Russo-Georgian War

For the 1921 war, see Red Army invasion of Georgia.

Russian forces temporarily occupied the Georgian cities

of Zugdidi, Senaki, Poti, and Gori, holding on to these areas beyond the ceasere. The South Ossetians destroyed
most ethnic Georgian villages in South Ossetia and were
responsible for an ethnic cleansing of Georgians. Russia recognised Abkhazia and South Ossetia as separate
republics on 26 August; in response, the Georgian government severed diplomatic relations with Russia. Russia
mostly completed its withdrawal of troops from Georgia
proper on 8 October. In the aftermath, Russias international relations were largely unharmed. The war displaced 192,000 people and while many returned to their
homes after the war, 20,272 people remained displaced
as of 2014. The Russian military has, since the war, increased its presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in violation of the ceasere agreement of August 2008.[32]

The Russo-Georgian War was a war between Georgia,

Russia and the Russian-backed self-proclaimed republics
of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.[note 3] The war took place
in August 2008 following a period of worsening relations
between Russia and Georgia, both formerly constituent
republics of the Soviet Union. The ghting took place in
the strategically important Transcaucasia region, which
borders the Middle East. It was regarded as the rst
European war of the 21st century.[29]
The Republic of Georgia declared its independence in
early 1991 as the Soviet Union began to fall apart. Amidst
this backdrop, a war between Georgia and separatists
left parts of the former South Ossetian Autonomous
Oblast under the de facto control of Russian-backed but
internationally unrecognised separatists. Following the
war, a joint peacekeeping force of Georgian, Russian and
Ossetian troops was stationed in the territory. Meanwhile, a similar stalemate developed in the region of
Abkhazia, where Abkhaz separatists had waged their own
war in 19921993. Following Vladimir Putin's rise to
power in Russia in 2000 and a pro-Western change of
power in Georgia in 2003, relations between Russia and
Georgia began to deteriorate, reaching a full diplomatic
crisis by April 2008. By August 1, 2008, Ossetian separatists began shelling Georgian villages, with a sporadic
response from Georgian peacekeepers in the region. To
put an end to these deadly attacks and restore order, the
Georgian Army was sent to the South Ossetian conict
zone on 7 August.[30] Georgians took control of most
of Tskhinvali, a separatist stronghold, in hours. Georgia later stated it was also responding to Russia moving
non-peacekeeping units into the country.

1 Background
Main article: Background of the Russo-Georgian War
See also: GeorgianOssetian conict and Georgia
Russia relations

1.1 History

In the tenth century AD, Georgia for the rst time

emerged as an ethnic concept in the territories where the
Georgian language was used to perform Christian rituals.
After the Mongol invasions of the region, the Kingdom of
Georgia eventually was broken up into several kingdoms
and principalities. In the nineteenth century, the Russian
Russia accused Georgia of aggression against South Empire gradually annexed the Georgian lands. In the afOssetia,[30] and launched a large-scale land, air and sea termath of the Russian revolution, Georgia declared its
[33]
invasion of Georgia on 8 August with the stated aim of independence on 26 May 1918.
[31]
"peace enforcement" operation. Russian and Ossetian The Ossetian people are indigenous to North Ossetia, loforces battled Georgian forces in and around South Os- cated in the North Caucasus.[34] Controversy surrounds
setia for several days, until Georgian forces retreated. the date of Ossetian arrival in Transcaucasia. AccordRussian and Abkhaz forces opened a second front by ing to one theory, they rst migrated there during the
attacking the Kodori Gorge held by Georgia. Russian 13th and 14th centuries AD,[35] and lived alongside the
naval forces blockaded part of the Georgian coast. This Georgians peacefully for centuries.[36] In 1918, conict
was the rst war in history in which cyber warfare co- began between the landless Ossetian peasants living in
incided with military action. An active information war Shida Kartli, who were inuenced by Bolshevism and
was also waged during and after the conict. President of demanded ownership of the lands they worked and the
France Nicolas Sarkozy negotiated a ceasere agreement Menshevik government backed ethnic Georgian aristoon 12 August.
crats, who were legal owners. Although the Ossetians
were initially discontented with the economic policies of
1

2
the central government, the tension soon transformed into
ethnic conict. During uprisings in 1919 and 1920, the
Ossetians were covertly supported by Soviet Russia, but
even so, were defeated.[37]
The independent Democratic Republic of Georgia was
invaded by the Red Army in 1921 and a Soviet government was installed.[38] The government of Soviet Georgia
created an autonomous administrative unit for Transcaucasian Ossetians in April 1922, called the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast.[39] Historians such as Stephen
F. Jones, Emil Souleimanov and Arsne Saparov believe that the Bolsheviks granted this autonomy to the
Ossetians in exchange for their help in ghting the
Democratic Republic of Georgia,[37][40][41] since this area
had never been a separate entity prior to the Russian
invasion.[30][42][43]
Nationalism in Soviet Georgia emerged in 1989 when the
weakening of the Soviet Union began. The Kremlin endorsed South Ossetian nationalism as a counter against
the Georgian independence movement.[44] On 11 December 1990, the Supreme Soviet of Georgia abolished
the South Ossetian autonomous region.[45] Georgia declared its restoration of independence on 9 April 1991,
thus becoming the rst non-Baltic state of the Soviet
Union to do so.[46] A military conict broke out between
Georgia and South Ossetia in January 1991, which lasted
until June 1992.[47] The separatists were aided by former
Soviet military units now under Russian command.[48]
After the Sochi agreement in 1992, Georgian, South Ossetian, Russian and North Ossetian peacekeepers were
stationed in South Ossetian conict zone under the Joint
Control Commission's (JCC) mandate.[49] Some parts of
the former South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast remained
under the Georgian control.[47] The Tskhinvali separatist
authorities (the self-proclaimed Republic of South Ossetia) were in control of one third of the territory of
the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast before the 2008
war.[50]

BACKGROUND

scaucasia, according to Swedish academic Svante Cornell, would enable Russia to control Western inuence in
the geopolitically important region of Central Asia.[53]
Russia saw the Black Sea coast and the border with
Turkey as invaluable strategic attributes of Georgia.[54]
Russia had more vested interests in Abkhazia than in
South Ossetia, since the Russian military presence on the
Black Sea coast was seen as vital to Russian inuence in
the Black Sea.[31] Before the early 2000s, South Ossetia was originally intended as a tool to retain a grip on
Georgia.[44]
Vladimir Putin became president of the Russian Federation in 2000, which had a profound impact on
Russo-Georgian relations. The conict between Russia and Georgia began to escalate in December 2000,
when Georgia became the rst and only member of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) on which the
Russian visa regime was imposed. In December 2001,
Eduard Kokoity, an alleged member of organised crime,
became de facto president of South Ossetia; he was endorsed by Russia since he would subvert the peaceful
reintegration of South Ossetia into Georgia. The Russian government began massive distribution of Russian
passports to the residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia
in 2002 without Georgias permission; this passportization policy laid the foundation for Russias future claim
to these territories.[55] In 2003, President Putin began to
consider the possibility of a military solution to the conict with Georgia.[56]
After Georgia deported four suspected Russian spies in
2006, Russia began a full-scale diplomatic and economic
war against Georgia, accompanied by the persecution of
ethnic Georgians living in Russia.[55]

By 2008, most residents of South Ossetia had obtained

Russian passports. According to Reuters, Russia supplied two-thirds of South Ossetias annual budget before
the war.[57] Russian ocials had de facto control of South
Ossetias security institutions, including the armed forces;
This situation was mirrored in Abkhazia, an autonomous South Ossetias de facto government was largely staed
republic in the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic, where with Russians and South Ossetians with Russian passthe Abkhaz seceded from Georgia during the early ports, who had occupied equivalent government positions
1990s.[48] The population of Abkhazia was reduced to in Russia.[58]
216,000 after an ethnic cleansing of Georgians, a decrease from 525,000 before the war.[51] An unrecognised government did not control the entire territory of
1.3 Unresolved conicts
Abkhazia.[52]
The conicts in Georgia remained at a stalemate until 2004,[59] when Mikheil Saakashvili came to power
1.2 Russian interests and involvement
after Georgias Rose Revolution, which ousted president
Eduard Shevardnadze.[60] Restoring South Ossetia
Transcaucasia lies between the Russian region of the
to Georgian control was a top-priority of
North Caucasus and the Middle East, forming a "buer and Abkhazia[61]
Saakashvilis.
zone" between Russia and the Middle East. It borders
Turkey and Iran. The strategic importance of the region The Georgian government launched an initiative to curb
has made it a security concern for Russia. Signicant smuggling from South Ossetia in 2004 after its success
economic reasons, such as presence or transportation of in restoring control in Adjara. Tensions were further esoil, also aect interest in Transcaucasia. Control of Tran- calated by South Ossetian authorities.[61] Intense ghting

3
took place between Georgian forces and South Ossetian and Georgia would become members of the alliance and
militia between 8 and 19 August.[62]
pledged to review the applications for MAP in Decem[72]
Russian President Vladimir Putin was in
At the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Eu- ber 2008.
Bucharest
during
the summit. At the end of the summit
rope in Strasbourg in January 2005, Georgian president
on
4
April,
Putin
said that expansion of NATO to RusSaakashvili proposed a peace settlement for South Ossias
borders
would
be taken in Russia as a direct threat to
setia within a unied Georgian state. The proposal was
[73]
the
security
of
our
country.
After the Bucharest sum[63]
rejected by South Ossetian president Eduard Kokoity.
mit,
Russia
became
more
aggressive
and began to actively
In 2006, Georgia sent security forces to the Kodori Valprepare for the invasion of Georgia.[74] Chief of the Genley region of Abkhazia, when a local militia leader rebelled against Georgian authorities.[52] In 2007, Geor- eral Sta of the Russian Armed Forces Yuri Baluyevsky
said on 11 April that Russia would take steps of a difgia established what Russia called a puppet governprevent
ment in South Ossetia, led by Dmitry Sanakoyev (former ferent nature in addition to military action to[75]
NATO membership of former Soviet republics. GenSouth Ossetian prime minister), calling it a provisional
eral Baluyevsky admitted in 2012 that when the deciadministration.[64]
sion to attack Georgia was taken by President Putin beIn early March 2008, Abkhazia and South Ossetia sub- fore Dmitry Medvedev assumed the oce of president in
mitted formal requests for their recognition to Russias May 2008, a military action was planned and explicit orparliament shortly after the Wests recognition of Kosovo ders were issued in advance before August 2008. Russia
to which Russia was opposed. Dmitry Rogozin, Rus- aimed to stop Georgias accession to NATO and also to
sian ambassador to NATO, warned that Georgias NATO bring about a "regime change".[56]
membership aspirations would cause Russia to support
the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.[65] The
Russian State Duma adopted a resolution on 21 March, 2 Prelude
in which it called on the President of Russia and the government to consider the recognition.[66]
Main article: 2008 Russo-Georgian diplomatic crisis
Georgia began proposing the placement of international See also: Timeline of the Russo-Georgian War
peacekeeping forces in the separatist regions when Russia began to apply more pressure on Georgia after April
2008. The West launched new initiatives for peace settlement, with peace plans being oered and conferences 2.1 AprilJuly 2008
being organised by the European Union, the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and
Germany. Georgia accepted the German project for AbkAbkhazia
hazia, but the separatists dismissed it. Russia and the separatists did not attend an EU-funded peace conference on
Abkhazia. They also dismissed an OSCE oer to renew
South
Ossetia
Black Sea
talks regarding South Ossetia.[67]
Kodori
Gorge

Pskhu

Gagra

Bichvinta
Gudauta
New Athos
Lata
Sokhumi

UN Security zone (SZ)

Omarishara

Otapi

Restricted weapons zone

(RWZ)

Mestia

Khaishi

Gulripshi

Tqvarcheli
Ochamchire
Jvari
Gali

Pichori

Controlled by Georgia

Lentekhi

Tsalenjikha

Khvanchkara

Zugdidi

Anaklia
Khobi

Tsqaltubo

Tqibuli

Senaki Kutaisi
Samtredia

NW

Lanchkhuti
NE

Chokhatauri

Ozurgeti
W

Bakhmaro

Kobuleti

SW

SE

Batumi

1.4

Relations between Georgia and the

West

(km)

(mi)

100
60

Adjara
Keda

Baghdati

Khulo
Vale

Pasanauri

Kurta

Akhalgori

Tskhinvali

Akhmeta

Dusheti

Khashuri

Borjomi
Abastumani
Atskuri

Archilo

Mleta

Chiatura
Zestaponi

Poti

Kvaisi

Ambrolauri

Gori

Georgia

Akhaltsikhe
Marneuli
Bolnisi
Ninotsminda

Telavi

Tbilisi

Bakuriani

Akhalkalaki

Qvareli

Mtskheta

Kazreti

Rustavi

Lagodekhi

Gurjaani
Tsnori
Dedoplis
Tsqaro

Situation in Georgia before the war

One of President Saakashvilis primary goals for Georgia

was NATO membership,[59] which has been one of the On 16 April 2008 Russian president Vladimir Putin aumajor stumbling blocks in Georgia-Russia relations.[68]
thorised ocial ties between the Russian government and
Although Georgia has no signicant oil or gas reserves, its the separatists in Abkhazia and South Ossetia by signing
territory hosts part of the BakuTbilisiCeyhan pipeline a decree. The legal acts issued by the separatists and the
supplying Europe.[69] The pipeline circumvents both Rus- entities registered under them were also recognised.[76]
sia and Iran. Because it has decreased Western depen- After a United Nations Security Council meeting on 23
dence on Middle Eastern oil, the pipeline has been a ma- April convened at Georgias request, the United States,
jor factor in the United States support for Georgia.[70]
the United Kingdom, France and Germany issued a stateDuring the NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2008, ment saying: We call on the Russian Federation to reAmerican president George W. Bush lobbied for oer- voke or not to implement its decision. However, this was
by Vitaly Churkin, Russias Ambasing a Membership Action Plan (MAP) to Georgia and labelled a tall order
[77]
sador
to
the
UN.
Ukraine. However, Germany and France said that oering MAP to Ukraine and Georgia would be an unnec- A Russian jet shot down a Georgian reconnaissance drone
essary oence to Russia.[71] NATO stated that Ukraine ying over Abkhazia on 20 April. However, Russia de-

4
nied responsibility for the incident and Abkhazia claimed
that the drone was shot down by an L-39 aircraft of the
Abkhaz Air Force.[78] An allegation of an attack by a
NATO MiG-29 was made by the Russia' Ambassador
to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin. NATO Secretary General
Jaap de Hoop Scheer commented that he'd eat his tie
if it turned out that a NATO MiG-29 had magically appeared in Abkhazia and shot down a Georgian drone.[79]
On 26 May, a United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) investigation concluded that the jet belonged to the Russian Air Force; it was either a MiG-29
Fulcrum or a Su-27 Flanker.[80]

2 PRELUDE
be followed by the expulsion of Georgian military and
population from South Ossetia.[94]
In early July, the security situation in South Ossetia aggravated, when a South Ossetian separatist militia ocial was killed by explosions on 3 July and several hours
later an unsuccessful assassination attempt on Dmitry
Sanakoyev, the leader of the Georgian-backed Ossetian
government, injured three policemen.[95] On 7 July, four
Georgian soldiers were captured by South Ossetian separatists. The next day, the Georgian president ordered police to get ready to liberate the soldiers.[96] Four Russian
Air Force jets ew over South Ossetia on 8 July.[97] A
scheduled visit of Condoleezza Rice, the US Secretary
of State, to Georgia on the next day nearly coincided
with the timing of the ight.[98] Georgia recalled its ambassador to Russia after Russia admitted its planes had
own in Georgias airspace to let hot heads in Tbilisi cool
down.[97] This was the rst time in a decade that Russia
had admitted to an overight of Georgian territory.[99]

