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Marine Policy 34 (2010) 967978

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Marine Policy
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/marpol

Ocean governance in a competitive world. The BRIC countries as emerging

maritime powersbuilding new geopolitical scenarios$
Juan L. Suarez de Vivero , Juan C. Rodrguez Mateos
Department of Human Geography, University of Sevilla, C/Mara de Padilla s/n, 41004 Seville, Spain

a r t i c l e in fo

abstract

Article history:
Received 13 January 2010
Received in revised form
5 February 2010
Accepted 6 February 2010

Owing to their style and economic impact, Brazil, Russia, India and China (the BRIC countries) are
destined to become relevant actors in the new ocean governance. The following working hypothesis is
sustained: the BRIC countries, due to the potential of their maritime territories, can be considered to be
emerging maritime powers capable of displacing some of the historical maritime powers. This would
also entail a shift of strategic maritime space towards the southern hemisphere. Other emerging
maritime scenarios associated with the BRIC countries include the Russian Arctic, and the Indo-Pacic
ocean belt, or string of pearls, as it is known. Factors such as competitiveness, maritime leadership
and ocean governance are thus placed in a new economic and political context where they might be
redened and adapted to the circumstances of the BRIC block and other emerging countries, the
majority of which are subject to demographic pressure and a high degree of poverty. The most relevant
conclusions point to the emergence of a new type of neo-navalism, on the one handa BRIC version of
traditional sea power and, on the other, a possible threat to the EUs Integrated Maritime Policy under
pressure from strong competitiveness in a highly internationalised environment, forcing changes in its
original approach with its distinct social proles and commitment to latest generation rights.
& 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords:
BRIC
Sea power
Ocean governance
Maritime scenarios
EU Integrated Maritime Policy

1. Introduction
Brazil, Russia, India and China, countries whose initials have
given rise to the acronym BRIC, represent a model of economic
development characterised by a strong growth rate and a great
capacity to compete in a globalised world. From the territorial
perspective, BRIC countries are similarly characterised by their
size and demographic weight. Being coastal, all four countries cast
their sovereignty over large maritime areas, thus increasing the
already immense size of their territory. This also adds to their
resource availability, as well as their inuence and power on the
world geopolitical stage. Their political style and economic impact
mean they are destined to become important players in the new
governance of the oceans. The maritime policies of the states and
political bodies that have until now been the traditional trade and
industrial leaders may nd themselves subjected to pressures that

$
This article is based on the following research projects: MEC (SEJ2007-66487/
GEOG); JA (PO7-SEJ-2564), and SPICOSA (EU IPO36992).
 Corresponding author.
E-mail address: vivero@us.es (J.L. Suarez de Vivero).
1
The expression naval power is understood in its historical sense as the
ideological basis for the expansion of trade and imperialism at the end of the 19th
century that led to (y) the creation of a modern maritime sector as a means to
revitalising and stimulating economic development based on maritime imperialism of a capitalist nature which, in turn, was based on solid naval strength [1].

0308-597X/$ - see front matter & 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.marpol.2010.02.002

force changes to their original approaches. As a result, all the BRIC

countries capacity and inuence for change might also be said to
have a maritime angle to it, a Blue BRIC, the seed of a new naval
power,1 the naval power of the emerging countries.
Despite the fact that these four countries do not form a
homogenous whole, they do share demographic, territorial and
economic features, and it is the last of these three that labels them
as emerging: above world average GNP growth and a large
percentage share of world and, consequently, maritime trade. The
growth rate of these countries in a world submerged in an
economic crisis2 demonstrates how strong they are and makes
them lead contributors to the world GNP as a group (22%
compared to 15.7% for the Eurozone and 20.6% for the United
States) [2]. Their economic importance is reected both on a
global scale: an unprecedented shift of wealth and economic
power towards the east [3], and on a regional scale, where all four
BRIC countries have their power-bases and spheres of inuence,
and thus dene new geopolitical scenarios with a self-evident
maritime angle to them.
After bursting onto the world economic system, these emerging powers have come to demand a leading role in world
relations, in forums and in economic and political institutions.

2
These were in 2008, according to the IMF: 5.1% in Brazil, 5.6% in Russia, 7.3%
in India and 9% in China [2].

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J.L. Sua

As a result they propose both the consolidation and institutionalisation of accords and dialogue, including the reform of the
United Nations Security Council, for example. It is also interesting
to highlight the idea of renegotiating both trade regulations
(especially any designed to restrict their growing foreign trade),
and also environmental regulations which would exacerbate the
ecological crises these countries are presently experiencing [4].
The maritime aspect of the BRIC countries throws up a number
of question marks while at the same time allowing hypotheses to
be suggested regarding the effect that these countries maritime
policies might have on a global scale and their effects on the
initiatives of countries and political bodies such as the European
Union, whose maritime policy is itself a response to the impacts of
globalisation and emerging economies.
The growth of BRIC countries economies and their expansion
over the oceans, both concerning maritime trade (China) and their
maritime space (particularly Brazil, Russia and India), are
sufciently signicant not only to alter the world geopolitical
map but to turn it on its head. The conguration of new regional
maritime scenarios (a swing or shift towards the southern
hemisphere), new areas of inuence (the massive presence of
India in the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea, and Russia in the
Artic), and access to new resources with a great strategic value
(hydrocarbons and biogenetic resources) are key issues that will
determine BRIC maritime policies. In this article the following
premises are assumed to be true: (i) the BRIC countries are laying
the foundations for emerging maritime power based on their
economic growth model, huge competitive capacity and access to
control over a wide-ranging maritime domain; this type of
maritime power might include a generally unprecedented, for
these countries, naval-military power component. Ocean governance and BRIC maritime policies might, on the one hand,
undermine and weaken the thus-far dominant positions that the
industrialised economies inherited from post-colonial maritime
power while, on the other hand, changes might be forced upon
international maritime regulations (including environmental
regulations) to bring them more in line with these countries
levels of competitiveness3; (ii) there will be a displacement of the
geo-strategic centre of gravity towards the maritime domain as a
result of the jurisdictional expansion of the BRIC countries
towards the EEZ and the extended continental shelf and of an
economy with a greater maritime element, to the degree that
these states (particularly China, India and the Russian Federation)
represent the continental power model over worldly power
according to the Mackinder postulates [5]. This displacement of
the continental and ocean mass would take place within the
context of a wider displacement of economic power from the west
to the east, with the consequent change of the geopolitical
landscape.4 It could therefore be suggested that Mackinders
popular concept of heartland might be replaced sometimes in the
future by the concept of heartsea.
This analysis of the maritime dimension of the BRIC block is
divided into three sections: (i) maritime geography as a startingpoint that allows the spatial bases of these states to be dened;
(ii) the geopolitical consequences of the combination of strong
maritime territory structures and high economic dynamism; (iii)
governance (or new ocean governance) adapted to the goals and/
or priorities of new actors in international relations.

