PROPERTY CASE DIGESTS

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. AFP RETIREMENT AND SEPARATION

BENEFITS SYSTEM,
G.R. No. 180463, January 16, 2013
Topic: Public Domain alienable and disposable lands
Principle: Under the present Constitution, national parks are declared part of the
public domain, and shall be considered and may not be increased nor diminished,
except by law.
FACTS:
Lots X, Y-1 and Y-2 were lands of the public domain pursuant to Proclamation No.
168 (Proc. 168). In 1983, Proclamation No. 2273 (Proc. 2273) was issued which
removed and segregated Lots Y-1 and Y-2 from the reservation and declaring them
open for disposition to qualified applicants. As a result, only Lot X which consists of
15,020 square meters remained part of the reservation now known as Magsaysay
Park.
The record discloses that the heirs of CabaloKusop and Atty. Flaviano petitioned the
President to have Lots Y-1 and Y-2 taken out of the reservation for the reason that
through their predecessor CabaloKusop (Kusop), they have acquired vested private
rights over these lots. This campaign resulted in Proc. 2273, which re-classified and
returned Lots Y-1 and Y-2 to their original alienable and disposable state.
In 1997, the heirs and Flaviano filed applications for the issuance of individual
miscellaneous sales patents over the whole of Lot X. Consequently, 16 original
certificates of title (OCTs) covering Lot X were issued in the names of the heirs,
Flaviano and several others. These 16 titles were simultaneously conveyed to
respondent AFP-Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS).
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines a complaint for reversion, cancellation and
annulment of the AFP-RSBS titles, on the thesis that they were issued over a public
park which is classified as inalienable and non-disposable public land.
The heirs and Flaviano intervened, and, together with the AFP-RSBS, argued that
their predecessor-in-interest Kusop had acquired vested interests over Lot X for
having occupied the same for more than 30 years. The RTC ruled in favor of the
Republic.
The CA reversed the RTC and ruled that the lands in dispute are alienable and
disposable lands. Hence this present appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the lands in question are alienable and
disposable lands
HELD:
No. (The Court grants the Petition.)

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From the wording of Proc. 168, the land it comprises is subject to sale or settlement,
and thus alienable and disposable. However, this alienable and disposable character
of the land covered by the proclamation was subsequently withdrawn, and the land
was re-classified by then President Macapagal to pave the way for the
establishment of a park reservation, subject only to previously acquired private
rights. The heirs then lobbied for the exclusion of certain portions of the reservation
which they claimed to be theirs, allegedly acquired by their predecessor Kusop
through prescription. They were successful, for in 1983, then President Marcos
issued Proc. 2273, which excluded and segregated Lots Y-1 and Y-2 from the
coverage of Proc. 168. In addition, Proc. 2273 declared Lots Y-1 and Y-2 open for
distribution to qualified beneficiaries which included the heirs. However, Lot X was
retained as part of the reservation.
The heirs did not question Proc. 2273, precisely because they were the beneficiaries
thereof; nor did they object to the retention of Lot X as part of the park reserve.
Instead, in 1997, they applied for, and were granted, sales patents over Lot X.
Evidently, the sales patents over Lot X are null and void, for at the time the sales
patents were applied for and granted, the land had lost its alienable and disposable
character. It was set aside and was being utilized for a public purpose, that is, as a
recreational park. And under the present Constitution, national parks are declared
part of the public domain, and shall be conserved and may not be increased nor
diminished, except by law.
The government, as the agent of the State, is possessed of the plenary power as the
persona in law to determine who shall be the favored recipients of public lands, as
well as under what terms they may be granted such privilege, not excluding the
placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what otherwise would be ordinary
acts of ownership.
The heirs and Flavianos actions betray their claim of ownership to Lot X. When Proc.
168 was issued, they did not institute action to question its validity, using as cause
of action their claimed ownership and title over the land. The same is true when
Proc. 2273 came out. They did not file suit to invalidate it because it contravenes
their claimed ownership over Lot X. They simply sat and waited for the good graces
of the government to fall on their laps. They simply waited for the State to declare
them beneficiaries of the land.
The principle of estoppel bars one from denying the truth of a fact which has, in the
contemplation of law, become settled by the acts and proceedings of judicial or
legislative officers or by the act of the party himself, either by conventional writing
or by representations, express or implied or in pais.
Finally, as regards AFP-RSBS rights, the Court sustains the petitioners view that any
title issued covering non-disposable lots even in the hands of an alleged innocent
purchaser for value shall be cancelled. The Court cannot ignore the basic principle
that a spring cannot rise higher than its source; as successor-in-interest, AFP-RSBS
cannot acquire a better title than its predecessor, the herein respondentsintervenors.

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Casilang, Sr. us. Casilang-Dizon
G.R. No. 180269, February 20, 2013 (691 SCRA 385)
Topic: Partition
Principle: An agreement of partition may be made orally or in writing. An oral
agreement for the partition of the property owned in common is valid and
enforceable upon the parties.
FACTS:
Spouses Liborio and Francisca owns three parcels of land: (1) Lot No. 4676; (2)Lot No.
4618; (3) Lot No. 4704.

8 children: Felicidad, Ireneo (deceased), Marcelina, Jacinta, Bonifacio(deceased),

Leonara, Jose (petitioner), Flora.

Respondents: heirs of Ireneo: Rosario Casilang-Dizon, Mario, Angelo, RodolfoCasilang.

Rosario filed with the MTC a complaint for unlawful detainer against her uncle Jose
Casilang for the lot hes currently occupying, Lot No. 4618.

In his answer he stated that hes the lawful, absolute, exclusive owner and in actual
possession of said lot, which he acquired through intestate succession from his late father.

MTC: in favor of Rosario and ordering Jose to remove his house and vacate thesaid lot.
That the lot was owned by Ireneo through extrajudicial partition and his heirs are entitled
to the land.

Petitioners (children of Liborio and Francisca), filed with the RTC a complaint for
Annulment of Documents, Ownership and Peaceful Possession with Damages against
respondents. They also moved for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order which was denied by the RTC.

Among the documents sought to be annulled was the 1997 Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition executed by Ireneos children over lot no. 4618.

