Case Complex

Article 48. Penalty for complex crimes.
- When a single act constitutes two or more grave or

less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the
penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum
period.
G.R. No. L-27097 January 17, 1975
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO TOLING y ROVERO and JOSE TOLING y ROVERO, defendants-appellants.
Antonio Toling and Jose Toling, twins, boarded the Bicol Express train. While in transit, both
picked each a pair of scissors and started stabbing and butchering their co- passengers,
thereby causing several casualties. They were charged with multiple murder and an attempted
murder.
Issue: whether there is a case of complex crime
Held:
The eight killings and the attempted murder were perpetrated by means of different
acts. Hence, they cannot be regarded as constituting a complex crime under Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code which refers to cases where a single act constitutes
two or more grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other.
G.R. No. L-38755 January 22, 1981

vs.
JOSE PINCALIN, RODOLFO BELTRAN, EDUARDO EMPLEO and ALEJANDRO
JANDOMON, accused-appellant.
Defendants planned and executed the killing of fellow convicts in the national
penitentiary. While armed with improvised weapons referred to as matalas
attacked and slaughtered the victims in their separate quarters.
Issue: whether there is a complex crime
Held:
We find that the four accused are guilty of the complex crime of double murder and frustrated
murder aggravated by quasi-recidivism. This case is governed by the rule that when for the
attainment of a single purpose, which constitutes an offense various acts are executed, such
acts must be considered as only one offense, a complex one.
In other words, where a conspiracy animates several persons with a single purpose, their
individual acts done in pursuance of that purpose are looked upon as a single act, the act of
execution, giving rise to a complex offense. Various acts committed under one criminal impulse
may constitute a single complex offense.
G.R. Nos. 100382-100385 March 19, 1997

vs.
MARIO TABACO, accused-appellant.
Tabaco entered the cockpit with a fully loaded M-14 sub-machine gun. He fired the
weapon, which contained 20 rounds of bullets in its magazine, continuously. When the
rifle was recovered from Tabaco, the magazine was already empty. Four persons died.
Held:
The evidence shows that the four (4) victims were FELLED by one single shot/burst of
fire and/or successive automatic gun fires, meaning continuous. Hence, it is a complex
crime involving four murdered victims, under the first category, where a single act of
shooting constituted two or more grave or less grave felonies (delito compuesto),
G.R. No. 139857
September 15, 2006
LEONILA BATULANON, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Petitioner was the manager-cashier of Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc. She falsified cash/
check vouchers making it appear that certain loans were granted to several persons when in
truth and in fact those persons never made or received a loan. Four informations for estafa thru
falsification of commercial documents were filed against Batulanon.
Issue: Whether there is a complex crime of estafa through falsification of private document.
Held: As there is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of private document, If the
falsification of a private document is committed as a means to commit estafa, the proper crime
to be charged is falsification. If the estafa can be committed without the necessity of falsifying a
document, the proper crime to be charged is estafa.
G.R. No. 124213 August 17, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DANTE ALFECHE y TAMPARONG, alias WILLY, and JOHN DOE, accused, DANTE
ALFECHE y TAMPARONG,accused-appellant.
On 11 September 1994, at about 10:30 p.m., ANALIZA was watching television in the sala of her
employers when she heard a sound from the front door, then somebody gagged her mouth, and
pointed a knife at her. Herein accused with his two companions, While she was thus gagged
and held at the point of a knife, Willy boxed her on her side, as a result of which she lost
consciousness. Upon regaining consciousness, ANALIZA found her short pants removed and
her private part bleeding, which was unusual because she was not menstruating before she was
attacked.
Again, on 18 September 1994, at about 11:00 a.m., ANALIZA was alone with her ward in her
employers residence. She was sauting pork when suddenly, the three accused again intruded
into the house through the back door. Willy held her hand and gagged her mouth, while John
Doe then laid her on the floor and pointed a knife at her. Thereupon, DANTE knelt on her legs,
undressed her, inserted his private part into hers, and made a "push and pull motion." DANTE
and his companions forthwith left.
Issue: whether the aggravating circumstance of treachery may be appreciated on a crime of

rape
Held: by quoting the words of the Supreme Court:
The foregoing notwithstanding, it is timely to remind prosecutors to exercise due care in the
preparation of complaints or informations to the end that circumstances which by specific
provisions of law change the nature of the crime or upgrade the penalty therefor must be
specifically alleged using the language of the law. 70
Parenthetically, we also note that the complaints allege treachery as an aggravating
circumstance. Under Article 14 of the Penal Code treachery is applicable only to crimes against
persons. At the time ANALIZA was raped, rape was a crime against chastity, although under the
Anti-Rape Law of 1997 (R.A. No. 8353), approved on 30 September 1997, rape is already a
crime against persons.
G.R. No. 92163 June 5, 1990

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS. JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, petitioner
vs.
JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR (Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City [Br.
103], SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR AURELIO TRAMPE, PROSECUTOR FERDINAND R.
ABESAMIS, AND CITY ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR EULOGIO MANANQUIL,
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION DIRECTOR ALFREDO LIM, BRIG. GEN. EDGAR
DULA TORRES (Superintendent of the Northern Police District) AND/ OR ANY AND ALL
PERSONS WHO MAY HAVE ACTUAL CUSTODY OVER THE PERSON OF JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, respondents.
G.R. No. 92164 June 5, 1990
SPS. REBECCO E. PANLILIO AND ERLINDA E. PANLILIO, petitioners,
vs.
PROSECUTORS FERNANDO DE LEON, AURELIO C. TRAMPE, FFRDINAND R.
ABESAMIS, AND EULOGIO C. MANANQUIL, and HON. JAIME W. SALAZAR, JR., in his
capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 103, respondents.
Article 134. Rebellion or insurrection; How committed. - The crime of rebellion or insurrection is
committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government
for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of
the Philippine Islands or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces,
depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or
prerogatives. (As amended by R.A. 6968).
Hernandez doctrine: murders which have been committed on the occasion of and in furtherance
of the crime of rebellion must be deemed absorbed in the offense of simple rebellion
Facts: Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement
officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of Investigation on the strength of a
warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar The warrant had issued on an information. charging
Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime
of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of
the failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990.
Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila,
without bail. The following morning, February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas
Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the
Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres.
On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition
for habeas corpus alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights in being, or having
been held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books;
Issue: whether the crime of rebellion may complexed with other offenses committed on the
occasion thereof
Held:
which have been committed on the occasion of and in furtherance of the crime of rebellion must
be deemed absorbed in the offense of simple rebellion. People vs. Hernandez,
there is no such crime in our statute books as rebellion complexed with murder, that murder
committed in connection with a rebellion is absorbed by the crime of rebellion, and that a resort
to arms resulting in the destruction of life or property constitutes neither two or more offenses
nor a complex crime but one crime-rebellion pure and simple.
the questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco
and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners are
entitled to bail,
G.R. No. 127663 March 11, 1999
vs.
ROLANDO VALDEZ, accused-appellant.
Six teenagers boarded a tricycle, when the vehicle took a turn on a barangay road they met the
appellant Rolando Valdez and his companions who were armed with guns. The tricycle's
headlight flashed on their faces. Without warning, they pointed their guns and fired at the
vehicle. Thereafter, after uttering the words, "nataydan, mapan tayon" (They are already dead.
Let us go), Valdez and companions left.
The shooting incident left 4 victims dead and two others injured.
The information charged the complex crime of Multiple Murder with Double Frustrated Murder
Held:
The case at bar does not fall under any of the two instances defined under art 48 of the RPC.
The evidence indicates that there was more than one gunman involved, and the act of each
gunman is distinct from that of the other. It cannot be said therefore, that there is but a single act
of firing a single firearm. Each act by each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective
firearms, aiming each particular moment at different persons constitute distinct and individual
acts which cannot give rise to the complex crime of multiple murder. We therefore rule that
accused-appellant is guilty, not of a complex crime of multiple murder, but of four counts of
murder for the death of the four victims in this case. In the same manner, accused-appellant is
likewise held guilty for two counts of frustrated murder.
G.R. No. 141125
February 28, 2002

vs.
JEFFREY GARCIA y CARAGAY and THREE JOHN DOES, accused.
JEFFREY GARCIA y CARAGAY, accused-appellant.
The victim, who was a physical therapy student, was crossing a street when a van boarded by
the accused with four other John Does pulled he inside, she lost her consciousness during the
abduction. She awoke inside a room where her molester took turns in raping her and she
blacked out. When she regained consciousness, she was lying by the roadside.
Accused was found guilty of Forcible Abduction with Rape and three counts of Rape
Issue: whether there is a complex crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape
Held: he trial court, therefore, did not err in convicting accused-appellant of the complex crime of
forcible abduction with rape. The two elements of forcible abduction, as defined in Article 342 of
the Revised Penal Code, are: (1) the taking of a woman against her will and (2) with lewd
designs. The crime of forcible abduction with rape is a complex crime that occurs when there is
carnal knowledge with the abducted woman under the following circumstances: (1) by using
force or intimidation; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
(3) when the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. 39
In the case at bar, the information sufficiently alleged the elements of forcible abduction, i.e., the
taking of complainant against her against her will and with lewd design. It was likewise alleged
that accused-appellant and his three co-accused conspired, confederated and mutually aided
one another in having carnal knowledge of complainant by means of force and intimidation and
against her will.
Aside from alleging the necessary elements of the crimes, the prosecution convincingly
established that the carnal knowledge was committed through force and intimidation. Moreover,
the prosecution sufficiently proved beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant succeeded
in forcibly abducting the complainant with lewd designs, established by the actual rape. 40
Hence, accused-appellant is guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. He
should also be held liable for the other three counts of rape committed by his three co-accused,
considering the clear conspiracy among them shown by their obvious concerted efforts to
perpetrate, one after the other, the crime. As borne by the records, all the four accused helped
one another in consummating the rape of complainant. While one of them mounted her, the
other three held her arms and legs. They also burned her face and extremities with lighted
cigarettes to stop her from warding off her aggressor. Each of them, therefore, is responsible not
only for the rape committed personally by him but for the rape committed by the others as
well. 41
However, as correctly held by the trial court, there can only be one complex crime of forcible
abduction with rape. The crime of forcible abduction was only necessary for the first rape. Thus,
the subsequent acts of rape can no longer be considered as separate complex crimes of
forcible abduction with rape. They should be detached from and considered independently of
the forcible abduction. Therefore, accused-appellant should be convicted of one complex crime
of forcible abduction with rape and three separate acts of rape. 42
The penalty for complex crimes is the penalty for the most serious crime which shall be imposed
in its maximum period. Rape is the more serious of the two crimes and, when committed by
more than two persons, is punishable with reclusion perpetua to death under Article 266-B of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353. Thus, accused-appellant
should be sentenced to the maximum penalty of death for forcible abduction with rape.
G.R. Nos. L-25375 and 25376
October 8, 1926
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
VICENTE DE LEON Y FLORA, defendant-appellant.
People vs. De Leon, 49 Phil. 437, where the crimes committed by means of separate acts were
held to be complex on the theory that they were the product of a single criminal impulse or intent
Facts: Vicente De Leon entered the yard of Vicente Magat and stole two fighting cocks, without
force upon things. He was prosecuted for two crimes of theft since the two game roosters
belong to different owner. De Leon pleaded guilty to the charged.
The trial court found the accused of one crime of theft, holding that the theft of the two roosters
constituted but one crime.
Issue: whether or not the fact that the accused, with intent to gain, on the same occasion and in
the same place, took the two roosters, one belonging to Vicente Magat and the other to Ignacio
Nicolas, constitutes two crimes of theft.
Held: the act of taking the two roosters, in response to the unity of thought in the criminal
purpose on one occasion, is not susceptible of being modified by the accidental circumstance
that the article unlawfully belonged to two distinct persons. There is no series of acts here for
the accomplishment of different purposes, but only one of which was consummated, and which
determines the existence of only one crime. The act of taking the roosters in the same place
and on the same occasion cannot give rise to two crimes having an independent existence of
their own, because there are not two distinct appropriations nor two intentions that characterize
two separate crimes.
G.R. No. 109266 December 2, 1993
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUSTICE FRANCIS GARCHITORENA, SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Petitioner, while being the Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation
was charged with violation Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, allegedly committed by her
favoring "unqualified" aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program. 32 different
informations were file corresponding with the 32 names approved. Petitioner avers that while
hypothetically admitting that the allegations were true the 32 informations should be
consolidated because of the concept of delito continuado.
Issue: whether the crimes charged in the 32 informations filed constitute only one
crime
Held: The 32 Amended Informations aver that the offenses were committed on the same period
of time, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988. The strong probability even exists that the approval
of the application or the legalization of the stay of the 32 aliens was done by a single stroke of
the pen, as when the approval was embodied in the same document.
For delito continuado to exist there should be a plurality of acts performed during a period of
time; unity of penal provision violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means that
two or more violations of the same penal provisions are united in one and same instant or
resolution leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim.
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-41054 November 28, 1975
JOSE L. GAMBOA and UNITS OPTICAL SUPPLY COMPANY, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and BENJAMIN LU HAYCO, respondents.
Facts:
Hayco was a former employee of petitioner company in its optical supply business. The owner
was duped into signing a special power of attorney which Hayco used to close and open
accounts on several banks and with the same authority received payments in his own accounts.
He was charged with 75 cases of estafa committed on separate dates and places.
The court of appeals ordered the consolidation of all information on the reason that
the crimes charged were committed in view of a single purpose.
Issue: Whether there is a case of delito continuado
Held: The intention of the Code in installing this particular provision is to regulate the two cases
of concurrence or plurality of crimes which in the field of legal doctrine are called "real plurality"
and "ideal plurality". 2 There is plurality of crimes or "concurso de delitos" when the actor
commits various delictual acts of the same or different kind. "Ideal plurality" or "concurso ideal"
occurs when a single act gives rise to various infractions of law. This is illustrated by the very
article under consideration: (a) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies (described as "delito compuesto" or compound crime); and (b) when an offense is a
necessary means for committing another offense (described as "delito complejo" or complex
proper). "Real plurality" or "concurso real", on the other hand, arises when the accused
performs an act or different acts with distinct purposes and resulting in different crimes which
are juridically independent. Unlike "ideal plurality", this "real plurality" is not governed by Article
48.
\
Apart and isolated from this plurality of crimes (ideal or real) is what is known as "delito
continuado" or "continuous crime". This is a single crime consisting of a series of acts arising
from a single criminal resolution or intent not susceptible of division. For Cuello Calon, when the
actor, there being unity of purpose and of right violated, commits diverse acts, each of which,
although of a delictual character, merely constitutes a partial execution of a single particular
delict, such concurrence or delictual acts is called a "delito continuado". In order that it may
exist, there should be "plurality of acts performed separately during a period of time; unity of
penal provision infringed upon or violated and unity of criminal intent and purpose, which
means that two or more violations of the same penal provision are united in one and the same
intent leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim."
The test is not whether one of the two offenses is an essential element of the other. 6 In People
v. Pineda , 7 the court even expressed that "to apply the first half of Article 48, ... there must be
singularity of criminal act; singularity of criminal impulse is not written into the law."
In the case before Us, the daily abstractions from and diversions of private respondent of the
deposits made by the customers of the optical supply company from October 2, 1972 to
December 30, 1972, excluding Saturdays and Sundays, which We assume ex hypothesi,
cannot be considered as proceeding from a single criminal act within the meaning of Article 48.
The abstractions were not made at the same time and on the same occasion, but on variable
dates. Each day of conversion constitutes a single act with an independent existence and
criminal intent of its own. All the conversions are not the product of a consolidated or united
criminal resolution, because each conversion is a complete act by itself. Specifically, the
abstractions and the accompanying deposits thereof in the personal accounts of private
respondent cannot be similarly viewed as "continuous crime". In the above formulation of Cuello
Calon, We cannot consider a defalcation on a certain day as merely constitutive of partial
execution of estafa under Article 315, para. 1-b of the Revised Penal Code. As earlier pointed
out, an individual abstraction or misappropriation results in a complete
execution or consummation of the delictual act of defalcation. Private respondent cannot be
held to have entertained continously the same criminal intent in making the first abstraction on
October 2, 1972 for the subsequent abstractions on the following days and months until
December 30, 1972, for the simple reason that he was not possessed of any fore-knowledge of
any deposit by any customer on any day or occasion and which would pass on to his
possession and control. At most, his intent to misappropriate may arise only when he comes in
possession of the deposits on each business day but not in futuro, since petitioner company
operates only on a day-to-day transaction. As a result, there could be as many acts of
misappropriation as there are times the private respondent abstracted and/or diverted the
deposits to his own personal use and benefit. Thus, it may be said that the City Fiscal had acted
properly when he filed only one information for every single day of abstraction and bank deposit
made by private respondent. 10 The similarity of pattern resorted to by private respondent in
making the diversions does not affect the susceptibility of the acts committed to divisible crimes.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-46353-46355 December 5, 1938

vs.
RESURRECCION B. PEAS, defendant-appellant.
Aniceto B. Fabia for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor-General Abad Santos and J. G. Bautista for appellee.
DIAZ, J.:
The appellant was convicted on three separate charges for estafa with falsification
of public documents for the three money orders placed in his name while being an
assistant postmaster. He even forged the signature of the head postmaster to
accomplish his crime.
Issue: Whether his acts constitute separate crimes
Held:
Since the accused was aware that no money order could be brought or issued for a
sum greater than $100, as expressly provided in section 1968 of the Administrative
Code, in order to issue a money order for P600, it was necessary to make three
separate money orders. That the appellant falsified the same on a single date:
November 24, 1936, and he collected them also on a single date, January 4, 1937
from which it is inferred that the three acts of falsification and the said three acts of
appropriation of the sum of P200 in each case proceed from a single purpose of the
appellant, namely, to appropriate for himself the sum of P600.
If he had to resort to this means falsifying three money orders, it was because he
was aware that he could not do otherwise, in view of the legal provision, which he
was supposed to know, limiting the issuance of money orders to sums not greater
than P100 or P200. When, for the attainment of a single purpose which constitutes
an offense, various acts are executed, such acts must be considered only as one
offense.
Under this view, the appellant committed only the complex crime of estafa with
falsification of three postal money orders which are, without doubt, official and
public documents, the falsification being the means he employed to appropriate, as
he did for himself the sum of P600, to the prejudice of the Government.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-16688-90
April 30, 1963
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
PACITA MADRIGAL-GONZALES, (formerly Pacita M. Warns), ET AL., accusedappellees.
Accused, while administrator of the Social Welfare Administration (SWA) was
charged in 27 cases of falsification and 1 case of Malversation. That in the
commission of malversation several documents were falsified showing