3
This is something that might be laid at the door of many countries but would
be more pronounced in the BRIC countries as they head economic growth at a rate
that far outpaces the rest of the world, and they are genuine illustrations of the
growth-rst mentality [3, p. 57].
4
A change of the geopolitical framework on a global scale as the result of the
rise of wannabe powers (basically the BRIC countries) is addressed in the
National Intelligence Councils analytical forecasts [3,6,7].

2. Maritime geography
As a group of geographical entities, the BRIC countries bear a
certain weight on the global scale: they are home to 42% of the
world population and occupy 25.6% of emerged land (Table 1).
Individually they respectively head the rankings of population
(China), and land surface area (Russian Federation). This same
order of magnitudes also holds true for the oceans: the four
countries joint EEZ represents 9.2% of the world total5; the total
expanse of the BRIC block maritime jurisdictional area6
constitutes 4.5% of ocean surface area, and the total length of
these countries coasts is 18% of the world total. Russia, Brazil and
India generate extensive exclusive economic zones (over 2 million
square kilometres (583,000 n. sq. mi.) in all three cases) and their
relative locations, as well as that of China, provide them with a
wide-ranging maritime presence on a regional scale (Fig. 1). All
the BRIC countries are signatories to the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea7 (UNCLOS); India and the
Russian Federation declared their exclusive economic zones
before the Convention was approved (1982) while Brazil and
China did likewise in the nineteen-nineties (Table 2). All four
countries have already initiated claims to their jurisdiction over
the continental shelf outside the 200 n. mi. limit.8 To be precise, it
was the Russian Federation that was the rst state in the
international community to present a proposal for delimitation
[9] (2001) to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf [10]; Brazil [11] was the second to do so (2004)
and both India [12] and China did the same on the same day in
2009, although the latter restricted itself to presenting a rst
information report [13]. The importance that this jurisdictional
area (the continental margin) has in extending these states
territorial sovereignty over the marine environment can be
appreciated in their percentages of the EEZ: 28.5% Brazil, 27.2%
India, and 16.9% the Russian Federation.
The BRIC countries project over the seas in four of the ve
oceans: the Arctic (the Russian Federation), the Atlantic (Brazil),
the Pacic (the Russian Federation and China) and the Indian
Ocean (India). Their greatest presence in the oceans can be found
around the Eurasian continent. This is especially due to the
Russian Federations rights of sovereignty over the Arctic Ocean
and Indias dual seaboards (the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian
Sea). This compacting of the Eurasian mass and its outlying waters
forms a connection between Chinese and Indian strategic areas
and the maritime trafc ows that link these countries with the
global network and, especially, with the mega-port and harbour
system of Eastern Asia. However, Brazil and its maritime space are
not located in the mainstream and have no links with the
principal strategic maritime world scenarios. It does introduce the
southern hemisphere into the block of emerging powers, how-

5
This calculation of the world total is made taking the surface area based on
the 200 nm line.
6
Exclusive economic zone plus extended continental shelf (continental
margin beyond 200 nm) claimed by this group of countries to date.
7
Brazil (22.12.1988); India (29.06.1995); China (07.06.1996); Russian Federation (12.03.1997). All four are also signatories to Part XI and (with the exception of
China) the Agreement on Straddling Stocks [8].
8
This process, which is dealt with by the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf (CLCS), does not imply that the United Nations recognises any
sovereignty over the area in question. It is the responsibility of the CLCS to assess
the quality and scientic rigour of the proposal, not to solve territorial disputes.
There have indeed been reactions from a number of countries which have either
stated their reservations on the matter, or put forward arguments on certain
precise issues: notications have been made by Canada, Japan, Norway and the
United States in response to the Russian Federations proposal; thus far, a single
notication by the United States in response to Brazils; and notications
presented by Myanmar and Bangladesh in response to the proposal made by
India (see [9]).

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Table 1
Basic geographical data.
Pases

Population
(000)a

Land area
(sq. km)b

EEZ

Coast length
(km)b

sq. km

World
rankingc

EEZ/CL

Extended CS
(sq. km)/
dated

% ECS/EEZ

426

911,847e
17.05.2004
1,279,800f
20.12.2001
628,327g
11.05.2009

28.5

Brazil

195,493

8,514,877

3,191,827

14

7,491

Russian

140,367

17,075,200

7,566,673

37,653

200.9

India

1,214,464

3,28,263

2,305,143

21

7,000

329.3

China

1,354,146

9,326,410

879,666

36

14,500

60.6

16.9
27.2

Source: Author.
a

UN Population Division.
CIA Factbook.
c
Author from VLIZ (http://www.vliz.be/); Sea around us Project (www.seaaroundus.org/).
d
CLCS website (http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/clcs_home.htm).
e
Continental Shelf and UNCLOS Article 76. Brazilian Submission. Executive Summary. Brazilian Continental Shelf Survey Project, 2004.
f
[14].
g
Author.
b

EEZ boundaries

India EEZ

Arctic Circle

India extended CS

China EEZ
Brazil EEZ

Russian Fed. EEZ

Russian Fed. Extended CS

Brazil extended CS
Source: Author based on
1. VLIZ, Maritime Boundaries Geodatabase
2. Oceans and Law of the Seas,Commission on the Limits
of Continental Shelf (CLCS)
MARINEPLAN.
University of Seville.
Department of Human Geography.

