JOSE

A.
BELTRAN,
ET
AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
PEOPLE'S HOMESITE & HOUSING CORPORATION, defendantsappellees.
G.R. No. L-25138
August 28, 1969
Teehankee, J:
Facts: An interpleader suit was filed on August 21, 1962, by
plaintiffs Jose Beltran, et al. in their own behalf and in behalf of all
residents of Project 4 in Quezon City, praying that the People's
Homesite & Housing Corporation (PHHC) and GSIS be compelled to
litigate and interplead between themselves their alleged conflicting
claims involving said Project 4.
PHHC leased out housing units to plaintiffs in 1953. The lessees,
paying monthly rentals therefor, were assured by competent
authority that after 5 years of continuous occupancy, they would be
entitled to purchase these units. In 1961, the PHHC announced
that the management, administration and ownership of Project 4
would be transferred to GSIS in payment of PHHS debts to GSIS.
PHHC also asked the tenants to signify their conformity to buy the
housing units at the selling price indicated on the back thereof,
agreeing to credit the tenants, as down payment on the selling
price, 30% of what had been paid by them as rentals. The tenants
accepted the PHHC offer, and on March 27, 1961, the PHHC
announced in another circular that all payments made by the
tenants after March 31, 1961 would be considered as amortizations
or installment payments.

By the end of 1960, administration and ownership of Project 4 was

turned over to GSIS. PHHC, however, through its new ChairmanGeneral Manager, Esmeraldo Eco, refused to recognize all
agreements previously entered into with GSIS, while GSIS insisted
on its legal rights to enforce the said agreements and was upheld
in its contention by both the Government Corporate Counsel and
the Secretary of Justice.

Plaintiffs thus claimed that these conflicting claims between PHHC

and GSIS caused them great inconvenience and incalculable moral
and material damage, as they did not know to whom they should
pay the monthly amortizations or payments.

TC: Designated the People's First Savings Bank, QC "to receive in

trust the payments from the plaintiffs on their monthly
amortizations on PHHC lots and to be released only upon proper
authority of the Court."

PHHC and GSIS filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint of Beltran,

et al. for failure to state a cause of action as well as to lift the
Court's order designating the People's First Savings Bank as trustee
to receive the tenants' payments on the PHHC lots.

TC granted the Motion, ruling that the counsel for GSIS ratified the
allegations in his motion and made of record that GSIS has no
objection that payments on the monthly amortizations be made
directly to PHHC. There was thus no dispute as to whom the
residents pay and therefore no cause of action for interpleading.
Counsel for defendants went further to say that whatever dispute,
if any, may exist between the two corporations over the lots and
buildings in Project 4, payments made to the PHHC will not and
cannot in any way affect or prejudice the rights of the residents
thereof as they will be credited by either of the two defendants.

On appeal, plaintiffs claim that the trial Court erred in dismissing

their suit, contending the allegations in their complaint "raise
questions of fact that can be established only by answer and trial
on the merits and not by a motion to dismiss heard by mere oral
manifestations in open court," and that they "do not know who, as

between the GSIS and the PHHC, is the right and lawful party to
receive their monthly amortizations as would eventually entitle
them to a clear title to their dwelling units."