RTC affirmed Joses ownership and possession of Lot No. 4618.

CA reversed the RTC ruling mainly on the factual findings and conclusions of theMTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim executed bythe heirs of Ireneo is
valid?
HELD:
No. It grossly violated the substantive right of Jose Casilang Sr. as direct compulsory heir. Petition
is granted and CA decision is reversed and set aside.
RATIO:

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From the conclusion of the RTC is well-supported that there was indeed a verbal partition among
the heirs of Liborio, pursuant to which each of his eight children
received his or her share of his estate, and that Joses share was Lot No. 4618.
The parties verbal partition is valid, and has been ratified by their taking
possession of their respective shares.
"An agreement of partition may be made orally or in writing. An oral agreement for the partition
of the property owned in common is valid and enforceable upon the parties. The Statute of
Frauds has no operation in this kind of agreements, for partition is not a conveyance of property
but simply a segregation and designation of the part of the property which belong to the coowners."
Joses possession of Lot No. 4618 under a claim of ownership is well borne out by the records. It
is also consistent with the claimed verbal partition with his siblings, and fully corroborated by his
sisters Felicidad, Jacinta, Leonora, and Flora, who further testified that they each had taken
possession of their own shares and built their houses thereon.
A possessor of real estate property is presumed to have title thereto unless the adverse claimant
establishes a better right.
Tax declarations and tax receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership.

Philippine National Bank vs. Spouses Bernard and Cresencia Maranon

G.R. No. 189316, July 01, 2013

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Topic: Civil Fruit
Principle: Rent is a civil fruit that belongs to the owner of the property producing it
by right of accession.
FACTS:
The case is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The antecedent events being the Spouses Maranon, owner of a piece of real
property, erected with a building occupied by various tenants. Said subject property
was among the properties mortgaged by spouses Montealegre to PNB as a security
for a loan. Spouses Montealegre, through a falsified Deed of Sale, acquired title to
the property and used the propertys title which was purportedly registered in the
name of Emelie Montealegre. However, due to failure to pay the loan, said property
was foreclosed by PNB, and upon auction, was thereafter acquired by the same
bank, PNB. Spouses Maranon filed before the RTC a complaint for Annulment of
Title, Reconveyance and Damages against spouses Montealegre. Judgment of RTC
was rendered in favour of spouses Maranon, and also stipulated that the Real Estate
Mortgage lien of PNB shall stay and be respected. Such decision prompted PNB to
also seek for entitlement to the fruits of the property such as rentals paid by the
tenants.
ISSUE:
Whether or not is PNB entitled to fruits of the disputed property.
RULING:
No. Rent is a civil fruit that belongs to the owner of the property producing it by
right of accession. The rightful recipient of the disputed rent in this case should be
thus the owner of the lot at the time the rent accrued. It is beyond question that
spouses Maranon never lost ownership over the subject lot, and that technically,
there is no juridical tie created by a valid mortgage contract that binds PNB to the
subject lot because the mortgagors Montealegre were not the true owners. PNBs
lien as a mortgagee in good faith pertains to the subject lot alone and not on the
erected building which was not foreclosed and still remained to be a property of
Maranon. Thus, PNBs claim for the rents paid by the tenants has no basis.

GREEN ACRES HOLDING, INC. vs Cabral

June 5, 2013 697 SCRA 266
Topic: Quieting of Title

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Principle: Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of cloud upon,
doubt, or uncertainty affecting title to real property.
FACTS:
The case is of two consolidated petitions wherein the parties involved are: (1) Green
Acres Holding, Inc-Green Acres; (2) Victoria Cabral V. Cabral; (3) Spouses
Enrique Moraga and Victoria Soriano Spouses Moraga; and (4) Filcon Ready
Mixed, Inc. Filcon.
V. Cabral was the original owner of a parcel of land in Brgy. Pandayan, Meycauyan,
Bulacan with an area of 11, 432 sq. m. The land was placed under the coverage of
P.D. No. 27. On March 23, 1993, 3 Emancipation Patents (E.P.) were issued to
Spouses Moraga (areas of the 3 E.P.: 861 sq. m., 2159 sq. m., and 8941 sq. m.).
Thereafter, Spouses Moraga caused the cancellation of the E.P. with the largest area
(8941 sq. m.) and its conversion to a Transfer Certificate of Title. On August 29,
1994, V. Cabral filed a complaint before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(PARAD) seeking the cancellation of the E.P. issued to the Spouses on the grounds
that these were obtained through fraud and that the land is not suitable for rice and
corn production and has long been classified as residential, commercial, industrial
and non-agricultural land by the Zoning Administrator of the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board. On December 15, 1995, PARAD denied V. Cabrals petition for
cancellation of the E.P. and dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Cabral
appealed to the Dept. of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). While the
appeal was pending, Spouses Moraga subdivided the lot into 3 smaller lots. They
sold it to Filcon on June 19, 1996. On April 29, 1999, Green Acres purchased 5 lots,
including the 3 disputed lots, from Filcon. Except for an already cancelled
annotation of a real estate mortgage in favor of Philippine Commercial International
Bank, the titles were free from any annotations, liens, notices, claims or
encumbrances. Green Acres then constructed a warehouse building complex on the
said lots.
On January 17, 2001, the DARAB finally resolved V. Cabrals appeal and rendered
judgment ordering the cancellation of the titles issued in the names of Spouses
Moraga and Filcon for having been illegally acquired. Here, it should be clear that V.
Cabral won and that she has a right over those titles of the land in dispute the
question now is What will happen to Green Acres titles? There was
correspondence via letters between Green Acres and Filcon the former reminded
the latter of its warranties under the deed of sale. On April 19, 2001,
Green Acres filed a complaint for Quieting of Title, Damages with Application for
Preliminary Injunction and Writ of Preliminary Attachment
before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan. According to Green Acres, it is a purchaser in
good faith and for value. It further claimed that it had no notice or knowledge of any
adverse claim, lien or encumbrance on the properties. Neither was it a party to the