disbursements for cash aids, reliefs and supplies when in fact there were none.
In her defense, the accused interposed while hypothetically admitting that acts of
falsification which took place within a specified period and the allegations are the
same, said acts were but the result of a singular criminal intent- to conceal the
crime of malversation.
Issue:
Whether or not the twenty-seven (27) falsifications were the product of only one
criminal intent.
Held:
The appellees seem to confuse motive with criminal intent. Motive is not an element
of a felony; it is merely a prospectant circumstantial evidence. Criminal intent
renders an act a felony. Motive is a state of the mind of the accused, and it is he
who can state his real motive in committing a crime. Whatever the fiscal had
manifested, as to the motive which had impelled the accused to transgress the law,
was but a speculation gathered in the process of investigation. In other words, the
existence of the motive to conceal malversation, in the cases at bar, is a question of
fact which should be ventilated in a formal trial, in connection with the defense of
double jeopardy. The Court cannot assume that the purpose of committing the
twenty-seven (27) falsifications was to conceal the malversation. This is so because
there is no showing that for every particular amount they had malversed on a
certain period, they had purposedly perpetrated the corresponding falsification to
cover up such amount, until the whole amount proposed to be malversed, shall
have been completely misappropriated. In the absence of such showing, it is to be
presumed that in the falsification of each document, the criminal intent was
separated and distinct.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 166401
October 30, 2006
[Formerly G.R. Nos. 158660-67]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
ALFREDO BON, appellant.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Two critical issues emerge in this case. The first relates to whether the Court should affirm the
conviction of appellant Alfredo Bon (appellant) for six counts of rape and two counts of
attempted rape, the victims being his then-minor nieces. On that score, we affirm. As a
consequence though, we are ultimately impelled to confront a question much broader in
both scope and import. While the Court had previously declined to acknowledge the
constitutional abolition of the death penalty through the 1987 Constitution,1 we now find it
necessary to determine whether the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 resulted in the
statutory interdiction of the death penalty.
The second issue arises as we are compelled to review the maximum term of reclusion
temporal in the sentence imposed on appellant by the Court of Appeals for the two counts of
attempted rape. The sentence was prescribed by the appellate court prior to the enactment of
Republic Act No. 9346 which ended the imposition of the death penalty in the Philippines. The
proximate concern as to appellant is whether his penalty for attempted qualified rape, which
under the penal law should be two degrees lower than that of consummated qualified rape,
should be computed from death or reclusion perpetua.
First, the antecedent facts.
I.
Eight (8) Informations2 were filed within the period from 21 August 2000 to 23 February 2001 by
the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Gumaca, Quezon against appellant, charging him with the
rape of AAA3 and BBB,4 the daughters of his older brother. Appellant was accused of raping AAA
in Criminal Case Nos. 6899-G, 6902-G, 6906-G, and 6908-G; while he was accused of raping
BBB in Criminal Case Nos. 6689-G, 6903-G, 6905-G, and 6907-G.5All these cases were
consolidated for trial. The rapes were alleged to have been committed in several instances over
a span of six (6) years.
Both AAA and BBB testified against appellant, their uncle, and both identified him as the man
who had raped them. During trial, their respective birth certificates and the medical certificates
executed by the doctor who physically examined them were entered as documentary evidence.
AAA testified that she was only six (6) years old when she was first molested in 1994 in the
house appellant had shared with her grandmother.6 She recounted that the incident took place
when she and appellant were alone in the house. Appellant touched her thighs and vagina,
removed her clothes and inserted his penis into her vagina. Appellant threatened that she and
her parents would be killed should she disclose the incident to anyone. She thereafter stopped
sleeping in the house of her grandmother. It was only three (3) years after, in 1997, that she
slept in the said house, yet again she was sexually abused by appellant. She was then nine (9)
years old.7
AAA recounted that at age eleven (11) in 1999, she was raped by appellant for the third time,
again at the house of her grandmother.8 The following year, when she was twelve (12), she was
abused for the fourth time by appellant. This time, she was raped in an outdoor clearing9 after
having been invited there by appellant to get some vegetables. While at the clearing, appellant
forced her to lie down on a grassy spot and tried to insert his penis in her vagina. As she cried in
pain, appellant allegedly stopped.10
It was only on 12 June 2000 that she decided to reveal to her mother, CCC,11 the brutish acts
appellant had done to her.12 Her mother thus filed a complaint against her uncle. AAA identified
appellant in open court and presented as documentary evidence her birth certificate to prove
that she was born on 3 September 1988.13
BBB, on the other hand, testified that she was first raped by appellant in 1997 when she was ten
(10) years old, also at the house appellant shared with her grandmother. While alone in the
house, appellant poked a knife at her, removed her clothes and inserted his penis in her vagina.
Despite the pain she felt, she could not resist appellant as he was holding a knife. She did not
report the rape to her parents out of fear of appellant's threat that he would kill her.14 BBB further
testified that in 1998 and 1999, she was raped again by appellant on several occasions, the
rapes occurring under threat of a bladed weapon, and regardless of the time of day.15
BBB stated that she was last raped by appellant on 15 January 2000.16 On that night, she was
sleeping beside her sister AAA in the house of her grandmother when she felt appellant
touching her body. She pushed him away but appellant pulled her three (3) meters away from
AAA towards the door. As appellant was holding a knife, BBB could not make any noise to alert
her sister. Appellant ordered her to remove her clothes and forced her to lie down. After he took
off his clothes, appellant placed himself on top of BBB and stayed there for three (3) minutes
"moving up and down." Thereafter, she put on her clothes and returned to where her sister was.
She added that although it was dark, she knew it was appellant who had molested her as she
was familiar with his smell. Since then, she never slept in her grandmother's house again.17
It was on 14 June 2000 that BBB disclosed her harrowing experience to her mother. Prior to
that, however, she had already revealed the sexual abuses she had underwent to her sister
AAA. Upon learning of the same, her mother brought her to the police station and her statement
was taken. Thereafter, she was brought to the hospital to be examined. Furthermore, BBB
explained that she only reported the abuses done to her on 14 June 2000 or five (5) months
after the last rape because she was afraid of appellant's threat of killing her and her family.18
The third witness for the prosecution was the mother, CCC. She testified that she only knew of
the abuses done on her daughters on 15 June 2000. Five months earlier, CCC became
concerned after observing that BBB, on the pretext of preparing clothes for a game, was
packing more than enough clothes. She asked her other daughter, DDD, to dig into the matter
and the latter told her that BBB was planning to leave their house. Upon learning this, she sent
somebody to retrieve BBB. However, it was only five months after that incident that BBB
confided to her mother that she was raped by appellant. CCC lost no time in reporting the
matter to the authorities and had BBB and AAA examined in the hospital. After examination, it
was confirmed that BBB was indeed sexually molested.19
CCC initially did not tell her husband about what had happened to their daughters because she
was afraid that her husband might kill appellant. It was only after appellant was arrested that
she disclosed such fact to her husband. After the arrest of appellant, his relatives became angry
at CCC, and her mother-in-law avoided talking to her since then.20
The physician who examined BBB and AAA also testified for the prosecution. Dr. Purita T. Tullas
(Dr. Tullas), medical officer of Gumaca District Hospital, testified that she was the one who
examined BBB and AAA, and thereafter, issued medical certificates for each child. These
medical certificates were presented in court.21
The medical certificate of BBB revealed that at the time of examination, there were no external
sign of physical injury found on her body. However, Dr. Tullas found that the labia
majora and minora of BBB was slightly gaping, her vaginal orifice was admitting two fingers
without resistance and there were hymenal lacerations at "three (3) o'clock" and "eight (8)
o'clock" which might have happened a long time before her examination. Dr. Tullas concluded
that there might have been sexual penetration caused by a male sex organ for several times.22
AAA's medical certificate stated that at the time of examination, there were no external physical
injuries apparent on her body. AAA's labia majora and minora were well coaptated and the
hymen was still intact. On direct examination, Dr. Tullas said that it could happen that the hymen
would still be intact despite sexual penetration with a person having an elastic hymen. On the
other hand, when asked on cross-examination, she stated that there was also the possibility that
no foreign body touched the labia of the pudendum of AAA.23
Only appellant testified for his defense, offering denial and alibi as his defense. He averred in
court that from 1994 to 2000, he lived in the house of his parents which was about "thirty (30)
arm stretches" away from the house of BBB and AAA. He denied having raped BBB on 15
January 2000 because on said date he was at the house of his sister, two (2) kilometers away
from the house of his parents where the rape occurred, from 11:30 in the morning and stayed
there until early morning of the following day.24
He offered a general denial of the other charges against him by BBB and AAA. He claimed that
he seldom saw the two minors. He further asserted that prior to the institution of the criminal
case against him he had a smooth relationship with his nieces and the only reason the case
was filed against him was that CCC, his sister-in-law and the mother of his nieces, harbored ill-
feelings towards his deceased father, who would call CCC "lazy" within earshot of other family
members.25
The RTC convicted appellant on all eight (8) counts of rape.26 The RTC pronounced appellant's
defense of denial and alibi as unconvincing, citing jurisprudence declaring denial and alibi as
intrinsically weak defenses. The RTC concluded that appellant failed to controvert the clear,
candid and straightforward testimonies of his nieces. It further considered the qualifying
circumstances of minority of the victims and the relationship of the victims and appellant, the
latter being the former's relative by consanguinity within the third degree.
As the penalty imposed consisted of eight (8) death sentences, the records of the case were
automatically elevated to this Court for review. However, in the aftermath of the pronouncement
of the Court in People v. Mateo27 the present case was transferred to the Court of Appeals for
appropriate action and disposition.
On 29 December 2004, the Court of Appeals agreed with the rulings of the RTC in regard to six
(6) of the eight (8) death sentences imposed on appellant.28 The appellate court ratiocinated,
thus:
We have painstakingly gone over the record of these cases and find no cogent reason to
deviate from the findings of the trial court except in at least two (2) cases. The
prosecution's case which was anchored mainly on the testimonies of private
complainants [BBB] and [AAA], deserve full faith and credit for being clear, precise and
straightforward. Like the trial court, We find no reason to disbelieve the private
complainants. It was established with certitude that the accused on several occasions
sexually assaulted his nieces. The perpetration of the crimes and its authorship were
proved by the victims' candid and unwavering testimonies both of whom had the
misfortune of sharing the same fate in the hands of their own uncle. The sincerity of
[AAA] was made more evident when she cried on the witness stand in obvious distress
over what their uncle had done to her and her sister.29
The Court of Appeals downgraded the convictions in Criminal Case Nos. 6906 and 6908 to
attempted rape. In these two (2) cases, it was alleged that appellant had raped AAA in 1999 and
on 11 June 2000, respectively. According to the appellate court, it could not find evidence
beyond reasonable doubt in those two (2) cases that appellant had accomplished the slightest
penetration of AAA's vagina to make him liable for consummated rape. It stressed that there
was not even moral certainty that appellant's penis ever touched the labia of the pudendum,
quoting portions of the transcript of the stenographic notes where AAA was asked if appellant
was then successful in inserting his penis into her vagina and she answered in the
negative.30 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals reduced the penalties attached to the two (2)
counts of rape from death for consummated qualified rape to an indeterminate penalty of ten
(10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for attempted rape.
Appellant, in his Supplemental Brief31 before this Court, assails the findings of the Court of
Appeals. He cites inconsistencies in the testimony of BBB as to what really transpired on 15
January 2000. Particularly, appellant observes that BBB testified on 6 June 2001 as to her rape
on 15 January 2000. BBB, her sister and appellant had been sleeping side by side. However,
when BBB again testified on 3 July 2002, this time she stated that on that night, as she and her
sister AAA were sleeping in their room at their parents' house (and not at her grandmother's),
the accused passed through a window, entered their room and raped her again.32 Appellant also
latches on the inconsistencies in BBB's testimony as to the length of the duration of her rape on
that day. In BBB's testimony on 6 June 2001, she said that appellant was atop her for three (3)
minutes while in the 3 July 2002 hearing, BBB stated that the rape lasted for only half a minute.
It must be observed though that BBB was at a tender age when she was raped in 2001.
Moreover, these inconsistencies, which the RTC and the Court of Appeals did not consider
material, were elicited while BBB was testifying in open court. Our observations in People v.
Perez33 on the appreciation of alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of rape victims who
happen to be minors are instructive, thus:
We note that these alleged inconsistencies refer, at best, only to trivial, minor, and
insignificant details. They bear no materiality to the commission of the crime of rape
of which accused-appellant was convicted.[34] As pointed out by the Solicitor General
in the Appellee's Brief, the seeming inconsistencies were brought about by confusion
and merely represent minor lapses during the rape victim's direct examination and
cannot possibly affect her credibility. Minor lapses are to be expected when a person is
recounting details of a traumatic experience too painful to recall. The rape victim was
testifying in open court, in the presence of strangers, on an extremely intimate matter,
which, more often than not, is talked about in hushed tones. Under such circumstances,
it is not surprising that her narration was less than letter-perfect.[35] "Moreover, the
inconsistency may be attributed to the well-known fact that a courtroom atmosphere can
affect the accuracy of testimony and the manner in which a witness answers
questions."[36]37
Further, the public prosecutor offered a convincing explanation on why BBB was confused on
some points of her two testimonies. Particularly in the Memorandum for the People38 filed with
the RTC, the public prosecutor creditably explained the inconsistencies, thus:
[BBB]'s testimony on July 3, 2002 might be contradictory to her first testimony on June 6,
2001, with respect to the last rape on January 15, 2000, as regards the place of
commissionhouse of her parents or house of accused; and the length of time he
stayed on her top 3 minutes or half-minute. But she remained consistent in her
declaration that on January 15, 2000, her uncle inserted his penis into her vagina, and
he was moving while on her top then she felt something came out from him. He was able
to rape her because he threatened her with a knife or bladed weapon. Further, the first
she took the witness stand on June 6, 2001, she was made to recall the last rape, the
first rape and many acts of sexual abuses [sic] against her. She was even confused
about her age when she was first raped by her uncle. After she testified on November
14, 2001, for the separate charges of rapes in 1997, 1998 and 1999, she was able to
recall more clearly the last rape on January 15, 2000, which happened in her own
house. These noted discrepancies as to the exact place of commission accused's
house or victim's house is not an essential element of the crime of rape and both
houses are situated in Brgy. Villa Padua Ilaya, Gumaca, Quezon, which is within the
territorial jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. x x x 39
In addition, we share the lower court's disbelief of appellant's proffered defenses of denial and
alibi. These two defenses are inherently the weakest as they are negative defenses. Mere
denials of involvement in a crime cannot take precedence over the positive testimony of the
offended party. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the defendant to prove that he was
somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must likewise demonstrate that it is
physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time.40
In the case at bar, appellant's alibi that he was at his sister's house barely two (2) kilometers
away when the rape took place on 15 January 2000 cannot be given credence by this Court. If
we are to thread this line of reasoning, appellant could have easily left his sister's house in the
middle of the night, raped BBB, and then returned to his sister's house without much difficulty
and without anybody noticing his absence.
Well-settled is the rule that a categorical and positive identification of an accused, without any
showing of ill-motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi
and denial.41 The defenses of denial and alibi deserve scant consideration when the prosecution
has strong, clear and convincing evidence identifying appellant as the perpetrator.42 In this case,
both BBB and AAA, minors and relatives of appellant, positively identified him as their rapist in
open court. The lower courts found no issue detracting from the credibility of such identification.
It is worthy to note that the alibi presented by appellant is limited to the 15 January 2000 rape of
BBB. He offers nothing to counteract the accusations against him involving the seven (7) other
specific acts of rape other than the averment that he did not know anything about the allegations
propounded on him, an infinitesimal defense considering the evidence against him.
Appellant does claim that the present case was merely instituted because of the grudge of CCC
towards his deceased father. It is outrageous to even suggest that a mother will subject her
daughters to the humiliating experience of coming before the court and narrating their harrowing
experience just because she was tagged by her father-in-law as lazy. In addition, CCC's fatherin-law had died several years before the criminal charges against appellant were ever instituted.
If CCC truly wanted to retaliate and damage the reputation of her father-in-law, she could have
done so when the latter was still alive. No member of a rape victim's family would dare
encourage the victim to publicly expose the dishonor of the family, more specifically if such
accusation is against a member of the family, unless the crime was in fact committed.43
Besides, no sane woman, least of all a child, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an
examination of her private parts and subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she has not in
truth, been a victim of rape and impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to her. Testimonies
of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a woman, more so if she is
a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape
has been committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.44 The
weight of such testimonies may be countered by physical evidence to the contrary, or
indubitable proof that the accused could not have committed the rape, but in the absence of
such countervailing proof, these testimonies shall be accorded utmost value.
The twin aggravating circumstances of minority and relationship were properly appreciated in
this case. The minority of the victims and their relationship with appellant were aptly established
in the lower court proceedings. Not only did the prosecution allege in the Informations the ages
of the victims when they were raped but the prosecution also presented the birth certificates of
BBB and AAA in court as documentary evidence to prove that they were both minors when
appellant raped them. Appellant, in open court, also admitted that that he was the uncle of both
victims being the brother of the victims' father, and thus, a relative of the victims within the third
degree of consanguinity.
Furthermore, the delay in reporting the repulsive acts of appellant to BBB and AAA is
understandably justified, considering that appellant repeatedly threatened to kill them and their
family should they disclose the incidents to anyone. It has been held time and again that delay
in revealing the commission of rape is not an indication of a fabricated charge.45 Such
intimidation must be viewed in light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the
commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule. It is enough that the intimidation
produces a fear that if the victim does not yield to the perverse impulses of the accused,
something would happen to her at the moment, or even thereafter, as when she is threatened
with death if she would report the incident.46
At the same time, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the two counts of rape in Criminal
Case Nos. 6906-G and 6908-G were not proven beyond reasonable doubt, but only the two
separate incidents of attempted rape.
It is to be noted that there is an attempt to commit rape when the offender commences its
commission directly by overt acts but does not perform all acts of execution which should
produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance.47 In Criminal Case No. 6906-G, the records show that there was no penetration or
any indication that the penis of appellant touched the labia of the pudendum of AAA. This was
evident in AAA's testimony at the hearing on 17 October 2001, to wit:
Q Do you remember of any unusual incident that happened to you when you were
eleven years old?
A Yes, Mam. [sic]
Q What was that?
A He also touched my vagina and my other private parts and he inserted also his penis
(into) my vagina. [sic]
Q Was he able to insert his penis into your vagina?
A No, Mam. [sic]
Q Why?
A It was painful, Mam. [sic]
xxxx
Q How many times did he try to insert his penis into your vagina?
A Many times, Mam.48 [sic]
AAA also testified in the same vein in Criminal Case No. 6908-G.
Q I am now through with Criminal Case No. 6906-G. In Criminal Case No. 6908-G,
also for Rape. When was the last time that this sexual abuse was committed by your
Uncle?
A June 11, Mam. [sic]
Q What year?
A June 11, 2000, Mam. [sic]
xxxx
Q What did your Uncle do to you on June 11, 2000?
A He also removed my clothes, Mam. [sic]
Q And after removing your clothes, what did he do to you?
A He was trying to insert his penis into my vagina, Mam. [sic]
xxxx
Q And what did you feel when he was trying to insert his penis in your vagina?
A Painful, Mam. [sic]
Q And what did you do when you feel painful?
A I cried, Mam. [sic]
Q When you cried, what did your Uncle do, if any?
A He did not pursue what he was doing, Mam. [sic]
xxxx
Q And your Uncle was not able to penetrate his penis to your vagina?
A No, Mam.49 [sic]
In downgrading the offense committed and consequently decreasing the penalty, the CA
declared:
It is carnal knowledge, not pain, that is the element to consummate rape. Indeed pain
may be deduced from the sexual act but accused cannot be convicted of rape by
presuming carnal knowledge out of pain. It is well-settled that complete penetration of
the penis into the vagina is not necessary to convict for consummated rape since the
slightest penetration of one into the other will suffice. However, in People v. Campuhan,
the term "slightest penetration" was clarified to mean that there must be sufficient and
convincing proof of the penis indeed touching at the very least the labias of the female
organ. Mere epidermal contact between the penis and the external layer of the victim's
vagina (the stroking and the grazing of the male organ upon the female organ or the
mons pubis) categorizes the crime as attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness. There
must be positive proof of even the slightest penetration, more accurately, the touching of
the labias by the penis, before rape could be deemed consummated. We, therefore, take
exception to the finding of the trial court that when the accused was trying to insert his
penis into the child's vagina, the act proved painful to [AAA,] which made the accused
stop from further executing the act. From the testimony of private complainant, [AAA] in
the afore-numbered cases, the prosecution failed to demonstrate beyond any shadow of
doubt that accused-appellant's penis reached the labia of the pudendum of AAA's
vagina. There is no basis then to apply the rule that the introduction of the penis into the
aperture of the female organ (thereby touching the labia of the pudendum) already
consummates the case of rape. x x x 50
It should be added that under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, there is an attempt when the
offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all
the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident
other than his own spontaneous desistance. In the crime of rape, penetration is an essential act
of execution to produce the felony. Thus, for there to be an attempted rape, the accused must
have commenced the act of penetrating his sexual organ to the vagina of the victim but for
some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance, the penetration, however
slight, is not completed.51
The Court thus affirms the conclusions of the Court of Appeals that it has been established
beyond reasonable doubt that appellant is guilty of six (6) counts of rape and two (2) counts of
attempted rape. However, in light of Rep. Act No. 9346, the appropriate penalties for both
crimes should be amended.
II.
We shall not dwell at length on the proper penalty imposable on appellant for the six (6) counts
of rape. The sentence of death imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals can
no longer be affirmed in view of Rep. Act No. 9346, titled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of
Death Penalty in the Philippines." Section 2 of the law mandates that in lieu of the death penalty,
the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. Correspondingly, the Court can no longer
uphold the death sentences imposed by lower courts, but must, if the
guilt of the accused is affirmed, impose instead the penalty of reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment when appropriate. Since the passage of Rep. Act No. 9346, the Court has had
occasion to effectuate such reduction in recent cases such as People v.
Tubongbanua52 and People v. Cabalquinto.53
III.
The question of what should be the appropriate penalty for the two (2) counts of attempted rape
proves to be the more challenging but interesting question facing the Court.
The Court of Appeals had sentenced appellant, for the attempted rape of AAA, to "an
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum," for each count of attempted rape.
There is no doubt as to the validity of this sentence at the time it was meted prior to the
enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346. Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code establishes the penalty
to be imposed upon the principals of an attempted felony:
ART. 51. xxx A penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the
consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principals in an attempt to commit a
felony.54
What is the penalty "lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law" for attempted rape?
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, which incorporates the amendments introduced by
Rep. Act No. 8353, prescribes:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the victim. x x x55
The prescribed penalty for the consummated rape of a victim duly proven to have been under
eighteen years of age and to have been raped by her uncle, is death under Article 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code. The determination of the penalty two degrees lower than the death
penalty entails the application of Articles 61 and 71 of the Revised Penal Code:
Art. 61. Rules of graduating penalties.For the purpose of graduating the penalties
which, according to the provisions of Articles 50 to 57, inclusive, of this Code, are to be
imposed upon persons guilty as principals of any frustrated or attempted felony, or as
accomplices or accessories, the following rules shall be observed:
1. When the penalty prescribed for the felony is single and indivisible, the penalty next
lower in degree shall be that immediately following that indivisible penalty in the
respective graduated scale prescribed in Article 71 of this Code.56
xxxx
Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code (Article 71) warrants special attention, crucial as it is to our
disposition of this question. The provision reads:
Art. 71. Graduated scales. In the case in which the law prescribes a penalty lower or
higher by one or more degrees than another given penalty, the rules prescribed in Article
61 shall be observed in graduating such penalty.
The lower or higher penalty shall be taken from the graduated scale in which is
comprised the given penalty:
The courts, in applying such lower or higher penalty, shall observe the following
graduated scales:
SCALE NO. 1
1. Death
2. Reclusion perpetua
3. Reclusion temporal
4. Prision mayor
5. Prision correctional
6. Arresto mayor
7. Destierro
8. Arresto menor
9. Public censure
10. Fine57
xxxx
Following the scale prescribed in Article 71, the penalty two degrees lower than death
is reclusion temporal, which was the maximum penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals on
appellant for attempted rape. Reclusion temporal is a penalty comprised of three divisible
periods, a minimum, a medium and a maximum.
At the same time, the Indeterminate Sentence Law prescribes that "the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view
of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code,
and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by
the Code for the offense." The purpose of the prescription of minimum and maximum periods
under the Indeterminate Sentence Law is to effect the privilege granted under the same law, for
prisoners who have served the minimum penalty to be eligible for parole per the discretion of
the Board of Indiscriminate Sentence.58 Thus, convicts sentenced to suffer death penalty or lifeimprisonment are ineligible under that law, as are persons sentenced to reclusion perpetua, an
indivisible penalty without minimum or maximum periods.59
Hence, the Court of Appeals sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty for attempted rape, with a
maximum penalty within the range of reclusion temporal, and a minimum penalty within the
range of the penalty next lower, or prision mayor. If Rep. Act No. 9346 had not been enacted,
the Court would have affirmed such sentence without complication. However, the enactment of
the law has given rise to the problem concerning the imposable penalty. Appellant was
sentenced to a maximum term within reclusion temporal since that is the penalty two degrees
lower than death. With the elimination of death as a penalty, does it follow that appellant should
now be sentenced to a penalty two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua, the highest
remaining penalty with the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346? If it so followed, appellant would be
sentenced to prision mayor in lieu of reclusion temporal.
IV.
Obviously, our ruling on the appropriate penalty on appellant for attempted rape will affect not
only appellant, but several classes of convicts as well. Before we proceed with the discussion,
the Court finds it necessary to make the following qualification.
Prior to the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346, the death penalty was imposable under two
different frames of reference. This was especially made clear with the 1993 amendments to the
Revised Penal Code through Rep. Act No. 7659, or the Death Penalty Law. Under the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, the death penalty was provided for in two ways, namely: as the
maximum penalty for "reclusion perpetua to death," and death itself as an automatic and
exclusive penalty. Death as the automatic penalty was mandated for the crimes of qualified
bribery "if it is the public officer who asks or demands such gift or present;"60 kidnapping or
detention "for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person;"61 destructive
arson wherein "death results;"62 and rape qualified by any of the several circumstances
enumerated under the law.
On the other hand, the penalty of "reclusion perpetua to death" was imposable on several
crimes, including murder,63 qualified piracy,64 and treason.65 The imposition of the death penalty
for crimes punishable by "reclusion perpetua to death" depended on the appreciation of the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances generally outlined in Articles 13 and 14 of the Revised
Penal Code. Reference to those two provisions was unnecessary if the penalty imposed was
death, as opposed to "reclusion perpetua to death."
There is no need for now to discuss the effects of Rep. Act No. 9346 on the penalties for
frustrated and attempted felonies which were punishable by "reclusion perpetua to death" if
consummated, or on accomplices and accessories to such felonies. Such situations do not
relate to the case of appellant, who was convicted of two (2) counts of attempted rape, which, if
consummated, of course would have carried prior to the enactment of Rep. Act 9346 the penalty
of death, and not "reclusion perpetua to death."
The Court also recognizes that the graduation of penalties reckoned from "reclusion perpetua to
death" differs from that based on the exclusive penalty of death. For example, it has been held
that the penalty two degrees lower than "reclusion perpetua to death" is prision mayor.66 In
contrast, the Court has likewise held that for qualified rape in the attempted stage, "the penalty x
x x two (2) degrees lower than the imposable penalty of death for the offense charged x x x is
reclusion temporal."67 In People v. Tolentino,68 we ruled that the accused, who had been
sentenced to die for the rape of his nine (9)-year old stepdaughter, was guilty only of attempted
rape. In explaining that "reclusion temporal" was the proper penalty, the Court, through then
Chief Justice Davide, explained:
Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for an attempted felony is the
"penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony."
In this case, the penalty for the rape if it had been consummated would have been
death, pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No.
7659, since [RT69] was eight years old and TOLENTINO was the common-law spouse of
[RT's] mother. The last paragraph thereof provides:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with
any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the
victim.
xxxx
The penalty in this case should have been reclusion temporal, which is the penalty lower
by two degrees than death. However, with the application of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, TOLENTINO may be sentenced to an indeterminate imprisonment penalty whose
minimum shall be within the range of prision mayor and whose maximum shall be within
the range of reclusion temporal in its medium period pursuant to Article 64 (1) of the
Revised Penal Code.70
This dichotomy results from the application of Article 61 of the Revised Penal Code.
Both reclusion perpetua and death are indivisible penalties. Under Article 61 (2) of the Revised
Penal Code, "[w]hen the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of two indivisible
penalties the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following the lesser of
the penalties prescribed in the respective graduated scale." Hence, in passing sentence on
those convicted of attempted felonies which warranted the penalty of "reclusion perpetua to
death" if consummated, the Court has consistently held that penalty two degrees lower than
"reclusion perpetua to death" is prision mayor. In contrast, if the penalty for the consummated
crime is the single indivisible penalty of death, as was prescribed for several crimes under Rep.
Act No. 7659, Article 61(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that "the penalty prescribed for
the felony is single and indivisible, the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately
following that indivisible penalty in the respective graduated scale prescribed in Article 71".
Thus, the proper penalty two degrees lower than death is reclusion temporal.
It is also for this reason that the controversy we are now addressing did not similarly arise after
the enactment of the 1987 Constitution, which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty
subject to its subsequent readoption at the choice of Congress. Generally, the highest penalty
imposed under the Revised Penal Code was "reclusion perpetuato death," a penalty composed
of two indivisible penalties. As a result, the Court had no occasion, after the passage of the
1987 Constitution, to consider the effect of the charter on penalties downgraded from a single
indivisible penalty. It was under Rep. Act No. 7659, passed in 1993, that some commonly
occurring crimes, such as qualified rape and kidnapping for ransom, were penalized with the
single indivisible penalty of death.
The discussion for purposes of this decision will only center on crimes, such as qualified rape as
defined in the Revised Penal Code, as amended, for which the imposable penalty was death
alone. Thus, our ruling will bear no direct effect on the sentencing of accomplices and
accessories or persons guilty of the attempted or frustrated stage of felonies for which the
imposable penalty was "reclusion perpetua to death."
Hence, it should be understood that any reference forthwith to the penalty of death does
not refer to the penalty of "reclusion perpetua to death."
V.
If there was a clear intent in Rep. Act No. 9346 to downgrade the penalties for convicts whose
sentences had been graduated beginning from death pursuant to Article 71, the Court would not
hesitate to enforce such downgrading based on clear statutory intent. However, nothing in Rep.
Act No. 9346 expressly refers to those penalties imposed on frustrated or attempted felonies, or
on accessories and accomplices.
Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 9346 bears examination:
Section 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly,
Republic Act No. Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177),
otherwise known as the Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection, is hereby repealed.
Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659), otherwise
known as the Death Penalty Law, and all other laws, executive orders and decrees,
insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.
If the penalties for attempted rape of a minor,71 among others, were deemed to have been
amended by virtue of Rep. Act No. 9346, such amendment can be justified under the ambit of
the repealing clause, which reads, "all other laws, executive orders and decrees, insofar as they
impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended accordingly." While this clause may,
given its breadth, initially impress as the nature of a general repealing clause, it is in actuality an
express repealing clause. Section 1 specifically repeals all laws, executive orders and decrees
insofar as they impose the death penalty, and not merely such enactments which are
inconsistent with Rep. Act No. 9346.
Section 1 arguably presents more problems in that regard with its utilization of the particular
phrase "insofar as they impose the death penalty." We can entertain two schools of thought in
construing this provision, both of them rooted in literalist interpretations. First, it can be claimed
that the present application of the penalties for attempted rape of a minor (among many
examples) does not "impose the death penalty," since none of the convicts concerned would
face execution through the application of the penalty for attempted rape. Hence, the statutory
provisions enforced in determining the penalty for attempted rape, or other crimes not
punishable by death, are not amended by Rep. Act No. 9346.
On the other hand, the operation of the provisions imposing the penalty for attempted rape of a
minor necessarily calls for the application, if not its literal imposition, of death as a penalty, in the
context of applying the graduated scale of penalties under Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code.
If we were to construe "impose" as to mean "apply," then it could be argued that Article 71 was
indeed amended by Rep. Act No. 9346. After all, the application of Article 71 to crimes such as
attempted rape of a minor call for the actual operation of the death penalty not only in theory,
but as a means of determining the proper graduated penalty.
On face value, the attractive worth of the firstly offered line of thinking is enhanced by its innate
conservatism, limiting as it would the effects of Rep. Act No. 9346. It also can be understood if
confronted with the option of employing either a liberal or a conservative construction, there is a
natural tendency to employ the conservative mode. Further, the reasoning is seemingly
consistent with that employed by the Court in People v. Muoz,72 a decision which will be
thoroughly analyzed in the course of this discussion.
If the true intent of Rep. Act No. 9346 was to limit the extent of the "imposition" of the death
penalty to actual executions, this could have been accomplished with more clarity. For example,
had Section 1 read instead "insofar as they sentence an accused to death," there would have
been no room for doubt that only those statutory provisions calling for actual executions would
have been repealed or amended. The inability of Congress to shape the repealing clause in so
specific a fashion does leave open the question whether Congress did actually intend to limit the
operation of Rep. Act No. 9346 to actual executions only.
But let us for now test that premise by assuming for the nonce that the legislative intent of Rep.
Act No. 9346 was to limit the prohibition of the law to the physical imposition of the death
penalty, without extending any effect to the graduated scale of penalties under Article 71 of the
Revised Penal Code.
VI.
There are troubling results if we were to uphold, based on legislative intent, the interpretation of
Rep. Act No. 9346 that limits its effects only to matters relating to the physical imposition of the
death penalty.
Illustrations are necessary. The easy demonstration of iniquitous results is in the case of
accomplices. Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, kidnapping for ransom
was punishable by death. Let us say X and Y were tried for the crime. X was charged as a
principal for having directly participated in the kidnapping. Y was charged as an accomplice for
having allowed X to use his house to detain the victim, even though Y was abroad at the time of
the crime and otherwise had no other participation therein. Both X and Y were convicted by final
judgment. Since X could no longer be meted the death penalty, he is sentenced instead
to reclusion perpetua. Ordinarily, Y as an accomplice should receive the penalty next lower in
degree, or reclusion temporal. Yet following the "conservative" interpretation of Rep. Act No.
9346, the graduation of penalties remains unaffected with the enactment of the new law. Thus,
under Article 71, which would still take into account the death penalty within the graduated
scale, Y, as an accomplice, would be sentenced to reclusion perpetua, the same penalty as the
principal.
It might be countered that part of the legislative intent of Rep. Act No. 9346, by retaining the
graduated scale of penalties under Article 71, was to equalize the penalties of principals and
accomplices for crimes previously punishable by death. We do not doubt that the legislature has
the theoretical capability to amend the penal law in such fashion. Yet given the drastic effects of
equalizing the penalties for principals and accomplices, a step that runs contrary to entrenched
thought in criminal law, one could reasonably assume that a legislature truly oriented to enact
such change would have been candid enough to have explicitly stated such intent in the law
itself. Of course, nothing in Rep. Act No. 9346, either in the caption or in the provisions,
explicates the intention to equalize the penalties for principals and accomplices in any crime at
all.
Moreover, it cannot be denied that it would, at bare minimum, seem strange that the penalties
for principals and accomplices are equalized in some crimes, and not in others. Let us return to
our previous example of X and Y, but this time, assume that they were charged for simple
kidnapping, with no qualifying circumstance that would have resulted in the imposition of the
death penalty. Since the crime is not punishable by death, Rep. Act No. 9346 would have no
effect in the imposition of the penalty for simple kidnapping. Accordingly, X would have been
sentenced toreclusion perpetua as the principal, while Y would have been sentenced
to reclusion temporal as an accomplice.
Since simple kidnapping is a comparatively lighter crime than kidnapping for ransom, the lesser
penalties are justified. Since Y was merely an accomplice to the crime of simple kidnapping, the
imposition on him of a lighter penalty than X is in accord with the Revised Penal Code and
established juridical and legal thought. Less justifiable would be the notion that in kidnapping for
ransom, the principal and the accomplice would receive the same penalty, while in simple
kidnapping, the principal suffers a higher penalty than the accomplice. Frankly, there is no
rational explanation for such a disparity, and no legal justification other than the recognition that
Congress has the power to will it so.
Admittedly, the impact of Rep. Act No. 9346 is less dramatic in relation to frustrated and
attempted felonies which were punishable by death if consummated. The consummated felony
previously punishable by death would now be punishable by reclusion perpetua. At the same
time, the same felony in its frustrated stage would, under the foregoing premise in this section,
be penalized one degree lower from death, or also reclusion perpetua. It does not seem right, of
course, that the same penalty of reclusion perpetua would be imposed on both the
consummated and frustrated felony. However, the anomaly would be mainly in theory, as we
recognize that those felonies previously punishable by death are improbable of commission in
their frustrated stage, unlike several felonies punishable by "reclusion perpetua to death,"73 such
as murder, which may be frustrated.
Still, it cannot be denied that these felonies previously punishable by death are capable of
commission in their attempted stages and that the Revised Penal Code provides that the
penalty for attempted felonies is "a penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for
the consummated felony." The Court has thus consistently imposed reclusion temporal, the
penalty two degrees lower than death, as the maximum term for attempted felonies which, if
consummated, would have warranted the death penalty.74 If it were to be insisted that Rep. Act
No. 9346 did not affect at all the penalties for attempted felonies, then those found guilty of the
subject attempted felonies would still be sentenced to reclusion temporal, even though the
"penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony" would
now be prision mayor.
It should be pointed out that the interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346 that would sanction a
penalty for some attempted felonies that is only one degree lower than the consummated crime
would, again, be disharmonious and inconsistent with the Revised Penal Code and established
thought in criminal law. Conceding again that the legislature has the discretion to designate the
criminal penalties it sees fit, a regime that foists a differential theoretical basis for the
punishment of different attempted felonies resulting in discriminatory penalties is not only
irrational but also, to say the least, highly suspect. Considering that physical liberties are at
stake, it would be a most cruel joke if such discriminatory effects ensued not from deliberate
legislative will, but from oversight.
VII.
The implementation of Rep. Act No. 9346 in a way that leaves extant the penalties for
accomplices, accessories, frustrated and attempted felonies, clearly results in illogical,
iniquitous and inconsistent effects. In contrast, no similar flaws ensue should we construe Rep.
Act No. 9346 instead as not having barred the application of the death penalty even as a means
of depreciating penalties other than death. In particular, the operative amendment that would
assure the integrity of penalties for accomplices, accessories, frustrated and attempted felonies
lies in Article 71, which ranks "death" at the top of the scale for graduated penalties.
Simply put, the negation of the word "death" as previously inscribed in Article 71 will have the
effect of appropriately downgrading the proper penalties attaching to accomplices, accessories,
frustrated and attempted felonies to the level consistent with the rest of our penal laws.
Returning to our previous examples, Y, the convicted accomplice in kidnapping for ransom,
would now bear the penalty of reclusion temporal, the penalty one degree lower than that the
principal X would bear (reclusion perpetua). Such sentence would be consistent with Article 52
of the Revised Penal Code, as well as Article 71, as amended, to remove the reference to
"death." Moreover, the prospect of the accomplice receiving the same sentence as the principal,
an anomalous notion within our penal laws, would be eliminated. Thus, the same standard
would prevail in sentencing principals and accomplices to the crime of kidnapping in ransom, as
that prescribed to the crime of simple kidnapping.
The harmonization that would result if Rep. Act No. 9346 were construed as having eliminated
the reference to "death" in Article 71 would run across the board in our penal laws. Consistent
with Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, those convicted of attempted qualified rape would
receive the penalty two degrees lower than that prescribed by law, now Rep. Act No. 9346, for
qualified rape.
There are principles in statutory construction that will sanction, even mandate, this "expansive"
interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346. The maxim interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus
interpretandi embodies the principle that a statute should be so construed not only to be
consistent with itself, but also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter, as to
form a complete, coherent and intelligible systema uniform system of
jurisprudence.75"Interpreting and harmonizing laws with laws is the best method of
interpretation. x x x x This manner of construction would provide a complete, consistent and
intelligible system to secure the rights of all persons affected by different legislative and quasilegislative acts."76 There can be no harmony between Rep. Act No. 9346 and the Revised Penal
Code unless the later statute is construed as having downgraded those penalties attached to
death by reason of the graduated scale under Article 71. Only in that manner will a clear and
consistent rule emerge as to the application of penalties for frustrated and attempted felonies,
and for accessories and accomplices.
It is also a well-known rule of legal hermeneutics that penal or criminal laws are strictly
construed against the state and liberally in favor of the accused.77 If the language of the law
were ambiguous, the court will lean more strongly in favor of the defendant than it would if the
statute were remedial, as a means of effecting substantial justice.78 The law is tender in favor of
the rights of an individual.79 It is this philosophy of caution before the State may deprive a
person of life or liberty that animates one of the most fundamental principles in our Bill of Rights,
that every person is presumed innocent until proven guilty.
Resort to the aforementioned principles in statutory construction would not have been
necessary had Rep. Act No. 9346 ineluctably stated that the repeal of all laws imposing the
death penalty did not engender the corresponding modification of penalties other than death,
dependent as these are on "death" as a measure under the graduated scale of penalties under
Article 71. Admittedly, if this were indeed the intent of Congress, and such intent were
unequivocally expressed in Rep. Act No. 9346, the resulting inequities and inconsistencies we
had earlier pointed out would have remained. If that were to be the case, we would have
acknowledged, perhaps tacitly, that such inequities and inconsistencies fell part of the legislative
intent. It does not speak well of a Congress to be deliberately inconsistent with, or ignorant of its
own prior enactments. Yet ultimately, Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 9346 is not expressive of such
rash or injudicious notions, as it is susceptible to a reading that would harmonize its effects with
the precepts and practices that pervade our general penal laws, and in a manner that does not
defy the clear will of Congress.
VIII.
One who would like to advocate that Rep. Act No. 9346 did not correspondingly amend any of
the penalties other than death in our penal laws would most certainly invoke our ruling in People
v. Muoz,80 decided in 1989. Therein, a divided Court ruled in that the constitutional bar on the
imposition of the death penalty did not enact "a corresponding modification in the other periods
[in penalties]", there being no expression of "such a requirement in Article III, Section 19(1) of
the Constitution or indicat[ion] therein by at least
clear and unmistakable implication."81 In so concluding, the Court made the oft-cited
pronouncement that there was nothing in the 1987 Constitution "which expressly declares the
abolition of the death penalty."82
It is time to re-examine Muoz and its continued viability in light of Rep. Act No. 9346. More
precisely, would Muozas precedent deter the Court from ruling that Rep. Act No. 9346
consequently downgraded penalties other than death?
It can be recalled that the accused in Muoz were found guilty of murder, which under the
Revised Penal Code, carried the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death.
The subject murders therein were not attended by any modifying circumstance, and thus
penalized in the penalty's medium term. Jurisprudence previous to Muoz held that the proper
penalty in such instances should be "the higher half of reclusion temporal maximum,"
with reclusion temporal maximum, divided into two halves for that purpose. Muoz rejected this
formulation, holding instead that the penalty should be reclusion perpetua. Towards this
conclusion, the Court made the above-cited conclusions relating to the constitutional abolition of
the death penalty, and the charter's effects on the other periods. Six justices dissented from that
ruling, and as recently as 1997, a member of the Court felt strongly enough to publish a view
urging the reexamination of Muoz.83
It would be disingenuous to consider Muoz as directly settling the question now befacing us, as
the legal premises behind Muoz are different from those in this case. Most
pertinently, Muoz inquired into the effects of the Constitution on the proper penalty for murder;
while herein, we are ascertaining the effects of Rep. Act No. 9346 on the proper penalty for
attempted qualified rape. Muoz may have pronounced that the Constitution did not
abolish the death penalty, but that issue no longer falls into consideration herein, the
correct query now being whether Congress has banned the death penalty through Rep.
Act No. 9346. Otherwise framed,Muoz does not preclude the Court from concluding that
with the express prohibition of the imposition of the death penalty Congress has
unequivocally banned the same.
Muoz made hay over the peculiar formulation of Section 19(1), Article III, which provided that
"[n]either shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it." Muoz and its progenies, have interpreted that
provision as prohibiting the actual imposition of the death penalty, as opposed to enacting an
amendatory law that eliminates all references and applications of the death penalty in our
statutes. It can also be understood and appreciated that at the time Muoz was decided, it
would have been polemical to foster an unequivocal pronouncement that Section 19(1), Article
III abolished the death penalty, since the very provision itself acknowledged that Congress may
nonetheless subsequently provide for the penalty "for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes," as Congress very well did just four (4) years after Muoz. No such language exists in
Rep. Act No. 9346. Of course, the legislature has the inherent and constitutional power to enact
laws prescribing penalties for crimes, and the Constitution will not prohibit Congress from
reenacting the death penalty "for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes." Yet it was that
express stipulation in the Constitution that dissuaded the Court from recognizing the
constitutional abolition of the death penalty; and there is no similar statutory expression in Rep.
Act No. 9346, which could be construed as evocative of intent similar to that of the Constitution.
The doctrine in Muoz that the constitutional prohibition on the imposition of the death penalty
did not enact a corresponding modification of other penalties is similarly irrelevant to this case,
which calls for an examination as to whether such corresponding modifications of other
penalties arose as a consequence of Rep. Act No. 9346, and not the Constitution.
For purposes of legal hermeneutics, the critical question is whether Rep. Act No. 9346 intended
to delete the word "death" as expressly provided for in the graduated scale of penalties under
Article 71. Muoz did not engage in an analogous inquiry in relation to Article 71 and the
Constitution, for what was relevant therein was not the general graduated scale of penalties, but
the range of the penalties for murder. Herein, at bare minimum, no provision in Rep. Act No.
9346 provides a context within which the concept of "death penalty" bears retentive legal effect,
especially in relation to Article 71. Unlike the Constitution, Rep. Act No. 9346 does expressly
stipulate the amendment of all extant laws insofar as they called for the imposition of the penalty
of death.
The impression left by Muoz was that the use of the word "imposition" in the Constitution
evinced the framer's intent to retain the operation of penalties under the Revised Penal Code. In
the same vein, one might try to construe the use of "imposition" in Rep. Act No. 9346 as a
means employed by Congress to ensure that the "death penalty", as applied in Article 71,
remain extant. If the use of "imposition" was implemented as a means of retaining "death" under
Article 71, it would have been a most curious, roundabout means indeed. The Court can tolerate
to a certain degree the deliberate vagueness sometimes employed in legislation, yet
constitutional due process demands a higher degree of clarity when infringements on life or
liberty are intended. We have ruled, on due process grounds, as arbitrary and oppressive a tax
assessed on a standard characterized as "nothing but blather in search of meaning."84 In the
matter of statutes that deprive a person of physical liberty, the demand for a clear standard in
sentencing is even more exacting.
Yet in truth, there is no material difference between "imposition" and "application," for both terms
embody the operation in law of the death penalty. Since Article 71 denominates "death" as an
element in the graduated scale of penalties, there is no question that the operation of Article 71
involves the actual application of the death penalty as a means of determining the extent which
a person's liberty is to be deprived. Since Rep. Act No. 9346 unequivocally bars the application
of the death penalty, as well as expressly repeals all such statutory provisions requiring the
application of the death penalty, such effect necessarily extends to its relevance to the
graduated scale of penalties under Article 71.
We cannot find basis to conclude that Rep. Act No. 9346 intended to retain the operative effects
of the death penalty in the graduation of the other penalties in our penal laws. Munoz cannot
enjoin us to adopt such conclusion. Rep. Act No. 9346 is not swaddled in the same restraints
appreciated by Muoz on Section 19(1), Article III. The very Congress empowered by the
Constitution to reinstate the imposition of the death penalty once thought it best to do so,
through Rep. Act No. 7650. Within the same realm of constitutional discretion, Congress has
reversed itself. It must be asserted that today, the legal status of the suppression of the death
penalty in the Philippines has never been more secure than at any time in our political history as
a nation.
Following Muoz, the sovereign people, through the 1987 Constitution, might not have willed
the abolition of the death penalty and instead placed it under a suspensive condition. As such,
we affirmed the characterization of the death penalty during the interregnum between the 1987
Constitution and its reimposition through law as being "in a state of hibernation."85 No longer. It
reawakened then it died; because the sovereign people, through Rep. Act No. 9346, banned
the death penalty. Only by an Act of Congress can it be reborn. Before that day, the
consideration of death as a penalty is bereft of legal effect, whether as a means of depriving life,
or as a means of depriving liberty.
Despite our present pronouncement on the ban against of the death penalty, we do not
acknowledge that Muozlacked legal justification when it was decided; that its application as
precedent prior to Rep. Act No. 9346 was erroneous; or that previous sentences imposed on
convicts on the basis of Muoz were wrong. Muoz properly stood as the governing precedent
in the matter of sentences that passed finality prior to Rep. Act No. 9346; and the consistent
reliance by the courts on its doctrines entrenched its footing in criminal law jurisprudence.
IX.
Rep. Act No. 7659, in the course of reintroducing the death penalty in the Philippines, also
effectively classified the crimes listed therein as "heinous," within constitutional contemplation.
Such reclassification under Rep. Act No. 7659 was accompanied by certain legal effects other
than the imposition of the death penalty, such as the increase in imposable fines attached to
certain heinous crimes.86 The categorization of certain crimes as "heinous", constituting as it
does official recognition that some crimes are more odious than others, has also influenced this
Court in adjudging the proper pecuniary indemnities awarded to the victims of these crimes.
Hence, a general inclination persists in levying a greater amount of damages on accused found
guilty of heinous crimes.
It should be understood that the debarring of the death penalty through Rep. Act No. 9346 did
not correspondingly declassify those crimes previously catalogued as "heinous". The
amendatory effects of Rep. Act No. 9346 extend only to the application of the death penalty but
not to the definition or classification of crimes. True, the penalties for heinous crimes have been
downgraded under the aegis of the new law. Still, what remains extant is the recognition by law
that such crimes, by their abhorrent nature, constitute a special category by themselves.
Accordingly, Rep. Act No. 9346 does not serve as basis for the reduction of civil indemnity and
other damages that adhere to heinous crimes.
X.
Having pronounced the statutory disallowance of the death penalty through Rep. Act No. 9346
and the corresponding modification of penalties other than death through that statute, we now
proceed to discuss the effects of these rulings.
As to sentences not yet handed down, or affirmed with finality, the application is immediate.
Henceforth, "death," as utilized in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, shall no longer form
part of the equation in the graduation of penalties. For example, in the case of appellant, the
determination of his penalty for attempted rape shall be reckoned not from two degrees lower
than death, but two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua. Hence, the maximum term of his
penalty shall no longer be reclusion temporal, as ruled by the Court of Appeals, but
instead,prision mayor.
There should be little complication if the crime committed was punishable by the free-standing
penalty of "death," as utilized in Rep. Act No. 7659, as opposed to the ranged penalty of
"reclusion perpetua to death," as often used in the Revised Penal Code and other penal laws.
The facts of the present case do not concern the latter penalty, hence our reluctance to avail of
an extended discussion thereof. However, we did earlier observe that both "reclusion perpetua"
and death are indivisible penalties. Under Article 61 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, "[w]hen the
penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of two indivisible penalties x x x x the penalty next
lower in degree shall be that immediately following the lesser of the penalties prescribed in the
respective graduated scale." Hence, as we earlier noted, our previous rulings that the penalty
two degrees lower than "reclusion perpetua to death" isprision mayor.
Then there is the matter of whether retroactive effect should be extended to this new ruling,
favorable as it is to persons previously convicted of crimes which, if consummated or
participated in as a principal, would have warranted the solitary penalty of death. We see no
choice but to extend the retroactive benefit. Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code states that
"[p]enal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony,
who is not a habitual criminal[87] x x x x although at the time of the publication of such laws a
final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same." Given that we have
ruled that Rep. Act No. 9346 downgraded the penalties for such crimes, the benefit of Article 22
has to apply, except as to those persons defined as "habitual criminal[s]." Indeed, Rep. Act No.
9346 expressly recognized that its enactment would have retroactive beneficial effects, referring
as it did to "persons x x x whose sentences were reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of
this Act."88
It cannot be discounted that by operation of Rep. Act No. 9346 and Article 22 of the Revised
Penal Code, there may be convicts presently serving their original sentences whose actual
served terms exceed their reduced sentences. It should be understood that this decision
does not make operative the release of such convicts, especially as there may be other
reasons that exist for their continued detention. There are remedies under law that could be
employed to obtain the release of such prisoners, if warranted. Offices such as the Public
Attorney's Office and non-governmental organizations that frequently assist detainees possess
the capacity and acumen to help implement the release of such prisoners who are so entitled by
reason of this ruling.
XI.
We close by returning to the matter of appellant Alfredo Bon. By reason of Rep. Act No. 9346,
he is spared the death sentence, and entitled to the corresponding reduction of his penalty as a
consequence of the downgrading of his offense from two (2) counts consummated rape to two
(2) counts of attempted rape. For the six (6) counts of rape, we downgrade the penalty of death
to reclusion perpetua with no eligibility for parole, pursuant to Rep. Act No. 9346. For each of
the two (2) counts of attempted rape, we downgrade by one degree lower the penalty imposed
by the Court of Appeals. We hold that there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances,
the penalty of prision mayor should be imposed in it medium period. Consequently, we impose
the new penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.
Lastly, as to damages, the Court awards AAA P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P25,000.00 as
moral damages andP10,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count of attempted rape, it
being the prevailing rate of indemnity as pronounced in the recent case of People v. Miranda.89
Separately, the Court applies prevailing jurisprudence90 in awarding to BBB and
AAA P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,P75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages, for each count of consummated rape.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The Court sentences appellant Alfredo J. Bon to the penalty
of reclusion perpetua with no possibility of parole for each of the six (6) counts of consummated
rape committed against AAA in Criminal Case Nos. 6699, 6902, and against BBB in Criminal
Case Nos. 6689, 6903, 6905, and 6907. Appellant is further ORDERED to indemnify AAA and
BBB for the crime of consummated rape, in the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages for each of
them.
For the two (2) counts of attempted rape of AAA in Criminal Cases No. 6906 and 6908,
appellant is hereby SENTENCED to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day of prision correccionalas minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) of prision
mayor as maximum for each count of attempted rape. In addition, appellant is ORDERED to
indemnify AAA for each of the two (2) counts of attempted rape in the amounts of P30,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P25,000.00 as moral damages and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson), Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Chico-Nazario, Garcia,
and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 93028 July 29, 1994

vs.
MARTIN SIMON y SUNGA, respondent.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Ricardo M.Sampang for accused-appellant.
REGALADO, J.:
Herein accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga was charged on November 10, 1988 with a
violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, under an
indictment alleging that on or about October 22, 1988, at Barangay Sto. Cristo, Guagua,
Pampanga, he sold four tea bags of marijuana to a Narcotics Command (NARCOM) poseurbuyer in consideration of the sum of P40.00, which tea bags, when subjected to laboratory
examination, were found positive for marijuana. 1
Eventually arraigned with the assistance of counsel on March 2, 1989, after his rearrest
following his escape from Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga where he was temporarily
detained, 2 he pleaded not guilty. He voluntarily waived his right to a pre-trial conference, 3 after
which trial on the merits ensued and was duly concluded.
I
The evidence on record shows that a confidential informant, later identified as a NARCOM
operative, informed the police unit at Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga, of the illegal
drug activities of a certain "Alyas Pusa" at Sto. Cristo, Guagua, Pampanga. Capt. Francisco
Bustamante, Commanding Officer of the 3rd Narcotics Regional Unit in the camp, then formed a
buy-bust team composed of Sgt. Buenaventura Lopez, Pfc. Virgilio Villaruz and
Sgt. Domingo Pejoro, all members of the same unit. After securing marked money from
Bustamante, the team, together with their informant, proceeded to Sto. Cristo after they had
coordinated with the police authorities andbarangay officers thereof. When they reached the
place, the confidential informer pointed out appellant to Lopez who consequently approached
appellant and asked him if he had marijuana. Appellant answered in the affirmative and Lopez
offered to buy two tea bags. Appellant then left and, upon returning shortly thereafter, handed to
Lopez two marijuana tea bags and Lopez gave him the marked money amounting to P40.00 as
payment. Lopez then scratched his head as a
pre-arranged signal to his companions who were stationed around ten to fifteen meters away,
and the team closed in on them. Thereupon, Villaruz, who was the head of the back-up team,
arrested appellant. The latter was then brought by the team to the 3rd Narcotics Regional Unit
at Camp Olivas on board a jeep and he was placed under custodial investigation, with Sgt.
Pejoro as the investigator. 4
Pfc. Villaruz corroborated Lopez' testimony, claiming that he saw the deal that transpired
between Lopez and the appellant. He also averred that he was the one who confiscated the
marijuana and took the marked money from appellant. 5
Sgt. Domingo Pejoro, for his part, declared that although he was part of the buy-bust team, he
was stationed farthest from the rest of the other members, that is, around two hundred meters
away from his companions. He did not actually see the sale that transpired between Lopez and
appellant but he saw his teammates accosting appellant after the latter's arrest. He was likewise
the one who conducted the custodial investigation of appellant wherein the latter was apprised
of his rights to remain silent, to information and to counsel. Appellant, however, orally waived his
right to counsel. 6
Pejoro also claimed having prepared Exhibit "G", the "Receipt of Property Seized/Confiscated"
which appellant signed, admitting therein the confiscation of four tea bags of marijuana dried
leaves in his possession. Pejoro likewise informed the court below that, originally, what he
placed on the receipt was that only one marijuana leaf was confiscated in exchange for P20.00.
However, Lopez and Villaruz corrected his entry by telling him to put "two", instead of "one" and
"40", instead of "20". He agreed to the correction since they were the ones who were personally
and directly involved in the purchase of the marijuana and the arrest of appellant. 7
Dr. Pedro S. Calara, a medical officer at Camp Olivas, examined appellant at 5:30 p.m. of the
day after the latter's apprehension, and the results were practically normal except for his
relatively high blood pressure. The doctor also did not find any trace of physical injury on the
person of appellant. The next day, he again examined appellant due to the latter's complaint of
gastro-intestinal pain. In the course of the examination, Dr. Calara discovered that appellant has
a history of peptic ulcer, which causes him to experience abdominal pain and consequently
vomit blood. In the afternoon, appellant came back with the same complaint but, except for the
gastro-intestinal pain, his physical condition remained normal. 8
As expected, appellant tendered an antipodal version of the attendant facts, claiming that on the
day in question, at around 4:30 p.m., he was watching television with the members of his family
in their house when three persons, whom he had never met before suddenly arrived. Relying on
the assurance that they would just inquire about something from him at their detachment,
appellant boarded a jeep with them. He was told that they were going to Camp Olivas, but he
later noticed that they were taking a different route. While on board, he was told that he was a
pusher so he attempted to alight from the jeep but he was handcuffed instead. When they finally
reached the camp, he was ordered to sign some papers and, when he refused, he was boxed in
the stomach eight or nine times by Sgt. Pejoro. He was then compelled to affix his signature and
fingerprints on the documents presented to him. He denied knowledge of the P20.00 or the
dried marijuana leaves, and insisted that the twenty-peso bill came from the pocket of Pejoro.
Moreover, the reason why he vomited blood was because of the blows he suffered at the hands
of Pejoro. He admitted having escaped from the NARCOM office but claimed that he did so
since he could no longer endure the maltreatment to which he was being subjected. After
escaping, he proceeded to the house of his uncle, Bienvenido Sunga, at San Matias, Guagua,
reaching the place at around 6:30 or 7:30 p.m. There, he consulted a quack doctor and, later, he
was accompanied by his sister to the Romana Pangan District Hospital at Floridablanca,
Pampanga where he was confined for three days. 9
Appellant's brother, Norberto Simon, testified to the fact that appellant was hospitalized at
Floridablanca, Pampanga after undergoing abdominal pain and vomiting of blood. He likewise
confirmed that appellant had been suffering from peptic ulcer even before the latter's
arrest. 10 Also, Dr. Evelyn Gomez-Aguas, a resident physician of Romana Pangan District
Hospital, declared that she treated appellant for three days due to abdominal pain, but her
examination revealed that the cause for this ailment was appellant's peptic ulcer. She did not
see any sign of slight or serious external injury, abrasion or contusion on his body. 11
On December 4, 1989, after weighing the evidence presented, the trial court rendered judgment
convicting appellant for a violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, to pay a fine of twenty thousand
pesos and to pay the costs. The four tea bags of marijuana dried leaves were likewise ordered
confiscated in favor of the Government. 12
Appellant now prays the Court to reverse the aforementioned judgment of the lower court,
contending in his assignment of errors that the latter erred in (1) not upholding his defense of
"frame-up", (2) not declaring Exhibit "G" (Receipt of Property Seized/Confiscated) inadmissible
in evidence, and (3) convicting him of a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. 13
At the outset, it should be noted that while the People's real theory and evidence is to the effect
the appellant actually sold only two tea bags of marijuana dried leaves, while the other two tea
bags were merely confiscated subsequently from his possession, 14 the latter not being in any
way connected with the sale, the information alleges that he sold and delivered four tea bags of
marijuana dried leaves. 15 In view thereof, the issue presented for resolution in this appeal is
merely the act of selling the two tea bags allegedly committed by appellant, and does not
include the disparate and distinct issue of illegal possession of the other two tea bags which
separate offense is not charged herein. 16
To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs, the sale must be clearly and unmistakably
established. 17 To sell means to give, whether for money or any other material consideration. 18 It
must, therefore, be established beyond doubt that appellant actually sold and delivered two tea
bags of marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez, who acted as the poseur-buyer, in exchange for
two twenty-peso bills.
After an assiduous review and calibration of the evidence adduced by both parties, we are
morally certain that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto engaging in the illegal sale of
prohibited drugs. The prosecution was able to prove beyond a scintilla of doubt that appellant,
on October 22, 1988, did sell two tea bags of marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez. The latter
himself creditably testified as to how the sale took place and his testimony was amply
corroborated by his teammates. As between the straightforward, positive and corroborated
testimony of Lopez and the bare denials and negative testimony of appellant, the former
undeniably deserves greater weight and is more entitled to credence.
We are aware that the practice of entrapping drug traffickers through the utilization of poseurbuyers is susceptible to mistake, harassment, extortion and abuse. 19 Nonetheless, such causes
for judicial apprehension and doubt do not obtain in the case at bar. Appellant's entrapment and
arrest were not effected in a haphazard way, for a surveillance was conducted by the team
before the
buy-bust operation was effected. 20 No ill motive was or could be attributed to them, aside from
the fact that they are presumed to have regularly performed their official duty. 21 Such lack of
dubious motive coupled with the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as
well as the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, should prevail over the selfserving and uncorroborated claim of appellant of having been framed, 22 erected as it is upon the
mere shifting sands of an alibi. To top it all, appellant was caught
red-handed delivering prohibited drugs, and while there was a delimited chance for him to
controvert the charge, he does not appear to have plausibly done so.
When the drug seized was submitted to the Crime Laboratory Service of the then Philippine
Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-INP) at Camp Olivas for examination, P/Cpl.
Marlyn Salangad, a forensic chemist therein, 23confirmed in her Technical Report No. NB-448-88
that the contents of the four tea bags confiscated from appellant were positive for and had a
total weight of 3.8 grams of marijuana. 24 Thus, the corpus delicti of the crime had been fully
proved with certainty and conclusiveness. 25
Appellant would want to make capital of the alleged inconsistencies and improbabilities in the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Foremost, according to him, is the matter of who
really confiscated the marijuana tea bags from him since, in open court, Pejoro asserted that he
had nothing to do with the confiscation of the marijuana, but in the aforementioned "Receipt of
Property Seized/Confiscated," he signed it as the one who seized the same. 26
Suffice it to say that whether it was Villaruz or Pejoro who confiscated the marijuana will not
really matter since such is not an element of the offense with which appellant is charged. What
is unmistakably clear is that the marijuana was confiscated from the possession of appellant.
Even, assuming arguendo that the prosecution committed an error on who actually seized the
marijuana from appellant, such an error or discrepancy refers only to a minor matter and, as
such, neither impairs the essential integrity of the prosecution evidence as a whole nor reflects
on the witnesses' honesty. 27 Besides, there was clearly a mere imprecision of language since
Pejoro obviously meant that he did not take part in the physical taking of the drug from the
person of appellant, but he participated in the legal seizure or confiscation thereof as the
investigator of their unit.
Next, appellant adduces the argument that the twenty-peso bills allegedly confiscated from him
were not powdered for finger-printing purposes contrary to the normal procedure in buy-bust
operations. 28 This omission has been satisfactorily explained by Pfc. Virgilio Villaruz in his
testimony, as follows:
Q: Is it the standard operating procedure of your unit that in
conducting such operation you do not anymore provide a powder
(sic) on the object so as to determine the thumbmark or identity of
the persons taking hold of the object?
A: We were not able to put powder on these denominations
because we are lacking that kind of material in our office since that
item can be purchased only in Manila and only few are producing
that, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Is it not a fact that your office is within (the) P.C. Crime