Issue: Whether the dismissal of the complaint for interpleader was

proper? YES.
Ruling: Plaintiffs entirely missed the vital element of an action of
interpleader. Rule 62, section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court
requires as an indispensable element that "conflicting claims upon
the same subject matter are or may be made" against the plaintiffin-interpleader "who claims no interest whatever in the subject
matter or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by
the claimants." While PHHC and GSIS may have conflicting
claims between themselves with regard to the management,
administration and ownership of Project 4, such conflicting claims
are not against the plaintiffs nor do they involve or affect the
plaintiffs. No allegation is made in their complaint that any
corporation other than the PHHC which was the only entity privy to
their lease-purchase agreement, ever made on them any claim or
demand for payment of the rentals or amortization payments. The
questions of fact raised in their complaint concerning the
enforceability, and recognition or non-enforceability and nonrecognition of the turnover agreement of December 27, 1961
between the two defendant corporations are irrelevant to their
action of interpleader, for these conflicting claims, loosely so-called,
are between the two corporations and not against plaintiffs. Both
defendant corporations were in conformity and had no dispute, as
pointed out by the trial court that the monthly payments and
amortizations should be made directly to the PHHC alone.
Board of Optometry vs. Hon. Colet
G.R. No.
122241 July 30, 1996
Facts:
The Revised Optometry Law of 1995 was approved into law. The
private respondents here filed with the RTC for a declaratory relief,
among others, to protect their Constitutional rights because
allegedly, said law would affect their operation and inflict serious
and irreparable injury to their legal rights. They were not able to
prove, however, their juridical personality. Thus, they also assert

that such action is in their capacity as taxpayers and citizens suit,

and therefore pray to bar the enforcement of the law because it
endangers public health (in the nature of a taxpayers suit).
Issue: WON the private respondents have a legal interest in the
controversy; and WON the issue invoked is ripe for judicial
determination.
Held: No and no.
As a special civil action for declaratory relief, its requisites are: (1)
the existence of a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy is
between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party
seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4)
that the issue invoked is ripe for judicial determination. On this
score, we find no difficulty holding that at least the first and fourth
requisites are wanting.
For having failed to show that they are juridical entities, private
respondents must then be deemed to be devoid of legal personality
to bring the action. Thus, they cannot be deemed real parties in
interest. They cannot also claim such legal personality under a
taxpayers suit because, among others, they failed to allege the
existence and prove the requisites of a class suit.
And since an actual case or controversy means an existing case or
controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not
conjectural or anticipatory, it cannot be disputed that there is yet
no actual case or controversy involving all or any of the private
respondents on one hand, and all or any of the petitioners on the
other, with respect to rights or obligations under the law subject
matter of this case.
OLLADA VS. CENTRAL BANK
Facts: Felipe B. Ollada is a certified public accountant, accredited
to practice accountancy in the office of the Central Bank of the
Philippines. In December 1955, by reason of a requirement of the
Import-Export Department of said bank that CPAs submit to an
accreditation under oath before they could certify financial
statements of their clients applying for import dollar allocations
with its office, Ollada's previous accreditation was nullified. Ollada
thus filed a petition for declaratory relief before the trial court to
nullify said accreditation requirement. He alleges that because of
these requirements he had suffered serious injury, and that such
enforcement has resulted in the unlawful restraint in the practice of
CPAs in the Office of the Central Bank.
Issue: Will

the

petition

for

declaratory

relief

prosper?

Held: The complaint for declaratory relief will not prosper if filed
after a contract, statute or right has been breached or violated. In
the present case such is precisely the situation arising from the
facts alleged in the petition for declaratory relief. As vigorously
claimed by petitioner himself, respondent had already invaded or
violated his right and caused him injury all these giving him a
complete cause of action enforceable in an appropriate ordinary
civil
action
or
proceeding.
An action for declaratory relief should be filed before there has
been a breach of a contract, statutes or right, and that it is
sufficient to bar such action, that there had been a breach which
would constitute actionable violation. The rule is that an action for
Declaratory Relief is proper only if adequate relief is not available
through the means of other existing forms of action or
proceeding. (Ollada vs. Central Bank, G.R. No. L-11357, May 31,
1962)
Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v CA (334 SCRA 305)
Certiorari under Rule 65 is proper if a tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial/quasi-judicial functions acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and that
there is no appeal or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. The abuse of discretion must be so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty. It seeks to
correct errors of jurisdiction. Also certiorari is not allowed when a
party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of
that remedy.
On the other hand, Rule 45 as a petition for review seeks to
correct errors of judgment which include errors of procedure or
mistakes in the courts findings. All errors committed in the
exercise of such jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment.
FACTS:
Banco Fil sold to Tala Realty 4 lots in Iloilo. Tala then leased the
properties back to Banco Fil for a monthly rental of P21,000 for a
period of 20 years. Tala demanded payment for rentals but Banco
Fil failed to comply with their obligation so Tala filed numerous
ejectment suits against Banco Fil. Incidentally, Banco Fil also filed
16 other complaints for recovery of real property to which Tala filed
a Motion to Dismiss (MtD). The trial court granted the MtD and
denied Banco Fils Motion for Reconsideration.
Banco Fil, instead of filing an appeal, filed a petition for certiorari
with the CA under Rule 65 alleging that the trial court acted with

