Abelita III vs. Supt Doria

9/10/2016
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATEDVOLUME596
G.R.No.170672.August14,2009.*
JUDGE FELIMON ABELITA III, petitioner, vs. P/SUPT.

GERMANB.DORIAandSPO3CESARRAMIREZ,respondents.
Searches and Seizures Warrantless Arrests Hot Pursuit Requisites
Personalknowledgeoffactsmustbebasedonprobablecause,whichmeans
anactualbelieforreasonablegroundsofsuspicionAreasonablesuspicion,
therefore, must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on
thepartofthepeaceofficersmakingthearrest.Forthewarrantlessarrest
underthisRuletobevalid,tworequisitesmustconcur:(1)theoffenderhas
just committed an offense and (2) the arresting peace officer or private
person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it. Personal knowledge of facts must be based on
probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of
suspicion.Thegroundsofsuspicionarereasonablewhen,intheabsenceof
actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be
arrestedisprobablyguiltyofcommittingtheoffenseisbasedonactualfacts,
i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create
the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable
suspicion,therefore,mustbefoundedonprobablecause,coupledwithgood
faithonthepartofthepeaceofficersmakingthearrest.
SameSameSameTheactofthepersontobearrestedoftryingtoget
away, coupled with the incident report which the policemen investigated, is
enoughtoraiseareasonablesuspiciononthepartofthepoliceauthorities
as to the existence of probable cause.Section 5,Rule 113 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure does not require the arresting officers to
personally witness the commission of the offense with their own eyes. In
thiscase,P/Supt.Doriareceivedareportabouttheallegedshootingincident.
SPO3 Ramirez investigated the report and learned from witnesses that
petitioner was involved in the incident. They were able to track down
petitioner, but when invited to the police headquarters to shed light on the
incident,petitionerinitiallyagreedthenspeduphisvehicle,promp
_______________
*FIRSTDIVISION.
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AbelitaIIIvs.Doria
ting the police authorities to give chase. Petitioners act of trying to get
away,coupledwiththeincidentreportwhichtheyinvestigated,isenoughto
raise a reasonable suspicion on the part of the police authorities as to the
existenceofprobablecause.
SameWarrantlessSearchesPlainViewDoctrineRequisites.
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an
officerwhohasarighttobeinthepositiontohavethatviewaresubjectto
seizure and may be presented as evidence. The plain view doctrine applies
when the following requisites concur: (1) the law enforcement officer in
search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a
position from which he can view a particular area (2) the discovery of the
evidence in plain view is inadvertent and (3) it is immediately apparent to
theofficerthattheitemheobservesmaybeevidenceofacrime,contraband
orotherwisesubjecttoseizure.
ActionsJudgmentsResJudicataWordsandPhrasesBarbyPrior
JudgmentandConclusivenessofJudgment,Distinguished.
Bar by prior judgment and conclusiveness of judgment differ as follows:
There is bar by prior judgment when, as between the first case where the
judgmentwasrenderedandthesecondcasethatissoughttobebarred,there
is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. In this instance,
thejudgmentinthefirstcaseconstitutesanabsolutebartothesecondaction.
Otherwiseput,thejudgmentordecreeofthecourtofcompetentjurisdiction
on the merits concludes the litigation between the parties, as well as their
privies,andconstitutesabartoanewactionorsuitinvolvingthesamecause
of action before the same or other tribunal. But where there is identity of
partiesinthefirstandsecondcases,butnoidentityofcausesofaction,the
first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly
controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein.
Thisistheconceptofresjudicataknownasconclusivenessofjudgment.
Stated differently, any right, fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or
necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent
courtinwhichjudgmentisrenderedonthemeritsisconclusivelysettledby
the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and
theirprivieswhetherornottheclaim,demand,purpose,orsubjectmatterof
thetwoactionsisthesame.
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SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
AbelitaIIIvs.Doria
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Same Same Same Requisites.For res judicata to apply, the

