People of the Philippines v.

Ricardo Lagbo
G. R. No. 207535 10 February 2016

FACTS:
Ricardo Lagbo is accused of raping his eldest daughter three times since his
daughter was only 17 years old. AAA had the opportunity to report the
incidents to the police when her mother filed a complaint against Lagbo for
allegedly mauling her. Thus 3 separate information were filed against Lagbo
for each count of rape.
Upon arraignment, Lagbo pleaded not guilty and the cases were jointly tried
after the accused waived his right to pretrial. RTC convicted Lagbo giving full
faith and credence to the testimony of AAA and held that accusedappellant's mere denial without any corroborative evidence leaves the court
without any option but to convict him. CA affirmed RTC's decision on appeal
ISSUE:
Whether CA and RTCs conviction was correct.

HELD:
YES. Both the RTC and the CA found that the prosecution has alleged and
proved beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of qualified rape. This
court sees no reason to depart from the findings of the lower courts. As
correctly held by the CA, AAA's recollection of the heinous acts of her father
was vivid and straightforward. She was able to positively identify the
accused-appellant as her sexual assailant. While there are minor
inconsistencies, her testimony was given in a categorical, straightforward,
spontaneous and candid manner.
The rule is that the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the
testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight
thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded
respect if not conclusive effect. This is truer if such findings were affirmed by
the appellate court. When the trial court's findings have been affirmed by the
appellate court, said findings are generally binding upon this Court

People of the Philippines v. Zaldy Salahuddin

G. R. No. 206291 18 January 2016

FACTS:
Atty. Segundo Sotto Jr, a prominent lawyer in Zamboanga together with his
niece, Liezel Mae Java were on their way home from his law office when 2
men riding a motorcycle shot at them a few times. Atty. Segundo died and
his niece was fatally wounded. Vicente Delos Reyes, a security guard at a
nearby residence witnessed the shooting incident and he was the one who
brought the victims to the hospital. After NBI investigation, they were able to
positively identify Zaldy Salahuddin as the shooter in the crime scene.
Zaldy Salahuddin was charged with the crime of murder for and frustrated
murder. To establish its murder case against appellant, the prosecution
presented the testimonies of 9 witnesses.
Zaldys defense was mere denial claiming that he was at the house of the
Barangay Captain when it happened, this was corroborated by the barangay
kagawad and barangay chairmans testimony. One of the witnesses
presented by the accused also allege that a certain Toto Amping is the
assailant.
The trial court found that two (2) eyewitnesses positively and categorically
identified appellant as the gunman who shot Atty. Segundo and Java at
around 6:00 p.m. on February 1.0, 2004 at Farmer's Drive, Sta. Maria,
Zamboanga City. The trial court stressed that Java could not have been
mistaken in identifying appellant as the gunman as he was just a meter away
when he shot Atty. Segundo, while Juanchito Delos Reyes, a security guard
on-duty at an establishment near the crime scene, also positively identified
appellant as the gunman, and could not be mistaken as to the latter's
identity because they had an eye-to-eye contact for about 5 seconds at a
distance of 6 meters. The trial court added that the testimonies of the
defense witnesses were replete with inconsistencies and contradictions, and
were incredible when ranged against the positive testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses who were not shown to have any improper motive to
falsely testify against appellant.
The CA ruled that appellant failed to present convincing evidence that he
was indeed at the barangay hall the whole day of February 10, 2004, and
that his defenses were anchored on the testimonies of the Barangay
Chairman, Kagawad and Secretary, which were all inconsistent from his very
own testimony. Even if appellant's denial and alibi were corroborated by said

defense witnesses, the CA rejected such defenses as unworthy of belief and

credence, as they were established mainly by appellant himself, his friends
and comrades-in-arms. The CA also found that it was not physically
impossible for appellant to be present at the crime scene because the
barangay hall where he supposedly stayed the whole day was just about 44
kilometers away and can be reached within a travel time of about 1 hour and
30 minutes.

ISSUE:
Whether Zaldys defense of denial and alibi should be given weight.

HELD:
NO. In seeking his acquittal, appellant raises the defenses of denial and alibi.
However, such defenses, if not substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in
law. They are considered with suspicion and always received with caution,
not only because they are inherently weak and unreliable but also because
they are easily fabricated and concocted. Denial cannot prevail over the
positive testimony of prosecution witnesses who were not shown to have any
ill-motive to testify against the appellants.
Denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of prosecution witnesses
who were not shown to have any ill-motive to testify against the appellants.
Between the categorical statements of the prosecution eyewitnesses Java
and Delos Reyes, on one hand, and the bare denial of the appellant, on the
other, the former must prevail. After all, an affirmative testimony is far
stronger than a negative testimony especially when it conies from the mouth
of a credible witness. In order for the defense of alibi to prosper, it is also not
enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the offense was
committed, but it must likewise be shown that he was so far away that it was
not possible for him to have been physically present at the place of the crime
or its immediate vicinity at the 43 time of its commission

People of the Philippines v. Vicente Lugnasin and DeVincio Guerrero

G. R. No. 208404 24 February 2016

FACTS:
Vicente and DeVincio were accused of kidnapping Nicassius Cordero for
ransom. Demand for money was made on the relatives of the victim and he
was released along the South Luzon Expressway.
Both accused plead not guilty and denied the accusations against them
claiming that they do not know the Cordero. DeVincio also argument that his
warrantless arrest was illegal since it did not fall under Section 6, Rule 109 of
the Rules of Procedure. Also he claims that his rights under RA 7438 An Act
Defining Certain Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or under Custodial
Investigation as well as the Duties of the Arresting, Detaining and
Investigating Officers and Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof were
violated.