Fig. 1. BRICs jurisdictions.

ever, due to its territorial size and its resource potential, turning
the south-western Atlantic into an area of new global strategic
interest. It is in the marine areas of greater territorial complexity
(neighbouring states and opposed states, insularity and territorial

dispersion) where jurisdictional expansion, together with a

geopolitical advantage, becomes a source of bitter conict. The
paradigm of this situation is China and its projection over the
Eastern China Sea and the South China Sea, where territorial

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Table 2
UNCLOS status.
Country

Brazil
Russian
India
China

UNCLOS
Ratication accession

Part XI

Agreement FS

22.12.88
12.03.97
29.06.95
07.06.96

25.10.07
12.03.97
29.06.95
07.06.96

08.03.00
04.08.97
19.08.03

Source: Author based on DOALOS: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agree

ments/convention_overview_convention.htm.

disputes exist with Japan, Korea, the Philippines and Indonesia, as

well as the historical conict with Taiwan/the United States [15].
Geographically, the BRIC countries occupy a maritime scenario
with a surface area of almost 19 million sq. km. (5,539,500 sq. n.
m.),9 80% of which is located around Eurasia.

2.1. Geo-maritime scenarios

Analyses of development and trends for key questions in the
current world usually shape political and geopolitical scenarios10;
as far as the latter are concerned, there is general agreement when
pointing to the specic weight of Asia (or, in broader terms,
Eurasia11) as an area where there is an ongoing signicant
concentration of power occurringfundamentally economic in
nature and supported by demographic weight which is being
converted into political inuence. The fact that power centres are
being displaced from the west to the east is also being stressed.
China and India form the territorial nucleus that is to be the seat
of greatest power on a global scale, with the former playing the
primary role, possibly outstripping the United States by the year
2050.12 In this context, China and India, with their intense
economic growth rates, are increasingly dependant on the
maritime transport ows that are fundamental to guaranteeing
them a supply of vital energy and raw materials. India, meanwhile, also benets from its geographical position with regard to
the transport ows that go through the Indian Ocean and connect
the Persian Gulf and Middle East with Japan and south east Asia,
turning the country into the natural sentry standing guard over
these trafc ows ([19, p. 2]). And so, the new emerging
phenomenon associated with the BRIC countries is that of the
developing world (and countries where poverty is still a
constituent feature) joining the club of naval powers (with the
exception of the Russian Federation which, when it was part of
the Soviet Union, was already a world naval leader during the
Cold War13). Although it easily evokes the rst theorists of naval
9

This is the sum of the various EEZs and the surface area of the extended
continental shelf. The gure of 3 million sq. km. (875,000 n. sq. mi.) is used for
China, which includes its EEZ, its potential extended continental shelf and its
claims for sovereignty over a number of islands in the South China Sea [16].
10
See, amongst others, those prepared by the National Intelligence Council
(NIC) [3,6,7] with a maritime focus [17]. From an academic point-of-view, see:
International Futures (http://www.ifs.du.edu/).
11
Coinciding with the growing importance of Asia and particularly of China,
and from the European perspective (European Union Institute for Security
Studies), the arc that connects the immediate area around Europe with the Far
East (Suez-Shanghai) is emphasised [18].
12
According to International Futures (cit. by Rogers [18, p. 41]) Chinas
percentage share of world power in 2050 would be 23.07 compared to 15.98% for
the United States; Indias share would be 12.39%. The United States, together with
the European Union, Japan and Russia would develop negatively between 2009
and 2050. The 2025 Global Trends report (which cites the International Future
Model) states that in 2025 the United States will maintain its share of power over
China, despite negative development compared to China, India, Russia and Brazil,
which all increase their share of world power [3, p. 28].

doctrines [20], this new sea power is, as might be anticipated,

situated in a new, historically post-imperialist context, and
cloaked in modern globalisation. Naval power is now both the
effect and the consequence of a maritime potential that is, for the
rst time, underpinned by territorial dominion over large
continental and ocean masses (the latter of vast proportions
(Table 3)), which, in turn, allow access to great quantities of
resources thanks to scientic and technological development.
Territory and resources, the strategic value of which demands and
justies naval means; this explains the lack of tradition and the
previously unheard-of character of an ocean vector in the defence
policies of some of the BRIC countries, and even, in the case of
Brazil, the modest development of its armed forces as a whole
[21]. Each of the BRIC countries creates a geo-maritime scenario
which in some cases, such as that of Brazil and its surrounding
ocean, is much more individualised; others, such as, China and
India, could make up a macro scenario due to the links between
them and the fact that they share a large geographical domain,
while the Russian Federation is the dominant territory in the
ocean region where it is located. There are three great scenarios at
the heart of which the BRIC countries dominate; these three
scenarios will be referred to as: (i) the Arctic scenario; (ii) the
Indo-Pacic scenario, and (iii) the Southern scenario.
2.1.1. The Arctic scenario
The most outstanding dual features of this scenario (Fig. 1) are
the fact that it is an emerging area as a result of the effects of
global warming (the possibility of its waters being navigable and
providing easy access to resources) and the development of its
maritime potential by an emerging country which has, in turn, the
greatest territorial presence in the Arctic region. This circumstance (territorial dominance) will allow Russia to command
hydrocarbon production in the Arctic Ocean as 69% of Arctic
reserves belong to Russia14 [14]. The Russian part of the Arctic
will also play a key role in global navigation routes, as the melting
Arctic ice-cap makes the so-called north sea route (NSR) (or
northeast passage) increasingly practicable. This shortens the
route between the north of Europe and north-eastern Asia and the
north-eastern American seaboard by 40% compared to the
southern route via the Panama Canal [24]. This maritime scenario,
till now marginal, is acquiring primary geo-strategic importance
as a result of global changes and it is becoming a strategic area,
not only for coastal countries (with Russia, as already stated,
being the largest territorial power in the region), but also for
countries with a greater dependance on foreign trade, including
India and China. What is most peculiar about this scenario is its
continuing low level of resident population.
2.1.2. The Indo-Pacic scenario
Unlike in the Arctic, in the Indo-Pacic region (Fig. 2) the
greatest concentration of population on the planet is to be found:
13
China, India and Brazil have already initiated programmes that tend
towards the development of naval forces in keeping with their new status as
global players. In April 2009 China celebrated the 60th anniversary of the creation
of its naval eet in an unprecedented manner (Chinese Peoples Liberation Army
Navy [PLAN]) with the inclusion of two nuclear submarines. Its immediate goal is
the construction of an aircraft carrier [16].
14
The Arctic Ocean (and especially the western part of the ocean) is already
an area that is vital to Russias hydrocarbon production. Eighty percent of its 100
billion tonnes of offshore resources are in the Artic. In global terms, it is estimated
that this ocean holds 25% of the as yet undiscovered hydrocarbon resources and
that by 2030 production will reach 10 million barrels of oil equivalent per day [14].
Continental platform hydrocarbon resources arouse great interest as, compared to
land-based resources, this is where the greatest number of new discoveries are
made: four of the largest deposits discovered in the last ten years are offshore and
comprise 40% of total incorporated reserves [23].