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DARAB proceedings nor did it have notice of the said proceedings where the DARAB
decision was issued. Green Acres claimed that the DARAB decision casts a cloud on
its titles. On April 13, 2005, the DARAB decision became final and executory. On July
8, 2005, V. Cabral filed with the PARAD a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution of
the DARAB decision and to nullify Green Acres titles as well. On January 25, 2006,
this motion was denied on the ground that it would violate Green Acres right to due
process for it was not a party to the DARAB decision, among others.
ISSUES:
1. WHETHER THE DARAB DECISION MAY BE ENFORCED AGAINST GREEN ACRES?
2. SECOND ISSUE: WHETHER THE DARAB DECISION CONSTITUTES A CLOUD ON
GREEN ACRES TITLE OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES?
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE
NO. In Muoz vs Yabut, Jr., it was stated that No man shall be affected by any
proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by any
judgment rendered by the court. In the same manner, a writ of execution can be
issued only against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court.
Only real parties in interest in an action are bound by the judgment therein and by
writs of execution issued pursuant thereto. Section 48 of PD 1529 (Property
Registration Decree) provides that a certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack. The Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution filed by V. Cabral
constituted a collateral attack against Green Acres titles for nowhere in the
DARABs decision where Green Acres titles mentioned. To subscribe to Cabrals
prayer in her motion is tantamount to modifying or amending a decision that has
already attained finality in violation of the Doctrine of Immutability of Judgment.
The fact that DARAB ordered the cancellation of the titles of Spouses Moraga and
F.R.M.I. does not automatically make Green Acres title null and void. A void title
may
be the source of a valid title in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. An
innocent purchaser for value is one who, relying on the certificate of title, bought
the property from the registered owner, without notice that some other person has
a right to, or interest in such property and pays a full and fair price for the same at
the time of such purchase or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some
other person in the property. Green Acres is considered an innocent purchaser for
value. If there was anyone to be blamed for Cabrals failure to recover the subject
properties, it is Cabral herself, who, due to her own negligence, failed to annotate a
notice of lis pendens on the titles of Spouses Moraga and Filcon.
SECOND ISSUE
YES. See Article 476 of the NCC.

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Quieting of Title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon doubt
or uncertainty affecting title to real property. There are two indispensable requisites:
(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title or interest in the real
property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim encumbrance or proceeding
claimed to be casting a cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or
inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. A cloud
on the title consists of (1) any instrument, record, claim or encumbrance or
proceeding; (2) which is apparently valid or effective; (3) but is in truth and in fact
invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable; and (4) may be prejudicial to the title
sought to be quieted.
The first requisite for Quieting of Title is not disputed. The question lies on whether
there is indeed a cloud on Green Acres title.
The DARAB decision satisfies all the four elements of a cloud of title. The DARAB
decision is an instrument, a record, a claim and a proceeding. It is a final decision
that has not been reversed, vacated or nullified and therefore valid and effective.
However, since Green Acres is not a party and is an innocent purchaser for value,
the DARAB decision is ineffective and unenforceable against it. In Dare Adventure
Farm Corporation vs C.A., it was stated that one of the proper remedies of a person
who was not impleaded in the proceedings declaring null and void the title from
which his title to the property had been derived, is an action for quieting of title.

CABAHUG vs. NPC (CASE DIGEST)

G.R. No. 186069 January 30, 2013
Topic: Easement of Right of Way
Principle: The owner should be compensated for the monetary equivalent of the
land if the easement is intended to perpetually or indefinitely deprive the owner of
his proprietary rights through the imposition of conditions that affect the ordinary
use, free enjoyment and disposal of the property or through restrictions and
limitations that are inconsistent with the exercise of the attributes of ownership, or
when the introduction of structures or objects which, by their nature, create or

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increase the probability of injury, death upon or destruction of life and property
found on the land necessary.
FACTS:
The Spouses Cabahug are the owners of two parcels of land situatedi n Barangay
Capokpok, Tabango, Leyte, registered in their names under TCT Nos. T-9813 and T1599 of the Leyte provincial registry. They were among the defendants in Special
Civil Action No. 0019-PN, a suit for expropriation earlier filed by NPC before the RTC,
in connection with its Leyte-Cebu Interconnection Project. The suit was later
dismissed when NPC opted to settle with the landowners by paying an easement fee
equivalent to 10% of value of their property in accordance with Section 3-A of
Republic Act (RA)No. 6395. On 9 November 1996, Jesus Cabahug executed two
documents denominated as Right of Way Grant in favor of NPC. For and in
consideration of the easement fees, Cabahug granted NPC a continuous easement
of right of way for the latters transmissions lines and their appurtenances over
24,939 and 4,750 square meters of the parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. T-9813
and T-1599, respectively. By said grant, Jesus Cabahug agreed not to construct any
building or structure whatsoever, nor plant in any area within the Right of Way that
will adversely affect or obstruct the transmission line of NPC, except agricultural
crops, the growth of which will not exceed three meters high. Under paragraph 4 of
the grant, however, Jesus Cabahug reserved the option to seek additional
compensation for easement fee, based on the Supreme Courts 18 January1991
Decision in G.R. No. 60077, entitled National Power Corporation v. Spouses
Misericordia Gutierrez and Ricardo Malit, et al. (Gutierrez). On 21September 1998,
the Spouses Cabahug filed the complaint for the payment of just compensation,
damages and attorneys fees against NPC before the RTC. In its answer, NPC
averred that it already paid the full easement fee mandated under Section 3-A of RA
6395 and that the reservation in the grant referred to additional compensation for
easement fee, not the full just compensation sought by the Spouses Cabahug. The
RTC rendered a Decision dated 14 March 2000, brushing aside NPCs reliance on
Section 3-A of RA6395. Aggrieved by the foregoing decision, the NPC perfected the
appeal before the CA which, on 16 May 2007, rendered the herein assailed decision,
reversing and setting aside the RTCs appealed decision. On motion for
reconsideration, the same was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition fo rreview on
certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON petitioners are entitled to full just compensation.
RULING:
The rule is settled that a contract constitutes the law between the parties who are
bound by its stipulations which, when couched in clear and plain language, should
be applied according to their literal tenor. Courts cannot supply material

