The South China Sea Dispute: A Review of Developments and their Implications

since the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties1

Ian Storey and Carlyle A. Thayer

Ian Storey is a Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.

Carlyle A. Thayer is Professor of Politics, School of Humanities and Social Sciences,

University College, University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force
Academy in Canberra, Australia.

Among all of Southeast Asia’s territorial disputes none is more complex and contentious
than the South China Sea. For much of the 1990s this issue was a source of serious
interstate tension between several ASEAN states and China. The focus of the dispute is
contested sovereignty over two chains of islands, the Paracels and Spratlys. The Paracel
Islands, which lie off the central coast of Vietnam and southeast of China’s Hainan
Island, are claimed by both the Chinese and Vietnamese governments. In 1974, China’s
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) expelled South Vietnamese forces from the Paracels
when Hanoi and Beijing were still nominal allies. Since 1975 Hanoi has consistently
rejected China’s claim to sovereignty over the islands. The Paracel dispute is truly
intractable as Beijing considers the matter closed and even refuses to discuss the issue
with Vietnam.
The Spratlys archipelago, located in the southern part of the South China Sea, is
composed of over 170 geographical features, less than 50 of which can be called islands
technically. Sovereignty of the features is claimed by five governments: China, Taiwan,
Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia. Brunei only claims an Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ). The islands, rocks and atolls that make up the Spratlys have no intrinsic value in
themselves. Sovereignty is contested because of the potential for rich hydrocarbon
deposits under the seabed, and because the Spratlys lie adjacent to the vital Sea Lanes of
Communication (SLOC) that pass through the South China Sea. Since the 1950s each of

1
the disputants except Brunei has occupied islands and stationed military forces on their
possessions.
In the 1990s China’s assertive behaviour in the South China Sea stirred anxiety in
the ASEAN capitals. While China’s paramount leader Deng Xiaoping had called on the
disputants to put aside their sovereignty claims and engage in joint exploration and
exploitation of maritime resources, a series of actions taken by the Chinese government
suggested it was intent on enforcing its irredentist claims. In 1992, China passed
legislation that appeared to lay claim to virtually the entire South China Sea. In 1995, it
rattled the ASEAN states by occupying and building military structures on Mischief
Reef, a small atoll within the Philippines’ 200 nm EEZ; and throughout the 1990s China
and Vietnam sparred over ownership of off-shore oil fields close to the Vietnamese coast.
China’s “creeping assertiveness” was interpreted by some as a worrying harbinger of how
a powerful China might behave in the future. As Philippine President Fidel Ramos
warned in 1995, the Spratlys issue was “a litmus test of whether China as a Great Power
intends to play by international rules, or make its own.”2
In the second half of the 1990s the Chinese government recognized that its
assertive behaviour in the South China Sea had been counterproductive in that it was
fuelling fears of a “China threat”. Accordingly, in 1995, Beijing began to show greater
tactical flexibility by agreeing to discuss the dispute with the ASEAN states in a
multilateral setting. These discussions by senior officials culminated in the Declaration
on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DoC), signed by ASEAN and China in
November 2002.

The 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea

Under the terms of the DoC the parties pledged to resolve their territorial and maritime
boundary claims by peaceful means (Paragraph 4) and exercise “self restraint in the
conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes” including refraining
from occupying presently unoccupied features (Paragraph 5). Paragraph 6 enjoins the
disputants to undertake five kinds of cooperative activities: marine environmental
protection; marine scientific research; safety of navigation and communication at sea;

