congress and as taxpayers.
Public respondents allege that the petitioners have no
standing to maintain the instant suit.
Held
A partys standing before the Court is a
procedural technicality which it may in the exercise of
its discretion set aside in view of the importance of the
issues raised. Jurisprudence likewise shows that the SC
entertains cases of paramount importance to public

interest even if it appears that petitioners have no

locus standi.
The instant petition in the case at bar is of paramount
public interest and the ramifications of such issues
immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral
well-being of the people even in the remotest
barangays and the counter productive and
retrogressive effects staggering as it is expected to
raise billions of pesos.

23
2004

Taxpayers Standing:
ITF v. Comelec, 420 SCRA 438, January 13,

Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines

vs. Commission on Elections
[GR 159139, 13 January 2004]
En Banc, Panganiban (J): 4 concur, 1 concurs in
separate opinion, 1 concurs in result, 2 filed separate
opinions, 1 also filed a separate opinion to which 1
joined, 1 dissents in separate opinion to which 1 joined
Facts: On 7 June 1995, Congress passed Republic Act
8046, which authorized Comelec to conduct a
nationwide demonstration of a computerized election
system and allowed the poll body to pilot-test the
system in the March 1996 elections in the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). On 22 December
1997, Congress enacted Republic Act 8436 authorizing
Comelec to use an automated election system (AES)
for the process of voting, counting votes and
canvassing/consolidating the results of the national
and local elections. It also mandated the poll body to
acquire automated counting machines (ACMs),
computer equipment, devices and materials; and to
adopt new electoral forms and printing materials.
Initially intending to implement the automation during
the 11 May 1998 presidential elections, Comelec -- in
its Resolution 2985 dated 9 February 1998 -- eventually
decided against full national implementation and
limited the automation to the ARMM. However, due to
the failure of the machines to read correctly some
automated ballots in one town, the poll body later
ordered their manual count for the entire Province of
Sulu. In the May 2001 elections, the counting and
canvassing of votes for both national and local
positions were also done manually, as no additional
ACMs had been acquired for that electoral exercise
allegedly because of time constraints. On 29 October
2002, Comelec adopted in its Resolution 02-0170 a
modernization program for the 2004 elections. It
resolved to conduct biddings for the three (3) phases of
its Automated Election System; namely, Phase I - Voter
Registration and Validation System; Phase II Automated Counting and Canvassing System; and
Phase III - Electronic Transmission. On 24 January 2003,
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive
Order 172, which allocated the sum of P2.5 billion to
fund the AES for the 10 May 2004 elections. Upon the
request of Comelec, she authorized the release of an
additional P500 million. On January 28, 2003, the
Commission issued an "Invitation to Apply for Eligibility
and to Bid." On 11 February 2003, Comelec issued
Resolution 5929 clarifying certain eligibility criteria for
bidders and the schedule of activities for the project
bidding. Out of the 57 bidders, the Bidding and Awards