Laboratory, CIS, as well as the office of NICA?
A: Our office is only adjacent to those offices but we cannot make
a request for that powder because they, themselves, are using
that in their own work, sir. 29
The foregoing explanation aside, we agree that the failure to mark the money bills used for
entrapment purposes can under no mode of rationalization be fatal to the case of the
prosecution because the Dangerous Drugs Act punishes "any person who, unless authorized by
law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport
any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions." 30 The dusting of said
bills with phosphorescent powder is only an evidentiary technique for identification purposes,
which identification can be supplied by other species of evidence.
Again, appellant contends that there was neither a relative of his nor any barangay official or
civilian to witness the seizure. He decries the lack of pictures taken before, during and after his
arrest. Moreover, he was not reported to or booked in the custody of any barangay official or
police authorities. 31 These are absurd disputations. No law or jurisprudence requires that an
arrest or seizure, to be valid, be witnessed by a relative, a barangay official or any other civilian,
or be accompanied by the taking of pictures. On the contrary, the police enforcers having caught
appellant inflagrante delicto, they were not only authorized but were also under the obligation to
effect a warrantless arrest and seizure.
Likewise, contrary to appellant's contention, there was an arrest report prepared by the police in
connection with his apprehension. Said Booking Sheet and Arrest Report 32 states, inter alia,
that "suspect was arrested for selling two tea bags of suspected marijuana dried leaves and the
confiscation of another two tea bags of suspected marijuana dried leaves." Below these
remarks was affixed appellant's signature. In the same manner, the receipt for the seized
property, hereinbefore mentioned, was signed by appellant wherein he acknowledged the
confiscation of the marked bills from him. 33
However, we find and hereby declare the aforementioned exhibits inadmissible in evidence.
Appellant's conformance to these documents are declarations against interest and tacit
admissions of the crime charged. They were obtained in violation of his right as a person under
custodial investigation for the commission of an offense, there being nothing in the records to
show that he was assisted by counsel. 34 Although appellant manifested during the custodial
investigation that he waived his right to counsel, the waiver was not made in writing and in the
presence of counsel, 35 hence whatever incriminatory admission or confession may be extracted
from him, either verbally or in writing, is not allowable in evidence. 36 Besides, the arrest report is
self-serving and hearsay and can easily be concocted to implicate a suspect.
Notwithstanding the objectionability of the aforesaid exhibits, appellant cannot thereby be
extricated from his predicament since his criminal participation in the illegal sale of marijuana
has been sufficiently proven. The commission of the offense of illegal sale of prohibited drugs
requires merely the consummation of the selling transaction 37 which happens the moment the
buyer receives the drug from the seller. 38 In the present case, and in light of the preceding
discussion, this sale has been ascertained beyond any peradventure of doubt.
Appellant then asseverates that it is improbable that he would sell marijuana to a total
stranger. 39 We take this opportunity to once again reiterate the doctrinal rule that drug-pushing,
when done on a small scale as in this case, belongs to that class of crimes that may be
committed at any time and in any place. 40 It is not contrary to human experience for a drug
pusher to sell to a total stranger, 41 for what matters is not an existing familiarity between the
buyer and seller but their agreement and the acts constituting the sale and delivery of the
marijuana leaves. 42 While there may be instances where such sale could be improbable, taking
into consideration the diverse circumstances of person, time and place, as well as the
incredibility of how the accused supposedly acted on that occasion, we can safely say that
those exceptional particulars are not present in this case.
Finally, appellant contends that he was subjected to physical and mental torture by the arresting
officers which caused him to escape from Camp Olivas the night he was placed under
custody. 43 This he asserts to support his explanation as to how his signatures on the documents
earlier discussed were supposedly obtained by force and coercion.
The doctrine is now too well embedded in our jurisprudence that for evidence to be believed, it
must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself such
as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances. 44 The evidence on record is bereft of any support for appellant's allegation of
maltreatment. Two doctors, one for the prosecution 45 and the other for the defense, 46testified on
the absence of any tell-tale sign or indication of bodily injury, abrasions or contusions on the
person of appellant. What is evident is that the cause of his abdominal pain was his peptic ulcer
from which he had been suffering even before his arrest. 47 His own brother even corroborated
that fact, saying that appellant has had a history of bleeding peptic ulcer. 48
Furthermore, if it is true that appellant was maltreated at Camp Olivas, he had no reason
whatsoever for not divulging the same to his brother who went to see him at the camp after his
arrest and during his detention there. 49Significantly, he also did not even report the matter to the
authorities nor file appropriate charges against the alleged malefactors despite the opportunity
to do so 50 and with the legal services of counsel being available to him. Such omissions funnel
down to the conclusion that appellant's story is a pure fabrication.
These, and the events earlier discussed, soundly refute his allegations that his arrest was
baseless and premeditated for the NARCOM agents were determined to arrest him at all
costs. 51 Premeditated or not, appellant's arrest was only the culmination, the final act needed for
his isolation from society and it was providential that it came about after he was caught in the
very act of illicit trade of prohibited drugs. Accordingly, this opinion could have concluded on a
note of affirmance of the judgment of the trial court. However, Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, was further amended by Republic Act No. 7659 effective December 31,
1993, 52 which supervenience necessarily affects the original disposition of this case and entails
additional questions of law which we shall now resolve.
II
The provisions of the aforesaid amendatory law, pertinent to the adjudication of the case at bar,
are to this effect:
Sec. 13. Sections 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 of Art. II of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, are hereby amended to
read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. The penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand
pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who,
unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away
to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited
drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 17. Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of
the Proceeds or Instrument of the Crime. The penalties for
offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections
14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the
dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following quantities:
xxx xxx xxx
5. 750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana
xxx xxx xxx
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing
quantities, the penalty shall range from prision
correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity.
1. Considering that herein appellant is being prosecuted for the sale of four tea bags of
marijuana with a total weight of only 3.8 grams and, in fact, stands to be convicted for the sale
of only two of those tea bags, the initial inquiry would be whether the patently favorable
provisions of Republic Act
No. 7659 should be given retroactive effect to entitle him to the lesser penalty provided
thereunder, pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code.
Although Republic Act No. 6425 was enacted as a special law, albeit originally amendatory and
in substitution of the previous Articles 190 to 194 of the Revised Penal Code, 53 it has long been
settled that by force of Article 10 of said Code the beneficient provisions of Article 22 thereof
applies to and shall be given retrospective effect to crimes punished by special laws. 54 The
execution in said article would not apply to those convicted of drug offenses since habitual
delinquency refers to convictions for the third time or more of the crimes of serious or less
serious physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa orfalsification. 55
Since, obviously, the favorable provisions of Republic Act No. 7659 could neither have then
been involved nor invoked in the present case, a corollary question would be whether this court,
at the present stage, can
sua sponte apply the provisions of said Article 22 to reduce the penalty to be imposed on
appellant. That issue has likewise been resolved in the cited case of People vs. Moran, et al.,
ante., thus:
. . . . The plain precept contained in article 22 of the Penal Code, declaring the
retroactivity of penal laws in so far as they are favorable to persons accused of a
felony, would be useless and nugatory if the courts of justice were not under
obligation to fulfill such duty, irrespective of whether or not the accused has
applied for it, just as would also all provisions relating to the prescription of the
crime and the penalty.
If the judgment which could be affected and modified by the reduced penalties provided in
Republic Act No. 7659 has already become final and executory or the accused is serving
sentence thereunder, then practice, procedure and pragmatic considerations would warrant and
necessitate the matter being brought to the judicial authorities for relief under a writ of habeas
corpus. 56
2. Probably through oversight, an error on the matter of imposable penalties appears to have
been committed in the drafting of the aforesaid law; thereby calling for and necessitating judicial
reconciliation and craftsmanship.
As applied to the present case, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as now further amended,
imposes the penalty ofreclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to
P10,000,000.00 upon any person who shall unlawfully sell, administer, deliver, give away,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug. That penalty, according to the
amendment to Section 20 of the law, shall be applied if what is involved is 750 grams or more of
indian hemp or marijuana; otherwise, if the quantity involved is less, the penalty shall range
from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity.
In other words, there is here an overlapping error in the provisions on the penalty of reclusion
perpetua by reason of its dual imposition, that is, as the maximum of the penalty where the
marijuana is less than 750 grams, and also as the minimum of the penalty where the marijuana
involved is 750 grams or more. The same error has been committed with respect to the other
prohibited and regulated drugs provided in said Section 20. To harmonize such conflicting
provisions in order to give effect to the whole law, 57 we hereby hold that the penalty to be
imposed where the quantity of the drugs involved is less than the quantities stated in the first
paragraph shall range from prision correccional toreclusion temporal, and not reclusion
perpetua. This is also concordant with the fundamental rule in criminal law that all doubts should
be construed in a manner favorable to the accused.
3. Where, as in this case, the quantity of the dangerous drug is only 3.8 grams, hence covered
by the imposable range of penalties under the second paragraph of Section 20, as now
modified, the law provides that the penalty shall be taken from said range "depending upon the
quantity" of the drug involved in the case. The penalty in said second paragraph constitutes a
complex one composed of three distinct penalties, that is, prision correccional,prision
mayor, and reclusion temporal. In such a situation, the Code provides that each one shall form a
period, with the lightest of them being the minimum, the next as the medium, and the most
severe as the maximum period. 58
Ordinarily, and pursuant to Article 64 of the Code, the mitigating and aggravating circumstances
determine which period of such complex penalty
shall be imposed on the accused. The peculiarity of the second paragraph of Section
20, however, is its specific mandate, above quoted, that the penalty shall instead depend upon
the quantity of the drug subject of the criminal transaction. 59 Accordingly, by way of exception to
Article 77 of the Code and to subserve the purpose of Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7659,
each of the aforesaid component penalties shall be considered as a principal imposable penalty
depending on the quantity of the drug involved. Thereby, the modifying circumstances will not
altogether be disregarded. Since each component penalty of the total complex penalty will have
to be imposed separately as determined by the quantity of the drug involved, then the modifying
circumstances can be used to fix the proper period of that component penalty, as shall hereafter
be explained.
It would, therefore, be in line with the provisions of Section 20 in the context of our aforesaid
disposition thereon that, unless there are compelling reasons for a deviation, the quantities of
the drugs enumerated in its second paragraph be divided into three, with the resulting quotient,
and double or treble the same, to be respectively the bases for allocating the penalty
proportionately among the three aforesaid periods according to the severity thereof. Thus, if the
marijuana involved is below 250 grams, the penalty to be imposed shall be prision correccional;
from 250 to 499 grams, prision mayor; and 500 to
749 grams, reclusion temporal. Parenthetically, fine is imposed as a conjunctive penalty only if
the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. 60
Now, considering the minimal quantity of the marijuana subject of the case at bar, the penalty
of prision correccionalis consequently indicated but, again, another preliminary and cognate
issue has first to be resolved.
4. Prision correccional has a duration of 6 months and 1 day to 6 years and, as a divisible
penalty, it consists of three periods as provided in the text of and illustrated in the table provided
by Article 76 of the Code. The question is whether or not in determining the penalty to be
imposed, which is here to be taken from the penalty of prision correccional, the presence or
absence of mitigating, aggravating or other circumstances modifying criminal liability should be
taken into account.
We are not unaware of cases in the past wherein it was held that, in imposing the penalty for
offenses under special laws, the rules on mitigating or aggravating circumstances under the
Revised Penal Code cannot and should not be applied. A review of such doctrines as applied in
said cases, however, reveals that the reason therefor was because the special laws involved
provided their own specific penalties for the offenses punished thereunder, and which penalties
were not taken from or with reference to those in the Revised Penal Code. Since the penalties
then provided by the special laws concerned did not provide for the minimum, medium or
maximum periods, it would consequently be impossible to consider the aforestated modifying
circumstances whose main function is to determine the period of the penalty in accordance with
the rules in Article 64 of the Code.
This is also the rationale for the holding in previous cases that the provisions of the Code on the
graduation of penalties by degrees could not be given supplementary application to special
laws, since the penalties in the latter were not components of or contemplated in the scale of
penalties provided by Article 71 of the former. The suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code
to special laws, as provided in Article 10 of the former, cannot be invoked where there is a legal
or physical impossibility of, or a prohibition in the special law against, such supplementary
application.
The situation, however, is different where although the offense is defined in and ostensibly
punished under a special law, the penalty therefor is actually taken from the Revised Penal
Code in its technical nomenclature and, necessarily, with its duration, correlation and legal
effects under the system of penalties native to said Code. When, as in this case, the law
involved speaks of prision correccional, in its technical sense under the Code, it would
consequently be both illogical and absurd to posit otherwise. More on this later.
For the nonce, we hold that in the instant case the imposable penalty under Republic Act No.
6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is prision correccional, to be taken from the
medium period thereof pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, there being no
attendant mitigating or aggravating circumstance.
5. At this juncture, a clarificatory discussion of the developmental changes in the penalties
imposed for offenses under special laws would be necessary.
Originally, those special laws, just as was the conventional practice in the United States but
differently from the penalties provided in our Revised Penal Code and its Spanish origins,
provided for one specific penalty or a range of penalties with definitive durations, such as
imprisonment for one year or for one to five years but without division into periods or any
technical statutory cognomen. This is the special law contemplated in and referred to at the time
laws like the Indeterminate Sentence Law 61 were passed during the American regime.
Subsequently, a different pattern emerged whereby a special law would direct that an offense
thereunder shall be punished under the Revised Penal Code and in the same manner provided
therein. Inceptively, for instance, Commonwealth Act No. 303 62 penalizing non-payment of
salaries and wages with the periodicity prescribed therein, provided:
Sec. 4. Failure of the employer to pay his employee or laborer as required by
section one of this Act, shall prima facie be considered a fraud committed by
such employer against his employee or laborer by means of false pretenses
similar to those mentioned in article three hundred and fifteen, paragraph four,
sub-paragraph two (a) of the Revised Penal Code and shall be punished in the
same manner as therein provided. 63
Thereafter, special laws were enacted where the offenses defined therein were specifically
punished by the penalties as technically named and understood in the Revised Penal Code.
These are exemplified by Republic Act No. 1700 (Anti-Subversion Act) where the penalties
ranged from arresto mayor to
death; 64 Presidential Decree No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Decree) where the penalties run
from arresto mayor to prision mayor; and Presidential Decree
No. 1866 (illegal possession and other prohibited acts involving firearms), the penalties
wherefor may involve prision mayor, reclusion temporal, reclusion perpetua or death.
Another variant worth mentioning is Republic Act No. 6539
(Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972) where the penalty is imprisonment for not less than 14 years and
8 months and not more than 17 years and 4 months, when committed without violence or
intimidation of persons or force upon things; not less than 17 years and 4 months and not more
than 30 years, when committed with violence against or intimidation of any person, or force
upon things; and life imprisonment to death, when the owner, driver or occupant of the
carnapped vehicle is killed.
With respect to the first example, where the penalties under the special law are different from
and are without reference or relation to those under the Revised Penal Code, there can be no
suppletory effect of the rules for the application of penalties under said Code or by other
relevant statutory provisions based on or applicable only to said rules for felonies under the
Code. In this type of special law, the legislative intendment is clear.
The same exclusionary rule would apply to the last given example, Republic Act No. 6539.
While it is true that the penalty of 14 years and
8 months to 17 years and 4 months is virtually equivalent to the duration of the medium period
of reclusion temporal,such technical term under the Revised Penal Code is not given to that
penalty for carnapping. Besides, the other penalties for carnapping attended by the qualifying
circumstances stated in the law do not correspond to those in the Code. The rules on penalties
in the Code, therefore, cannot suppletorily apply to Republic Act No. 6539 and special laws of
the same formulation.
On the other hand, the rules for the application of penalties and the correlative effects thereof
under the Revised Penal Code, as well as other statutory enactments founded upon and
applicable to such provisions of the Code, have suppletory effect to the penalties under the
former Republic Act
No. 1700 and those now provided under Presidential Decrees Nos. 1612 and 1866. While these
are special laws, the fact that the penalties for offenses thereunder are those provided for in the
Revised Penal code lucidly reveals the statutory intent to give the related provisions on
penalties for felonies under the Code the corresponding application to said special laws, in the
absence of any express or implicit proscription in these special laws. To hold otherwise would
be to sanction an indefensible judicial truncation of an integrated system of penalties under the
Code and its allied legislation, which could never have been the intendment of Congress.
In People vs. Macatanda, 65 a prosecution under a special law (Presidential Decree No. 533,
otherwise known as the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974), it was contended by the prosecution
that Article 64, paragraph 5, of the Revised Penal Code should not apply to said special law. We
said therein that
We do not agree with the Solicitor General that P.D. 533 is a special law entirely
distinct from and unrelated to the Revised Penal Code. From the nature of the
penalty imposed which is in terms of the classification and duration of penalties
as prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, which is not for penalties as are
ordinarily imposed in special laws, the intent seems clear that P.D. 533 shall be
deemed as an amendment of the Revised Penal Code, with respect to the
offense of theft of large cattle (Art. 310) or otherwise to be subject to applicable
provisions thereof such as Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code . . . . Article 64
of the same Code should, likewise, be applicable, . . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
More particularly with regard to the suppletory effect of the rules on penalties in the Revised
Penal Code to Republic Act No. 6425, in this case involving Article 63(2) of the Code, we have
this more recent pronouncement:
. . . Pointing out that as provided in Article 10 the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code shall be "supplementary" to special laws, this Court held that where the
special law expressly grants to the court discretion in applying the penalty
prescribed for the offense, there is no room for the application of the provisions of
the Code . . . .
The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by P.D. No. 1623, contains no
explicit grant of discretion to the Court in the application of the penalty prescribed
by the law. In such case, the court must be guided by the rules prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code concerning the application of penalties which distill the
"deep legal thought and centuries of experience in the administration of criminal
laws." (Emphasis ours.) 66
Under the aforestated considerations, in the case of the Dangerous Drugs Act as now amended
by Republic Act No. 7659 by the incorporation and prescription therein of the technical penalties
defined in and constituting integral parts of the three scales of penalties in the Code, 67 with
much more reason should the provisions of said Code on the appreciation and effects of all
attendant modifying circumstances apply in fixing the penalty. Likewise, the different kinds or
classifications of penalties and the rules for graduating
such penalties by degrees should have supplementary effect on Republic Act No. 6425, except
if they would result in absurdities as will now be explained.
While not squarely in issue in this case, but because this aspect is involved in the discussion on
the role of modifying circumstances, we have perforce to lay down the caveat that mitigating
circumstances should be considered and applied only if they affect the periods and
the degrees of the penalties within rational limits.
Prefatorily, what ordinarily are involved in the graduation and consequently determine the
degree of the penalty, in accordance with the rules in Article 61 of the Code as applied to the
scale of penalties in Article 71, are the stage of execution of the crime and the nature of the
participation of the accused. However, under paragraph 5 of Article 64, when there are two or
more ordinary mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance, the penalty shall be
reduced by one degree. Also, the presence of privileged mitigating circumstances, as provided
in Articles 67 and 68, can reduce the penalty by one or two degrees, or even more. These
provisions of Articles 64(5), 67 and 68 should not apply in toto in the determination of the proper
penalty under the aforestated second paragraph of section 20 of Republic Act No. 6425, to
avoid anomalous results which could not have been contemplated by the legislature.
Thus, paragraph 5 of Article 61 provides that when the law prescribes a penalty in some manner
not specially provided for in the four preceding paragraphs thereof, the courts shall proceed by
analogy therewith. Hence, when the penalty prescribed for the crime consists of one or two
penalties to be imposed in their full extent, the penalty next lower in degree shall likewise
consist of as many penalties which follow the former in the scale in Article 71. If this rule were to
be applied, and since the complex penalty in this
case consists of three discrete penalties in their full extent, that is,
prision correccional, prision mayor and reclusion temporal, then one degree lower would
be arresto menor, destierroand arresto mayor. There could, however, be no further reduction by
still one or two degrees, which must each likewise consist of three penalties, since only the
penalties of fine and public censure remain in the scale.
The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may be appreciated to determine
the periods of the corresponding penalties, or even reduce the penalty by degrees, in no case
should such graduation of penalties reduce the imposable penalty beyond or lower than prision
correccional. It is for this reason that the three component penalties in the second paragraph of
Section 20 shall each be considered as an independent principal penalty, and that the lowest
penalty should in any event be prision correccional in order not to depreciate the seriousness of
drug offenses. Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Such interpretation is to
be adopted so that the law may continue to have efficacy rather than fail. A perfect judicial
solution cannot be forged from an imperfect law, which impasse should now be the concern of
and is accordingly addressed to Congress.
6. The final query is whether or not the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable to the case
now before us. Apparently it does, since drug offenses are not included in nor has appellant
committed any act which would put him within the exceptions to said law and the penalty to be
imposed does not involve reclusion perpetua or death, provided, of course, that the penalty as
ultimately resolved will exceed one year of imprisonment. 68 The more important aspect,
however, is how the indeterminate sentence shall be ascertained.
It is true that Section 1 of said law, after providing for indeterminate sentence for an offense
under the Revised Penal Code, states that "if the offense is punished by any other law, the court
shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not
exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum
term prescribed by the same." We hold that this quoted portion of the section indubitably refers
to an offense under a special law wherein the penalty imposed was not taken from and is
without reference to the Revised Penal Code, as discussed in the preceding illustrations, such
that it may be said that the "offense is punished" under that law.
There can be no sensible debate that the aforequoted rule on indeterminate sentence for
offenses under special laws was necessary because of the nature of the former type of
penalties under said laws which were not included or contemplated in the scale of penalties in
Article 71 of the Code, hence there could be no minimum "within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense," as is the rule for felonies therein. In the
illustrative examples of penalties in special laws hereinbefore provided, this rule applied, and
would still apply, only to the first and last examples. Furthermore, considering the vintage of Act
No. 4103 as earlier noted, this holding is but an application and is justified under the rule
of contemporanea expositio. 69
We repeat, Republic Act No. 6425, as now amended by Republic Act No. 7659, has
unqualifiedly adopted the penalties under the Revised Penal Code in their technical terms,
hence with their technical signification and effects. In fact, for purposes of determining
the maximum of said sentence, we
have applied the provisions of the amended Section 20 of said law to arrive at prision
correccional and Article 64 of the Code to impose the same in the medium period. Such offense,
although provided for in a special law, is now in effect punished by and under the Revised Penal
Code. Correlatively, to determine the minimum, we must apply the first part of the aforesaid
Section 1 which directs that "in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the
Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence themaximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposedunder the rules of said Code, and the minimum which
shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the
offense." (Emphasis ours.)
A divergent pedantic application would not only be out of context but also an admission of the
hornbook maxim thatqui haeret in litera haeret in cortice. Fortunately, this Court has never gone
only skin-deep in its construction of Act. No. 4103 by a mere literal appreciation of its provisions.
Thus, with regard to the phrase in Section 2 thereof excepting from its coverage "persons
convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or life imprisonment," we have held that what
is considered is the penalty actually imposed and not the penalty imposable under the law, 70and
that reclusion perpetua is likewise embraced therein although what the law states is "life
imprisonment".
What irresistibly emerges from the preceding disquisition, therefore, is that under the
concurrence of the principles of literal interpretation, which have been rationalized by
comparative decisions of this Court; of historical interpretation, as explicated by the antecedents
of the law and related contemporaneous legislation; and of structural interpretation, considering
the interrelation of the penalties in the Code as supplemented by Act No. 4103 in an integrated
scheme of penalties, it follows that the minimum of the indeterminate sentence in this case shall
be the penalty next lower to that prescribed for the offense. Thereby we shall have interpreted
the seeming ambiguity in Section 1 of Act No. 4103 in such a way as to harmonize laws with
laws, which is the best mode of interpretation. 71
The indeterminate Sentence Law is a legal and social measure of compassion, and should be
liberally interpreted in favor of the accused. 72 The "minimum" sentence is merely a period at
which, and not before, as a matter of grace and not of right, the prisoner may merely be allowed
to serve the balance of his sentence outside of his confinement. 73 It does not constitute the
totality of the penalty since thereafter he still has to continue serving the rest of his sentence
under set conditions. That minimum is only the period when the convict's eligibility for parole
may be considered. In fact, his release on parole may readily be denied if he is found unworthy
thereof, or his reincarceration may be ordered on legal grounds, even if he has served the
minimum sentence.
It is thus both amusing and bemusing if, in the case at bar, appellant should be begrudged the
benefit of a minimum sentence within the range of arresto mayor, the penalty next lower
to prision correccional which is the maximum range we have fixed through the application of
Articles 61 and 71 of the Revised Penal Code. For, with fealty to the law, the court may set the
minimum sentence at 6 months of arresto mayor, instead of 6 months and 1 day of prision
correccional. The difference, which could thereby even involve only one day, is hardly worth the
creation of an overrated tempest in the judicial teapot.
ACCORDINGLY, under all the foregoing premises, the judgment of conviction rendered by the
court a quo against accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga is AFFIRMED, but with the
MODIFICATION that he should be, as he hereby is, sentenced to serve an indeterminate
penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as the minimum, to six (6) years of prision
correccional, as the maximum thereof.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza,
JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring and dissenting:

I am still unable to agree with the view that (a) in appropriate cases where the penalty to be
imposed would beprision correccional pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 20 of R.A.
No. 6425, as amended by Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659, the sentence to be meted out, applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103, as amended), should be that whose minimum is
within the range of the penalty next lower, i.e., arresto mayor; and (b) the presence of two or
more mitigating circumstances not offset by any mitigating circumstances or of a privileged
mitigating circumstance shall not reduce the penalty by one or two degrees if the penalty to be
imposed, taking into account the quantity of the dangerous drugs involved, would be prision
correccional.
I
The first view is based on the proposition that since R.A. No. 7659 had unqualifiedly adopted
the penalties under the Revised Penal Code in their technical terms, hence also their technical
signification and effects, then what should govern is the first part of Section 1 of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law which directs that:
in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal
Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view
of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the
said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense.
Elsewise stated, by the adoption of the penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code for the
offenses penalized under the Dangerous Drugs Act (R.A. No. 6425), as amended, the latter
offenses would now be considered as punished under the Revised Penal Code for purposes of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act. No. 4103, as amended by Act. No. 4225 and
R.A. No. 4203) also provides that:
if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused
to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the
maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum
prescribed by the same (Emphasis supplied).
There are, therefore, two categories of offenses which should be taken into account in the
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law: (1) offenses punished by the Revised Penal
Code, and (2) offenses punished by other laws (or special laws).
The offenses punished by the Revised Penal Code are those defined and penalized in Book II
thereof, which is thus appropriately titled CRIMES AND PENALTIES. To simplify further, a crime
is deemed punished under the Revised Penal Code if it is defined by it, and none other, as a
crime and is punished by a penalty which is included in the classification of Penalties in Chapter
II, Title III of Book I thereof.
On the other hand, an offense is considered punished under any other law (or special law) if it is
not defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code but by such other law.
It is thus clear that an offense is punished by the Revised Penal Code if both its definition and
the penalty therefor are found in the said Code, and it is deemed punished by a special law if its
definition and the penalty therefor are found in the special law. That the latter imports or borrows
from the Revised Penal Code its nomenclature of penalties does not make an offense in the
special law punished by or punishable under the Revised Penal Code. The reason is quite
simple. It is still the special law that defines the offense and imposes a penalty therefor,
although it adopts the Code's nomenclature of penalties. In short, the mere use by a special law
of a penalty found in the Revised Penal Code can by no means make an offense thereunder an
offense "punished or punishable" by the Revised Penal Code.
Thus, I cannot subscribe to the view that since R.A. No. 7659 had adopted the penalties
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code in drug cases, offenses related to drugs should now be
considered as punished under the Revised Penal Code. If that were so, then we are also bound,
ineluctably, to declare that such offenses are mala in se and to apply the Articles of the Revised
Penal Code regarding the stages of a felony (Article 6), the nature of participation (Article 16),
accessory penalties (Articles 40-45), application of penalties to principals, accomplices, and

accessories (Article 46 et seq.), complex crimes (Article 48), and graduation of penalties (Article
61), among others. We cannot do otherwise without being drawn to an inconsistent posture
which is extremely hard to justify.
I respectfully submit then that the adoption by the Dangerous Drugs Act of the penalties in the
Revised Penal Code does not make an offense under the Dangerous Drugs Act an
offense punished by the Revised Penal Code. Consequently, where the proper penalty to be
imposed under Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act is prisioncorreccional, then, applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the indeterminate sentence to be meted on the accused should be
that whose minimum should not be less than the minimum prescribed by the special law (the
Dangerous Drugs Act), i.e., not lower than six (6) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional.
II
The majority opinion holds the view that while the penalty provided for in Section 20 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act is a complex one composed of three distinct penalties, viz., prision
correccional, prision mayor, and reclusion temporal,and that pursuant to Article 77 of the
Revised Penal Code, each should form a period, with the lightest of them being the minimum,
the next as the medium, and the most severe as the maximum, yet, considering that under the
said second paragraph of Section 20 the penalty depends on the quantity of the drug subject of
the criminal transaction, then by way of exception to Article 77 of the Revised Penal Code and
to subserve the purpose of Section 20, as amended, each of the aforesaid component penalties
shall be considered as a principal penalty depending on the quantity of the drug involved.
Thereafter, applying the modifying circumstances pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised Penal
Code, the proper period of the component penalty shall then be fixed.
To illustrate, if the quantity of the drugs involved (e.g., marijuana below 250 grams) the proper
principal penalty should be prision correccional, but there is one mitigating and no aggravating
circumstance, then the penalty to be imposed should be prision correccional in its minimum
period. Yet, the majority opinion puts a limit to such a rule. It declares:
The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may be
appreciated to determine the periods of the corresponding penalties, or even
reduce the penalty by degrees, in no case should such graduation of penalties
reduce the imposable penalty beyond or lower than
prision correccional. It is for this reason that the three component penalties in the
second paragraph of Section 20 shall each be considered as an independent
principal penalty, and that the lowest penalty should in any event be prision
correccional in order to depreciate the seriousness of drug offenses.
Simply put, this rule would allow the reduction from reclusion
temporal if it is the penalty to be imposed on the basis of the quantity of the drugs involved
by two degrees, or to prision correccional, if there are two or more mitigating circumstances and
no aggravating circumstance is present (paragraph 5, Article 64, Revised Penal Code) or if

there is a privileged mitigating circumstances of, say, minority (Article 68, Revised Penal Code),
or under circumstances covered by Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code. Yet, if the proper
penalty to be imposed is prision mayor, regardless of the fact that a reduction by two degrees is
proper, it should only be reduced by one degree because the rule does not allow a reduction
beyond prision correccional. Finally, if the proper penalty to be imposed is prision
correccional, no reduction at all would be allowed.
I find the justification for the rule to be arbitrary and unfair. It is arbitrary because within the
same second paragraph involving the same range of penalty, we both allow and disallow the
application of Article 64(5), Article 68, and Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code. The reason for
the disallowance, viz., in order not to depreciate the seriousness of drug offenses, is
unconvincing because Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by R.A.
No. 7659, has in fact "depreciated" the seriousness of drug offenses by providing quantity as
basis for the determination of the proper penalty and limiting fine only to cases punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death. It is unfair because an accused who is found guilty of
possessing MORE dangerous
drugs say 500 to 749 grams of marijuana, in which case the penalty to be imposed would
be reclusion temporal may only be sentenced to six (6) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional minimum because of privileged mitigating circumstances. Yet, an accused who is
found guilty of possession of only one (1) gram of marijuana in which case the penalty to be
imposed is prision correccional would not be entitled to a reduction thereof even if he has the
same number of privileged mitigating circumstances as the former has.
Also, if the privileged mitigating circumstance happens to be the minority of the accused, then
he is entitled to the reduction of the penalty as a matter of right pursuant to Article 68 of the
Revised Penal Code, which reads:
Art. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age.
When the offender is a minor under eighteen years and his case is one coming
under the provisions of the paragraph next to the last of Article 80 of this Code,
the following rules shall be observed:
1. Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who is
not exempted from liability by reason of the court having declared
that he acted with discernment, a discretionary penalty shall be
imposed, but always lower by two degrees at least than that
prescribed by law for the crime which he committed.
2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the
penalty next lover than that prescribed by law shall be imposed,
but always in the proper period.
I do not think that as to the second paragraph of Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as
amended by Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659, we can be at liberty to apply the Revised Penal Code
in one aspect and not to apply it in another.
Feliciano and Quiason, JJ., concur.
# Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring and dissenting:

I am still unable to agree with the view that (a) in appropriate cases where the penalty to be
imposed would beprision correccional pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 20 of R.A.
No. 6425, as amended by Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659, the sentence to be meted out, applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103, as amended), should be that whose minimum is
within the range of the penalty next lower, i.e., arresto mayor; and (b) the presence of two or
more mitigating circumstances not offset by any mitigating circumstances or of a privileged
mitigating circumstance shall not reduce the penalty by one or two degrees if the penalty to be
imposed, taking into account the quantity of the dangerous drugs involved, would be prision
correccional.
I
The first view is based on the proposition that since R.A. No. 7659 had unqualifiedly adopted
the penalties under the Revised Penal Code in their technical terms, hence also their technical
signification and effects, then what should govern is the first part of Section 1 of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law which directs that:
in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal
Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view
of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the
said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense.
Elsewise stated, by the adoption of the penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code for the
offenses penalized under the Dangerous Drugs Act (R.A. No. 6425), as amended, the latter
offenses would now be considered as punished under the Revised Penal Code for purposes of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act. No. 4103, as amended by Act. No. 4225 and
R.A. No. 4203) also provides that:
if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused
to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the
maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum
prescribed by the same (Emphasis supplied).
There are, therefore, two categories of offenses which should be taken into account in the
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law: (1) offenses punished by the Revised Penal
Code, and (2) offenses punished by other laws (or special laws).
The offenses punished by the Revised Penal Code are those defined and penalized in Book II
thereof, which is thus appropriately titled CRIMES AND PENALTIES. To simplify further, a crime
is deemed punished under the Revised Penal Code if it is defined by it, and none other, as a
crime and is punished by a penalty which is included in the classification of Penalties in Chapter
II, Title III of Book I thereof.
On the other hand, an offense is considered punished under any other law (or special law) if it is
not defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code but by such other law.
It is thus clear that an offense is punished by the Revised Penal Code if both its definition and
the penalty therefor are found in the said Code, and it is deemed punished by a special law if its
definition and the penalty therefor are found in the special law. That the latter imports or borrows
from the Revised Penal Code its nomenclature of penalties does not make an offense in the
special law punished by or punishable under the Revised Penal Code. The reason is quite
simple. It is still the special law that defines the offense and imposes a penalty therefor,
although it adopts the Code's nomenclature of penalties. In short, the mere use by a special law
of a penalty found in the Revised Penal Code can by no means make an offense thereunder an
offense "punished or punishable" by the Revised Penal Code.
Thus, I cannot subscribe to the view that since R.A. No. 7659 had adopted the penalties
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code in drug cases, offenses related to drugs should now be
considered as punished under the Revised Penal Code. If that were so, then we are also bound,
ineluctably, to declare that such offenses are mala in se and to apply the Articles of the Revised
Penal Code regarding the stages of a felony (Article 6), the nature of participation (Article 16),
accessory penalties (Articles 40-45), application of penalties to principals, accomplices, and
accessories (Article 46 et seq.), complex crimes (Article 48), and graduation of penalties (Article
61), among others. We cannot do otherwise without being drawn to an inconsistent posture
which is extremely hard to justify.
I respectfully submit then that the adoption by the Dangerous Drugs Act of the penalties in the
Revised Penal Code does not make an offense under the Dangerous Drugs Act an
offense punished by the Revised Penal Code. Consequently, where the proper penalty to be
imposed under Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act is prisioncorreccional, then, applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the indeterminate sentence to be meted on the accused should be
that whose minimum should not be less than the minimum prescribed by the special law (the
Dangerous Drugs Act), i.e., not lower than six (6) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional.
II
The majority opinion holds the view that while the penalty provided for in Section 20 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act is a complex one composed of three distinct penalties, viz., prision
correccional, prision mayor, and reclusion temporal,and that pursuant to Article 77 of the
Revised Penal Code, each should form a period, with the lightest of them being the minimum,
the next as the medium, and the most severe as the maximum, yet, considering that under the
said second paragraph of Section 20 the penalty depends on the quantity of the drug subject of
the criminal transaction, then by way of exception to Article 77 of the Revised Penal Code and
to subserve the purpose of Section 20, as amended, each of the aforesaid component penalties
shall be considered as a principal penalty depending on the quantity of the drug involved.
Thereafter, applying the modifying circumstances pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised Penal
Code, the proper period of the component penalty shall then be fixed.
To illustrate, if the quantity of the drugs involved (e.g., marijuana below 250 grams) the proper
principal penalty should be prision correccional, but there is one mitigating and no aggravating
circumstance, then the penalty to be imposed should be prision correccional in its minimum
period. Yet, the majority opinion puts a limit to such a rule. It declares:
The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may be
appreciated to determine the periods of the corresponding penalties, or even
reduce the penalty by degrees, in no case should such graduation of penalties
reduce the imposable penalty beyond or lower than
prision correccional. It is for this reason that the three component penalties in the
second paragraph of Section 20 shall each be considered as an independent
principal penalty, and that the lowest penalty should in any event be prision
correccional in order to depreciate the seriousness of drug offenses.
Simply put, this rule would allow the reduction from reclusion
temporal if it is the penalty to be imposed on the basis of the quantity of the drugs involved
by two degrees, or to prision correccional, if there are two or more mitigating circumstances and
no aggravating circumstance is present (paragraph 5, Article 64, Revised Penal Code) or if
there is a privileged mitigating circumstances of, say, minority (Article 68, Revised Penal Code),
or under circumstances covered by Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code. Yet, if the proper
penalty to be imposed is prision mayor, regardless of the fact that a reduction by two degrees is
proper, it should only be reduced by one degree because the rule does not allow a reduction
beyond prision correccional. Finally, if the proper penalty to be imposed is prision
correccional, no reduction at all would be allowed.
I find the justification for the rule to be arbitrary and unfair. It is arbitrary because within the
same second paragraph involving the same range of penalty, we both allow and disallow the
application of Article 64(5), Article 68, and Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code. The reason for
the disallowance, viz., in order not to depreciate the seriousness of drug offenses, is
unconvincing because Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by R.A.
No. 7659, has in fact "depreciated" the seriousness of drug offenses by providing quantity as
basis for the determination of the proper penalty and limiting fine only to cases punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death. It is unfair because an accused who is found guilty of
possessing MORE dangerous
drugs say 500 to 749 grams of marijuana, in which case the penalty to be imposed would
be reclusion temporal may only be sentenced to six (6) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional minimum because of privileged mitigating circumstances. Yet, an accused who is
found guilty of possession of only one (1) gram of marijuana in which case the penalty to be
imposed is prision correccional would not be entitled to a reduction thereof even if he has the
same number of privileged mitigating circumstances as the former has.
Also, if the privileged mitigating circumstance happens to be the minority of the accused, then
he is entitled to the reduction of the penalty as a matter of right pursuant to Article 68 of the
Revised Penal Code, which reads:
Art. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age.
under the provisions of the paragraph next to the last of Article 80 of this Code,
the following rules shall be observed:
1. Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who is
not exempted from liability by reason of the court having declared
that he acted with discernment, a discretionary penalty shall be
imposed, but always lower by two degrees at least than that
prescribed by law for the crime which he committed.
2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the
penalty next lover than that prescribed by law shall be imposed,
but always in the proper period.
I do not think that as to the second paragraph of Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as
amended by Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659, we can be at liberty to apply the Revised Penal Code
in one aspect and not to apply it in another.
Feliciano and Quiason, JJ., concur.
#Footnotes
Saturday, October 26, 2013

Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW): How to determine maximum and minimum penalties
(Act no 4103 as amended)

The Indeterminate Sentence Law is mandatory in all cases, EXCEPT if the accused will fall in
any of the following exceptions:
1. if sentenced with a penalty of death or life imprisonment
2. if convicted of treason, conspiracy, proposal to commit treason
3. if convicted of misprision of treason, sedition, rebellion or espionage
4. if convicted of piracy
5. if the offender is a habitual delinquent
6. those who escaped from prison or evaded sentence
7. those who violated the terms of conditional pardon of the chief executive
8. where the maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed 1 year (important!)
9. if convicted by final judgement at the time of the effectivity of Act No. 4103
10. if penalized with suspension or distierro
If accused fall in any of the foregoing exceptions. DO NOT APPLY ISLAW!
ISLAW applies to offenses punished by Special Law and Revised Penal Code.
Why is ISLAW mandatory?
In the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law the judge will get the maximum penalty
and likewise the minimum penalty. If the accused was already able to serve the minimum term
of his indeterminate sentence and upon the approval of the Board, the accused now becomes
eligible for parole. ISLAW is favorable to the accused.
If the accused was granted parole and violated some conditions of the parole, What will
happen?
A warrant of arrest will be issued by the court and the accused will be made to serve the rest of
the remaining or unexpired portion of his sentence. (But in probation you go back to number 1,
serving of sentence will be from the beginning)
Application of ISLAW:
How to get maximum and minimum penalty in Special Law:
1. The maximum penalty should NOT exceed the maximum provided for by that law.
2. The minimum penalty should NOT fall below the minimum provided by the law.
How to get maximum and minimum penalty in Revised Penal Code:
Example: In the crime of homicide, under the Revised Penal Code, the offender is sentenced to
reclusion temporal.
The maximum penalty under the Indeterminate Sentence Law is reclusion temporal. But
reclusion temporal is a divisible penalty consisting of maximum, medium and minimum periods.
Which period will we place the maximum term of the Indeterminate Sentence?
Guide for determining the maximum penalty:
1. Determine the entire range of the penalty
2. Determine if there is mitigating or aggravating circumstance
Which period will the maximum penalty be placed?

In pursuant to art 64, when there is no mitigating and no aggravating circumstance, it should be
placed at the medium period. Thus, the maximum penalty for the example above is reclusion
temporal in the medium period.
What is the minimum penalty now?
In getting the minimum penalty, the rule is to simply get the penalty one (1) degree lower from
the maximum penalty without taking into account the mitigating and aggravating circumstance.
Thus, the penalty one degree lower from reclusion temporal, without taking into account any
mitigating or aggravating circumstance, is prision mayor. Prision mayor is now the minimum
penalty for our example.
Important: If your maximum penalty is wrong, it follows that the minimum penalty will also be
wrong.
Again, prision mayor is a divisible penalty. Which period can it be placed?
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, it would depend upon the discretion of the court on
which period to place it. Thus, the minimum penalty is prision mayor in any of its period.
Factors that could affect the imposition of minimum penalty:
1. Age
2. Conduct during trial
3. Mental or physical condition
Suppose in the example above, 1 aggravating circumstance was proven. What is now the
maximum penalty?
It would still be reclusion temporal, but it shall be placed in the maximum period because of the
presence of 1 aggravating circumstance.
How about the minimum penalty?
It would still be 1 degree lower from reclusion temporal, which is prision mayor. In which period?
It shall be discretionary upon the court.
(More examples)
1 mitigating but NO aggravating
maximum penalty: reclusion temporal in the minimum period
minimum penalty: prision mayor in any period
2 mitigating, NO aggravating (privileged mitigating)
maximum penalty: prision mayor in the medium period
minimum penalty: prision correctional any period
The preceding example is an exception to the rule. If there is a privileged mitigating
circumstance, we take it into account first in order to obtain the proper maximum penalty. Then,
from that maximum penalty, we obtain the proper minimum penalty by getting the penalty 1
degree lower. Same rule applies as to the period of the minimum penalty.
Remember: It will never become a privileged mitigating circumstance if there is an aggravating
circumstance present. 8 mitigating and 1 aggravating will never become privileged mitigating
circumstance.
3 mitigating, NO aggravating
maximum penalty: prision mayor in the minimum period
minimum penalty: prision correctional any period
In the preceding example, there are 3 mitigating circumstance present and no aggravating
circumstance. The first two mitigating circumstance shall be a privileged mitigating
circumstance. Thus, the penalty will be reduced by 1 degree from reclusion temporal to prision
mayor. The 3rd mitigating circumstance shall place the penalty in the minimum period.
maximum penalty: prision correctional in the medium period (2 privileged circumstance. Thus
we lower by 2 degrees)
minimum penalty: arresto mayor any period
maximum penalty: prision correctional in the minimum period
At most we can only lower by 2 degrees. Thus, if there are 6 mitigating circumstance and NO
aggravating:
maximum penalty: prision correctional in the minimum period
How is Indeterminate Sentence Law applied in complex crimes (Article 48)?
A complex crime is punished by the most serious offense and shall be imposed in its maximum
period.
Example: Estafa through falsification of public documents.
Under the Revised Penal Code, falsification of public documents (Article 171) is a more serious
offense punished by prision mayor than estafa (Article 315), punished only by prision
correctional.
Thus, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty for estafa through
falsification of public documents shall be prision mayor in the maximum period. Minimum
penalty shall be prision correctional, any period.
Suppose there was 1 mitigating circumstance proven. Maximum penalty would still be prision
mayor in the maximum period. In pursuant to Article 48, even if there is a mitigating
circumstance present, it should still be imposed at the maximum period.
How about if there are 2 mitigating circumstance and no aggravating?
The rule is, if it is a privileged mitigating circumstance, we lower by the penalty by one degree
but still place it at the maximum period. Thus, the maximum penalty shall be prision correctional
in the maximum period.
maximum penalty: arresto mayor in its maximum period
Title Three
PENALTIES
Chapter One PENALTIES IN GENERAL
ARTICLE 21. Penalties that May Be Imposed. No felony shall be punishable by
any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission.
ARTICLE 22. Retroactive Effect of Penal Laws. Penal laws shall have a retroactive
effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual
criminal, as this term is defined in rule 5 of article 62 of this Code, although at the
time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the
convict is serving the same.

