Marxs Realism, Utopianism, and the Role of Vision

Many find it impossible to imagine an alternative to capitalism some go as far as to

claim that its easier to imagine the end of the world. If there really is no feasible alternative
to capitalism, revolutionary organisation might justifiably be thought pointless. One line of
reply to this is to develop more or less detailed visions of what a socialist society might look
like. Common responses to such proposals include charges of utopianism and idealism.
Usually one of four different things is meant by this: (1) any kind of conception of which
direction our movement can and ought to move or societies in; (2) a broad substantial
conception of what a future society might look like; (3) some more specific conceptions of
the forms and procedures through which some of these substantial views can be instantiated;
or (4) a complete description of what an alternative society would look like in toto.
My paper will reconstruct Marxs realist approach to political theory and make an
argument for the potentially positive role that a form of vision of a future society can play
within this framework. My reconstruction of Marxs approach will show that he was clearly
committed to both (1) and (2) for central methodological reasons; and that he clearly rejected,
for excellent reasons, variants of (4). It is clear that Marx rejects this kind of detailed utopian
modelling for practical purposes, and Leopolds paper will tells us more about why so I wont
go into it. What I will argue is that within Marxs realistic approach to political theory a good
case can be made for (3) as well, i.e. for some more specific conceptions of the forms and
procedures through which our broad substantive commitments can be brought about. I will
finish by showing how this sometimes termed a form of utopianism is entirely consistent
with Marxs realist methodology, and can in fact play a useful role within it.
Marxs approach to political theory is broadly realist in nature and more specifically,
post-1844, what I shall call agent-centred. By a political theory being agent-centred I
mean that it fulfils the following necessary and jointly sufficient criteria:

(1) An agent-centred political theory starts from a descriptive account of a particular

context or a kind of context c.
(2) From this descriptive account, it draws a conception of the social forces c
generates, be they factors, processes, or agents of whatever kind.
(3) The available factors, processes, or agents available in c constrain such political
theory in the sense that only alternatives which really can be brought about by one
or more of the available factors, processes, or agents are open for political
theorising, whether these alternatives be ones of policy, legislation, economic and
political institutions, or whatever. More precisely, alternatives must be:
(a) viable, in the sense of both being possible in the sense of being able to
survive and maintain themselves over time in light certain basic,

critical facts about human nature, planetary conditions, and so on, and
being able, at least in principle, to generate the consequences its
proponents claim without generating negative effects which outweigh
these positive ones;
(b) there must be at least one factor, process or agent, or combination
thereof, A;
(c) in context or kind of context c;
(d) such that, in c, A really can bring about the alternative in question.
(4) Within the bounds of these constraints, such a political theory develops a
conception of at least two or more alternatives within c, at least one of which is
recommended over at least one of the others in terms of the social realisations it
generates, or can reasonably be expected to generate, under the conditions c.
(5) The available factors, processes or agents available in c also positively determine
the form and content of the advocacy of the political theorist in that such advocacy
must:
(a) seek to address itself (successfully) to an agent AG which, whether AG
is an individual or group of some kind, is a proper subset of A;
(b) in a suitable manner, i.e. by some suitable means;
(c) such that AG will act appropriately (and/or not inappropriately), in
light of the other factors, processes, and agents A, in c, to bring about
the alternative in question.

The proletariat, on Marxs view, is a revolutionary subject, in my sense, in that it is

both the principal factor, process, or agent proposed to bring about the achievable alternative
in (3) and the agent Marxs theory appeals to in order to bring about its recommendations as
per (5). This view has a number of important implications. For one, the scope of this sort of
political theory is clearly determined by its conception of possible political agency.
Moreover, the kinds of political theory developed, and the concrete products (books,
pamphlets, etc.) they are embodied and expressed in will need to be such that they enable the
theorist to influence their chosen political agents successfully. With this perspective also
comes an important critique of utopian socialism that is, one of a number of distinct but
related ones. If we fail to construct out political theories on the basis of realistic conceptions
of political agency and its scope of action, then we risk producing theory which will be
inherently unable to affect real politics in any significant way or only incidentally. For
anyone who takes the vocation of political theory are practical philosophy seriously this is a
real problem.