followingrequisitesmustbepresent:(a)theformerjudgmentorordermust
be final (b) it must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was
rendered after a consideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by
thepartiesatthetrialofthecase(c)itmusthavebeenrenderedbyacourt
havingjurisdictionoverthesubjectmatterandthepartiesand(d)theremust
be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject
matter,andofcauseofactionthisrequisiteissatisfiedifthetwoactionsare
substantiallybetweenthesameparties.
SameSameSameThereisnoidentityofcausesofactionwhereone
is an administrative case dealing with the administrative liability of the
respondentjudgeforthecommissionofcertainactscomplainedofwhilethe
present case deals with the civil liability for damages of the police
authorities who arrested him.While the present case and the
administrativecasearebasedonthesameessentialfactsandcircumstances,
thedoctrineofresjudicatawillnotapply.Anadministrativecasedealswith
theadministrativeliabilitywhichmaybeincurredbytherespondentforthe
commission of the acts complained of. The case before us deals with the
civil liability for damages of the police authorities. There is no identity of
causes of action in the cases. While identity of causes of action is not
requiredintheapplicationofresjudicataintheconceptofconclusivenessof
judgment, it is required that there must always be identity of parties in the
first and second cases. There is no identity of parties between the present
case and the administrative case. The administrative case was filed by
BenjaminSiaLao(SiaLao)againstpetitioner.SiaLaoisnotapartytothis
case. Respondents in the present case were not parties to the administrative
case between Sia Lao and petitioner. In the present case, petitioner is the
complainantagainstrespondents.Hence,whileresjudicataisnotadefense
to petitioners complaint for damages, respondents nevertheless cannot be
heldliablefordamagesasdiscussedabove.
PETITION forreviewon certiorariof the decision and order of

theRegionalTrialCourtofQuezonCity,Br.217.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
VicenteRoyL.Kayaban,Jr.forpetitioner.
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AbelitaIIIvs.Doria
EduardoT.Sierra,Jr.forrespondents.
CARPIO,J.:
TheCase
Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the 10 July

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Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 10 July

2004 Decision2 and 18 October 2004 Order3 of the Regional Trial
CourtofQuezonCity,Branch217(trialcourt),inCivilCaseNo.Q
9833442forDamages.
TheAntecedentFacts
Judge Felimon Abelita III (petitioner) filed a complaint for
Damages under Articles 32(4) and (9) of the Civil Code against
P/Supt.GermanB.Doria(P/Supt.Doria)andSPO3CesarRamirez
(SPO3 Ramirez). Petitioner alleged in his complaint that on 24
March1996,ataround12noon,heandhiswifewereontheirway
to their house in Bagumbayan, Masbate, Masbate when P/Supt.
Doria and SPO3 Ramirez (respondents), accompanied by 10
unidentified police officers, requested them to proceed to the
Provincial PNP Headquarters at Camp Boni Serrano, Masbate,
Masbate. Petitioner was suspicious of the request and told
respondentsthathewouldproceedtothePNPHeadquartersafterhe
had broughthiswife home. Petitioner alleged that when heparked
hiscarinfrontoftheirhouse,SPO3Ramirezgrabbedhim,forcibly
tookthekeytohisTotoyaLiteAcevan,bargedintothevehicle,and
conducted a search without a warrant. The search resulted to the
seizure of a licensed shotgun. Petitioner presented the shotguns
license to respondents. Thereafter, SPO3 Ramirez continued his
search and then produced a .45 caliber pistol which he allegedly
foundinsidethevehicle.Respon
_______________
1UnderRule45ofthe1997RulesofCivilProcedure.
2Rollo,pp.3040.PennedbyJudgeLydiaQuerubinLayosa.
3Id.,atp.41.
224
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AbelitaIIIvs.Doria
dents arrested petitioner and detained him, without any appropriate