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stipulations, read into the contract words it does not contain or, for that matter,
read into it any other intention that would contradict its plain import. Neither can
they rewrite contracts because they operate harshly or inequitably as to one of the
parties, or alter them for the benefit of one party and to the detriment of the other,
or by construction ,relieve one of the parties from the terms which he voluntarily
consented to ,or impose on him those which he did not.
The power of eminent domain may be exercised although title is not transferred to
the expropriator in an easement of right of way. Just compensation which should be
neither more nor less than the money equivalent of the property is, moreover, due
where the nature and effect of the easement is to impose limitations against the
use of the land for an indefinite period and deprive the landowner its ordinary use. It
has bee nruled that the owner should be compensated for the monetary equivalent
of the land if, as here, the easement is intended to perpetually or indefinitely
deprive the owner of his proprietary rights through the imposition of conditions that
affect the ordinary use, free enjoyment and disposal of the property or through
restrictions and limitations that are inconsistent with the exercise of the attributes
of ownership, or when the introduction of structures or objects which, by their
nature, create or increase the probability of injury, death upon or destruction of life
and property found on the land is necessary.
Measured not by the takers gain but the owners loss, just compensation is defined
as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. The determination of just compensation in eminent domain
proceedings is a judicial function and no statute, decree, or executive order can
mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court's findings. Any
valuation for just compensation laid down in the statutes may serve only as a
guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation, but it may
not substitute the court's own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and
how to arrive at such amount. Hence, Section 3A of R.A. No.6395, as amended, is
not binding upon this Court.

Pilar Devlopment Corp. v Dumadag, et al.

GR No. 194336, March 11, 2013
Topic: Easement
Principle: An easement or servitude is a real right on anothers property, corporeal
and immovable, whereby the owner of the latter must refrain from doing or allowing
somebody else to do or something to be done on his or her property, for the benefit
of another person or tenement; it is jus in re aliena, inseparable from the estate to
which it actively or passively belongs, indivisible, perpetual, and a continuing
property right, unless extinguished by causes provided by law.

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FACTS:
The petitioner owned Pillar Village Subdivision at Las Pias where the respondents
allegedly built their shanties without the petitioners knowledge or consent. Thus, a
Complaint for accion publiciana was filed against the respondents. The respondents
denied the material allegations of the Complaint asserting that its the local
government and not the petitioner, which has jurisdiction and authority over them.
RTC dismissed the complaint saying that the land in question is situated on the
sloping area leading down a creek and within the three-meter legal easement and
thus, its considered as public property and part of public dominion under Article
502 of the New Civil Code. With this, only the local government of Las Pinas City
could insititute an action for recovery of possession or ownership. CA dismissed the
case but noted that the proper party to seek recovery of the property is not the City
of Las Pinas but the Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG pursuant to
Section 101 of the Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141 otherwise known as the Public
Land Act.
ISSUES:
1. WON the land in question is part of public property-YES.
2. Who is the property party entitled to institute the case-the OSG or the LGU
HELD:
1. Yes. Petitioner used Article 630 of the Civil Code as it provides the general rule
that the owner of the estate retains the ownership of the portion of the easement
established, Article 635 says that all matters concerning easements established for
public or communal use shall be governed by the special laws and regulations
relating thereto. The applicable special laws are DENR A.O. No. 99021 dated June
11, 1999 which prescribed the guidelines for the implementation of P.D. Nos. 705
and 1067 which was issued for biodiversity preservation, P.D. 1216 and P.D. 1067 or
The Water Code of the Philippines all of which states that such 3 meter allowance is
reserved for public use. Therefore, it cannot be denied that the subject land is public
property. In relation to this, the Court held that respondents have no better right to
the property as the petitioners because it is public land.
2. With regard to the second issue, both the OSG and the local government of Las
Pinas City, may file an action depending on the purpose sought to be achieved. The
former shall be responsible in case of action for reversion under C.A. 141, while the
latter may also bring an action to enforce the relevant provisions of Republic Act No.
7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992). Under RA No. 7279, all LGUs
are mandated to evict and demolish persons or entities occupying dangerous areas
including riverbanks. It also obliges the LGUS to strictly observe resettlement

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procedures and prohibition against new illegal structures in Sections 29 and 30
respectively. Else, there will be administrative and criminal liability.
The Court suggests that petitioner should file an action for mandamus to compel
the local government of Las Pias City to enforce with reasonable dispatch the
eviction of respondents under R.A. 7279.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

MERCY VDA. DE ROXAS, represented by ARLENE C. ROXAS-CRUZ vs. OUR

LADY'S FOUNDATION, INC.
G.R. No. 182378, March 6, 2013
Topic: Builder in Good Faith
Principle: Under Article 448 pertaining to encroachments in good faith, as well as
Article 450 referring to encroachments in bad faith, the owner of the land
encroached upon has the option to require respondent builder to pay the price of
the land.
FACTS:

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On 1 September 1988, Salve Dealca Latosa filed before the RTC a Complaint for the
recovery of ownership of a portion of her residential land located at Our Ladys
Village, Bibincahan, Sorsogon, Sorsogon. According to her, Atty. Henry Amado
Roxas, represented by petitioner herein, encroached on a quarter of her property by
arbitrarily extending his concrete fence beyond the correct limits. In his Answer,
Roxas imputed the blame to respondent Our Ladys Village Foundation, Inc., now
Our Ladys Foundation, Inc. (OLFI). He then filed a Third-Party Complaint against
respondent and claimed that he only occupied the adjoining portion in order to get
the equivalent area of what he had lost when OLFI trimmed his property for the
subdivision road. The trial court held that Latosa had established her claim of
encroachment by a preponderance of evidence. It found that Roxas occupied a total
of 112 square meters of Latosas lots, and that, in turn, OLFI trimmed his property
by 92 square meters. The trial court ordered for Roxas to return and surrender the
encroached portion of Latosas lot and to demolish whatever structure constructed
thereon and remove the same at his own expense. On the 3rd party complaint the
trial court ordered OLFI to reimburse Roxas plus legal interest to be reckoned from
the time it was paid to the 3rd Party Defendant.
Subsequently, Roxas appealed to the CA, which later denied the appeal, the RTC
issued a writ of execution to implement the ruling ordering OLFI to reimburse Roxas
for the value of the 92-square-meter property plus legal interest to be reckoned
from the time the amount was paid to the third-party defendant. The trial court then
approved the Sheriffs Bill, which valued the subject property at P2,500 per square
meter which was later amended which reduced the valuation to P1,800 per square
meter.
Opposing the valuation of the subject property, OLFI filed a Motion to Quash the
Sheriffs Bill and a Motion for Inhibition of the RTC judge. It insisted that it should
reimburse Roxas only at the rate of P40 per square meter, the same rate that Roxas
paid when the latter first purchased the property. Eventually, the RTC denied both
the Motion for Inhibition and the Motion to Quash the Sheriffs Bill. It cited fairness
to justify the computation of respondents judgment obligation found in the
Amended Sheriffs Bill. To collect the aforementioned amount, notices of
Garnishment were then issued by the sheriff to the managers of the Development
Bank of the Philippines and the United Coconut Planters Bank for them to garnish
the account of Bishop Robert Arcilla-Maullon (Arcilla-Maullon), OLFIs general
manager. Refusing to pay P1,800 per square meter to Roxas, OLFI filed a Rule 65
Petition before the CA. CA ruled in favor of OFLI. It construed reimbursement as an
obligation to pay back what was previously paid and thus required OLFI to merely
reimburse him at the rate of P40 per square meter, which was the consideration
respondent had received when Roxas purchased the subdivision lots. Therefore, for
changing the tenor of the RTC Decision by requiring the reimbursement of P1,800
per square meter, both the Amended Sheriffs Bill and the 2 December 2004 Order
of the RTC were considered null and void. Further, the CA nullified the Notices of

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Garnishment issued against the bank accounts of Arcilla-Maullon. It noted that since
the general manager of OLFI was not impleaded in the proceedings, he could not be
held personally liable for the obligation of the corporation.
Hence, the pertinent issue in this case requires the determination of the correct
amount to be reimbursed by OLFI to Roxas. As a corollary matter, this Court also
resolves the propriety of issuing the Notices of Garnishment against the bank
accounts of Arcilla-Maullon as OLFIs general manager.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the value of the property is to be reckoned from the date of the
purchase of the lot or from the current market value.
HELD:
To settle the contention, this Court resorts to the provisions of the Civil Code
governing encroachment on property. Under Article 448 pertaining to
encroachments in good faith, as well as Article 450 referring to encroachments in
bad faith, the owner of the land encroached upon petitioner herein has the
option to require respondent builder to pay the price of the land.
Although these provisions of the Civil Code do not explicitly state the reckoning
period for valuing the property, Ballatan v. Court of Appeals already specifies that in
the event that the seller elects to sell the lot, "the price must be fixed at the
prevailing market value at the time of payment." More recently, Tuatis v. Spouses
Escol illustrates that the present or current fair value of the land is to be reckoned at
the time that the landowner elected the choice, and not at the time that the
property was purchased. We quote below the relevant portion of that Decision: In
Sarmiento v. Agana, we reckoned the valuation of the property at the time that the
real owner of the land asked the builder to vacate the property encroached upon.
Moreover, the oft-cited case Depra v. Dumlao likewise ordered the courts of origin to
compute the current fair price of the land in cases of encroachment on real
properties.

Dream Village Neighborhood Association Inc., Represented by its

Incumbent President, Greg Seriego, vs. Bases Conversion Development
Authority
G.R. No. 192896, July 24, 2013
Topic: Public Domain
Principle:

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Facts: Dream Village, composed of more than 2,000 families have been occupying
the disputed lot continuously, exclusively and notoriously since the year 1985. Said
lot used to be a part of the Hacienda de Maricaban, which was subsequently
purchased by the government of the United States of America (USA) and was
converted to Fort William McKinley. Later on, USA transferred 30 hectares of it to the
Manila Railroad Company, while the rest were still in the name of US Government.
Finally, on December of 1956, the US government ceded Fort William McKinley to
the Republic of the Philippines (RP) and was renamed Fort Bonifacio, reserved for
military purposes. On January 1986, President Marcos Issued Proclamation No. 2476
declaring certain portions of Fort Bonifacio alienable and disposable, thus allowing
sale to the settlers of home lots in Upper Bicutan, Lower Bicutan, Signal Village, and
Western Bicutan. President Corazon Aquino on the other hand amended the
proclamation of Pres. Marcos and limited the lots which were open for disposition.
On March of 1992, the Bases conversion and Development Authority (BCDA) was
created to oversee and accelerate the conversion of Clark and Military Reservations
to productive civilian uses, which then authorized the President of the Philippines to
sell the lands covered in whole or in part, specifically to raise capital for the BCDA.
BCDA asserted its title to Dream Village owing to the fact that BCDAs titles over
Fort Bonifacio are valid and commercially valuable to the agency, however, due to
the passage of time, was contended to have been abandoned to Dream Village, and
that BCDAs right over it has already prescribed.

Issue: Whether the area occupied by Dream Village is susceptible of acquisition by

prescription.

Ruling: No. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in
character shall not be the object of prescription (Art.1113, NCC). Also, under Article
422 of the Civil Code, public domain lands become patrimonial property only if there
is a declaration that these are alienable or disposable, together with an express
government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer
retained for public service or the development of national wealth. Only when the
property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of
property of the public dominion begin to run. It is also stipulated under PD 1529 that
before the acquisitive prescription can commence, the property must expressly
declared by the State that it is no longer intended for public service or the
development of national wealth, and that absent such express declaration, the land
remains to be property of public dominion. Subsequent proclamations over vast
portions of Maricaban exempted the lot where Dream Village was situated from
being open for disposition, thus Fort Bonifacio remains a property of public

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Dominion of the State because although declared alienable and disposable, it is
reserved for some public service or development of national wealth, and thus, the
acquisitive prescription asserted by Dream Village has not even begun to run. Thus,
the area occupied by Dream Village is still not susceptible of acquisition by
prescription.