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Table 3
Maritime scenarios.
Country

Maritime
jurisdictiona
(EEZ + ECS) sq km.

Wider ocean region

Key issues

Neighbour states

Remarks

Brazil

4,103,674

Oil-gas

Russian

8,846,473

Atlantic SW (FAO Area

41: 17.5M., sq km.)b
Arctic Ocean (14M.,
sq km.)c

Uruguay, Argentina,
French Guiana
USA, Canada, Denmark,
Norway

India

2,933,470

FAO areas 51-57:

60.5M., sq km.b

Shipping. Oil-gas

Pakistan, Sri Lanka,

Bangladesh, Myanmar,
Malaysia, Maldives
Indonesia

FAO area 61: 21.5M.,

sq km.b

Shipping

North Korea, South

Korea, Japan, Vietnam,
Philippinnes, Brunei,
Indonesia

Brazil is uncontested
leader
Under populated
region. Convergence
of great world
powers
Over populated. No
coastal countries in
the region (Indian
Ocean) to dispute
leadership. Chinas
security extends
over this region
Over populated.
Territorial Conicts

China

879,666

Oil-gas. Environment.
World shipping routes

Source: Author.
a
b
c

Sea Around Us Project (www.seaaroundus.org).

FAO (www.fao.org).
[22].

EEZ boundaries
China EEZ
India EEZ
India extended CS
Russian Fed. EEZ
Russian Fed. Extended CS
Source: Author based on
1. VLIZ, Maritime Boundaries Geodatabase
2. Oceans and Law of the Seas, Commission on
the Limits of Continental Shelf (CLCS)
MARINEPLAN
University of Seville
Department of Human Geography

Fig. 2. Eurasian geopolitical scenario.

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half the people in the world live in the coastal countries around
these seas.15 With the claims for jurisdiction made to date, China
and India project their sovereignty over almost 4 million sq. km.
(1,166,000 sq. n. m.), although 6 million (1,750,000) could be the
nal gure (see note 9). As the greatest seaway for maritime
trafc in the world16 passes through the waters of the Indian
Ocean, and the western Pacic (Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal, Straits
of Malacca and Singapore, South China Sea and South East China
Sea), these two BRIC countries are considered to form a single
geo-maritime scenario: two areas of jurisdiction linked by the
powerful trade ow which hinges on the Asian straits, thus
causing great inter-dependance between the two states.17 This
said, as the country heading the strong growth not only in the
region but of the world economy, China is attributed the
geostrategic willand need to extend its inuence and power
over the maritime arc that stretches from the Arabian Sea to the
South East China Sea.18 Nevertheless, this concentration of
population and economic potential is not proportional to the
degree that these two powers command dominion over
neighbouring maritime areas. Although in both cases the
expectation of accessing conventional offshore energy resources
exists, strong economic growth maintains the high level of
dependance on energy resources and other raw materials, which
both aggravates the feeling of vulnerability and geostrategic risk,
and explains the two countries plans for military modernisation
(of the navy, especially) [19,28]. As such, lines of communication
are the dominant feature in this geo-maritime scenario, which is a
paradigm of the globalised world, with a high percentage of trade
ows originating from, or destined for, countries outside the
region [29]. The constriction of the maritime area available to
these two demographic and economic powers, in an area shared
by a high number of (continental and island) states (Table 3),
might lead to the creation of an expansive naval power in a quest
for greater security due to a marked dependance on trade ows in
an unstable environment.19
2.1.3. The Southern scenario
With Brazils growth, maritime expansion and leadership, the
southern hemisphere has assumed greater importance on the
world stage. This is one of the features that has to be stressed
since, in the new global geopolitical structure, and aside from the
shift of power from west to east, the Brazilian focus entails a
swing towards the southern hemisphere (Fig. 3). One contributing
factor to this is Brazils great maritime expansion on the back of
large quantities of recently discovered hydrocarbon reserves
15
The total joint population of China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh,
Japan and the Philippines is almost 3.5 billion. Two of these nine countries have
populations of over one billion inhabitants and four, of over one hundred million
[25].
16
Thirty percent of world trade and 25% of the world eet passes through the
Strait of Malacca yearly [26]. The EUs maritime trade with Asia represents 26.25%
of all transcontinental trafc by sea; for the 20062016 period it is estimated that
container trafc between Europe and Asia will grow by 121% [18].
17
Both states are interested in the stability and security of the marine
environment across which the huge amounts of raw materials and commercial
goods generated by their high growth rates are shipped; this does not imply that
the historical differences between both will remain, although a strategic alliance
cannot be totally ruled out [27].
18
This arc is called the string of pearls; from an energy point-of-view, it is
vital for China, to which 40% of the new demand for oil in the world can be
attributed with seventy percent of the fuel being used in the country coming the
Middle East and Africa [28]. India, meanwhile, has a similar dependence on
external energy to China, with about 70% of the energy resources used in the
country being brought in by sea [19].
19
Although the piracy rate has dropped dramatically in the Straits of Malacca
and Singapore, intense activity continues, although focusing on local shing boats.
In other regards, it can be highlighted that the 2008 terrorist attack on Mumbai
also came from the sea [29].