2
search and rescue operations; and combating transnational crime. The DoC also calls on
claimants to continue “consultations and dialogues” for the purpose of “promoting good
neighbourliness, transparency, establishing harmony, mutual understanding and
cooperation and facilitating peaceful resolution of disputes among them” (Paragraph 7).
As with any compromise, the DoC suffered from weaknesses. First, as the name
suggests, the Declaration is neither a binding treaty nor a formal code of conduct. As
such, the DoC lacks teeth. It does not enumerate sanctions in the event of infringements.
Nor, in keeping with China’s insistence, is the geographical scope of the agreement
articulated (neither the Paracels nor Spratlys are mentioned by name). However, in
Paragraph 10 the signatories agree to work towards the goal of a formal code of conduct.
Second, while the DoC urges claimants not to occupy uninhabited features and build
structures on them, it does not prevent them from upgrading existing facilities and
structures. Third, the DoC is not inclusive: Taiwan, which occupies the largest island in
the Spratlys, was not invited to sign as part of China’s policy of limiting Taipei’s
international space.
Despite these three flaws the DoC did at least represent a political commitment by
all the signatories to mitigate tensions, freeze the status quo in terms of occupied features,
pursue confidence building measures (CBMs) and work towards a binding agreement in
the future. In the years immediately following the conclusion of the DoC tensions did
indeed seem to relax. Although the Philippines, Taiwan, China and Vietnam accused
each other of violating the “self restraint” clause by upgrading structures and conducting
tourist cruises around the disputed features, no major incidents occurred.3
The most tangible CBM to emerge from the DoC was an agreement reached in
September 2004 between the national oil companies of the Philippines and China to
conduct “pre-exploration” studies in the Spratlys to identify areas for oil and gas
exploration. Vietnam was initially opposed to the agreement but after talks with the
Philippines joined the agreement in March 2005. Under the Joint Marine Seismic
Undertaking (JMSU), the state-owned energy companies of the Philippines, China and
Vietnam agreed to jointly prospect for oil and gas deposits in the disputed waters of the
South China Sea over a three year period beginning on 1 July 2005. The JMSU was given
a mixed reception. At the official level, the agreement was widely praised. Philippine

3
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo called it an “historic diplomatic breakthrough for
peace and security,” while China’s state-run People’s Daily lauded the agreement as the
first step towards putting Deng’s sovereignty-shelving formula into action.4 Detractors of
the agreement pointed to the JMSU’s lack of transparency. The contents of the agreement
were never made public, nor the exact locations of the survey sites.
In 2008, the JMSU became engulfed in a firestorm of controversy in the
Philippines. Veteran journalist Barry Wain contended that in agreeing to the initial
agreement in 2004, the Arroyo government had not only broken ranks with its ASEAN
partners by cutting a bilateral deal with China without consulting them, but, more
seriously, Manila had made “breathtaking concessions” to Beijing since approximately
one-sixth of the area designated for the seismic survey lay within Philippine territorial
waters, and outside the claims of both China and Vietnam.5 Wain’s allegations were
quickly seized on by Arroyo’s opponents, who accused the government of prejudicing the
country’s territorial claims in the South China Sea and violating Article 12 the 1987
Constitution which stipulates that any consortium undertaking exploratory activities in
Philippine waters must be 60 per cent owned by Filipinos. Critics assailed the
government for selling out the national patrimony; some even called for the President’s
impeachment for treason. Further, it was insinuated that the Philippine president had
agreed to the JMSU as a quid pro quo for several large overseas development aid (ODA)
projects funded by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), including a national broadband
network and the upgrade of the country’s rail network, all of which had come under
scrutiny by the Philippine Senate in response to allegations of overpricing and bribery
(these projects were subsequently cancelled).6
The Philippine government offered a three-point defence. It argued the JMSU was
a critical component of the country’s search for energy independence, a commercial
agreement that did not prejudice the Philippines’ territorial claims, and an important
CBM that would transform the South China Sea from a region of conflict into a region of
peace and cooperation. Critics of the JMSU remained unconvinced and called on the
Supreme Court to declare the agreement unconstitutional. At the same time, the PRC
came under fire for allegedly trying to exert undue pressure on Manila over a bill being
discussed in the legislature to update the Philippines’ archipelagic baseline claims in

4
preparation for submission to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf (UNCLCS) before the 13 May 2009 deadline. The bill, which
reaffirmed Philippine claims to sovereignty over part of the Spratlys, passed two readings
but stalled on the third and final one. It was alleged that the Chinese Embassy in Manila
had expressed opposition to the bill as a violation of the DoC and inimical to Sino-
Philippine relations.7 China’s objections to the bill could be seen as hypocritical because
Beijing had passed legislation in December 2007 creating a county-level city in Hainan
Island called Sansha to administer China’s claims in the South China Sea, including the
Paracels and Spratlys.
This potent combination of scandal-tainted Chinese-funded ODA projects,
questions surrounding the constitutionality of the JMSU and allegations of strong-arm
tactics by Beijing over Philippine maritime legislation, persuaded the Arroyo
administration to distance itself from the tripartite seismic study to avoid further
controversy. When the JMSU lapsed on 30 June 2008, the Philippine government
announced that it would not be extended.8 Interestingly there was no official reaction
from either Beijing or Hanoi. Sino-Philippine relations continued their downward spiral
in early 2009 when China denounced the signing into law of the Philippines’ archipelagic
baselines bill as “illegal and invalid”.9 China’s subsequent dispatch of a patrol boat to the
South China Sea to “demonstrate Beijing’s sovereignty over China’s islands” precipitated
a mini-crisis in Sino-Philippine relations of the kind not seen since the second half of the
1990s.10