In late April, the Russian government said that Georgia was amassing 1,500 soldiers and police in the upper Kodori Gorge area and was planning to invade
Abkhazia,[81] and that Russia would retaliate against
Georgian attack and had boosted its forces in the separatist regions.[82] Any buildup in the Kodori Gorge or near
the Abkhaz border by either party was not conrmed by
the UNOMIG.[83][84]
On 15 July, the United States and Russia began two parRussia increased the number of its peacekeepers in Abk- allel military exercises in the Caucasus, though Russia
hazia to 2,542 in early May, but its troop levels remained denied that the identical timing was intentional.[100] The
under the limit of 3,000 imposed by a 1994 decision joint US-Georgian exercise was called Immediate Reof CIS heads of state.[85] Georgia showed video footage sponse 2008 and also included servicemen from Ukraine,
captured by a drone to the BBC allegedly proving that Azerbaijan and Armenia. A total of 1,630 serviceRussian troops used heavy hardware in Abkhazia and men, including 1,000 American troops, took part in
were a ghting force, rather than peacekeepers; Russia the exercise, which concluded on 31 July.[101] Counterdenied the accusations.[86] On 15 May, the United Na- insurgency action was the focal point of the joint extions General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for ercise. The Georgian brigade was trained to serve in
the return of all refugees and internally displaced per- Iraq.[102] The Russian exercise was named Caucasus 2008
sons (IDPs) to Abkhazia.[87] Russia voted against the and units of the North Caucasus Military District, includGeorgian-sponsored resolution. The Russian Foreign ing the 58th Army, participated. The exercise included
Ministry said that the resolution was a counterproduc- training to aid peacekeepers stationed in Abkhazia and
tive move.[88]
South Ossetia.[103] During exercises, a leaet named SolRussia sent railway troops (unarmed, according to the dier! Know your probable enemy!" was circulated among
The leaet described the GeorRussian defence ministry) on 31 May to repair a rail the Russian participants.
[104]
gian
Armed
Forces.
Russian
troops remained near the
line in Abkhazia. Georgia stated that the move was an
Georgian
border
after
the
end
of
their exercise on 2 Au[89]
aggressive act. The European Parliament adopted a
gust,
instead
of
returning
to
their
bases.[83]
resolution on 5 June which condemned the deployment
of Russian forces to Abkhazia. The resolution stated
that the peacekeeping structure must be changed because Russia was no longer an unbiased player.[90] Russian railway troops began withdrawal from Abkhazia on
30 July after attending the opening ceremony of the railway line.[91] The repaired railway was used to transport
military equipment by at least a part of the 9,000 Russian
soldiers who entered Georgia from Abkhazia during the
war.[92]
In late June, Russian military expert Pavel Felgenhauer
predicted that Vladimir Putin would start a war against
Georgia in Abkhazia and South Ossetia supposedly in
August.[83][93] The Kavkaz Center reported in early July
that Chechen separatists had intelligence data that Russia was preparing a military operation against Georgia in AugustSeptember 2008 which mainly aimed to
expel Georgian forces from the Kodori Gorge; this would

2.2 Early August

At 8:00 am on 1 August, a Georgian police lorry was
blown up by an improvised explosive device on the road
near Tskhinvali, injuring ve Georgian policemen. In response, Georgian snipers assaulted some of the South Ossetian border checkpoints, killing four Ossetians and injuring seven.[105]
Ossetian separatists began intensively shelling Georgian villages on 1 August, with a sporadic response
from Georgian peacekeepers and other troops in the
region.[106][107][108][109] During the night of 1/2 August,
grenades and mortar re were exchanged. The number of Ossetian casualties rose to six and the number of
injured to fteen, including several civilians; the Georgian casualties were six injured civilians and one injured

2.2

Early August

policeman.[105] According to the OSCE mission, the incident was the worst outbreak of violence since 2004.[110]
On 23 and again on 34 August, ring recommenced
during the night.[110] A 1992 ceasere agreement was
breached by Ossetian artillery attacks.[111]

5
Russian peacekeepers could not stop Ossetians and Georgia should implement a ceasere.[121][124] Nobody was
in the streets no cars, no people, Iakobashvili later told
journalists.[119]

All the evidence available to the country team supports

Saakashvilis statement that this ght was not Georgias
original intention. Key Georgian ocials who would
have had responsibility for an attack on South Ossetia
have been on leave, and the Georgians only began mobilizing August 7 once the attack was well underway. As
late as 2230 last night Georgian MOD and MFA ocials were still hopeful that the unilateral cease-re announced by President Saakashvili would hold. Only when
On 4 August, South Ossetian president Eduard Kokoity the South Ossetians opened up with artillery on Georgian
said that about 300 volunteers had arrived from North villages, did the oensive to take Tskhinvali begin.
Ossetia to help ght the Georgians and thousands more A condential report sent on August 8, 2008, by the
were expected from the North Caucasus.[114] On 5 Au- US Embassy in Tbilisi, leaked by WikiLeaks.[125]
gust, Georgian authorities organised a tour for journal- At around 19:00, Georgian President Saakashvili anists and diplomats to demonstrate the damage supposedly nounced a unilateral ceasere and no-response order.[126]
caused by separatists. That day, Russian Ambassador-at- The ceasere reportedly held for about three hours.[127]
Large Yuri Popov declared that his country would inter- Russia regarded the ceasere as an attempt to buy time
vene on the side of South Ossetia.[115] The destruction of
to deploy Georgian forces for an oensive.[119] The sepathe village of Nuli was ordered by South Ossetian interior ratists shelled Tamarasheni and Prisi after Saakashvilis
minister Mindzaev.[116] About 50 Russian journalists had
ceasere. They destroyed Avnevi and a police station
arrived in Tskhnivali. They were waiting for something in Kurta, the seat of the Provisional Administrative Ento happen.[83] A pro-government Russian newspaper retity of South Ossetia. The escalated attacks forced civilported on 6 August: "Don Cossacks prepare to ght in ians to ee the Georgian villages.[128][129] A senior oSouth Ossetia.[117][118]
cial from the Georgian Ministry of Defence said late on
Mortar and artillery exchange between the South Osse- August 7 that his country was going to restore constitian and Georgian forces erupted in the afternoon of 6 tutional order in response to the shelling.[130] Georgian
August along almost the entire line of contact, which Interior Ministry ocial later told Russian newspaper
lasted until the dawn of 7 August. Exchanges resumed Kommersant (on 8 August) that after Ossetians had refollowing a brief gap in the morning.[110][116] At 14:00 sponded to the ceasere by shelling, it became clear
on 7 August, two Georgian peacekeepers were killed in that South Ossetians wouldn't stop ring and the GeorAvnevi as a result of Ossetian shelling.[119][120] At about gian casualties were 10 killed and 50 wounded.[131] Ac14:30, Georgian tanks, 122 mm howitzers and 203 mm cording to Pavel Felgenhauer, the Ossetians intentionself-propelled artillery began heading towards South Os- ally provoked the Georgians, so Russia would use the
setia to dissuade separatists from additional attacks.[121] Georgian response as a pretext for premeditated military
During the afternoon, OSCE monitors recorded Geor- invasion.[132]
gian military trac, including artillery, on roads near According to Georgian intelligence,[133] and several
Gori.[119] In the afternoon, Georgian personnel left the Russian media reports, parts of the regular (nonJoint Peacekeeping Force headquarters in Tskhinvali.[122] peacekeeping) Russian Army had already moved to
The Russian deputy defence minister, Nikolay Pankov,
had a secret meeting with the separatist authorities in
Tskhinvali on 3 August.[112] An evacuation of Ossetian
women and children to Russia began on the same day.[83]
According to researcher Andrey Illarionov, the South Ossetian separatists evacuated more than 20,000 civilians,
which represented more than 90 percent of the civilian
population of the future combat zone.[113]

At 16:00, Temur Iakobashvili (the Georgian Minister

for Reintegration) arrived in Tskhinvali for a previouslyarranged meeting with South Ossetians and Russian
diplomat Yuri Popov;[121] however, Russias special envoy, who blamed a at tire, did not appear;[106] and neither did the Ossetians.[122] One day earlier the South Ossetians refused to participate in bilateral talks, demanding
a session of the Joint Control Commission for Georgian
Ossetian Conict Resolution.[123] Tbilisi had withdrawn
from the Commission in March, demanding that body include the European Union, the OSCE and the Provisional
Administrative Entity of South Ossetia.[83] Iakobashvili
met with General Marat Kulakhmetov (the Russian commander of the Joint Peacekeeping Force) who said that

South Ossetian territory through the Roki Tunnel before the Georgian military operation.[134] Even the statecontrolled Russian TV showed Abkhazias de facto president Sergei Bagapsh on 7 August as saying: I have spoken to the president of South Ossetia. It has more or
less stabilized now. A battalion from the North Caucasus District has entered the area.[135] Georgian president Saakashvili later told journalists that around 23:00
on 7 August, Russian tanks had begun moving into Georgia, causing the Georgians to open re with artillery
weapons.[136]

3 LARGE-SCALE CONFLICT

Large-scale conict

See also: Timeline of the Russo-Georgian War

3.1

Battle of Tskhinvali

Ossetian forces and militia near the town at 04:00 on 8

August, with Georgian tanks remotely shelling South Ossetian positions. An attempt to take the village of Kvaysa
from the west of South Ossetia by the Georgian special
forces was thwarted by a platoon of South Ossetian troops
occupying fortied positions; several Georgian soldiers
were wounded.[137] By the morning, the South Ossetian
authorities had reported that the Georgian shelling had
killed at least 15 civilians.[138]

Main article: Battle of Tskhinvali

Georgian artillery units launched smoke bombs into Georgian forces (among them special forces of the Ministry of Internal Aairs) entered Tskhinvali after taking
the heights near the town.[127] The centre of the town was
reached by 1,500 men of the Georgian ground forces by
10:00.[119] The Russian air force began bombing targets
inside South Ossetia and Georgia proper after 10:00 on
8 August.[139] According to Russia, it suered its rst
casualties at around 12:00 when two servicemen were
killed and ve wounded following an attempt by the Georgian troops to storm the northern peacekeeping base in
Tskhinvali.[140] Georgia has stated that it only targeted
Russian peacekeepers in self-defence, after coming under re from them.[141] Most of Tskhinvali and several
villages had been secured by Georgian forces by the
afternoon;[127] however, they failed to achieve their objective of blocking the Gupta bridge and the main roads
Russian BMP-2 from the 58th Army in South Ossetia
(linking Tshkinvali with the Roki Tunnel and the Russian military base in Java).[142] One Georgian diplomat
told Kommersant on the same day that by taking control
of Tskhinvali, Tbilisi wanted to demonstrate that Georgia
wouldn't tolerate killing of Georgian citizens.[131]

Destroyed Georgian tank in Tskhinvali

South Ossetia at 23:35 on 7 August. This was followed

by a 15-minute intermission (which purportedly enabled
the civilians to escape) before the Georgian forces began
bombarding enemy targets.[127]

By 15:00 MSK, an emergency meeting of Security Council of Russia had been convened by Russian president Dmitry Medvedev and Russias options regarding
the conict in South Ossetia had been discussed.[143]
Russia accused Georgia of aggression against South
Ossetia.[30] Russia stated it was defending both peacekeepers and South Ossetian civilians (who were Russian
citizens).[31] While Russia claimed that it had to conduct
peacekeeping operations according to the international
mandates, in reality such agreements had only arranged
the ceasere observer status; according to political scientist Roy Allison, Russia could evacuate its peacekeepers
if attacked.[31] At around 16:00 MSK, it became known
that two tank columns of the 58th Army passed the Roki
Tunnel and Java and were on the road to Tskhinvali.
The column had begun moving towards South Ossetia at
the same time as President Medvedev was giving a televised speech. According to Kommersant, at around 17:00
MSK, Russian tank columns surrounded Tskhinvali and
began bombing the Georgian positions.[131] The Russian
Air Force mounted attacks on Georgian infantry and artillery on 8 August, but suspended sorties for two days
after taking early losses from anti-aircraft re.[144] Georgian troops left the centre of the town in the evening.[142]

Early in the morning on 8 August the Georgian 4th

Brigade from Vaziani Military Base advanced on the left
ank of Tskhinvali; the 3rd Brigade advanced on the right
ank. The aim of the ank operations was to advance
northward after capturing key positions. The Georgian
troops would take the Gupta bridge and the road to the
Roki Tunnel, barring the Russian troops from moving
southward.[127]
In the afternoon of 9 August, Georgian attempt to push
was repulsed with Georgian losses and
Georgian forces started moving towards Tskhinvali fol- into Tskhinvali[142]
According to the Georgian Defence
they
withdrew.
lowing several hours of bombardment and engaged South

3.2

Bombing and occupation of Gori

Minister, the Georgian military had tried to push into road near Gori.[157]
Tskhinvali three times by 9 August. During the last attempt they were met with a heavy counterattack, which
Georgian ocers described as something like hell.[119]
On the same day a Russian advance column, led by
Lieutenant-General Anatoly Khrulyov, was ambushed by
Georgian special forces near Tskhinvali; Khrulyov was
wounded in the leg.[145] The number of Russian forces
deployed in South Ossetia exceeded the number of Georgians by 9 August.[83]
A unilateral ceasere was announced on 10 August by
the Georgian government. An intention to pull out Georgian troops from South Ossetia was stated by the Georgian government. However, Russia did not embrace
this ceasere oer.[146] The duration of the military engagement was three days and nights in the Tskhinvali
region.[147] After the ceasere agreement was negotiated
by French president Nicolas Sarkozy on 12 August, military action was to cease at 15:00 on 12 August, however
Russian forces didn't stop to advance.[148]

3.2

Bombing and occupation of Gori

Main article: Occupation of Gori

Gori is an important city in central Georgia,[149]

Nearly-intact Russian missile booster in the bedroom of a Gori

house

Russian planes bombed Gori on 12 August,[156] killing a

seven people and wounding over thirty.[158] Dutch television journalist Stan Storimans was among those killed and
another foreign correspondent was injured.[156] Georgian
ocials said that the Russians targeted the citys administrative buildings. The air raids set the post oce and
the Gori University on re.[156] The Gori Military Hospital was struck by a missile, in spite of the fact that it was
lo- ying a Red Cross ag,[159] killing one doctor.[160]

Russian forces occupied Gori on 13 August.[161] A Russian military spokesman said that military hardware and
ammunition was being conscated from an abandoned
arms depot near the city.[162] On 14 August, Major General Vyacheslav Borisov (the commander of the Russian occupying troops) told Aleksandre Lomaia, secretary of Georgias National Security Council, that the Russian presence did not upset the locals of Gori.[163] That
day, Borisov stated that the Georgian police and Russian troops were jointly in charge of Gori. He also
said that Russian troops would begin leaving Gori in two
days.[164] Joint patrol eorts by the Russian Army and
Georgian police in Gori soon broke down.[161] The next
Apartment building in Gori, damaged during the war
day, Russian forces pushed to about 40 kilometres (25
mi) from Tbilisi and stopped in Igoeti at the same time
cated about 25 km (16 mi) from Tskhinvali.[150] On 9 as Condoleezza Rice was received by Georgian president
August, a Russian air attack targeted military garrisons Saakashvili.[165]
in Gori, damaging the base, several apartment build- Russian forces turned back some humanitarian aid misings and a school. Russia denied intentionally attacking sions trying to help civilians, with only the United Nations
civilians.[151] The Georgian government reported that the (UN) managing to bring limited food provisions to the
air raid had killed 60 civilians.[152] At least ve Georgian city. The situation in Gori was assessed as desperate
cities had been bombed by 9 August.[153]
by the UN.[166] Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported
After Georgian troops had left Tskhinvali on 10 August,
the Russians indiscriminately bombed the civilian areas
in Gori on 11 August.[154] The Georgian forces withdrew from Gori on 11 August. A Georgian ocial said
that the troops were ordered to secure Tbilisi, the capital
of Georgia.[155] By late 11 August, most remaining inhabitants and Georgian troops had abandoned Gori.[156]
Georgian president Saakashvili stated that Russians had
split Georgia into two by occupying an important cross-

that its researchers interviewed Georgians from Gori and

the surrounding villages; those Georgians reported South
Ossetian militias assaulting their automobiles and kidnapping civilians trying to escape attacks on their homes after
the Russian advance. HRW was told by villagers in the region by telephone that they observed looting and arson by
South Ossetian militias; however, after nding out about
assaults on those who did escape, the Georgians did not
dare to leave.[166]

3 LARGE-SCALE CONFLICT

The occupation lasted until 22 August, when Rus- tending to expand assault to Georgia proper.[157] Russian
sian troops left and Georgian police re-entered the forces reached the town of Senaki that day and captured
city.[167] Georgias main east-west highway was eec- a military base there.[149]
tively reopened.[168]