(some of the largest since the beginning of the century and

comparable to the huge deposits found in Kahagan (Kazakhstan)
in 2000) (Table 3) [30]. The amounts of reserves found, together
with those expected to be discovered in the near future, will make
Brazil one of the worlds largest oil exporters by 2020, although its
political outlook limits its leadership to the continent [3].
Notwithstanding, the way the governance of the Antarctic and
its surrounding waters develops will have to be taken into
account in these future scenarios in a world under pressure from
its population and dwindling resources. It would seem that Brazil,
having experienced solid growth strongly underpinned by (land
and sea) strategic resources and a diversied economy, would
play a key role in this scenario in the hemisphere with the
greatest ocean surface area on the planet. Due to its greater
individuality, with no other states converging on this part of the
sea with which it has to share and/or dispute territory,20 Brazils
relative location differentiates this scenario greatly from the
previous two.
2.2. Trade ows and ports
To the extent that international trade is a reection of the
structure of world political organisation and power relationships,
the great geo-economic scenarios are transformed, evolved and
are congured in different geographical ways. On the global scale,
strategic tensions tend to be located around the axes of trade ow
circulation and the territories that exert power and inuence,
whether because of their economic-political leadership or on the
basis of the income of their location vis-a`-vis the trade ows. All
these factors have been subject to great change in recent years,
such as the strategic revaluation of the Indian Ocean and the
international straits, and the emergence of new ports of global
importance. The BRIC countries are playing a key role in these
processes. China and its ports, in particular, are reshaping the
world political map. The geopolitical structure, with the United
States as it is global hub, is turning into a more complex multihubbed structure. In regional terms, the geopolitical centre of
gravity is shifting towards the Indian Ocean, through which 70%
[18] of world crude oil trafc sails towards India and China along
with raw materials. The ports in this region have grown at a
greater rate than those in Europe and America and attract 50% of
container trafc. China (including Hong Kong) on its own has
experienced greater growth than North America and Europe [31].
One example of this is the fact that seventeen Chinese ports
can be found amongst the world top one hundred container ports
(and they move over 31% of the trafc produced by these hundred
ports), as can two from India, one from Brazil, and one from
Russia, and ports in other emerging or developing economies
(Singapore, South Korea, the UAE, Taiwan and Malaysia) are also
amongst the top twenty-ranked ports (Table 4) [32]. To this we
must add the fact that by January, 2008, the eets registered in
the BRIC countries alone together added up to over 123 million
tonnes DWT or, in other words, almost 12% of the world total
(Table 5) [33]. The case of China is especially signicant: it is in
fourth place in the world ranking for tonnage and second place for
number of vessels.
In other regards it can be stated that, even though the ows
that originate from and/or are destined for BRIC country ports
have still not overtaken those found in other parts of the world,
their growth rate is greater. It can be highlighted that BRIC
exports totalled 1879.5 billion dollars in 2007 (13.6% of the world
total), for example, which is an increase of 300% over 2000 [34].
20
Brazil has already delimited its maritime borders with its neighbouring
territories, the State of Uruguay and French Guiana (Table 3).

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EEZ boundaries

Brazil EEZ

Ecuatorial line

Brazil extended CS

973

Source: Author based on

1. VLIZ, Maritime Boundaries Geodatabase
2. Oceans and Law of the Seas,Commission on the Limits
of Continental Shelf (CLCS)

MARINEPLAN
University of Seville
Department of Human Geography

Fig. 3. Brazil maritime area.

Table 4
BRIC ports in the world top one hundred (2008).
Country

Ports and positions in ranking

No.
ports

Total trafc (TEUs)

(2007)

Percentage of total trafc of

top one hundred ports

Brazil
Russia
India
China

Santos (44th)
St Petersburg (69th)
Jawaharlal Nehru (24th), Chennai (91st)
Shanghai (2nd), Hong Kong (3rd), Shenzhen (4th), Qingdao (10th),
Ningbo-Zhoushan (11th), Guangzhou (12th), Tianjin (17th), Xiamen
(22nd), Dalian (26th), Lianyungang (57 th), Suzhou (62nd), Yingkou
(79th), Zhongshan (81st), Yantai (82nd), Fuzhou (84th), Nanjing
(90th), Quanzhou (93rd)

1
1
2
17

2,532,900
1,697,720
5,112,993
126,020,000

0.63
0.42
1.26
31.17

Source: Author based on http://www.cargosystems.net/freightpubs/cs/top100interactiveGuide.htm.

3. BRICs ocean governance

The transition to the 21st century marks the beginning of a
phase in which a signicant number of new marine policies and
strategies have sprung up (Fig. 4) to respond to the new maritime
paradigm that involves a new strategic vision of the seas and
oceans: the old paradigm, associated with discoveries, the
creation of colonial empires and trade which is giving way to a
model that is deeply rooted in competitiveness, innovation and
knowledge. This new vision means a loss of strategic interest in
traditional activities and the shifting of the maritime centre of

gravity towards the new technologies, energy security and global

leadership [35]. A considerable number of countries and political
entities, including the European Union, have taken up their
positions in this new ocean scenario. In this context, the strategic
interest that the BRIC countries have for the oceans arose as early
as the most emblematic initiatives taken by more developed
countries with a strong maritime tradition. Countries such as
Canada, Australia and the United States can be considered
pioneers, not so much because of the dates on which specic
laws or policy documents were passed, but because of the
consistency and range of their initiatives. Be that as it may,

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Table 5
BRIC country eets.
Country

Brazil
Russia
India
China
USA
World total

DWT

4,421,361
18,037,890
16,053,485
84,881,703
39,828,150
1,038,296,589

% of world total

0.43
1.74
1.55
8.18
3.84
100.00

Position in ranking

31st
14th
16th
4th
6th

No. vessels
Own ag

Foreign ag

130
1,532
474
1,900
855
16,798

14
579
60
1,403
914
19,515

% of world total

Position in ranking

0.40
5.81
1.47
9.09
4.87
100.00

31st
5th
18th
2nd
7th

Source: Author based on [33].