Sino-Vietnamese Tensions

The South China Sea dispute also overshadowed Vietnam’s relations with the PRC
during 2007-2009 As noted earlier, Hanoi had signed on to the JMSU in March 2005
after initially protesting the agreement. At the signing ceremony, Vietnam explained it
had changed tack in the interests of regional stability.11 It now seems clear, however, that
Hanoi was prepared to join the JMSU only because the survey area covered by the
agreement was not located in Vietnamese-claimed waters.

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 The JMSU may have contributed to an easing of Sino-Vietnamese tensions in the
South China Sea during 2005-2006, but in 2007 developments led to a sharp deterioration
in relations. Three sets of incidents riled Vietnam. The first concerned overlapping
sovereignty claims in the Con Son Basin, 230 miles off Vietnam’s southeast coast. In
April, the PRC accused Vietnam of infringing its sovereignty by allowing a consortium
of energy companies led by British Petroleum (BP) to develop two gas fields in the
basin.12 As had become customary practice, Vietnam rejected China’s protest and
reaffirmed sovereignty over the area in question. However, in June, BP announced it was
suspending work in the two fields, leading to speculation that Beijing had put pressure on
the company and threatened to exclude it from future energy projects in the PRC.13
Energy hungry Vietnam, which has prioritized the extraction of natural gas to help fuel
the country’s rapid economic development, was furious that China had apparently leaned
on BP.
The second set of events concerned Chinese activities in the Paracels. In April
Chinese authorities seized and detained a Vietnamese fishing boat in disputed waters. In
July, Chinese naval vessels fired on a Vietnamese fishing boat in the vicinity of the
archipelago, killing one sailor. Vietnamese officials travelled to Beijing, and both sides
agreed to maintain stability in the area.14 At the end of the year, however, Hanoi felt
compelled to reaffirm its sovereignty claims over the Paracels when Beijing announced
the start of tourist cruises to the islands and conducted military exercises in the area
which were not, in Hanoi’s view, “conducive to a friendly bilateral relationship”.15
The third set of incidents provoked the most serious crisis in Sino-Vietnamese
relations since normalization in 1991. As noted earlier, in December 2007 China passed
legislation creating Sansha city to administer the country’s claims over the Paracels and
Spratlys. The Sansha proposal proved to be the last straw for Vietnam. Over two
consecutive weekends in December hundreds of Vietnamese students were permitted to
conduct anti-China protests near the Chinese Embassy in Hanoi and consular office in Ho
Chi Minh City. The demonstrators expressed anger over China’s claims in the South
China Sea and accused China of invading Vietnamese territory and pursuing hegemonic
ambitions.16 The Vietnamese government claimed the protests had been spontaneous,
though few believed this given the authoritarian nature of Vietnam.

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 Clearly, Hanoi had taken a leaf out of China’s playbook and was using the
demonstrations to register its indignation with Beijing. In response, the PRC declared it
was “highly concerned” at the rallies and demanded the Vietnamese authorities adopt a
“responsible attitude” and “avoid bilateral ties from being hurt”.17 Vietnamese officials
viewed these three incidents as part of a larger Chinese strategy to undermine Vietnam’s
still secret plans to integrate the economic development of its coastal region with its
maritime zone.18 In January 2007, the Central Committee of the Vietnam Communist
Party (VCP) mandated that a comprehensive maritime strategy out to 2020 be drawn up.
This plan was basically completed by the end of the year but had not yet been publicly
released.
Sino-Vietnamese relations took another downturn in 2008-2009 as a result of a
series of further incidents. In January 2008, China accused Vietnamese fishermen of
attacking Chinese trawlers in the Gulf of Tonkin, a semi- enclosed body of water in the
South China Sea, which China and Vietnam had partially delimited in a 2000 agreement.
In keeping with their long-standing commitment to resolve outstanding disputes
peacefully, and not to let territorial issues hinder the forward momentum of bilateral ties,
Vietnam and China moved quickly to stabilize relations. The China-Vietnam Steering
Committee met in Beijing on 23 January 2008 to diffuse tensions. Co-chairs Chinese
State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan and Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign
Minister Pham Gia Khiem agreed to “properly handle the problems in bilateral relations”
through “dialogue and consultation”, and accelerate negotiations on the delineation of
remaining areas of the Gulf of Tonkin and issues relating to the South China Sea.19
During a visit to China by VCP Secretary General Nong Duc Manh in June 2008, the two
countries agreed to “uphold the use of peaceful negotiations to search for basic and long-
term solutions acceptable to both sides, and at the same time to actively study and discuss
the issue of joint development to find a suitable model and areas”.20 Agreement was also
reached to undertake delimitation of waters outside the mouth of the Gulf of Tonkin.
Controversy resurfaced in July 2008 when Greg Torode, a Hong Kong based
journalist, reported that executives of the world’s largest energy company, ExxonMobil,
had been approached by Chinese officials and warned not to proceed with a deal the
company had signed in June to explore for energy resources off the Vietnamese coast.