However, this does not rule out the possible usefulness of producing visions for what
a future society might look like. As we know, such visions are commonly subject to dogmatic
accusations of utopianism. Marx clearly has views both on (1) and (2) i.e. on the direction
we should be moving society in and on the broad substantial details of a future society in
fact, theyre central to his project. In order to overcome alienation Marxs diagnosis of how
the structure of capitalism thwarts human freedom and thereby human development and
flourishing is to be overcome by a real movement towards a new kind of society:
communism. If free conscious activity constitutes the species-character of man1 then
communism is the true appropriation of the human essence through and for man; it is the
complete restoration of man to himself as a social, i.e. human, being...2 Communism is such
a (re)-appropriation of the human essence first and foremost because it enables and
generates[u]niversally developed individuals, whose social relations, as their own communal
[gemeinschaftlich] relations, are hence also subordinated to their own communal control3. In
this sense it is the case that in a real community the individuals obtain their freedom in and
through their association4.
This necessarily, for Marx, implies a participatory democratically structured society
replacing both capitalism and the state. He also has some ideas about the institutional forms
this would involve, such as freedoms of speech and press5 and the awareness of both a
necessity for some sort of delegation and its possible pitfalls6. In addition to this, communism
will have three more institutional features: communism will feature a participatory
democratically planned economy; communism will eliminate the capitalist division of labour;
and communism will distribute according to human needs, and the members of communist
society will contribute according to their abilities7.
The first specifically economic component Marx adds to his conception of
communism is the idea that the economy as a whole must be organised through some sort of
participatory democratic planning. This is needed to prevent the form of economic
1 EPM, p. 328/I:2, p. 240/369.
2 EPM, p. 348/I:2, p. 263/389.
3 Marx 1973, p.162, square brackets in the original.
4 Marx 1970, p. 83.
5 In fact, as late as 1851 Marx re-published his articles defending freedom of the
press without changes. See Draper, 1977, p. 59.
6 For more on this, see esp. Marxs discussion of the Paris Commune in The Civil
War in France.
7 For more detailed discussion, see Ollman 1977 and Campbell 2011.

administration forming a locus of power outside and independent of its participants, whether
this domination were to come from impersonal market forces or from authoritarian
hierarchies such as feudal lords or guild masters. In the German Ideology, for instance, he
writes of communism as a society [that] regulates the general production8, and of the need
for the associated producers to collectively appropriate the totality of societys productive
forces9. Moving on to the first volume of Capital, Marx asks us to imagine, for a change, an
association of free men, working with the means of production held in common, and
expending their many different forms of labour-power in full self-awareness as one single
social labour force and regulating labour-time in accordance with a definite social plan,
while maintaining the correct relations between the different functions of labour and the
various needs of the associations. In such a situation, he writes, the social relations of the
individual producers, both towards their labour and the products of their labour, are here
transparent in their simplicity, in production as well as in distribution10.
In addition to being democratically structured and planned, a communist society, on
Marxs view, must also do away with the division of labour seen under capitalism. In the
German Ideology, he writes of communist society as one where nobody has an exclusive
sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes11, and of
individuals no longer [being] subject to the division of labour12 . There will of course still
be a planned distribution of labour-time among the various branches of production13, but
workers are not to be bound and restricted to one activity only, as part of a fixed social
structure in which they are driven to participate by the force of material (or other external)
compulsion. None of this means an end either to modern industry and technology or to the
subdivision of tasks in the service of minimising necessary labour time. What it does entail is
an end to the exclusion of workers from mental and conceptual tasks, from the planning,
management, and overseeing of their individual and collective labour, and allowing their
work-week (or year) to consist of any number of specific tasks both within and between
industries subject, of course, to the individual and collective needs of their society, and to
their abilities. This would mean that (i) a person does not give himself to one activity only;

8Marx 1970, p. 53.