Comparison with USA. (1st January, 2008)

these are complex processes that require wide-ranging political,

legal and institutional development. The United States is a good
illustration of how complex the process of drawing-up this policy
(one of the aspects of which is ample public participation) and the
process for reconciling and combining domestic and international
interests are. Although the BRIC countries are not submerged
in the development of complex integrated maritime policy
construction processes, they do nevertheless show willingness
for including the maritime dimension in their economic
development schemes, albeit within a blueprint dominated by
demands for strong growth rates and their inclusion amongst the
new naval powers.
Although propounded since the nineteen-seventies, the integrated ocean management approach, which has found support in
the concept of sustainable development since the eighties-nineties (and more recently in that of the ecosystem approach), is not
only being expressed in theories, but is becoming reality in the
rst practical attempts at draughting ocean policies (Fig. 4). This,
what could be referred to as new maritime thinking, which is no
longer the sole heritage of western states but also a growing
phenomenon in emerging countries, is conditioned by objective
parameters of a physical-natural nature (importance and vulnerability of the natural environment, the potential of the marine
resources in the area in question) and of a human nature
(societies that have the greatest bonds with coastal-marine
activity), but also, at the same time, by the great economic and
geopolitical changes that throughout time have moved centres of
interest from one part of the planet to another.
The new generation of ocean strategies and policies usually
put the emphasis on environment- and sustainability-related
aspects. This is reected in examples such as Canadas Oceans
Strategy (COS)21 and Australias Oceans Policy (AOP),22 and also in
the maritime approaches of emerging countries where the
degradation of the environment is taking on gloomier and
gloomier overtones, although these issues are sometimes eclipsed
by matters relating to economic growth. In this respect, an
analysis of some ofcial documents regarding ocean management
in the BRIC countries reveals that, along with the recurring
environmental and sustainability aspects that are running the risk
of ending up as pure rhetoric, the insistence on economic (and,
sometimes, social) aspects comes to play a highly important role
in emerging countries. In one way or the other, this great interest

21
The political goals included in the COS are understanding and protecting
the marine environment, and encouraging and supporting sustainable economic
opportunities among others [36].
22
The AOP is an integrated and comprehensive ocean policy that arose with
two aims of the greatest strategic interest: the full development of rights of
sovereignty over the EEZ and ensuring the ecologically sustainable development of
ocean resources both for the creation of wealth and in order to protect the
environment [37,38].

in economic growth (an adoption of the growth-rst mentality

as mentioned in note 3) might end up skewing the BRIC countries
marine policies and promoting a new style in the sense of reviving
old exclusivist and nationalistic approaches in the management/
protection of ones own marine resources, with the use of
instruments such as border control (by the coast guard and
the national navy), the expropriation/nationalisation of resources
and a restriction on concessions to foreign companies, all of which
are aspects that can be found in the respective energy policies
[14,23].
In Russia, for example, there has been a political formulation
for maritime affairs in recent years. The basic postulates of the
Russian national marine policy have all been put together in the
July 2001 Marine Policy Document (approved by the President of
the Russian Federation, V.V. Putin, No. Pr-1387 [39]). This is the
basic document that denes Russian federal policy in the eld of
marine activities. Five action regions are set out in the document
(the Atlantic, the Arctic, the Pacic, the Caspian Sea and the Indian
Ocean) and objectives of a sectoral nature relating to navigation,
the exploitation/conservation of resources, science and also naval
activities, are dealt with [40,41].
Indias ocean policy, meanwhile, straddles environmental and
social matters (at least in theory). It proposes the sustainable use
of ocean resources as a means to beneting society. The
opportunities that the sea offers economic development and the
need to increase coastal management efforts and extend them
further out to sea, led to the appearance of the countrys Ocean
Policy Statement (1982). This document incorporates the idea that
marine resources should be used in a sustainable way while
obtaining a benet for society as a whole [42].
One of the BRIC countries, the Chinese Peoples Republic, has
developed a broad range of ocean issue-related legislative
instruments since the nineteen-eighties and nineties [43]. Of all
these laws, the Law on Management of Sea Area Use (enacted in
2002) stands out. This law seeks to manage property rights and
the main ocean uses of inland waters and the Chinese territorial
sea, classifying these uses and granting licences for the use of
these areas according to the functions they are licensed for [44]. In
other respects, driven by the problems of sustainability and
economic development, the Chinese state draughted the National
Plan for Marine Development (20012010) in 1994. This is devoted
to promoting and guiding marine economic activities. The most
robust attempt at surpassing earlier sectoral focuses in ocean
management was initially and especially developed through the
China Oceans Agenda 21 [44,45], which is a guide for the
exploration and protection of marine resources, the ght against
pollution, the implementation of sustainable development, and
the establishment of an integrated coastal and marine management system, and the Ocean White Paper on the Development of
Marine Affairs of China, which proposes sustainable development
in six marine areas or sectors, and Chinas Ocean Policy (1991).

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MARINE GOVERNANCE. SCOPE AND HISTORIC PERSPECTIVE

Agreement FS: Agreement for the implementation of the provisions of the

convention relating to the conservation and management of
straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks.
AU: Australia
BARCOM: Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the
Coastal Region of the Mediterranean (Barcelona).
BE : Belgium
Bergen: Bergen Declaration (of the 5th North Sea Conference).
Blue Paper: Integrated Maritime Policy for the European Union.
BR : Brazil
CA: Canada
CCRF: Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries.
CN: China
CO: Colombia
DE : Germany
FR: France
Green paper: Towards a future Maritime Policy for the Union: A European
vision for the oceans and seas.
HELCOM: Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the
Baltic Sea
JP: Japan
KYOTO: Kyoto protocol on climate change.

MAP: Action Plan for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the
sustainable Development of the Coastal Areas of the Mediterranean
MSFD: Maritime Strategy Framework Directive.
NL: Netherlands
NO: Norway
NZ : New Zealand
OSPAR: Convention for the protection and conservation the North-East
Atlantic and its resources.
PT: Portugal
RU: Russia
SCT: Scothland
Thematic Strategy: Thematic Strategy for the protection and conservation of
the marine environment.
UK: United Kingdom
UNCED: United Nations Conference on Environment and Development.
UNCHE: United Nations Conference of the Human Environment.
UNCLOS: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
UNFCCC COP-15: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (Copenhagen)
US: United States
WSSD: World Summit on Sustainable Development

Fig. 4. Marine governance. Scope and historical perspective.