Committee (BAC) found the Mega Pacific Consortium

(MPC) and the Total Information Management
Corporation (TIMC) eligible. For technical evaluation,
they were referred to the BACs Technical Working
Group (TWG) and the Department of Science and
Technology (DOST). In its Report on the Evaluation of
the Technical Proposals on Phase II, DOST said that
both MPC and TIMC had obtained a number of failed
marks in the technical evaluation. Notwithstanding
these failures, Comelec en banc, on 15 April 2003,
promulgated Resolution 6074 awarding the project to
MPC. The Commission publicized this Resolution and
the award of the project to MPC on 16 May 2003. On 29
May 2003, five individuals and entities (including the
Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines,
represented by its president, Alfredo M. Torres; and Ma.
Corazon Akol) wrote a letter to Comelec Chairman
Benjamin Abalos Sr. They protested the award of the
Contract to MPC "due to glaring irregularities in the
manner in which the bidding process had been
conducted." Citing therein the noncompliance with
eligibility as well as technical and procedural
requirements, they sought a re-bidding. In a letter-reply
dated 6 June 2003, the Comelec chairman -- speaking
through Atty. Jaime Paz, his head executive assistant -rejected the protest and declared that the award
"would stand up to the strictest scrutiny." Hence, the
present petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether ITF, et. al. have the locus standi to file
the case questioning the validity of the election
computerization bidding.
Held: The issues central to the case are "of
transcendental importance and of national interest." As
alleged, Comelecs flawed bidding and questionable
award of the Contract to an unqualified entity would
impact directly on the success or the failure of the
electoral process. Any taint on the sanctity of the ballot
as the expression of the will of the people would
inevitably affect their faith in the democratic system of
government. Further, the award of any contract for
automation involves disbursement of public funds are
in gargantuan amounts; therefore, public interest
requires that the laws governing the transaction must
be followed strictly. Truly, our nations political and
economic future virtually hangs in the balance,
pending the outcome of the 2004 elections. Hence,
there can be no serious doubt that the subject matter
of the case is "a matter of public concern and imbued
with public interest"; in other words, it is of "paramount
public interest" and "transcendental importance."
This fact alone would justify relaxing the rule on legal
standing, following the liberal policy of the Court
whenever a case involves "an issue of overarching
significance to our society." ITF, et. al.s legal standing
should therefore be recognized and upheld. Moreover,
the Court has held that taxpayers are allowed to sue
when there is a claim of "illegal disbursement of public
funds," or if public money is being "deflected to any
improper purpose"; or when petitioner(s) seek to
restrain respondent(s) from "wasting public funds
through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law." Herein, Ma. Corazon M. Akol,
Miguel Uy, Eduardo H. Lopez, Augusto C. Lagman, Rex
C. Drilon, Miguel Hilado, Ley Salcedo, and Manuel
Alcuaz Jr., suing as taxpayers, assert a material interest

in seeing to it that public funds are properly and

lawfully used. In the Petition, they claim that the
bidding was defective, the winning bidder not a
qualified entity, and the award of the Contract contrary
to law and regulation. Accordingly, they seek to
restrain the Commission On Elections; Comelec
Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr.; Comelec Bidding And
Award Committee Chairman Eduardo D. Mejos And
Members Gideon De Guzman, Jose F. Balbuena,
Lamberto P. Llamas, And Bartolome Sinocruz Jr.; Mega
Pacific eSolutions, Inc.; And Mega Pacific Consortium
from implementing the Contract and, necessarily, from
making any unwarranted expenditure of public funds
pursuant thereto. Thus, the Court hold that ITF, et. al.
possess locus standi.
Voters Standing:
24
Tolentino v. Comelec, 420 SCRA 438, January
21, 2004

25

Legislative Standing:
Ople v. Torres, 293 SCRA 141 (1998)

BLAS F. OPLE
v.
RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR
VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO,ROBERT BARBERS,
CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO
VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEADOF THE NATIONAL
COMPUTER CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF THE
COMMISSION ON AUDITFacts:
The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the
part of Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent the shrinking of
the rightto privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice
Brandeis considered as "the most comprehensive of
rights and the rightmost valued by civilized men."
Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative
Order No. 308 entitled"Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System" on two
important constitutional grounds,
viz
:(1)it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to
legislate, and(2)it impermissibly intrudes on our
citizenry's protected zone of privacy.We grant the
petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the
petitioner need stronger barriers against
furthererosion.A.O. No. 308 was published in four
newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997
and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner
filed the instant petition against respondents, then
Executive Secretary Ruben Torresand the heads of the
government agencies, who as members of the InterAgency Coordinating Committee, arecharged with the
implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we
issued a temporary restraining orderenjoining its
implementation.
Issue:
WON the petitioner has the stand to assail the validity
of A.O. No. 308
Ruling:
YES
Rationale:
As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise
the threshold issues relating to the standing to sue of
thepetitioner and the justiciability of the case at bar.
More specifically, respondents aver that petitioner has