3.3

Abkhaz front

3.4 Occupation of Poti

Main articles: Battle o the coast of Abkhazia and Battle

of the Kodori Valley
Main article: Occupation of Poti
A naval confrontation took place between Russian and
Poti is the crucial port of Georgia on the Black Sea and
serves as an essential entry point for Transcaucasia and
the landlocked nations of Central Asia.[179] Russian aircraft bombed the town of Poti on 8 August, causing the
port to be closed for two days.[179] Russia positioned ships
in the vicinity of Poti and other Georgian ports on 10
August 2008.[173] The next day, Georgian and Russian
representatives said that Russian troops had entered Poti
(although Russia claimed it had only sent a task force for
surveying the area).[180] On 13 August, six Georgian naval
vessels were sunk by Russian troops in Poti.[181] Russian
deputy chief of the General sta, Anatoliy Nogovitsyn,
denied the Russian presence in the port the following
day.[182] On 19 August, Russian forces took twenty-one
Russian guided-missile ship 12341 Mirazh (Mirage) in Georgian soldiers prisoner and grabbed ve US Humvees
in Poti, taking them to a military base occupied by RusSevastopol
sian troops in Senaki.[183] The Wall Street Journal said that
Georgian ships on 10 August.[169] According to the Russian actions in Poti constituted an additional attack on
[179]
Russian Ministry of Defence, the Russian navy sank Georgian economy.
one Georgian vessel after four Georgian missile boats
had attacked the Russian Navy ships o the coast of
Abkhazia.[170] The Russian patrol ship Mirazh was probably responsible for the sinking.[171] The Georgian coast
3.5 Bombing of Tbilisi
was blockaded by vessels of the Russian Black Sea Fleet
on 10 August.[172][173] The Black Sea Fleet, which participated in the military conict for the rst time since 1945, During the ghting in South Ossetia, the Russian Air
had probably departed from Sevastopol before full-scale Force repeatedly attacked Tbilisi and its surrounding
areas.[184] On 8 August, the Georgian Interior Ministry
hostilities between Russia and Georgia began.[174]
reported that two bombs were dropped on Vaziani MiliAbkhaz forces opened a second front by attacking the tary Base near the city.[185] A Georgian military airstrip in
Kodori Gorge, held by Georgia.[175] Abkhaz artillery and Marneuli was bombed, killing three people.[186] Georgian
aircraft began a bombardment against Georgian forces ocials said on 9 August that Russian air attacks had tarin the upper Kodori Gorge on 9 August.[176] Three days geted the BakuTbilisiCeyhan pipeline, but missed.[153]
later, a military oensive against the Kodori Gorge was Correspondents for Reuters in Tbilisi reported hearing
ocially initiated by Abkhaz separatists.[173] Abkhaz de- three loud bangs in the early-morning hours of 10 Aufence ocial said that Georgian forces were pushed out of gust and a Georgian Interior Ministry senior representathe Kodori Gorge by the operation. Although he claimed tive said that three bombs were dropped on Tbilisi Interthat Russians did not participate in the battle, Russian national Airport by Russian jets.[187] Construction plant
military trac headed for the gorge was witnessed by an near the airport was also bombed by Russia that day.[188]
AP reporter.[177] Casualties were light on both sides; Abk- A civilian radar station in Tbilisi was bombed the followhaz ghters accidentally killed one of their comrades,[19] ing day.[154] Although an end to hostilities was announced
and two Georgian soldiers were also killed.[178] About on 12 August, Russian air attacks in Georgia continued
2,000 people living in the Kodori Gorge ed.[2]
through the day.[189] The Wall Street Journal reported on
Russian forces advanced into western Georgia from Abk- 14 August that reporter had witnessed 45 craters near oil
hazia on 11 August.[155] This marked the opening of a and gas pipelines bringing fuel to the West (intersecnew front. Russian troops captured the police stations in tion of BakuTbilisiCeyhan pipeline and BakuSupsa
Zugdidi despite earlier Russian ocial claims of not in- Pipeline south of Tbilisi).[190]

3.6

Media and cyber war

Main articles: Information war during the RussoGeorgian War and Cyberattacks during the RussoGeorgian War

enforcement" operation in Georgia. The operation has

achieved its goal, security for peacekeepers and civilians
has been restored. The aggressor was punished, suering huge losses.[199] Later that day he met French President Nicolas Sarkozy (the President-in-Oce of the European Union) and approved a six-point plan.[200] The
plan originally had four points, but Russia insisted on
an additional two. Georgia requested that the additions
be parenthesised; Russia objected and Sarkozy prevailed
upon Saakashvili to sign the agreement.[201] According to
Sarkozy and Saakashvili, a sixth point in the Sarkozy plan
was removed with Medvedevs consent.[202] On 14 August, South Ossetian President Eduard Kokoity and Abkhaz President Sergei Bagapsh also signed the plan.[203]
The following day Condoleezza Rice travelled to Tbilisi,
where Saakashvili signed the plan in her presence.[204] On
16 August, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed
the plan.[205]

The war was accompanied by a media battle between

Russia and Georgia.[191] The Russian military brought
Russian journalists to the combat zone to report news discrediting Georgia and portraying Russia as the saviour
of Russian citizens in the conict zone. Russia also
aired television footage supporting its actions which had
a strong eect on the local populations of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In a rst for Russia, a Russian Armed
Forces spokesman was provided by the Russian authorities to give television interviews about the war. Despite these tactics and domestic success, the Russian information campaign against Georgia was not successful
internationally.[192] In response to the information war, The plan embodied the following principles (rejected adthe Georgian government halted the broadcasting of Rus- ditions are parenthesised):[201]
sian television channels in Georgia and blocked access
to Russian websites.[193] The information skirmishes between Georgia and Russia continued after armed hostili1. No recourse to the use of force
ties had ended.[191] According to political scientist Svante
2. Denitive cessation of hostilities
Cornell, the Kremlin spent millions in an international information campaign to blame Georgia for the war; how3. Free access to humanitarian aid (and to
ever there is abundant evidence, including some in Rusallow the return of refugees)
[194]
sian media, that Russia actually started the war.
During the war, hackers attacked Georgian government
and news websites and disabled host servers.[195] Some
Russian news websites were also attacked.[196][197] Some
experts noted this as the rst time in history that a notable
cyberattack and an actual military engagement happened
at the same time.[198]

Ceasere agreement

4. Georgian military forces must withdraw

to their normal bases of encampment
5. Russian military forces must withdraw to
the lines prior to the start of hostilities.
While awaiting an international mechanism, Russian peacekeeping forces will
implement additional security measures
(six months)
6. Opening of international discussions on
the modalities of lasting security in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (based on the decisions of the U.N. and the OSCE)
After the ceasere was signed, hostilities did not immediately end.[148] Noting that civilians were eeing before advancing Russian tanks, soldiers and irregulars, a reporter
for The Guardian wrote on 13 August that the idea there
is a ceasere is ridiculous.[206]

On 8 September, Sarkozy and Medvedev signed a new

agreement on a Russian withdrawal from Georgia. After
meeting with the French president, Medvedev said the
Joint press conference by Russian president Dmitry Medvedev withdrawal depended on guarantees that Georgia would
[207]
his troops would pull out from the
and French President Nicolas Sarkozy after negotiations on the not use force;
zones adjacent to South Ossetia and Abkhazia to the
plan
line preceding the start of hostilities. However, a withOn 12 August, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev an- drawal of troops from South Ossetia or Abkhazia was not
nounced that he had ordered the cessation of the "peace announced.[208]

10

5 AFTERMATH

Aftermath

tial to prevent Georgia from regaining control.[4] Georgia

considers Abkhazia and South Ossetia Russian-occupied
[217]
territories.
In November 2011, the European ParliaSee also: Occupied territories of Georgia and Geneva
ment
passed
a
resolution
recognising Abkhazia and South
International Discussions
Ossetia as occupied Georgian territories.[218]

5.1

Russian withdrawal

The breakaway republics of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh within the Caucasus region (after August 2008)
k

Malgobek Chechenia

Groznyy
Shali

Beslan
Alagir
Vladikavkaz

uri

North Ossetia

Kutaisi Chiatura
Samtredia
Zestaponi
Supsa
Borjomi

Kobuleti

Ajaria

Batumi

Vale

Khasuri

Gori
Kura

GEORGIA

Country border
Autonomous entity border

Road
Railway

TBILISI

kilometers

100

miles

60

be
d

an

De

YEREVAN

Ararat

Maku

ica

a
Tovuz

Ganca

Dilijan

Hrazdan

Dogubayaz

Ayr
Kur

Main article: International recognition of Abkhazia and

South Ossetia

Xacmaz

Saki

Mingacevir

Goycay

Yevlaxi

Lake
Sevan

Barda

Sotk

Jermuk
Arp
a

NagornoKarabakh

Sumkayit

AZERBAIJAN
Kur

Agdam

!(

Ali Bairamli

Ara

Stepanakert

Artyom

BAKU

Qazimammad

Salyan

!(

!(

Vor Goris
otan

Territory controlled by the Republic of Abkhazia

Territory controlled by the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh

Vanadzor

Yejmiadzin

Sam
ur

Zaqatala

Tsnori

Quba

ARMENIA
Aras

Gurjaani

Iori
Rustavi

Ara

Territory controlled by the Republic of South Ossetia

Gyumri

Derbent

zani

at

Airport

6000 m
4000 m
3000 m
2000 m
1000 m
100 m
0m

sa

Capital of autonomous entity

Stepanavan

Caspian Sea

Dagestan

Pir

Town
Capital

Kura Nehr

Akhury

TURKEY

Rize

Teavi

Khrami
Bolnisi

Ardahan

Trabzon

Kaspiysk
Izberash

Ala

Akhaltsikhe

Hopa

Makhachkala

Buynaksk

Tskhinvali
Aragvi

Senaki

Rioni

Poti

South
Ossetia

Eng

Zugdidi

Gudermes
Khasavyurt

Nazran

Sulak

Ochamchire

Black Sea

5.2 Recognition of Abkhazia and South

Ossetia by Russia

Terek

KabardinoBalkaria

ia
shet

ori
Kod
Tqvarcheli

Prokhladnyy
Baksan
Nalchik

Malka

Ingu

Abkh
azia

Gudauta
Sukhumi

Kizlyar

Kub
an

Teberda

rta

ba

KarachayCherkessia

Ta

Gagra

Stavropol Kray

Pyatigorsk

Argun

Sochi

Mineralnyye
Vody

Cherkessk

Ust Dzhegutinskaya

La

Zele
nchu

Bela

ya

Krasnodar
Kray

Psebay

Adygea

Nakhchivan

Jolfa

!(
!( ")
#
0!( !(
!(

2 !(
(!%

Kapan

!(

!( !(!(
!(
(!!(

IRAN

!( $
1
(! !(

Masalli
Lankaran

!( !(
!(
2
%
!(

!(
#
0
!(

1
$

Territories controlled by Abkhazia, South Ossetia and NagornoKarabakh after August 2008

On 17 August, Medvedev announced that Russian forces

would begin to pull out of Georgia the following day.[209]
The two countries exchanged prisoners of war on 19 August. A Georgian ocial said that although his country
exchanged ve Russian servicemen for fteen Georgians
(including two civilians), Georgia suspected that Russia
still held two more Georgians.[210] On 22 August, Russian forces withdrew from Igoeti and the Georgian police
proceeded towards Gori.[211] Russia claimed that its military withdrawal was completed; however, Russian checkpoints remained near Gori and two Russian lookout stations remained near Poti.[212] On 13 September, Russian
troops began withdrawing from western Georgia and by
11:00 Moscow Time, the posts near Poti were abandoned.
Withdrawals from Senaki and Khobi also took place.[213]
Russian forces withdrew from the buer zones adjacent
to Abkhazia and South Ossetia on 8 October and authority over them was transferred to the European Union
monitoring mission in Georgia.[214]

!(

)"!(
!(
(!")

!(
!(
!(
!(
!(
")!(

Russian Military Bases

in Abkhazia as of 2016.
G E O
R G I
A

!(
!(
!(
!( !
"/

!(

(!
"/
"/

0
#

!(
"/

"/

"/

!( $
1
!(
!(

!(

Russian
Tskhinvali Region as of 2015.

military

bases

in

On 25 August 2008, the Russian parliament unanimously

voted in favour of a motion urging President Medvedev
to recognise Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states.[219] On 26 August, Medvedev signed decrees
recognising the two states,[220] saying that recognising the
independence of the two entities represents the only possibility to save human lives.[3]

Russia continued to maintain a single checkpoint in the

border village of Perevi. On 12 December, Russian
forces withdrew; eight hours later they re-entered the village and Georgian police withdrew after the Russians
threatened to re.[215] Russian forces then set up three
checkpoints in the village. On 18 October 2010 all Russian troops in Perevi withdrew to South Ossetia and a
Georgian Army unit moved in.[216]

The recognition by Russia was condemned by the United

States, France, the secretary-general of the Council of
Europe, the president of the Parliamentary Assembly of
the Council of Europe, the OSCE chairman, NATO and
the G7 on the grounds that it violated Georgias territorial integrity, United Nations Security Council resolutions
and the ceasere agreement.[221][222][223][224][225] In response to Russias action, the Georgian government severed diplomatic relations with Russia.[226]

On 9 September 2008, Russia announced that its troops in

South Ossetia and Abkhazia would remain under bilateral
agreements with their respective de facto governments.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that a military presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia was essen-

Russia sought support for its recognition from the

Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. However, because
of concerns about separatist regions in SCO states
(especially China), the organisation did not support
recognition.[227]

11

5.3

International monitors

The mandate of the OSCE mission in Georgia expired on

1 January 2009, after Russia vetoed its extension. OSCE
monitors had been denied access to South Ossetia since
the war.[228] The mandate of the UNOMIG expired on
16 June 2009; its extension was also vetoed by Russia,
which argued that the mandate did not properly reect
Russias position of recognising Abkhazia as an independent state. According to UN mission head Johan Verbeke, about 60,000 ethnic Georgians in Abkhazia became
vulnerable after the missions end.[229]

they may be, is an unquestionable priority for our country. The presence of Russian citizens in foreign countries would form a doctrinal foundation for invasion if
needed. Medvedevs statement that there were areas in
which Russia had privileged interests, underlined Russias particular interest in the former Soviet Union and the
fact that Russia would feel endangered by subversion of
local pro-Russian regimes.[235]

The war eliminated Georgias prospects for joining

NATO.[60][236] Russian President Dmitry Medvedev
stated in November 2011 that NATO would have admitted former Soviet republics if Russia had not invaded
As of 5 January 2015, 259 European Union Monitoring Georgia. If you ... had faltered back in 2008, the geopoMission (EUMM) monitors operate in Georgia and 2 in litical situation would be dierent now, Medvedev deBrussels.[230] Russia does not allow EUMM monitors into clared at a Vladikavkaz military base.[237]
Abkhazia and South Ossetia.[231]

5.4

6 Humanitarian impact and war

crimes

Geopolitical impact

Baku-Novorossiysk
oil pipeline

ME

RK

TU

Baku-Supsa
oil pipeline

AN
ST

NI

Nabucco gas pipeline

to Central Europe
(planned)
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
oil pipeline
Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum
gas pipeline

Main articles: Humanitarian impact of the RussoGeorgian War and Humanitarian response to the RussoGeorgian War
See also: Ethnic cleansing of Georgians in South Ossetia
Human Rights Watch (HRW) states that all parties to the

Trans-Caspian gas pipeline

(proposed)

BTC pipeline (green) and planned Nabucco gas pipeline (tangerine)

The 2008 war was the rst time since the fall of the Soviet
Union that the Russian military had been used against an
independent state, demonstrating Russias willingness to
wage a full-scale military campaign to attain its political
objectives.[232] The failure of the Western security system to respond swiftly to Russias attempt to forcibly re- South Ossetian refugees in a camp in Alagir, North Ossetia
vise the borders of an OSCE member country revealed
its weaknesses. The division between Western European and Eastern European nations also became apparent
over the relations with Russia. Ukraine and other postSoviet states received a clear message from the Russian
leadership that the possible accession to NATO would
cause a foreign invasion and the break-up of the country.
Eective annexation of Abkhazia was also one of Russias geopolitical goals.[233] The construction of the EUsponsored Nabucco pipeline (connecting Central Asian
reserves to Europe) in Transcaucasia was averted.[234]
The war in Georgia showed Russias assertiveness in
revising international relations and undermining the
hegemony of the United States. Shortly after the war, A burning house in the Georgian village of Kekhvi, on the road
Russian president Medvedev unveiled a ve-point Rus- from Tskhinvali to Java.
sian foreign policy. The Medvedev Doctrine stated that
protecting the lives and dignity of our citizens, wherever war seriously violated international laws governing war,

12
causing many civilian casualties.[238] The South Ossetian
parliament and several schools and nurseries were used as
military positions or posts by South Ossetian troops and
volunteer militias and targeted by Georgian artillery re.
Georgia stated that its attacks only intended to neutralize ring positions from where Georgian positions were
being targeted. HRW documented witness accounts
that civilian objects were used by South Ossetian ghters (making them permissible military aims), concluding
that South Ossetian ghters put civilians at risk by setting
up military positions near or in civilian structures. Georgia was responsible for indiscriminate attacks, with little
concern for minimising civilian risk.[239]
Russia deliberately attacked eeing civilians in South
Ossetia and the Gori district of Georgia.[240] Russian
warplanes bombed civilian population centres in Georgia proper and villages of ethnic Georgians in South
Ossetia.[240] Armed militias engaged in looting, arson
attacks and abductions, forcing Georgian civilians to
ee.[240] HRW said the conict was a civilian disaster
and called for international organisations to send factnding missions to the area of conict. It also asked for
the authorities to hold people responsible for any crimes
accountable.[240]
The use of M85S cluster bombs by the Georgians and
RBK 250 cluster bombs by the Russians resulted in civilian casualties. Georgia was reported to have used cluster
munitions twice to hit civilians eeing via the main escape road and admitted using cluster bombs against Russian troops and near the Roki Tunnel.[241] Russia denied
using cluster bombs.[242]

Tserovani, one of the villages built by the Georgian government

for IDPs from the conict zone

ber 2008, the gures were revised down to a total of 162

South Ossetian casualties by the Investigative Committee
of the Prosecutors Oce of the Russian Federation.[248]
Georgia and South Ossetia have led complaints about
alleged war crimes committed by the other side with international courts, including the International Criminal
Court,[249] the International Court of Justice,[250] and the
European Court of Human Rights.[251]
The war displaced a 192,000 people including both Ossetians and Georgians.[26] Many were able to return to their
homes after the war, but a year later around 30,000 ethnic Georgians remained displaced.[252] As of May 2014,
20,272 persons remained displaced, with their return being blocked by de facto authorities.[253]