ARTICLE 23. Effect of Pardon by the Offended Party. A pardon by the offended
party does not extinguish criminal action except as provided in article 344 of this
Code; but civil liability with regard to the interest of the injured party is extinguished
by his express waiver.
ARTICLE 24. Measures of Prevention or Safety Which are Not Considered
Penalties. The following shall not be considered as penalties:
1. The arrest and temporary detention of accused persons, as well as their
detention by reason of insanity or imbecility, or illness requiring their confinement
in a hospital.
2. The commitment of a minor to any of the institutions mentioned in article 80 and
for the purposes specified therein.
3. Suspension from the employment or public office during the trial or in order to
institute proceedings.
4. Fines and other corrective measures which, in the exercise of their administrative
or disciplinary powers, superior officials may impose upon their subordinates.
5. Deprivation of rights and the reparations which the civil laws may establish in
penal form.
Chapter Two CLASSIFICATION OF PENALTIES
ARTICLE 25. Penalties Which May Be Imposed. The penalties which may be
imposed, according to this Code, and their different classes, are those included in
the following:
Scale
Principal Penalties
Capital punishment: Death.
Afflictive penalties:
Reclusin perpetua,
Reclusin temporal,
Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification,
Perpetual or temporary special disqualification,
Prisin mayor.
Correctional penalties:
Prisin correccional,
Arresto mayor,
Suspensin,
Destierro.
Light penalties:
Arresto menor,
Public censure.
Penalties common to the three preceding classes:

Fine, and
Bond to keep the peace.
Accessory Penalties
Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification,
Perpetual or temporary special disqualification,
Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for, the profession or
calling.
Civil interdiction,
Indemnification,
Forfeiture or confiscation of instruments and proceeds of the offense,
Payment of costs.
ARTICLE 26. Fine When Afflictive, Correctional or Light Penalty. A fine,
whether imposed as a single or as an alternative penalty, shall be considered an
afflictive penalty, if it exceeds 6,000 pesos; a correctional penalty, if it does not
exceed 6,000 pesos but is not less than 200 pesos; and a light penalty, if it be less
than 200 pesos.
Chapter Three DURATION AND EFFECTS OF PENALTIES
Section One. Duration of Penalties
ARTICLE 27. Reclusin Perpetua. Any person sentenced to any of the perpetual
penalties shall be pardoned after undergoing the penalty for thirty years, unless
such person by reason of his conduct or some other serious cause shall be
considered by the Chief Executive as unworthy of pardon.
Reclusin temporal. The penalty of reclusin temporal shall be from twelve years
and one day to twenty years.
Prisin mayor and temporary disqualification. The duration of the penalties of
prisin mayor and temporary disqualification shall be from six years and one day to
twelve years, except when the penalty of disqualification is imposed as an
accessory penalty, in which case its duration shall be that of the principal penalty.
Prisin correccional, suspensin, and destierro. The duration of the penalties of
prision correccional, suspensin and destierro shall be from six months and one day
to six years, except when suspension is imposed as an accessory penalty, in which
case, its duration shall be that of the principal penalty.
Arresto mayor. The duration of the penalty or arresto mayor shall be from one
month and one day to six months.
Arresto menor. The duration of the penalty of arresto menor shall be from one
day to thirty days.
Bond to keep the peace. The bond to keep the peace shall be required to cover
such period of time as the court may determine.
ARTICLE 28. Computation of Penalties. If the offender shall be in prison the term
of the duration of the temporary penalties shall be computed from the day on which
the judgment of conviction shall have become final.
If the offender be not in prison, the term of the duration of the penalty consisting of
deprivation of liberty shall be computed from the day that the offender is placed at
the disposal of the judicial authorities for the enforcement of the penalty. The
duration of the other penalties shall be computed only from the day on which the
defendant commences to serve his sentence.
ARTICLE 29. One-half of the Period of the Preventive Imprisonment Deducted from
Term of Imprisonment. Offenders who have undergone preventive imprisonment
shall be credited in the service of their sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty,
with one-half of the time during which they have undergone preventive
imprisonment, except in the following cases:
1. When they are recidivists, or have been convicted previously twice or more times
of any crime;
2. When upon being summoned for the execution of their sentence they have failed
to surrender voluntarily;
3. When they have been convicted of robbery, theft, estafa, malversation of public
funds, falsification, vagrancy, or prostitution.
Section Two. Effects of the penalties according to their respective
nature
ARTICLE 30. Effects of the Penalties of Perpetual or Temporary Absolute
Disqualification. The penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification
for public office shall produce the following effects:
1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may
have held, even if conferred by popular election.
2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective office
or to be elected to such office.
3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise of
any of the rights mentioned.
In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised in
paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article shall last during the term of the sentence.
4. The loss of all right to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly
held.
ARTICLE 31. Effects of the Penalties of Perpetual or Temporary Special
Disqualification. The penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification
for public office, profession or calling shall produce the following effects:
1. The deprivation of the office, employment, profession or calling affected;
2. The disqualification for holding similar offices or employments either perpetually
or during the term of the sentence, according to the extent of such disqualification.
ARTICLE 32. Effects of the Penalties of Perpetual or Temporary Special
Disqualification for the Exercise of the Right of Suffrage. The perpetual or
temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage shall
deprive the offender perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to
the nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in any popular election for any public
office or to be elected to such office. Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted
to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification.
ARTICLE 33. Effects of the Penalties of Suspension from Any Public Office,
Profession or Calling, or the Right of Suffrage. The suspension from public office,
profession or calling, and the exercise of the right of suffrage shall disqualify the
offender from holding such office or exercising such profession or calling or right of
suffrage during the term of the sentence.
The person suspended from holding public office shall not hold another having
similar functions during the period of his suspension.
ARTICLE 34. Civil Interdiction. Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during
the time of his sentence of the rights of parental authority, or guardianship, either
as to the person or property of any ward, of marital authority, of the right to
manage his property and of the right to dispose of such property by any act or any
conveyance inter vivos.
ARTICLE 35. Effects of Bond to Keep the Peace. It shall be the duty of any
person sentenced to give bond to keep the peace, to present two sufficient sureties
who shall undertake that such person will not commit the offense sought to be
prevented, and that in case such offense be committed they will pay the amount
determined by the court in its judgment, or otherwise to deposit such amount in the
office of the clerk of the court to guarantee said undertaking.
The court shall determine, according to its discretion, the period of duration of the
bond.
Should the person sentenced fail to give the bond as required he shall be detained
for a period which shall in no case exceed six months, if he shall have been
prosecuted for a grave or less grave felony, and shall not exceed thirty days, if for a
light felony.
ARTICLE 36. Pardon; Its Effects. A pardon shall not work the restoration of the
right to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly
restored by the terms of the pardon.
A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity
imposed upon him by the sentence.
ARTICLE 37. Costs What are Included. Costs shall include fees and
indemnities in the course of the judicial proceedings, whether they be fixed or
unalterable amounts previously determined by law or regulations in force, or
amounts not subject to schedule.
ARTICLE 38. Pecuniary Liabilities Order of Payment. In case the property of
the offender should not be sufficient for the payment of all his pecuniary liabilities,
the same shall be met in the following order:
1. The reparation of the damage caused.
2. Indemnification of consequential damages.
3. The fine.
4. The costs of the proceedings.
ARTICLE 39. Subsidiary Penalty. If the convict has no property with which to
meet the pecuniary liabilities mentioned in paragraphs 1st, 2nd and 3rd of the next
preceding article, he shall be subject to a subsidiary personal liability at the rate of
one day for each 2 pesos and 50 centavos, subject to the following rules:
1. If the principal penalty imposed be prisin correccional or arresto and fine, he
shall remain under confinement until his fine and pecuniary liabilities referred in the
preceding paragraph are satisfied, but his subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed
one-third of the term of the sentence, and in no case shall it continue for more than
one year, and no fraction or part of a day shall be counted against the prisoner.
2. When the principal penalty imposed be only a fine, the subsidiary imprisonment
shall not exceed six months, if the culprit shall have been prosecuted for a grave or
less grave felony, and shall not exceed fifteen days, if for a light felony.
3. When the principal penalty imposed is higher than prisin correccional no
subsidiary imprisonment shall be imposed upon the culprit.

4. If the principal penalty imposed is not to be executed by confinement in a penal
institution, but such penalty is of fixed duration, the convict, during the period of
time established in the preceding rules, shall continue to suffer the same
deprivations as those of which the principal penalty consists.
5. The subsidiary personal liability which the convict may have suffered by reason of
his insolvency shall not relieve him from reparation of the damaged caused, nor
from indemnification for the consequential damages in case his financial
circumstances should improve; but he shall be relieved from pecuniary liability as to
the fine.
Section Three. Penalties in which other accessory penalties are inherent
ARTICLE 40. Death Its Accessory Penalties. The death penalty, when it is not
executed by reason of commutation or pardon shall carry with it that of perpetual
absolute disqualification and that of civil interdiction during thirty years following
the date of sentence, unless such accessory penalties have been expressly remitted
in the pardon.
ARTICLE 41. Reclusin Perpetua and Reclusin Temporal Their accessory
penalties. The penalties of reclusin perpetua and reclusin temporal shall carry
with them that of civil interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as the
case may be, and that of perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender
shall suffer even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall
have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
ARTICLE 42. Prisin Mayor Its Accessory Penalties. The penalty of prisin
mayor shall carry with it that of temporary absolute disqualification and that of
perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage which the offender shall
suffer although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have
been expressly remitted in the pardon.
ARTICLE 43. Prisin Correccional Its Accessory Penalties. The penalty of
prisin correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from public office, from the
right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification
from the right of suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment shall exceed
eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the disqualification provided in this
article although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have
been expressly remitted in the pardon.
ARTICLE 44. Arresto Its Accessory Penalties. The penalty of arresto shall carry
with it that of suspension of the right to hold office and the right of suffrage during
the term of the sentence.
ARTICLE 45. Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the
Crime. Every penalty imposed for the commission of a felony shall carry with it
the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the instruments or tools with which it
was committed.
Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of
the Government, unless they be the property of a third person not liable for the
offense, but those articles which are not subject of lawful commerce shall be
destroyed.
Chapter Four APPLICATION OF PENALTIES
Section One. Rules for the application of penalties to the persons

criminally liable and for the graduation of the same.
ARTICLE 46. Penalty to be Imposed Upon Principals in General. The penalty
prescribed by law for the commission of a felony shall be imposed upon the
principals in the commission of such felony.
Whenever the law prescribes a penalty for a felony in general terms, it shall be
understood as applicable to the consummated felony.
ARTICLE 47. In What Cases the Death Penalty Shall Not Be Imposed. The death
penalty shall be imposed in all cases in which it must be imposed under existing
laws, except in the following cases:
1. When the guilty person be more than seventy years of age.
2. When upon appeal or revision of the case by the Supreme Court, all the members
thereof are not unanimous in their voting as to the propriety of the imposition of the
death penalty. For the imposition of said penalty or for the confirmation of a
judgment of the inferior court imposing the death sentence, the Supreme Court
shall render its decision per curiam, which shall be signed by all justices of said
court, unless some member or members thereof shall have become disqualified
from taking part in the consideration of the case, in which event the unanimous
vote and signature of only the remaining justices shall be required.
ARTICLE 48. Penalty for Complex Crimes. When a single act constitutes two or
more crimes, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other,
the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in
its maximum period.
ARTICLE 49. Penalty to Be Imposed Upon the Principals When the Crime
Committed is Different from that Intended. In cases in which the felony
committed is different from that which the offender intended to commit, the
following rules shall be observed:
1. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be higher than that
corresponding to the offense which the accused intended to commit, the penalty
corresponding to the latter shall be imposed in its maximum period.
2. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be lower than that
corresponding to the one which the accused intended to commit, the penalty for the
former shall be imposed in its maximum period.
3. The rule established by the next preceding paragraph shall not be applicable if
the acts committed by the guilty person shall also constitute an attempt or
frustration of another crime, if the law prescribes a higher penalty for either of the
latter offenses, in which case the penalty provided for the attempt or the frustrated
crime shall be imposed in its maximum period.
ARTICLE 50. Penalty to Be Imposed Upon Principals of a Frustrated Crime. The
penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated
felony shall be imposed upon the principal in a frustrated felony.
ARTICLE 51. Penalty to Be Imposed Upon Principals of Attempted Crimes. The
penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated
felony shall be imposed upon the principals in an attempt to commit a felony.
ARTICLE 52. Penalty to Be Imposed Upon Accomplices in a Consummated Crime.
The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated
felony shall be imposed upon the accomplices in the commission of a consummated
felony.
ARTICLE 53. Penalty to Be Imposed Upon Accessories to the Commission of a
Consummated Felony. The penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by
law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the accessories to the
commission of a consummated felony.
ARTICLE 54. Penalty to Be Imposed Upon Accomplices in a Frustrated Crime . The
penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the frustrated felony
shall be imposed upon the accomplices in the commission of a frustrated felony.
ARTICLE 55. Penalty to Be Imposed Upon Accessories of a Frustrated Crime. The
penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the frustrated felony
shall be imposed upon the accessories to the commission of a frustrated felony.
ARTICLE 56. Penalty to Be Imposed Upon Accomplices in an Attempted Crime.
The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for an attempt to
commit a felony shall be imposed upon the accomplices in an attempt to commit
the felony.
ARTICLE 57. Penalty to Be Imposed Upon Accessories of an Attempted Crime.
The penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the attempt shall
be imposed upon the accessories to the attempt to commit a felony.
ARTICLE 58. Additional Penalty to Be Imposed Upon Certain Accessories. Those
accessories falling within the terms of paragraph 3 of article 19 of this Code who
should act with abuse of their public functions, shall suffer the additional penalty or
absolute perpetual disqualification if the principal offender shall be guilty of a grave
felony, and that of absolute temporary disqualification if he shall be guilty of a less
grave felony.
ARTICLE 59. Penalty to Be Imposed in Case of Failure to Commit the Crime Because
the Means Employed or the Aims Sought are Impossible. When the person
intending to commit an offense has already performed the acts for the execution of
the same but nevertheless the crime was not produced by reason of the fact that
the act intended was by its nature one of impossible accomplishment or because
the means employed by such person are essentially inadequate to produce the
result desired by him, the court, having in mind the social danger and the degree of
criminality shown by the offender, shall impose upon him the penalty of arresto
mayor or a fine ranging from 200 to 500 pesos.
ARTICLE 60. Exceptions to the Rules Established in Articles 50 to 57. The
provisions contained in articles 50 to 57, inclusive, of this Code shall not be
applicable to cases in which the law expressly prescribes the penalty provided for a
frustrated or attempted felony, or to be imposed upon accomplices or accessories.
ARTICLE 61. Rules for Graduating Penalties. For the purpose of graduating the
penalties which, according to the provisions of articles 50 to 57, inclusive, of this
Code, are to be imposed upon persons guilty as principals of any frustrated or
attempted felony, or as accomplices or accessories, the following rules shall be
observed:
1. When the penalty prescribed for the felony is single and indivisible, the penalty
next lower in degree shall be that immediately following that indivisible penalty in
the scale prescribed in article 70 of this Code.
2. When the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of two indivisible
penalties, or of one or more divisible penalties to be imposed to their full extent, the
penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following the lesser of the
penalties prescribed in the above mentioned scale.

3. When the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of one or two indivisible
penalties and the maximum period of another divisible penalty, the penalty next
lower in degree shall be composed of the medium and minimum periods of the
proper divisible penalty and the maximum period of that immediately following in
said scale.
4. When the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of several periods,
corresponding to different divisible penalties, the penalty next lower in degree shall
be composed of the period immediately following the minimum prescribed and of
the two next following, which shall be taken from the penalty prescribed, if possible;
otherwise, from the penalty immediately following in the above mentioned scale.
5. When the law prescribes a penalty for a crime in some manner not specially
provided for in the four preceding rules, the courts, proceeding by analogy, shall
impose corresponding penalties upon those guilty as principals of the frustrated
felony, or of attempt to commit the same, and upon accomplices and accessories.
TABULATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE CHAPTER
Penalty to be
imposed upon
the principal
in a frustrated
crime, and
accomplice in
Penalty
a
Prescribe for consummated
the crime
crime
Penalty to be
imposed upon
the principal
in an
attempted
crime, the
accessory in
the
consummated
crime and the
accomplices
in a frustrated
crime.
First Case
Death
Reclusion
Perpetua
Second
Case
Reclusion
Perpetuato
Death
Reclusion
Temporal
Third Case
Reclusion
Prision
Temporalin its Mayor in its
maximum
maximum
period to
period
death
toreclusion
temporalin its
medium
Penalty to be
imposed
upon the
accessory in
a frustrated
crime, and
the
accomplices
in an
Penalty to be imposed
attempted upon the accessory in an
crime
attempted crime
Prision
Correccion
al
Reclusion
Temporal
Prision
Mayor
Prision
Mayor
Prision
Arresto
Correccional Mayor
Prision
correccionali
n its
maximum
period
toprision
mayor in its
Arresto
Mayor in it s
maximum
period
toprision
correccional i
n its medium
Fine
andArrest
o Mayorin
its
minimum
and
medium
Prision
Mayor in its
maximum
period
toreclusion
temporal in
its medium
Fourth Case period.
period
medium
period
period
Prision
correccionalin
its maximum
period
toprision
mayor in its
medium
period.
Arresto
mayor in its
maximum
period
toprision
correccionali
n its medium
period.
Fine
and Arresto
Mayor in its
minimum
and medium
periods
periods
Section Two. Rules for the application of penalties with regard to the
mitigating and aggravating circumstances, and habitual delinquency.
ARTICLE 62. Effects of the Attendance of Mitigating or Aggravating Circumstances
and of Habitual Delinquency. Mitigating or aggravating circumstances and
habitual delinquency shall be taken into account for the purpose of diminishing or
increasing the penalty in conformity with the following rules:
1. Aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime specially
punishable by law or which are included by the law in defining a crime and
prescribing the penalty therefor shall not be taken into account for the purpose of
increasing the penalty.
2. The same rule shall apply with respect to any aggravating circumstances inherent
in the crime to such a degree that it must of necessity accompany the commission
thereof.
3. Aggravating or mitigating circumstances which arise from the moral attributes of
the offender, or from his private relations with the offended party, or from any other
personal cause, shall only serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability of the
principals, accomplices and accessories as to whom such circumstances are
attendant.
4. The circumstances which consist in the material execution of the act, or in the
means employed to accomplish it, shall serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability
of those persons only who had knowledge of them at the time of the execution of
the act or their cooperation therein.
5. Habitual delinquency shall have the following effects:
(a) Upon a third conviction the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided by
law for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of
prisin correccional in its medium and maximum periods;
(b) Upon a fourth conviction the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided
for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prisin
mayor in its minimum and medium periods; and
(c) Upon a fifth or additional conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty
provided for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty
of prisin mayor in its maximum period to reclusin temporal in its minimum period.
Notwithstanding the provisions of this article, the total of the two penalties to be
imposed upon the offender, in conformity herewith, shall in no case exceed 30
years.
For the purpose of this article, a person shall be deemed to be habitual delinquent,
if within a period of ten years from the date of his release or last conviction of the
crimes robo, hurto, estafa, or falsificacion, he is found guilty of any of said crimes a
third time or oftener.
ARTICLE 63. Rules for the Application of Indivisible Penalties. In all cases in
which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts
regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended
the commission of the deed.
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible
penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating
circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied.
2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the
commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance
and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission
of the act, the courts shall reasonably allow them to offset one another in
consideration of their number and importance, for the purpose of applying the
penalty in accordance with the preceding rules, according to the result of such
compensation.
ARTICLE 64. Rules for the Application of Penalties Which Contain Three Periods.
In cases in which the penalties prescribed by law contain three periods, whether it
be a single divisible penalty or composed of three different penalties, each one of
which forms a period in accordance with the provisions of articles 76 and 77, the
courts shall observe for the application of the penalty the following rules, according
to whether there are or are not mitigating or aggravating circumstances:
1. When there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, they shall
impose the penalty prescribed by law in its medium period.
2. When only a mitigating circumstance is present in the commission of the act,
they shall impose the penalty in its minimum period.
3. When only an aggravating circumstance is present in the commission of the act,
they shall impose the penalty in its maximum period.
4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall
reasonably offset those of one class against the other according to their relative
weight.
5. When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstances are present, the court shall impose the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem applicable, according to the
number and nature of such circumstances.
6. Whatever may be the number and nature of the aggravating circumstances, the
courts shall not impose a greater penalty than that prescribed by law, in its
maximum period.
7. Within the limits of each period, the courts shall determine the extent of the
penalty according to the number and nature of the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances and the greater or lesser extent of the evil produced by the crime.
ARTICLE 65. Rule in Cases in Which the Penalty is Not Composed of Three
Periods. In cases in which the penalty prescribed by law is not composed of three
periods, the courts shall apply the rules contained in the foregoing articles, dividing
into three equal portions the time included in the penalty prescribed, and forming
one period of each of the three portions.
ARTICLE 66. Imposition of Fines. In imposing fines the courts may fix any
amount within the limits established by law; in fixing the amount in each case
attention shall be given, not only to the mitigating and aggravating circumstances,
but more particularly to the wealth or means of the culprit.
ARTICLE 67. Penalty to Be Imposed When Not All the Requisites of Exemption of
the Fourth Circumstance of Article 12 are Present. When all the conditions
required in circumstance number 4 of article 12 of this Code to exempt from
criminal liability are not present, the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prisin correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon the
culprit if he shall have been guilty of a grave felony, and arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods, if of a less grave felony.
ARTICLE 68. Penalty to Be Imposed Upon a Person Under Eighteen Years of Age.
under the provisions of the paragraph next to the last of article 80 of this Code, the
following rules shall be observed:
1. Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who is not exempted
from liability by reason of the court having declared that he acted with discernment,
a discretionary penalty shall be imposed, but always lower by two degrees at least
than that prescribed by law for the crime which he committed.
2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty next
lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period.
ARTICLE 69. Penalty to Be Imposed When the Crime Committed is Not Wholly
Excusable. A penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law
shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some
of the conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from criminal liability in
the several cases mentioned in articles 11 and 12, provided that the majority of
such conditions be present. The courts shall impose the penalty in the period which
may be deemed proper, in view of the number and nature of the conditions of
exemption present or lacking.
ARTICLE 70. Successive Service of Sentences; Exception. When the culprit has
to serve two or more penalties, he shall serve them simultaneously if the nature of
the penalties will so permit; otherwise, said penalties shall be executed
successively, following the order of their respective severity, which shall be
determined in accordance with the following scale:
1. Death.
2. Reclusin perpetua.
3. Reclusin temporal.
4. Prisin mayor.
5. Prisin correccional.
6. Arresto mayor.
7. Arresto menor.
A person sentenced to destierro who is also sentenced to the penalty of prisin or
arresto shall be required to serve these latter penalties before serving the penalty of
destierro.
ARTICLE 71. Fine. The fine shall be considered as the last of all the principal
penalties listed in the preceding article.
When a fine is so imposed, the duration of the subsidiary liability corresponding
thereto, by reason of the insolvency of the offender, shall not exceed that which is
provided in rule 2 of article 39.
ARTICLE 72. Preference in the Payment of the Civil Liabilities. The civil liabilities
of a person found guilty of two or more offenses shall be satisfied by following the
chronological order of the dates of the final judgments rendered against him,
beginning with the first in order of time.
Section Two. Rules for the application of penalties with regard to the
mitigating and aggravating circumstances, and habitual delinquency.
ARTICLE 73. Presumption in Regard to the Imposition of Accessory Penalties.
Whenever the courts shall impose a penalty which, by provision of law, carries with
it other penalties, according to the provisions of articles 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, and 45
of this Code, it must be understood that the accessory penalties are also imposed
upon the convict.
ARTICLE 74. Penalty Higher Than Reclusin Perpetua in Certain Cases. In cases
in which the law prescribes a penalty higher than another given penalty, without
specifically designating the name of the former, if such higher penalty should be
that of death, the same penalty and the accessory penalties of article 40, shall be
considered as the next higher penalty.
ARTICLE 75. Increasing or Reducing the Penalty of Fine by One or More Degrees .
Whenever it may be necessary to increase or reduce the penalty of fine by one or
more degrees, it shall be increased or reduced, respectively, for each degree, by
one-fourth of the maximum amount prescribed by law, without, however, changing
the minimum.
The same rules shall be observed with regard to fines that do not consist of a fixed
amount, but are made proportional.
ARTICLE 76. Legal Period of Duration of Divisible Penalties. The legal period of
duration of divisible penalties shall be considered as divided into three parts,
forming three periods, the minimum, the medium, and the maximum in the manner
shown in the following table:
TABLE SHOWING THE DURATION OF DIVISIBLE PENALTIES AND THE TIME
INCLUDED IN EACH OF THEIR PERIODS
Penalties
Time included
in the penalty
in its entirety
Reclusion temporal From 12

years and 1
day to 20
years.
Time included
in its
Time included Time included
minimum
in its medium
in its
period
period
maximum
From 12
years and 1
day to 14
years and 8
months.
From 14
From 17
years, 8
years, 4
months and 1 months and 1
day to 17
day to 20
years and 4
years.
months.
Prision
mayor, absolute
disqualification and From 6 years
special temporary and 1 day to
disqualification
12 years.
From 6 years
and 1 day to
8 years.
From 8 years
and 1 day to
10 years.
From 6
From 2 years,
From 6
months and 1 4 months and
Prision
months and 1 day to 2
1 day to 4
correccional, suspe day to 6
years and 4
years and 2
nsion anddestierro years.
months.
months.
From 10
years and 1
day to 12
years.
From 4 years,
2 months and
1 day to 6
years.
Arresto mayor
From 1 month
and 1 day to From 1 to 2
months.
months.
From 2
From 4
months and 1 months and 1
day to 4
day to 6
months.
months.
Arresto menor
From 1 to 30
days.
From 11 to 20 From 21 to 30
days.
days.
From 1 to 10
days.
ARTICLE 77. When the Penalty is a Complex One Composed of Three Distinct
Penalties. In cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of three
distinct penalties, each one shall form a period; the lightest of them shall be the
minimum, the next the medium, and the most severe the maximum period.
Whenever the penalty prescribed does not have one of the forms specially provided
for in this book, the periods shall be distributed, applying by analogy the prescribed
rules.
Chapter Five EXECUTION AND SERVICE OF PENALTIES
Section One. General Provisions
ARTICLE 78. When and How a Penalty is to Be Executed. No penalty shall be
executed except by virtue of a final judgment.
A penalty shall not be executed in any other form than that prescribed by law, nor
with any other circumstances or incidents than those expressly authorized thereby.
In addition to the provisions of the law, the special regulations prescribed for the
government of the institutions in which the penalties are to be suffered shall be
observed with regard to the character of the work to be performed, the time of its
performance, and other incidents connected therewith, the relations of the convicts
among themselves and other persons, the relief which they may receive, and their
diet.
The regulations shall make provision for the separation of the sexes in different
institutions, or at least into different departments, and also for the correction and
reform of the convicts.
ARTICLE 79. Suspension of the Execution and Service of the Penalties in Case of
Insanity. When a convict shall become insane or an imbecile after final sentence
has been pronounced, the execution of said sentence shall be suspended only with
regard to the personal penalty, the provisions of the second paragraph of
circumstance number 1 of article 12 being observed in the corresponding cases.
If at any time the convict shall recover his reason, his sentence shall be executed,
unless the penalty shall have prescribed in accordance with the provisions of this
Code.
The respective provisions of this section shall also be observed if the insanity or
imbecility occurs while the convict is serving his sentence.
ARTICLE 80. Suspension of Sentence of Minor Delinquents. Whenever a minor
under eighteen years of age, of either sex, be accused of a crime, the court, after
hearing the evidence in the proper proceedings, instead of pronouncing judgment,
shall suspend all further proceedings and shall commit such minor to the custody or
care of a public or private, benevolent or charitable institution, established under
the law for the care, correction or education of orphaned, homeless, defective and
delinquent children, or to the custody or care of any other responsible person in any
other place subject to visitation and supervision by the Public Welfare Commissioner
or any of his agents or representatives, if there be any, or otherwise by the
superintendent of public schools or his representatives, subject to such conditions
as are prescribed herein below, until such minor shall have reached his majority or
for such less period as the court may deem proper.
The court, in committing said minor as provided above, shall take into consideration
the religion of such minor, his parents or next of kin, in order to avoid his
commitment to any private institution not under the control and supervision of the
religious sect or denomination to which they belong.
The Public Welfare Commissioner or his duly authorized representatives or agents,
the superintendent of public schools or his representatives, or the person to whose
custody or care the minor has been committed, shall submit to the Court every two
months or as often as required, a written report on the good or bad conduct of said
minor and the moral and intellectual progress made by him.
The suspension of the proceedings against a minor may be extended or shortened
by the court on the recommendation of the Public Welfare Commissioner or his
authorized representatives or agents, or the superintendent of public schools or his
representatives, according as to whether the conduct of such minor has been good
or not and whether he has complied with the conditions imposed upon him. The
provisions of the first paragraph of this article shall not, however, be affected by
those contained herein.
If the minor has been committed to the custody or care of any of the institutions
mentioned in the first paragraph of this article, with the approval of the Public
Welfare Commissioner and subject to such conditions as this official in accordance
with the law may deem proper to impose, such minor may be allowed to stay
elsewhere under the care of a responsible person.
If the minor has behaved properly and has complied with the conditions imposed
upon him during his confinement, in accordance with the provisions of this article,
he shall be returned to the court in order that the same may order his final release.
In case the minor fails to behave properly or to comply with the regulations of the
institution to which he has been committed or with the conditions imposed upon
him when he was committed to the care of a responsible person, or in case he
should be found incorrigible or his continued stay in such institution should be
inadvisable, he shall be returned to the court in order that the same may render the
judgment corresponding to the crime committed by him.
The expenses for the maintenance of a minor delinquent confined in the institution
to which he has been committed, shall be borne totally or partially by his parents or
relatives or those persons liable to support him, if they are able to do so, in the
discretion of the court.
Section Two. Execution of principal penalties
ARTICLE 81. When and How the Death Penalty is to Be Executed. The death
sentence shall be executed with preference to any other and shall consist in putting
the person under sentence to death by electrocution. The death sentence shall be
executed under the authority of the Director of Prisons, endeavoring so far as
possible to mitigate the sufferings of the persons under sentence during
electrocution as well as during the proceedings prior to the execution.
If the person under sentence so desires, he shall be anaesthetized at the moment of
the electrocution.
ARTICLE 82. Notification and Execution of the Sentence and Assistance to the
Culprit. The court shall designate a working day for the execution, but not the
hour thereof; and such designation shall not be communicated to the offender
before sunrise of said day, and the execution shall not take place until after the
expiration of at least eight hours following the notification, but before sunset.
During the interval between the notification and the execution, the culprit shall, in
so far as possible, be furnished such assistance as he may request in order to be
attended in his last moments by priests or ministers of the religion he professes and
to consult lawyers, as well as in order to make a will and confer with members of his
family or persons in charge of the management of his business, of the
administration of his property, or of the care of his descendants.
ARTICLE 83. Suspension of the Execution of the Death Sentence. The death
sentence shall not be inflicted upon a woman within the three years next following
the date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, nor upon any person over
seventy years of age. In this last case, the death sentence shall be commuted to the
penalty of reclusin perpetua with the accessory penalty provided in article 40.
ARTICLE 84. Place of Execution and Persons Who May Witness the Same. The
execution shall take place in the penitentiary of Bilibid in a space closed to the
public view and shall be witnessed only by the priests assisting the offender and by
his lawyers and by his relatives, not exceeding six, if he so request, by the physician
and the necessary personnel of the penal establishment, and by such persons as
the Director of Prisons may authorized.
ARTICLE 85. Provision Relative to the Corpse of the Person Executed and Its
Burial. Unless claimed by his family, the corpse of the culprit shall, upon the
completion of the legal proceedings subsequent to the execution, be turned over to
the institute of learning or scientific research first applying for it, for the purpose of
study and investigation, provided that such institute shall take charge of the decent
burial of the remains. Otherwise, the Director of Prisons shall order the burial of the
body of the culprit at government expense, granting permission to be present
thereat to the members of the family of the culprit and the friends of the latter. In
no case shall the burial of the body of a person sentenced to death be held with
pomp.
ARTICLE 86. Reclusin Perpetua, Reclusin Temporal, Prisin Mayor, Prisin
Correccional and Arresto Mayor. The penalties of reclusin perpetua, reclusin
temporal, prisin mayor, prisin correccional, and arresto mayor, shall be executed
and served in the places and penal establishments provided by the Administrative
Code in force or which may be provided by law in the future.
ARTICLE 87. Destierro. Any person sentenced to destierro shall not be permitted
to enter the place or places designated in the sentence, nor within the radius
therein specified, which shall be not more than 250 and not less than 25 kilometers
from the place designated.
ARTICLE 88. Arresto Menor. The penalty of arresto menor shall be served in the
municipal jail, or in the house of the defendant himself under the surveillance of an
officer of the law, when the court so provides in its decision, taking into
consideration the health of the offender and other reasons which may seem
satisfactory to it.
Title Four
EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY AND OF CIVIL LIABILITY RESULTING
FROM CRIME
Chapter One EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Section One. Total Extinction of Criminal Liability
Section Two. Partial Extinction of Criminal Liability
Title Five
CIVIL LIABILITY
Chapter One PERSON CIVILLY LIABLE FOR FELONIES
Chapter Two WHAT CIVIL LIABILITY INCLUDES
Chapter Three EXTINCTION AND SURVIVAL OF CIVIL LIABILITY

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 135457
September 29, 2000

vs.
JOSE PATRIARCA, JR., alias "KA DJANGO," CARLOS NARRA, alias "KA JESSIE" and
TEN (10) JOHN DOES, accused-appellant.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
Accused-appellant Jose Patriarca, Jr., with the aliases of "Ka Django," "Carlos Narra" and "Ka
Jessie," appeals the decision of the Regional Trial Court at Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52, in
Criminal Case No. 2773 entitled "People of the Philippines versus Jose Patriarca, Jr. alias 'Ka
Django,' 'Carlos Narra,' 'Ka Jessie,' and 21 John Does" convicting him of murder and sentencing
him to reclusion perpetua.
On August 16, 1990, an information for murder was filed against Jose Patriarca, Jr., alias "Ka
Django," "Carlos Narra", "Ka Jessie," et al., charging them of murder committed as follows:
"That on or about the 30th day of June, 1987 at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening in the
Municipality of Donsol, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, armed with guns, forcibly took away ALFREDO AREVALO from his residence and
brought him to Sitio Abre, Mabini, Donsol, Sorsogon, and did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault and
shoot ALFREDO AREVALO thereby inflicting upon him mortal wounds, which directly caused
his death to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."
Accused-appellant Jose Patriarca, Jr. was also charged with Murder for the killing of one Rudy
de Borja and a certain Elmer Cadag under Informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 2665
and 2672, respectively.
Upon arraignment on November 25, 1993, accused-appellant, assisted by his counsel de parte,
pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged. Joint trial of the three cases was conducted
considering the substantial identity of the facts and circumstances of the case.
Prosecution witness Nonito Malto testified that on June 30, 1987, the accused, with ten (10)
armed companions, requested permission to rest in his house, which was granted. They had
with them a person who was hogtied. Accused Patriarca asked that the lights in Malto's house
be extinguished and Malto complied.
Around 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of July 1, 1987, Malto was awakened by a gunshot.
When he looked out, he saw Patriarca holding a gun and ordering the person who was hogtied
to lie down. After several minutes, Malto heard two gunshots. He then heard the accused direct
his companions to carry away the dead man.
Nonito Malto, later on, learned that the dead man was Alfredo Arevalo when Patriarca went back
to his place, together with the military, on March 29, 1990.
The skeletal remains of Alfredo Arevalo were recovered in the property of a Rubuang Tolosa
and were identified by Elisa Arevalo, the mother of the victim.
The second witness for the prosecution was Elisa Arevalo. She knew Patriarca, alias "Ka
Django", as he told her on March 10, 1987 not to let her son join the military. She, however,
replied that they were only seeking employment. Her son Alfredo was her companion in
attending to their farm and he was a member of the Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF) in
their locality.
After she was informed by her tenant Alegria Moratelio Alcantara that her son was abducted by
the New People's Army (NPA) led by Patriarca, she reported the matter to the military and
looked for him. She was informed by the residents of the place where the NPA passed, that they
saw her son hogtied, that her son even asked for drinking water, and complained that he was
being maltreated by the NPA. After three days of searching, a certain Walter Ricafort, an NPA
member and a relative of hers, notified her that her son Alfredo was killed by Jose Patriarca, Jr.
In the municipal building, Nonito Malto likewise informed her of her son's death in the hands of
Ka Django. Consequently, a Death Certificate was issued by the Local Civil Registrar.
When the skeletal remains of a man were recovered, she was able to identify them as belonging
to her son by reason of the briefs found in the burial site. Her son, Alfredo Arevalo, used to print
his name on the waistband of his briefs so that it would not get lost.
The defense presented accused Jose Patriarca, Jr. and Francisco Derla who admitted that
accused is a member of the NPA operating in Donsol, Sorsogon, but denied ever abducting the
victims in the three criminal cases filed against him.
On January 20, 1998, a decision was rendered convicting the accused and imposing the
following penalty:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Jose Patriarca, Jr. alias Ka
Django, alias Carlos Narra guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder for the death
of Alfredo Arevalo and hereby sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua
with all the accessory provided by law and to pay the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity to
the heirs of the victim Alfredo Arevalo, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
and as regards Crim. Case No. 2665 and Crim. Case No. 2672, for failure of the prosecution to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, said Jose Patriarca alias Carlos Narra,
Ka Django, is hereby acquitted.
"In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be given full credit of his period of detention.
"With cost de-oficio.
"SO ORDERED."1
Hence, this appeal where accused-appellant assigns the following lone error allegedly
committed by the trial court:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF
MURDER, AN OFFENSE COMMITTED IN PURSUANCE OR IN FURTHERANCE OF
REBELLION.
Accused-appellant applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 724 amending Proclamation
No. 347, dated March 25, 1994, entitled "Granting Amnesty to Rebels, Insurgents, and All Other
Persons Who Have or May Have Committed Crimes Against Public Order, Other Crimes
Committed in Furtherance of Political Ends, and Violations of the Article of War, and Creating a
National Amnesty Commission." His application was favorably granted by the National Amnesty
Board. Attached to appellant's brief is the Notice of Resolution of the National Amnesty
Commission (NAC) dated November 17, 1999 which states:
"Quoted below is a resolution of the National Amnesty Commission dated 22 October 1998.2
'RESOLUTION NO. D-99-8683 refers to Application No. 02125 of MR. JOSE NARRA
PATRIARCA filed with the Local Amnesty Board of Legazpi City on 18 February 1997.
'Applicant admitted joining the NPA in 1977. He served under the Sandatahang Yunit
Pampropaganda and participated in the following armed activities:
'a) Encounter with the Philippine Army forces at Barangay Hirawon, Donsol, Sorsogon
on 14 February 1986;
'b) Encounter with elements of the Philippine Constabulary at Barangay Godon, Donsol,
Sorsogon on 15 February 1986;
'c) Encounter with the Philippine Army forces at Barangay Banwang, Gurang, Donsol,
Sorsogon in 1987;
'd) Liquidation of ELMER CADAG an alleged military informer at Barangay Boroan,
Donsol, Sorsogon, on 21 March 1987, in which a case of Murder in Criminal Case No.
2672 was filed against him before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon,
Sorsogon;
'e) Liquidation of a certain RUDY DEBORJA, a thief and nuisance of the community, at
Donsol, Sorsogon, on 09 March 1984, in which a case of Murder in Criminal Case No.
2665 was filed against him before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon,
Sorsogon;
'f) Liquidation of a certain ALEJANDRINO MILITANTE for his misconducts at San
Antonio, Donsol, Sorsogon, on 12 February 1986, in which a case of Murder in Criminal
Case No. 2664 was filed against him before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52,
Sorsogon, Sorsogon;
'g) Liquidation of a certain ALFREDO AREVALO, a former member of the CHDF at Sitio
Abe (sic), Mabini, Donsol, Sorsogon, on 30 June 1987, in which a case of Murder in
Criminal Case No. 2773 was filed against him before the Regional Trial Court, Branch
52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon;
'h) Liquidation of one DOMINGO DONQUILLO, a barangay captain, at Barangay
Tinanogan, Donsol, Sorsogon, on 20 September 1986 in which a (sic) Criminal Case No.
2663 was filed against him.
'After a careful verification and evaluation on (sic) the claims of the applicant, the Local Amnesty
Board concluded that his activities were done in the pursuit of his political beliefs. It thus
recommended on 20 May 1998 the grant of his application for amnesty.
'The Commission, in its deliberation on the application on 22 October 1999, resolved to approve
the recommendation of the Local Amnesty Board.
'WHEREFORE, the application for amnesty of MR. JOSE NARRA PATRIARCA under
Proclamation No. 724 is hereby GRANTED for rebellion constituted by the acts detailed above,
provided they were committed on or before the date he was captured on 22 June 1988. Let a
Certificate of Amnesty be issued in his favor as soon as this Resolution becomes final. It shall
become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) calendar days from receipt of this Notice, unless a
Motion for Reconsideration is filed with the Commission by any party within said period.'" 3
On March 9, 2000, Hon. Alfredo F. Tadiar, Chairman of the National Amnesty Commission,
wrote the following letter to the Provincial Prosecutor of Sorsogon, Sorsogon:
"Notice of Amnesty Grant to Jose N. Patriarca"
"Pursuant to NAC Action No. 95-358-C, we are transmitting herewith the attached copy of
RESOLUTION NO. D-99-8683 granting amnesty to JOSE N. PATRIARCA. The grantee was
accused of the following cases:
"1. Murder in Criminal Case No. 2672 filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52,
Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
"He is currently detained at the Provincial Jail, Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
"The purpose of this transmittal is to provide you, as the chief prosecutor of the province, the
opportunity to take whatever action you may deem appropriate from receipt of this note. This
grant of amnesty shall become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) calendar days from receipt of
this Notice, unless a Motion for Reconsideration is filed with the Commission by any party within
said period.
"Thank you for your continued support for the Peace Process."4
The Office of the Solicitor General, in its letter dated June 23, 2000 to the National Amnesty
Commission, requested information as to whether or not a motion for reconsideration was filed
by any party, and the action, if there was any, taken by the NAC.5
In his reply dated June 28, 2000, NAC Chairman Tadiar wrote, among other things, that there
has been no motion for reconsideration filed by any party.6
Accused-appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. was granted amnesty under Proclamation No. 724
dated May 17, 1996. It amended Proclamation No. 347 dated March 25, 1994.
Section 1 of Proclamation No. 724 reads thus:
"Section 1. Grant of Amnesty. - Amnesty is hereby granted to all persons who shall apply
therefor and who have or may have committed crimes, on or before June 1, 1995, in pursuit of
their political beliefs, whether punishable under the Revised Penal Code or special laws,
including but not limited to the following: rebellion or insurrection; coup d'etat; conspiracy and
proposal to commit rebellion, insurrection, or coup d'etat; disloyalty of public officers or
employees; inciting to rebellion or insurrection; sedition; conspiracy to commit sedition; inciting
to sedition; illegal assembly; illegal association; direct assault; indirect assault; resistance and
disobedience to a person in authority or agents of such person; tumults and other disturbances
of public order; unlawful use of means of publication and unlawful utterances; alarms and
scandals; illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions, and explosives, committed in furtherance
of, incident to, or in connection with the crimes of rebellion and insurrection; and violations of
Articles 59 (desertion), 62 (absence without leave), 67 (mutiny or sedition), 68 (failure to
suppress mutiny or sedition), 94 (various crimes), 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and
gentleman), and 97 (general article) of the Articles of War; Provided, That the amnesty shall not
cover crimes against chastity and other crimes for personal ends."1wphi1
Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high political
offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who have
offended, by some breach, the law of nations.7 Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and
puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is
charged, that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had
committed no offense.8
Paragraph 3 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally
extinguished by amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.
In the case of People vs. Casido,9 the difference between pardon and amnesty is given:
"Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded
and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty
by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, is a public act of
which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction;
while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political
offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after
conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense
of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that
reason it does 'not work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage,
unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon,' and it 'in no case exempts
the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence' (Article
36, Revised Penal Code). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion
the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the
person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no
offense."
This Court takes judicial notice of the grant of amnesty upon accused-appellant Jose N.
Patriarca, Jr. Once granted, it is binding and effective. It serves to put an end to the appeal.10
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Regional Trial Court at
Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52 in Criminal Case No. 2773 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accused-appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of murder.
Pursuant to Resolution No. D-99-8683,11 Criminal Case Nos. 2663 and 2664, which are both
filed in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Sorsogon, Sorsogon,12 are ordered DISMISSED.
The release of Jose N. Patriarca who is presently detained at the Provincial Jail of Sorsogon is
likewise ORDERED unless he is being detained for some other legal cause.
The Director of Prisons is ordered to report within ten (10) days his compliance with this
decision.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 109376
January 20, 2000
PANFILO O. DOMINGO, petitioner,

vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN (Second Division) and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