no legalinterest to uphold and that the implementing

rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated.
These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear.
Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our
Senate. Asa Senator, petitioner is possessed of the
requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that
the issuance of A.O.No. 308 is a usurpation of
legislative power.
4
As taxpayer and member of the Government Service
InsuranceSystem (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn
the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the
misuse of GSISfunds to implement A.O. No. 308. The
ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is not
affected by the fact that the implementing rules of
A.O.No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner
Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid
per se
and as infirmed on itsface. His action is not premature
for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal
defects. Moreover, therespondents themselves have
started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without
waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997,
respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the
publication of a notice to bid for themanufacture of the
National Identification (ID) card. Respondent Executive
Secretary Torres has publicly announcedthat
representatives from the GSIS and the SSS have
completed the guidelines for the national
identificationsystem.All signals from the respondents
show their unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308
and we need not wait forthe formality of the rules to
pass judgment on its constitutionality. In this light, the
dissenters insistence that wetighten the rule on
standing is not a commendable stance as its result
would be to throttle an importantconstitutional
principle and a fundamental right.

26

Governmental Standing:
People v. Vera, 65 Phil 56, November 16, 1937

PEOPLE & HSBC V. VERA & CU UNJIENG

Facts: Respondent, Mariano Cu Unjieng was found
guilty in a criminal case (no mention of crime) and
sentenced to indeterminate penalty of 5 years & 6
months of prision correccional to 7 years, 6 months &
27 days of prision mayor. Then the accused applied for
PROBATION based on ACT NO. 4221. Judge Vera then
set the hearing for the application on probation which
the Fiscal of Manila opposed as well as counsel for
HSBC. Probation was denied. An MR was filed by Cu
Unjieng, and included a Motion to Intervene as AMICI
CURAE, 34 lawyers. This was again opposed by the
Fiscal and the counsel for HSBC, and subsequently filed
a motion for execution of the conviction of Cu Unjieng.
Meanwhile, Judge Vera still considered the motion to
intervene of Cu Unjieng. Hence, a petition for certiorari
and prohibition was filed with the SC. One of the issues
raised in this petition was the constitutionality of the
Probation law. The challenged provision is Article 11
which provides: This Act shall apply only in those
provinces in which the respective provincial boards
have provided for the salary of a probation officer at
rates not lower than those now provided for provincial
fiscals. Said probation officers shall be appointed by
the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the
direction of the Probation Office. It was argued that

the aforesaid provision results in undue delegation of

legislative power to the provincial boards.
Issue: Whether there is indeed an Undue Delegation of
Legislative Power?
Held: YES. The power to make lawslegislative power
is vested in a bicameral Legislature by the Jones Law
(then the organic law of the country prior to the
commonwealth) and in a unicameral National Assembly
by the Constitution (1935 Constitution). The Philippine
Legislature or the National Assembly may not escape
its duties and responsibilities by delegating that power
to any other body or authority. Any attempt to abdicate
the power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle
that potestas delegate non posest delegari. The rule,
however, is no absolute and inflexible. It admits of
exceptions. An exception sanctioned by immemorial
practice permits the central legislative body to
delegate legislative powers to local authorities.
Legislative power may also be delegated by the
Constitution itself. Clearly the instant case does not fall
within these exceptions.
In TESTING whether a statue constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to
inquire WHETHER THE STATUTE WAS COMPLETE IN ALL
ITS TERMS AND CONDITIONS WHEN IT LEFT THE
HANDS OF THE LEGISLATURE so that nothing is left to
the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the
legislature. As a rule, AN ACT OF THE LEGISLATURE IS
INCOMPLETE, IF IT DOES NOT LAY DOWN ANY RULE OR
DEFINITE STANDARD BY WHICH THE ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICER OR BOARD MAY BE GUIDED in the exercise of
the discretionary powers delegated to it.
In the case at bar, we do not find any (standards) and
none has been pointed by the respondents. The
probation Act does not, by the force of any of its
provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards
any standard or guide in the exercise of their
discretionary power. What is granted , if we may use
the language of Justice Cardozo in the recent case of
Schecter, is a roving commission which enables the
provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. In
other words by Section 11, the provincial boards of the
various provinces are to determine for themselves
whether the Probation Law shall apply to their
provinces or not at all. The application or nonapplication of the Probation Law are left entirely in the
hands of the provincial boards. This, to our minds, is a
virtual surrender of legislative power to the provincial
boards, and clearly an unlawful delegation of legislative
power.
FACTS:
Cu-Unjieng was convicted of criminal charges by the
trial court of Manila. He filed a motion for
reconsideration and four motions for new trial but all
were denied. He then elevated to the Supreme Court of
United States for review, which was also denied. The
SC denied the petition subsequently filed by CuUnjieng for a motion for new trial and thereafter
remanded the case to the court of origin for execution
of the judgment. CFI of Manila referred the application
for probation of the Insular Probation Office which
recommended denial of the same. Later, 7th branch of