HRW reported that during the war, ethnic-Georgian villages in South Ossetia were burned and looted by South
7
Ossetian militias, preventing 20,000 displaced people
[243]
from returning after the conict.
According to the
Memorial society, the villages of Kekhvi, Kurta, Acha- 7.1
beti, Tamarasheni, Eredvi, Vanati and Avnevi were virtually fully burnt down.[244] South Ossetian president
Eduard Kokoity said in an interview that Georgian villages had been demolished and no Georgian refugees
would be allowed to return.[245] The Georgian civilians,
who resided in the Akhalgori district, willing to live in
South Ossetia were coerced into obtaining a Russian
passport.[246] The EU commission said it was likely that
during and after the war, an ethnic cleansing of Georgians
was committed in South Ossetia.[247]
Russian ocials initially claimed that up to 2,000 ethnic Ossetian civilians of Tskhinvali were killed by Georgian forces; according to Russia, the reason for the military intervention in Georgia was this large number of
casualties.[248] Public opinion among Ossetians was impacted by claims of high casualties; according to HRW,
some Ossetian civilians said in interviews that they approved of burning and looting of Georgian villages because of the thousands of civilian casualties in South
Ossetia reported by Russian television.[248] In Decem-

REACTIONS

Reactions
International reactions

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and President of Georgia

Mikheil Saakashvili at a Tbilisi press conference, August 2008

Main article: International reaction to the RussoGeorgian War

See also: Protests regarding the Russo-Georgian War

7.1

International reactions

13
elected by its people. Such an action is unacceptable in the 21st century.[257] Bush later again criticised Russia, saying Bullying and intimidation are
not acceptable ways to conduct foreign policy in the
21st century.[258] Although the Bush administration
considered a military response to defend Georgia, it
decided against it so as to not provoke a conict with
Russia. Instead, the US sent humanitarian aid to
Georgia on military aircraft.[259] The Bush administration also imposed sanctions on Russia, which
were revoked by the Obama administration in May
2010.[260]
Poland The presidents of Poland, Lithuania,
Estonia, Ukraine and the prime minister of Latvia
(Lech Kaczyski, Valdas Adamkus, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, Viktor Yushchenko and Ivars Godmanis), who met with Georgian president Mikheil
Saakashvili at Kaczyskis initiative, appeared at a
12 August 2008 Tbilisi rally held in front of the
parliament which was attended by nearly 150,000
people. The crowd responded enthusiastically to
the Polish presidents speech, chanting Poland,
Poland, Friendship, Friendship and Georgia,
Georgia.[261]

Georgian Coast Guard patrol boat P-24 Sokhumi passes the USS
McFaul on its arrival at the port of Batumi

Russian actions during the war were heavily criticised by

several Western countries.

Hungary Hungarian opposition leader Viktor Orbn drew parallels between the Russian intervention
and the crushing of the Hungarian Revolution of
1956.[262]
Ukraine Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko
said in late August 2008 that he intended to increase
the rent for the Russian naval base at Sevastopol in
the Crimean Peninsula.[263]

Sweden On 8 August 2008, Swedish Minister for

Foreign Aairs Carl Bildt said that the crisis was
due to provocations from the South Ossetian side France and Germany took an intermediate position, aband that Georgian forces were trying to restore the staining from naming a guilty party:[264]
constitutional order.[254] On 9 August, Bildt compared Russias reason for going to war with Georgia
European Union On 8 August, France (who held
to Adolf Hitler's actions, No state has the right to
the rotating presidency of the European Union) anintervene militarily in the territory of another state
nounced that the EU and the US would send a joint
simply because there are individuals there with a
delegation to negotiate a ceasere.[265]
passport issued by that state or who are nationals of
Germany German chancellor Angela Merkel exthe state. Attempts to apply such a doctrine have
pressed her concern about the humanitarian sitplunged Europe into war in the past... And we have
uation in Georgia and called for an immediate
reason to remember how Hitler used this very docceasere.[266]
trine little more than half a century ago to undermine
[255]
and attack substantial parts of central Europe.
A few leaders supported Russias position:
United Kingdom British Foreign Secretary David
Miliband said on 9 August, Russia has extended
Italy Italian Minister of Foreign Aairs Franco
the ghting today well beyond South Ossetia, atFrattini said, We cannot create an anti-Russia
tacking the Georgian port of Poti, and the town of
coalition in Europe, and on this point we are close
Gori, while Abkhaz forces have been shelling Georto Putins position. He emphasised that Vladimir
gian positions in the Upper Kodori valley. I deplore
Putin was a near partner of Italian Prime Minister
this.[256]
Silvio Berlusconi.[264]
United States US president George W. Bush
said, Russia has invaded a sovereign neighbouring state and threatens a democratic government

Belarus President of Belarus Alexander

Lukashenko said, Russia acted calmly, wisely and
beautifully.[267]

14

COMBATANTS

Georgia announced on 12 August 2008 that it would conict.[8] The primary task of capturing Tskhinvali was
leave the Commonwealth of Independent States, which accomplished by the 4th Brigade with support from the
it blamed for failing to avert the conict. Its departure 2nd and 3rd Brigades.[8] According to the EU fact-nding
became eective in August 2009.[268]
mission, 10,00011,000 soldiers took part in the war.[11]
According to academic Martin Malek, western countries
did not feel it was necessary to aggravate relations with
Russia over tiny and insignicant Georgia. He wrote in
the Caucasian Review of International Aairs that western policy makers did not want to isolate Russia because its support was necessary to solve international
problems.[117]

7.2

NATO reaction in the Black Sea

The 1st Infantry Brigade, the only one trained to NATO

standards, was serving in Iraq at the beginning of the
war;[275] on 11 August, the United States Air Force airlifted it to Georgia.[276]

8.2 Russo-South Ossetian-Abkhaz order

of battle
A sizeable portion of the Russian 58th Army, one of
the foremost military units in Russia, was included in
the Russian order of battle.[277] It exceeds the Georgian
Army in the number of troops, heavy hardware and
planes.[277] The 58th Army fought in Second Chechen
War.[278]

NATO increased its naval presence in the Black Sea

signicantly following the Russian invasion, with ships
docking in Georgian ports,[269] and (according to the
US Navy) delivering humanitarian aid.[270] NATO said
that its presence in the Black Sea was not related to
the Georgian crisis; its vessels were conducting typical
visits and preplanned naval exercises with Romania and
8.3 Military analysis
Bulgaria.[271] Russian General Anatoliy Nogovitsyn reminded NATO of the limit on the number of vessels al8.3.1 Georgia
lowed in the Black Sea under the 1936 Montreux conven[272]
tion.
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev questioned
the claim that ships going to Georgia were bringing only
humanitarian assistance, alleging the delivery of military
material.[273] According to political analyst Vladimir Socor, the US maintained a continual presence in the Black
Sea. The ships were rotated from time to time in the
Black Sea because of the constraints on ships weight and
length of visits set by the Montreux Convention.[274]

Combatants

See also: Military of Georgia, Military of Russia,

Buk-M1 air defence system
Military of South Ossetia, and Military of Abkhazia

8.1

Georgian order of battle

According to the Moscow Defence Brief, an Englishlanguage magazine published by the Russian nongovernmental organisation the Centre for Analysis of
Strategies and Technologies, the Georgian troops included the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Infantry Brigades, the Artillery Brigade, part of the 1st Infantry Brigade and
the separate Gori Tank Battalion. Additionally, special
forces and Ministry of Internal Aairs troops were deployed. The total number of troops was 16,000 according to the magazine.[7] According to the International
Institute for Strategic Studies, ten light infantry battalions of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th infantry brigades, special
forces and an artillery brigade, totalling approximately
12,000 troops, had been concentrated by the start of the

United States ocials said that one of the few eective elements of the [Georgia]'s military was air defence,
with the analysts crediting the SA-11 Buk-1M with shooting down a Tupolev-22M bomber and contributing to
the loss of some Su-25s.[283] This view was supported
by independent Russian analysis.[144] Colonel-General
Anatoliy Nogovitsyn, Russian deputy chief of general
sta, said the Soviet-made Tor and Buk anti-aircraft
missile systems, bought by Georgia from Ukraine, were
responsible for downing Russian aircraft during the
war.[284] A Russian assessment, reported by Roger McDermott, said that Russian losses would have been signicantly higher if the Georgians had not left behind
a portion of their Buk-M1 systems near Senaki (in
western Georgia) and several Osa missile launchers in
South Ossetia.[285] According to some reports, Georgia
also possessed a battery of the Israeli-made SPYDERSR short-range self-propelled anti-aircraft system.[286]

8.3

Military analysis

15

The Georgian air-defence early-warning and commandcontrol tactical system was connected via Turkey to a
NATO Air Situation Data Exchange (ASDE), which provided Georgia with intelligence during the conict.[286]

reconnaissance systems, once using a Tupolev Tu-22M3

bomber instead.[290] However, Russian reconnaissance
battalions and regiments were also deployed during the
war.[291] General Anatoly Nogovitsyn, deputy chief of the
said that during the war, new weapons were
Georgia has said that its key vulnerabilities were inef- General sta,[292]
not
tried
out.
fective communication during action and its weaker air
strength.[287] Konstantin Makienko of CAST saw sub- The RIA Novosti editorial also said that Russian
standard training of pilots as the primary reason for the Su-25 ground-attack jets did not have radar sights
poor performance of Georgian air sorties.[144] According and ground-target coordinate computing. They also
to Georgian rst deputy defence minister Batu Kutelia, did not have long-range surface-to-air missiles that
Georgia needed a complex, multi-layered air-defence sys- could be launched beyond the air-defence zones of an
tem to protect its airspace.[287] However, Western mili- adversary.[290] Opposition-aliated Russian analyst Kontary ocers experienced with Georgian military forces stantin Makienko observed the poor performance of the
suggested that Georgias military shortcomings were too Russian Air Force: It is totally unbelievable that the Rusgreat to be eliminated by new equipment acquisitions.[287] sian Air Force was unable to establish air superiority alAccording to a 2 September 2008 New York Times arti- most to the end of the ve-day war, despite the fact that
cle, Georgias Army ed ahead of the Russian Armys the enemy had no ghter aviation.[144]
advance, turning its back and leaving Georgian civilians According to Russian expert Anton Lavrov, on 8 August,
in an enemys path. Its planes did not y after the rst Russian and South Ossetian troops deployed in South Osfew hours of contact. Its navy was sunk in the harbor, setia were unaware that Russian aviation was involved in
and its patrol boats were hauled away by Russian trucks the war. Russian troops and South Ossetians often ason trailers.[287]
sessed Russian aircraft as hostile and red at them beAccording to a Western military ocer, Georgian logistical preparations were mediocre and there was interference between units during the action.[287] Exercises simulating combat against a probable enemy (the 58th Army)
had never been organised by the Georgian Army. During
the war, communications broke down in the mountains
and troops had to resort to mobile phones. There was insucient planning; according to Giorgi Tavdgiridze, nobody thought of how to seal the Roki Tunnel. There was
a dismal organisation of the delivery of 10,000 Georgian reservists in Gori on 9 August; they had no specic targets and went back to Tbilisi the following day.
The conict was called by journalists as the war that
was hidden from history because there was very little
video recording of military action.[5] According to their
American trainers, Georgian soldiers were unprepared
for combat despite having warrior spirit.[275] There
were few well-trained, educated ocers in high ranking
positions,[288] and Saakashvilis government had no military experience.[289]
8.3.2

Russia

The Russian Command, Control, Communications

and Intelligence (CI) performed poorly during the
conict.[285] The Russian communication systems were
outdated, with a 58th Army commander allegedly making contact with his combat troops via a journalist-owned
satellite phone.[285] Without the modern GLONASS,
precision-guided munitions could not be used; the UScontrolled GPS was unavailable, since the war zone
was blacked out.[285] Due to the negligence of Russian defence minister, the use of unmanned aerial vehicles was not authorised;[285] an RIA Novosti editorial said that Russian forces lacked reliable aerial-

fore precise identication took place.[293] On 8 August,

the air force performed 63 ights in support of Russian
ground troops.[294] A total of six Russian aircraft were
lost during the war: one Su-25SM, two Su-25BMs, two
Su-24Ms and one Tu-22M3; friendly re was the cause
of the downing of three planes.[295] Lavrov denied that
the Tu-22M was used for reconnaissance.[296]
The relationship between the North Caucasus Military
District commander and the air force and their roles in
commanding were unclear. Colonel-General Aleksandr
Zelin, commander-in-chief of the Air Force did not set
foot in the command post, instead running Air-force operations on a mobile phone from his oce without any
help from his air-defence assistants. The air force was
accused of rendering no assistance to land campaign.[285]
Swedish analysts Carolina Vendil Pallin and Fredrik
Westerlund said that although the Russian Black Sea
Fleet did not meet signicant resistance, it proved eective at implementing elaborate manoeuvres.[297] Mechanised infantry opened a second front in Abkhazia,
which contributed to the rapidity of the Russian military
victory.[285]
Heritage Foundation researchers said in their assessment
of the preparation of Russian general-sta that the operations were planned and implemented eectively, with a
strategic surprise being engineered by the Russians.[278]
A Reuters analyst described Russias army as strong
but awed"; the war demonstrated that Russias armed
forces have emerged from years of neglect as a formidable
ghting force, but revealed important deciencies. He
stated that due to these weaknesses, Russia fell short
of its image of a world-class military power.[298] Unlike
the Second Chechen War, Russias force in Georgia was
composed primarily of professional soldiers instead of

16

10 NOTES

conscripts.[299] Reuters journalists in Georgia stated that

they saw the Russian forces to be well-equipped and disciplined forces. CAST director Ruslan Pukhov said that
the victory over the Georgian army ... should become
for Russia not a cause for euphoria and excessive joy, but
serve to speed up military transformations.[298] Roger
McDermott wrote that slight dierences in criticism by
civilian media or ocial sources after the conict was an
orchestrated eort by the government to 'sell' reform to
the military and garner support among the populace.[285]
However, the Russian Armys transformation into a professional army was not deemed as successful. In September 2008, General Vladimir Boldyrev acknowledged that
many of the professional soldiers did not have better training than the conscripts. Russian Airborne Troops and
special forces conducted most of the land ghting. Due
to the Russian Air Forces inability to penetrate Georgian
air defence, airborne troops could not be airlifted behind
Georgian lines. An ambush of a ground-troop commander, in which only ve of thirty vehicles in his convoy survived, indicated intelligence and surveillance negligence.
Many Russian land units reportedly had an insucient
ammunition supply.[288]

8.4

Equipment losses and cost

After the ceasere was signed on 12 August, in Georgia proper, Russian troops attempted to seize and destroy Georgian armament, a process termed by the
Moscow Defence Brief as the demilitarization of the
Georgian Armed Forces.[7] After the war Stratfor states
that Russia has largely destroyed Georgias war-ghting
capability.[300] According to Moscow Defence Brief,
Georgia lost its air and naval forces and its air-defence
systems. The Georgian army lost large quantities of
equipment to the Russians during the conict.[7] Russian
Ground Forces ocial Igor Konashenkov said that the
Russians captured 65 Georgian tanks, over 20 of which
were destroyed because they were beyond repair or too
old.[301] Russia estimated that the Georgian Air Force
lost three Su-25 attack aircraft and two L-29 jets.[302] A
Russian air attack on Marneuli Air Force Base destroyed
three AN-2 aircraft. Russian airborne forces set re to
two Mi-24 helicopters and one Mi-14 on 11 August.[303]
Georgian Defence Minister Davit Kezerashvili said that
Georgia lost materiel worth $250 million.[5] According
to Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili, his country
saved 95 percent of its armed forces.[5] The 4th Brigade
had more casualties than any other Georgian military
unit.[8]
In 2009, Russian Army Chief of General Sta Nikolai
Makarov stated that Georgia was rearming, although the
armament was not directly provided by the United States.
According to Makarov, the Georgian Armed Forces had
exceeded their pre-war strength by 2009.[304]
Russia admitted that three of its Su-25 strike aircraft

Russian Tu-22M3

and one Tu-22M3 long-range bomber were lost,[284] in

addition to at least three tanks, 20 armoured and 20
non-armoured vehicles.[305] Moscow Defence Brief provided a higher estimate, saying that Russian Air Force
total losses during the war were one Tu-22M3 long-range
bomber, one Su-24M Fencer ghter-bomber, one Su24MR Fencer E reconnaissance plane and four Su-25 attack planes.[7] Anton Lavrov listed one Su-25SM, two Su25BM, two Su-24M and one Tu-22M3 lost.[295] According to Nezavisimaya Gazeta, the ve-day war cost Russia
an estimated 12.5 billion rubles, a daily cost of 2.5 billion
rubles.[306]

9 See also
Tom Clancys Ghost Recon (2001 video game)
Kosovo independence precedent
For Enforcing Peace
Responsibility for the Russo-Georgian War
Olympus Inferno a 2009 Russian war drama lm
and the rst feature lm on the South Ossetian conict
5 Days of War a 2011 lm depicting the war
August Eighth a 2012 Russian war drama lm depicting the war

10 Notes
[1] South Ossetia's status is disputed. It considers itself to be
an independent state, but this is recognised by only a few
other countries. The Georgian government and most of
the worlds other states consider South Ossetia de jure a
part of Georgias territory.
[2] Abkhazia's status is disputed. It considers itself to be an
independent state, but this is recognised by only a few
other countries. The Georgian government and most of

17

the worlds other states consider Abkhazia de jure a part

of Georgias territory. In Georgias ocial subdivision it
is an autonomous republic, whose government sits in exile
in Tbilisi.
[3] The war is known by a variety of other names, including
Five-Day War, August War and Russian invasion of
Georgia.