In this special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for temporary
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, petitioner Panfilo O. Domingo (hereafter
DOMINGO) seeks to nullify the resolution1 of 15 March 1993 of the Second Division of the
Sandiganbayan denying his motion to quash the information against him for violation of Section
3(e) in relation to Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act.
The records show that on 26 May 1987, the Philippine National Bank (PNB) filed a complaint
with the Tanodbayan against former President Ferdinand E. Marcos; Rodolfo M. Cuenca, then
president of the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP); and
Joaquin T. Venus, Jr., former Deputy Presidential Assistant. The complaint was docketed as
TBP Case No. 87-02391.2
In an Order dated 1 September 1987, Special Prosecutor Juan T. Templonuevo dropped from
the complaint Ferdinand Marcos, who was out of the country and therefore outside the criminal
jurisdiction of the Tanodbayan, so as not to delay the preliminary investigation against the other
respondents. In the same order, it was also directed that a subpoena be issued to DOMINGO,
the President of PNB at the time of the questioned transactions, it appearing from the evidence
on record that he was also involved in the case.3 However, the subpoena addressed to
DOMINGO at PNB, Escolta, Manila, his last known address, was returned "unserved," since he
was no longer connected with the said bank at the time it was served.4
On 8 June 1988, in line with the ruling in Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan,5 then Ombudsman
Conrado M. Vasquez issued Administrative Order No. 1 addressed to the Office of the Special
Prosecutor and Deputized Tanodbayan Prosecutors authorizing them to continue the
preliminary investigation of cases pending as of 27 April 1988 until the same are terminated.6
On 6 February 1992, after a finding of probable cause to implead DOMINGO in the case,
Special Prosecution Officer (SPO) III Teresita V. Diaz-Baldos issued an order directing him to
submit a counter-affidavit.7 DOMINGO submit on 9 March 1992 his counter-affidavit with the
Office of the Special Prosecutor.8
On 9 July 1992, SPO III Diaz-Baldos issued a resolution recommending that DOMINGO and
Rodolfo M. Cuenca be prosecuted for violation of Section 3(e) in relation to Section 4(a) of
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, but that the complaint be dismissed as against Ferdinand
E. Marcos for being moot and academic by reason of his death, and as against Joaquin T.
Venus for lack of merit.9 This was approved by Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez, and the
corresponding information was filed with the Sandiganbayan on 30 July 1992. The case was
docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 17847.10 The information reads as follows:
That on or about the month of July 1980, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto,
in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, PANFILO O. DOMINGO, being then the President of the
Philippine National Bank, a government financial institution, and hence a public officer,
while in the performance of his official functions, committing the offense in relation to his
office and conspiring and confederating with then President Ferdinand E. Marcos and
with RODOLFO M. CUENCA, a private individual, being then the Chairman of the Board
of Directors of the Construction and Development Company of the Philippines (CDCP), a
corporation duly organized and existing in accordance with the laws of the Philippines,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully, criminally, with evident bad faith and manifest
partiality cause undue injury to the Philippine National Bank and grant unwarranted
benefits to CDCP in the following manner: accused RODOLFO M. CUENCA, capitalizing
and exploiting his close personal association with the then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos to obtain favorable loan accommodations for CDCP, requested the latter's
assistance and intervention in securing the approval by the Philippine National Bank
Board of Directors of the application of the CDCP for a U.S. $40 Million Letter of Credit
and in foregoing the collateral requirements of CDCP, as a result of which accused
Panfilo O. Domingo, acceding to the pressure exerted by President Marcos in relation to
accused Cuenca's requests, facilitated and made possible the passage by the PNB
Board of Directors of Board Resolution No. 144 whereby the U.S.$40 Million Standby
Letter of Credit applied for by CDCP to secure the principal and interest on its loan with
the Republic National Bank of Dallas was approved, notwithstanding a collateral
deficiency by CDCP on its previous accounts with PNB, and again subsequently
recommended to the PNB Board of Directors the approval of Board Resolution No. 180
amending Board Resolution No. 144 in order to allow CDCP to use its loan proceeds
secured by the aforementioned letter of credit for its other international projects and
thereafter allowed CDCP to forego its collateral requirements, which act of the accused
inflicted undue injury and prejudice to PNB which was unjustly forced to assume CDCP's
obligation to the Republic National Bank of Dallas after the latter had defaulted in the
payment thereof, amounting to U.S. $29 Million, and which likewise granted unwarranted
benefits to CDCP in the same amount.
On 11 August 1992, DOMINGO filed a petition for reinvestigation11 with the Sandiganbayan. The
latter directed the prosecution to treat the petition as a motion for reconsideration of the 9 July
1992 resolution.12 The motion was, however, denied by the Office of the Special Prosecutor on
14 January 1993.13
On 19 February 1993, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the information
against him on the grounds that (1) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished by
prescription, and (2) the facts charged do not constitute an offense.14 In its Resolution of 15
March 1993 the Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash.15
Not satisfied, DOMINGO filed the instant petition alleging that the respondent Sandiganbayan
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it denied his motion
to quash the information.
Meanwhile, on 17 August 1993, during his arraignment in Criminal Case No. 17847, DOMINGO
refused to enter a plea; hence, the Sandiganbayan ordered that a plea of "not guilty" be entered
for him.16
We shall first take up the issue of prescription.
DOMINGO contends that his alleged criminal liability has already been extinguished by
prescription. In support thereof he claims that the prescriptive period commenced to run in July
1980 when the crime was allegedly committed, and was only tolled on 6 February 1992, when
he was impleaded as party-respondent by Prosecutor Diaz-Baldos. The filing of the complaint
with the Tanodbayan on 26 May 1987 produced no legal effect and could never be deemed to
have validly interrupted the running of the prescriptive period, considering that effective 2
February 1987, the Tanodbayan was divested of its authority to conduct preliminary
investigation unless duly authorized by the Ombudsman.
We are not persuaded.
In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be considered:
(1) the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of prescription
starts to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted.
The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) provides for its own prescriptive
period. Section 11 thereof reads: "All offenses punishable under this Act shall prescribe in ten
years." This was later amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, approved on 16 March 1982,
which increased the prescriptive period of the crime from ten years to fifteen years.
Since the law alleged to have been violated, R.A. No. 3019, as amended, is a special law, the
applicable rule in the computation of the prescriptive period is Section 2 of Act No. 3326,17 as
amended, which provides:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of
the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.
This simply means that if the commission of the crime is known, the prescriptive period shall
commence to run on the day the crime was committed. However, if the violation of the special
law is not known at the time of its commission, the prescription begins to run only from the
discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the constitutive act or acts.18
In the present case, it was well-nigh impossible for the government, the aggrieved party, to have
known the violations committed at the time the questioned transactions were made because
both parties to the transactions were allegedly in conspiracy to perpetrate fraud against the
government.19 The alleged anomalous transactions could only have been discovered after the
February 1986 Revolution when one of the original respondents, then President Ferdinand
Marcos, was ousted from office. Prior to said date, no person would have dared to question the
legality or propriety of those transactions.20 Hence, the counting of the prescriptive period would
commence from the date of discovery of the offense, which could have been between February
1986 after the EDSA Revolution and 26 May 1987 when the initiatory complaint was
filed.1wphi1.nt
As to when the period of prescription is interrupted, the second paragraph of Section 2 of Act.
No. 3326, as amended, provides that it is "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person." Whether the running of the prescriptive period was tolled on 1 September 1987, when
DOMINGO was impleaded as an accused, or on 30 July 1992, when the information against
him was filed with the Sandiganbayan, is immaterial; for only about one or six years,
respectively, has elapsed from the date of the discovery of the alleged offense. Thus, the
prescriptive period, whether ten years as provided in R.A. No. 3019 or fifteen years as provided
in the amendatory Act, has not yet lapsed. The motion to quash on the ground of prescription
was, therefore, correctly denied.
We now come to the question of whether the facts charged in the information constitute an
offense.
The fundamental test on the viability of a motion to quash on the ground that the facts averred in
the information do not amount to an offense is whether the facts asseverated would establish
the essential elements of the crime defined in the law.21 In this examination, matters aliunde are
not considered.22
As a general proposition, a motion to quash on the ground that the allegations of the information
do not constitute the offense charged, or any offense for that matter, should be resolved on the
basis alone of said allegations whose truth and veracity are hypothetically admitted.23 The
informations need only state the ultimate facts; the reasons therefor could be proved during the
trial.24
DOMINGO, together with Rodolfo Cuenca, was charged with violation of Section 3(e), in relation
to Section 4(a), of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. These provisions read:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing laws, the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(e). Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Sec. 4. Prohibition on private individuals. (a) It shall be unlawful for any person having
family or close personal relation with any public official to capitalize or exploit or take
advantage of such family or close personal relation by directly or indirectly requesting or
receiving any present, gift or material or pecuniary advantage from any other person
having some business, transaction, application, request or contract with the government,
in which such public official has to intervene. Family relation shall include the spouse or
relatives by consanguinity or affinity in the third civil degree. The word "close personal
relation" shall include close personal relationship, social and fraternal connections, and
professional employment all giving rise to intimacy which assures free access to such
public officer.
The elements of the offense under Section 3(e) are the following: (1) that the accused is a
public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the former; (2) that the said public
officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his or her official duties or in
relation to his or her public positions; (3) that he or she causes undue injury to any party,
whether the government or a private party; (4) that such undue injury is caused by giving
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such parties; and (5) that the public officer
has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.25
The information specifically stated as follows:
(1) That DOMINGO was a public officer, being then the president of PNB, a government
financial institution, and Rodolfo Cuenca was a private individual, then Chairman of the
Board of Directors of the CDCP, who conspired and confederated with DOMINGO,
capitalizing and exploiting his close personal association with then President Marcos to
obtain favorable loan accommodations for CDCP;
(2) That DOMINGO committed the offense in relation to his office and while in the
performance of his official functions;
(3) That he facilitated and made possible the passage by the PNB Board of Directors of
Resolution No. 144, thereby causing undue injury and prejudice to PNB which was
unjustly forced to assume CDCP's obligation to the Republic National Bank of Dallas
after the CDCP defaulted in the payment of the loan amounting to US$29 Million;
(4) That such undue injury was caused by his facilitation of the approval of the Letter of
Credit and the waiver of the collateral deficiency, thereby granting unwarranted benefits
to CDCP in the same amount; and
(5) That he acted with evident bad faith and manifest partiality.
Clearly, the facts alleged in the information constitute a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019, as amended. Hence, the motion to quash must fail.
Finally, DOMINGO avers that the long and inordinate delay in the termination of the preliminary
investigation and the filing of the information violated his right to speedy trial, invoking the ruling
enunciated in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan.26
The concept of speedy disposition of cases is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible
concept. Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether that right has been
violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced are the length of delay, the reasons
for such delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the
accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay.27 The right of an accused to a speedy trial is
guaranteed to him by the Constitution, but the same shall not be utilized to deprive the State of
a reasonable opportunity of fairly indicting criminals. It secures rights to an accused, but it does
not preclude the rights of public justice.28
A review of the records show that his right has not been violated. The Office of the Special
Prosecutor, in its Comment/Opposition to the Motion to Quash,29 has adequately explained the
reason for the said delay, to wit:
The records show that accused Domingo filed his counter affidavit on March 3, 1992,
and the case was resolved on July 9, 1992. There was no undue delay in the resolution
of this case despite the gargantuan volume of cases filed with the Office of the Special
Prosecutor.
There [might have been] a delay in the conduct of the preliminary investigation but which
is not undue and intended as they were brought about by unforseen peculiar
circumstances.
Sometime in 1987, when this case was in its initial stage of preliminary investigation, the
authority of the Office of the Special Prosecutor to conduct preliminary investigation and
file cases with the Sandiganbayan was questioned and was subsequently nullified by the
Supreme Court in the cases of Zaldivar vs. Gonzalesand Zaldivar
vs. Sandiganbayan (supra.) This necessitated the issuance of Administrative Order No.
1 (supra.) in order that the Office of the Special Prosecutor will continue to function as
part of the Ombudsman. Following this event was the retirement of the assigned
Prosecutor, Juan T. Templonuevo, in the early part of 1989. When RA 6770 was enacted
in November 1989, the OSP was reorganized by the Ombudsman. After its
reorganization in 1990, the present case was assigned to SPO III Teresita Diaz-Baldos.
The said SPO instead of resolving the case, considering that the respondents have
already been subpoenaed, gave another opportunity for the accused herein to file their
counter affidavits. She forthwith issued subpoena for the accused to file their counteraffidavits. Accused-movant, Domingo filed his counter-affidavit in March 199[2]. Hence,
the Resolution.30
Perforce, DOMINGO cannot validly claim that he was denied due process of law considering
that one of the principal reasons for the delay was precisely to afford him the opportunity to
submit his counter-affidavit since the first subpoena was returned unserved. After DOMINGO
filed his counter-affidavit on 9 March 1992, the corresponding information was in due time filed
on 30 July 1992. The delay, if any, was actually more beneficial, rather than prejudicial, to
petitioner in that it was intended to afford him the opportunity to refute the charges made against
him.
It is also worthy to note at this point the long-standing doctrine that writs of injunction or
prohibition will not lie to restrain a criminal prosecution for the reason that public interest
requires that criminal acts be immediately investigated and prosecuted for the protection of
society. The writ may issue only in specified cases, among which are to prevent the use of the
strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner, and to afford adequate protection
to constitutional rights.31 Such exceptions do not obtain in this case.
Thus, there being no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of the Sandiganbayan, the Resolution denying DOMINGO's Motion to Quash must be, and
is hereby, AFFIRMED.
WHEREFORE, the petition in this case is hereby DISMISSED. The Sandiganbayan is
DIRECTED to try and decide Criminal Case No. 17847 with purposeful dispatch.1wphi1.nt
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Pardo, J., I dissent. See dissenting opinion attached.
Kapunan, J., I join Justice Pardo in his dissenting opinion.
Separate Opinions
PARDO, J., dissenting opinion;
I am constrained to dissent.
Let me review the facts.
On May 26, 1987, the Philippine National Bank (PNB) filed a complaint with the Tanodbayan
against the following: Ferdinand E. Marcos, Rodolfo M. Cuenca and Joaquin T. Venus,
Jr.1 Petitioner was not one of the respondents therein.2
On September 1, 1987, Special Prosecutor Juan T. Temple-Nuevo issued a subpoena to
petitioner upon the ground that on the basis of the evidence on record, petitioner, along with
others, is involved in the case.3 The subpoena, however, was not served upon petitioner since
he was no longer connected with PNB, Escolta, Manila, the address indicated in the subpoena.
On June 8, 1988, Ombudsman Justice Conrado M. Vasquez (ret.) issued Administrative Order
No. 1 addressed to the Office of the Special Prosecutor and Deputized Tanodbayan Prosecutors
authorizing them to continue the preliminary investigation of cases pending as of April 27, 1988,
until the same are terminated.4
On February 6, 1992, almost five (5) years after the complaint had been filed, Special
Prosecution Officer (SPO) III Teresita V. Diaz-Baldos, issued an order directing petitioner to
submit his counter-affidavit, holding that there is probable cause to implead him in the case.5
On March 9, 1992, petitioner submitted his counter-affidavit to the Office of the Special
Prosecutor.6
On July 9, 1992, SPO III Teresita V. Diaz-Baldos issued a resolution recommending that
petitioner be prosecuted for violation of Section 3(e) in relation to Section 4(a), of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 3019.7
Without giving petitioner a chance to seek a reconsideration/review of the resolution, on July 30,
1992, Prosecutor Baldos filed directly with the Sandiganbayan an information charging
petitioner Panfilo O. Domingo and Rodolfo M. Cuenca, with violation of Section 3(e) in relation
to Section 4(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, dropping two (2) of the original
respondents, namely, Ferdinand E. Marcos and Joaquin T. Venus, Jr.8
On August 11, 1992, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a petition for reinvestigation.9
On October 28, 1992, the Sandiganbayan partially granted the petition for reinvestigation in the
sense that it directed the prosecution to consider the petition for reinvestigation as a motion for
reconsideration of the July 9, 1992 resolution.10
On January 14, 1993, the Special Prosecutor denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.11
On February 19, 1993, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the
information against him upon the grounds that (1) the criminal action or liability has been
extinguished by prescription, and (2) the facts charged do not constitute an offense.12
On March 10, 1993, respondent People of the Philippines filed with the Sandiganbayan an
opposition with motion to admit.13
On March 15, 1993, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its resolution denying the motion to quash
ruling that if the facts alleged were true, the offense had been committed.14
Hence, this petition.15
Petitioner submits that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense. I agree.
Parenthetically, the prosecution itself dismissed or dropped the case against former president
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Joaquin T. Venus, without stating the reason why. And more, the
prosecution did not include in the information the members of the board of directors of the
Philippine National Bank who approved the application for letter of credit.
The charge is for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. The elements
of this offense are as follows:
(1) The accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the
former;
(2) The said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his or
her official duties or in relation to his or her public positions;
(3) That he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or a private
party;
(4) Such undue injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference to such parties; and
(5) That the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence.16
In a later case, the Court clarified that the third element of causing undue injury could only mean
actual injury or damage.17
The "Information" against petitioner reads as follows:
xxx
xxx
xxx
Accused Rodolfo M. Cuenca, capitalizing and exploiting his close personal association
with the then President Ferdinand E. Marcos to obtain favorable loan accommodations
for CDCP, requested the latter's assistance and intervention in securing the approval by
the Philippine National Bank Board of Directors of the application of the CDCP for a U.S.
$40 Million Letter of Credit and in foregoing the collateral requirements of CDCP, as a
result of which accused Panfilo O. Domingo, acceding to the pressure exerted by

President Marcos in relation to accused Cuenca's requests, facilitated and made
possible the passage by the PNB Board of Directors of Board Resolution No. 144
whereby the U.S. $40 Million Standby Letter of Credit applied for by CDCP to secure the
principal and interest on its loan with the Republic National Bank of Dallas was
approved, notwithstanding a collateral deficiency by CDCP on its previous accounts with
PNB, and again subsequently recommended to the PNB Board of Directors the approval
of Board Resolution No. 180 amending Board Resolution No. 144 in order to allow
CDCP to use its loan proceeds secured by the aforementioned Letter of Credit for its
other international projects and thereafter allowed CDCP to forego its collateral
requirements, which act of the accused inflicted undue injury and prejudice to PNB
which was unjustly forced to assume CDCP's obligation to the Republic National Bank of
Dallas after the latter had defaulted in the payment thereof, amounting to U.S. $29
Million, and which likewise granted unwarranted benefits to CDCP in the same amount. .
. .18
xxx
xxx
xxx
In my view, the information fails to allege specifically the third element of the offense charged of
causing undue injury or damage to the government by acts of manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence causing actual injury or damage.19 As the bank president,
it was actually petitioner's duty to make a recommendation on the bank client's application for
letter of credit as a business decision. The information does not allege that petitioner's act of
"facilitating" or "making possible" or "recommending" the PNB board's approval of CBCP's
application for a US$40 million letter of credit was done through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence and caused actual damage to the bank or the
government, and in what amount. On the contrary, "good faith is always presumed" to use the
words of the ponente in a precedent case.20 Quashal is proper where the facts stated in the
information are incomplete and do not convey the elements of the crime.21Consequently, the
facts charged against petitioner do not constitute the offense of violation of Section 3(e),
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended.22
IN VIEW WHEREOF, I vote to grant the petition and to quash the information in Criminal Case
No. 17847 of the Sandiganbayan.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 139405
March 13, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
ARTURO F. PACIFICADOR, respondent.
DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a petitioner for review on certiorari of the Resolution1 dated February 3, 1999 of the
Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) granting the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution2 dated
October 20, 1998 denying herein respondent's Motion to Dismiss the Information in Criminal
Case No. 13044 and the Resolution3 dated July 23, 1999 which denied petitioner's urgent
motion for reconsideration.
On October 27, 1988, herein respondent, Arturo Pacificador y Fullon, and his erstwhile coaccused, Jose T. Marcelo,4 were charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of violation
of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, in an Information5 that reads:
That on or about and during the period from December 6, 1975 to January 6, 1976, in
Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said
accused, Arturo Pacificador, then Chairman of the Board of the National Shipyard and
Steel Corporation, a government-owned corporation, and therefore, a public officer, and
Jose T. Marcelo, Jr., then President of the Philippine Smelters Corporation, a private
corporation, conspiring and confederating with one another and with other individuals,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and knowingly, and with evident bad faith
promote, facilitate, effect and cause the sale, transfer and conveyance by the National
Shipyard and Steel Corporation of its ownership and all its titles, rights and interests over
parcels of land in Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte where the Jose Panganiban
Smelting Plant is located including all the reclaimed and foreshore areas of about 50
hectares to the Philippine Smelters Corporation by virtue of a contract, the terms and
conditions of which are manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the Government as
the consideration thereof is only P85,144.50 while the fair market value thereof at that
time was P862,150.00 thereby giving the Philippine Smelters Corporation unwarranted
benefits, advantages and profits and causing undue injury, damage and prejudice to the
government in the amount of P777,005.50.
After his arraignment, the respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Information in Criminal Case
No. 13044 on July 15, 1998 on the following grounds:
1) The court has no jurisdiction since the crime charged had been extinguished by
prescription; and
2) The information does not charge an offense in view of the decision of the Supreme
Court in the case of San Mauricio Mining Corporation, et al. vs. Hon. Constante A.
Ancheta, et al., G.R. No. L-47859 and L-57132 dated July 10, 1981.
On August 21, 1998 the petitioner filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss.
On November 10, 1998, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying the Motion to Dismiss
the Information ruling that:
The information in this case, dated October 19, 1988, was filed with the Sandiganbayan
on October 27, 1988 on which date the existing jurisprudence on matters of prescription
of the offense was the ruling enunciated in Francisco v. Court of Appeals (May 30, 1983,
122 SCRA 538) to the effect that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office also
interrupts the period of prescription of the offense.
The offense charged was allegedly committed from December 16, 1975 to January 6,
1976. The running of the period of prescription of the offense may have started on
January 6, 1976 but was interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the appropriate
investigating body. In the case at bench, We find in the record no proof, or even an
allegation, of the precise date of filing of the complaint with the appropriate investigating
body which investigated this case, to enable us to determine with certainty if the offense
charged have (sic) indeed prescribed.
The second ground submitted by the accused-movant is precipitate at this stage of the
proceedings, as it involves a matter of defense.
Thereupon, on December 7, 1998, respondent Pacificador moved for the reconsideration of the
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying his Motion to Dismiss, contending that:
1) The prosecution of the crime charged is time-barred by prescription as shown by facts
and circumstances on record and of judicial notice; and
2) It is not precipitate for the Honorable Court to consider the Supreme Court ruling in
San Mauricio Mining Co. vs. Hon. Constante A. Ancheta, et al., declaring the basic deed
of sale as not illegal and with justly adequate consideration.
On February 3, 1999, the Sandiganbayan reconsidered its Resolution of November 10, 1998
and dismissed the Information in Criminal Case No. 139405 against the respondent on the
ground of prescription. It ruled thus:
In Our resolution denying accused Pacificador's Motion to Dismiss. We applied Article 91
of the Revised Penal Code and the doctrine laid down in Francisco vs. CA (122 SCRA
538) to the effect that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office or investigating
body interrupts the running of the period of prescription. This is where We committed an
oversight. Instead of applying Act No. 3326, as amended, . . ., We utilized Article 91 of
the Revised Penal Code.
In this case, as the offense involved is the violation of R.A. 3019, a special law, it follows
that in computing the prescriptive period of the offense, it is not the provision contained
in the Revised Penal Code that should govern but that of Act No. 3326. x x x
In Zaldivia vs. Reyes, Jr., (211 SCRA 277), the Supreme Court, in a clear language, held
that the proceedings referred to in Section 2 of Act No. 3326 are "judicial proceedings"
and do not include administrative proceedings. x x x
The offense imputed on accused was allegedly committed from December 6, 1975 to
January 6, 1976. The offense prescribed on January 3, 1986, or ten years from January
6, 1976.
The Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner was denied by the Sandiganbayan on July
23, 1999.
Hence, the petition.

In its Brief,6 the petitioner contends that, contrary to the ruling of the Sandiganbayan, the
provision of Act No. 33267on prescription of offenses punishable under special laws is not
applicable to the instant criminal case for the reason that Republic Act No. 3019 provides for its
own prescriptive period. Section 11 thereof provides that offenses committed and punishable
under the said law shall prescribe in fifteen (15) years. However, inasmuch as Republic Act No.
3019 does not state exactly when the fifteen-year prescriptive period begins to run, Article 91 of
the Revised Penal Code should be applied suppletorily.8 Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code,
which adopts the "discovery rule" for the prescription of offenses, provides:
ARTICLE 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. The period of prescription shall
commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party,
the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by filing of the complaint or
information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without
the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not
imputable to him.
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine
Archipelago.
Petitioner also contends that the crime, subject of this case should be deemed as discovered
only on May 13, 1987 when a complaint was filed with the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) by the then Solicitor General Francisco Chavez. Hence, the filing of the
information on October 27, 1988 with the Sandiganbayan was well within the prescriptive
period.
Additionally, petitioner contends that the ordinary principles of prescription do not apply in this
case for the reason that the respondent effectively concealed his criminal acts which prevented
the discovery of the offense until May 13, 1987. Even on the assumption that the registration of
the Deed of Sale was on December 29, 1975 when that document was executed by the parties,
and thus, amounted to a constructive notice to the whole world of the existence of the said Deed
of Sale, the registration thereof could not have given notice of fraudulent acts of the parties to
the sale. The situation prevailing at that time, that is, during the authoritarian regime of then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, did not permit the investigative and prosecuting arms of the
government to institute complaints against him, his wife and his cronies.
In his Comment,9 respondent Arturo Pacificador argued that Act No. 3326 governs the
prescription of offenses punishable under special laws; that the registration of the Deed of Sale
in question is the correct reckoning or starting point for prescription inasmuch as the fact of
registration of said Deed of Sale in effect gave notice to the whole world not only of its existence
but also of all the facts contained therein, that, aside from the ground of prescription, the
Information in Criminal Case No. 13044 should be dismissed on the ground that it does not
charge an offense inasmuch as the issue of whether or not the contract of sale was
disadvantageous to the government had long been settled in the case of San Mauricio Mining
Co. v. Hon. Constante A. Ancheta, et al.,10 and that the dismissal of the criminal case against
him by the Sandiganbayan on the ground of prescription is tantamount to acquittal which bars
prosecution of the respondent for the same offense under Section 6, Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court.
The petition is not impressed with merit.

It has been settled that Section 2 of Act No. 3326 governs the computation of prescription of
offenses defined and penalized by special laws. In the case of People v. Sandiganbayan,11 this
Court ruled that Section 2 of Act No. 3326 was correctly applied by the anti-graft court in
determining the reckoning period for prescription in a case involving the crime of violation of
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. In the fairly recent case of Presidential Ad Hoc FactFinding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto,12 we categorically ruled that:
Since the law alleged to have been violated, i.e., paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3,
R.A. No. 3019, as amended, is a special law, the applicable rule in the computation of
the prescriptive period is Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides:
SECTION 2. Prescription should begin to run from the day of the commission of
the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment. (Emphasis ours)
The prescription shall be interrupted when the proceedings are instituted against
the guilty person and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for
reasons not constituting double jeopardy.
This simply means that if the commission of the crime is known, the prescriptive period
shall commence to run on the day it was committed
It can be gleaned from the Information in this case that respondent Pacificador allegedly
committed the crime charged "on or about and during the period from December 6, 1975 to
January 6, 1976." Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended by B.P. Blg. 195, provides that the
offenses committed under the said statute shall prescribe in fifteen (15) years. It appears
however, that prior to the amendment of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 by B.P. Blg. 195 which was
approved on March 16, 1982, the prescriptive period for offenses punishable under the said
statute was only ten (10) years. The longer prescriptive period of fifteen (15) years, as provided
in Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 as amended by B.P. Blg. 195, does not apply in this case for the
reason that the amendment, not being favorable to the accused (herein private respondent),
cannot be given retroactive effect. Hence the crime prescribed on January 6, 1986 or ten (10)
years from January 6, 1976.
The petitioner, however, vehemently denies having any knowledge of the crime at the time it
was allegedly committed by the respondent. It claims that the crime charged in the Information
should be deemed as discovered only on May 13, 1987 when the then Solicitor General,
Francisco Chavez, filed a complaint with the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) against the respondent, for violation of the provision of R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
We are not convinced. This Court takes notice of the fact that the subject Deed of Sale dated
December 29, 1975 relative to the sale of the parcels of land by the National Steel Corporation
to the Philippine Smelters Corporation, was registered shortly thereafter in the Registry of
Deeds of the Province of Camarines Norte. Subsequently, the Original Certificate of Title No.
0440 in the name of the National Steel Corporation was cancelled and in lieu thereof Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 13060 was issued in the name of the vendee Philippine Smelters
Corporation. On February 28, 1977, the Philippine Smelters Corporation even filed an action for
quieting of title with the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, docketed therein as
Civil Case No. 2882,13 which case forms the basis for the Sandiganbayan to deduce that the
subject Deed of Sale may be deemed registered on the said date, at the latest.14
While petitioner may not have knowledge of the alleged crime at the time of its commission, the
registration of the subject Deed of Sale with the Registry of Deeds constitutes constructive
notice thereof to the whole world including the petitioner. Well entrenched is the jurisprudential
rule that registration of deeds in the public real estate registry is a notice thereof to the whole
world. The registration is a constructive notice of its contents as well as all interests, legal and
equitable, included therein. All persons are charged with the knowledge of what it
contains.15 Hence, even if the period of prescription is reckoned from February 28, 1977, the
crime had already prescribed when the Information in this case was filed with the
Sandiganbayan on October 27, 1988.
It bears emphasis, as held in a number of cases, that in the interpretation of the law on
prescription of crimes, that which is more favorable to the accused is to be adopted.16 The said
legal principle takes into account the nature of the law on prescription of crimes which is an act
of amnesty and liberality on the part of the state in favor of the offender. In the case of People v.
Moran,17 this Court amply discussed the nature of the statute of limitations in criminal cases, as
follows:
The statute is not a statute of process, to be scantily and grudgingly applied, but an
amnesty, declaring that after a certain time oblivion shall be cast over the offense; that
the offender shall be at liberty to return to his country, and resume his immunities as a
citizen; and that from henceforth he may cease to preserve the proofs of his innocence,
for the proofs of his guilt are blotted out. Hence, it is that statutes of limitation are to be
liberally construed in favor of the defendant, not only because such liberality of
construction belongs to all acts of amnesty and grace, but because the very existence of
the statute is a recognition and notification by the legislature of the fact that time, while it
gradually wears out proofs of innocence, has assigned to it fixed and positive periods in
which it destroys proofs of guilt.
The instant case should be distinguished from the cases of People v. Duque18 and Presidential
Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto19 wherein we upheld the view that
the prescriptive period started to run only upon the discovery of the illegal nature of the acts
constituting the offense. The first case involves the crime of illegal recruitment where the
accused, Napoleon Duque, was found to have misrepresented himself to several job applicants
as a registered employment agent duly recognized by the Philippine Overseas Employment
Agency (POEA). Due to the said misrepresentation of the accused, the applicable prescriptive
period began to run not from the time of recruitment of job applicants by the accused but from
the time his recruitment activities were ascertained by the complainants and the POEA to have
been carried out without any license or authority from the government. The second,
or Desierto case, which was decided by this Court on October 25, 1999, involves the grant of
alleged behest loans by certain government-owned and controlled financial institutions to
several individuals and corporations closely associated with the then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos and his relatives. It was alleged that the public officials concerned, who were charged in
the corresponding Informations, connived or conspired with the beneficiaries of the loans in
covering up the anomalous transactions. Under the circumstances, it was impossible for the
State, the aggrieved party, to have known the violations of R.A. No. 3019 at the time the
questioned transactions were made. The prescriptive period started to run only upon discovery
of the alleged illegality of the transactions after the investigations thereon were conducted.
In the case at bar, the petitioner contends that respondent concealed his criminal acts that
effectively prevented discovery thereof. The records of this case do not specifically show how
the respondent allegedly employed acts that could prevent the discovery of any illegality in the
transaction other than the bare assertion of the petitioner. There is also no allegation that the
government officials involved in the transactions connived or conspired with respondent
Pacificador. The said government officials were not even charged in the instant Information. On
the other hand, it was never disputed by the petitioner that the subject Deed of Sale was duly
registered with the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Camarines Norte and that the
corresponding Transfer Certificate of Title No. 13060 was subsequently issued to the vendee,
Philippine Smelters Corporation.20
In view of the foregoing, we do not find it necessary to discuss the other points raised by the
respondent in his Comment as additional grounds for the denial of the instant petition.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ ., concur.
Footnotes
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 109454 June 14, 1994

JOSE C. SERMONIA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Eleventh Division, HON. DEOGRACIAS FELIZARDO,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Br. 151, and JOSEPH
SINSAY, respondents.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Pea and Nolasco for petitioner.
Ponciano L. Escuadra for private respondent.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before
the first marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. 1 Bigamy
carries with it the imposable penalty of prision mayor. Being punishable by an afflictive penalty,
this crime prescribes in fifteen (15) years. 2 The fifteen-year prescriptive period commences to
run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their
agents . . . 3
That petitioner contracted a bigamous marriage seems impliedly admitted. 4 At least, it is not
expressly denied. Thus the only issue for resolution is whether his prosecution for bigamy is
already time-barred, which hinges on whether its discovery is deemed to have taken place from
the time the offended party actually knew of the second marriage or from the time the document
evidencing the subsequent marriage was registered with the Civil Registry consistent with the
rule on constructive notice.
The antecedents: In an information filed on 26 May 1992, petitioner Jose C. Sermonia was
charged with bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Br. 151, for contracting marriage
with Ma. Lourdes Unson on 15 February 1975 while his prior marriage to Virginia C. Nievera
remained valid and subsisting. 5
Petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that his criminal liability for bigamy has
been extinguished by prescription.
In the order of 1 October 1992, respondent judge denied the motion to quash. On 27 October
1992, he likewise denied the motion to reconsider his order of denial.
Petitioner challenged the above orders before the Court of Appeals through a petition
for certiorari and prohibition. In the assailed decision of
21 January 1993, his petition was dismissed for lack of merit. 6
In this recourse, petitioner contends that his criminal liability for bigamy has been obliterated by
prescription. He avers that since the second marriage contract was duly registered with the
Office of the Civil Registrar in 1975, 7such fact of registration makes it a matter of public record
and thus constitutes notice to the whole world. The offended party therefore is considered to
have had constructive notice of the subsequent marriage as of 1975; hence, prescription
commenced to run on the day the marriage contract was registered. For this reason, the
corresponding information for bigamy should have been filed on or before 1990 and not only in
1992.
Petitioner likewise takes issue with the "alleged concealment of the bigamous marriage" as
declared by the appellate court, insisting that the second marriage was publicly held at Our Lady
of Nativity Church in Marikina on

15 February 1975, and adding for good measure that from the moment of registration the
marriage contract was open to inspection by any interested person.
On the other hand, the prosecution maintains that the prescriptive period does not begin from
the commission of the crime but from the time of discovery by complainant which was in July
1991.
While we concede the point that the rule on constructive notice in civil cases may be applied in
criminal actions if the factual and legal circumstances so warrant, 8 we agree with the view
expounded by the Court of Appeals that it cannot apply in the crime of bigamy notwithstanding
the possibility of its being more favorable to the accused. The appellate court succinctly explains
Argued by the petitioner is that the principle of constructive notice should be

applied in the case at bar, principally citing in support of his stand, the cases
of People v. Reyes (175 SCRA 597); and People v.Dinsay (40 SCRA 50).
This Court is of the view that the principle of constructive notice should not be
applied in regard to the crime of bigamy as judicial notice may be taken of the
fact that a bigamous marriage is generally entered into by the offender in secrecy
from the spouse of the previous subsisting marriage. Also, a bigamous marriage
is generally entered into in a place where the offender is not known to be still a
married person, in order to conceal his legal impediment to contract another
marriage.
In the case of real property, the registration of any transaction involving any right
or interest therein is made in the Register of Deeds of the place where the said
property is located. Verification in the office of the Register of Deeds concerned
of the transactions involving the said property can easily be made by any
interested party. In the case of a bigamous marriage, verification by the offended
person or the authorities of the same would indeed be quite difficult as such a
marriage may be entered into in a place where the offender is not known to be
still a married person.
Be it noted that in the criminal cases cited by the petitioner wherein constructive
notice was applied, involved therein were land or property disputes and certainly,
marriage is not property.
The non-application to the crime of bigamy of the principle of constructive notice
is not contrary to the well entrenched policy that penal laws should be construed
liberally in favor of the accused. To compute the prescriptive period for the
offense of bigamy from registration thereof would amount to almost absolving the
offenders thereof for liability therefor. While the celebration of the bigamous
marriage may be said to be open and made of public record by its registration,
the offender however is not truthful as he conceals from the officiating authority
and those concerned the existence of his previous subsisting marriage. He does
not reveal to them that he is still a married person. He likewise conceals from his
legitimate spouse his bigamous marriage. And for these, he contracts the
bigamous marriage in a place where he is not known to be still a married person.
And such a place may be anywhere, under which circumstance, the discovery of
the bigamous marriage is rendered quite difficult and would take time. It is
therefore reasonable that the prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should
be counted only from the day on which the said crime was discovered by the
offended party, the authorities or their agency (sic).
Considering such concealment of the bigamous marriage by the offender, if the
prescriptive period for the offense of bigamy were to be counted from the date of
registration thereof, the prosecution of the violators of the said offense would
almost be impossible. The interpretation urged by the petitioner would encourage
fearless violations of a social institution cherished and protected by law. 9
To this we may also add that the rule on constructive notice will make
de rigueur the routinary inspection or verification of the marriages listed in the National Census
Office and in various local civil registries all over the country to make certain that no second or
even third marriage has been contracted without the knowledge of the legitimate spouse. This is
too formidable a task to even contemplate.
More importantly, while Sec. 52 of P.D. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) provides for
constructive notice to all persons of every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order,
judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land filed or entered in the office of the
Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land to which it relates lies from the time of
such registering, filing or entering, there is no counterpart provision either in Act
No. 3753 (Act to Establish a Civil Register) or in Arts. 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, which leads
us to the conclusion that there is no legal basis for applying the constructive notice rule to the
documents registered in the Civil Register.
Finally, petitioner would want us to believe that there was no concealment at all because his
marriage contract with Ms. Unson was recorded in the Civil Registry which is open to all and
sundry for inspection. We cannot go along with his argument because why did he indicate in the
marriage contract that he was "single" thus obviously hiding his true status as a married man?
Or for that matter, why did he not simply tell his first wife about the subsequent marriage in
Marikina so that everything would be out in the open. The answer is obvious: He knew that no
priest or minister would knowingly perform or authorize a bigamous marriage as this would
subject him to punishment under the Marriage Law. 10 Obviously, petitioner had no intention of
revealing his duplicity to his first spouse and gambled instead on the probability that she or any
third party would ever go to the local civil registrar to inquire. In the meantime, through the
simple expedience of having the second marriage recorded in the local civil registry, he has set
into motion the running of the fifteen-year prescriptive period against the unwary and the
unsuspecting victim of his philandering.
Were we to put our imprimatur to the theory advanced by petitioner, in all likelihood we would be
playing right into the hands of philanderers. For we would be equating the contract of marriage
with ordinary deeds of conveyance and other similar documents without due regard for the
stability of marriage as an inviolable social institution, the preservation of which is a primary
concern of our society.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals,
the same is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Davide, Jr., and Quiason, JJ., concur.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 152259
July 29, 2004
ALFREDO T. ROMUALDEZ, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division) and the PEOPLE of the
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Repetitive motions to invalidate or summarily terminate a criminal indictment prior to plea and
trial, however they may be named or identified -- whether as a motion to quash or motion to
dismiss or by any other nomenclature -- delay the administration of justice and unduly burden
the court system. Grounds not included in the first of such repetitive motions are generally
deemed waived and can no longer be used as bases of similar motions subsequently filed.
Section 5 of the Anti-Graft Law is constitutional. It penalizes certain presidential relatives who
"intervene, directly or indirectly, in any business, transaction, contract or application with the
Government." This provision is not vague or "impermissibly broad," because it can easily be
understood with the use of simple statutory construction. Neither may the constitutionality of a
criminal statute such as this be challenged on the basis of the "overbreadth" and the "void-forvagueness" doctrines, which apply only to free-speech cases.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside
the November 20, 20012 and the March 1, 20023 Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case No. 13736. The first Resolution disposed thus:
"WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED. The
arraignment of the accused and the pre-trial of the case shall proceed as scheduled."4
The second Resolution denied reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts of the case are narrated by the Sandiganbayan as follows:
"[The People of the Philippines], through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), filed on July 12, 1989 an information before [the anti-graft court]
charging the accused [with] violation of Section 5, Republic Act No. 3019,5 as amended.
The Information reads:
'That on or about and during the period from July 16, 1975 to July 29, 1975, in
Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of [the Sandiganbayan], said
[petitioner], brother-in-law of Ferdinand E. Marcos, former President of the
Philippines, and therefore, related to the latter by affinity within the third civil
degree, did then and there wil[l]fully and unlawfully, and with evident bad faith, for
the purpose of promoting his self-interested [sic] and/or that of others, intervene
directly or indirectly, in a contract between the National Shipyard and Steel
Corporation (NASSCO), a government-owned and controlled corporation and the
Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Company (BASECO), a private corporation,
the majority stocks of which is owned by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos,
whereby the NASSCO sold, transferred and conveyed to the BASECO its
ownership and all its titles and interests over all equipment and facilities including
structures, buildings, shops, quarters, houses, plants and expendable and semiexpendable assets, located at the Engineer Island known as the Engineer Island
Shops including some of its equipment and machineries from Jose Panganiban,
Camarines Norte needed by BASECO in its shipbuilding and ship repair program
for the amount ofP5,000,000.00.
'Contrary to law.'
"On December 27, 1996, the accused filed his first 'MOTION TO DISMISS AND TO
DEFER ARRAIGNMENT' claiming that no valid preliminary investigation was conducted
in the instant case. He asserts that if a preliminary investigation could be said to have
been conducted, the same was null and void having been undertaken by a biased and
partial investigative body.
"On January 9, 1997, [the Sandiganbayan], through the First Division, issued an order
giving the accused fifteen days to file a Motion for Reinvestigation with the Office of the
Special Prosecutor.
"[Petitioner] questioned said order before the Supreme Court via a petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order. On January 21, 1998, the
Supreme Court dismissed the petition for failure to show that [the Sandiganbayan]
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed order.
"On November 9, 1998, the [petitioner] filed with the Office of the Special Prosecutor a
Motion to Quash.
"On September 22, 1999, x x x Special Prosecution Officer (SPO) III Victorio U.
Tabanguil, manifested that the prosecution had already concluded the reinvestigation of
the case. He recommended the dismissal of the instant case. Both the Deputy Special
Prosecutor and the Special Prosecutor approved the recommendation. However,
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto disagreed and directed the prosecutors to let the
[petitioner] present his evidence in Court.
"Subsequently, [petitioner] filed on October 8, 1999 his second 'MOTION TO QUASH
AND TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT'.
"On February 9, 2000, the [Sandiganbayan] denied the motion for lack of merit.
"On June 19, 2001, [the] accused filed a 'MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE MOTION TO
DISMISS'. On June 29, 2001, the [Sandiganbayan] admitted the motion and admitted
the attached (third) Motion to Dismiss.
"The [Motion to Dismiss] raise[d] the following grounds:
'I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW OF
[PETITIONER] WAS VIOLATED DURING THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
STAGE IN THE FOLLOWING WAYS:
'A. NO VALID PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION WAS CONDUCTED IN THE
INSTANT CASE; AND
'B. THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION WAS CONDUCTED BY A BIASED
AND PARTIAL INVESTIGATOR
'II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF [PETITIONER] TO BE INFORMED OF
THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM WAS
VIOLATED
'III. PURSUANT TO ARTICLE VII, SECTION 17 OF THE 1973 CONSTITUTION,
[PETITIONER] IS IMMUNE FROM CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
'IV. THE CRIMINAL ACTION OR LIABILITY HAS BEEN EXTINGUISHED BY
PRESCRIPTION'"6
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