charge,atthePNPspecialdetentioncell.
P/Supt. Doria alleged that his office received a telephone call
from a relative of Rosa Sia about a shooting incident in Barangay
Nursery. He dispatched a team headed by SPO3 Ramirez to
investigatetheincident.SPO3Ramirezlaterreportedthatacertain
William Sia was wounded while petitioner, who was implicated in
theincident,andhiswifejustlefttheplaceoftheincident.P/Supt.
Dorialookedforpetitionerandwhenhefoundhim,heinformedhim
oftheincidentreport.P/Supt.Doriarequestedpetitionertogowith
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himtothepoliceheadquartersashewasreportedtobeinvolvedin
theincident.Petitioneragreedbutsuddenlyspeduphisvehicleand
proceeded to his residence. P/Supt. Doria and his companions
chasedpetitioner.Uponreachingpetitionersresidence,theycaught
up with petitioner as he was about to run towards his house. The
policeofficerssawaguninthefrontseatofthevehiclebesidethe
driversseataspetitioneropenedthedoor.Theyalsosawashotgun
at the back of the drivers seat. The police officers confiscated the
firearms and arrested petitioner. P/Supt. Doria alleged that his men
alsoarrestedotherpersonswhowereidentifiedtobewithpetitioner
during the shooting incident. Petitioner was charged with illegal
possessionoffirearmsandfrustratedmurder.Anadministrativecase
wasalsofiledagainstpetitionerbeforethisCourt.4
_______________
4 Sia Lao v. Abelita III, A.M. No. RTJ961359, 356 Phil. 575 295 SCRA 267
(1998). The Court found petitioner guilty of conduct unbecoming a member of the
judiciaryanddismissedhimfromtheservicewithforfeitureofallbenefitsandwith
prejudice to reemployment in any other branch, instrumentality or agency of the
government,includinggovernmentownedandcontrolledcorporations.
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AbelitaIIIvs.Doria
TheDecisionoftheTrialCourt
Inits10July2004Decision,thetrialcourtdismissedpetitioners
complaint.
The trial court found that petitioner was at the scene of the
shootingincidentinBarangayNursery.Thetrialcourtruledthatthe
police officers who conducted the search were of the belief, based
on reasonable grounds, that petitioner was involved in the incident
andthatthefirearmusedinthecommissionoftheoffensewasinhis
possession. The trial court ruled that petitioners warrantless arrest
andthewarrantlessseizureofthefirearmswerevalidandlegal.The
trialcourtgavemorecredencetothetestimoniesofrespondentswho
were presumed to have performed their duties in accordance with
law.Thetrialcourtrejectedpetitionersclaimofframeupasweak
and insufficient to overthrow the positive testimonies of the police
officerswhoconductedthearrestandtheincidentalsearch.Thetrial
courtconcludedthatpetitionersclaimfordamagesunderArticle32
oftheCivilCodeisnotwarrantedunderthecircumstances.
Petitionerfiledamotionforreconsideration.
Inits18October2004Order,thetrialcourtdeniedthemotion.
Hence,thepetitionbeforethisCourt.
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TheIssues
Theissuesinthiscasearethefollowing:
1.Whether the warrantless arrest and warrantless search and
seizure were illegal under Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985
RulesonCriminalProcedure
2.Whether respondents are civilly liable for damages under
Articles32(4)and(9)oftheCivilCodeand
3.Whether the findings in the administrative case against
petitionerareconclusiveinthiscase.
226
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AbelitaIIIvs.Doria
TheRulingofthisCourt
Thepetitionhasnomerit.
ApplicationofSection5,Rule113ofthe
1985RulesonCriminalProcedure
Petitioner alleges that his arrest and the search were unlawful
underSection5,Rule113ofthe1985RulesonCriminalProcedure.
Petitioner alleges that for the warrantless arrest to be lawful, the
arresting officer must have personal knowledge of facts that the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attemptingtocommitanoffense.Petitionerallegesthatthealleged
shootingincidentwasjustrelayedtothearrestingofficers,andthus
theyhavenopersonalknowledgeoffactsasrequiredbytheRules.
Wedonotagree.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
states:
Sec.5.Arrest without warrant when lawful.A peace officer or a
privatepersonmay,withoutawarrant,arrestaperson:
(a)When,inhispresence,thepersontobearrestedhascommitted,is
actuallycommitting,orisattemptingtocommitanoffense
(b)When an offense has in fact just been committed and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committeditand
(c)Whenthepersontobearrestedisaprisonerwhohasescapedfrom
a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferredfromoneconfinementtoanother.
For the warrantless arrest under this Rule to be valid, two

requisites must concur: (1) the offender has just committed an
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offenseand(2)thearrestingpeaceofficerorprivateperson
227
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AbelitaIIIvs.Doria
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be