HELEN CALIMOSO, MARILYN P. CALIMOSO AND LIBY P. CALIMOSO VS. AXEL

D. ROULLO,
G.R. No. 198594, January 25, 2016
Topic: Easement of Right of Way
Principle: Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law
as the basis of setting up a compulsory easement.
FACTS:
In a complaint for Easement of Right of Way filed by Axel against the petitioners,
which the RTC granted, the CA agreed with RTC, ratiocinating that that all the
requisites for the establishment of a legal or compulsory easement of right-of-way

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were present in the respondents case: first, that the subject lot is indeed
surrounded by estates owned by different individuals and the respondent has no
access to any existing public road; second, that the respondent has offered to
compensate the petitioners for the establishment of the right-of-way through the
latters property; third, that the isolation of the subject lot was not caused by the
respondent as he purchased the lot without any adequate ingress or egress to a
public highway; and, fourth and last, given the available options for the right-ofway, the route that passes through the petitioners lot requires the
shortest distance to a public road and can be established at a point least
prejudicial to the petitioners property.
Petitioners moved to reconsider, arguing that while the easement through their
property is the shortest route, the same would result in substantial damage, not
only to their nipa hut constructed on the property, but also the bedroom portion of
the other house constructed thereat. The CA, however was not convinced, and
denied the motion for reconsideration, hence the petitioners elevated their case to
the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the easement of right of way should be granted.
RULING:
We disagree with the CA finding that all the requisites for the valid
establishment of an easement of right-of-way are present in this case.
To be entitled to an easement of right-of-way, the following requisites should be
met:
1.
The dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no
adequate outlet to a public highway;
2.
There is payment of proper indemnity;
3.
The isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate;
and
4.
The right-of-way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient
estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
The immovable in whose favor the easement is established is called the dominant
estate, and the property subject to the easement is called the servient estate. Here,
the respondents lot is the dominant estate and the petitioners lot is the servient
estate.
That the respondents lot is surrounded by several estates and has no access to a
public road are undisputed. The only question before this Court is whether the rightof-way passing through the petitioners lot satisfies the fourth requirement of
being established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate.
Three options were then available to the respondent for the demanded right-of-way:
the first option is to traverse directly through the petitioners property, which
route has an approximate distance of fourteen (14) meters from the respondents
lot to the Fajardo Subdivision Road; the second option is to pass through two

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vacant lots (Lots 1461-B-l and 1461-B-2) located on the southwest of the
respondents lot, which route has an approximate distance of forty-three (43)
meters to another public highway, the Diversion Road; and the third option is to
construct a concrete bridge over Sipac Creek and ask for a right-of-way on the
property of a certain Mr. Basa in order to reach the Fajardo Subdivision Road.
Among the right-of-way alternatives, the CA adopted the first option, i.e., passing
through the petitioners lot, because it offered the shortest distance (from the
respondents lot) to the Fajardo Subdivision Road and the right-of-way would only
affect the nipa hut standing on the petitioners property. The CA held that the
establishment of the easement through the petitioners lot was more practical,
economical, and less burdensome to the parties.
Article 650 of the Civil Code provides that the easement of right-of-way shall be
established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as
consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest. Under this guideline, whenever there are several
tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the right-of-way must be established
on the tenement where the distance to the public road or highway is
shortest and where the least damage would be caused. If these two criteria
(shortest distance and least damage) do not concur in a single tenement, we have
held in the past that the least prejudice criterion must prevail over the
shortest distance criterion.
In this case, the establishment of a right-of-way through the petitioners lot would
cause the destruction of the wire fence and a house on the petitioners property.
Although this right-of-way has the shortest distance to a public road, it is not the
least prejudicial considering the destruction pointed out, and that an option to
traverse two vacant lots without causing any damage, albeit longer, is available.
We have held that mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is
required by law as the basis of setting up a compulsory easement; 5 that a longer
way may be adopted to avoid injury to the servient estate, such as when there are
constructions or walls which can be avoided by a roundabout way.

SPOUSES ROMEO T. JAVIER AND ADORINA F. JAVIER VS. SPOUSES

EVANGELINE PINEDA DE GUZMAN AND VIRGILIO DE GUZMAN, ARNEL
PINEDA, EDGAR PINEDA, HENRY PINEDA AND REGINO RAMOS
G.R. No. 186204, September 02, 2015
Topic: Recovery of Possession
Principle: Opposing possessory rights over certain areas of adjacent lots, arising
from claims of ownership thereof, cannot be resolved n a summary action such as
an ejectment suit.
FACTS:

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In their complaint for forcible entry before the MTCC of Cabanatuan City, the
petitioners alleged that they are the owners of a parcel of land covered by TCT No.
T-113559 containing an area of 740 square meters; that respondents unlawfully
entered a portion of the property and enclosed it with hollow blocks, in the process
cutting a Java plum tree; that they requested the Office of the City Engineers Office
to conduct a relocation survey of the property, where it was found out that
respondents have encroached on an area of 121.5434 square meters; despite the
findings and the demand for the respondents to vacate, the latter refused to do so.
On the other hand, the respondents maintained that they have always been in
possession of the property.
The MTCC, noting that the complaint was a boundary dispute, dismissed the
complaint, holding that the RTC has jurisdiction over the case. On appeal to the
RTC, the latter reversed the MTCC decision and ordered the respondents to vacate
the area. Thus, the respondents elevated their case to the CA, which reinstated the
MTCC decision. Petitioners interposed an appeal before the SC.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the action filed by petitioners qualify as one for forcible entry
based on the allegations in the complaint;
(2) Whether or not the remedy of petitioners should be an action for recovery of
possession and not one for ejectment; and
RULING:
The petition lacks merit.
1. At the outset, it should be made clear that there is absolutely no issue regarding
the MTCCs jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioners complaint for ejectment. It
is true that petitioners alleged in their complaint that they had prior possession of
the contested area and, thus, the MTCC properly acted on the case, conducting the
necessary summary proceedings. However, after their respective pleadings and
evidence were presented by the contending parties before the MTCC as a trial court,
it found that the case actually involved a boundary dispute, and thus, the MTCC
dismissed the case. It should be emphasized that the dismissal was not due to lack
of jurisdiction of the court over the complaint, but rather, due to petitioners failure
to prove that they had a proper case for ejectment. The case was dismissed on the
ground of lack of merit, not lack of jurisdiction.
2. Likewise, the MTCC and the CA are correct that the meat of the controversy
between herein parties is the actual boundaries or the metes and bounds of their
respective lots. On this matter, Manalang v. Bacani is quite instructive:
x x x a boundary dispute must be resolved in the context of accion
reivindicatoria, not an ejectment case. The boundary dispute is not about
possession, but encroachment, that is, whether the property claimed by the
defendant formed part of the plaintiffs property. A boundary dispute cannot be
settled summarily under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the proceedings under
which are limited to unlawful detainer and forcible entry. In unlawful detainer, the
defendant unlawfully withholds the possession of the premises upon the expiration
or termination of his right to hold such possession under any contract, express or