grave abuse of discretion because it did not comply with the

constitutional mandate on the form for decisions. CA dismissed the
certiorari stating that Rule 65 may be granted only when theres no
appeal or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law.
Banco Fil received the copy of the CAs decision and filed a Motion
for Reconsideration to which the CA again denied. Banco Fil filed
another petition for certiorari under Rule 65 this time with the SC.
ISSUE: Whether appeal to SC under Rule 65 is proper.
HELD: NO. SC immediately dismissed petition for the violation of
the basic rules of Remedial Law. The proper remedy from the CAs
adverse resolutions to the SC is an ordinary appeal via petition for
review under Rule 45.
Certiorari under Rule 65 is proper if a tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial/quasi-judicial functions acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and that
there is no appeal or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. The abuse of discretion must be so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty. It seeks to
correct errors of jurisdiction. Also certiorari is not allowed when a
party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of
that remedy.
On the other hand, Rule 45 as a petition for review seeks to correct
errors of judgment which include errors of procedure or mistakes in
the courts findings. All errors committed in the exercise of such
jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment.
In the case, Banco Fils allegations that the CA committed grave
abuse of discretion were only bare allegations since Banco Fil even
admitted that the CA labored out a 33-page rationale on the
decision of their case, thus, the CA did not commit any grave abuse
of discretion.
Note that, the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually
exclusive and not alternative or successive. Hence, the availability
to Banco Fil of the remedy under Rule 45 effectively foreclosed its
right to resort to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Also note that certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for the
lapsed or lost remedy of appeal. In the case, Banco Fils recourse
under Rule 65 cannot be taken, because when it filed a petition for
certiorari to the SC, the reglementary period for filing a petition for
review under Rule 45 to the CA had already lapsed

Title : HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. vs SECRET

ARY MICHAELDEFENSORCitation : G.R. No. 163980August
3,
2006Ponente : TINGA, J.:
Facts :
A number of presidential issuances prior to the passage of R.A. No.
9207, authorized the creation anddevelopment of what is now
known as the National Government Center (NGC).On March 5,
1972, former President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No.
1826, reserving a parcelof land in Constitution Hills, Quezon City,
covering a little over 440 hectares as a national government site to
beknown as the NGC.On August 11, 1987, then President Corazon
Aquino issued Proclamation No. 137, excluding 150 of the440
hectares of the reserved site from the coverage of Proclamation
No. 1826 and authorizing instead the disposition of the excluded
portion by direct sale to the bona fide residents therein.In view of
the rapid increase in population density in the portion excluded by
Proclamation No. 137 fromthe coverage of Proclamation No. 1826,
former President Fidel Ramos issued Proclamation No. 248 on
September7, 1993, authorizing the vertical development of the
excluded portion to maximize the number of families who can
effectively become beneficiaries of the governments socialized
housing programm.On May 14, 2003, President Gloria MacapagalArroyo
signed
into
law
R.A. No.
9207. Petitioner
Holy
SpiritHomeowners Association, Inc. (Association) is a homeowners
association from the West Side of the NGC. It isrepresented by its
president, Nestorio F. Apolinario, Jr., who is a co-petitioner in his
own personal capacity and onbehalf of the association. The instant
petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure,with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, seeks toprevent
respondents from enforcing the implementing rules and regulations
(IRR) of Republic Act No. 9207,otherwise known as the "National
Government Center (NGC) Housing and Land Utilization Act of
2003."
Issue :Whether or not in issuing the questioned IRR of R.A. No.
9207, the Committee was not exercising judicial,quasi-judicial or
ministerial function and should be declared null and void for being
arbitrary, capricious andwhimsical.
Held:Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rulemaking powers and quasi-judicial oradministrative adjudicatory
powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to
make rules andregulations which results in delegated legislation