arrestedhascommittedit.5
Personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable cause,
which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.6
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of
actualbeliefofthearrestingofficers,thesuspicionthatthepersonto
bearrestedisprobablyguiltyofcommittingtheoffenseisbasedon
actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselvestocreatetheprobablecauseofguiltofthepersontobe
arrested.7 A reasonable suspicion, therefore, must be founded on
probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace
officersmakingthearrest.8
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
does not require the arresting officers to personally witness the
commissionoftheoffensewiththeirowneyes.Inthiscase,P/Supt.
Doria received a report about the alleged shooting incident. SPO3
Ramirez investigated the report and learned from witnesses that
petitioner was involved in the incident. They were able to track
downpetitioner,butwheninvitedtothepoliceheadquarterstoshed
light on the incident, petitioner initially agreed then sped up his
vehicle, prompting the police authorities to give chase. Petitioners
actoftryingtogetaway,coupledwiththeincidentreportwhichthey
investigated,isenoughtoraiseareasonablesuspiciononthepartof
thepoliceauthoritiesastotheexistenceofprobablecause.
_______________
5Peoplev.Cubcubin,Jr.,413Phil.249360SCRA690(2001).
6Id.
7 Umil v. Ramos, G.R. No. 81567, 3 October 1991, 202 SCRA 251 People v.
Lozada,454Phil.241406SCRA494(2003).
8Id.
228
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AbelitaIIIvs.Doria
PlainViewDoctrine
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The seizure of the firearms was justified under the plain view
doctrine.
Undertheplainviewdoctrine,objectsfallingintheplainviewof
anofficerwhohasarighttobeinthepositiontohavethatvieware
subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.9 The plain
viewdoctrineapplieswhenthefollowingrequisitesconcur:(1)the
law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior
justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can
view a particular area (2) the discovery of the evidence in plain
viewisinadvertentand(3)itisimmediatelyapparenttotheofficer
thattheitemheobservesmaybeevidenceofacrime,contrabandor
otherwisesubjecttoseizure.10
In this case, the police authorities were in the area because that
waswheretheycaughtupwithpetitionerafterthechase.Theysaw
the firearms inside the vehicle when petitioner opened the door.
Since a shooting incident just took place and it was reported that
petitionerwasinvolvedintheincident,itwasapparenttothepolice
officers that the firearms may be evidence of a crime. Hence, they
werejustifiedinseizingthefirearms.
CivilLiabilityUnderArticle32oftheCivilCode
Petitioner alleges that respondents are civilly liable under
paragraphs(4)and(9)ofArticle32oftheCivilCode.
Paragraphs (4) and (9) of Article 32 of the Civil Code
respectivelystate:
Art.32.Any public officer or employee, or any private individual,
whodirectlyorindirectlyobstructs,defeats,violatesorin
_______________
9Abenesv.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.156320,14February2007,515SCRA690.
10Id.
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AbelitaIIIvs.Doria
any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of
anotherpersonshallbeliabletothelatterfordamages:
xxxx
(4)Freedomfromarbitraryorillegaldetention
xxxx
(9)The right to be secure in ones person, house, papers, and effects
againstunreasonablesearchesandseizures
xxx
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In this case, it was established that petitioner was lawfully

arrested without a warrant and that firearms were validly seized
from his possession. The trial court found that petitioner was
charged with illegal possession of firearms and frustrated murder.
Weagreewiththetrialcourtinrejectingpetitionersallegationthat
he was merely framedup. We also agree with the trial court that
respondents were presumed to be performing their duties in
accordancewithlaw.Hence,respondentsshouldnotbeheldcivilly
liablefortheiractions.
ResJudicataDoesNotApply
Respondentsraisethedefenseofresjudicataagainstpetitioners
claimfordamages.
Res judicata has two aspects: bar by prior judgment and
conclusiveness of judgment provided under Section 47(b) and (c),
Rule39,respectively,ofthe1997RulesofCivilProcedure11which
provide:
Sec.47.Effect of judgments or final orders.The effect of a
judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having
jurisdictiontopronouncethejudgmentorfinalorder,maybeasfollows:
xxx
_______________
11Agustinv.Sps.DelosSantos,G.R.No.168139,20January2009,576SCRA576.
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AbelitaIIIvs.Doria
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the
matterdirectlyadjudgedorastoanyothermatterthatcouldhavebeenraised
in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in
interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special
proceeding,litigatingforthesamethingandunderthesametitleandinthe
samecapacityand
(c)Inanyotherlitigationbetweenthesamepartiesortheirsuccessors
ininterest,thatonlyisdeemedtohavebeenadjudgedinaformerjudgment
or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or
whichwasactuallyandnecessarilyincludedthereinornecessarythereto.
Barbypriorjudgmentandconclusivenessofjudgmentdifferas
follows:
Thereisbarbypriorjudgmentwhen,asbetweenthefirstcase
wherethejudgmentwasrenderedandthesecondcasethatissought
tobebarred,thereisidentityofparties,subjectmatter,andcausesof
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action.Inthisinstance,thejudgmentinthefirstcaseconstitutesan
absolute bar to the second action. Otherwise put, the judgment or
decreeofthecourtofcompetentjurisdictiononthemeritsconcludes
the litigation between the parties, as well as their privies, and
constitutesabartoanewactionorsuitinvolvingthesamecauseof
actionbeforethesameorothertribunal.
Butwherethereisidentityofpartiesinthefirstandsecondcases,
butnoidentityofcausesofaction,thefirstjudgmentisconclusive
only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and
determinedandnotastomattersmerelyinvolvedtherein.Thisisthe
concept of res judicata known as conclusiveness of judgment.
Stated differently, any right, fact or matter in issue directly
adjudicatedornecessarilyinvolvedinthedeterminationofanaction
before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the
merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot
again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or
nottheclaim,demand,purpose,orsubjectmatterofthetwoactions
isthesame.12
_______________
12Id.
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AbelitaIIIvs.Doria
For res judicata to apply, the following requisites must be

