Association of Small landowners vs Secretary of Agrarian Reform

Facts:
Consolidated cases on the constitutionality of P.D 27, EO Nos. 228, and RA
6657. The petitioners contend that it violates the separation of powers, due process,
equal protection and constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken
for public use without just compensation.
They contend that Pres. Aquino usurped legislative power when she
promulgated E0 228. It also violates Article XIII Section IV of the constitution for
failure to provide retention limits.
It also deprives them on property rights as protected by due process and the
equal protection clause is also violated because the order places the burden of
solving agrarian reform on the owners of only agricultural land.
Issue:
Is the CARP/EO 228 unconstitutional?
Held:
The promulgation of Proc. 131 and EO 228 and 229 promulgated by the
president was authorized under section 6 of the transitory provision of the 1987
constitution.
As regards to retention limit (EO 228) it is no longer tenable because RA 6657
provide for such limits.
In regards to the Equal Protection Clause, the petitioners have not shown that
they belong to a different class and entitled to different treatment.
In regards to the argument that the state should first distribute public
agricultural lands. It is not correct to say that only the latter shall be covered by
CARP as the constitution calls for the the just distribution of Lands.
The requirement for Public use is already settled in the constitution itself,
Roxas vs Court of Appeals
Facts:
Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three
haciendas, namely, Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, all located in the
Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas. Hacienda Palico is 1,024 hectares in Hacienda
Banilad is 1,050 hectares in area. Hacienda Caylaway is 867.4571 hectares in
area. (2) Before the law's effectivity, on May 6, 1988, [Roxas & Co.] filed with
respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell [VOS] Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to

the provisions of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed under
compulsory acquisition by . . . DAR in accordance with the CARL. The Sangguniang
Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly authorized the reclassification of Hacienda
Caylaway from agricultural to non-agricultural. As a result, petitioner informed
respondent DAR that it was applying for conversion of Hacienda Caylawayfrom
agricultural to other uses.
Issue:
Whether the Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, all situated in Nasugbu,
Batangas, are non-agricultural and outside the scope of Republic Act No. 6657.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that The DAR itself has issued administrative circulars
governing lands which are outside of CARP and may not be subjected to land
reform. Administrative Order No. 3, Series of 1996 declares in its policy statement
what landholdings are outside the coverage of CARP. The AO is explicit in providing
that such non-covered properties shall be reconveyed to the original transferors or
owners. These non-covered lands are: a. Land, or portions thereof, found to be no
longer suitable for agriculture and, therefore, could not be given appropriate
valuation by the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP); b. Those were a Conversion
Order has already been issued by the DAR allowing the use of the landholding other
than for agricultural purposes in accordance with Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657 and
Administrative Order No. 12, Series of 1994; c. Property determined to be exempted
from CARP coverage pursuant to Department of Justice Opinion Nos. 44 and 181; or
d. Where a Presidential Proclamation has been issued declaring the subject property
for certain uses other than agricultural. In the present case, Proclamation 1520
dated November 20, 1975 is part of the law of the land. It declares the area in and
around Nasugbu, Batangas, as a Tourist Zone. It has not been repealed, and has in
fact been used by DAR to justify conversion of other contiguous and nearby
properties of other parties. Furthermore, the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu,
affirmed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Batangas, expressly defines the
property as tourist, not agricultural. The power to classify its territory is given by law
to the local governments.

Hacienda Luisita Inc. Vs Presidential Agrarian Reform Council

Facts:
The Tarlac development Corporation(TADECO), Hacienda Luisita Inc and the
5,848 qualified farm worker beneficiaries entered into a Stock Distribution Option
Agreement. The agreement consist of:

a. Production sharing equivalent to three percent of gross sales from the

production of the agricultural land payable to the farm worker benificiaries in
cash dividends or incentive bonus, irrespective of whether HLI makes money
or not; and
b. Distribution of free homelots of not more than 240 sq meters to family
benificiaries.
A group of supervisors filed with the DAR a petition to revoke the SDOA
alleging that HLI had failed to give their dividends and the 1% share in gross sales
as well as the 33percent share in the proceeds of the sale of the converted 500
hectares of land(which is now the SCTEX).
Another petition was filed to revoke the said agreement who wanted
distribution of lands and not stock option.
The Dar finds the HLI has not complied with its obligations under RA 6657
despite the implementation of the agreement, the PARC revoked the agreement.
Issues:
Was the DAR correct in revoking the said agreement?
Held:
The PARC was correct in revoking the said agreement. The HLi has not fully
complied with its undertaking to distribute homelots and the mechanics and
timelines of the stock distribution violates DAO 10.
Alita vs Court of Appeals
Facts:
The subject matter of the case consist of two parcels of land acquired by
private respondent predecessor through homestead patent under CA 141. Private
respondents desires of cultivating these lands but petitioner refuse to vacate relying
on the provisions of PD 27 and 316.
Issues:
Is homestead patend exempted from PD 27?
Held:
No, PD 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the
soil and transferring them ownership of landt hey till is a sweeping social legislation,
a remedial measure promulgated to social justice precepts of the constitution.
Natalia Realty vs DAR

Facts:
Natalia Realty Inc. is the owner of of a 125 hectare land in Antipolo Rizal. On
April 18, 1979, PP No. 1637 set adide 20321 hectares of land located in Antipolo,
San Mateo and Montalban as townsite areas to absorb the population overspill in
the metropolis. The Natalia properties were situated in the said areas.
Private landowners were allowed to developed their properties into low cost
housing subdivisions within the reservation and has a permit from the Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission.
When Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law took effect,the Dar issued notice
of coverage to the undeveloped portions of the subdivision. Natalia sought the
cancellation of the notice of coverage.
Issue:
Whether the undeveloped portions of the subdivision are covered by the
CARL.
Held:
The undeveloped portions of the subdivision was not covered by
CARLbecause they are not agricultural lands. Agricultural Lands do not include
residential, industrial, and commercial lands.
Luz Farms vs Secretary of Agrarian Reform
Facts:
Luz farms challenged the constitutionality of Sections 3(b),11,13 and 32 of
RA6657 insofar as the said law includes the lands devoted in raising of livestock,
poultry, and swine in its coverage.
Issue:
Does agrarian reform includes lands devoted in raising of livestock, poultry
and swine in its coverage.
Held:
No, it is unconstitutional. In livestock, poultry, and swine farming no lanf is
tilled and no crop is harvested. It was never the intention of the framers of the
constitution to include livestock, poultry industry in the CARP.
Central Mindanao University vs DARAB
Facts:

Central Mindanao University owns 3000

hectares of land and in 1984
CMU adopted a livelihood program under which its land resources were leases to its
faculty and employees. Later the faculty and employees filed in the DAR a
complaint praying that they be declared as tenants under the CARL.
The DAR ruled that the faculty and employees were not tenants but they
segregated the 400 hectares of land of the CMU to Agrarian Reform.
Issues:
Was the DAR correct in segregating these lands?
Held:
No, the school is in the best position to determine whether the land is
necessary for use as school site or campuses.
Caballes vs DAR
Facts:
The spouses Caballes acquired 60 meters of land by virtue of a deed of sale.
Before the sale to the spouses Caballes, Abajon constructed his house on a portion
of said landholding paying a monthly rental of 200 pesos to the owner. Abajon
planted corn and bananas to the said landholding.
After the property was sold, the spouses told Abajon that the poultry they
intented to build was closed to his house and persuaded him to transfer, Abajon
offer the spouses topay them but they refuse then later the spouses told Abajon to
vacate the property but he refused.
Yolanda Caballes filed a case against Abajon for malicious mischief for cutting
down bananas in the property, the case was refered on MAR and ruled that the case
was not proper for hearing cause Abajon is a tenant, the case was appealed and it
was reversed, but in the Motion for reconsideration filed by Abajon the decision
states he is a tenant.
Issue:
Whether there is a tenancy relationship.
Held:
The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are 1.) The parties are the
landowner and the tenant 2.) The subject is agricultural land 3.) There is consent 4.)
The purpose is agricultural production 5.) There is personal cultivation 6.) There is
sharing of harvest. All of these elements must concur, the abscence of one does not
make one a de jure tenant.