CFI Manila set the petition for hearing. The Fiscal filed
an opposition to the granting of probation to Cu
Unjieng, alleging, among other things, that Act No.
4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by
section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is
nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1),
Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal
protection of the laws. The private prosecution also
filed a supplementary opposition, elaborating on the
alleged unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an
undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial
boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI,
Constitution).
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is undue delegation of powers.
RULING:
Yes. SC conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221
constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of
legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for
this reason, unconstitutional and void.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11
which reads as follows: "This Act shall apply only in
those provinces in which the respective provincial
boards have provided for the salary of a probation
officer at rates not lower than those now provided for
provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be
appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be
subject to the direction of the Probation Office."
The provincial boards of the various provinces are to
determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law
shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The
applicability and application of the Probation Act are
entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If
the provincial board does not wish to have the Act
applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline
to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a
probation officer.
The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a
careful examination of the whole context, is to make
the application of the system dependent entirely upon
the affirmative action of the different provincial boards
through appropriation of the salaries for probation
officers at rates not lower than those provided for
provincial fiscals. Without such action on the part of the
various boards, no probation officers would be
appointed by the Secretary of Justice to act in the
provinces. The Philippines is divided or subdivided into
provinces and it needs no argument to show that if not
one of the provinces and this is the actual situation
now appropriate the necessary fund for the salary of
a probation officer, probation under Act No. 4221 would
be illusory. There can be no probation without a
probation officer. Neither can there be a probation
officer without the probation system.
Facial Challenge:
27
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
148560, Nov. 19, 2001
ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYANG.R. No. 148560,
November 19, 2001Facts:Petitioner Joseph Estrada
prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of
Plunder,wishes to impress upon the Court that the

assailed law is so defectively fashioned that itcrosses

that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from
the constitutionally infirm. Hiscontentions are mainly
based on the effects of the said law that it suffers from
the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the
"reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions;
and itabolishes the element of mens rea in crimes
already punishable under The Revised Penal
Codesaying that it violates the fundamental rights of
the accused.The focal point of the case is the alleged
vagueness of the law in the terms it uses.Particularly,
this terms are: combination, series and unwarranted.
Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial challenge
on the validity of the mentioned law.Issue:Whether or
not the petitioner possesses the locus standi to attack
the validity of the law usingthe facial challenge.
Ruling: On how the law uses the terms combination
and series does not constitute vagueness.
Thepetitioners contention that it would not give a fair
warning and sufficient notice of what the lawseeks to
penalize cannot be plausibly argued. Void-forvagueness doctrine is manifestlymisplaced under the
petitioners reliance since ordinary intelligence can
understand whatconduct is prohibited by the statute. It
can only be invoked against that specie of legislation
thatis utterly vague on its face, wherein clarification by
a saving clause or construction cannot beinvoked. Said
doctrine may not invoked in this case since the statute
is clear and free fromambiguity. Vagueness doctrine
merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for
the statuteto be upheld, not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude.On the other hand,
overbreadth doctrine decrees that governmental
purpose may not beachieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms.Doctrine of strict scrutiny holds
that a facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague
statuteand to one which is overbroad because of
possible chilling effect upon protected
speech.Furthermore, in the area of criminal law, the
law cannot take chances as in the area of freespeech.
A facial challenge to legislative acts is the most difficult
challenge to mount successfullysince the challenger
must establish that no set of circumstances
exists.Doctrines mentioned are analytical tools
developed for facial challenge of a statute in
freespeech cases. With respect to such statue, the
established rule is that one to who application of a
statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the
statute on the ground that impliedly itmight also be
taken as applying to other persons or other situations
in which its applicationmight be unconstitutional. On its
face invalidation of statues results in striking them
downentirely on the ground that they might be applied
to parties not before the Court whose activitiesare
constitutionally protected. It is evident that the
purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law ismore
imagined than real.The crime of plunder as a malum in
se is deemed to have been resolve in the
Congressdecision to include it among the heinous
crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death.Supreme Court holds the plunder law
constitutional and petition is dismissed for lacking
merit
3. Earliest Opportunity