that is within the confines of the granting statute and thedoctrine

of non-delegability and separability of powers.In questioning the
validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an
administrative agency, aparty need not exhaust administrative
remedies before going to court. This principle, however, applies
only wherethe act of the administrative agency concerned was
performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and notwhen the
assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative
power.The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasi-legislative
power of the Committee expresslyauthorized by R.A. No. 9207.
The petition rests mainly on the theory that the assailed IRR issued
by the Committeeis invalid on the ground that it is not germane to
the object and purpose of the statute it seeks to implement.Where
what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or
regulation issued by the administrative agencyin the performance
of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction
to pass upon the same.Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to
pass upon the validity of the assailed IRR issued by theCommittee
in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power, the judicial course to
assail its validity must follow thedoctrine of hierarchy of courts.
Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional
Trial Courts haveconcurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition,
mandamus,
quo
warranto,
habeas
corpus
andinjunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.
HILARION
M.
HENARES,
JR.,
et
al.
vs.
LAND
TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY BOARD
(LTFRB devotions) et al.
G.R. No. 158290
October 23, 2006
FACTS
Citing statistics from National and International agencies,
petitioners prayed for a writ of mandamus commanding
respondents Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board
(LTFRB)
and
the
Department
of
Transportation
and
Communications (DOTC) to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to
use compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel. Petitioners
allege that the particulate matters (PM) complex mixtures of
dust, dirt, smoke, and liquid droplets, varying in sizes and
compositions emitted into the air from various engine combustions
have caused detrimental effects on health, productivity,
infrastructure and the overall quality of life. In addition, they allege
that with the continuing high demand for motor vehicles, the

energy and transport sectors are likely to remain the major sources
of harmful emissions. They cited studies showing that vehicular
emissions in Metro Manila have resulted to the prevalence of
chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases (COPD); that pulmonary
tuberculosis is highest among jeepney drivers; and that the
children in Metro Manila showed more compromised pulmonary
function than their rural counterparts. Petitioners infer that these
are mostly due to the emissions of PUVs.
Asserting their right to clean air, petitioners contend that the bases
for their petition for a writ of mandamus to order the LTFRB to
require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel, lie in Section
16,12 Article II of the 1987 Constitution, in Oposa v. Factoran,
Jr. and Section 414 of Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as
the Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999.
Petitioners insist that since it is the LTFRB and the DOTC that are
the government agencies clothed with power to regulate and
control motor vehicles, particularly PUVs, and with the same
agencies awareness and knowledge that the PUVs emit dangerous
levels of air pollutants, then, the responsibility to see that these
are curbed falls under respondents functions and a writ of
mandamus should issue against them.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General said that the respondent
government agencies, the DOTC and the LTFRB, are not in a
position to compel the PUVs to use CNG as alternative fuel. He
explained that the function of the DOTC is limited to implementing
the emission standards set forth in Rep. Act No. 8749 and the said
law only goes as far as setting the maximum limit for the emission
of vehicles, but it does not recognize CNG as alternative engine
fuel. He recommended that the petition should be addressed to
Congress for it to come up with a policy that would compel the use
of CNG as alternative fuel.
ISSUES
1. Whether the respondent is the agency responsible to implement
the suggested alternative of requiring public utility vehicles to
use compressed natural gas (cng)
2. Whether the respondent can be compelled to require public
utility vehicles to use compressed natural gas through a writ of
mandamus
RULING
1. Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act
specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that
mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order
owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. At most the LTFRB has