7
The report also suggested other foreign energy companies had also received similar
warnings from China.21 In a departure from the usual practice, China’s foreign ministry
confirmed the story by stating it had made clear its position to the “relevant side” (i.e.
ExxonMobil).22 Vietnam brushed off China’s diplomatic pressure. A foreign ministry
spokesman noted: “We have confirmed that all Vietnamese cooperation with foreign
partners in the field of petroleum is conducted in Vietnamese territorial waters and in the
exclusive economic zone”.23
Anti-Chinese nationalist sentiment was aroused in Vietnam in August when a
Chinese website posted an alleged ‘invasion plan’ of Vietnam. Bloggers in both countries
fired salvos into cyberspace attacking each other.24 By October, official harmony had
once more been restored, at least on the surface. During a visit to Beijing by Vietnamese
Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, the two countries agreed to “collaborate in
maintaining peace and stability” in the South China Sea.25
In 2009, Sino-Vietnamese relations became further strained over China’s
unilateral declaration of a moratorium on fishing from 16 May to 1 August in a large
section of the South China Sea. Eight modern Chinese fishery administration vessels
were dispatched to enforce the ban.26 Vietnam lodged a diplomatic protest and
Vietnamese media reported that the Chinese vessels stopped, boarded and seized the
catches of fishing boats and chased other Vietnamese boats out of the proscribed area. In
one instance a Chinese fishery vessel rammed and sank a Vietnamese boat.27 In June,
China arrested three Vietnamese boats. After freeing two boats and their crews, China
detained the third and its twelve crewmembers pending payment of a fine totaling US
$31,700.28 This prompted defiance from local government officials in Quang Ngai
province, the home of the detained fishermen, who declared they would refuse to pay the
fine.29 The Vietnamese Foreign Ministry issued a protest note to the Chinese Embassy in
Hanoi demanding the release of the detained fishermen.30
Friction over China’s fishing ban served to magnify the salience of other South
China Sea issues. For example, as noted above, the UNCLSC set 13 May as the deadline
for states to lodge claims extending their continental shelve beyond the 200 nautical mile
limit set by the UN Convention of Law of the Sea. Malaysia and Vietnam submitted a
joint proposal and Vietnam also presented a separate claim. China quickly lodged a

8
protest. When China submitted its claim, Vietnam responded by presenting its own
protest.31 Under the rules of the UNCLCS contested submissions cannot be evaluated. In
the midst of these diplomatic exchanges, an article prepared by China’s Ministry of Trade
critical of Vietnam’s claims appeared on a website jointly maintained by the trade
ministries of China and Vietnam. This prompted Vietnamese officials to close the site
temporarily.32
In August, when a Vietnamese fishing boat sought to avoid a tropical storm by
seeking safe haven in the Paracel archipelago, it was detained by Chinese authorities.33
Vietnam not only demanded the boat’s release, but upped the ante by threatening to
cancel a meeting that had been scheduled to discuss maritime affairs. China released the
fishermen and the bilateral talks were held.34