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implied. The defendants possession was lawful at the beginning, becoming unlawful
only because of the expiration or termination of his right of possession. In forcible
entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the very beginning, and the
issue centers on which between the plaintiff and the defendant had the
prior possession de facto.
Opposing possessory rights over certain areas of adjacent lots, arising from claims
of ownership thereof, cannot be resolved in a summary action such as an ejectment
suit. The issues involved in such a controversy should be fully threshed out in an
action like accion reivindicatoria, especially when plaintiff fails to establish actual
prior possession. In a much earlier ruling of this Court, it was already held therein
that [i]f [a party] is indeed the owner of the premises subject of this suit and she
was unlawfully deprived of the real right of possession or the ownership thereof, she
should present her claim before the regional trial court in an accion publiciana or
an accion reivindicatoria, and not before the municipal trial court in a summary
proceeding of unlawful detainer or forcible entry.

MARK ANTHONY ESTEBAN (IN SUBSTITUTION OF THE DECEASED GABRIEL

O. ESTEBAN), PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES RODRIGO C. MARCELO AND
CARMEN T. MARCELO, RESPONDENTS
G.R. No. 197725, July 31, 2013
Topic: Accion Interdictal/Accion Publiciana
Principle: It is the owners demand for the tenant to vacate the premises and the
tenants refusal to do so which makes unlawful the withholding of possession
FACTS:
The late Gabriel was the owner of a parcel of land located in Mandaluyong City since
the 1950s. After the foundry business constructed by his sister on the lot proved
unproductive, the spouses Rodrigo and Carmen Marcelo were allowed to reside
therein for a monthly rental of P50.00. After the spouses failed to pay rent starting
2001, the late Gabriel sent a demand letter requiring them to pay their arrears and

PROPERTY CASE DIGESTS

to vacate the land. Upon failure of the respondents, Gabriel filed a complaint for
unlawful detainer against the spouses. The MeTC ruled in their favour. It held that
pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2, Article 1673 of the New Civil Code, on the grounds
of expiration of the lease and non-payment of monthly rentals, the petitioner have a
valid action for ejectment. The RTC affirmed the MeTC decision, but the CA reversed
the lower courts. It held that from the year of disposition in 2001, when the spouses
failed to pay rent, until the filing of the complaint in 2005, more than one year have
lapsed, hence the proper action should have been an accion publiciana, cognizable
by the RTC, rather than an accion interdictal, cognizable by the MeTC. Likewise, the
spouses are protected by Section 6 of PD 1517, hence they cannot be ejected.
Finally, they are beneficiaries under Section 16 of RA 7279. On motion for
reconsideration, the CA denied it, hence Gabriel, now substituted by his son Mark
Anthony elevated the case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case is an accion interdictal, or an accion publicana.
HELD:
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
The one-year prescription period
is counted from the last demand to
pay and vacate
As correctly pointed out by the petitioner, there should first be a demand to pay or
to comply with the terms of the lease and a demand to vacate before unlawful
detainer arises. The Revised Rules of Court clearly so state.
Since 1947, case law has consistently upheld this rule. Mere failure to pay rents
does not ipso facto make unlawful tenants possession of the premises. It is the
owners demand for tenant to vacate the premises, when the tenant has
failed to pay the rents on time, and tenants refusal or failure to vacate,
which make unlawful withholding of possession.2 In 2000, we reiterated this
rule when we declared: It is therefore clear that before the lessor may institute
such action, he must make a demand upon the lessee to pay or comply with the
conditions of the lease and to vacate the premises. It is the owners demand for the
tenant to vacate the premises and the tenants refusal to do so which makes
unlawful the withholding of possession. Such refusal violates the owners right of
possession giving rise to an action for unlawful detainer.
Furthermore, in cases where there were more than one demand to pay and vacate,
the reckoning point of one year for filing the unlawful detainer is from the last
demand as the lessor may choose to waive his cause of action and let the defaulting
lessee remain in the premises.

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MA. ELENA R. DIVINAGRACIA, AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF THE

LATE SANTIAGO C. DIVINAGRACIA, PETITIONER, VS. CORONACION PARILLA,
CELESTIAL NOBLEZA, CECILIA LELINA, CELEDONIO NOBLEZA, AND MAUDE
NOBLEZA, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 196750, March 11, 2015
Topic: Partition
Principle: In actions for partition, Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court requires
that all persons interested in the property shall be joined as defendants.
FACTS:
During his lifetime, Conrado Nobleza contracted two marriages. The first marriage
with Lolita Palermo produced siblings Cresencio and Conrado, Jr. The second
marriage produced siblings Mateo, Sr., Coronacion, Cecilia, Celestial, Celedonio,
Ceruleo, and Cebeleo, Sr. Conrado also sired illegitimate children, namely Eduardo,
Rogelio, and Ricardo. Mateo Sr., pre-deceased Conrado, and was survived by his
children, Felcon, Landelin, Eusela, Giovanni, Mateo, Jr., Tito, and Gaylord. Cabeleo,
Sr. Also pre-deceased Conrado Sr., and was survived by his wife, Maude, and
children Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel. After Conrado Sr.s death, Conrado, Felcon (in
representation of his late father Mateo Sr., and his siblings) Coronacion, Celestial,
Cecilia, Rogelio, Eduardo, and Ricardo sold their respective shares over the lot
covered by TCT No. T-12255 owned by Conrado Sr., for a consideration of