present:
(a)theformerjudgmentorordermustbefinal
(b)itmustbeajudgmentororderonthemerits,thatis,itwas
rendered after a consideration of the evidence or stipulations
submittedbythepartiesatthetrialofthecase
(c)it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction
overthesubjectmatterandthepartiesand
(d)theremustbe,betweenthefirstandsecondactions,identity
ofparties,ofsubjectmatter,andofcauseofactionthisrequisiteis
satisfied if the two actions are substantially between the same
parties.13
Whilethepresentcaseandtheadministrativecasearebasedon
the same essential facts and circumstances, the doctrine of res
judicata will not apply. An administrative case deals with the
administrativeliabilitywhichmaybeincurredbytherespondentfor
the commission of the acts complained of.14 The case before us
deals with the civil liability for damages of the police authorities.
Thereisnoidentityofcausesofactioninthecases.Whileidentity
ofcausesofactionisnotrequiredintheapplicationofresjudicata
15
in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment, it is required that

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in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment,15 it is required that

theremustalwaysbeidentityofpartiesinthefirstandsecondcases.
There is no identity of parties between the present case and the
administrativecase.TheadministrativecasewasfiledbyBenjamin
Sia Lao (Sia Lao) against petitioner. Sia Lao is not a party to this
case.Respondentsinthepresent
_______________
13EstateoftheLateEncarnacionVda.dePanliliov.Dizon,G.R.No.148777,18
October2007,536SCRA565.
14SeeVelasquezv.Hernandez,480Phil.844437SCRA357(2004).
15SeeLayosv.FilEstateGoldandDevelopment,Inc.,G.R.No.150470,6August
2008, 561 SCRA 75, citing Oropeza Marketing Corp. v. Allied Banking Corp., 441
Phil.551393SCRA278(2002).
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AbelitaIIIvs.Doria
casewerenotpartiestotheadministrativecasebetweenSiaLaoand
petitioner. In the present case, petitioner is the complainant against
respondents. Hence, while res judicata is not a defense to
petitionerscomplaintfordamages,respondentsneverthelesscannot
beheldliablefordamagesasdiscussedabove.
WHEREFORE,weDENYthepetition.WeAFFIRMthe10July
2004 Decision and 18 October 2004 Order of the Regional Trial
CourtofQuezonCity,Branch217,inCivilCaseNo.Q9833442.
SOORDERED.
Puno (C.J., Chairperson), Corona, LeonardoDe Castro and
Bersamin,JJ.,concur.
Petitiondenied,judgmentandorderaffirmed.
Notes.A judgment is on the merits when it determines the
rights and liabilities of the parties based on the disclosed facts,
irrespectiveofformal,technicalordilatoryobjections,anditisnot
necessary that there should have been trial. (Mendiola vs. Court of
Appeals,258SCRA492[1996])
Dismissalsunderparagraphs(f),(h),and(i)ofSection1ofRule
16 of the Rules of Court constitute res judicata. (Cruz vs. Caraos,
521SCRA510[2007])
o0o
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Abelita III vs. Supt Doria

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9/10/2016

JUDGE FELIMON ABELITA III, petitioner, vs. P/SUPT.

Same Same Same Requisites.For res judicata to apply, the

PETITION forreviewon certiorariof the decision and order of

Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the 10 July

Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 10 July

dents arrested petitioner and detained him, without any appropriate

For the warrantless arrest under this Rule to be valid, two

has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be

In this case, it was established that petitioner was lawfully

For res judicata to apply, the following requisites must be

in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment, it is required that

in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment,15 it is required that

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