Explaining Chinese Behaviour

There are several possible explanations to account for Sino-Vietnamese friction in the
South China Sea during 2007-2009. First, Beijing may be attempting to pressure Hanoi
into accepting a joint exploration and production agreement covering energy fields
located off the Vietnamese coast, similar in nature to the June 2008 pact between China
and Japan to jointly develop the Chunxiao gas field in the disputed waters of the East
China Sea. If so, Beijing’s efforts are unlikely to succeed, as the off-shore energy fields
lie within, or at the edge of, Vietnam’s declared 200 nm EEZ. Moreover, Vietnamese
nationalism suggests that Hanoi will resolutely resist perceived attempts by China to
bully it into accepting such an arrangement. As a tactic in pursuit of this goal Beijing
seems to be ratcheting up the pressure on foreign oil companies not to enter into energy
deals with Vietnam, with the implicit threat that corporations that do so will be excluded
from future energy projects in the PRC. Thus far this tactic has proven unsuccessful, as
both BP and ExxonMobil have indicated their intention to proceed with existing deals.
Second, China may be signaling to Vietnam its strong disapproval of deeper US-
Vietnam security ties. Since Vietnam and the United States normalized relations in 1995,
Hanoi has been careful to calibrate its defence relations with the US so as not to offend
the PRC. However, in recent years the pace of development of US-Vietnamese military-

9
security ties has noticeably quickened. In June 2008, Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen
Tan Dung made a high-profile trip to the United States where he met with President
George W. Bush and became the first Vietnamese premier since 1975 to visit the
Pentagon. In a joint statement released after the Bush-Dung meeting, both sides agreed to
hold regular high-level talks on security and strategic issues. Moreover, President Bush
also stated that the US supported “Vietnam’s national sovereignty, security and territorial
integrity” (italics added).35 Bush’s unprecedented comment was open to interpretation, as
it did not explicitly identify the South China Sea. However, it reinforced comments made
by US Defense Secretary Robert Gates earlier in the year in Singapore: “In my Asian
travels, I hear my hosts worry about the security implications of rising demand for
resources, and about coercive diplomacy and other pressures that can lead to disruptive
complications… All of us in Asia must ensure that our actions are not seen as pressure
tactics, even when they coexist beside outward displays of cooperation” (italics added).36
The US position has always been that it does not recognize the claims of any of the
disputants in the South China Sea; taken together, however, the comments made by Bush
and Gates indicate that Washington is warning Beijing not to blackmail US energy
companies into non-participation in Vietnam’s oil and gas sector.
A third possible reason is that Beijing has reverted to a more assertive policy in
the South China Sea. This assertiveness may be driven by China’s increasing thirst for
off-shore energy deposits, the growing importance of Southeast Asian SLOCs to China’s
strategic interests, and Great Power ambitions. China has not only embarked on a major
program to modernize the People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) but has constructed a
major naval base on Hainan Island from which China can enforce its maritime claims and
project power into the South China Sea. It remains to be seen whether the Chinese
government will risk damaging greatly improved relations with ASEAN in pursuit of its
goals.

The South China Sea and Regional Security

The standoff between the USNS Impeccable and Chinese naval vessels on March 8,
followed by the collision of a Chinese submarine with a towed sonar array by the USS

10
John S. McCain on 11 June, has reawakened concerns in Southeast Asia that if Sino-US
strategic rivalry heats up, regional stability will be imperiled. The March skirmish called
to mind the April 2001 EP-3 spy plane incident which also took place off Hainan Island
in the South China Sea. Speaking after that crisis, Singapore’s then Senior Minister Lee
Kuan Yew remarked: “We in Southeast Asia held our breath. When it was over, we
heaved a sigh of relief”.37 Although the Impeccable incident was not nearly as serious as
the EP-3 episode, and the dynamics of US-China relations have changed substantially for
the better since 2001, the rapid expansion of China’s naval forces has provoked greater
scrutiny from the US military. It subsequently emerged that the Impeccable was
monitoring Chinese submarines based at the Sanya Naval Base on Hainan Island; given
intense US interest in China’s submarine fleet, future skirmishes between US surveillance
ships and the PLAN in the South China Sea are likely to become more commonplace,
especially absent a bilateral Incidents at Sea Agreement. The ASEAN states view this
prospect as deeply unsettling: they do not want to see Great Power rivalry played out in
their front yard, nor do they want to be forced to make a choice between America and
China.
In its 2009 report to Congress on the PLA, the Pentagon warned that the rapid
transformation of the Chinese armed forces was changing Asia’s military balance in favor
of the PRC and providing it with the capabilities to conduct military operations beyond
Taiwan, including in the South China Sea. Washington has demonstrated a keener
interest in Southeast Asia’s most intractable territorial dispute over the past several years,
driven mainly by freedom of navigation concerns but also by the need to protect the
commercial activities of US energy companies. The Obama Administration has built on
the legacy left by the Bush Administration by retaining Robert Gates as Secretary of
Defense. During the latest Sino-Philippine spat over the Spratlys, President Barack
Obama called President Arroyo on the phone to reaffirm the US-Philippine alliance
relationship and Washington’s commitment to the Visiting Forces Agreement.38 The
intent of that call is open to interpretation, but the timing suggests it was a gesture of
support for the Philippines in its altercation with the PRC.
In July 2009, the Obama Administration made clear its policies towards maritime
issues in the Asia-Pacific, including the South China Sea, in testimony by two high-