28

Umali vs. Guingona, 305 SCRA 533 (1999)

Facts: Osmundo Umali the petitioner was appointed

Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue by
Pres Fidel V. Ramos. He assigned him in Manila,
November 29, 1993 to March 15, 1994 and Makati,
March 16, 1994 to August 4, 1994. On August 1, 1994,
President Ramos received a confidential memorandum
against the petitioner for alleged violations ofinternal
revenue laws, rules and regulations during his
incumbency as Regional Director, more particularly the
following malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance.
upon receipt of the said confidential memorandum,
former President authorized the issuance of an Order
for the preventive suspension of the petitioner and
immediately referred the Complaint against the latter
to the Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and
Corruption (PCAGC), for investigation. Petitioner was
duly informed of the charges against him. And was
directed him to send in his answer, copies of
hisStatement of Assets, and Liabilities for the past
three years (3), and Personal Data Sheet. Initial hearing
was set on August 25, 1994, at 2:00 p.m., at the
PCAGC Office. On August 23, the petitioner filed his
required answer. After evaluating the evidence on
record, the PCAGC issued its Resolution of September
23, 1994, finding a prima facie evidence to support six
(6) of the twelve (12) charges against petitioner. On
October 6, 1994, acting upon the recommendation of
the PCAGC, then President Ramos issued
Administrative Order No. 152 dismissing petitioner
from the service, with forfeiture of retirement and all
benefits under the law.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not AO No. 152 violated petitioner's
Right to Security of Tenure.
(2) Whether or Not Petitioner was denied due process
of law
(3) Whether or Not the PCAGC is a validly Constituted
government agencyand whether the petitioner can
raise the issue of constitutionality belatedly in its
motion for reconsideration of the trial courts decision.
(4) Whether or Not the ombudsman's resolution
dismissing the charges against the petitioner is still
basis for the petitioner's dismissal with forfeiture of
benefits as ruled in AO No. 152
Held:
Petitioner maintains that as a career executive service
officer, he can only be removed for cause and under
the Administrative Code of 1987, 6 loss of confidence is
not one of the legal causes or grounds for removal.
Consequently, his dismissal from office on the ground
of loss confidence violated his right to security of
tenure, petitioner theorized.
After a careful study, we are of the irresistible
conclusion that the Court of Appeals ruled correctly on
the first three Issue.
To be sure, petitioner was not denied the right to due
process before the PCAGC. Records show that the
petitioner filed his answer and other pleadings with