PROPERTY CASE DIGESTS

P447,695.66, thru a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement or Adjudication with Deed of
Sale. The other heirs, Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude (in representation of his
husband, Cebeleo, Sr., and their children) did not sign, however. The same parties
also executed a Supplemental Contract, agreeing that Santiago will pay only
P109,807.93 up front, the balance to be paid upon partition of the subject land. He
was not able to have TCT No. T-12255 cancelled, however, because the other heirs
refused to surrender the said title. Since the other heirs failed to partition the land,
Santiago filed a petition for judicial partition and receivership of the subject land. In
answer, Ceruleo, Celedodion, and Maude asserted that Santiago had no legal right
to the action for partition because a) Santiago did not pay the full purchase price of
the shares sold to him; and (b) the subject land is a conjugal asset of Conrado Sr.
and Eusela Niangar and, thus, only their legitimate issues may validly inherit the
same.
The RTC in a Decision, ordered the partition of the subject land between Santiago,
on one hand, and Ceruleo, Celedonio, Maude, and the heirs of Mateo, Sr. (i.e.,
Felcon, et al.) on the other hand and, consequently, the cancellation of TCT No. T12255 and the issuance of a new owners duplicate certificate in favor of Santiago
and the group of Ceruleo, Celedonio, Maude, and the heirs of Mateo, Sr. Through
the document, Santiago became a co-owner of the land, and as such, had the legal
right to demand partition, although he did not validly actuire Mateo Srs share as
Felcon did not have the authority to bind his siblings with regard to Mateo Sr.,
share. Upon reconsideration, the RTC ordered Santiago to pay the balance
(P337,887.93) upon partition of the land. Respondents filed appealed to the CA,
which set aside the RTC ruling, and dismissed Santiagos complaint for partition, for
failure to include Felcons siblings, as well as Maudes children,, who are
indispensable parties to the judicial partition, the non-inclusion of which
necessitated the dismissal of the complaint.
The heirs of Santiago (who died in the meantime) appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Felcons siblings and Cebeleo, Sr. and Maudes children are
indispensable parties to Santiagos complaint for judicial partition, failure to implead
of which lead to Santiagos complaint.
RULING:
The petition is partly meritorious.
An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the courts action in
the litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can be had. The
partys interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so
inextricably intertwined with the other parties that his legal presence as a party to
the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence, there cannot be a resolution
of the dispute of the parties before the court which is effective, complete, or
equitable. Thus, the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent
actions of the court null and void, for want of authority to act, not only as to the
absent parties but even as to those present.

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With regard to actions for partition, Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court requires
that all persons interested in the property shall be joined as defendants, viz.:
SEC. 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. A person having the right to
compel the partition of real estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth
in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate description of the
real estate of which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all other
persons interested in the property. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, all the co-heirs and persons having an interest in the property are
indispensable parties; as such, an action for partition will not lie without the joinder
of the said parties.
In the instant case, records reveal that Conrado, Sr. has the following heirs,
legitimate and illegitimate, who are entitled to a pro-indiviso share in the subject
land, namely: Conrado, Jr., Cresencio, Mateo, Sr., Coronacion, Cecilia, Celestial,
Celedonio, Ceruleo, Cebeleo, Sr., Eduardo, Rogelio, and Ricardo. However, both
Mateo, Sr. and Cebeleo, Sr. pre-deceased Conrado, Sr. and, thus, pursuant to the
rules on representation under the Civil Code, their respective interests shall be
represented by their children, namely: (a) for Mateo, Sr.: Felcon, Landelin, Eusela,
Giovanni, Mateo, Jr., Tito, and Gaylord; and (b) for Cebeleo, Sr.: Cebeleo, Jr. and
Neobel.
The aforementioned heirs whether in their own capacity or in representation of
their direct ascendant have vested rights over the subject land and, as such,
should be impleaded as indispensable parties in an action for partition thereof.
However, a reading of Santiagos complaint shows that as regards Mateo, Sr.s
interest, only Felcon was impleaded, excluding therefrom his siblings and corepresentatives. Similarly, with regard to Cebeleo, Sr.s interest over the subject
land, the complaint impleaded his wife, Maude, when pursuant to Article 972 of the
Civil Code, the proper representatives to his interest should have been his children,
Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel. Verily, Santiagos omission of the aforesaid heirs renders
his complaint for partition defective.
Santiagos contention that he had already bought the interests of the majority of
the heirs and, thus, they should no longer be regarded as indispensable parties
deserves no merit. As correctly noted by the CA, in actions for partition, the court
cannot properly issue an order to divide the property, unless it first makes a
determination as to the existence of co-ownership. The court must initially settle the
issue of ownership, which is the first stage in an action for partition. Indubitably,
therefore, until and unless this issue of co-ownership is definitely and finally
resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties.
In this case, while it is conceded that Santiago bought the interests of majority of
the heirs of Conrado, Sr. as evidenced by the subject document, as a vendee, he
merely steps into the shoes of the vendors-heirs. Since his interest over the subject
land is merely derived from that of the vendors-heirs, the latter should first be
determined as co-owners thereof, thus necessitating the joinder of all those who
have vested interests in such land, i.e., the aforesaid heirs of Conrado, Sr., in
Santiagos complaint.

PROPERTY CASE DIGESTS

In fine, the absence of the aforementioned indispensable parties in the instant
complaint for judicial partition renders all subsequent actions of the RTC null and
void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties, but even as to
those present. Therefore, the CA correctly set aside the November 29, 2002
Decision and the April 4, 2003 Order of the RTC.
However, the CA erred in ordering the dismissal of the complaint on account of
Santiagos failure to implead all the indispensable parties in his complaint. In Heirs
of Mesina v. Heirs of Fian, Sr., the Court definitively explained that in instances of
non-joinder of indispensable parties, the proper remedy is to implead them and not
to dismiss the case, to wit:
The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal
of an action. At any stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are just,
parties may be added on the motion of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal
concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the
order of the court, that court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiffs failure to
comply with the order. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be
indispensable. x x x(Underscoring supplied; emphases in the original)
In view of the foregoing, the correct course of action in the instant case is to order
its remand to the RTC for the inclusion of those indispensable parties who were not
impleaded and for the disposition of the case on the merits.