11
ranking officials to the Subcommittee on East Asia and Pacific Affairs of the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Scot Marciel
opened his remarks by noting that the United States has “a vital interest in maintaining
stability, freedom of navigation, and the right to lawful commercial activity in East
Asia’s waterways” (italics added). He rejected out of hand China’s claims to territorial
waters and maritime zones that did not derive from a land territory. “Such maritime
claims are not consistent with international law,” he argued. And more pointedly, after
reviewing cases of Chinese intimidation against American oil and gas companies
working with Vietnamese partners, Marciel stated, “We object to any effort to intimidate
U.S. companies”.39
The Obama Administration’s policy with respect to harassment of US naval
vessels was made clear by Robert Scher, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, who
outlined a four-point strategy:

In support of our strategic goals, the [Defense] Department has embarked on a

multi-pronged strategy that includes; 1) clearly demonstrating, through word and
deed, that U.S. forces will remain present and postured as the preeminent military
force in the region; 2) deliberate and calibrated assertions of our freedom of
navigation rights by U.S. Navy vessels; 3) building stronger security relationships
with partners in the region, at both the policy level through strategic dialogues and
at the operational level by building partner capacity, especially in the maritime
security area, and 4) strengthening the military-diplomatic mechanisms we have
with China to improve communications and reduce the risk of miscalculation.40

During 2007-09, the South China Sea dispute has moved from the back to the
middle burner of Asian security issues despite the intentions of the 2002 DoC for parties
to exercise “self restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate
disputes.” The Obama Administration has reached out to China and raised bilateral
relations to ministerial-level with the convening of the first Strategic and Economic
Dialogue (SED) in Washington, D. C. in July 2009. Recent naval incidents between
China and the United States raise the possibility that the South China Sea could once
again become a “front burner” issue if not managed properly. One hopeful outcome of
the SED was agreement by participants to hold a Military Maritime Consultative
Agreement meeting in Beijing by the end of the year.

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Notes

1
This paper is an updated version of Ian Storey’s “Maritime Security in Southeast Asia:
Two Cheers for Regional Cooperation” in Daljit Singh (ed.), Southeast Asian Affairs
2009 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009). This paper also draws on
Carlyle A. Thayer’s “The South China Sea’s Roiled Waters: Diplomatic Settlement or
Destabilising Naval Arms Buildup?,” Presentation to the Australian Institute of
International Affairs, Stephen House, Canberra, 7 July 2009.
2
“Spratlys will show if China plays by the rules: Ramos”, Straits Times, 8 May 1995.
3
Clive Schofield and Ian Storey, “Energy Security and Southeast Asia: The Impact on
Maritime Boundary and Territorial Disputes”, Harvard Asia Quarterly IX, No .4 (Fall
2005), p. 43.
4
“All-win rational choice”, People’s Daily, 18 March 2005.
5
Barry Wain, “Manila’s Bungle in the South China Sea”, Far Eastern Economic Review,
January-February 2008.
6
“RP may lose Kalayaans by default”, Newsbreak, 6 March 2008.
7
“China objection stalls OK of bill on RP territory-solon”, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 12
March 2008.
8
“Joint exploration pact lapses”, Philippine Star, 12 July 2008.
9
“China lodges stern protest to Philippines”, Xinhua, 14 March 2009.
10
“Fishery patrol boats sent to protect interests”, China Daily, 16 March 2009.
11
“Philippines, China, Vietnam to conduct joint marine seismic research in South China
Sea”, People’s Daily, 15 March 2005.
12
“Vietnam’s actions on Nansha Islands infringe on China’s sovereignty: FM
spokesman”, People’s Daily, 10 April 2007.
13
“Vietnam sees second weekend of anti-China protests”, Straits Times, 17 December
2007.
14
“Vietnamese, Chinese negotiators meet on territorial issue”, Straits Times, 24 July
2007.
15
“Nation reasserts sovereignty over Hoang Sa, Truong Sa”, Thanh Nien News, 25
November 2007.
16
“Vietnam sees second weekend of anti-China protests”, Straits Times, 17 December
2007.
17
“China pays close attention to so-called protest in Vietnam over South China Sea”,
Xinhua News Agency, 11 December 2007.
18
In December 2007 one of the co-authors was told by a former high-ranking Vietnamese
government official that China had acquired a copy of the still confidential draft maritime
strategy and was exerting pressure on foreign oil companies not to assist in its
implementation.