ISSUE:
Whether DeVinvios rights were violated.

HELD:
NO. As the Court of Appeals has already pointed out, that accused-appellant
Devincio raised none of these issues anytime during the course of his trial.
These issues were raised for the first time on appeal before the Court of
Appeals. We affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals and quote below Miclat,
Jr. v. Peopleon this Court's treatment of an accused's belated allegation of
the illegality of his warrantless arrest:
At the outset, it is apparent that petitioner raised no objection to the
irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment. Considering this and his
active participation in the trial of the case, jurisprudence dictates that
petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court,
thereby curing any defect in his arrest. An accused is estopped from
assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move
for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before
arraignment. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by
which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be
made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.

In the present case, at the time of petitioner's arraignment, there was no

objection raised as to the irregularity of his arrest. Thereafter, he actively
participated in the proceedings before the trial court. In effect, he is deemed
to have waived any perceived defect in his arrest and effectively submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court trying his case. At any rate, the illegal
arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment
rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. It will not
even negate the validity of the conviction of the accused.
The foregoing ruling squarely applies to accused-appellants Devincio and
Vicente who failed to raise their allegations before their arraignment. They
actively participated in the trial and posited their defenses without
mentioning the alleged illegality of their warrantless arrests. They are
deemed to have waived their right to question their arrests.
With respect to appellant Devincio's argument that his rights under RA 7438
were violated while he was under custodial investigation, aside from his
bare-faced claim, he has offered no evidence to sustain such claim; and
appellant Devincio (or appellant Vicente, for that matter) has not executed
an extrajudicial confession or admission for, as stated in People vs. Buluran
and Valenzuela:
There is no violation of the constitutional rights of the accused during
custodial investigation since neither one executed an extrajudicial confession
or admission. In fact, the records show that appellant Cielito Buluran opted to
remain silent during custodial investigation. Any allegation of violation of
rights during custodial investigation is relevant and material only to cases in
which an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the accused
becomes the basis of their conviction.

Gloria Macapagal Arroyo v. People of the Philippines and the Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 225598 19 July 2016

FACTS:
The Court resolves the consolidated petitions for certiorari separately filed by
former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
(PCSO) Budget and Accounts Manager Benigno B. Aguas.
On July 10, 2012, the Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan former President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) and PCSO Budget and Accounts Manager Aguas
(and some other officials of PCSO and Commission on Audit whose charges were
later dismissed by the Sandiganbayan after their respective demurrers to evidence
were granted, except for Uriarte and Valdes who were at large) for conspiracy to
commit plunder, as defined by, and penalized under Section 2 (b) of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No. 7659.
The information reads: That during the period from January 2008 to June 2010 or
sometime prior or subsequent thereto xxx accused Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, the
then President of the Philippines xxx Benigno Aguas, then PCSO Budget and
Accounts Manager, all public officers committing the offense in relation to their
respective offices and taking undue advantage of their respective official positions,
authority, relationships, connections or influence, conniving, conspiring and
confederating with one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally amass, accumulate and/or acquire, directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth
in the aggregate amount or total value of PHP365,997,915.00, more or less, [by
raiding the public treasury].
Thereafter, accused GMA and Aguas separately filed their respective petitions for
bail which were denied by the Sandiganbayan on the ground that the evidence of
guilt against them was strong.
After the Prosecution rested its case, accused GMA and Aguas then separately filed
their demurrers to evidence asserting that the Prosecution did not establish a case
for plunder against them. The same were denied by the Sandiganbayan, holding
that there was sufficient evidence to show that they had conspired to commit
plunder.After the respective motions for reconsideration filed by GMA and Aguas
were likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan, they filed their respective petitions for
certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether the special civil action for certiorari is proper to assail the denial of the
demurrers o evidence.

HELD:

The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail such an
interlocutory order issued by the trial court because of the availability of
another remedy in the ordinary course of law. Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119
of the Rules of Court expressly provides that the order denying the motion
for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not
be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment. It is not an
insuperable obstacle to this action, however, that the denial of the demurrers
to evidence of the petitioners was an interlocutory order that did not
terminate the proceedings, and the proper recourse of the demurring
accused was to go to trial, and that in case of their conviction they may then
appeal the conviction, and assign the denial as among the errors to be
reviewed. Indeed, it is doctrinal that the situations in which the writ of
certiorari may issue should not be limited, because to do so x x x would be
to destroy its comprehensiveness and usefulness. So wide is the discretion of
the court that authority is not wanting to show that certiorari is more
discretionary than either prohibition or mandamus. In the exercise of our
superintending control over other courts, we are to be guided by all the
circumstances of each particular case as the ends of justice may require. So
it is that the writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a substantial
wrong or to do substantial justice.
The exercise of this power to correct grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government cannot be thwarted by rules of procedure to the contrary or
for the sake of the convenience of one side. This is because the Court has
the bounden constitutional duty to strike down grave abuse of discretion
whenever and wherever it is committed. Thus, notwithstanding the
interlocutory character and effect of the denial of the demurrers to evidence,
the petitioners as the accused could avail themselves of the remedy of
certiorari when the denial was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.