respect to his alleged violation ofinternal revenue laws

and regulations, and he attended the hearings before
the investigatory body.
It is thus decisively clear that his protestation of nonobservance of due process is devoid of any factual or
legal basis. Neither can it be said that there was a
violation of what petitioner asserts as his security of
tenure. According to petitioner, as a Regional Director
of Bureau of Internal Revenue, he is CESO eligible
entitled to security of tenure.
However, petitioner's claim of CESO eligibility is anemic
of evidentiary support. It was incumbent upon him to
prove that he is a CESO eligible but unfortunately, he
failed to adduce sufficient evidence on the matter.
His failure to do so is fatal. As regards the issue of
constitutionalityof the PCAGC, it was only posed by
petitioner in his motion for reconsideration before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati. It was certainly too late
to raise for the first time at such late stage of the
proceedings.
As to last issue, It is worthy to note that in the case
under consideration, the administrative action against
the petitioner was taken prior to the institution of the
criminal case. The charges included in Administrative
Order No. 152 were based on the results of
investigation conducted by the PCAGC and not on the
criminal charges before the Ombudsman. In sum, the
petition is dismissable on the ground that the Issue
posited by the petitioner do not constitute a valid legal
basis for overturning the finding and conclusion arrived
at by the Court of Appeals. However, taking into
account the antecedent facts and circumstances
aforementioned, the Court, in the exercise of its equity
powers, has decided to consider the dismissal of the
charges against petitioner before the Ombudsman, the
succinct and unmistakable manifestation by the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue that
his office is no longer interested in pursuing the case,
and the position taken by the Solicitor General, that
there is no more basis for Administrative Order No.
152, as effective and substantive supervening events
that cannot be overlooked.
Brief Summary: The case is a case filed for the
dismissal of the petition for Certiorari Prohibition and
Injunction brought by petitioner against the
respondents. It was on October 27, 1993 when
Osmundo Umali was appointed as Regional Director of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue by Pres. Fidel V. Ramos.
The late President received a memorandum alleging
against the petitioner in violation of internal revenue
laws during the incumbency as Regional Director. On
October 6, 1994, President Ramos issued an
Administrative Order No. 152 dismissing the petitioner
from service with forfeiture of retirement and all
benefits provided by law. The petitioner moved for
reconsideration but the Office of the President denied
the motion for reconsideration. December 1, 1994, a
petition is brought to the regional Trial Court of Makati
pertaining to Certiorari, Prohibition and Injunction of
Administrative Order No. 152.
Issues:
(a) Whether or not administrative order no. 152
violated the petitioner's right to security of tenure
(b) Whether or not the petitioner was denied of due
process in the issuance of administrative order no. 152

(c) Whether the PCAGC is validly constituted

government agency and whether the petitioner can
raise the issue of its constitutionality belated in its
motion for reconsideration of the trial court's decision
(d) Whether or not in the light of the ombudsman
resolution dismissing the charges against petitioner,
there is still basis for petitioner's dismissal with
forfeiture of benefits as ruled in administrative order
no. 152
Ruling:
(a) Whether or not administrative order no. 152
violated the petitioner's right to security of tenure
NO. Neither can it be said that there was a violation of
what petitioner asserts as his security of tenure. The
petitioner claimed that as a Regional Director of Bureau
of Internal revenue he is CESO eligible entitled to
security of tenure however it is anemic of evidentiary
support. But it was fatal that he wasn't able to provide
sufficient evidence on this matter.
(b) Whether or not the petitioner was denied of due
process in the issuance of administrative order no. 152
NO. The Court of Appeals ruled correctly on the first
three issues to be sure, petitioner was not denied the
right to due processes before the PCAGC. Records show
that the petitioner filed his answer and other pleadings
with respect to his alleged violations of internal
revenue laws and regulations and he attended the
hearings before the investigatory body.
(c) Whether the PCAGC is validly constituted
government agency and whether the petitioner can
raise the issue of its constitutionality belated in its
motion for reconsideration of the trial court's decision
The constitutionality of PCAGC was only posed by the
petitioner in his motion for reconsideration before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati. It is too late to raise the
said issue for the first time at such late stage of the
proceedings below
(d) Whether or not in the light of the ombudsman
resolution dismissing the charges against petitioner,
there is still basis for petitioner's dismissal with
forfeiture of benefits as ruled in administrative order
no. 152
The administrative action against the petitioner was
taken prior to the institution of the criminal case.
Administrative Order No. 152 were based on the results
of investigation conducted by the PCAGC and not on
the criminal charges before the ombudsman.
Note: The petition is dismissible because the issues
raised by the petitioner does not constitute any valid
legal basis for overturning the findings and conclusions
by the Court of Appeals. However considering
antecedent facts and circumstances, the Court has
decided to consider the dismissal and because the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue is no
longer interested in pursuing the case. Finally the
Solicitor General has no more basis to enact
Administrative Order No. 152.
Dispositive:
Wherefore, in light of the foregoing effective and
substantive supervening events, and in the exercise of