9 Marx 1970, p. 93.
10 Marx 1990, p. 171-2.
11 Marx 1970, p. 53.
12 Ibid, p. 97.
13 Marx 1973, p. 173.

(ii) he does not relate to any of his several activities as to a role in a fixed social structure;
and (iii) what he does is at least generally speaking, something he wishes to do14.
Third and finally, Marx also believes that communism requires a criterion for fully
human scheme of remuneration: from each according to his abilities, to each according to
his needs!15 This last element enters Marxs writings less as an important component either
in its own right, or for the purposes of securing the collective appropriation and self-rule of
the totality of our social powers. All of this clearly amounts to a broad substantial conception
of what a future society might look like (i.e. (2)).
Does this mean that he also has to reject developing ideas along the lines of (3) as
well that is, must he also reject any role for some more specific conceptions of the forms
and procedures through which some of these substantial views can be instantiated? The
answer to this kind of question bears on a number of recent contributions to radical theory
seeking to do just that, such as the model of democratic planning proposed by Pat Devine,
and the model of Participatory Economics proposed by Michael Albert and Robin Hahnel.
These thinkers themselves believe their models to constitute a viable contribution within a
kind of revolutionary libertarian socialist, and, at least in the respects were concerned with
here, Marxist framework. Yet some of their critics have insisted that any contributions of the
kinds they offer are inherently idealistic and utopian in a sense that Marx does, or has to,
reject. I will argue that these critics are mistaken for two reasons. First, since they are entirely
compatible with an agent-centred approach to political theory that Marxists, anarchists, and
others are, and should be, committed to; and, secondly, since theres good reason to think that
vision of this kind can provide a positive contribution to a real movement towards an
emancipatory alternative.
First, a couple of points of clarification on what the Participatory Economics model is
and tries to be and what it isnt and does not try to be. Participatory Economics is a model of
some of the institutional forms that can instantiate or realise the substantial commitments
Marx commits his conception of communism to. It consists in a federated network of
workers and consumers councils coming together what is termed participatory democratic
planning, and balancing jobs in specific ways to eliminate the capitalist division of labour
seen in both capitalist and centrally planned societies. (It also includes a different criterion of
remuneration, but here they differ from Marx, and in any case I think its less important, so I
leave that issue aside.) I cant get into the detail of the model itself, but suffice to say that it
goes further than the stipulations Marx gives of communism insofar as it suggests some of
the concrete institutional forms through which things like participatory democratic planning
and elimination the capitalist division of labour can be brought about. It is thus far less
ambitious and disconnected to social and historical context than the utopian socialists Marx
was faced with.
14 Cohen 2001, p. 133.
15 CGP, p. 215.

For one, ParEcon is just a model for handling certain kinds of economic production.
It does no attempts to provide anything like a complete blueprint for how a future society
would look like in any way. Nor is anyone saying that this is the only model for how a future
society could and should look like. Obviously it might not be the best one; it will certainly
look different if implemented in different times and places by different groups of people; and
building a future society, like anything a large group of people ever does, will be an on-going
process of learning and experimentation which, as socialists, we all want all of the population
to play and active part in. Presenting one set of ideas about how we might want to proceed
does not amount to denying any of these things. Instead, it is one way of attempting to
contribute productively to this process of learning and experimentation.
The model also makes no attempt to say anything about how the many other
important aspects of human social life sex, relationships, child-rearing, etc. Obviously these
are all important, and they relate to economic issues in a multitude of different ways, and
can be expected to change and be changed by altered economic institutions. But you cant
always talk about everything all at once. ParEcon, being just about how we might want to reorganise economic institutions, focuses on trying to contribute to one aspect of the
revolutionary process one aspect among many. I dont think this is a weakness or a
shortcoming, so long as were aware of the fact that this is what it is, and not this complete
utopian vision of a future world.
Now, how can such a model be useful on an agent-centred approach? First, it gives a
good reply to the There Is No Alternative objection, by showing that we do indeed have at
least one broad conception of what a future economic structure might look like, and thus,
trivially, that we can imagine at least one alternative to capitalism. Furthermore, the model is
one which theres good reason to believe is able to survive and reproduce itself over time in
light of basic facts about human nature, planetary conditions, etc. (i.e. its possible), which is
likely to yield the benefits claimed for it without overwhelming problems (i.e. its viable),
and, grounded as it is in the revolutionary experiences of peasants and workers movements
of the past century, and their own lessons and reflections, it is an achievable alternative to
capitalism.
Apart from giving a response to the traditional There Is No Alternative-objection, a
general model of what a future society could look like has a number of potential advantages.
First, it can help guide our organisational structures and practices in the present. If we want
our organisations and movements to prefigure the society we want to create, it can really help
to have some general idea about what that kind of future society might look like, so that we
can make sure to try to prefigure it. Spreading around rewarding and empowering tasks as
demanded by balanced job complexes for example, is something we might want to try to
implement in organisations for the same reasons we might want them in a future society,
namely because it helps to prevent the emergence of a layer of privileged managers and
bureaucrats who control critical skills and knowledge.
A second thing it can help with is to guide actual struggles and actions we might want
to take. Some revolutions take a lot of time to develop, and we might move towards them one

step at a time. But not all steps are equal: some help empower us and our future struggles
much more than others, for example. If we have some idea of where we might want to get to,
that can make it easier to determine which particular steps along the road of revolutionary
struggle might be more important than others and which we might want to prioritise.
Thirdly, having some idea of a better society can be motivationally useful. If we have
a strongly-held belief not only that we want a better world, but that a better world really is
possible, and that we have some concrete ideas about how we might set about re-organising it
if and when we have a chance, that can help to sustain us and keep us going long-term.

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