11

References

[1] Hider, James (27 August 2008).

Russian-backed
paramilitaries 'ethnically cleansing villages". The Times.
Archived from the original on 27 August 2008.

[16] Volume II 2009, p. 224.

[17] Tanks 2010, pp. 136-137.
[18] : " " (in Russian). " ". 11 April 2009.
Archived from the original on 28 July 2013.
[19] Inal Khashig (14 August 2008). Abkhaz Open 'Second
Front'". Institute for War and Peace Reporting. Archived
from the original on 14 August 2008.
[20] List of Casualties among the Georgian Military Servicemen. Ministry of Defence of Georgia. Archived from
the original on 7 June 2012.

[2] Irma Choladze (22 January 2009). Kodori Gorge

Refugees in Limbo. Institute for War and Peace Reporting. Archived from the original on 11 October 2014.

[21] BASIC FACTS: CONSEQUENCES OF RUSSIAN

AGGRESSION IN GEORGIA. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia. Archived from the original on 2 August
2014.

[3] Statement by President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev.

The Kremlin. 26 August 2008. Archived from the original on 2 September 2008.

[22] , (in Russian). Interfax. 3 July 2009.

Archived from the original on 16 May 2011.

[4] Harding, Luke; Percival, Jenny (9 September 2008).

Russian troops to stay in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
The Guardian.

[23] Deceased victims list. Ossetia-war.com. Archived from

the original on 28 May 2009.

[5] Liklikadze, Koba (26 September 2008). Lessons and

losses of Georgias ve-day war with Russia. The
Jamestown Foundation. Archived from the original on 6
September 2009.
[6] Donovan 2009, p. 11.
[7] Barabanov, Mikhail (2009). The August War between
Russia and Georgia. Moscow Defence Brief. Centre for
Analysis of Strategies and Technologies. 3 (13). Archived
from the original on 4 April 2009.
[8] Alexander Nicoll; Sarah Johnstone (September 2008).
Russias rapid reaction. International Institute for
Strategic Studies. Archived from the original on 21 October 2008.
[9] Krasnogir, Sergey (8 August 2008). (in
Russian). Lenta.Ru. Archived from the original on 9 August 2008.
[10] Luke Harding (11 August 2008). Abkhazia: Moscow
sends troops into second enclave. The Guardian.
[11] Volume II 2009, p. 214.
[12] Misha Dzhindzhikhashvili (9 August 2008). Full scale
war: Georgia ghting continues over South Ossetia. Die
Welt.

[24] 04.09.08
(in Russian). osetinfo.ru. 4 September 2008. Archived
from the original on 5 September 2008.
[25] A Summary of Russian Attack. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2
August 2014.
[26] Civilians in the line of re: The Georgia-Russia conict.
Amnesty International. 18 November 2008. Archived
from the original on 11 December 2008.
[27] UNHCR secures safe passage for Georgians fearing further ghting. UNHCR. 15 August 2008.
[28] Fawkes, Helen (20 August 2008). Despair among Georgias displaced. BBC News.
[29] Michael Emerson (August 2008). Post-Mortem on Europes First War of the 21st Century (PDF). Centre for
European Policy Studies.
[30] Peter Roudik. Russian Federation: Legal Aspects of War
in Georgia. Library of Congress.
[31] Roy Allison (2008). Russia resurgent? Moscows
campaign to 'coerce Georgia to peace'". International
Aairs. 84 (6): 11451171. doi:10.1111/j.14682346.2008.00762.x. Archived from the original (PDF)
on 6 September 2009.

[13] Human Rights Watch Appendix (PDF). Human

Rights Watch.

[32] Andrew North (14 July 2015). Georgia accuses Russia

of violating international law over South Ossetia. The
Guardian.

[14] Russia increases death toll in S. Ossetia conict to 67 soldiers. RIA Novosti. 7 August 2009.

[33] Cornell 2001, pp. 131135.

[15] Russia lost 64 troops in Georgia war, 283 wounded.

Reuters. 21 February 2009.

[34] Cornell 2001, p. 130.

[35] Julie 2009, pp. 9799.

18

[36] Julie 2009, p. 105.

[37] Souleimanov, Emil (2013). Understanding Ethnopolitical
Conict: Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia Wars Reconsidered. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 112113.
[38] Saparov 2014, p. 74.
[39] Saparov 2014, p. 82.
[40] Stephen F. Jones (10 June 2014). South Ossetias unwanted independence. openDemocracy.
[41] Saparov 2014, p. 148.
[42] Saparov 2014, p. 77.
[43] Stephen Jones (November 2008). Clash in the Caucasus:
Georgia, Russia, and the Fate of South Ossetia (PDF).
Origins: Current Events in Historical Perspective. 2 (2).
[44] Lieven, Anatol (11 August 2008). Analysis: roots of the
conict between Georgia, South Ossetia and Russia. The
Times. Archived from the original on 12 August 2008.
[45] Bloodshed in the Caucasus (PDF). Human Rights
Watch. 1992. p. 8.
[46] March 31: Georgia moves towards independence, rst
presidents birthday. Agenda.ge. 31 March 2015.
[47] International Crisis Group (7 June 2007). Georgias
South Ossetia Conict: Make Haste Slowly (PDF).
Archived from the original (PDF) on 13 June 2007.

11

REFERENCES

[61] Charles King (25 August 2004). Tbilisi Blues. Foreign

Aairs.
[62] Sergey Markedonov (16 November 2008). Regional
Conicts Reloaded. Russia in Global Aairs.
[63] Chronicle of the Georgian-Ossetian conict: Fact sheet.
RIA Novosti. 13 August 2008.
[64] Russia Warns Against Tbilisis 'S.Ossetia Administration'
Plan. Civil.Ge. 29 March 2007.
[65] The Associated Press (11 March 2008). Russias NATO
envoy says oering Georgia membership track would bolster separatists. International Herald Tribune. Archived
from the original on 17 September 2008.
[66] Marina Perevozkina (24 March 2008). (in Russian). Nezavisimaya Gazeta.
[67] Cohen 2011, p. 15.
[68] James Rodgers (28 November 2006). Georgias Nato bid
irks Russia. BBC News.
[69] Pagnamenta, Robin (8 August 2008). Analysis: energy
pipeline that supplies West threatened by war Georgia
conict. The Times. Archived from the original on 3
September 2008.
[70] Anne Gearan (9 August 2008). Georgias oil pipeline is
key to U.S. support. San Francisco Chronicle.

[48] Charles King. The Five-Day War (PDF). Georgetown

University.

[71] Steven Erlanger; Steven Lee Myers (3 April 2008).

NATO Allies Oppose Bush on Georgia and Ukraine.
The New York Times.

[49] Giorgi Sepashvili; Nino Khutsidze (5 February 2006).

S.Ossetia: Mapping Out Scenarios. Civil.Ge.

[72] What NATO Summit Declaration Says on Georgia.

Civil.Ge. 4 April 2008.

[50] Luke Harding (1 September 2008). Russias cruel intention. The Guardian.

[73] Evans, Michael (5 April 2008). Vladimir Putin tells

summit he wants security and friendship. The Times.
Archived from the original on 24 July 2008.

[51] Oleksandr Kramar (16 April 2014). Self-Determination

for the Kremlin. The Ukrainian Week.
[52] Giorgi Kupatadze (26 September 2006). GeorgianAbkhaz Tensions Rise Over Kodori Gorge. Institute for
War and Peace Reporting. Archived from the original on
20 October 2014.
[53] Cornell 2001, pp. 331332.
[54] Cornell 2001, p. 334.
[55] Van Herpen 2014, pp. 206-209.
[56] Van Herpen 2014, pp. 233-235.
[57] FACTBOX-What is Georgias rebel South Ossetia region?". Reuters. 8 August 2008.

[74] Van Herpen 2014, p. 210.

[75] Russia army vows steps if Georgia and Ukraine join
NATO. Reuters. 11 April 2008.
[76] Vladimir Socor (18 April 2008). Russia moves toward open annexation of Abkhazia, South Ossetia. The
Jamestown Foundation. Archived from the original on 15
August 2009.
[77] Russia Brushes o Western Call to Revoke Abkhaz,
S.Ossetia Move. Civil.Ge. 24 April 2008.
[78] Russia 'shot down Georgia drone'". BBC News. 21 April
2008.

[58] Volume II 2009, p. 132.

[79] Finn, Peter (1 May 2008). Russias Moves Add To

Strains With Georgia. The Washington Post.

[59] Q&A: Conict in Georgia. BBC News. 11 November

2008.

[80] UN Probe Says Russian Jet Downed Georgian Drone.

Civil.Ge. 26 May 2008.

[60] Prole: President Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia.

BBC. 27 September 2012.

[81] Georgia 'plans war in Abkhazia'". BBC News. 29 April

2008.

19

[82] Georgia-Russia tensions ramped up. BBC News. 30 [103] Russian paratroopers arrive in North Caucasus for comApril 2008.
bat drills. RIA Novosti. 16 July 2008.
[83] Svante E. Cornell; Johanna Popjanevski; Niklas Nils- [104] Svante E. Cornell; S. Frederick Starr, eds. (2009). The
son (August 2008). Russias War in Georgia: Causes
Guns of August 2008: Russias War in Georgia. M.E.
and Implications for Georgia and the World. Central
Sharpe. p. 71.
Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program.
Archived from the original (PDF) on 26 February 2014. [105] Tanks 2010, p. 44.
[84] UNOMIG Denies Military Buildup in Abkhaz Conict [106] Brian Whitmore (12 September 2008). Is The Clock
Ticking For Saakashvili?'". Radio Free Europe / Radio
Zone. Civil.Ge. 8 May 2008.
Liberty.
[85] Russia Gives Some Details on Troop Increase in Abk[107] Marc Champion; Andrew Osborn (16 August 2008).
hazia. Civil.Ge. 8 May 2008.
Smoldering Feud, Then War. The Wall Street Journal.
[86] Georgia condemns Russian actions. BBC News. 18
May 2008.
[108] Luke Harding (19 November 2008). Georgia calls on EU
for independent inquiry into war. The Guardian.
[87] General Assembly recognizes right of return of displaced
to Abkhazia, Georgia. UN News Centre. 15 May 2008. [109] Jean-Rodrigue Par (13 February 2009). The Conict
Between Russia and Georgia. Parliament of Canada.
[88] Russia says UN Abkhazian refugee resolution counterproductive. RIA Novosti. 16 May 2008.
[110] Volume II 2009, p. 208.
[89] Russia army unit sent to Abkhazia. BBC News. 31 May [111] Eka Tsamalashvili; Brian Whitmore (14 November
2008.
2008). Eyewitness Accounts Conrm Shelling Of Georgian Villages. Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty.
[90] European Parliament resolution of 5 June 2008 on the
situation in Georgia. European Parliament. 5 June 2008. [112] Van Herpen 2014, p. 214.
[91] Russia railway soldiers leave Georgian rebel region.
[113] Dunlop 2012, p. 93.
Reuters. 2 August 2008.
[114] 300
[92] RUSSIA VS GEORGIA: THE FALLOUT (PDF). In (in Russian). Lenta.ru. 4 August 2008.
ternational Crisis Group. 22 August 2008.
[115] Russia vows to defend S Ossetia. BBC News. 5 August
[93] 2008.
- . (in Russian). Gruziya
Online. 20 June 2008.
[116] Dunlop 2012, p. 95.
[94]
[117] Martin Malek (March 2009). Georgia & Russia: The
(in Russian). MIGnews. 5 July 2008.
'Unknown' Prelude to the 'Five Day War'". Caucasian Review of International Aairs. 3 (2): 227232.
[95] Volume II 2009, p. 204.
[96] Margarita Antidze (8 July 2008). Georgia plans opera- [118] Maria Bogdarenko (6 August 2008). (in
Russian). Nezavisimaya Gazeta. Archived from the origtion to free detained soldiers. Reuters.
inal on 30 May 2009.
[97] Mikheil Svanidze (11 July 2008). Russia says it sent warplanes over South Ossetia to 'prevent bloodshed'". The [119] Peter Finn (17 August 2008). A Two-Sided Descent into
Full-Scale War. The Washington Post.
Messenger.
[98] Russia admits Georgia overights. BBC News. 10 July [120]
2008.
[121]
[99] Overights question Russias Georgia role: NATO.
Reuters. 15 July 2008.

Tanks 2010, p. 46.

On the eve of war: The Sequence of events on august
7, 2008. Archived from the original (PDF) on 23 July
2009.

[100] Russia, U.S. hold war games on opposite sides of Cauca- [122] Spot Report: Update on the situation in the zone of
sus: ocials. Canada.com. Agence France-Presse. 15
the Georgian-Ossetian conict (PDF). OSCE. 7 August
July 2008.
2008. Archived from the original (PDF) on 6 March
2009.
[101] Tea Kerdzevadze (1 August 2008). International LargeScale Military Exercise 'Immediate Response 2008'". [123] S.Ossetia Rejects Talks. Civil.Ge. 6 August 2008.
Georgian Daily. Archived from the original on 13 August
[124] Van Herpen 2014, p. 222.
2008.
[102] Shanker, Thom (16 August 2008). Russians Melded [125] GEORGIA: SOUTH OSSETIA SITREP 2: GEORGIA
Old-School Blitz With Modern Military Tactics. The
CLAIMS TO CONTROL MUCH OF SOUTH OSSENew York Times.
TIA, FIGHTING CONTINUES. WikiLeaks.

20

11

REFERENCES

[126] Saakashvili Appeals for Peace in Televised Address. [148] Volume II 2009, p. 219.
Civil.Ge. 7 August 2008.
[149] Schwirtz, Michael; Barnard, Anne; Kramer, Andrew E.
[127] Volume II 2009, p. 209.
(11 August 2008). Russian Forces Capture Military Base
in Georgia. The New York Times.
[128] Vladimir Socor (8 August 2008). THE GOALS BEHIND MOSCOW'S PROXY OFFENSIVE IN SOUTH [150] Elizabeth Owen; Giorgi Lomsadze (8 August 2008).
OSSETIA. The Jamestown Foundation.
Georgia: All-Out War Looms in South Ossetia.
EurasiaNet.
[129] Alex Rodriguez; Bay Fang (9 August 2008). Georgian
conict puts U.S. in middle. Chicago Tribune.
[151] Adrian Blomeld (9 August 2008). Georgia conict:
[130] "'Georgia Decided to Restore Constitutional Order in
S.Ossetia' MoD Ocial. Civil.Ge. 8 August 2008.
Archived from the original on 6 September 2009.
[131]
[132]

[133]
[134]

[135]

Screams of the injured rise from residential streets. The

Telegraph.

[152] Russian jets attack Georgian town. BBC News. 9 August 2008.
Allenova, Olga (8 August 2008). (in Russian). Kommersant.
[153] Barnard, Anne (9 August 2008). Georgia and Russia
Nearing All-Out War. The New York Times.
Pavel Felgenhauer (14 August 2008). , (in Russian). Novaya
[154] Harding, Luke (11 August 2008). "'I got my children out
Gazeta.
minutes before the bombs fell'". The Guardian.
Chivers, C.J. (15 September 2008). Georgia Oers
[155] Damien McElroy; Adrian Blomeld; Jon Swaine (11 AuFresh Evidence on Wars Start. The New York Times.
gust 2008). Georgia: Russia ghting on several fronts as
: Georgian troops withdraw to defend Tbilisi. The Tele (in Russian).
graph.
NEWSru.com. 11 September 2008.
[156] Dutch journalist killed in Russian bombing of Gori.
Nikolaus von Twickel (17 November 2008). Moscow
International Herald Tribune. The Associated Press. 12
Claims Media War Win. The Moscow Times. Archived
August 2008. Archived from the original on 13 August
from the original on 23 May 2012.
2008.