its equity powers, the Court hereby GRANTS the

petition Accordingly Administrative order no 152 is
considered LIFTED and petitioner can be allowed to
retire with full benefits No pronouncement as to costs.
4. Necessity of Deciding Constitutional
Questions
29
Arceta v. Mangrobang, G.R. No. 152895,
June 15, 2004
Facts:
The City Prosecutor of Navotas, Metro Manila charged
Ofelia V. Arceta with violating Batas Pambansa 22 in
anInformation (Criminal Case 1599-CR), alleging in an
Information that on or about 16 September 1998,
Arceta issued aRegional Bank check worth P740,000
(postdated 21 December 1998) to Oscar R. Castro
payable in CASH, well-knowing that at the time of issue
she did have sufficient funds or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment, anddespite receipt of notice of
such dishonor, Arceta failed to pay said payee with the
face amount of said check or tomake arrangement for
full payment thereof within 5 banking days after
receiving notice. Arceta did not move to havethe
charge against her dismissed or the Information
quashed on the ground that BP 22 was
unconstitutional. Shereasoned out that with the Lozano
doctrine still in place, such a move would be an
exercise in futility for it was highlyunlikely that the trial
court would grant her motion and thus go against
prevailing jurisprudence.
On 21 October 2002, Arceta was arraigned and pleaded
not guilty to the charge. However, she manifested
that her arraignment should bewithout prejudice to the
present petition or to any other actions she would take
to suspend proceedings in the trialcourt. Arceta [GR
152895] then filed the petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus, with prayers for a
temporaryrestraining order, assailing the
constitutionality of the Bouncing Checks Law (BP 22).
On the other hand, the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Caloocan filed a charge sheet against Gloria S. Dy for
violation of the Bouncing Checks Law(MeTC of
Caloocan City, Criminal Case 212183), alleging in the
Information that on or about the month of January2000,
Dy issued Prudential Bank Check 0000329230 in the
amount of P2,500,000.00 dated 19 January 2000 in
favor of Anita Chua well knowing at the time of issue
that she has no sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for thepayment of such check in full upon
its presentment which check was subsequently
dishonored for the reasonACCOUNT CLOSED and with
intent to defraud failed and still fails to pay the said
complainant the amount of P2,500,000.00 despite
receipt of notice from the drawee bank that said check
has been dishonored and had not beenpaid. Like
Arceta, Dy made no move to dismiss the charges
against her on the ground that BP 22 was
unconstitutional.Dy likewise believed that any move on

her part to quash the indictment or to dismiss the

charges on said ground wouldfail in view of the Lozano
ruling. Instead, she filed a petition with the Supreme
Court invoking its power of judicialreview to have the
said law voided for Constitutional infirmity.
Issue:
Whether the Court should render BP22
unconstitutional due to the present economic and
financial crisis, elsedue to the undue burden made
upon the MeTC by bouncing checks cases.
Held:
When the issue of unconstitutionality of a legislative
act is raised, it is the established doctrine that the
Court mayexercise its power of judicial review only if
the following requisites are present:
(1) an actual and appropriate case andcontroversy
exists;
(2) a personal and substantial interest of the party
raising the constitutional question;
(3) theexercise of judicial review is pleaded at the
earliest opportunity; and
(4) the constitutional question raised is the very
lismota of the case. Only when these requisites are
satisfied may the Court assume jurisdiction over a
question of unconstitutionality or invalidity of an act of
Congress. With due regard to counsels spirited
advocacy in both cases, theCourt was unable to agree
that the said requisites have been adequately met. Nor
does the Court find theconstitutional question raised to
be the very lis mota presented in the controversy
below.
Every law has in its favor thepresumption of
constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there
must be a clear and unequivocal breach of
theConstitution, and not one that is doubtful,
speculative or argumentative. The Court examined the
contentions of Arcetaand Dy carefully; but they still
have to persuade us that BP 22 by itself or in its
implementation transgressed aprovision of the
Constitution. Even the thesis of Dy that the present
economic and financial crisis should be a basis
todeclare the Bouncing Checks Law constitutionally
infirm deserves but scant consideration. As stressed in
Lozano, it isprecisely during trying times that there
exists a most compelling reason to strengthen faith
and confidence in thefinancial system and any practice
tending to destroy confidence in checks as currency
substitutes should be deterred,to prevent havoc in the
trading and financial communities. Further, while
indeed the metropolitan trial courts may beburdened
immensely by bouncing checks cases now, that fact is
immaterial to the alleged invalidity of the law
beingassailed. The solution to the clogging of dockets
in lower courts lies elsewhere.