been tasked by E.O. No. 290 in par. 4.5 (ii), Section 4 to grant
preferential and exclusive Certificates of Public Convenience
(CPC) or franchises to operators of NGVs based on the results
of the DOTC surveys.
In addition, under the Clean Air Act, it is the DENR that is tasked to
set the emission standards for fuel use and the task of developing
an action plan. As far as motor vehicles are concerned, it devolves
upon the DOTC and the line agency whose mandate is to oversee
that motor vehicles prepare an action plan and implement the
emission standards for motor vehicles, namely the LTFRB.
2. No. Petitioners are unable to pinpoint the law that imposes an
indubitable legal duty on respondents that will justify a grant of
the writ of mandamus compelling the use of CNG for public
utility vehicles. The legislature should provide first the specific
statutory remedy to the complex environmental problems bared
by herein petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus
is taken.
In addition, the petition had been mooted by the issuance of
Executive Order No. 290, which implemented a program on the use
of CNG by public vehicles. The court was assured that the
implementation for a cleaner environment is being addressed.
.LOTA vs CA
Facts: 1. Moises Sangalang was the cementery caretaker from
1951 until he was extended a newappointment by the Local Health
Officer.2. Flaviano Lota, then mayor of Taal appointed Jose
Sangalang
as
cementery
caretaker,
thus
takingMoises
place.3.Moises filed a complaint against Mayor Lota, Jose and the
municipal treasurer.4.The CFI of Batangas renderedin favor of
Moises.5. Mayor Lota appealed.He claimed that the trial court erred
in not dismissing complaint on theground that the real party in
interest, which is the municipality of Lipa was not made partydefendant; and the trial court erred in not dismissing the complaint
on the ground that appelleewas not validly appointed to the post of
municipal cemetery of Taal.6.CA rendered a decision declaring
Moises to continue in the office as cementary caretaker.7. Lota
contended that the CA erred in holding that the present action is
one of quo warranto; innot dismissing the action for failure of the
Moises to join the Municipality of Taal, Batangas, asparty
defendant; and in declaring that respondent Moises Sangalang is
entitled to hold, andcontinue in the office of caretaker of the
municipal cemetery of that municipality.

Issue: 1. WON the CA erred in holding the action is one of a quo

warranto.2 WON the CA erred in not dismissing the action
for failure of the plaintiff to join the Municipality of Taal, Batangas,
as party defendant.
Held: 1. NoThe claim that the instant action is one of mandamus,
not quo warranto, is devoid of basis. While quo warranto and
mandamus are often concurrent remedies, however, there exists a
cleardistinction between the two.The authorities are agreed that
quo warranto is the remedy to try the right to an office or
franchiseand to oust the holder from its enjoyment, while
mandamus only lies to enforce clear legal duties,not to try disputed
titles,that where there is usurpation or intrusion into an office, quo
warranto is the proper remedy and that where the respondent,
without claiming any right to an Office, excludesthe petitioner
therefrom, his remedy is mandamus, not quo warranto.The instant
action is clearly one of quo warranto, although mandamus is also
invoked therein as anancillary remedy. It appears that Moises
Sangalang alleges in his complaint that he had the right tothe
possession and enjoyment of said office to which he had legally
been appointed, and asks that Jose Sangalang, who is occupying it
unlawfully, be ousted. The present action, therefore, is onewhose
purpose is to try the right or title to a public office and oust he
alleged unlawful holder fromits enjoyment. Such proceeding and
remedy could only be litigated in a quo warranto actionaccording to
the authorities.2. NoThere is no merit in the claim that the action
should have been dismissed by the respondent Court for failure of
the plaintiff to implead the municipality of Taal. According to the
jurisprudence, anyperson claiming to be entitled to a public office
may bring an action of quo warranto, without theintervention of the
Solicitor-General or the Fiscal and that only the person who is in
unlawfulpossession of the office, and all who claim to be entitled to
that office, may be made parties in orderto determine their
respective rights thereto in the same action. The municipality of
Taal does not claim that it wanted and had the right to occupy and
enjoy the office of caretaker of its ownmunicipal cemetery its
pretension, as voiced by its mayor, is that Jose Sangalang is the
party whohad the right to occupy said office. It is not necessary for
that municipality to appropriate funds forthe payment of Moises
Sangalang's salary and salary differentials; there already existed
fundsappropriated for the purpose, and what remained to be done
was for the municipal treasurer todisburse them in accordance with
law. The municipality of Taal, therefore, is not an essential,
noreven a necessary party, to this action.