[136] Countdown in the Caucasus: Seven days that brought [157] Christopher Torchia; David Nowak (11 August 2008).
Russia and Georgia to war. Financial Times. 26 August
Russia opens new front, drives deeper into Georgia. As2008. Archived from the original on 20 September 2008.
sociated Press. Archived from the original on 14 August
2008.
[137] Tanks 2010, pp. 5051.
[138] Heavy ghting as Georgia attacks rebel region. Agence [158] Goga Aptsiauri (12 August 2009). Victims of Last Years
Tragedy Remembered in Gori. Media.ge. Archived
France-Presse. 7 August 2008. Archived from the origifrom the original on 15 August 2009.
nal on 22 August 2008.
[139] Tanks 2010, p. 54.
[140] Volume III 2009, pp. 370-371.
[141] Volume III 2009, p. 69.
[142] Volume II 2009, p. 210.

[159] Kim Sengupta; Shaun Walker; Rupert Cornwell (17 August 2008). The new Cold War: Crisis in the Caucasus.
The Independent.
[160] Greenhill, Sam (13 August 2008). The innocent babies covered in blood after Russias blitzkrieg in Georgia.
Daily Mail.

[143] Dmitry Medvedev held an emergency meeting with per[161] Levy, Cliord J. (14 August 2008). Russia Vows to Supmanent members of the Security Counsil on the situaport Two Enclaves, in Retort to Bush. The New York
tion in South Ossetia. The Kremlin. 8 August 2008.
Times.
Archived from the original on 10 February 2015.
[144] Konstantin Makienko (15 November 2008). The Rus- [162] Russia says removing Georgian arms from town of Gori.
Reuters. 13 August 2008.
sian Air Force didn't perform well during the conict in
South Ossetia. Centre for Analysis of Strategies and
[163] Bahrampour, Tara (14 August 2008). A Convoy Heads
Technologies. Archived from the original on 27 March
for Gori to Investigate Rumors of Plunder. The Wash2009.
ington Post.
[145] (in Russian). Lenta.ru. 15 August 2008. Archived
[164] Russian Military Will Leave Gori in 2 Days. redOrbit.
from the original on 28 May 2009.
14 August 2008.
[146] Volume I 2009, p. 21.
[165] C. J. Chivers (15 August 2008). For Russian Armor,
[147] South-Ossetian stando. Results and forecasts. RIA
Even With Rice in Georgia, Cease-Fire Is Not a Red
Novosti. 20 August 2008.
Light. The New York Times.

21

[166] Russia/Georgia: Militias Attack Civilians in Gori Re- [187] Russia bombs Tbilisi airport, says ocial. Reuters. 9
gion. Human Rights Watch. 16 August 2008.
August 2008.
[167] Police Back in Gori. Civil.Ge. 23 August 2008.

[188] Tbilisi civilian airport hit in Russian air strike. Reuters.

10 August 2008.

[168] C.J. Chivers (22 August 2008). Russia Pulls the Bulk of
Its Forces Out of Georgia. The New York Times.
[189] Kramer, Andrew E.; Barry, Ellen (12 August 2008).
Russia, in Accord With Georgians, Sets Withdrawal.
[169] Russian navy sinks Georgian boat: Defence ministry.
The New York Times.
Reuters. 10 August 2008.

[170] Russia sinks Georgian boat after attack. RT. 11 August [190] Guy Chazan (14 August 2008). Raids Suggest Russia
Targeted Energy Pipelines. The Wall Street Journal.
2008.
[171] Dmitry Gorenburg (December 2008).
The Rus- [191] Matthew Collin (24 November 2008). Media war ares
over S Ossetia. Al Jazeera.
sian Black Sea Fleet After The Georgia War (PDF).
PONARS Eurasia Policy.
[192] Donovan 2009, p. 21.
[172] Ariel Cohen (11 August 2008). The Russian-Georgian
War: A Challenge for the U.S. and the World. The Her- [193] (in Russian). Interfax. 21 October 2008.
itage Foundation. Archived from the original on 28 May
2009.
[194] Svante Cornell (17 June 2009). Georgia feels Russias
heavy hand. The Guardian.
[173] Day-by-day: Georgia-Russia crisis. BBC News. 21 August 2008.
[174] Cohen 2011, pp. 11-12.

[195] Asher Moses (12 August 2008). Georgian websites

forced oine in 'cyber war'". The Sydney Morning Herald.

[175] Ilya Kachayev (9 August 2008). Abkhaz separatists

[196] RIA Novosti hit by cyber-attacks as conict with Georgia
strike disputed Georgia gorge. Reuters.
rages. RIA Novosti. 10 August 2008.
[176] Abkhazia moves to ush out Georgian troops. Associated Press. 9 August 2008. Archived from the original on [197] RT attacked. RT. 12 August 2008.
12 August 2008.
[198] Marko, John (12 August 2008). Before the Gunre,
[177] Abkhazia says Georgian troops pushed from province.
Cyberattacks. The New York Times.
International Herald Tribune. The Associated Press. 12
August 2008. Archived from the original on 13 August [199] Russias president says operation in Georgia over. RIA
2008.
Novosti. 12 August 2008.
[178] Abchasen rumen Minen und suchen versprengte geor- [200] Russia Endorses Six-Point Plan. Civil.Ge. 12 August
gische Truppen im Kodori-Tal (in German). RIA
2008.
Novosti. 14 August 2008. Archived from the original on
[201] Kramer, Andrew E. (13 August 2008). Peace Plan Oers
18 August 2008.
Russia a Rationale to Advance. The New York Times.
[179] Guy Chazan (19 August 2008). Russia Briey Seizes
The translation of the six points is by the Times.
Georgian Port. The Wall Street Journal.
[202] Georgia and Russia agree on truce. BBC News. 13 Au[180] Russia moves into Georgian territory as conict worsgust 2008.
ens. Agence France-Presse. 11 August 2008. Archived
from the original on 17 August 2008.
[203] President of Russia. The Kremlin. 14 August 2008.
Archived from the original on 5 May 2009.
[181] Russian forces sink Georgian ships. Al Jazeera. 14 August 2008. Archived from the original on 22 March 2014. [204] Kilner, James (15 August 2008). Russian convoy moves
deeper inside Georgia: witness. Reuters.
[182] Russian tanks in Georgias Poti: witnesses. Reuters. 14
August 2008.
[205] President Medvedev signed a plan to resolve the
Georgian-South Ossetia conict, based on the six prin[183] Schwirtz, Michael; Barry, Ellen (19 August 2008).
ciples previously agreed on.. The Kremlin. 16 August
Russia Sends Mixed Signs on Pullout From Georgia.
2008. Archived from the original on 29 July 2012.
The New York Times.
[184] Russian bombing kills 3 at Georgian airbase-Georgia. [206] Harding, Luke; Meikle, James (13 August 2008).
Georgian villages burned and looted as Russian tanks adReuters. 8 August 2008.
vance. The Guardian.
[185] Georgia Says Russian Jet Bombed Vaziani Base.
[207] New Agreement in Force. Civil.Ge. 8 September 2008.
Civil.Ge. 8 August 2008.
[186] MIA: Three Die in Marneuli Aireld Bombing. [208] Russians 'agree Georgia deadline'".
Civil.Ge. 8 August 2008.
September 2008.

BBC News.

22

11

REFERENCES

[209] Kunkle, Fredrick (18 August 2008). Bush, European [229] Matt Robinson (16 June 2009). Georgia angry after RusLeaders Urge Quick Withdrawal From Georgia. The
sia vetoes U.N. monitors. Reuters.
Washington Post.
[230] EUMM Mission Facts And Figures. Retrieved 7 Jan[210] Margarita Antidze; Matt Robinson (19 August 2008).
uary 2015.
Russian, Georgian forces exchange prisoners. Reuters.
[231] Luke Coey (1 June 2012). Georgia and Russia: The
[211] Halpin, Tony (23 August 2008). Russian troops in partial
occupation too many have forgotten. thecommentator.
pullout keeping checkpoints within Georgia. The Times.
Archived from the original on 27 August 2008.
[232] Kaarel Kaas (2009). The Russian Bear on the Warpath
Against Georgia. International Centre for Defense Stud[212] Schwirtz, Michael (23 August 2008). Georgia Prepares
ies.
for Refugees; Russians Declare Pullback Finished. The
New York Times.
[233] Cohen 2011, pp. vii-viii.
[213] (in Russian). Interfax. 13 September 2008. [234] Mohammad Sajjadur Rahman. Georgia and Russia:
What Caused the August War?" (PDF). Identity, Culture
[214] Russia hands over control of Georgian buer zones to
& Politics: An Afro-Asian Dialogue. 10 (1): 132146.
EU. RIA Novosti. 9 October 2008.
[215] MIA: Russias Moves in Perevi Aim at 'Renewal of Military Confrontation'". Civil.Ge. 13 December 2008.

[235] George Friedman (2 September 2008). The Medvedev

Doctrine and American Strategy. Stratfor Global Intelligence.

[216] Russian troops withdraw from Georgian town. BBC

[236] Henrik Larsen (March 2012). The Russo-Georgian
News. 19 October 2010.
war and beyond: towards a European great power
concert.
European Security.
21 (1): 102121.
[217] Abkhazia, S.Ossetia Formally Declared Occupied Terridoi:10.1080/09662839.2012.656595.
tory. Civil.Ge. 28 August 2008.
[218] European Parliament resolution of 17 November 2011 [237] Denis Dyomkin (21 November 2011). Russia says Georcontaining the European Parliaments recommendations
gia war stopped NATO expansion. Reuters.
to the Council, the Commission and the EEAS on the
negotiations of the EU-Georgia Association Agreement [238] S Ossetia 'war crimes condemned. BBC News. 23 January 2009.
(2011/2133(INI))". European Parliament. 17 November
2011.
[239] 2.2 Indiscriminate Shelling of Tskhinvali and Outlying
Villages. Up in Flames. Human Rights Watch. 23 Jan[219] Russian MPs back Georgias rebels. BBC News. 25
uary 2009. Archived from the original on 28 May 2009.
August 2008.
[220] Mark Tran (26 August 2008). Russia dees west by [240] Georgia: International Groups Should Send Missions.
recognising Georgian rebel regions. The Guardian.
Human Rights Watch. 18 August 2008.
[221] West condemns Russia over Georgia. BBC News. 26 [241] Thomas Hammarberg (8 September 2008). Human
August 2008.
Rights in Areas Aected by the South Ossetia Conict. Special Mission to Georgia and Russian Federation.
[222] CoE, PACE Chairs Condemn Russias Move. Civil.Ge.
Council of Europe.
26 August 2008.
[223] OSCE Chair Condemns Russias Recognition of Abkhazia, S.Ossetia. Civil.Ge. 26 August 2008.

[242] The human cost of war in Georgia. Amnesty International. 1 October 2008. Archived from the original on 2
October 2008.

[224] Scheer 'Rejects Russias Move. Civil.Ge. 26 August

[243] Russia: Protect Civilians in Occupied Georgia. Human
2008.
Rights Watch. 25 November 2008.
[225] Jun Okumura (29 August 2008). The Emergence of an
Expanded Forum to Replace the G8: The Silver Lining [244] Violations of Human Rights and Norms of Humanitarian
law in the Conict Zone in South Ossetia. Memorial. 11
to the Cloud over Russia and the West. GLOCOM PlatSeptember 2008. Archived from the original on 28 May
form.
2009.
[226] Georgia breaks ties with Russia. BBC News. 29 August
[245] Aleksandr Gabuev (15 August 2008). :
2008.
(in Russian). Kom[227] Niklas Swanstrm (3 September 2008). Georgia: The
mersant. Archived from the original on 28 May 2009.
split that split the SCO. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute
[246] McElroy, Damien (30 August 2008). South Ossetian poAnalyst. Archived from the original on 28 May 2009.
lice tell Georgians to take a Russian passport, or leave their
[228] Partt, Tom (22 December 2008). Security and human
homes. The Telegraph.
rights observers to close South Ossetia mission. The
Guardian.
[247] Volume I 2009, p. 27.

23

[248] 2.7 The Issue of Civilian Casualties in South Ossetia. [267] Belarus leader applauds Russian response to South OsseUp in Flames. Human Rights Watch. 23 January 2009.
tia crisis. RIA Novosti. 19 August 2008. Archived from
the original on 7 September 2009.
[249] South Ossetia Floods European Rights Court With Georgia Cases. Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty. 6 October [268] Georgia Finalizes Withdrawal From CIS. RFE/RL. 18
2008. Archived from the original on 6 August 2009.
August 2009.
[250] Case Concerning Application of the International Con- [269] Kramer, Andrew (27 August 2008). NATO ships
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discause alarm in Moscow. International Herald Tribune.
crimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation) Order of
Archived from the original on 31 August 2008.
2 December 2008 (PDF). Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions, and Orders. International Court of Justice. [270] Mike Mount (20 August 2008). Navy ships wait to deliver aid to Georgia. CNN.
Archived from the original on 6 August 2009.
[251] South Ossetians Complain to Court. The New York [271] Tran, Mark (21 August 2008). Russia suspends military
cooperation with Nato. The Guardian.
Times. Reuters. 7 October 2008.
[252] Georgia marks anniversary of war. BBC News. 7 Au- [272] Black Sea Fleet ships start tracking NATO guests. Regnum. 27 August 2008. Archived from the original on 28
gust 2009.
August 2008.
[253] Status of internally displaced persons and refugees from
Abkhazia, Georgia, and the Tskhinvali region/ South Os- [273] (in Russian). Pervy Kanal.
setia, Georgia. United Nations. 7 May 2014.
6 September 2008. Archived from the original on 12
[254] Carl Bildt oroad ver utvecklingen (in Swedish). AftonSeptember 2008.
bladet. 8 August 2008.
[274] Vladimir Socor (27 November 2008). Naval Imbalance
[255] Sweden evokes Hitler in condemning Russian assault.
in the Black Sea After the Russian-Georgian War. OcThe Local. 9 August 2008. Archived from the original on
nus.Net.
10 August 2008.
[275] US trainers say Georgian troops weren't ready. Interna[256] Foreign Secretary deplores continued ghting in Geortional Herald Tribune. Associated Press. 19 August 2008.
gia (09/08/2008)". Foreign and Commonwealth Oce.
Archived from the original on 19 September 2008.
Archived from the original on 28 August 2008.
[276] Michael Homan (11 August 2008). U.S. takes Geor[257] Luke Harding; Ian Traynor (12 August 2008). Russians
gian troops home from Iraq. Air Force Times.
march into Georgia as full-scale war looms. The
Guardian.
[277] Hamilton, Robert E. (4 September 2008). A Resolute
Strategy on Georgia (PDF). Centre for Strategic and In[258] Terence Hunt (15 August 2008). Bush To Russia: Stop
ternational Studies.
The Bullying And Intimidation"". The Hungton Post.
[278] James Jay Carafano; Ariel Cohen; Lajos F. Szaszdi (20
[259] Ben Smith (2 March 2010). U.S. pondered military use
August 2008). Russian Forces in the Georgian War: Prein Georgia. Politico.com.
liminary Assessment and Recommendations. The Heritage Foundation. Archived from the original on 14 Au[260] Baker, Peter; Sanger, David E. (21 May 2010). U.S.
gust 2009.
Makes Concessions to Russia for Iran Sanctions. The
New York Times.
[261] Lech Kaczyski: jestemy tu po to, by podj walk".
Rzeczpospolita (in Polish). 12 August 2008.

[279] What will be the outcome of the Georgian-Ossetian

war?". RIA Novosti. 8 August 2008.

[280] Volume III 2009, p. 371.

[262] Orbnnak 56 jutott eszbe az orosz hadmveletekrl (in
[281] Hungarian). index.hu. 14 August 2008. Archived from
"" "" (in Russian). Lenta.ru. 11
the original on 26 February 2012.
August 2008.
[263] Kramer, Andrew E. (27 August 2008). NATO Ships in
[282] Black Sea Raise Alarms in Russia. The New York Times.
(in Russian). Russian Ministry of
Defence. 9 August 2008. Archived from the original on
[264] Bennhold, Katrin (12 August 2008). Dierences emerge
12 August 2008.
in Europe of a response to Georgia conict. International
Herald Tribune. Archived from the original on 21 August
[283] David A. Fulghum; Douglas Barrie; Robert Wall; Andy
2008.
Nativi (15 August 2008). Georgian Military Folds Under Russian Attack. Aviation Week. Archived from the
[265] La Gorgie et la Russie sarontent pour le contrle de
original on 21 May 2011.
l'Osstie du Sud. Le Monde (in French). 8 August 2008.
[266] Angela Merkel calls for immediate ceasere. Bun- [284] Vladimir Isachenkov (18 August 2008). War Redeskanzlerin. 11 August 2008. Archived from the original
veals Russias Military Might and Weakness. Aviation.
on 31 August 2008.
Archived from the original on 20 November 2008.