The circumstances in the case indicates that private respondent was more of
a caretaker. Agricultural production is absent.
Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations Inc vs Secretary of Agrarian
Reform
Facts:
The Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued DAR AO 07 97 entitled Omnibus
Rules and procedures governing the conversion of agricultural lands to non
agricultural uses which consolidatedall existing implementing guidelines related to
land used conversion.
Subsequently on March 30 1999 the Secretary of DAR issued A) 01-99
entitled Revised Rules and Regulations on the conversion of Agricultural Lands to
non Agricultural uses.
Then the Secretary issued another AO, AO No. 01-22 entitled 2002
Comprehensive rules on land used conversion.
In the same breath, petitioner contends that DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended,
was made in violation of Section 65[11] of Republic Act No. 6657 because it covers
all applications for conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to other
agricultural uses, such as the conversion of agricultural lands or areas that have
been reclassified by the LGUs or by way of Presidential Proclamations, to residential,
commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses on or after 15 June 1988.
According to petitioner, there is nothing in Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657 or in
any other provision of law that confers to the DAR the jurisdiction or authority to
require that non-awarded lands or reclassified lands be submitted to its conversion
authority. Thus, in issuing and enforcing DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Issue:
Was the DAR correct in including reclassified lands into the term agricultural?
Held:

Under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, lands not reclassified as residential,

commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988 have been
included in the definition of agricultural lands. In so doing, the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform merely acted within the scope of his authority stated in the aforesaid
sections of Executive Order No. 129-A, which is to promulgate rules and regulations
for agrarian reform implementation and that includes the authority to define

agricultural lands for purposes of land use conversion. Further, the definition of
agricultural lands under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, merely refers to the
category of agricultural lands that may be the subject for conversion to nonagricultural uses and is not in any way confined to agricultural lands in the context
of land redistribution as provided for under Republic Act No. 6657.
This Court held in Alarcon v. Court of Appeals[43] that reclassification of lands does
not suffice. Conversion and reclassification differ from each other. Conversion is the
act of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other use
as approved by the DAR while reclassification is the act of specifying how
agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential,
industrial, and commercial, as embodied in the land use plan, subject to the
requirements and procedures for land use conversion. In view thereof, a mere
reclassification of an agricultural land does not automatically allow a landowner to
change its use. He has to undergo the process of conversion before he is permitted
to use the agricultural land for other purposes.
Such inclusion does not unduly expand or enlarge the definition of agricultural lands
instead it made clear what are the lands that can be subject to Dar conversion
authority.
Sta. Realty Development Corporation vs Juan Amante
Facts:
The Canlubang Estate in Laguna is a vast landholding previously titled in the
name of the late Speaker and Chief Justice Jose Yulo, Sr. Within this estate are two
parcels of land (hereinafter referred to as the subject property) covered by TCT Nos.
81949 and 84891 measuring 254.766 hectares and part of Barangay Casile,
subsequently titled in the name of Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation
(SRRDC), the majority stockholder of which is C.J. Yulo and Sons, Inc.
On December 6, 1985, Amante, et al., who are the private respondents in
G.R. No. 112526 and petitioners in G.R. No. 118838, instituted an action for
injunction with damages in the Regional Trial Court of Laguna (Branch 24) against
Luis Yulo, SRRDC, and several SRRDC security personnel, docketed as Civil Case No.
B-2333. Amante, et al. alleged that: they are residents of Barangay Casile, Cabuyao,
Laguna, which covers an area of around 300 hectares; in 1910, their ancestors
started occupying the area, built their houses and planted fruit-bearing trees
thereon, and since then, have been peacefully occupying the land; some time in
June 3, 1985, SRRDCs security people illegally entered Bgy. Casile and fenced the
area; SRRDCs men also entered the barangay on November 4, 1985, cut down the
trees, burned their huts, and barred the lone jeepney from entering the Canlubang
Sugar Estate; as a result of these acts, Amante, et al. were deprived of possession
and cultivation of their lands. Thus, they claimed damages, sought the issuance of
permanent injunction and proposed that a right of way be declared.