The Sandiganbayan explained that all the grounds invoked by petitioner, except the third one,
had already been raised by him and passed upon in its previous Resolutions.7 In resolving the
third ground, the anti-graft court pointed out that Section 17 of the 1973 Constitution became
effective only in 1981 when the basic law was amended. Since his alleged illegal intervention
had been committed on or about 1975, the amended provision was inapplicable to him.8
In denying the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner, the Sandiganbayan passed upon
the other grounds he had raised. It ruled that his right to a preliminary investigation was not
violated, because he had been granted a reinvestigation.9 It further held that his right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation was not trampled upon, either, inasmuch as
the Information had set forth the essential elements of the offense charged.10
Hence, this Petition.11
The Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner assigns the following errors for our consideration:
"Whether or not the Honorable Sandiganbayan erred and gravely abused its discretion
amounting to lack of, or in excess of jurisdiction
I. In not dismissing and/or quashing Criminal Case No. 13736 despite clear and
incontrovertible evidence that:
A. Section 5 of Republic Act No. 3019 is unconstitutional because its vagueness
violates the due process right of an individual to be informed of the nature and
the cause of the accusation against him;
B. Section 5 of Republic Act No. 3019 is unconstitutional because it violates the
due process right of an individual to be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved;
C. The constitutional right of petitioner x x x to be informed of the nature and the
cause of the accusation against him was violated;
D. The constitutional right to due process of law of petitioner x x x was violated
during the preliminary investigation stage in the following ways:
[i] No valid preliminary investigation was con-ducted for Criminal Case
No. 13736; and
[ii] The preliminary investigation was conducted by a biased and partial
investigator.
E. The criminal action or liability has been extinguished by prescription; and
F. Pursuant to Article VII, Section 17 of the 1973 Constitution, petitioner x x x is

immune from criminal prosecution.
And
II. In light of the foregoing, in denying petitioner['s] x x x right to equal protection of the
laws."12
Simply stated, the issues are as follows: (1) whether Section 5 of Republic Act 3019 is
unconstitutional; (2) whether the Information is vague; (3) whether there was a valid preliminary
investigation; (4) whether the criminal action or liability has been extinguished by prescription;
and (5) whether petitioner is immune from criminal prosecution under then Section 17 of Article
VII of the 1973 Constitution.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue:
Constitutionality of Section 5,
Republic Act 3019
Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of Section 5 of RA 3019 for the first time in the
Sandiganbayan through a Supplemental Motion to Dismiss. Attached to his December 7, 2001
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order denying his Motion to Dismiss was this Supplemental
Motion which was, in effect, his third motion to quash.13 We note that the Petition for Certiorari
before us challenges the denial of his original, not his Supplemental, Motion to Dismiss.
Upon the denial of his original Motion to Quash on February 9, 2000, petitioner could have filed
a motion for reconsideration of the denial. Had reconsideration been turned down, the next
proper remedy would have been either (1) a petition for certiorari14 -- if there was grave abuse of
discretion -- which should be filed within 60 days from notice of the assailed order;15 or (2) to
proceed to trial without prejudice to his right, if final judgment is rendered against him, to raise
the same questions before the proper appellate court.16 But instead of availing himself of these
remedies, he filed a "Motion to Dismiss" on June 19, 2001.
Impropriety of
Repetitive Motions
There is no substantial distinction between a "motion to quash" and a "motion to dismiss." Both
pray for an identical relief, which is the dismissal of the case. Such motions are employed to
raise preliminary objections, so as to avoid the necessity of proceeding to trial. A motion to
quash is generally used in criminal proceedings to annul a defective indictment. A motion to
dismiss, the nomenclature ordinarily used in civil proceedings, is aimed at summarily defeating
a complaint. Thus, our Rules of Court use the term "motion to quash" in criminal,17 and "motion
to dismiss" in civil, proceedings.18
In the present case, however, both the "Motion to Quash" and the "Motion to Dismiss" are
anchored on basically the same grounds and pray for the same relief. The hairsplitting
distinction posited by petitioner does not really make a difference.
By filing a Motion to Dismiss, petitioner submitted in effect a prohibited second motion to quash.
A party is not permitted to raise issues, whether similar or different, by installment. The Rules
abhor repetitive motions. Otherwise, there would be no end to preliminary objections, and trial
would never commence. A second motion to quash delays the administration of justice and
unduly burdens the courts. Moreover, Rule 117 provides that grounds not raised in the first
motion to quash are generally deemed waived.19 Petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss" violates this
rule.
Constitutionality of
the Challenged Provision
If only for the foregoing procedural lapses, the Petition deserves to be dismissed outright.
However, given the importance of this case in curtailing graft and corruption, the Court will
nevertheless address the other issues on their merit. Petitioner challenges the validity of Section
5 of Republic Act 3019, a penal statute, on the ground that the act constituting the offense is
allegedly vague and "impermissibly broad."
It is best to stress at the outset that the overbreadth20 and the vagueness21 doctrines have
special application only to free-speech cases. They are not appropriate for testing the validity of
penal statutes. Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza explained the reason as follows:
"A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is
overbroad because of possible 'chilling effect' upon protected speech. The theory is that
'[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction
suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the
transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to
justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person
making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute
drawn with narrow specificity.' The possible harm to society in permitting some
unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected
speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of
possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general
in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed
for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against
socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in
the area of free speech.
xxxxxxxxx
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools
developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called
in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what
is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that
'one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the
statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons
or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional.' As has been
pointed out, 'vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth
challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of
due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular

defendant.'"22(underscoring supplied)
"To this date, the Court has not declared any penal law unconstitutional on the ground of
ambiguity."23 While mentioned in passing in some cases, the void-for-vagueness concept
has yet to find direct application in our jurisdiction. In Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad,24 the
Bookkeeping Act was found unconstitutional because it violated the equal protection
clause, not because it was vague. Adiong v. Comelec25 decreed as void a mere Comelec
Resolution, not a statute. Finally, Santiago v. Comelec26 held that a portion of RA 6735
was unconstitutional because of undue delegation of legislative powers, not because of
vagueness.
Indeed, an "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal statutes would result in a mass acquittal of
parties whose cases may not have even reached the courts. Such invalidation would constitute
a departure from the usual requirement of "actual case and controversy" and permit decisions to
be made in a sterile abstract context having no factual concreteness. In Younger v. Harris, this
evil was aptly pointed out by the U.S. Supreme Court in these words:27
"[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring
correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an
appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the
controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the
speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed
statutes, x x x ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding
constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided."
For this reason, generally disfavored is an on-its-face invalidation of statutes, described as a
"manifestly strong medicine" to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort." In determining
the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions that have allegedly been violated must
be examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant has been charged.28
As conduct -- not speech -- is its object, the challenged provision must be examined only "as
applied" to the defendant, herein petitioner, and should not be declared unconstitutional for
overbreadth or vagueness.
The questioned provision reads as follows:
"Section 5. Prohibition on certain relatives. It shall be unlawful for the spouse or for
any relative, by consanguinity or affinity, within the third civil degree, of the President of
the Philippines, the Vice-President of the Philippines, the President of the Senate, or the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, to intervene, directly or indirectly, in any
business, transaction, contract or application with the Government: Provided, That this
section shall not apply to any person who, prior to the assumption of office of any of the
above officials to whom he is related, has been already dealing with the Government
along the same line of business, nor to any transaction, contract or application already
existing or pending at the time of such assumption of public office, nor to any application
filed by him the approval of which is not discretionary on the part of the official or officials
concerned but depends upon compliance with requisites provided by law, or rules or
regulations issued pursuant to law, nor to any act lawfully performed in an official
capacity or in the exercise of a profession."
Petitioner also claims that the phrase "to intervene directly or indirectly, in any business,
transaction, contract or application with the Government" is vague and violates his right to be
informed of the cause and nature of the accusation against him.29 He further complains that the
provision does not specify what acts are punishable under the term intervene, and thus
transgresses his right to be presumed innocent.30 We disagree.
Every statute is presumed valid.31 On the party challenging its validity weighs heavily the
onerous task of rebutting this presumption.32 Any reasonable doubt about the validity of the law
should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality.33 To doubt is to sustain, as tersely put by
Justice George Malcolm. In Garcia v. Executive Secretary,34 the rationale for the presumption of
constitutionality was explained by this Court thus:
"The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume
that the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and
unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This presumption is based
on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon each department a
becoming respect for the acts of the other departments. The theory is that as the joint
act of Congress and the President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied
and determined to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally
enacted."35
In the instant case, petitioner has miserably failed to overcome such presumption. This Court
has previously laid down the test for determining whether a statute is vague, as follows:
"x x x [A] statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient
definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is
prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that species of legislation that is
utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or
by construction.
"A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its
application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2)
respects - it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.36 But the doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are
merely couched in imprecise language but which nonetheless specify a standard though
defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to
certain types of activities. The first may be 'saved' by proper construction, while no
challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever directed against such
activities.37 With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute
is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.
"The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the
language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when
measured by common understanding and practice.38 It must be stressed, however, that
the 'vagueness' doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute
to be upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to
suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes
and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely
because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions,
especially where, because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all
the details in advance as in all other statutes."39
A simpler test was decreed in Dans v. People,40 in which the Court said that there was nothing
vague about a penal law that adequately answered the basic query "What is the
violation?"41 Anything beyond -- the hows and the whys -- are evidentiary matters that the law
itself cannot possibly disclose, in view of the uniqueness of every case.42
The question "What is the violation?" is sufficiently answered by Section 5 of RA 3019, as
follows:
1. The offender is a spouse or any relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree of the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President of the Philippines, the
President of the Senate, or the Speaker of the House of Representatives; and
2. The offender intervened directly or indirectly in any business, transaction, contract or
application with the government.
Applicability of
Statutory Construction
As to petitioner's claim that the term intervene is vague, this Court agrees with the Office of the
Solicitor General that the word can easily be understood through simple statutory construction.
The absence of a statutory definition of a term used in a statute will not render the law "void for
vagueness," if the meaning can be determined through the judicial function of
construction.43 Elementary is the principle that words should be construed in their ordinary and
usual meaning.
"x x x. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are
used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them;44 much less
do we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or
statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an
enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability
to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness
or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered
from the whole act x x x.
"x x x [I]t is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be
interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification,45 unless it is
evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those
words.46 The intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and
lexicographers - to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed."47
The term intervene should therefore be understood in its ordinary acceptation, which is to "to
come between."48Criminally liable is anyone covered in the enumeration of Section 5 of RA 3019
-- any person who intervenes in any manner in any business, transaction, contract or application
with the government. As we have explained, it is impossible for the law to provide in advance
details of how such acts of intervention could be performed. But the courts may pass upon
those details once trial is concluded. Thus, the alleged vagueness of intervene is not a ground
to quash the information prior to the commencement of the trial.
In sum, the Court holds that the challenged provision is not vague, and that in any event, the
"overbreath" and "void for vagueness" doctrines are not applicable to this case.
Second Issue:
Allegedly Vague Information
Other than arguing on the alleged intrinsic vagueness of intervene, petitioner further contends
that the Information itself is also unconstitutionally vague, because it does not specify the acts of
intervention that he supposedly performed.49 Again, we disagree.
When allegations in the information are vague or indefinite, the remedy of the accused is not a
motion to quash, but a motion for a bill of particulars.50 The pertinent provision in the Rules of
Court is Section 9 of Rule 116, which we quote:
"Section 9. Bill of particulars. -- The accused may, before arraignment, move for a bill of
particulars to enable him properly to plead and prepare for trial. The motion shall specify
the alleged defects of the complaint or information and the details desired."
The rule merely requires the information to describe the offense with sufficient particularity as to
apprise the accused of what they are being charged with and to enable the court to pronounce
judgment. 51 The particularity must be such that persons of ordinary intelligence may
immediately know what is meant by the information.52
While it is fundamental that every element of the offense must be alleged in the
information,53 matters of evidence -- as distinguished from the facts essential to the nature of the
offense -- need not be averred.54 Whatever facts and circumstances must necessarily be alleged
are to be determined by reference to the definition and the essential elements of the specific
crimes.55
In the instant case, a cursory reading of the Information shows that the elements of a violation of
Section 5 of RA 3019 have been stated sufficiently. Likewise, the allegations describe the
offense committed by petitioner with such particularity as to enable him to prepare an intelligent
defense. Details of the acts he committed are evidentiary matters that need not be alleged in the
Information.
Third Issue:
Preliminary Investigation
Clearly, petitioner already brought the issue of lack of preliminary investigation when he
questioned before this Court in GR No. 128317 the Sandiganbayan's Order giving him 15 days
to file a Motion for Reinvestigation with the Office of the Special Prosecutor.56 Citing Cojuangco
v. Presidential Commission on Good Government,57 he undauntedly averred that he was
deprived of his right to a preliminary investigation, because the PCGG acted both as
complainant and as investigator.58
In the case cited above, this Court declared that while PCGG had the power to conduct a
preliminary investigation, the latter could not do so with the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge"
in cases in which it was the agency that had gathered evidence and subsequently filed the
complaint.59 On that basis, this Court nullified the preliminary investigation conducted by PCGG
and directed the transmittal of the records to the Ombudsman for appropriate action.
It is readily apparent that Cojuangco does not support the quashal of the Information against
herein petitioner. True, the PCGG initiated the present Complaint against him; hence, it could
not properly conduct the preliminary investigation. However, he was accorded his rights -- the
Sandiganbayan suspended the trial and afforded him a reinvestigation by the Ombudsman. The
procedure outlined in Cojuangco was thus followed.
The Sandiganbayan's actions are in accord also with Raro v. Sandiganbayan,60 which held that
the failure to conduct a valid preliminary investigation would not warrant the quashal of an
information. If the information has already been filed, the proper procedure is for the
Sandiganbayan to hold the trial in abeyance while the preliminary investigation is being
conducted or completed.61
Fourth Issue:
Prescription
The issue of prescription was the principal basis of the Motion to Quash filed by petitioner with
the Sandiganbayan on October 8, 1999.62 Such issue should be disregarded at this stage, since
he failed to challenge its ruling debunking his Motion within the 60-day period for the filing of a
petition for certiorari. A party may not circumvent this rule by filing a subsequent motion that
raises the same issue and the same arguments.
Furthermore, it is easy to see why this argument being raised by petitioner is utterly
unmeritorious. He points out that according to the Information, the offense was committed
"during the period from July 16, 1975 to July 29, 1975." He argues that when the Information
was filed on July 12, 1989,63 prescription had already set in, because the prescriptive period for
a violation of Republic Act No. 3019 is only ten (10) years from the time the offense was
allegedly committed. The increase of this prescriptive period to fifteen (15) years took effect only
on March 16, 1982, upon the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195.64
Act No. 3326, as amended,65 governs the prescription of offenses penalized by special laws. Its
pertinent provision reads:
"Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of
the law, and if the same not be known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
"The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy."
Consistent with the provision quoted above, this Court has previously reckoned the prescriptive
period of cases involving RA 3019 (committed prior to the February 1986 EDSA Revolution)
from the discovery of the violation.66 InRepublic v. Desierto, the Court explained:
"This issue confronted this Court anew, albeit in a larger scale, in Presidential Ad Hoc
Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto. In the said recent case, the Board
of Directors of the Philippine Seeds, Inc. and Development Bank of the Philippines were
charged with violation of paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3 of RA No. 3019, by the
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, created by then
President Fidel V. Ramos to investigate and to recover the so-called 'Behest Loans',
where the Philippine Government guaranteed several foreign loans to corporations and
entities connected with the former President Marcos. x x x In holding that the case had
not yet prescribed, this Court ruled that:
'In the present case, it was well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved
party, to have known the violations of RA No. 3019 at the time the questioned
transactions were made because, as alleged, the public officials concerned
connived or conspired with the 'beneficiaries of the loans.' Thus, we agree with
the COMMITTEE that the prescriptive period for the offenses with which the
respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were charged should be computed from the
discovery of the commission thereof and not from the day of such commission.
xxx
xxx
xxx
'People v. Duque is more in point, and what was stated there stands reiteration:
In the nature of things, acts made criminal by special laws are frequently not
immoral or obviously criminal in themselves; for this reason, the applicable
statute requires that if the violation of the special law is not known at the time,
the prescription begins to run only from the discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of
the unlawful nature of the constitutive act or acts.' (Italics supplied)
"There are striking parallelisms between the said Behest Loans Case and the present
one which lead us to apply the ruling of the former to the latter. First, both cases arose
out of seemingly innocent business transactions; second, both were 'discovered' only
after the government created bodies to investigate these anomalous
transactions; third, both involve prosecutions for violations of RA No. 3019;
and, fourth, in both cases, it was sufficiently raised in the pleadings that the respondents
conspired and connived with one another in order to keep the alleged violations hidden
from public scrutiny.
"This Court's pronouncement in the case of Domingo v. Sandiganbayan is quite relevant
and instructive as to the date when the discovery of the offense should be reckoned,
thus:
'In the present case, it was well-nigh impossible for the government, the
aggrieved party, to have known the violations committed at the time the
questioned transactions were made because both parties to the transactions
were allegedly in conspiracy to perpetuate fraud against the government. The
alleged anomalous transactions could only have been discovered after the
February 1986 Revolution when one of the original respondents, then President
Ferdinand Marcos, was ousted from office. Prior to said date, no person would
have dared to question the legality or propriety of those transactions. Hence, the
counting of the prescriptive period would commence from the date of discovery
of the offense, which could have been between February 1986 after the EDSA
Revolution and 26 May 1987 when the initiatory complaint was filed.'"67
The above pronouncement is squarely applicable to the present case. The general rule that
prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the crime cannot apply to the
present case. It is not legally prudent to charge the State, the aggrieved party, with knowledge
of the violation of RA 3019 at the time the alleged intervention was made. The accused is the
late President Ferdinand E. Marcos' brother-in-law. He was charged with intervening in a sale
involving a private corporation, the majority stocks of which was allegedly owned by President
Marcos.
Prior to February 1986, no person was expected to have seriously dared question the legality of
the sale or would even have thought of investigating petitioner's alleged involvement in the
transaction. It was only after the creation68of PCGG69 and its exhaustive investigations that the
alleged crime was discovered. This led to the initiation on November 29, 1988 of a Complaint
against former President Marcos and petitioner for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. Consequently, the filing of the Information on July 12, 1989 was well within the
prescriptive period of ten years from the discovery of the offense.
Fifth Issue
Immunity from Prosecution
Petitioner argues that he enjoys derivative immunity, because he allegedly served as a highranking naval officer -- specifically, as naval aide-de-camp -- of former President Marcos.70 He
relies on Section 17 of Article VII of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, which we quote:
"The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit
whatsoever shall lie for official acts done by him or by others pursuant to his specific
orders during his tenure.
"x x x
xxx
x x x"
As the Sandiganbayan aptly pointed out, the above provision is not applicable to petitioner
because the immunity amendment became effective only in 1981 while the alleged crime
happened in 1975.
In Estrada v. Desierto,71 this Court exhaustively traced the origin of executive immunity in order
to determine the extent of its applicability. We explained therein that executive immunity applied
only during the incumbency of a President. It could not be used to shield a non-sitting President
from prosecution for alleged criminal acts done while sitting in office. The reasoning of petitioner
must therefore fail, since he derives his immunity from one who is no longer sitting as President.
Verily, the felonious acts of public officials and their close relatives "are not acts of the State,
and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands on the same footing as any
other trespasser."
In sum, petitioner utterly fails to show that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in
issuing the assailed Resolutions.72 On the contrary, it acted prudently, in accordance with law
and jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED, and the questioned Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Quisumbing, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and
Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Puno, Ynares-Santiago, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., in the result.
Corona, J., on leave.
Tinga, J., in the result. Please see separate opinion.
Chico-Nazario, J., no part. Ponente of assailed SB Resolutions.
x-------------------------------------------------------------------x
SEPARATE OPINION
TINGA, J.:
I concur in the result of the ponencia and the proposition that Section 5 of the Anti-Plunder Law
is constitutional. The validity of the provision has been passed upon by the Court before
in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan.1 I also agree with the ponencia's reiteration of the ruling
in Estrada that Section 5 is receptive to the basic principle in statutory construction that words
should be construed in their ordinary and usual meaning.2
However, with all due respect, I raise serious objections to the ponencia's holding that the socalled "void for vagueness" doctrine has special application only to free speech cases,3 and the
undeclared proposition that penal
laws may not be stricken down on the ground of ambiguity.4 I am aware that the assertions rely
upon the separate opinions of the herein ponente5 and Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza6 in Estrada.
I am also aware that the critical portion of Mr. Justice Mendoza's separate opinion
in Estrada was cited with approval by Mr. Justice Bellosillo'sponencia therein.7
The incontrovertible reality though is that the majority's pronouncement in Estrada that penal
statutes cannot be challenged on vagueness grounds did not form part of the ratio decidendi.
The ratio, in the words of Justice Bellosillo, was: "as it is written, the Plunder Law contains
ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the accused to
determine the nature of his violation,"8 and thus the law does not suffer from unconstitutionality.
The discussion on the vagueness aspect was not decisive of the main issue and, therefore,
clearly obiter dictum. I submit that it is erroneous to resolve the present petition on the basis of
that dictum inEstrada.
As the obiter dictum in Estrada is needlessly made a ratio in the present case,
the ponencia herein has even unwittingly elevated to doctrinal level the proposition that the
constitutionality of penal laws cannot be challenged on the ground of vagueness. I humbly
submit that the stance is flawed and contrary to fundamental principles of due process.
The Bill of Rights occupies a position of primacy in the fundamental law.9 It is thus sacrosanct in
this jurisdiction that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law.10
A challenge to a penal statute premised on the argument that the law is vague is a proper
invocation of the due process clause. A statute that lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application
violates the due process clause, for failure to accord persons fair notice of the conduct to
avoid.11 As held by the Court in People v. Dela Piedra:12
Due process requires that the terms of a penal statute must be sufficiently explicit to
inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its
penalties. A criminal statute that "fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice
that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute," or is so indefinite that "it
encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions," is void for vagueness. The
constitutional vice in a vague or indefinite statute is the injustice to the accused in
placing him on trial for an offense, the nature of which he is given no fair warning.13
It should also be reckoned that the Bill of Rights likewise guarantees that no person shall be
held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law,14 and that the accused enjoys
the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him or her.15 The Bill
of Rights ensures the fullest measure of protection to an accused. If a particular mode of
constitutional challenge, such as one predicated on the "void for vagueness" doctrine, is
available to an ordinary person deprived of property or means of expression, then more so
should it be accessible to one who is in jeopardy of being deprived of liberty or of life.16
"Vagueness" and "Overbreadth" Are Distinct Concepts
A fundamental flaw, to my mind, in the analysis employed by the ponencia and some of the
separate opinions inEstrada is the notion that the "vagueness" and "overbreadth" doctrines are
the same and should be accorded similar treatment. This is erroneous.
Mr. Justice Kapunan, in his dissenting opinion in Estrada, offers a correct distinction between
"vagueness" and "overbreadth":
A view has been proferred that "vagueness and overbreadth doctrines are not applicable
to penal laws." These two concepts, while related, are distinct from each other. On one
hand, the doctrine of overbreadth applies generally to statutes that infringe upon
freedom of speech. On the other hand, the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine applies
to criminal laws, not merely those that regulate speech or other fundamental
constitutional right. (not merely those that regulate speech or other fundamental
constitutional rights.) The fact that a particular criminal statute does not infringe upon
free speech does not mean that a facial challenge to the statute on vagueness grounds
cannot succeed.17
This view should be sustained, especially in light of the fact that the "void for vagueness"
doctrine has long been sanctioned as a means to invalidate penal statutes.
"Void For Vagueness" Invalidation of Penal Statutes has Long-Standing Jurisprudential History
As early as 1926, the United States Supreme Court held in Connally v. General Construction
Co., thus: 18
That the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be sufficiently explicit to
inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its
penalties is a well- recognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair
play and the settled rules of law; and a statute which either forbids or requires the doing
of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of
law.
Thus in Connally, a statute prescribing penalties for violation of an eight-hour workday law was
voided, presenting as it did, a "double uncertainty, fatal to its validity as a criminal statute."19
In Lanzetta v. State of New Jersey,20 a challenge was posed to a statute defining a "gangster"
and prescribing appropriate penalties, for being void for vagueness. The U.S. Supreme Court
ruled that the definition of a "gang" under the statute was vague, and the statute void for
vagueness. It was of no moment that the information against the accused described the offense
with particularity.
If on its face the challenged provision is repugnant to the due process clause,
specification of details of the offense intended to be charged would not serve to validate
it. (United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221; Czarra v. Board of Medical Supervisors, 25
App.D.C. 443, 453.) It is the statute, not the accusation under it, that prescribes the
rule to govern conduct and warns against transgression. (See Stromberg v.
California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 , 51 S.Ct. 532, 535, 73 A.L. R. 1484; Lovell v. Griffin, 303
U.S. 444 , 58 S.Ct. 666.) No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to
speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what
the State commands or forbids.21 (Emphasis supplied)
In Bouie v. City of Columbia,22 civil rights protesters were charged with violating a criminal
trespass statute proscribing entry upon the lands of another after notice prohibiting such entry. A
state court construed the statute as applicable to the act of remaining on the premises of
another after receiving notice to leave. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, applying again the
"void for vagueness" doctrine. Said Court admitted that "typical applications of the principle, the
uncertainty as to the statute's prohibition resulted from vague or overbroad language in the
statute itself."23 Yet the Court noted that "[t]here can be no doubt that a deprivation of the right of
fair warning can result not only from vague statutory language but also from an unforeseeable
and retroactive judicial expansion of narrow and precise statutory language."24 Accordingly, the
Court overturned the convictions, holding that "the crime for which [they] were convicted was not
enumerated in the statute at the time of their conduct," thus denying the accused due process of
law.25
In Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,26 a statute penalizing vagrancy was voided by the U.S.
Supreme Court, again for being vague:
This ordinance is void for vagueness, both in the sense that it "fails to give a person of
ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the
statute," (United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617), and because it encourages
arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions (Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88; Herndon
v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242).27
Kolender v. Lawson28 involves another affirmation of the well-established doctrine. There, the
US Supreme Court invalidated a loitering statute requiring a loiterer to produce credible and
reliable identification when requested by a peace officer. It elucidated:
Although the doctrine focuses on both actual notice to citizens and arbitrary
enforcement, we have recognized recently that the more important aspect of the
vagueness doctrine "is not actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrinethe requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law
enforcements. Where the legislature fails to provide such minimal guidelines, a criminal
statute may permit "a standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors and
juries to pursue their personal predilections.29
In the fairly recent case of City of Chicago v. Morales,30 the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed a
lower court ruling invalidating as void for vagueness an ordinance prohibiting "criminal street
gang members" from loitering in public places, as well as the conviction based on the
invalidated ordinance. The US Court again asserted:
For it is clear that the vagueness of this enactment makes a facial challenge appropriate.
This is not an ordinance that "simply regulates business behavior and contains a
scienter requirement." (See Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.
S. 489, 499 (1982)). It is a criminal law that contains nomens rea requirement
(see Colautti v. Franklin , 439 U. S. 379, 395 (1979)), and infringes on constitutionally
protected rights (see id. , at 391). When vagueness permeates the text of such a law, it
is subject to facial attack.
Vagueness may invalidate a criminal law for either of two independent reasons. First, it
may fail to provide the kind of notice that will enable ordinary people to understand what
conduct it prohibits; second, it may authorize and even encourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement. (See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U. S., at 357).31
Given the wealth of jurisprudence invalidating penal statutes for suffering from vagueness, it is
mystifying why the notion that the doctrine applies only to "free-speech" cases has gained a
foothold in this Court. It might be argued that the above-cited cases are foreign jurisprudence,
inapplicable to this jurisdiction. Yet it is submitted that the rule is applicable here, not because of
its repeated affirmation by American courts, but because such rule is lucidly consistent with our
own fundamental notions of due process, as enunciated in our own Constitution.
What then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and as
substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any government action for that
matter, from the imputation of legal infirmity; sufficient to spell its doom? It is
responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice.
Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due
process requirement, official action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds
of reasons and result in sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official
action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly has it been identified as freedom
from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play. It exacts fealty
"to those strivings for justice" and judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch" in the
light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions
of legal and political thought." It is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed
content unrelated to time, place and circumstances," decisions based on such a clause
requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society."32
The dissent of Justice White, joined by Justice Rehnquist, in Kolender v. Lawson finds some
kinship with Mr. Justice Mendoza's views in Estrada, insofar as they point out a distinction
between the "vagueness" doctrine, as applied to criminal statutes, on one hand, and as applied
to US First Amendment cases, on the other.
The usual rule is that the alleged vagueness of a criminal statute must be judged in light
of the conduct that is charged to be violative of the statute. If the actor is given sufficient
notice that his conduct is within the proscription of the statute, his conviction is not
vulnerable on vagueness grounds, even if as applied to other conduct, the law would be
unconstitutionally vague. None of our cases "suggests that one who has received fair
warning of the criminality of his own conduct from the statute in question is nonetheless
entitled to attack it because the language would not give similar fair warning ;with
respect to other conduct which might be within its broad and literal ambit. One to whose
conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness." The
correlative rule is that a criminal statute is not unconstitutionally vague on its face unless
it is "impermissibly vague in all of its applications."
These general rules are equally applicable to cases where First Amendment or other
"fundamental" interests are involved. The Court has held that in such circumstances
"more precision in drafting may be required because of the vagueness doctrine in the
case of regulation of expression, a "greater degree of specificity" is demanded than in
other contexts. But the difference in such cases "relates to how strict a test of vagueness
shall be applied in judging a particular criminal statute." It does not permit the challenger
of the statute to confuse vagueness and overbreadth by attacking the enactment as
being vague as applied to conduct other than his own. Of course, if his own actions
are themselves protected by the First Amendment or other constitutional
provision, or if the statute does not fairly warn that it is proscribed, he may not be
convicted. But it would be unavailing for him to claim that although he knew his own
conduct was unprotected and was plainly enough forbidden by the statute, others may
be in doubt as to whether their acts are banned by the law.33 (Emphasis supplied)
Still, the quoted dissenting opinion concedes the applicability of the "void for vagueness" rule in
striking infirm criminal statutes. It just enunciates a greater demand for "specificity" in statutes
which may infringe on free speech protections.
Moreover, Mr. Justice Mendoza likewise invoked American jurisprudence in support of his view
that the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines apply only to free speech cases.34 He cites,
among others, U.S. v. Salerno35
and Broadrick v. Oklahoma.36 In Salerno, the US Supreme Court notes that the "overbreadth"
doctrine was inapplicable outside the context of the First Amendment.37 Notably though, the US
Court did not make the same assertion as to the "vagueness" doctrine. Had it done so
in Salerno, it would have been incongruent with its previous rulings, as well as with its
subsequent ones.
Broadrick v. Oklahoma did not pertain to a challenge to a penal statute, but rather an Oklahoma
law restricting the political activities of that state's classified civil
servants.38 Again, Broadrick may advert to a correct interpretation of the "overbreadth" doctrine.
However, in the face of numerous jurisprudence affirming the "vagueness" challenge of
American penal laws neither Broadrick nor Salerno can be utilized to assert a converse rule.
Mr. Justice Mendoza's opinion also cites from the American constitutional law textbook of
Sullivan and Gunther, to assert that "vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like
overbreadth challenges, typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a
matter of due process typically are invalidated only as
applied to a particular defendant."39 This may be a correct restatement of the American rule. Yet,
it does not necessarily mean that penal laws are not susceptible to a "void for vagueness"
challenge. In fact, in the same page cited in Mr. Justice Mendoza's opinion, Sullivan and
Gunther cite cases wherein American penal laws were stricken down for being vague, such
as Connally v. General Construction Co., Kolender v. Lawson, and Papachristou v.
Jacksonville.40
The same citation likewise refers to the odd situation wherein unlike in First Amendment cases,
due process invalidations for vagueness apply only to a particular defendant. Sullivan and
Gunther posit that the broader protection afforded in First Amendment cases follow from "a
special concern about the 'chilling effect' of vague statutes on protected speech."41 However,
the ponencia latches onto this distinction in order to foist the bugaboo of "mass acquittal" of
criminals due to the facial invalidation of criminal statutes.42 Moreover, the ponencia asserts that
such invalidation would constitute a departure from the usual requirement of actual case and
controversy and permit decisions to be made in a sterile abstract context having no factual
concreteness.43
Such concerns are overwrought. In this jurisdiction, judicial review over the constitutionality of
statutes, penal or otherwise, avails only upon the concurrence of (1) the existence of an
appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional
question; (3) a plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) a necessity
that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case.44Challenges to the
validity of laws are not lightly undertaken, and the non-existence of any of the four conditions
precedent bar a successful challenge. Surely, not just anybody picked off the street
prepossesses the requisite standing, nor could just any case present itself as the proper vehicle
for a constitutional attack.
These conditions precedent successfully weigh the concerns of the State, fearful of instabilities
brought by frequent invalidations of the laws it passes, and with the basic component of justice
that a person to whom a wrong is done by the State can seek vindication from the courts. Our
basic jurisprudential barrier has shielded this Court for generations from exercising unwarranted
and unmitigated judicial review. There is no need to further raise the bar for review, especially
on such flimsy foundations, lest we insulate ourselves from the pleas of the truly prejudiced,
truly injured, truly violated.
At the same time, the ponencia raises the concern that the invalidation of a void law will
unnecessarily benefit those without actual cases or controversies. It must be remembered
though that the Court will not unhesitatingly strike down a statute if a narrower alternative
affording the same correct relief is available. Within the confines of this discretion, all the tools of
searching inquiry are at the Court's disposal to carve as narrow a rule as necessary.
Still and all, if there is no alternative but to strike down a void law, there should be no hesitation
on the part of this Court in ruling it so, no matter the effective scope and reach of the decision.
The State has no business promulgating void laws, which stick out like a cancer infecting our
constitutional order. When faced with the proper opportunity, it is the Court's duty to excise the
tumor no matter how painful. Unfortunately, the solution advocated by the ponencia barring
penal statutes from "void for vagueness" assaults hides the patient from the doctor.
People v. Dela Piedra, earlier cited,45 did not invalidate the statute questioned therein on the
"void for vagueness" ground. Yet it affirms that the "void for vagueness" challenge to a penal law
may be sustained if the statute contravenes due process. The circumstance, as
the ponencia herein points out, that no penal law has been declared unconstitutional on the
ground of ambiguity, does not mean that no penal law can ever be invalidated on that ground.
As long as the due process clause remains immanent in our Constitution, its long reach should
be applied to deter and punish unwarranted deprivations of life, liberty or property. Violations of
due process are myriad, ranging as they do from the simple to the complicated, from the
isolated to the intermittent, from the abashed to the brazen. No advance statement can
outrightly cast an act as beyond the ambit of the due process clause, especially when applied to
the lot of an accused, for such is simply presumptuous and anathema to the spirit of fair play.
I may disagree with the eventual conclusions of Justices Kapunan, Ynares-Santiago and
Sandoval-Gutierrez in theEstrada case that Section 5 of the Anti-Plunder Law is void for
vagueness. Yet, I submit that their inquiry as to whether the said criminal statute was void for
being vague is a juristic exercise worth pursuing. If the ponenciaaffirms the earlier erroneous
pronouncement as asserted in the main by Mr. Justice Mendoza in Estrada, then I express the
same fear articulated by Mr. Justice Kapunan in his dissent, that "such stance is tantamount to
saying that no criminal law can be challenged however repugnant it is to the constitutional right
to due process."46
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
Footnotes
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 99032 March 26, 1997
RICARDO A. LLAMADO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition to review the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Criminal Case No. 85-38653 convicting
petitioner of Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks
Law, and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment of one (1) year of prision correccional and to
pay a fine of P200,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to reimburse
Leon Gaw the amount of P186,500.00 plus the costs of suit.
The facts of the case, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
Accused-appellant, Ricardo Llamado, together with Jacinto Pascual, was
charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and pleaded "not guilty" of the
crime charged.
Accused Jacinto Pascual remained at large. Thus trial on the merits was
conducted against accused-appellant, Ricardo Llamado, only.
Accused Ricardo Llamado and his co-accused Jacinto Pascual were the
Treasurer and President, respectively, of the Pan Asia Finance Corporation.
As found by the trial court, private complainant, Leon Gaw, delivered to accused
the amount of P180,000.00, with the assurance of Aida Tan, the secretary of the
accused in the corporation, that it will be repaid on 4 November 1983, plus
interests thereon at 12% plus a share in the profits of the corporation, if any.
Upon delivery of the money, accused Ricardo Llamado took it and placed it
inside a deposit box. Accused Jacinto Pascual and Ricardo Llamado signed
Philippine Trust Company Check No. 047809, postdated 4 November 1983, in
the amount of P186,500.00 in the presence of private complainant.
The aforesaid check was issued in payment of the cash money delivered to the
accused by private complainant, plus interests thereon for sixty (60) days in the
amount of P6,500.00.
On 4 November 1983, private complainant deposited the check in his current
account with the Equitable Banking Corporation which later informed the
complainant that said check was dishonored by the drawee bank because
payment was stopped, and that the check was drawn against insufficient funds.
Private complainant was also notified by the Equitable Banking Corporation that
his current account was debited for the amount of P186,500.00 because of the
dishonor of the said check.
Private complainant returned to Aida Tan to inform her of the dishonor of the
check. Aida Tan received the check from private complainant with the assurance
that she will have said check changed with cash. However, upon his return to
Aida Tan, the latter informed him that she had nothing to do with the check.
Thereupon, private complainant went to accused Ricardo Llamado on 11
November 1983 to inform him of the dishonor of the check. Accused offered in
writing to pay private complainant a portion of the amount equivalent to 10%
thereof on 14 or 15 November 1983, and the balance to be rolled over for a
period of ninety (90) days. This offer was accepted by private complainant.
Accused, however, failed to remit to private complainant the aforesaid 10% on or
before 15 November 1983 and to roll over the balance of the money.
Private complainant then demanded from the accused the payment of
P186,500.00 but accused failed to pay and instead, accused offered to return to
private complainant only 30% of his money which was refused by the latter.
Thus, the filing of the complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa No. 22 against
the accused. 2
On the other hand, petitioner's version of the relevant facts, is as follows:
It was the practice in the corporation for petitioner to sign blank checks and leave
them with Pascual so that Pascual could make disbursements and enter into
transactions even in the absence of petitioner.
One of the checks which petitioner signed in blank and gave to Pascual is the
check in question, Exhibit "A."
The check was later issued to private complainant, filled up with the amount
P186,500.00 and date November 4, 1983.
The check was dishonored on November 7, 1983 when private complainant
presented it for payment because its payment had been stopped (Exhibits A-6
and A-7). However, there were also no sufficient funds in the account to cover the
amount of the check.
Private complainant went to see Aida Tan, the "Secretary" of Pan-Asia Finance
Corporation, about the dishonor of the check because "she was the one who
handled [sic] the check and gave it to me." He returned the check to Aida Tan
who gave him a receipt for it (Exhibit C), and promised "to return the cash
money." However, she did not do so. Instead, she returned the check to private
complainant (pp. 9-11, tsn, January 6, 1986; p. 9, tsn, January 6, 1986).
On November 11, 1983, private complainant entered into an agreement (Exhibit
H) with petitioner whereby Pan-Asia Finance Corporation would pay private
complainant 10% of the P186,500.00 by November 14, or 15, and the balance
will be rolled over for 90 days (pp. 1-4, tsn, June 30, 1986). Private respondent
was not however paid as agreed upon.
In late 1985, petitioner was charged with violation of BP 22 under the following
Information: . . . 3
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment convicting the accused of violation of
Batas Pambansa No. 22, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the Accused Ricardo A.
Llamado guilty of Violation of Batas Pambansa No. 22 and hereby sentences him
to suffer imprisonment for a period of one (1) year of prision correccional and to
pay a fine of P200,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The Accused is likewise condemned to reimburse Leon Gaw the aforesaid
amount of P186,500.00 plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
In this petition, petitioner alleges that:
1. respondent Court of Appeals erred because it convicted petitioner of the
charge of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 although the check was only a
contingent payment for investment which had not been proven to be successful,
thus the check was not issued "to apply on account or for value" within the
contemplation of the batas;
2. respondent Court of Appeals erred because it convicted petitioner of the
charge for merely signing the check in question without being actually involved in
the transaction for which the check was issued, in disregard of the
pronouncement of this Court in Dingle vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 595;
3. respondent Court of Appeals erred because it refused to apply the "novation
theory" recognized by this Court in Ong v. Court of Appeals, 124 SCRA 578, and
Guingona, Jr. v. City Fiscal of Manila, 128 SCRA 577, despite admission by
private complainant that before the charge was filed in court or even the
prosecutor he had entered into a new agreement with petitioner supplanting the
check in question;
4. respondent Court of Appeals erred because it held petitioner personally liable

for the amount of the check in question, although it was a check of the Pan Asia
Finance Corporation and he signed the same in his capacity as Treasurer of the
corporation.
The petition is without merit.
For clarity, petitioner's second allegation shall be discussed first. Petitioner argues that
respondent court erred in disregarding the pronouncement in Dingle vs. IAC, 4 that "absent
knowledge by the maker or drawer of the issuance of a check much less of the transaction and
the fact of dishonor, the accused should be acquitted."
The respondent court did not err. In Dingle vs. IAC, the petitioner was acquitted because: 1.)
from the testimony of the sole prosecution witness, it was established that he dealt exclusively
with petitioner's co-signatory; 2.) nowhere in the prosecution witness' testimony was the name
of petitioner ever mentioned in connection with the transaction and the issuance of the check;
and, 3.) the prosecution witness therein categorically stated that it was Nestor Dingle,
petitioner's co-signatory who received his two letters of demand. These lent credence to the
testimony of petitioner that she signed the questioned checks in blank together with her
husband without any knowledge of its issuance, much less of the transaction and the fact of
dishonor. Moreover, while Paz Dingle and her husband Nestor Dingle owned the business, the
business was managed by Nestor, petitioner Paz's co-signatory.
The above circumstances in Dingle vs. IAC do not obtain in the case at bar. Here, the private
complainant testified that upon delivery of the money, petitioner took it and placed it inside a
deposit box; that Jacinto Pascual and petitioner Ricardo Llamado signed the questioned check,
postdated November 4, 1983, in the amount of P186,500.00 in the presence of private
complainant; notice of the fact of dishonor of the check was made on petitioner, who offered in
writing 5 to pay private complainant a portion of the amount equivalent to 10% thereof on 14 or
15 November 1983, and the balance to be rolled over for a period of 90 days.
Petitioner denies knowledge of the issuance of the check without sufficient funds and
involvement in the transaction with private complainant. However, knowledge involves a state of
mind difficult to establish. Thus, the statute itself creates a prima facie presumption, i.e., that the
drawer had knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the bank at the time of
the issuance and on the check's presentment for payment. 6 Petitioner failed to rebut the
presumption by paying the amount of the check within five (5) banking days from notice of the
dishonor. 7 His claim that he signed the check in blank which allegedly is common business
practice, is hardly a defense. If as he claims, he signed the check in blank, he made himself
prone to being charged with violation of BP 22. It became incumbent upon him to prove his
defenses. As Treasurer of the corporation who signed the check in his capacity as an officer of
the corporation, lack of involvement in the negotiation for the transaction is not a defense.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent court erred when it convicted petitioner of violation of BP
22 when the check was only a contingent payment for investment which had not been proven to
be successful, thus the check was not issued "to apply on account or for value" within the
contemplation of the batas. This contention is untenable.
The check was issued for an actual valuable consideration of P180,000.00, which private
complainant handed to Aida Tan, a secretary in petitioner's office. In fact, petitioner admits that
private complainant made an investment in said amount with Pan-Asia Finance Corporation.
Petitioner contends that the money which private complainant gave the corporation was
intended for investment which they agreed will be returned to private complainant with interests,
only if the project became successful. But then, if this were true, the check need not have been
issued because a receipt and their written agreement would have sufficed.
True, it is common practice in commercial transactions to require debtors to issue checks on
which creditors must rely as guarantee of payment, or as evidence of indebtedness, if not a
mode of payment. But to determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and
conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the stability and
commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring about havoc in trade and in
banking communities. 8 So, what the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not
the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The
mere act of issuing a worthless check ismalum prohibitum. 9
With regard to petitioner's third allegation, the "novation theory" recognized by this Court in
certain cases, does not apply in the case at bar. While private complainant agreed to petitioner's
offer to pay him 10% of the amount of the check on November 14 or 15, 1983 and the balance
to be rolled over for 90 days, this turned out to be only an empty promise which effectively
delayed private complainant's filing of a case for Violation of BP 22 against petitioner and his coaccused. As admitted by petitioner in his Memorandum, private complainant was never paid as
agreed upon.
Petitioner's argument that he should not be held personally liable for the amount of the check
because it was a check of the Pan Asia Finance Corporation and he signed the same in his
capacity as Treasurer of the corporation, is also untenable. The third paragraph of Section 1 of
BP Blg. 22 states:
Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who
actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of respondent court
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Footnotes