24

12 FURTHER READING

[285] McDermott, Roger N. (Spring 2009). Russias Conven- [306] Vladimir Ivanov (20 August 2008). tional Armed Forces and the Georgian War (PDF). Pa (in Russian). Nezavisimaya Gazeta.
rameters. US Army War College. XXXIX: 6580. Retrieved 3 September 2011.
Books and Reports
[286] Aminov, Said. Georgias Air Defense in the War with
South Ossetia. Moscow Defence Brief. Centre for
Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (#1(15)/2009).
Archived from the original on 28 May 2009.
[287] Chivers, C. J.; Shanker, Thom (2 September 2008).
Georgia Eager to Rebuild Its Defeated Armed Forces.
The New York Times.
[288] Tor Bukkvoll (NovemberDecember 2009). Russias
Military Performance in Georgia (PDF). Military Review. 89 (6): 58. Archived from the original (PDF) on
21 December 2009.
[289] Cooper, Helene; Chivers, C.J.; Levy, Cliord J. (17 August 2008). U.S. Watched as a Squabble Turned into a
Showdown. The New York Times.
[290] Russian Armys weaknesses exposed during war in Georgia. RIA Novosti. 9 September 2008.
[291] Tanks 2010, p. 142.
[292] Sebastian Alison (27 August 2008). Georgia War Shows
Russia Army Now a 'Force to Be Reckoned With'". Georgian Daily. Archived from the original on 5 May 2009.
[293] Tanks 2010, p. 105.
[294] Tanks 2010, p. 57.
[295] Tanks 2010, p. 104.
[296] Tanks 2010, p. 100.

Cornell, Svante E. (2001). Small Nations and Great

Powers (PDF). RoutledgeCurzon.
George, Julie A (2009). The Politics of Ethnic Separatism in Russia and Georgia. Palgrave Macmillan.
Saparov, Arsne (2014). From Conict to Autonomy
in the Caucasus: The Soviet Union and the Making
of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno Karabakh.
Routledge.
Colonel George T. Donovan, Jr. (2009). Russian
Operational Art in the Russo-Georgian War of 2008
(PDF). U.S. Army War College.
Cohen, Ariel; Hamilton, Robert E. (2011). The Russian Military and the Georgia War: Lessons and Implications (PDF). Strategic Studies Institute.
Maria Raquel Freire; Roger E. Kanet, eds. (2012).
Russia and its Near Neighbours. Palgrave Macmillan.
Van Herpen, Marcel H. (2014). Putins Wars: The
Rise of Russias New Imperialism. Rowman & Littleeld.
Report. Volume I (PDF). IIFFMCG. September
2009. Archived from the original (PDF) on 7 October 2009.

[297] Pallin, Carolina Vendil; Fredrik Westerlund (24 July

2009). Russias war in Georgia: lessons and consequences. Small Wars & Insurgencies. 20 (2).

Report. Volume II (PDF). IIFFMCG. September

2009. Archived from the original (PDF) on 6 July
2011.

[298] Christian Lowe (20 August 2008). Georgia war shows

Russian army strong but awed. Reuters.

Report. Volume III (PDF). IIFFMCG. September

2009. Archived from the original (PDF) on 6 July
2011.

[299] The Caucasus Crisis. German Institute for International

and Security Aairs. November 2008. Archived from the
original on 1 December 2008.
[300] Sweeney, Conor (13 August 2008). ANALYSISGeorgia rebel condence rises after ghting. Reuters.
Archived from the original on 2 September 2008.
[301]
(in Russian). Lenta.ru. 16 August 2008.
[302] John Pike. Georgia Air Force. GlobalSecurity.org.
Archived from the original on 15 May 2009.
[303] History of the Air Forces of Georgia. Geo-Army.ge.
Archived from the original on 13 October 2013.
[304] Russian Army Chief Says Georgia is Rearming.
Civil.Ge. 11 November 2009.
[305] Ruslan Pukhov.
(in Russian). Nezavisimaya Gazeta. Archived from
the original on 26 February 2012.

The Tanks of August (PDF). Centre for Analysis

of Strategies and Technologies. 2010.

12 Further reading
Asmus, Ronald D. (2010). A Little War That Shook
the World: Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the
West. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN
9780230102286.
Boufesis, Alexandros Fox. The Russia-Georgia War
of 2008: Russias Geostrategic Ascension (2015).
Cornell, Svante E.; Starr, S. Frederick (2009). The
Guns of August 2008: Russias War in Georgia.
Studies of Central Asia and the Caucasus. Armonk,
New York: M.E. Sharpe. ISBN 9780765625090.

25
Jones, Stephen F. The Making of Modern Georgia,
1918-2012: The First Georgian Republic and its Successors (2014).
Manko, Jerey. Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics (2nd ed. 2011).
Niedermaier, Ana K. Countdown to War in Georgia, Russias Foreign Policy and Media Coverage of
the Conict in South Ossetia and Abkhazia (2008); a
Russian perspective.
Stent, Angela E. The Limits of Partnership: U.S.Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century
(2015).

13

External links

Georgia
Chronology of Bombing Facts by the Ministry of
Foreign Aairs of Georgia
Russia
On the situation around Abkhazia and South Ossetia
@ President of Russia
International
EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia
OSCE Mission to Georgia (closed)
The EU Investigation Report on the August 2008
War and the Reactions from Georgia and Russia in
the Caucasus Analytical Digest No. 10
Media
War in Georgia. International Crisis Group's multimedia presentation
BBC hub
Fighting in South Ossetia Photos
Boston.com Gallery
Russian air attacks in Georgia
Documentaries
Andre Nekrasovs Russian Lessons
The Secrets Of Russias Propaganda Machine

26

14

14
14.1

TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses

Text

Russo-Georgian War Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russo-Georgian_War?oldid=743657767 Contributors: Rmhermen, Bobdobbs1723, Leandrod, Zache, Edward, Llywrch, Mdupont, Delirium, Skysmith, William M. Connolley, Kingturtle, Bogdangiusca,
Cherkash, John K, Etherialemperor, Charles Matthews, Vanished user 5zariu3jisj0j4irj, Timwi, Colipon, Doradus, WhisperToMe, Tpbradbury, Furrykef, Tempshill, Bcorr, Finlay McWalter, AdvoKot, ChrisO~enwiki, Altenmann, JeremyCole, Timrollpickering, Bkell, Naelphin,
Mattaschen, Katarzyna, Centrx, MaGioZal, Tom harrison, Everyking, Varlaam, Malyctenar, Ofus, BigBen212, Cloud200, Node ue, Avala,
Jackol, Edcolins, Cam, Chowbok, Geni, J~enwiki, Fangz, Antandrus, Ex ottoyuhr, OverlordQ, Evertype, Lesgles, Oneiros, Untier, Mzajac,
JimWae, Wiml, Martin Wisse, AndrewKeenanRichardson, Bodnotbod, Kuralyov, Pmanderson, Cynical, Neutrality, Willhsmit, Dcandeto,
Danga, Kouber, Mike Rosoft, D6, Wesha, An Siarach, Discospinster, Rich Farmbrough, Loganberry, Pmsyyz, Rama, Pie4all88, ArnoldReinhold, Andrew1718, Kostja, Xezbeth, Dbachmann, Pavel Vozenilek, Bender235, ESkog, El C, Shrike, Kwamikagami, Vecrumba,
Mkosmul, Art LaPella, RoyBoy, LordRM, Kgaughan, 96T, Wee Jimmy, Peter Greenwell, John Vandenberg, Keron Cyst, Shenme, Dpaajones, Giraedata, Xtra, Rje, Eritain, Sukiari, Polylerus, Lelik, Vesal, Red Winged Duck, Maxim K, Alansohn, Gary, Anthony Appleyard,
QVanillaQ, Eleland, Karlthegreat, Axl, Bete, Xerwer, Rwendland, Bart133, Hohum, Tetromino, Fourthords, ProhibitOnions, Quintin3265,
Deacon of Pndapetzim, Shogun~enwiki, NickMartin, Anthony Ivano, Amorymeltzer, Count Iblis, Kober, Mixer, Vuo, Kaiser matias,
Skyring, H2g2bob, Computerjoe, GabrielF, Drbreznjev, Shawnlipowski, Axeman89, Richwales, Oleg Alexandrov, Levan, Dejvid, Whiskyjack, Woohookitty, RHaworth, Igny, Asav, StradivariusTV, Mazca, Zealander, Before My Ken, Ratzer, ProfLupin, Tckma, Tabletop,
GregorB, Macaddct1984, OCNative, Tokek, G.W., Sudeepneelakantan, Graham87, Yuriybrisk, Cuchullain, BD2412, Yurik, Mendaliv,
Pmj, Search4Lancer, Rjwilmsi, Friejose, Tim!, Sparten, Koavf, Zbxgscqf, Marasama, Orville Eastland, PHenry, Amire80, Hiberniantears,
JHMM13, TexasDawg, Bjs (usurped), Jerey Henning, Infosocialist, Lairor, Bhadani, Toby Douglass, St33lbird, Fish and karate, FayssalF,
Titoxd, FlaBot, Alex Kaprano, Ian Pitchford, Ssrose, Ground Zero, Kcarnold, HiddenWolf, Tequendamia, Str1977, Sstrader, Militaryace, D.brodale, Srleer, Toxygen, Russavia, TheSun, MoRsE, ISasha, Chobot, Benlisquare, Garas, Volunteer Marek, Korg, Bgwhite,
Adoniscik, Tone, Kingnavland, Wavelength, TexasAndroid, BuddyJesus, Sceptre, Wester, Blightsoot, TSO1D, Kafziel, Brandmeister (old),
Pip2andahalf, RussBot, Mark Malcampo, Arado, Conscious, Robert A West, Art Navsegda, Eupator, Kurt Leyman, Alex Bakharev, Havok, Jumber, Evstaev, Anomie, Dysmorodrepanis~enwiki, -OOPSIE-, BGManofID, Madcoverboy, Joshdboz, Grafen, Voyevoda, Badagnani, TheLH, Welsh, Rjensen, Suva, Awiseman, SCZenz, Gbm, Brandon, Bryanpi, Capnpitz, Kingpomba, Dahveed323, Eugrus, Furious
Stormrage, Danlaycock, Derek505, Mieciu K, JonM, Emesik, Sandstein, Bdell555, Doktorbuk, Fastboy, Black Regent, Joshmaul, Nikkimaria, Closedmouth, Tim Parenti, Abune, Josh3580, De Administrando Imperio, Mercenary2k, Petri Krohn, Red Jay, Nizzil, Mursel,
Otebig, Xil, ArielGold, Erudy, Otto ter Haar, NeilN, John Broughton, Someje, Elliskev, CIreland, Mhardcastle, SaveTheWhales, Sergey
shandar, Attilios, Scolaire, SmackBot, Serg3d2, Amcbride, FungusFromYuggoth, ILBobby, Enlil Ninlil, KMcD, Cdogsimmons, Prodego,
FlashSheridan, Roel, Ariedartin, Grandmaster, Korossyl, Petercorless, Patrickneil, Clpo13, RenOfHeavens, Nickst, KelleyCook, Kintetsubualo, Alsandro, D39, Brianski, Skizzik, Vechs, BenAveling, Teemu Ruskeep, Chris the speller, GoldDragon, Ottawakismet, Shaggorama, JoshNarins, Jprg1966, Thumperward, Silly rabbit, Hibernian, Ceha, LV, Colonies Chris, Torzsmokus, Darth Panda, MaxSem,
Modest Genius, Derekbridges, Frap, Jaro.p~enwiki, AP1787, General Grievous, Nixeagle, MJCdetroit, Xeeron, MarshallBagramyan,
Apostolos Margaritis, Timberlax, Mhym, Homestarmy, Jasca Ducato, Nicklinn, Greenshed, Victor V V, AndySimpson, Khoikhoi, Davecampbell, PiMaster3, Bowlhover, CJBR, Yulia Romero, Alhizar, So cool~enwiki, Ultraexactzz, Aaker, Ru magister, DDima, Mostlyharmless, RossF18, OctaviusIII, Ohconfucius, L4MBDA, Jake7, Nishkid64, Mukadderat, MegA, Enegrea~enwiki, MarkC77, John, The
idiot, G.Freeman, Scientizzle, Mathiasrex, ZAB, Robosh, Shadowlynk, JorisvS, Mgiganteus1, Pirveli, IronGargoyle, KoalaMeatPie, Stanimir, Beefball, CoolKoon, A. Parrot, JHunterJ, Illythr, Hvn0413, Pandagopanda, Kondspi, Rock4arolla, Publicus, Dicklyon, Optakeover,
Darz Mol~enwiki, Kjallakr, Maksim L., Meco, Sijo Ripa, Dr.K., Andrwsc, Slipzen~enwiki, TJ Spyke, CillanXC, Levineps, Requoter,
Iridescent, Necrid Master, Judgesurreal777, Joseph Solis in Australia, Endrelunde, Dave420, RekishiEJ, AlexWelens, Amakuru, Octane,
Buer v2, Domitori, Courcelles, Meow, Eluchil404, Esn, Stuka2, Aristotle1990, SkyWalker, HDCase, Vitriden, J Milburn, Eternal Confusion, SuperTank17, CmdrObot, Muromec~enwiki, Geo8rge, Alex Usoltsev, Begoner, Prosallus, Gritzko, Banedon, Kushal one, Joncnunn,
Ruslik0, Green caterpillar, N2e, Saint yondo, Juhachi, , Moreschi, LCpl, Elendal, Comrade438, AndrewHowse, Mkjell, Cydebot,
Fnlayson, Jackyd101, Future Perfect at Sunrise, Aszumila, Red4tribe, Josephdurnal, Gogo Dodo, Cvik, Rmccready, Life is like a box
of chocolates, Meowy, Xxhopingtearsxx, Denghu, Jayen466, M.K, Daniel J. Leivick, Carlroller, Quibik, TheCheeseManCan, Asenine,
Narayanese, Ssilvers, Arcayne, Robin Hood 1212, Storeye, Wdspann, Casliber, Hypnosadist, JamesAM, Thijs!bot, Biruitorul, Albertde,
RohanDhruva, Faigl.ladislav, CopperKettle, Beobach972, Peer-LAN, Staberinde, NisJorgensen, Oliver202, Smile a While, Frank, A3RO,
SGGH, Folantin, Bouchecl, Wmasterj, Eilev G. Myhren~enwiki, Ultegra, Nick Number, Dezidor, Tocino, JxGx78, Uruiamme, Oreo Priest,
Makipedia, BokicaK, DenCA, Widefox, Jraytram, Carolmooredc, Nelliebellie, Superzohar, Corella, Sstteevvee, Spencer, Yellowdesk, Mr.
Unknown, Wayiran, Phanerozoic, Carewolf, Arx Fortis, Kami888, Smalltime0, Ingolfson, Tomertomer, Serpents Choice, DagosNavy,
Tigga, Numlockshy, Freepsbane, DuncanHill, Lan Di, Xnemesis, Redking7, Hello32020, Boguslavmandzyuk, Slayer of Cliracers, Realismadder, Smith Jones, Msalt, Kborland, Top Gun, Achero, Magioladitis, Jaysweet, Parsecboy, JanCK, Bg007, Jmorrison230582, Bakken,
JamesBWatson, Smooth0707, Malcolmst, Flayer, Pleckaitis, Yarilo2, Harelx, Buckshot06, CTF83!, Xav 101, Dima1, Nyttend, Recurring dreams, Ceriy, Orionist, Fallschirmjger, Seleucus, PlanetCeres, Winterus, Alex Spade, Taamu, Alexllew, Beagel, Cailil, Martynas
Patasius, Me..., Phatalbert, Wadim, Kelstonian, Jason3777, JdeJ, Garik 11, HeeQue, Christiangoth, Iceness, CeeWhy2, Don-vip,
Dc76, Walle83, Jcaddell, Oleg Str, Racepacket, Juansidious, Sm8900, R'n'B, Flrn, CommonsDelinker, AlexiusHoratius, Nono64, Lilac
Soul, Alaexis, Djma12, Brain Rodeo, Ssolbergj, DrFrench, J.delanoy, DandyDan2007, AstroHurricane001, Khathi, Bogey97, Aleksandr
Grigoryev, Stlsportsfan2316, Public Menace, Yonidebot, A Nobody, NerdyNSK, Hodja Nasreddin, Acalamari, Barts1a, It Is Me Here,
McSly, Little Professor, Ypetrachenko, Garret Beaumain, HOUZI, Ash sul, Mrg3105, Colchicum, Assassin3577, C1010, Efrafra, DadaNeem, Alexanderkg, Flatterworld, Olegwiki, Goodboy7557, 2812, Bogdan~enwiki, D.M.N., Zara1709, Leladax, Matej1234, Nimora,
Mirage GSM, Whateverist, Pglukhov, Andy Marchbanks, JavierMC, Hungryseal, Boombaard, Squids and Chips, Idioma-bot, Agamemnus, Geosultan4, VolkovBot, DOHC Holiday, Nug, Asa Zernik, AlnoktaBOT, Orcano, Gab.popp, Toddy1, YusufAlBinVeryNaughty,
JayEsJay, VAR-loader, Sweetness46, TXiKiBoT, Oshwah, XavierGreen, Tritec, Gb-uk, Philaweb, Dojarca, Tovojolo, Jacob Lundberg,
Calendar, Poligraf, Schickaneder, MatthewLiberal, Ataby, Piratetm, Andrein, lex, Broadbot, LeaveSleaves, Manchurian candidate,
BotKung, M0RD00R, SwordSmurf, Raltieri, OrionArisen, Hoboron, Enviroboy, Anton Gutsunaev, Hanskarlperez, Eurocopter, Kermanshahi, Jihinotenshi, Badkhan, The Devils Advocate, Naughtyzzz, Baltaci, AlleborgoBot, Nagy, Finalyzer, Jim Furtado, DVoit, Daritto7117,
MattW93, Deconstructhis, Al.Glitch, Legokid, Linelor, Aalox, SieBot, Interselector, Gprince007, Rlendog, Ostap R, PeterPredator, Fanra,
Krawi, Weather82004, Pawebster, Pereleshin, HyperrealORnot, Kephalonikos, 0xFFFF, Althena, Orthorhombic, GlassCobra, BStarky,
Digwuren, Burtb, SGViper07, Colfer2, Dhateld, Vancraft, Berserkerus, Mimihitam, Zalktis, Mankar Camoran, Chourique, Miniapolis, S99en, Animagi1981, Hobartimus, Tambo10, Russoswiss, Fratrep, Macy, Ehaalandtluk, SergeiXXX, Onopearls, Elysander, Spar-