CRISTOBAL vs MELCHOR
FACTS: The plaintiff was formerly employed as a private
secretary in the President's Private Office, Malacaang, Manila,
having been appointed to that position on July 1, 1961 with a
salary of P4,188.00 per annum. He is a third grade civil service
eligible. Secretary Amelito R. Mutuc, by means of a letter dated
January 1, 1962, informed the plaintiff that his services as private
secretary in the President's Private Office were "terminated
effective today." Sometime in May 1962, when the civil action
filed by Raul R. Ingles, et als. was still pending in the Court of First
Instance of Manila. the dismissed employees who filed said action
were recalled to their positions in the Office of the President,
plaintiff was one of those who had not been fortunate enough to be
reappointed to any positions as befits his qualifications. He
waited for Secretary Mutuc to make good his assurance that he
would be recalled to the service, until Secretary Mutuc was
replaced by other executive secretaries who likewise assured the
plaintiff of assistance to be reemployed at "the opportune time."
ISSUE: Is the principle of laches or non-compliance with the
"Statute of Limitations" applicable against appellant?
HELD: No. Laches not applicable to Appellant. - Laches is failure or
neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do
that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled
to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. - There
are certain exceptional circumstances attending which take this
case out of the rule enunciated above and lead Us to grant relief to
appellant. 1. There was no acquiescence to or inaction on the part
of Jose Cristobal amounting to a bandonment of his right to
reinstatement in office.Cristobal, with the other dismissed
employees, sought reconsideration in a letter dated January 3,
1962, calling inter alia the attention of then Executive Secretary
Amelito Mutuc that he (Cristobal) was a civil eligible employee with
eight years of service in the government and consequently entitled
to security of tenure under the Constitution. This was followed by
another letter of January 26, 1962.Cristobal was not one of the
plaintiffs in the civil case, it is true, but his non-participation is not
fatal to his cause of action. During the pendency of the civil case
Cristobal continued to press his request for reinstatement together
with the other employees who had filed the complaint and was in

fact promised reinstatement. The essence of laches is not merely

lapse of time. It is essential that there be also acquiescence in the
alleged wrong or lack of diligence in seeking a remedy. Here
plaintiffs, or others representing them, protested ... and ever since
they have ... persisted in the diligent pursuit of a remedy ... Where
the cause of action of such a nature that a suit to enforce it would
be brought on behalf, not only the Plaintiff, bit of all persons
similarly situated, it is not essential that etch such person should
intervened in the suit brought order that the be deemed thereafter
free from the laches which bars those no sleep on the rights. 2. It
was an act of the government through its responsible officials more
particularly then Executive Secretary Amelito Mutuc and his
successors which contributed to the alleged delay in the filing of
Cristobal's present complaint for reinstatement. The evidence of
Cristobal establish the following: After the Ingles suit was filed in
court, the dismissed employees, Cristobal included, continued to

seek reconsideration of their dismissal. It was then that Executive

Secretary Mutuc assured the employees that without prejudice to
the continuation of the civil action, he would work for their
reinstatement. It was this continued promise of the government
officials concerned which led Cristobal to bide his time and wait for
the Office of the President to comply with its commitment.
Furthermore, he had behind him the decision of the Supreme Court
in Ingles vs. Mutuc which he believed should be applied in his favor.
But when Cristobal, in answer to his various letters, received the
letter of May 19, 1971 from the Office of the President denying his
reinstatement and declaring the matter "definitely closed" because
of his failure to file an action in court within one year from his
separation, it was only then that he, set the necessity of seeking
redress from the courts.