The last of these emphasises holistic and integrated management

and develops aspects of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea, establishing the goals of ocean management and
the basic tasks it has to undertake in coming years. It is quite
signicant that this Chinese policy states that its priority is the
development of the marine economy and also the fact that it was
probably the rst modern multi-sectoral ocean policy to be
developed in the world. This whole Chinese maritime approach is
aimed at responding to the needs of the huge and rapid industrial
and trade growth that its coastal areas have experienced since the
economic reforms of the nineteen-eighties. We only have to think,
for example, of the need to satisfy a growing energy requirement
which is driving the search for hydrocarbon reserves in the sea
bottom sub-soil and the establishment of specic regulations
(Chapter III of the 1982 Marine Environmental Protection Law of the
Peoples Republic of China;23 the 1983 Regulations concerning
environmental protection in offshore oil exploration and exploitation;
the 1986 Law on Mineral Resources, amended in 1996; laws

23

Prevention of pollution damages the marine environment by offshore oil

exploration and exploitation.

on the various Chinese maritime jurisdictions from 1992 and

199824). These initiatives for the development of offshore
hydrocarbons will also be reected in the National Plan for Marine
Development (20012010), in which maritime sectors, especially
oil production, begin to be considered as pillars of the national
economy [46].
One of the most signicant current cases of an emerging
maritime power is Brazil. The extent of its coastline, its growing
role as a player in the global economy and the recent discovery of
large oil reserves off its southern coast are sufcient for it to be
paid special attention. In Brazil, the National Policy on Marine
Resources was created in 1980 with the purpose of incorporating
maritime areas into Brazilian territory and governing the use and
rational exploitation of marine resources and the protection of the
environment [47]. When it was revised in 2005 (Decree 5377 of
23rd February) [48] greater emphasis was placed on the objective
of the sustainability of maritime activities and achieving goals of a

24
Law of the Peoples Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone (1992) and Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf of the
Peoples Republic of China (1998).

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social nature (such as the creation of employment25). The

objectives of the policy were to promote training amongst human
resources, to boost the development of marine research, science
and technology, and to provide incentives for the exploration and
sustainable use of marine resources.26 The implementation of the
National Policy on Marine Resources is sustained by a series of
annual or multiannual plans and programmes (Sectoral Plan for
Marine Resources, National Coastal Zone Management Plan, Plan to
Survey the Brazilian Continental Shelf, Evaluation Programme
of the Sustainable Potential of Living Resources in the Economic
Zone, etc.).
Brazils 1994 National Maritime Policy (Decree 1265 of 11th
October), meanwhile, is aimed at directing the development of
maritime activities in an integrated and harmonious way in order
to achieve the effective, rational and complete use of the sea in
accordance with national interests. The goals of the National
Maritime Policy include: the development of a national maritime
culture, the rationality and benet of maritime activities,
environmental protection, and safeguarding national maritime
interests. For these goals to be achieved, certain actions have to be
undertaken in areas such as international relations, maritime
transport, ship building, the R&D sector, marine resources, human
resources and security [41,49]. As can be seen, the economic
challenges (growth, obtaining energy resources, international
competitiveness, etc.), together with environmental concerns,
could lead to the launching and implementation of Brazils
maritime policies in the short/medium term.

4. Concluding remarks

 The BRIC countries maritime focus and geo-strategic axes

respond to a neo-navalist conception, are understood as the

exercise of economic-commercial and political power more
akin to classic naval power (a trade-military alliance) than a
technological-environmental concept (access to the ocean
domain safeguarding its ecological functions through innovation, science and technology). BRIC naval power, rather than an
instrument for the expansion of politics and trade, has the
function of defending maritime resources and territories,
along with the ows of goods and raw materials that are
fuelling their intense economic growth. As such, claims
for greater maritime jurisdictions, the preservation of
national resources in the face of other countries and the
reinforcement of their naval military capabilities, are becoming characteristic features of emerging countries maritime
discourse.
In its Military Doctrine, Russia insists on both economic and
naval aspects as it continues to strongly believe that its role in
global politics depends on its greater ability to control the sea.
India, meanwhile, stresses the opportunities that the sea has to
offer for its economic development, but without neglecting the
security of its maritime spaces (as is stated in its Maritime
Doctrine and Maritime Capabilities Perspective Plan) [19].
China has similarly established a range of policies directed at
achieving the development of the national maritime economy
and covering the (energy) needs of the industrial and trade
growth of its coastal regions. Brazil has a more environmental
and social vision, seeing its international leadership and

25
A social objective that has been stressed once again when the creation of a
specic social fund using the benets generated by the exploitation of marine oil
was proposed.
26
The different actions that should be undertaken to achieve said objectives
are coordinated by the member organisations of the Inter-Ministerial Commission
for Marine Resources, created in 1974 and regulated by a Decree in 2001.

establishment as a naval power founded in its huge recentlydiscovered offshore energy potential.27
In their position as territorial entities with a powerful
maritime projection, the BRIC countries dene new geopolitical spaces. The Arctic and Southern scenarios represent the
expansion of the ecumene towards new areas that hereto were
located outside the mainstream strategic economic centres.
The maritimisation of the Eurasian territories and economies, the planets economic and demographic core displaces
the worlds geopolitical centre of gravity towards maritime
space, which could be interpreted as a change in the essence of
classical geopolitical thinking.28 The EU, with its projection
over all the worlds oceans [51] is present in one of these new
scenarios (the Arctic) and has expressed an interest in this
space in its IMP (Northern Dimension policy).29
The BRIC countries maritime policies, spurred on by the
growth rate, the search for competitiveness and a strong
dependance on maritime trade to satisfy a constant demand
for raw materials, do not envisage advancing and universalising social rights and good management practices in maritime
activities as a priority. A comparison with the EUs Integrated
Maritime Policy (Table 6) provides signicant references in
matters of a social nature, such as the promotion of
professional careers and employment within a framework of
greater job security and raising seafarers work conditions to
be on a par with those found in EU regulations. The weakness
of the social aspect of BRIC policies is, therefore, its strength in
the highly competitive environment of the maritime world
exacerbated by the economic and nancial crisis.
The BRIC countries ocean development might represent a
threat for the approaches that inspire and guide the EUs
Integrated Maritime Policy, not only because of these countries internal dynamics (extremely extendible to other very
similarly-placed countries, such as Indonesia and South
Africa), but due to the alliances that they might forge with
other powers regarding aspects that are crucial to the
maritime economy. The outcome of the UNFCCC COP-15, with
a nal agreement that had been previously arranged between
the USA, China, India, Brazil and South Africa,30 is proof of how
the EU could be affected with regard to other intrinsically
global situations like maritime policy: supplanted by the joint
interests of the still greatest world power and a conglomerate
of emerging powers.
The BRIC phenomenon and the consequent conguration of
what could be termed the Blue BRIC put ocean governance in
a new geopolitical context. In territorial terms, about half the
surface area of the waters under national jurisdiction correspond to countries with a Human Development Index that is
either medium or low and which groups together two-thirds of
the States in the world. In turn, this majority of national
political entities, together with the remaining developed
States, are jointly responsible for 60% of the oceans that still
bear the legal status of high seas. All ocean space (40% under
national jurisdiction plus the high seas and the zone) must
therefore be governed by political systems that still require
signicant institutional improvements and progress in the

27
The approaches and goals of the National Defence Strategy (2008) are
interesting in this regardsea denial, control of maritime areas, power projection[50] and plans for the building of a rst nuclear submarine.
28
The concept of heartland or geographical pivot was formulated by
Halford Mackinder in 1905 in his work The Geographical Pivot of History [5].
29
The Commissions political vision in the IMP is formally expressed in a
document dated 2008 [52].
30
The international press reported on this circumstance: the agreement
struck between the USA and major emerging countries [5355].