14.2

Images

27

tan198, Juvarra~enwiki, MentalMaelstrom, Rkarlsba, StaticGull, Myominane, Behtis, Sturm31, Latics, Pocopocopocopoco, Maralia,
Kieraf~enwiki, Bestalex, Jza84, Denisarona, Wee Curry Monster, Whyzeee, Mumble45, LarRan, Miyokan, Iberieli, TFCforever, Haberstr, Airow rus, Gr8opinionater, ImageRemovalBot, Peltimikko, Ratemonth, Xyxy, De728631, ClueBot, Yaleks, Andrushkapodn, The
Thing That Should Not Be, Alksentrs, Pikez33, EoGuy, General Epitaph, Nsk92, Heracletus, Wingsforsheeba, Matthiasb, Pheeror, Farolif,
Vnkd, Mustafaahmedhussien, Ezzex, Mild Bill Hiccup, Showtime2009, DerekMBarnes, Wikilost, Ventusa, Malikbek, Doseiai2, Krzyzowiec, Niceguyedc, Nanobear~enwiki, Ashmedai 119, Muscovite99~enwiki, Otolemur crassicaudatus, Bob bobato, Davidyz, Starstylers,
Auntof6, Homan05, Zlerman, Karabinier, Gordon Ecker, Massalim, Namenlos Ein, Dr. B. R. Lang, Ktr101, Robert Skyhawk, Excirial,
Dre123, Anonymous101, Encyclopedia77, CrazyChemGuy, Jaro7788, Ottre, AnthonyUK, Baseballbaker23, Gulmammad, Muhandes,
The Polar Man, Commdor, Sun Creator, FOARP, Randomcollector, Jeka3000, NuclearWarfare, Markuspint, Cenarium, Arjayay, PJLazy,
Anatoly.bourov, Narking, Drawn Some, Gytaz, SpudHawg948, Shin-chan01, Ltwin, RusskiDan, UltimateDestroyerOfWorlds, Nobody
of Consequence, Jhony, Chaosdruid, CarlosPatio, Joe N, Karolis-lt, Thingg, Dsmurat, Lindberg, Halgin, Goarmy06, IJA, Kruusamgi,
Xchange, ShipFan, XenonEngine, Trulystand700, BalkanFever, MaxSem on AWB wheels, Bogorm, Rossen4, Nikitn, XLinkBot, SebastianGS, DanielAgorander, Baron von HoopleDoople, Anthony Nolan O'Nymous, Stickee, Starstriker7, Rror, Mavigogun, UESPArules,
Astrofreak92, Avoided, Lstanley1979, WikHead, SilvonenBot, Sarejo, Mrcatzilla, Mm40, CD343, Sonyray, UNCtarheels2008, Asidemes,
JCDenton2052, Xasha, Elmor rus, Atoric, Emil Kastberg, Didgori2, Addbot, Roman888, Cohan8, Rayhou, The Twenty Thousand Tonne
Bomb, EZ1234, Roaring Siren, Aaronjhill, TheNeutroniumAlchemist, Phlegm Rooster, Jan Hofmann, Theearthshaker, Morriswa, Midnight818, Bushcutter, AkhtaBot, PatrickFlaherty, LatitudeBot, Montgomeryl, Fieldday-sunday, Laurinavicius, Leszek Jaczuk, USchick,
Veraptor, Enerjazzer, Cityvalyu, FrunkSpace, Wilzman3, Dyadron, NjardarBot, Aedile, LokiiT, Mnmazur, Proxima Centauri, LaaknorBot,
Chamal N, Barciur, Eltheodigraeardgesece, Lihaas, AndersBot, Debresser, Roux, Favonian, Gbentley, Green Squares, SpBot, LinkFA-Bot,
Manowar3745, Emadd, Fedoro, Hapsala, Zappa123123, Angry Shoplifter, Yezterdae, Audirs8, Captain Obvious and his crime-ghting
dog, Lightbot, Anxietycello, Smeagol 17, , Tenth Plague, Al3xil,
, , Zorrobot, Nierva, Djwilms, Latitude, Agora,
Kalvinus, Suwa, Sneaky Oviraptor18, Pk770, Naurmacil, Eraser, Alexander Wideeld, Luckas-bot, Yobot, Windyhead, AzureFury, Danvolodar, Bunnyhop11, Niggle, Alexpl, Legobot II, Be Black Hole Sun, Tony0Maxwell, Fenrir-of-the-Shadows, Edoe, Satt 2, Uskboy,
Darx9url, Nirvana888, Bachforelle, Mirandamir, Reenem, Melihsen, Necronaut, Zinvats uzher, NissanHonner, Goldhawk08, Ayrton Prost,
Thomaq, TestEditBot, BlueSalo, Kostan1, Sokol 92~enwiki, Domavain, Kittyhawk2, Eric-Wester, Mnation2, HyeTashnak, BWC56, What
Max, AnomieBOT, Jfry3, Chrystal Blue Moon, XL2D, Turkish Flame, DanteRay, Speaking sh, Stalnoy Tsvetok, Ieee2008, Niall1995,
Senor Freebie, FeelSunny, ETST, ComanL, Menrunningpast, YeshuaDavid, Bsimmons666, Mranistire, ThaddeusB, Tananka, Samogitia,
A20080819, Pubkjre, Grey Fox-9589, Jim1138, XChile, Guyver85, Piano non troppo, Mischa G, Kislorod, Kingpin13, Julnap, Ulric1313,
Keverich1, Flewis, WH Coordinator, Materialscientist, IkaMac, Bouron, Somkhishvili, Southafrican41, AlexNet88, Wikifor, HistoricWarrior007, Ossetia, ArthurBot, LilHelpa, Ziggy3055, Xqbot, Asks questions, TinucherianBot II, Shakshvili, K731, AudeBot, Drilnoth, Estlandia~enwiki, Poetaris, TechBot, Rebecca.m.bryant, Sir Luber, J.E.B.94, Levan666, GrouchoBot, Swd, Godvad, ProtectionTaggingBot,
Coltsfan, Anotherclown, Kylelovesyou, BobaFett85, Invest in knowledge, Amaury, Bertan1311, UplinkAnsh, MerlLinkBot, AustralianRupert, Saiga12, Labrang, Shadowjams, Methcub, Ilana81, WebCiteBOT, Allventon, Dbachinin, Alex.K.NY, Pecoc, UAS, Dead Mary,
Captain Cheeks, FrescoBot, Russian Rocky, Kupredu, Tobby72, Jermainedios, Gjandieri, A man without a country, Outback the koala,
Kunal Biswas 5487, Kwiki, Airborne84, A little insignicant, Citation bot 1, LMFS, Mdmitry1973, TJ13090, Politologia, Redrose64,
Biker Biker, Fujitzen, Moryak, BRUTE, Lars Washington, MondalorBot, MKFI, Jandalhandler, MastermindPrime, Geolasha, ,
MechanicalMind, Jirka.h23, NFSreloaded, Krassotkin, Dinamik-bot, TheMightyGeneral, UeArtemis, Diannaa, IRISZOOM, FluyPug,
Crystalgoth89, Bernd.Brincken, RjwilmsiBot, Chipmunkdavis, FetchcommsAWB, Antidiskriminator, MAXXX-309, Kiko4564, Derim
Hunt, Cattani, DASHBot, EmausBot, John of Reading, Beri Lukhumi, Dewritech, Faolin42, Ivushkin, Andraxxus, Hedles, Mircea87,
Zbase4, Ida Shaw, Iaki Salazar, Thargor Orlando, 2andrewknyazev, , Redav, Brildanz1, H3llBot, Circuitboardsushi, SkyBon, L1A1 FAL, IGeMiNix, Brandmeister, KazekageTR, , VanSisean, Donner60, Quite vivid blur, Dip20special, Diefgross, ChuispastonBot, HandsomeFella, Lina1988, SSDGFCTCT9, Abusepotential, Brigade Piron, IR393 will, TYelliot, Admiral Majic,
ClueBot NG, Dino nam, Mansmokingacigar, Piast93, Frietjes, ComtesseDeMingrelie, Cntras, Neljack, Rurik the Varangian, Mpellivert,
, Helpful Pixie Bot, Odabade90, Dday124, Gob Lofa, Mojorisin42, Festermunk, BG19bot, TGilmour, Yerevantsi, GeneralNutcaseReborn, Glevum, Zedshort, RGloucester, Dj777cool, ArsA-92, BattyBot, Tomh903, Shooter-Aleks, Triggerhippie4, Cyberbot II,
, Khazar2, Ssscienccce, S3r1alnumb3rl1nk1npark, KSNagra, Gio gog, Lorellay, Dexbot, Sir Joabary, LightandDark2000, Hmainsbot1, Mrmagikpants, Charles Essie, Mogism, Citation Needed, Saehry, Everything Is Numbers, Tony Mach, Archil Maisuradze, Wrant,
Antonioptg, RotlinkBot, Cathry, Alexander1257, Epicgenius, Giorgi Balakhadze, Vanamonde93, Kiwi228, AmaryllisGardener, Al Khazar,
Ucxo, Anonanonanon123, Plutonius1965, PussBroad, Jaytwist, Otto010, QuebecSierra, Chipperdude15, Second Skin, Arbutus the tree,
Woodmana, Gfcan777, Zgagloev, Doctor Papa Jones, Monkbot, Bolter21, Filedelinkerbot, Orejefparkn, Cryoweta, Havesannn76, Oercreeltr, Gustowkl, UA Victory, Hikestents22, Monopoly31121993, Ivaobongay, Tiptoethruthemineeld, Lolanaive12, GrandMaster101,
Amortias, Hilltrot, Confederateloyalist, Gladiuss2, Caealn, PLtrend, Hollth, Hey170, PilgrimMos, CentreLeftRight, Hamburg322, 92slim,
MB298, Francois, GeoRugby, Dorpater, Tridek Sep, Twitteristhebest, Stewader91, Lizard the Wizard, Damianmx, Spetsnazvdv, GreenC
bot and Anonymous: 619

14.2

Images

File:2008_South_Ossetia_war_en.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/3f/2008_South_Ossetia_war_en.

svg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: Own work by user Andrei nacu. sources> Wikipedia and the CIA regional map of 1994.
Original artist: Andrei nacu at English Wikipedia
File:A_Russian_missile_lies_largely_intact_in_a_home_in_Gori.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/
fc/A_Russian_missile_lies_largely_intact_in_a_home_in_Gori.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: http://www.navy.mil/view_
image.asp?id=63024 Original artist: U.S. Navy/Lt. Jim Hoeft
File:Arms_of_Georgia.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/7b/Arms_of_Georgia.svg License: CC0 Contributors: File:Lesser coat of arms of Georgia.svg Original artist: User:Rastrelli F
File:Baku_pipelines.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a1/Baku_pipelines.svg License: CC BY-SA 3.0
Contributors: Own work Original artist: Thomas Blomberg
File:Buk-M1-2_air_defence_system_in_2010.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/1a/Buk-M1-2_air_
defence_system_in_2010.jpg License: CC BY-SA 4.0 Contributors: http://vitalykuzmin.net/?q=node/313; exact source Original artist:
Vitaly V. Kuzmin

28

14

TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

File:Caucasus_breakaway_regions_2008.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/6d/Caucasus_breakaway_

regions_2008.svg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: Own work. Used the CIA Caucasus map of 1994 plus own work. Original
artist: Andrei nacu at English Wikipedia
File:Commons-logo.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/4/4a/Commons-logo.svg License: CC-BY-SA-3.0 Contributors: ? Original artist: ?
File:Condoleezza_Rice_Visit_to_Georgia,_Press_Conference_with_Mikheil_Saakashvli.JPG Source: https://upload.wikimedia.
org/wikipedia/commons/5/5c/Condoleezza_Rice_Visit_to_Georgia%2C_Press_Conference_with_Mikheil_Saakashvli.JPG
License:
Public domain Contributors: US embassy to Georgia Original artist: US gov't
File:Devnilebi.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d2/Devnilebi.jpg License: CC BY 2.0 Contributors:
Original artist: Gorod - SKY
File:Flag_of_Abkhazia.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/27/Flag_of_Abkhazia.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Own work , see URL http://www.abkhaziagov.org/ru/state/sovereignty/flag_b.jpg Original artist: Drawn by User:
Achim1999
File:Flag_of_Georgia.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/0f/Flag_of_Georgia.svg License: Public domain
Contributors: Own work based on File:Brdzanebuleba 31.pdf Original artist: User:SKopp
File:Flag_of_Russia.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/f/f3/Flag_of_Russia.svg License: PD Contributors: ? Original artist: ?
File:Flag_of_South_Ossetia.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/12/Flag_of_South_Ossetia.svg License:
Public domain Contributors: The law on State ag of South Ossetia Original artist: Various
File:Georgia,_Ossetia,_Russia_and_Abkhazia_(en).svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/cd/Georgia%
2C_Ossetia%2C_Russia_and_Abkhazia_%28en%29.svg License: CC-BY-SA-3.0 Contributors: Own work + Image:Caucasus-ethnic
en.svg. Image renamed from Image:Georgia, Ossetia, Russia and Abkhazia.svg Original artist: Ssolbergj & creator of source map.
File:Georgia_before_August_2008.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/5f/Georgia_before_August_2008.
svg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors:
Georgia high detail map.png Original artist: Goran tek-en
File:Kekhvi_on_fire.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/4a/Kekhvi_on_fire.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0
Contributors: http://www.hrw.org/photos/2008/georgia0808/ Original artist: Human Rights Watch
File:Medvedev-Sarkozy.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/7a/Medvedev-Sarkozy.jpg License: CC BY
4.0 Contributors: http://www.kremlin.ru/sdocs/news.shtml?day=12&month=08&year=2008&Submit.x=4&Submit.y=5&value_from=
&value_to=&date=&stype=&dayRequired=no&day_enable=true# Original artist: Presidential Press and Information Oce
File:Mirazh2007.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/eb/Mirazh2007.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: Own work Original artist: ru::
File:Refugees_from_south_ossetia-alagir.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/cf/Refugees_from_south_
ossetia-alagir.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: Own work Original artist: Evstaev
File:Ruins_of_a_burnt_apartment_building_in_Gori.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/56/Ruins_of_
a_burnt_apartment_building_in_Gori.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: http://www.defenseimagery.mil/; <a data-x-rel='nofollow'
class='external text' href='http://www.defenseimagery.mil/imagery.html;jsessionid=E89F37DF68E6878D2DDD72E788BBFD31#guid=
0c6f9e004c7f58f971e79a651656f35c1e16c9a6'>VIRIN: 080825-N-0629H-017</a> Original artist: Lt. Jim Hoeft, U.S. Navy
File:Russian_Military_Bases_in_Abkhazia_(2011-2016_Data).svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c9/
Russian_Military_Bases_in_Abkhazia_%282011-2016_Data%29.svg License: CC BY-SA 4.0 Contributors: Own work Original artist:
Giorgi Balakhadze
File:Russian_Military_bases_in_Tskhinvali_Region_of_Georgia.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/
d6/Russian_Military_bases_in_Tskhinvali_Region_of_Georgia.svg License: CC BY-SA 4.0 Contributors: Own work Original artist: Giorgi
Balakhadze
File:Sokhumi&McFaul-2008-Batumi.jpg
Source:
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d8/Sokhumi%
26McFaul-2008-Batumi.jpg License:
Public domain Contributors:
http://www.navy.mil/management/photodb/photos/
080824-N-4044H-012.jpg Original artist: Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Eddie Harrison
File:South_Ossetia_war_58_army.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/32/South_Ossetia_war_58_army.
jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: Yana Amelina ( ) Original artist: Yana Amelina ( . .)
File:Tskhinval_Yana_Amelina_10.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/ce/Tskhinval_Yana_Amelina_10.
jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: Yana Amelina ( ) Original artist: Yana Amelina ( . .)
File:Tu-22M3_Ryazan2.JPG Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/0c/Tu-22M3_Ryazan2.JPG License: CC
BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: Own work Original artist: Max071086

14.3

Content license

Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0