Issue:
Does DARAB has jurisdiction over SRRDCs properties?
Held:
it is the DAR Secretary that originally declared the subject property as falling
under the coverage of the CARP.

Moreover, DAR Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1990 (Rules and Procedure
Governing Exemption of Lands from CARP Coverage under Section 10, R.A. No.
6657) provides:

I. LEGAL MANDATE

The general policy under CARP is to cover as much lands suitable for agriculture as
possible. However, Section 10, RA 6657 excludes and exempts certain types of
lands from the coverage of CARP, to wit:

A. Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for parks,
wildlife, forest reserves, reforestation, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds,
watersheds and mangroves, national defense, school sites and campuses including
experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for educational
purposes, seeds and seedlings research and pilot production centers, church sites
and convents appurtenant thereto, mosque sites and Islamic centers appurtenant
thereof, communal burial grounds and cemeteries, penal colonies and penal farms
actually worked by the inmates, government and private research and quarantine
centers; and

...

II. POLICIES

In the application of the aforecited provision of law, the following guidelines shall be
observed:

A. For an area in I.A to be exempted from CARP coverage, it must be actually,

directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for the purpose so stated.

...

C. Lands which have been classified or proclaimed, and/or actually directly and
exclusively used and found to be necessary for parks, wildlife, forest reserves, fish
sanctuaries and breeding grounds, and watersheds and mangroves shall be
exempted from the coverage of CARP until Congress, taking into account ecological,
developmental and equity considerations, shall have determined by law, the
specific limits of public domain, as provided for under Sec. 4(a) of RA 6657, and a
reclassification of the said areas or portions thereof as alienable and disposable has
been approved. (Emphasis supplied)

In order to be exempt from coverage, the land must have been classified or
proclaimed and actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for
watershed purposes.[68] In this case, at the time the DAR issued the Notices of
Coverage up to the time the DARAB rendered its decision on the dispute, the
subject property is yet to be officially classified or proclaimed as a watershed and
has in fact long been used for agricultural purposes. SRRDC relies on the case of
Central Mindanao University (CMU) vs. DARAB,[69] wherein the Court ruled that
CMU is in the best position to determine what property is found necessary for its
use. SRRDC claims that it is in the best position to determine whether its properties
are necessary for development as park and watershed area.[70]
But SRRDCs reliance on the CMU case is flawed. In the CMU case, the subject
property from the very beginning was not alienable and disposable because
Proclamation No. 476 issued by the late President Carlos P. Garcia already reserved
the property for the use of the school. Besides, the subject property in the CMU case
was actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for
educational purposes.
In the present case, the property is agricultural and was not actually and
exclusively used for watershed purposes. As records show, the subject property was
first utilized for the purposes of the Canlubang Sugar Estate.[71] Later, petitioner
claimed that the occupants were allowed to cultivate the area so long as they do
not plant crops being grown by the Canlubang Sugar Estate in order to avoid
confusion as to ownership thereof.[72] Thus, based on its own assertions, it appears

that it had benefited from the fruits of the land as agricultural land. Now, in a
complete turnaround, it is claiming that the property is part of a watershed.
Land Bank of the Philippines vs Heirs of Elueterio Cruz
Facts:
The unirrigated Riceland of Eleuterio Cruz was placed by the government
under the operation land transfer program under PD 27.
LBP pegged the value of the land at 106,935,76 based on the guidelines set
forth under P.D 27 and EO 228 but respondent rejected the formula. The PARAD
ruled that the just compensation shall be 80K per hectare.
Issue:
What was the correct formula?
Held:
Just compensation shall be determined in accordance with RA 6657. The
decision of PARAD of 80K per hectare did not adhere to the formula prescribed by
the regulations of DAR.