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Table 6
EUs IMP responses to global challenges.
Global challenges

Connection with the EUs MP

1. Global warming. Global atmosphere

temperature rise. Effects on climate
and the way ocean dynamics work

Action Plan: 6.3 Action on Mitigation and Adaptation to Climate Change/Action on risk reduction policies and their
economic impacts; coastal regions
Specic action: Community strategy for disaster prevention (2008); Development of strategy for adaptation to Climate
Change (2008)
Milestone: White Paper: Adapting to climate change: Towards a European framework for action, COM (2009) 147,
01.04.2009

2. Over-exploitation of natural
resources and key ecosystems for
producing food as a consequence of
the increase in the human
population

Action Plan: 4.9 Implementation of Ecosystem Approach

Specic Action: Communication on ecosystem approach in sheries (2008)

Milestone: The role of the CFP in implementing an EA to marine management COM (2008) 187, 11.04.08
Action Plan 4.10 Proposals on the protection of sheries resources in international waters
Specic Action: Communication and Regulation on combating IUU
Fisheries (2007); Communication and Legislative proposal on destructive shing practices (2007)
Milestones: New strategy for the Community to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU shing, COM(2007) 601 and Proposal
for a Council Regulation COM(2007) 602, 17.10.07; Council Regulation (EC) establishing a Community system to
prevent, deter and eliminate IUU No 1005/2008, 29.09.08, OJ L/286/1
%
3. Pollution of soil, water and
atmosphere by different types of
pollutants (biological waste,
chemical products, carbon dioxide)

4.5 Air pollution by ships (promote use of shore-side electricity by ships at berth in EU ports. Evaluate options for EU
legislation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions; 6.3 (b) Carbon capture and storage (Enabling legal framework for CCS
(2007)
Marine Strategy Framework Directive (2008/56/EC (Art. 1: to achieve or maintain good environmental status in the
marine environment by the year 2020 at the latest

4. Exhaustion of fossil energy

resources. Reshaping of energy
system

Action Plan: 4.7 Action on marine-based energy infrastructures and resources

Specic action: Revise Guidelines for Trans-European Energy Networks (2009)

Milestone: Green PaperTowards a secure, sustainable and competitive European Energy Network, COM(2008) 782,
13.11.08
Support action for offshore wind energy: Communication Offshore Wind Energy: Action needed to deliver on the
Energy Policy Objectives for 2020 and beyond, COM(2008) 768, 13.11.08
5. Division of work and precarious
labour conditions. Deregulation and
degradation of labour market.
Dismantling of social protection
mechanisms, together with
progressive elimination of rigid
control measures in labour markets

Action Plan: 4.3 Strengthening careers and employment

Specic action: Support ECSA (European Community Shipowners Associations) and ETF (European Transport Workers
Federation) in their ongoing negotiations to transpose elements of ILO Maritime Labour Convention
Milestone: Agreement concluded by ECSA and ETF on the Maritime Labour Convention 2006, 19.05.08
Action Plan: 4.3 (a) Promotion of employment for seafarers
Specic action: Proposal for a directive on Article 139 ECT (implementation of ILO Convention)
Milestone: Proposal for a Council Directive implementing the Agreement concluded by the ECSA and ETF on the
Maritime Labour Convention, 2006 and amending Directive 1999/63/EC, COM(2008) 422, 02.07.08; Political agreement
in Council, 17 December 2008, EP approval 14 January 2009
Action Plan: 4.3 (b) Qualications of seafarers
Specic action: Action Plan on qualications of seafarers; 2nd semester 2009
Milestone: No
Action Plan: 4.3 (c) Exclusions of maritime professions from EU social legislation and working conditions
Specic action: Communication launching the reassessment of the exclusions of maritime sectors from EU labour law,
October 2007
Milestone: Reassessing the regulatory social framework for more and better seafaring jobs in the EU (rst phase
consultation of the social partners at Community level provided for in Article 138(2) of the Treaty), COM(2007) 591,
10.10.07
6. Relocation of economic activities.
Transfer from Northern Atlantic
development hubs to more dynamic
areas in Asia-Pacic area

Action Plan: 4.1 Development of multi-sectoral clusters and regional centres of maritime excellence

Specic action: A staff working document on Maritime Clusters (October 2007)

Milestone: Maritime Clusters, SEC(2007) 1406, 17.10.07
Action Plan: 4.2 Maritime Transport
Specic action: Final Guidelines on the application of competition rules to maritime transport (2008)
Milestone: Guidelines on the application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to maritime transport, SEC(2008) 2151, 01.07.08
Action Plan: 4.6 Ship dismantling
Specic action: Communication on a strategy for ship dismantling, 2008
Milestone: An EU strategy for better ship dismantling, COM (2008) 767, 19.11.08
Source: Author based on Commission of the European Communities. Progress Report on the EUs Integrated Maritime Policy. SEC(2009) 1343 nal, Brussels, 15.10.2009.

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978

quality of their democratic structure and participatory systems. As has already been demonstrated in other global issues,
the BRIC countries are capable of tilting policies of this type
(such as the ocean policy) towards positions that would
hamper the development of options like the EUs Integrated
Maritime Policy.

Acknowledgement
Research in Brazil-related aspects was done with the invaluable assistance of Pilar Carolina Villar (University of Sao Paulo,
Brazil).
GIS: Concepcion Jimenez Sanchez.
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