13
19
“China, Vietnam agree to properly handle the South China Sea dispute”, Xinhua News
Agency, 23 January 2008.
20
“China-Vietnam Joint Statement”, Xinhua News Agency, 1 June 2008.
21
Greg Torode, “Tussle for oil in the South China Sea”, South China Morning Post, 20
July 2008.
22
“China opposes any act violating its sovereignty”, Xinhua News Agency, 27 July 2008.
23
“Vietnam signals it wants ExxonMobil deal despite China warning”, Agence France
Presse, 24 July 2008.
24
“Invade Vietnam: Plan A. One battle to set the region in order”, Military Forum
website; an English-language translation was provided to the co-authors by Greg Torode.
Vietnam contacted the Chinese Ambassador on at least two occasions to request that the
invasion plan be removed from the website.
25
“Vietnam, China vow to deepen cooperation”, Vietnam News Agency, 23 October
2008.
26
“One more ship to patrol South China Sea,” Chinadaily.com.ch, 15 May 2009 and
“Reinforced patrol sails from Hainan,” Chinadaily.com.ch, 19 May 2009.
27
“Controversial Chinese ban affects more Vietnamese fishing vessels,” Thanh Nien
News, 5 June 2009 and “Fishermen intimidated and harassed by Chinese patrol boats,”
Thanh Nien News, 8 June 2009.
28
“MOFA Spokesman answers reporters’ question,” Nhan Dan on line, 27 June 2009 and
“Calling for signs of goodwill from China,” Thanh Nien News, 28 June 2009.
29
“China arrests Vietnamese fishermen, demands astronomical fines”, Vietnam.net, 30
June 2009 and “China again demands money for Vietnamese fishermen,” Vietnam.net, 7
July 2009.
30
“Fishermen team up for protection, Vietnam asks China to lift ban”, Thanh Nien News,
8 June 2009.
31
Neil Ford, “Progress in the South China Sea”, International Gas Report, 8 June 2009;
“Receipt of the joint submission made by Malaysia and the Socialist Republic of Viet
Nam to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf,” Secretary General of the
United Nations, 7 May 2009; Xinhua, “China urges UN commission not to review joint
Malaysia-Vietnam submission on outer limits of continental shelf”, 7 May 2009.
32
“Vietnam shuts down Web site in dispute with China”, Associated Press, 18 May 2009
and Deutsche Presse-Agentur (DPA), “Vietnam-China territory dispute moves to
cyberspace”, 19 May 2009. In April 2009, Vietnam’s Ministry of Information and
Communication suspended Du Lich (Tourism) newspaper for three months for publishing
a series of articles praising the patriotism of Vietnamese students who demonstrated
against China in late 2007. Nga Pham, “Vietnam paper banned over China,” BBC News,
15 April 2009.

14
33
DPA, “China detains Vietnamese fishermen fleeing storms”, 4 August 2009; DPA,
“Vietnam asks China to release fishermen”, 5 August 2009 and Beth Thomas, “China
Releases Vietnamese Fishermen Seized Near Paracel Islands,” Bloomberg, 12 August
2009.

34
The “border and territory” talks were held at deputy minister level from 12-14 August
2009 in Hanoi.
35
Joint Statement Between the United States of America and the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam, 24 June 2008. http://www.vietnamembassy-usa.org/
news/story.php?d=20080627045153
36
International Institute for Strategic Studies (Singapore) speech as delivered by
Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Singapore, 31 May 2008.
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1253
37
South China Morning Post, 23 May 2001.
38
Philippine Daily Inquirer, 17 March 2009.
39
Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary Scot Marciel, Bureau of East Asian and
Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State before the Subcommittee on East Asian and
Pacific Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 15 July 2009.
40
Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Scher, Asian and Pacific
Security Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense before the Subcommittee on East
Asia and Pacific Affairs, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate,
15 July 2009.

15