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-67301 January 29, 1990
MANUEL V. BALA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. JUDGE ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and
PAUL AYANG-ANG Probation Officer, Manila Probation Office No. 4, respondents.
Coronet Law Office for petitioner.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioner by this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction
and/or Temporary Restraining Order seeks the reversal of the order dated April 2, 1984 of
the then Court of First Instance (CFI), now Regional Trial Court (RTC), of Manila, Branch
XX. 1 The decretal portion of the assailed order reads:
WHEREFORE, for the reasons above-stated, the motion to dismiss and/or
strike out motion to revoke probation, filed by Manuel Bala, thru counsel,
should be, as it is hereby DENIED, for lack of merit.
Let the motion be set for continuation of hearing on April 25 & 27, at 8:30
o'clock in the morning.
SO ORDERED.
The petitioner had been indicted for removing and substituting the picture of Maria
Eloisa Criss Diazen which had been attached to her United States of America passport,
with that of Florencia Notarte, in effect falsifying a genuine public or official document.
On January 3, 1978, the trial court adjudged petitioner Manuel Bala in Criminal Case No.
24443, guilty of the crime of falsification of a public document. The dispositive portion of
the judgment states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Manuel
Bala y Valdellon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
falsification of a public or official document defined and penalized under
article 172 of the Revised Penal Code, without any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he
is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of not less than ONE (1)

YEAR AND ONE (1) DAY and not exceeding THREE (3) YEARS, SIX (6)
MONTHS & TWENTY-ONE (21) DAYS of prision correccional, to pay a fine of
Pl,800.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency at the rate of
P8.00 for each day, and to pay the cost. He shall be credited with the period
of preventive imprisonment that he may have undergone in accordance
with law.
The petitioner seasonably appealed, but the Court of Appeals, on April 9, 1980,
affirmed in toto the lower court's decision.
After the case had been remanded to the court of origin for execution of judgment, 2 the
petitioner applied for and was granted probation by the respondent judge in his order
dated August 11, 1982. The petitioner was then placed under probation for a period of
one (1) year, subject to the terms and conditions enumerated therein.
On September 23, 1982, the probationer (petitioner) asked his supervising probation
officer for permission to transfer his residence from BF Homes to Phil-Am Life
Subdivision in Las Pias specifically 33 Jingco Street. The probation officer verbally
granted the probationer's request as he found nothing objectionable to it.
By the terms of the petitioner's probation, it should have expired on August 10,
1983, 3 one year after the order granting the same was issued. But, the order of final
discharge could not be issued because the respondent probation officer had not yet
submitted his final report on the conduct of his charge.
On December 8, 1983, the respondent People of the Philippines, through Assistant City
Fiscal Jose D. Cajucom of Manila, filed a motion to revoke the probation of the petitioner
before Branch XX of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, presided over by the
respondent judge. 4 The motion alleged that the petitioner had violated the terms and
conditions of his probation.
On January 4, 1984, the petitioner filed his opposition to the motion on the ground that
he was no longer under probation, 5 his probation period having terminated on August
10, 1983, as previously adverted to. As such, no valid reason existed to revoke the same,
he contended.
As if to confirm the Manila Assistant City Fiscal's motion to revoke the petitioner's
probation, the respondent probation officer filed on January 6, 1984, a motion to
terminate Manuel Bala's probation, at the same time attaching his progress report on
supervision dated January 5, 1984. 6 The same motion, however, became the subject of a
"Manifestation," dated January 10, 1984, which stated that the probation officer was not
pursuing the motion to terminate dated January 6, 1984; instead, he was submitting a
supplemental report 7 which recommended the revocation of probation "in the light of
new facts, information, and evidences."
Thereafter, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and/or strike out the motion to revoke
probation, questioning the jurisdiction of the court over his case inasmuch as his
probation period had already expired. Moreover, his change of residence automatically
transferred the venue of the case from the RTC of Manila to the Executive. Judge, of the
RTC of Makati which latter court include under its jurisdiction the Municipality of Las
Pias the probationer's place of residence, invoking Section 13, P.D. No. 968, which
provides
Sec. 13. Control and Supervision of Probationer. ...
Whenever a probationer is permitted to reside in a place under the
jurisdiction of another court, control over him shall be transferred to the
Executive Judge of the, Court of First Instance of that place, and in such a
case a copy of the probation order the investigation report and other
pertinent records shall be furnished to said Executive Judge. Thereafter.
the Executive Judge to whom jurisdiction over the probationer is
transferred shall have the power with respect to him that was previously
possessed by the court which granted the probation.
As stated at the outset, the respondent judge denied the motion to dismiss for lack of
merit.
Hence, this petition.
The present law on probation, Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1990, which amends section 4 of
P.D. 968, clearly states that "no application for probation shall be entertained or granted
if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction."
However, in the case at bar, P.D. 1990 is inapplicable. P.D. 1990, which went in force on
January 15, 1985 can not be given retroactive effect because it would be prejudicial to
the accused.
It is worthy to note, that what was actually resolved and denied was the motion to
dismiss and/or strike out the motion to revoke probation which disposed of only the
issue of the petitioner's transfer of residence. The motion did not touch on the issue of
the timeliness to revoke probation. The respondent judge has not yet heard and received
evidence, much less acted on the matter. Accordingly, the Solicitor General submits that
the present petition is premature.
The Court finds no merit in the petition. Probation is revocable before the final discharge
of the probationer by the court, contrary to the petitioner's submission.
Section 16 of PD 968 8 is clear on this score:
See. 16. Termination of Probation. After the period of probation and upon
consideration of the report and recommendation of the probation officer,
the court may order the final discharge of the probationer upon finding that
he has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation and thereupon
the case is deemed terminated.
Thus, the expiration of the probation period alone does not automatically terminate
probation. Nowhere is the ipso facto termination of probation found in the provisions of
the probation law. Probation is not coterminous with its period. There must first be
issued by the court of an order of final discharge based on the report and
recommendation of the probation officer. Only from such issuance can the case of the
probationer be deemed terminated.
The period of probation may either be shortened or made longer, but not to exceed the
period set in the law. This is so because the period of probation, like the period of
incarceration, is deemed the appropriate period for the rehabilitation of the probationer.
In the instant case, a review of the records compels a revocation of the probation without
the need of further proceedings in the trial court which, after all, would only be an
exercise in futility. If we render justice now, why should we allow the petitioner to further
delay it. Probationer Manuel Bala failed to reunite with responsible society. Precisely he
was granted probation in order to give him a chance to return to the main stream, to give
him hope hope for self-respect and a better life. Unfortunately, he has continued to
shun the straight and narrow path. He thus wrecked his chance. He has not reformed.
A major role is played by the probation officer in the release of the probationer because
he (probation officer) is in the best position to report all information relative to the
conduct and mental and physical condition of the probationer in his environment, and
the existing institutional and community resources that he may avail himself of when
necessary. Indeed, it is the probation officer who primarily undertakes the supervision
and reform of the probationer through a personalized, individualized, and communitybased rehabilitation program for a specific period of time. On the basis of his final report,
the court can determine whether or not the probationer may be released from probation.
We find it reprehensible that the respondent probation officer had neglected to submit
his report and recommendation. For, as earlier discussed, without this report, the trial
court could not issue the order of final discharge of the probationer. And it is this order
of final discharge which would restore the probationer's suspended civil rights. In the
absence of the order of final discharge, the probation would still subsist, unless
otherwise revoked for cause and that is precisely what we are going to do. We are
revoking his probation for cause.
The petitioner, by applying for probation and getting it, consented to be emancipated
from the yoke if not stigma of a prison sentence, pledging to faithfully comply with the
conditions of his probation, among which are:
xxx
4. To be gainfully employed and be a productive member of society;
xxx
6. To cooperate fully with his program of supervision and rehabilitation that
will be prescribed by the Probation Officer. 9
These conditions, as the records show, were not complied with. This non-compliance
has defeated the very purposes of the probation law, to wit:
(a) promote the correction and rehabilitation of an offender by providing
him with individualized treatment;
(b) provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender which
might be less probable if he were to serve a prison sentence; and
(c) prevent the commission of offenses. 10
By his actuations, probationer-petitioner Manuel V. Bala has ridiculed the probation
program. Instead of utilizing his temporary liberty to rehabilitate and reintegrate himself
as a productive, law abiding, and socially responsible member of society, he continued in
his wayward ways falsifying public or official documents.
Specifically, on April 30, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, National Capital Judicial
Region, Branch XXX, convicted the petitioner, along with two other persons, Lorenzo
Rolo y Punzalan and Efren Faderanga y Fesalbon, for falsification of public and/or official
documents (U.S. Passports), under Article 172, in relation to Article 171, of the Revised
Penal Code, in five separate informations, in Criminal Cases Nos. 29100, 29101, 29102,
29103, and 29107. The trial court imposed upon each of them in all five (5) cases a prison
term of "two (2) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to four (4) years also
of prison correccional, as maximum, to pay a fine of P2,000, the accessory penalties
thereof, and to pay the costs." On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of
the RTC with modification by granting restitution of the amounts they collected from the
offended private parties. The judgment has since become final. As a matter of fact, for
failure of the petitioner to appear for execution of judgment despite notice, the trial court
ordered the arrest of Manuel Bala on July 10, 1989. A warrant of arrest against Bala was
issued on July 12, 1989 and this warrant has not yet been implemented because Bala
absconded. These facts are evident and constitute violations of the conditions of his
probation. Thus, the revocation of his probation is compelling.
At any time during the probation, the court may issue a warrant for the
arrest of a probationer for violation of any of the conditions of probation.
The probationer, once arrested and detained, shall immediately be brought
before the court for a hearing which may be informal and summary, of the
violation charged. ... If the violation is established, the court may revoke or
continue his probation and modify the conditions thereof. If revoked, the
court shall order the probationer to serve the sentence originally imposed.
An order revoking the grant of probation or modifying the terms and
conditions thereof shall not be appealable. 11
(Emphasis supplied.)
The probation having been revoked, it is imperative that the probationer be arrested so
that he can serve the sentence originally imposed. The expiration of the probation period
of one year is of no moment, there being no order of final discharge as yet, as we
stressed earlier. Neither can there be a deduction of the one year probation period from
the penalty of one year and one day to three years, six months, and twenty-one days of
imprisonment because an order placing the defendant on "probation" is not a
"sentence," but is in effect a suspension of the imposition of the sentence. 12 It is not a
final judgment but an "interlocutory judgment" in the nature of a conditional order
placing the convicted defendant under the supervision of the court for his reformation, to
be followed by a final judgment of discharge, if the conditions of the probation are
complied with, or by a final judgment if the conditions are violated." 13
Lastly, probation is a mere privilege. Privilege is a peculiar benefit or immunity conferred
by law on a person or group of persons, not enjoyed by others or by all; special
enjoyment of a good or exemption from an evil; it is a special prerogative granted by law
to some persons. 14 Accordingly, the grant of probation rests solely upon the discretion
of the court. This discretion is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized
society, and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused. 15 If the probationer has
proven to be unrepentant, as in the case of the petitioner, the State is not barred from
revoking such a privilege. Otherwise, the seriousness of the offense is lessened if
probation is not revoked.
On the second assigned error, the petitioner argues that his transfer of residence
automatically transferred jurisdiction over his probation from the Manila Regional Trial
Court to the same court in his new address.
We disagree.
In criminal cases, venue is an element of jurisdiction. 16 Such being the case, the Manila
RTC would not be deprived of its ,jurisdiction over the probation case. To uphold the
petitioner's contention would mean a depreciation of the Manila court's power to grant
probation in the first place. It is to be remembered that when the petitioner-accused
applied for probation in the then CFI of Manila, he was a resident of Las Pias as he is up
to now, although in a different subdivision. As pointed out earlier, he merely moved from
BF Homes to Philam Life Subdivision 33 Jingco Street, also in Las Pias. 17 On the other
hand, pursuing the petitioner's argument on this score to the limits of it logic would
mean that his probation was null and void in the place, because then the Manila CFI was
without jurisdiction to grant him probation as he was a resident of Las Pias.
It is therefore incorrect to assume that the petitioner's change of abode compels change
of venue, and necessarily, control over the petitioner, to the Executive Judge of the RTC
of his new residence. Thus, in the apportionment of the regional trial courts under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, Las
Pias is one among the municipalities included in the National Capital Judicial Region
(Metro Manila) with a seat at Makati. 18 Needless to say, the Regional Trial Court in Makati,
like the Manila Regional Trial Court, forms part of the Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Region. 19Accordingly, the various branches of the regional trial courts of Makati
or Manila under the National Capital Region, are coordinate and co-equal courts, the
totality of which is only one Regional Trial Court. Jurisdiction is vested in the court, not
in the judges. In other words, the case does not attach to the branch or
judge. 20 Therefore, in this case, RTC Branch XX of Manila, which granted the probation,
has not lost control and supervision over the probation of the petitioner.
The petitioner also claims that he had verbally obtained permission to transfer residence
from his probation officer. This would not suffice the law is very explicit in its
requirement of a prior court approval in writing. Section 10 of PD 968 categorically
decrees that the probationer must
xxx
(j) reside at premises approved by it (court) and not to change his
residence without its priorwritten approval;
xxx
Further, such written approval is required by the 21 probation order of August 11, 1982 as
one of the conditions of probation, to wit:
(3) To reside in BF Homes, Las Pias and not to change said address nor
leave the territorial jurisdiction of Metro Manila for more than twenty-four
(24) hours without first securing prior written approval of his Probation
Officer.
In the light of all the foregoing and in the interest of the expeditious administration of
justice, we revoke the probation of the petitioner for violations of the conditions of his
probation, instead of remanding the case to the trial court and having the parties start all
over again in needless protracted proceedings. 22
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED and the probation of the petitioner is hereby
REVOKED. Further, the trial court is ORDERED to issue a warrant for the arrest of the
petitioner and for him to serve thesentence originally imposed without any deduction.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairoperson), Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 89606 August 30, 1990

AGUSTIN SALGADO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, (Fourteenth Division) and HON. ANTONIO SOLANO, in
his capacity as Presiding Judge of the RTC-Quezon City (Branch 86) and FRANCISCO
LUKBAN, respondents.
Ernesto L. Pineda for petitioner.
Lukban, Vega, Lozada & Associates for private respondent.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 15493 entitled, "Agustin Salgado v. Hon. Antonio P. Solano, et al.," which
affirmed the Order dated December 22, 1987 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch
86) sustaining its previous order dated November 18, 1987 directing the issuance of a writ of
execution to enforce the civil liability of herein petitioner in Criminal Case No. 0-33798.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner was charged with the crime of serious physical injuries in Criminal Case No. 0-33798
entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Agustin Salgado," before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City (Branch 86). After trial, judgment was rendered on October 16, 1986 finding him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of the decision,
states:
WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused AGUSTIN P. SALGADO, JR., guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of serious physical injuries, defined and
penalized under paragraph 3 Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code, and
appreciating in his favor the following mitigating circumstances:
1) voluntary surrender; and
2) No intention to commit so grave a wrong hereby sentence (sic) said accused
to suffer imprisonment for a period of four (4) months and twenty (20) days, with
the accessories provided for by law, and to indemnify the victim, Francisco
Lukban, Jr., in the sum of P126,633.50 as actual or compensatory damages, and
the sum of P50,000.00 as damages for the incapacity of Francisco Lukban to
pursue and engage in his poultry business.
SO ORDERED. (p. 19, Rollo)
On October 17, 1986, petitioner filed an application for probation with the trial court. The
application was granted in an Order dated April 15, 1987. The order contained, among others,
the following condition:
xxx xxx xxx
4. Indemnify the victim FRANCISCO LUKBAN, JR., in a monthly installment of
P2,000.00 (TWO THOUSAND PESOS) every month during the entire period of
his probation. (p. 15, Rollo)
For the months of May, June, July, August, September and October, 1987, petitioner complied
with the above condition by paying in checks the said sum of P2,000.00 monthly, through the
City Probation Officer, Perla Diaz Alonzo. Private respondent Francisco Lukban, Jr. voluntarily
accepted the checks and subsequently encashed them (p. 19, Rollo).
On September 19, 1987, private respondent Francisco Lukban, Jr. filed a motion for the
issuance of a writ of execution for the enforcement of the civil liability adjudged in his favor in
the criminal case. The motion was opposed by the petitioner.
On November 18, 1987, the trial court issued an order granting the motion for issuance of a writ
of execution. A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but it was denied on December
22, 1987. After the denial of his motion for reconsideration, the petitioner filed directly with this
Court a petition for review of the trial court's order granting the motion for issuance of a writ of
execution. We referred the petition to the Court of Appeals in a resolution dated April 13, 1988
(p. 18, Rollo).
On March 16, 1989, respondent Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the order of the
trial court granting the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by petitioner but respondent Court of Appeals denied the motion in a
resolution dated August 3, 1989 (pp. 9-10, Rollo).
The petitioner went to this Court via a petition for review which was filed on September 26, 1989
and raised the following assignment of errors:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ORDER DATED
APRIL 15, 1987 HAS NOT MODIFIED THE DECISION OF OCTOBER 16, 1986
AS FAR AS THE CIVIL ASPECT IS CONCERNED.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CONDITION IN
THE PROBATION ORDER MODIFYING OR ALTERING THE CIVIL LIABILITY
OF THE OFFENDER IS UNAUTHORIZED AND NOT SANCTIONED BY LAW.
(p. 10, Rollo)
In its decision affirming the order of the trial court granting private respondent's motion for the
issuance of a writ of execution, respondent Court of Appeals advanced three (3) reasons: 1) that
the decision dated October 16, 1986 had become final and executory and the judge who
rendered the decision cannot lawfully alter or modify it; 2) that it is clear that the probation law
provides only for the suspension of sentence imposed on the accused; that it has absolutely no
beating on his civil liability and that none of the conditions listed under Section 10 of the
Probation Law relates to civil liability; and 3) that private respondent is not estopped because he
had nothing to do with the filing and the granting of the probation.
There is no question that the decision of October 16, 1986 in Criminal Case No. Q-33798
finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of serious physical injuries had
become final and executory because the filing by respondent of an application for probation is
deemed a waiver of his right to appeal (See Section 4 of P.D. 968). Likewise, the judgment
finding petitioner liable to private respondent for P126,633.50 as actual damages and
P50,000.00 as consequential damages had also become final because no appeal was taken
therefrom. Hence, it is beyond the power of the trial court to alter or modify. In the case
of Samson v. Hon. Montejo, L-18605, October 31, 1963, 9 SCRA 419, 422-423 cited by
respondent appellate court, it was held:
. . . , once a decision becomes final, even the court which rendered it cannot
lawfully alter or modify the same (Rili, et al. v. Chunaco, et al., G.R. No. L-6630,
Feb. 29, 1956), especially, considering the fact that, as in the instant case, the
alteration or modification is material and substantial (Ablaza v. Sycip, et al., L12125, Nov. 23, 1960). In the case of Behn, Meyer & Co., v. J. Mcmicking et al.,
11 Phil. 276, (cited by respondents), it was held that "where a final judgment of
an executory character had been rendered in a suit the mission of the court is
limited to the execution and enforcement of the said final judgment in all of its
parts and in accordance with its express orders." The judgment in question is
clear, and with the amended writ of execution, the liability of petitioner is greatly
augmented, without the benefit of proper proceeding. (Emphasis ours)
We do not believe, however, that the order dated April 15, 1987 granting the application for
probation and imposing some conditions therein altered or modified the decision dated October
16, 1986. The April 15, 1987 Order of the trial court granting the application for probation and
providing as one of the conditions therein that petitioner indemnify private respondent P2,000.00
monthly during the period of probation did not increase or decrease the civil liability adjudged
against petitioner but merely provided for the manner of payment by the accused of his civil
liabilityduring the period of probation.
It is the submission of private respondent that in the case of Budlong v. Apalisok, No. 60151,
June 24, 1983, 122 SCRA 935. We already ruled that "(T)he 'conviction and sentence' clause of
the statutory definition clearly signifies that probation affects only the criminal aspect of the
case."
The pronouncement in Apalisok that "probation affects only the criminal aspect of the case"
should not be given a literal meaning. Interpreting the phrase within the context of that case, it
means that although the execution of sentence is suspended by the grant of probation, it does
not follow that the civil liability of the offender, if any, is extinguished. This can be inferred from a
reading of the text of the Apalisok case where the issue that was involved therein was whether a
grant of probation carries with it the extinction of the civil liability of the offender. The reason for
ruling that the grant of probation does not extinguish the civil liability of the offender is clear,
"(T)he extinction or survival of civil liability are governed by Chapter III, Title V, Book I of the
Revised Penal Code where under Article 113 thereof provides that: '. . . , the offender shall
continue to be obliged to satisfy the civil liability resulting from the crime committed by him,
notwithstanding the fact that he has served his sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty or
other lights, or has not been required to serve the same by reason of amnesty, pardon,
commutation of sentence, or any other reason.'" In the instant case, the issue is not the survival
or extinction of the civil liability of a probationer but, whether or not the trial court may impose as
a condition of probation the manner in which a probationer may settle his civil liability against
the offended party during the period of probation.
Respondent appellate court ruled that Section 10 of the Probation Law enumerates thirteen (13)
conditions of probation not one of which relates to the civil liability of the offender (p. 22, Rollo).
Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968 (Probation Law of 1976) provides:
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the court
may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant but before he
begins to serve his sentence and upon his application, suspend the execution of
said sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon
such terms and conditions as it may deem best.
In the case of Florentino L. Baclayon v. Hon. Pacito G. Mutia, et al., G.R. No. 59298, April 30,
1984, 129 SCRA 148, We ruled that the conditions listed under Section 10 of the Probation Law
are not exclusive. Courts are allowed to impose practically any term it chooses, the only
limitation being that it does not jeopardize the constitutional rights of the accused. Courts may
impose conditions with the end that these conditions would help the probationer develop into a
law-abiding individual. Thus,
The conditions which trial courts may impose on a probationer may be classified
into general or mandatory and special or discretionary. The mandatory
conditions, enumerated in Section 10 of the Probation Law, require that
probationer should a) present himself to the probation officer designated to
undertake his supervision at such place as may be specified in the order within
72 hours from receipt of said order, and b) report to the probation officer at least
once a month at such time and place as specified by said officer. Special or
discretionary conditions are those additional conditions, listed in the same
Section 10 of the Probation Law, which the courts may additionally impose on the
probationer towards his correction and rehabilitation outside of prison. The
enumeration, however, is not inclusive. Probation statutes are liberal in character
and enable courts to designate practically any term it chooses as long as the
probationer's constitutional rights are not jeopardized. There are innumerable
conditions which may be relevant to the rehabilitation of the probationer when
viewed in their specific individual context. It should, however, be borne in mind
that the special or discretionary conditions of probation should be realistic,
purposive and geared to help the probationer develop into a law-abiding and
self-respecting individual. Conditions should be interpreted with flexibility in their
application, and each case should be judged on its own merits on the basis of
the problems, needs and capacity of the probationer. . . . .
The primary consideration in granting probation is the reformation of the probationer. That is
why, under the law, a post sentence investigation, which is mandatory, has to be conducted
before a person can be granted probation to help the court in determining whether the ends of
justice and the best interest of the public as well as the defendant will be served by the granting
of the probation (Alvin Lee Koenig, Post Sentence Investigation, Its Importance and Utility, IBP
Journal, Special Issue on Probation, Vol. 5, No. 5, pp. 381-387). In the case of People v.
Lippner, 219 Cal. 395, 26 p. 2d, 457, 458 (1933), among those which has to be ascertained is
the financial condition and capacity of the offender to meet his obligations:
. . . there can be no real reformation of a wrong-doer unless there is at least a
willingness on his part to right the wrong committed, and the effect of such an act
upon the individual is of inestimable value, and to a large extent, determines
whether there has been any real reformation. To be clearly consonant with such
a purpose, the post sentence investigation must include a financial examination
of the offender's capability in order to work out a system of payment which can
effectively accomplish reimbursement without interfering with the defendant's
family and other financial responsibilities, according to U.S. Model Penal Code of
the American Law Institute. . . . (Sec. 301.1 Comments (Tentative Draft No. 2,
1954; Also 2 U.S. Dept. of Justice, Attorney General's Survey of Release
Procedures 38 (1939) cited in The Period and Conditions of Probation by Sergio
F. Go, IBP Journal Special Issue on Probation, Vol. 5, No. 5, pp. 406-420).
(Emphasis ours)
The trial court is given the discretion to impose conditions in the order granting probation "as it
may deem best." As already stated, it is not only limited to those listed under Section 10 of the
Probation Law. Thus, under Section 26, paragraph (d) of the Rules on Probation Methods and
Procedures, among the conditions which may be imposed in the order granting probation is:
Sec. 26. Other conditions of Probation. The Probation Order may also require the
probationer in appropriate cases, to:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) comply with a program of payment of civil liability to the victim or his
heirs . . . .
However, this is not to say that the manner by which the probationer should satisfy the payment
of his civil liability in a criminal case during the probation period may be demanded at will by
him. It is necessary that the condition which provides for a program of payment of his civil
liability will address the offender's needs and capacity. Such need may be ascertained from the
findings and recommendations in the post-sentence investigation report submitted by the
Probation Officer after investigation of the financial capacity of the offender and that such
condition is to the end that the interest of the state and the reformation of the probationer is best
served.
In the instant case, in the absence of any showing to the contrary, it is presumed that when the
trial court issued the order of April 15, 1987, the condition that the petitioner has to pay private
respondent P2,000.00 a month for the satisfaction of the civil liability adjudged against him was
recommended by the probation officer who prepared the post-sentence investigation and that
such condition is, in the judgment of the trial court, "deemed best" under the circumstances.
Counting from April 15, 1987, the date of issuance of the order granting probation which under
the law is also the date of its effectivity (Sec. 11, P.D. 968), the probation period must have
lapsed by now. Hence, the order for petitioner to indemnify the private respondent in the amount
of P2,000.00 monthly during the period of probationmust have also lapsed. If such were the
case, there would therefore, be no more obstacle for the private respondent to enforce the
execution of the balance of the civil liability of the petitioner. However, the records are bereft of
allegations to this effect.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated March 16, 1989 of respondent
Court of Appeals affirming the order of the trial court granting the motion for the issuance of a
writ of execution as well as the resolution dated August 3, 1989 of the same court are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (Chairman), Gancayco and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., concurring:

I concur in the result, the issue having become moot and academic. At the same time, however,
I must express my reservation on the holding that the condition imposed on the probation was a
valid requirement and within the sound discretion of the trial court. I am not certain that the
award of civil damages, having become final and executory, could still be amended by the trial
court by providing for its payment in installments during the period of probation. It seems to me
that the said award was already a vested property right of the victim and that it could be
enforced by him immediately and in full as in ordinary money judgments where there is no
indication of a different mode and period of payment. There is none in the decision in question.
That decision was never appealed. Consequently, I submit that the trial judge had no authority
to in effect defer the immediate enforcement of the civil award of P176,633.50 by requiring the
probationer to pay it at the rate of only P2,000.00 a month, a paltry amount, indeed, considering
the total obligation. The fact that the victim accepted the payments did not validate the
condition, which was void ab initio as far as he was concerned. At any time he saw fit, he could
have disregarded that condition as an invalid amendment of the decision and demanded
the immediate issuance of a writ of execution for the fullamount of the civil award. I believe that
was his vested right.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., concurring:
I concur in the result, the issue having become moot and academic. At the same time, however,
I must express my reservation on the holding that the condition imposed on the probation was a
valid requirement and within the sound discretion of the trial court. I am not certain that the
award of civil damages, having become final and executory, could still be amended by the trial
court by providing for its payment in installments during the period of probation. It seems to me
that the said award was already a vested property right of the victim and that it could be
enforced by him immediately and in full as in ordinary money judgments where there is no
indication of a different mode and period of payment. There is none in the decision in question.
That decision was never appealed. Consequently, I submit that the trial judge had no authority
to in effect defer the immediate enforcement of the civil award of P176,633.50 by requiring the
probationer to pay it at the rate of only P2,000.00 a month, a paltry amount, indeed, considering
the total obligation. The fact that the victim accepted the payments did not validate the
condition, which was void ab initio as far as he was concerned. At any time he saw fit, he could
have disregarded that condition as an invalid amendment of the decision and demanded
the immediate issuance of a writ of execution for the fullamount of the civil award. I believe that
was his vested right.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 108747 April 6, 1995
PABLO C. FRANCISCO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND THE HONORABLE MAXIMO C. CONTRERAS, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to a penitent qualified offender. It essentially
rejects appeals and encourages an otherwise eligible convict to immediately admit his liability
and save the state of time, effort and expenses to jettison an appeal. The law expressly requires
that an accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail of probation. This
outlaws the element of speculation on the part of the accused to wager on the result of his
appeal that when his conviction is finally affirmed on appeal, the moment of truth well-nigh at
hand, and the service of his sentence inevitable, he now applies for probation as an "escape
hatch" thus rendering nugatory the appellate court's affirmance of his conviction. Consequently,
probation should be availed of at the first opportunity by convicts who are willing to be reformed
and rehabilitated, who manifest spontaneity, contrition and remorse.
As conceptualized, is petitioner entitled to probation within the purview of P.D. 968, as amended
by P.D. 1257 and P.D. 1990?
Petitioner's woes started when as President and General Manager of ASPAC Trans. Company
he failed to control his outburst and blurted
You employees in this office are all tanga, son of a bitches (sic), bullshit. Puro
kayo walang utak . . . .Mga anak ng puta . . . . Magkano ba kayo . . . God damn
you all.
Thus for humiliating his employees he was accused of multiple grave oral defamation in five (5)
separate Informations instituted by five (5) of his employees, each Information charging him with
gravely maligning them on four different days, i.e., from 9 to 12 April 1980.
On 2 January 1990, after nearly ten (10) years, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Br. 61,
found petitioner guilty of grave oral defamation in four (4) of the five (5) cases filed against him,
i.e., Crim. Cases Nos. 105206, 105207, 105209 and 105210, sentenced him to a prison term of
one (1) year and one (l) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional "in each
crime committed on each date of each case, as alleqed in the information(s)," ordered him to
indemnify each of the offended parties, Victoria Gatchalian, Rowena Ruiz, Linda Marie Ayala
Pigar and Marie Solis, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees,
plus costs of suit. 1 He was however acquitted in Crim. Case No. 105208 for persistent failure of
the offended party, Edgar Colindres, to appear and testify.
Not satisfied with the Decision of the MeTC, and insisting on his innocence, petitioner elevated
his case to the Regional Trial Court.
On 5 August 1991 the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Br. 59, affirmed his conviction but
appreciated in his favor a mitigating circumstance analogous to passion or obfuscation. Thus
. . . (he) was angry and shouting when he uttered the defamatory words
complained of . . . . he must have been angry and worried "about some missing
documents . . . as well as the letter of the Department of Tourism advising
ASPAC about its delinquent tax of P1.2 million . . . . " the said defamatory words
must have been uttered in the heat of anger which is a mitigating circumstance
analogous to passion or obfuscation. 2
Accordingly, petitioner was sentenced "in each case to a STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8)
MONTHS imprisonment . . . . " 3 After he failed to interpose an appeal therefrom the decision.of
the RTC became final. The case was then set for execution of judgment by the MeTC which, as
a consequence, issued a warrant of arrest. Butbefore he could be arrested petitioner filed an
application for probation which the MeTC denied "in the light of the ruling of the Supreme Court
in Llamado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No, 84850, 29 June 1989, 174 SCRA 566 . . . ." 4
Forthwith he went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari which on 2 July 1992 dismissed his
petition on the following grounds
Initially, the Court notes that the petitioner has failed to comply with the
provisions of Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 of September 4, 1991. Violation
of the circular is sufficient cause for dismissal of the petition.
Secondly, the petitioner does not allege anywhere in the petition that he had
asked the respondent court to reconsider its above order; in fact, he had failed to
give the court an.opportunity to correct itself if it had, in fact, committed any error
on the matter. He is, however, required to move for reconsideration of the
questioned order before filing a petition for certiorari (Sy It v. Tiangco, 4 SCRA
436). This failure is fatal to his cause. It is a ground for dismissal of his petition
(Santos v. Vda. de Cerdenola, 5 SCRA 823; Acquiao v. Estenso, 14 SCRA
18; Del Pilar Transit, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 31-SCRA 372).
Thirdly, it is obvious that respondent court did not commit any capricious,
arbitrary, despotic or whimsical exercise of power in denying the petitioner's
application for probation . . . .
Fourthly, the petition for probation was filed by the petitioner out of time . . . .
Fifthly, the Court notes that Section 4 of PD 968 allows the trial court to grant probation after
conviction, upon an application by the defendant within the period of appeal, upon terms and
conditions and period appropriate to each case, but expressly rules out probation where an
appeal has been taken . . . . 5
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
In the present recourse, petitioner squirms out of each ground and seeks this Court's
compassion in dispensing with the minor technicalities which may militate against his petition as
he now argues before us that he has not yet lost his right to avail of probation notwithstanding
his appeal from the MeTC to the RTC since "[t]he reason for his appeal was precisely to enable
him to avail himself of the benefits of the Probation Law because the original Decision of the
(Metropolitan) Trial Court was such that he would not then be entitled to probation." 6 He
contends that "he appealed from the judgment of the trial court precisely for the purpose of
reducing the penalties imposed upon him by the said court to enable him to qualify for
probation." 7
The central issue therefore is whether petitioneris still qualified to avail of probation even after
appealing his conviction to the RTC which affirmed the MeTC except with regard to the duration
of the penalties imposed.
Petitioner is no longer eligible for probation.
First. Probation is a mere privilege, not a right. 8 Its benefits cannot extend to those not
expressly included. Probation is not a right of an accused, but rather an act of grace and
clemency or immunity conferred by the state which may be granted by the court to a seemingly
deserving defendant who thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by law for
the offense of which he stands convicted. 9 It is a special prerogative granted by law to a person
or group of persons not enjoyed by others or by all. Accordingly, the grant of probation rests
solely upon the discretion of the court which is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of
organized society, and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused. 10 The Probation Law
should not therefore be permitted to divest the state or its government of any of the latter's
prerogatives, rights or remedies, unless the intention of the legislature to this end is clearly
expressed, and no person should benefit from the terms of the law who is not clearly within
them.
Neither Sec. 4 of the Probation Law, as amended, which clearly mandates that "no application
for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the
judgment of conviction," nor Llamado v. Court of Appeals 11 which interprets the quoted
provision, offers any ambiguity or qualification. As such, the application of the law should not be
subjected to any to suit the case of petitioner. While the proposition that an appeal should not
bar the accused from applying for probation if the appealis solely to reduce the penalty to within
the probationable limit may be equitable, we are not yet prepared to accept this interpretation
under existing law and jurisprudence. Accordingly, we quote Mr. Justice Feliciano speaking for
the Court en banc in Llamado v. Court of Appeals
. . . we note at the outset that Probation Law is not a penal statute. We, however,
understand petitioner's argument to be really that any statutory language that
appears to favor the accused in acriminal case should be given.a "liberal
interpretation." Courts . . . have no authority to invoke "liberal interpretation" or
"the spirit of the law" where the words of the statute themselves, andas
illuminated by the history of that statute, leave no room for doubt or
interpretation. We do not believe that "the spirit ofthe law" may legitimately be
invoked to set at naught words which have a clear and definite meaning imparted
to them by our procedural law. The "true legislative intent" must obviously be
given effect by judges and all others who are charged with the application and
implementation of a statute. It is absolutely essential to bear in mind, however,
that the spirit of the law and the intent that is to be given effect are derived from
the words actually used by the law-maker, and not from some external, mystical
or metajuridical source independent of and transcending the words of the
legislature.
The Court is not here to be understood as giving a "strict interpretation" rather
than a "liberal" one to Section 4 of the Probation Law of 1976 as amended by
P.D. No. 1990. "Strict" and "liberal" are adjectives which too frequently impede a
disciplined and principled search for the meaning which the law-making authority
projected when it promulgated the language which we must apply. That meaning
is clearly visible in the text of Section 4, as plain and unmistakable as the nose
on a man's face. The Courtis simplyreading Section 4 as it is in fact written.
There is no need for the involved process of construction that petitioner invites us
to engage in, a process made necessary only because petitioner rejects the
conclusion or meaning which shines through the words of the statute. The first
duty of the judge is to take and apply a statute as he finds it, not as he would
likeit to be. Otherwise, as this Court in Yangco v. Court of First Instance warned,
confusion and uncertainty will surely follow, making, we might add, stability and
continuity in the law much more difficult to achieve:
. . . [w]here language is plain, subtle refinements which tinge
words as to give them the color of a particular judicial theory are
not only unnecessary but decidedly harmful. That which has
caused so much confusion in the law, which has made it so
difficult for the public to understand and know what the law is with
respect to a given matter, is in considerable measure the
unwarranted interference by judicial tribunals with the English
language as found in statutes and contracts, cutting the words
here and inserting them there, making them fit personal ideas of
what the legislature ought to have done or what parties should
have agreed upon, giving them meanings which they do not
ordinarily have cutting, trimming, fitting, changing and coloring
until lawyers themselves are unable to advise their clients as to
the meaning of a given statute or contract until it has been
submitted to some court for its interpretation and construction.
The point in this warning may be expected to become sharper as our people's
grasp of English is steadily attenuated. 12
Therefore, that an appeal should notbar the accused from applying for probation if the appeal is
taken solely to reduce the penalty is simply contrary to the clear and express mandate of Sec, 4
of the Probation Law, as amended, which opens with a negativeclause, "no application for
probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the
judgment of conviction." In Bersabal v. Salvador, 13 we said
By its very language, the Rule is mandatory. Under the rule of statutory
construction. negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while
those in the affirmative are merely directory. . . . the use of the term "shall" further
emphasizes its mandatory character and means that it is imperative, operating to
impose a duty which may be enforced.
And where the law does not distinguish the courts should not distinguish; where the law does
not make exception the court should not except.
Second. At the outset, the penalties imposed by the MeTC were already probationable. Hence,
there was no need to appeal if only to reduce the penalties to within the probationable period.
Multiple prison terms imposed against an accused found guilty of several offenses in one
decision are not, and should not be, added up. And, the sum of the multiple prison terms
imposed against an applicant should not be determinative of his eligibility for, nay his
disqualification from, probation. The multiple prison terms are distinct from each other, and if
none of the terms exceeds the limit set out in the Probation Law,i.e., not more than six (6) years,
then he is entitled to probation, unless he is otherwise specifically disqualified. The number of
offenses is immaterial as long as all the penalties imposed, taken separately, are within the
probationable period. For, Sec. 9, par. (a), P.D. 968, as amended, uses the
word maximum not total when it says that "[t]he benefits of this Decree shall not be extended to
those . . . . sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years."
Evidently, the law does not intend to sum up the penalties imposed but to take each penalty
separately and distinctly with the others. Consequently, even if petitioner was supposed to have
served his prison term of one (1) year and one (1) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months
of prision correccional sixteen (16) times as he was sentenced to serve the prison term for
"each crime committed on each date of each case, as alleged in the information(s)," and in each
of the four (4) informations, he was charged with.having defamed the four (4) private
complainants on four (4) different, separate days, he was stilleligible for probation, as each
prison term imposed on petitioner was probationable.
Fixing the cut-off point at a maximum term of six (6) years imprisonment for probation is based
on the assumption that those sentenced to higher penalties pose too great a risk to society, not
just because of their demonstrated capability for serious wrong doing but because of the gravity
and serious consequences of the offense they might further commit. 14 The Probation Law, as
amended, disqualifies only those who have been convicted of grave felonies as defined in Art. 9
in relation to Art. 25 of The Revised Penal Code, 15 and not necessarily those who have been
convicted of multiple offenses in a single proceeding who are deemed to be less perverse.
Hence, the basis of the disqualification is principally the gravity of the offense committed and the
concomitant degree of penalty imposed. Those sentenced to a maximum term not exceeding six
(6) years are not generally considered callous, hard core criminals, and thus may avail of
probation.
To demonstrate the point, let ustake for instance one who is convicted in a single decision of,
say, thirteen (13) counts of grave oral defamation (for having defamed thirteen [13] individuals in
one outburst) and sentenced to atotal prison term of thirteen (13) years, and another who has
been found guilty of mutilation and sentenced to six (6) years and one (l) day of prision
mayor minimum as minimum to twelve (l2) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal minimum as maximuin. Obviously, the latter offender is more perverse and is
disqualified from availing of probation.
Petitioner thus proceeds on an erroneous assumption that under the MeTC Decision he could
not have availed of the benefits of probation. Since he could have, although he did not, his
appeal now precludes him from applying for probation.
And, even if we go along with the premise of petitioner, however erroneous it may be, that the
penalties imposed against him should be summed up, still he would not have qualified under the
Decision rendered by the RTC since if the "STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS
imprisonment" imposed by the RTC is multiplied sixteen (16) times, the total imposable penalty
would be ten (10) years and eight (8) months, which is still way beyond the limit of not more
than six (6) years provided for in the Probation Law, as amended. To illustrate: 8 months
multiplied by 16 cases = 128 months; 128 months divided by 12 months (in a year) = 10 years
and 8 months, hence, following his argument, petitioner cannot still be eligible for probation as
the total of his penalties exceeds six (6) years.
The assertion that the Decision of the RTC should be multiplied only four (4) times since there
are only four (4) Informations thereby allowing petitioner to qualify for probation, instead of
sixteen (16) times, is quite difficult to understand. The penalties imposed by the MeTC cannot
be any clearer "one (1) year and one (1) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision
correccional, in each crime committed on each date of each case, as alleged in the
information(s). "Hence, petitioner should suffer the imposed penalties sixteen (16) times. On the
other hand, the RTC affirmed, the judgment of conviction and merely reduced the duration of
each penalty imposed by the MeTC "in each case to a STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8)
MONTHS imprisonment" on account of a mitigating circumstance for each case, count or
incident of grave oral defamationThere is no valid reason therefore why the penalties imposed
by the RTC should be multiplied only four (4) times, and not sixteen (16) times, considering that
the RTC merely affirmed the MeTC as regards the culpability of petitioner in each of the sixteen
(16) cases and reducing only the duration of the penalties imposed therein. Thus
Premises considered, the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court is
AFFIRMED with modification, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused Pablo C. Francisco GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt in each of the above entitled cases and appreciating in
his favor the mitigating circumstance which is analogous to passion or
obfuscation, the Court hereby sentences the said accused in each case to a
straight penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS imprisonment, with the accessory
penalties prescribed by law; and to pay the costs. 16
Nowhere in the RTC Decision is it stated or even hinted at that the accused was acquitted or
absolved in any of the four (4) counts under each of the four (4) Informatfons, or that any part of
thejudgment of conviction was reversed, or that any of the cases, counts or incidents was
dismissed. Otherwise, we will have to account for the twelve (12) other penalties imposed by the
MeTC. Can we? What is clear is that the judgment of conviction rendered by the was affirmed
with the sole modification on the duration of the penalties.
In fine, considering that the multiple prison terms should not be summed up but taken
separately as the totality of all the penalties is not the test, petitioner should have immediately
filed an application for probation as he was already qualified after being convicted by the MeTC,
if indeed thereafter he felt humbled, was ready to unconditionally accept the verdict of the court
and admit his liability. Consequently, in appealing the Decision of the MeTC to the RTC,
petitioner lost his right to probation. For, plainly, the law considers appeal and probation
mutually exclusive remedies. 17
Third. Petitioner appealed to the RTC not to reduce or even correct the penalties imposed by
the MeTC, but to assert his innocence. Nothing more. The cold fact is that petitioner appealed
his conviction to the RTC not for the sole purpose of reducing his penalties to make him eligible
for probation since he was already qualified under the MeTC Decision but rather to insist
on his innocence. The appeal record is wanting of any other purpose. Thus, in his Memorandum
before the RTC, he raised only three (3) statements of error purportedly committed by the MeTC
all aimed at his acquittal: (a) in finding that the guilt of the accused has been established
because of his positive identification by the witness for the prosecution; (b) in giving full faith and
credence to the bare statements of the private complainants despite the absence of
corroborating testimonies; and, (c)in not acquitting him in all the cases,"18 Consequently,
petitioner insisted that the trial court committed an error in relying on his positive identification
considering that private complainants could not have missed identifying him who was their
President and General Manager with whom they worked for a good number of years. Petitioner
further argued that although the alleged defamatory words were uttered in the presence of other
persons, mostly private complainants, co-employees and clients, not one of them was
presented as a witness. Hence, according to petitioner, the trial court could not have convicted
him on the basis of the uncorroborative testimony of private complainants. 19
Certainly, the protestations of petitioner connote profession of guiltlessness, if not complete
innocence, and do not simply put in issue the propriety of the penalties imposed. For sure, the
accused never manifested that he was appealing only for the purpose of correcting a wrong
penalty to reduce it to within the probationable range. Hence, upon interposing an appeal,
more so after asserting his innocence therein, petitioner should be precluded from seeking
probation. By perfecting his appeal, petitioner ipso facto relinquished his alternative remedy of
availing of the Probation Law the purpose of which is simply to prevent speculation or
opportunism on the part of an accused who although already eligible does not at once apply for
probation, but doing so only after failing in his appeal.
The fact that petitioner did not elevate the affirmance of his conviction by the RTC to the Court
of Appeals does not necessarily mean that his appeal to the RTC was solely to reduce his
penalties. Conversely, he was afraid that the Court of Appeals would increase his penalties,
which could be worse for him. Besides, the RTC Decision had already become final and
executory because of the negligence, according to him, of his former counsel who failed to seek
possible remedies within the period allowed by law.
Perhaps it should be mentioned that at the outset petitioner, in accordance with Sec 3, par. (e),
Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, 20 should have moved to quash as each of the four (4)
Informations filed against him charged four (4) separate crimes of grave oral defamation,
committed on four (4) separate days. His failure to do so however may now be deemed a waiver
under Sec. 8 of the same Rule 21 and he can be validly convicted, as in the instant case, of as
many crimes charged in the Information.
Fourth. The application for probation was filed way beyond the period allowed by law. This is
vital way beyond the period allowed by law and crucial. From the records it is clear that the
application for probation was filed "only after a warrant for the arrest of petitioner had been
issued . . . (and) almost two months after (his) receipt of the Decision"22 of the RTC. This is a
significant fact which militates against the instant petition. We quote with affirmance the wellwritten, albeit assailed, ponencia of now Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals Nathanael P.
De Pano, Jr., on the specific issue
. . . the petition for probation was filed by the petitioner out of time. The law in
point, Section 4 of P.D. 968, as amended, provides thus:
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this
Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and
sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant
within the period for perfecting an appeal. . . . place the defendant
on probation . . . .
Going to the extreme, and assuming that an application for probation from one
who had appealed the trial court's judgment is allowed by law, the petitioner's
plea for probation was filed out of time. In the petition is a clear statement that
the petitioner was up for execution of judgment before he filed his application for
probation. P.D. No. 968 says that the application for probation must be filed
"within the period for perfecting an appeal;" but in this case, such period for
appeal had passed, meaning to say that the Regional Trial Court's decision had
attained finality, and no appeal therefrom was possible under the law. Even
granting that an appeal from the appellate court's judgment is contemplated by
P.D. 968, in addition to the judgment rendered by the trial court, that appellate
judgment had become final and was, in fact, up for actual execution before the
application for probation was attempted by the petitioner. The petitioner did not
file his application for probation before the finality of the said judgment; therefore,
the petitioner's attempt at probation was filed too late.
Our minds cannot simply rest easy on. the proposition that an application for probation may yet
be granted even if it was filed only after judgment has become final, the conviction already set
for execution and a warrant of arrest issued for service of sentence.
The argument that petitioner had to await the remand of the case to the MeTC, which
necessarily must be after the decision of the RTC had become final, for him to file the
application for probation with the trial court, is to stretch the law beyond comprehension. The
law, simply, does not allow probation after an appeal has been perfected.
Accordingly, considering that prevailing jurisprudence treats appeal and probation as mutually
exclusive remedies, and petitioner appealed from his conviction by the MeTC although the
imposed penalties were already probationable, and in his appeal, he asserted only his
innocence and did not even raise the issue of the propriety of the penalties imposed on him, and
finally, he filed an application for probation outside the period for perfecting an appeal granting
he was otherwise eligible for probation, the instant petition for review should be as it is hereby
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
MENDOZA, J., dissenting:

I vote to reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals in this case.
I.
The principal basis for the affirmance of the decision of the Court of Appeals denying probation
is the fact that petitioner had appealed his sentence before filing his application for probation.
Reliance is placed on the literal application of 4 of the Probation Law of 1976 ,as amended,
which provides as follows:
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial
court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon
application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend
the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for such
period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That
no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has
perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment
or a fine only probation shall be filed with the trial court application shall be
deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.
Thus, under 4 the accused is given the choice of appealing his sentence or applying for
probation. If he appeals, he cannot later apply for probation. If he opts for probation, he can not
appeal. Implicit in the choice, however, is that the accused is not disqualified for probation under
any of the cases mentioned in 9, to wit:
Sec. 9. Disqualified Offenders. The benefits of this Decree shall not be
extended to those:
(a) sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years;
(b) convicted of subversion or any crime against the national security or the
public order;
(c) who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished
by imprisonment of not less than one month and one day and/or a fine of not less
than Two Hundred Pesos.
(d) who have been once on probation under the provisions of this Decree; and
(e) who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of
this Decree became applicable pursuant to Section 33 hereof.
Consequently, if under the sentence given to him an accused is not qualified for probation, as
when the penalty imposed on him by the court singly or in their totality exceeds six (6) years but
on appeal the sentence is modified so that he becomes qualified, I believe that the accused
should not be denied the benefit of probation.
Before its amendment by P.D. No. 1990, the law allowed even encouraged speculation on
the outcome of appeals by permitting the accused to apply for probation after he had appealed
and failed to obtain an acquittal. 1 It was to change this that 4 was amended by P.D. No. 1990
by expressly providing that "no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the
defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction." For an accused, despite
the fact that he is eligible for probation, may be tempted to appeal in the hope of obtaining an
acquittal if he knows he can any way apply for probation in the event his conviction is affirmed. 2
There is, however, nothing in the amendatory Decree to suggest that in limiting the accused to
the choice of either appealing from the decision of the trial court or applying for probation, the
purpose is to deny him the right to probation in cases like the one at bar where he becomes
eligible for probation only because on appeal his sentence is reduced. The purpose of the
amendment, it bears repeating, is simply to prevent speculation or opportunism on the part of an
accused who; although eligible for probation, does not at once apply for probation, doing so only
after failing in his appeal.
In the case at bar, it cannot be said that in appealing the decision MeTC petitioner was
principally motivated by a desire to be acquitted. While acquittal might have been an alluring
prospect for him, what is clear is that he had a reason for appealing because under the
sentence given to him he was disqualified to apply for probation. The MeTC had originally
sentenced him to 1 year and 1 day to 1 year and 8 months of prision correccional for "each
crime committed on each date of each case, as alleged in the information[s]." This meant, as
the majority opinion points out, that petitioner had to suffer the prison term of 1 year and 1 day
to 1 year and 8 months sixteen times, since he was found guilty of four crimes of grave oral
defamation in each of four cases. The totality of the penalties imposed on petitioner (26 years
and 8 months) thus exceeded the limit of six (6) years of imprisonment allowed by 9(a) and
disqualified him for probation. It was only after this penalty was reduced on appeal to a straight
penalty of eight months imprisonment in each case or to a total term of 2 years and 8 months in
the four cases that petitioner became eligible for probation. Then he did not appeal further
although he could have done so.
The Court of Appeals, while acknowledging that "there may be some space not covered by the
present law on probation . . . where in its original state, the petitioner was disqualified from
applying for probation under Sec. 9 of the Decree, becoming eligible for probation only under
the terms of the judgment on appeal," nevertheless felt bound by the letter of 4: "No
application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the
appeal from the judgment of conviction." The majority opinion, affirming the ruling, states that to
allow probation in this case would be to go against the "clear and express mandate of sec. 4 of
the Probation Law, as amended." (p. 9)
To regard probation, however, as a mere privilege, to be given to the accused only where it
clearly appears he comes within its letter is to disregard the teaching in many cases that the
Probation Law should be applied in favor of the accused not because it is a criminal law it is
not but to achieve its beneficent purpose. (Santos To v. Pao, 120 SCRA 8, 14 (1983)). The
niggardly application of the law would defeat its purpose to "help the probationer develop into a
law-abiding and self-respecting individual" (Baclayon v. Mutia, 129 SCRA 148, 149 (1984), per
Teehankee, J.) or "afford [him] a chance to reform and rehabilitate himself without the stigma of
a prison record, to save government funds that may otherwise be spent for his food and
maintenance while incarcerated, and to decongest the jails of the country." (Del Rosario v.
Rosero, 126 SCRA 228, 232 (1983), per Makasiar, J.)
The approach followed by the Court in Atienza v. Court of Appeals, 140 SCRA 391, 395 (1985)
instead commends itself to me:
Regarding this, it suffices to state that the Probation Law was never intended to
limit the right of an accused person to present all relevant evidence he can avail
of in order to secure a verdict of acquittal or a reduction of the penalty. Neither
does the law require a plea of guilty on the part of the accused to enable him to
avail of the benefits of probation. A contrary view would certainly negate the
constitutional right of an accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved.
As already stated, petitioner did not appeal primarily to seek acquittal. Proof of this is that after
the penalty imposed on him by the MeTC had been reduced by the RTC so that he thereby
became qualified for probation, he did not appeal further. The majority says that this was
because he was afraid that if he did the penalty could be increased. That possibility, however,
was also there when he appealed from the MeTC to the RTC. For by appealing the sentence of
the MeTC, petitioner took as much risk that the penalty would be raised as the chance that he
would he acquitted.
It is true that in appealing the sentence of the MeTC petitioner professed his innocence and not
simply questioned the propriety of his sentence, but no more so does an accused who, upon
being arraigned, pleads, "Not Guilty." And yet the latter cannot be denied probation if he is
otherwise eligible for probation.
It is argued that there is a difference because an accused who pleads "not guilty'' in the
beginning, later acknowledges his guilt and shows contrition after he is found guilty. So does an
accused who appeals a sentence because under it he is not qualified for probation, but after the
penalty is reduced, instead of appealing further, accepts the new sentence and applies for
probation.
This case is thus distinguishable from Llamado v. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 566 (1989), in
which it was held that because the petitioner had appealed his sentence, he could not
subsequently apply for probation. For, unlike petitioner in the case at bar, the accused in that
case could have applied for probation as his original sentence of one year of prision
correccional did not disqualify him for probation. That case fell squarely within the ambit of the
prohibition in 4 that one who applies for probation must not "have perfected an appeal from
the judgment of conviction."
II.
It is contended that petitioner did not have to appeal because under the original sentence meted
out to him he was not disqualified for probation. The issue here is whether the multiple prison
terms imposed on petitioner are to be considered singly or in their totality for the purpose of
9(a) which disqualifies from probation those "sentenced to serve a maximum term of
imprisonment of more than six years."
I submit that they should be taken in their totality. As the sentence originally imposed on
petitioner was for "one (1) year and one (1) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision
correccional in each crime committed on each date of each case" and as there are four offenses
of grave oral defamation against petitioner in each of the four cases, the total prison term which
he would have to serve was 26 years and 8 months. This is clearly beyond the probationable
maximum allowed by law.
It is said, however, that even if the totality of the prison terms is the test, the modified sentence
imposed by the RTC would not qualify the petitioner for probation because he has to suffer
imprisonment of eight months sixteen times. That is not so. The RTC only "sentence[d] the said
accused in each case to STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS imprisonment." This means
eight (8) months times four (4), since there are four cases, or 32 months or 2 years and 8
months.
The policy of the law indeed appears to be to treat as only one multiple sentences imposed in
cases which are jointly tried and decided. For example, 9(c) disqualifies from probation
persons "who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by
imprisonment of not less than one month and one day and/or a fine of not less than Two
Hundred Pesos. It was held in Rura v. Lopena, 137 SCRA 121 (1985) that the accused, who
had been found guilty of estafa in five criminal cases, was qualified for probation because
although the crimes had been committed on different dates he was found guilty of each crime
on the same day. As this Court noted, "Rura was sentenced to a total prison term of seventeen
(l7) months and twenty-five (25) days. In each criminal case the sentence was three (3) months
and fifteen (15) days.
That the duration of a convict's sentence is determined by considering the totality of several
penalties for different offenses committed is also implicit in the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code on the accumulation of penalties. (See e.g., arts. 48 and 70)
It is said that the basis of disqualification under 9 is the gravity of the offense committed and
the penalty imposed. I agree. That is why I contend that a person who is convicted of multiple
grave oral defamation for which the total prison term is, say, 6 years and 8 months, is guilty of a
graver offense than another who is guilty of only offense of grave oral defamation and
sentenced to a single penalty of 1 year and 8 months. The relevant comparison is between an
accused convicted of one offense of grave oral defamation and another one convicted of
the same offense, say four or more times. The relevant comparison is not, as the majority says,
between an accused found guilty of grave oral defamation four or more times and another one
found guilty of mutilation and sentenced to an indeterminate term of 6 years and 1 day of prision
mayor to 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal.
III.
Finally, it is said that there is a more fundamental reason for denying probation in this case and
that is that petitioner applied for probation only after his case had been remanded to the MeTC
for the execution of its decision as modified. But that is because 4 provides that "an
application for probation shall be filed with the trial court." In the circumstances of this case,
petitioner had to await the remand of the case to the MeTC, which necessarily must be after the
decision of the RTC had become final.
The decision of the Court of Appeals should be REVERSED and respondent judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila should be ORDERED to GRANT petitioner's
application for probation.
VITUG, J., concurring:
While I subscribe to the observation made by Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in his dissenting
opinion that an accused, who originally is not qualified for probation because the penalty
imposed on him by a court a quo exceeds six (6) years, should not be denied that benefit of
probation if on appeal the sentence is ultimately reduced to within the prescribed limit, I am
unable, however, to second the other proposition that multiple prison terms imposed by a court
should be taken in their totality for purposes of Section 9 (a), P.D. No. 968. In this respect, I
concur with Mr. Justice Josue Bellosillo in his ponencia that in determining the eligibility or
disqualification of an applicant for probation charged with, and sentenced to serve multiple
prison terms for, several offenses, "the number of offenses is immaterial as long as all the
penalties imposed, taken separately, are within the probationable period." The use of the
word maximum instead of the word total in Section 9, paragraph (a) of P.D. 968, as amended,
should be enough to reveal that such has been the legislative intent.
Thus, I still must vote for the denial of the petition.
Separate Opinions
MENDOZA, J., dissenting:
I vote to reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals in this case.
I.
The principal basis for the affirmance of the decision of the Court of Appeals denying probation
is the fact that petitioner had appealed his sentence before filing his application for probation.
Reliance is placed on the literal application of 4 of the Probation Law of 1976 ,as amended,
which provides as follows:
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial
court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon
application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend
the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for such
period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That
no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has
perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment
or a fine only probation shall be filed with the trial court application shall be
deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.
Thus, under 4 the accused is given the choice of appealing his sentence or applying for
probation. If he appeals, he cannot later apply for probation. If he opts for probation, he can not
appeal. Implicit in the choice, however, is that the accused is not disqualified for probation under
any of the cases mentioned in 9, to wit:
Sec. 9. Disqualified Offenders. The benefits of this Decree shall not be
extended to those:
(a) sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years;
(b) convicted of subversion or any crime against the national security or the
public order;
(c) who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished
by imprisonment of not less than one month and one day and/or a fine of not less
than Two Hundred Pesos.
(d) who have been once on probation under the provisions of this Decree; and
(e) who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of
this Decree became applicable pursuant to Section 33 hereof.
Consequently, if under the sentence given to him an accused is not qualified for probation, as
when the penalty imposed on him by the court singly or in their totality exceeds six (6) years but
on appeal the sentence is modified so that he becomes qualified, I believe that the accused
should not be denied the benefit of probation.
Before its amendment by P.D. No. 1990, the law allowed even encouraged speculation on
the outcome of appeals by permitting the accused to apply for probation after he had appealed
and failed to obtain an acquittal. 1 It was to change this that 4 was amended by P.D. No. 1990
by expressly providing that "no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the
defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction." For an accused, despite
the fact that he is eligible for probation, may be tempted to appeal in the hope of obtaining an
acquittal if he knows he can any way apply for probation in the event his conviction is affirmed. 2
There is, however, nothing in the amendatory Decree to suggest that in limiting the accused to
the choice of either appealing from the decision of the trial court or applying for probation, the
purpose is to deny him the right to probation in cases like the one at bar where he becomes
eligible for probation only because on appeal his sentence is reduced. The purpose of the
amendment, it bears repeating, is simply to prevent speculation or opportunism on the part of an
accused who; although eligible for probation, does not at once apply for probation, doing so only
after failing in his appeal.
In the case at bar, it cannot be said that in appealing the decision MeTC petitioner was
principally motivated by a desire to be acquitted. While acquittal might have been an alluring
prospect for him, what is clear is that he had a reason for appealing because under the
sentence given to him he was disqualified to apply for probation. The MeTC had originally
sentenced him to 1 year and 1 day to 1 year and 8 months of prision correccional for "each
crime committed on each date of each case, as alleged in the information[s]." This meant, as
the majority opinion points out, that petitioner had to suffer the prison term of 1 year and 1 day
to 1 year and 8 months sixteen times, since he was found guilty of four crimes of grave oral
defamation in each of four cases. The totality of the penalties imposed on petitioner (26 years
and 8 months) thus exceeded the limit of six (6) years of imprisonment allowed by 9(a) and
disqualified him for probation. It was only after this penalty was reduced on appeal to a straight
penalty of eight months imprisonment in each case or to a total term of 2 years and 8 months in
the four cases that petitioner became eligible for probation. Then he did not appeal further
although he could have done so.
The Court of Appeals, while acknowledging that "there may be some space not covered by the
present law on probation . . . where in its original state, the petitioner was disqualified from
applying for probation under Sec. 9 of the Decree, becoming eligible for probation only under
the terms of the judgment on appeal," nevertheless felt bound by the letter of 4: "No
application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the
appeal from the judgment of conviction." The majority opinion, affirming the ruling, states that to
allow probation in this case would be to go against the "clear and express mandate of sec. 4 of
the Probation Law, as amended." (p. 9)
To regard probation, however, as a mere privilege, to be given to the accused only where it
clearly appears he comes within its letter is to disregard the teaching in many cases that the
Probation Law should be applied in favor of the accused not because it is a criminal law it is
not but to achieve its beneficent purpose. (Santos To v. Pao, 120 SCRA 8, 14 (1983)). The
niggardly application of the law would defeat its purpose to "help the probationer develop into a
law-abiding and self-respecting individual" (Baclayon v. Mutia, 129 SCRA 148, 149 (1984), per
Teehankee, J.) or "afford [him] a chance to reform and rehabilitate himself without the stigma of
a prison record, to save government funds that may otherwise be spent for his food and
maintenance while incarcerated, and to decongest the jails of the country." (Del Rosario v.
Rosero, 126 SCRA 228, 232 (1983), per Makasiar, J.)
The approach followed by the Court in Atienza v. Court of Appeals, 140 SCRA 391, 395 (1985)
instead commends itself to me:
Regarding this, it suffices to state that the Probation Law was never intended to
limit the right of an accused person to present all relevant evidence he can avail
of in order to secure a verdict of acquittal or a reduction of the penalty. Neither
does the law require a plea of guilty on the part of the accused to enable him to
avail of the benefits of probation. A contrary view would certainly negate the
constitutional right of an accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved.
As already stated, petitioner did not appeal primarily to seek acquittal. Proof of this is that after
the penalty imposed on him by the MeTC had been reduced by the RTC so that he thereby
became qualified for probation, he did not appeal further. The majority says that this was
because he was afraid that if he did the penalty could be increased. That possibility, however,
was also there when he appealed from the MeTC to the RTC. For by appealing the sentence of
the MeTC, petitioner took as much risk that the penalty would be raised as the chance that he
would he acquitted.
It is true that in appealing the sentence of the MeTC petitioner professed his innocence and not
simply questioned the propriety of his sentence, but no more so does an accused who, upon
being arraigned, pleads, "Not Guilty." And yet the latter cannot be denied probation if he is
otherwise eligible for probation.
It is argued that there is a difference because an accused who pleads "not guilty'' in the
beginning, later acknowledges his guilt and shows contrition after he is found guilty. So does an
accused who appeals a sentence because under it he is not qualified for probation, but after the
penalty is reduced, instead of appealing further, accepts the new sentence and applies for
probation.
This case is thus distinguishable from Llamado v. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 566 (1989), in
which it was held that because the petitioner had appealed his sentence, he could not
subsequently apply for probation. For, unlike petitioner in the case at bar, the accused in that
case could have applied for probation as his original sentence of one year of prision
correccional did not disqualify him for probation. That case fell squarely within the ambit of the
prohibition in 4 that one who applies for probation must not "have perfected an appeal from
the judgment of conviction."
II.
It is contended that petitioner did not have to appeal because under the original sentence meted
out to him he was not disqualified for probation. The issue here is whether the multiple prison
terms imposed on petitioner are to be considered singly or in their totality for the purpose of
9(a) which disqualifies from probation those "sentenced to serve a maximum term of
imprisonment of more than six years."
I submit that they should be taken in their totality. As the sentence originally imposed on
petitioner was for "one (1) year and one (1) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision
correccional in each crime committed on each date of each case" and as there are four offenses
of grave oral defamation against petitioner in each of the four cases, the total prison term which
he would have to serve was 26 years and 8 months. This is clearly beyond the probationable
maximum allowed by law.
It is said, however, that even if the totality of the prison terms is the test, the modified sentence
imposed by the RTC would not qualify the petitioner for probation because he has to suffer
imprisonment of eight months sixteen times. That is not so. The RTC only "sentence[d] the said
accused in each case to STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS imprisonment." This means
eight (8) months times four (4), since there are four cases, or 32 months or 2 years and 8
months.
The policy of the law indeed appears to be to treat as only one multiple sentences imposed in
cases which are jointly tried and decided. For example, 9(c) disqualifies from probation
persons "who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by
imprisonment of not less than one month and one day and/or a fine of not less than Two
Hundred Pesos. It was held in Rura v. Lopena, 137 SCRA 121 (1985) that the accused, who
had been found guilty of estafa in five criminal cases, was qualified for probation because
although the crimes had been committed on different dates he was found guilty of each crime
on the same day. As this Court noted, "Rura was sentenced to a total prison term of seventeen
(l7) months and twenty-five (25) days. In each criminal case the sentence was three (3) months
and fifteen (15) days.
That the duration of a convict's sentence is determined by considering the totality of several
penalties for different offenses committed is also implicit in the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code on the accumulation of penalties. (See e.g., arts. 48 and 70)
It is said that the basis of disqualification under 9 is the gravity of the offense committed and
the penalty imposed. I agree. That is why I contend that a person who is convicted of multiple
grave oral defamation for which the total prison term is, say, 6 years and 8 months, is guilty of a
graver offense than another who is guilty of only offense of grave oral defamation and
sentenced to a single penalty of 1 year and 8 months. The relevant comparison is between an
accused convicted of one offense of grave oral defamation and another one convicted of
the same offense, say four or more times. The relevant comparison is not, as the majority says,
between an accused found guilty of grave oral defamation four or more times and another one
found guilty of mutilation and sentenced to an indeterminate term of 6 years and 1 day of prision
mayor to 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal.
III.
Finally, it is said that there is a more fundamental reason for denying probation in this case and
that is that petitioner applied for probation only after his case had been remanded to the MeTC
for the execution of its decision as modified. But that is because 4 provides that "an
application for probation shall be filed with the trial court." In the circumstances of this case,
petitioner had to await the remand of the case to the MeTC, which necessarily must be after the
decision of the RTC had become final.
The decision of the Court of Appeals should be REVERSED and respondent judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila should be ORDERED to GRANT petitioner's
application for probation.
VITUG, J., concurring:
While I subscribe to the observation made by Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in his dissenting
opinion that an accused, who originally is not qualified for probation because the penalty
imposed on him by a court a quo exceeds six (6) years, should not be denied that benefit of
probation if on appeal the sentence is ultimately reduced to within the prescribed limit, I am
unable, however, to second the other proposition that multiple prison terms imposed by a court
should be taken in their totality for purposes of Section 9 (a), P.D. No. 968. In this respect, I
concur with Mr. Justice Josue Bellosillo in his ponencia that in determining the eligibility or
disqualification of an applicant for probation charged with, and sentenced to serve multiple
prison terms for, several offenses, "the number of offenses is immaterial as long as all the
penalties imposed, taken separately, are within the probationable period." The use of the
word maximum instead of the word total in Section 9, paragraph (a) of P.D. 968, as amended,
should be enough to reveal that such has been the legislative intent.
Thus, I still must vote for the denial of the petition.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 168550 August 10, 2006
URBANO M. MORENO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and NORMA L. MEJES, CHICO-NAZARIO, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
In this Petition 1 dated July 6, 2005, Urbano M. Moreno (Moreno) assails the Resolution 2 of the
Commission on Elections (Comelec) en banc dated June 1, 2005, affirming the Resolution 3 of
the Comelec First Division dated November 15, 2002 which, in turn, disqualified him from
running for the elective office of Punong Barangay of Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the
July 15, 2002 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.
The following are the undisputed facts:
Norma L. Mejes (Mejes) filed a petition to disqualify Moreno from running for Punong Barangay
on the ground that the latter was convicted by final judgment of the crime of Arbitrary Detention
and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to Two (2) Years
and Four (4) Months by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28 of Catbalogan, Samar on August
27, 1998.
Moreno filed an answer averring that the petition states no cause of action because he was
already granted probation. Allegedly, following the case of Baclayon v. Mutia, 4 the imposition of
the sentence of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties, was thereby suspended.
Moreno also argued that under Sec. 16 of the Probation Law of 1976 (Probation Law), the final
discharge of the probation shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a
result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed. The order of the
trial court dated December 18, 2000 allegedly terminated his probation and restored to him all
the civil rights he lost as a result of his conviction, including the right to vote and be voted for in
the July 15, 2002 elections.
The case was forwarded to the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Samar for
preliminary hearing. After due proceedings, the Investigating Officer recommended that Moreno
be disqualified from running for Punong Barangay.
The Comelec First Division adopted this recommendation. On motion for reconsideration filed
with the Comelec en banc, the Resolution of the First Division was affirmed. According to the
Comelec en banc, Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code provides that those sentenced by
final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1)
year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence, are disqualified from
running for any elective local position. 5 Since Moreno was released from probation on
December 20, 2000, disqualification shall commence on this date and end two (2) years thence.
The grant of probation to Moreno merely suspended the execution of his sentence but did not
affect his disqualification from running for an elective local office.
Further, the Comelec en banc held that the provisions of the Local Government Code take
precedence over the case of Baclayon v. Mutia cited by Moreno and the Probation Law because
it is a much later enactment and a special law setting forth the qualifications and
disqualifications of elective local officials.
In this petition, Moreno argues that the disqualification under the Local Government Code
applies only to those who have served their sentence and not to probationers because the latter
do not serve the adjudged sentence. The Probation Law should allegedly be read as an
exception to the Local Government Code because it is a special law which applies only to
probationers. Further, even assuming that he is disqualified, his subsequent election as Punong
Barangay allegedly constitutes an implied pardon of his previous misconduct.
In its Comment 6 dated November 18, 2005 on behalf of the Comelec, the Office of the Solicitor
General argues that this Court in Dela Torre v. Comelec 7 definitively settled a similar
controversy by ruling that conviction for an offense involving moral turpitude stands even if the
candidate was granted probation. The disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local
Government Code subsists and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of
probation.
Moreno filed a Reply to Comment 8 dated March 27, 2006, reiterating his arguments and
pointing out material differences between his case and Dela Torre v. Comelec which allegedly
warrant a conclusion favorable to him. According to Moreno, Dela Torre v. Comelec involves a
conviction for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, an offense involving moral turpitude covered by
the first part of Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code. Dela Torre, the petitioner in that case,
applied for probation nearly four (4) years after his conviction and only after appealing his
conviction, such that he could not have been eligible for probation under the law.
In contrast, Moreno alleges that he applied for and was granted probation within the period
specified therefor. He never served a day of his sentence as a result. Hence, the disqualification
under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code does not apply to him.
The resolution of the present controversy depends on the application of the phrase "within two
(2) years after serving sentence" found in Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code, which
reads:
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective
local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving
sentence; [Emphasis supplied.]
....
We should mention at this juncture that there is no need to rule on whether Arbitrary Detention,
the crime of which Moreno was convicted by final judgment, involves moral turpitude falling
under the first part of the above-quoted provision. The question of whether Arbitrary Detention is
a crime involving moral turpitude was never raised in the petition for disqualification because the
ground relied upon by Mejes, and which the Comelec used in its assailed resolutions, is his
alleged disqualification from running for a local elective office within two (2) years from his
discharge from probation after having been convicted by final judgment for an offense
punishable by Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to Two (2) Years and Four (4) Months. Besides,
a determination that the crime of Arbitrary Detention involves moral turpitude is not decisive of
this case, the crucial issue being whether Morenos sentence was in fact served.
In this sense, Dela Torre v. Comelec is not squarely applicable. Our pronouncement therein that
the grant of probation does not affect the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local
Government Code was based primarily on the finding that the crime of fencing of which
petitioner was convicted involves moral turpitude, a circumstance which does not obtain in this
case. At any rate, the phrase "within two (2) years after serving sentence" should have been
interpreted and understood to apply both to those who have been sentenced by final judgment
for an offense involving moral turpitude and to those who have been sentenced by final
judgment for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment. The placing of the
comma (,) in the provision means that the phrase modifies both parts of Sec. 40(a) of the Local
Government Code.
The Courts declaration on the effect of probation on Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code,
we should add, ought to be considered an obiter in view of the fact that Dela Torre was not even
entitled to probation because he appealed his conviction to the Regional Trial Court which,
however, affirmed his conviction. It has been held that the perfection of an appeal is a
relinquishment of the alternative remedy of availing of the Probation Law, the purpose of which
is to prevent speculation or opportunism on the part of an accused who, although already
eligible, did not at once apply for probation, but did so only after failing in his appeal. 9
Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code appears innocuous enough at first glance. The
phrase "service of sentence," understood in its general and common sense, means the
confinement of a convicted
person in a penal facility for the period adjudged by the court. 10 This seemingly clear and
unambiguous provision, however, has spawned a controversy worthy of this Courts attention
because the Comelec, in the assailed resolutions, is alleged to have broadened the coverage of
the law to include even those who did not serve a day of their sentence because they were
granted probation.
Moreno argues, quite persuasively, that he should not have been disqualified because he did
not serve the adjudged sentence having been granted probation and finally discharged by the
trial court.
In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order placing defendant on probation is not a
sentence but is rather, in effect, a suspension of the imposition of sentence. We held that the
grant of probation to petitioner suspended the imposition of the principal penalty of
imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties of suspension from public office and from the
right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right
of suffrage. We thus deleted from the order granting probation the paragraph which required
that petitioner refrain from continuing with her teaching profession.
Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the accessory penalties of suspension from public
office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage, attendant to the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period 11 imposed upon Moreno were
similarly suspended upon the grant of probation.
It appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer is not even disqualified from
running for a public office because the accessory penalty of suspension from public office is put
on hold for the duration of the probation.
Clearly, the period within which a person is under probation cannot be equated with service of
the sentence adjudged. Sec. 4 of the Probation Law specifically provides that the grant of
probation suspends the execution of the sentence. During the period of probation, 12 the
probationer does not serve the penalty imposed upon him by the court but is merely required to
comply with all the conditions prescribed in the probation order. 13
It is regrettable that the Comelec and the OSG have misapprehended the real issue in this case.
They focused on the fact that Morenos judgment of conviction attained finality upon his
application for probation instead of the question of whether his sentence had been served.
The Comelec could have correctly resolved this case by simply applying the law to the letter.
Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code unequivocally disqualifies only those who have been
sentenced by final judgment for an offense punishable by imprisonment of one (1) year or
more, within two (2) years after serving sentence.
This is as good a time as any to clarify that those who have not served their sentence by reason
of the grant of probation which, we reiterate, should not be equated with service of sentence,
should not likewise be disqualified from running for a local elective office because the two (2)year period of ineligibility under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code does not even begin
to run.
The fact that the trial court already issued an order finally discharging Moreno fortifies his
position. Sec. 16 of the Probation Law provides that "[t]he final discharge of the probationer
shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and
to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed as to the offense for which probation was
granted." Thus, when Moreno was finally discharged upon the courts finding that he has fulfilled
the terms and conditions of his probation, his case was deemed terminated and all civil rights
lost or suspended as a result of his conviction were restored to him, including the right to run for
public office.
Even assuming that there is an ambiguity in Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code which
gives room for judicial interpretation, 14 our conclusion will remain the same.
It is unfortunate that the deliberations on the Local Government Code afford us no clue as to the
intended meaning of the phrase "service of sentence," i.e., whether the legislature also meant to
disqualify those who have been granted probation. The Courts function, in the face of this
seeming dissonance, is to interpret and harmonize the Probation Law and the Local
Government Code. Interpretare et concordare legis legibus est optimus interpretandi.
Probation is not a right of an accused but a mere privilege, an act of grace and clemency or
immunity conferred by the state, which is granted to a deserving defendant who thereby
escapes the extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by law for the offense of which he was
convicted. 15 Thus, the Probation Law lays out rather stringent standards regarding who are
qualified for probation. For instance, it provides that the benefits of probation shall not be
extended to those sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six (6)
years; convicted of any offense against the security of the State; those who have previously
been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not less than one
(1) month and one (1) day and/or a fine of not less than P200.00; those who have been once on
probation; and those who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of
the Probation Law became applicable. 16
It is important to note that the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code
covers offenses punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, a penalty which also
covers probationable offenses. In spite of this, the provision does not specifically disqualify
probationers from running for a local elective office. This omission is significant because it offers
a glimpse into the legislative intent to treat probationers as a distinct class of offenders not
covered by the disqualification.
Further, it should be mentioned that the present Local Government Code was enacted in 1991,
some seven (7) years after Baclayon v. Mutia was decided. When the legislature approved the
enumerated disqualifications under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code, it is presumed to
have knowledge of our ruling in Baclayon v. Mutia on the effect of probation on the
disqualification from holding public office. That it chose not to include probationers within the
purview of the provision is a clear expression of the legislative will not to disqualify probationers.
On this score, we agree with Moreno that the Probation Law should be construed as an
exception to the Local Government Code. While the Local Government Code is a later law
which sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of local elective officials, the Probation
Law is a special legislation which applies only to probationers. It is a canon of statutory
construction that a later statute, general in its terms and not expressly repealing a prior special
statute, will ordinarily not affect the special provisions of such earlier statute. 17
In construing Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code in a way that broadens the scope of the
disqualification to include Moreno, the Comelec committed an egregious error which we here
correct. We rule that Moreno was not disqualified to run for Punong Barangay of Barangay
Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the July 15, 2002 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang
Kabataan Elections.
Finally, we note that Moreno was the incumbent Punong Barangay at the time of his conviction
of the crime of Arbitrary Detention. He claims to have obtained a fresh mandate from the people
of Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the July 15, 2002 elections. This situation calls to mind
the poignant words of Mr. Justice now Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban in Frivaldo v.
Comelec 18 where he said that "it would be far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty than
to be right in complex but little understood legalisms."
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Commission on Elections en
banc dated June 1, 2005 and the Resolution of its First Division dated November 15, 2002, as
well as all other actions and orders issued pursuant thereto, are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
The Commission on Elections is directed to proceed in accordance with this Decision. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C AT I O N

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 90828
September 5, 2000
MELVIN COLINARES and LORDINO VELOSO, petitioners,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and THE PEOPLE OF THE
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
In 1979 Melvin Colinares and Lordino Veloso (hereafter Petitioners) were contracted for a
consideration of P40,000 by the Carmelite Sisters of Cagayan de Oro City to renovate the
latters convent at Camaman-an, Cagayan de Oro City.
On 30 October 1979, Petitioners obtained 5,376 SF Solatone acoustical board 2x4x", 300 SF
tanguile wood tiles 12"x12", 260 SF Marcelo economy tiles and 2 gallons UMYLIN cement
adhesive from CM Builders Centre for the construction project.1 The following day, 31 October
1979, Petitioners applied for a commercial letter of credit2 with the Philippine Banking
Corporation, Cagayan de Oro City branch (hereafter PBC) in favor of CM Builders Centre. PBC
approved the letter of credit3 for P22,389.80 to cover the full invoice value of the goods.
Petitioners signed a pro-forma trust receipt4 as security. The loan was due on 29 January 1980.
On 31 October 1979, PBC debited P6,720 from Petitioners marginal deposit as partial payment
of the loan.5
On 7 May 1980, PBC wrote6 to Petitioners demanding that the amount be paid within seven
days from notice. Instead of complying with PBCs demand, Veloso confessed that they
lost P19,195.83 in the Carmelite Monastery Project and requested for a grace period of until 15
June 1980 to settle the account.7
PBC sent a new demand letter8 to Petitioners on 16 October 1980 and informed them that their
outstanding balance as of 17 November 1979 was P20,824.40 exclusive of attorneys fees of
25%.9
On 2 December 1980, Petitioners proposed10 that the terms of payment of the loan be modified
as follows: P2,000 on or before 3 December 1980, and P1,000 per month starting 31 January
1980 until the account is fully paid. Pending approval of the proposal, Petitioners paid P1,000 to
PBC on 4 December 1980,11 and thereafter P500 on 11 February 1981,12 16 March 1981,13 and
20 April 1981.14 Concurrently with the separate demand for attorneys fees by PBCs legal
counsel, PBC continued to demand payment of the balance.15
On 14 January 1983, Petitioners were charged with the violation of P.D. No. 115 (Trust Receipts
Law) in relation to Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code in an Information which was filed with
Branch 18, Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City. The accusatory portion of the
Information reads:
That on or about October 31, 1979, in the City of Cagayan de Oro, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused entered into a trust receipt
agreement with the Philippine Banking Corporation at Cagayan de Oro City wherein the
accused, as entrustee, received from the entruster the following goods to wit:
Solatone Acoustical board
Tanguile Wood Tiles
Marcelo Cement Tiles
Umylin Cement Adhesive
with a total value of P22,389.80, with the obligation on the part of the accused-entrustee to hold
the aforesaid items in trust for the entruster and/or to sell on cash basis or otherwise dispose of
the said items and to turn over to the entruster the proceeds of the sale of said goods or if there
be no sale to return said items to the entruster on or before January 29, 1980 but that the said
accused after receipt of the goods, with intent to defraud and cause damage to the entruster,
conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously fail and refuse to remit the proceeds of the sale of the goods to the
entruster despite repeated demands but instead converted, misappropriated and misapplied the
proceeds to their own personal use, benefit and gain, to the damage and prejudice of the
Philippine Banking Corporation, in the aforesaid sum of P22,389.80, Philippine Currency.
Contrary to PD 115 in relation to Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.16
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 1390.
During trial, petitioner Veloso insisted that the transaction was a "clean loan" as per verbal
guarantee of Cayo Garcia Tuiza, PBCs former manager. He and petitioner Colinares signed the
documents without reading the fine print, only learning of the trust receipt implication much later.
When he brought this to the attention of PBC, Mr. Tuiza assured him that the trust receipt was a
mere formality.17
On 7 July 1986, the trial court promulgated its decision18 convicting Petitioners of estafa for
violating P.D. No. 115 in relation to Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code and sentencing each
of them to suffer imprisonment of two years and one day of prision correccional as minimum to
six years and one day of prision mayor as maximum, and to solidarily indemnify PBC the
amount of P20,824.44, with legal interest from 29 January 1980, 12 % penalty charge per
annum, 25% of the sums due as attorneys fees, and costs.
The trial court considered the transaction between PBC and Petitioners as a trust receipt
transaction under Section 4, P.D. No. 115. It considered Petitioners use of the goods in their
Carmelite monastery project an act of "disposing" as contemplated under Section 13, P.D. No.
115, and treated the charge invoice19 for goods issued by CM Builders Centre as a "document"
within the meaning of Section 3 thereof. It concluded that the failure of Petitioners to turn over
the amount they owed to PBC constituted estafa.
Petitioners appealed from the judgment to the Court of Appeals which was docketed as CA-G.R.
CR No. 05408. Petitioners asserted therein that the trial court erred in ruling that they violated
the Trust Receipt Law, and in holding them criminally liable therefor. In the alternative, they
contend that at most they can only be made civilly liable for payment of the loan.
In its decision20 6 March 1989, the Court of Appeals modified the judgment of the trial court by
increasing the penalty to six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen years
eight months and one day ofreclusion temporal as maximum. It held that the documentary
evidence of the prosecution prevails over Velosos testimony, discredited Petitioners claim that
the documents they signed were in blank, and disbelieved that they were coerced into signing
them.
On 25 March 1989, Petitioners filed a Motion for New Trial/Reconsideration21 alleging that the
"Disclosure Statement on Loan/Credit Transaction"22 (hereafter Disclosure Statement) signed by
them and Tuiza was suppressed by PBC during the trial. That document would have proved that
the transaction was indeed a loan as it bears a 14% interest as opposed to the trust receipt
which does not at all bear any interest. Petitioners further maintained that when PBC allowed
them to pay in installment, the agreement was novated and a creditor-debtor relationship was
created.
In its resolution23 of 16 October 1989 the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for New
Trial/Reconsideration because the alleged newly discovered evidence was actually forgotten
evidence already in existence during the trial, and would not alter the result of the case.
Hence, Petitioners filed with us the petition in this case on 16 November 1989. They raised the
following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE DENIAL OF THE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL ON THE
GROUND OF NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE, NAMELY, "DISCLOSURE ON
LOAN/CREDIT TRANSACTION," WHICH IF INTRODUCED AND ADMITTED, WOULD

CHANGE THE JUDGMENT, DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS.
2. ASSUMING THERE WAS A VALID TRUST RECEIPT, WHETHER OR NOT THE
ACCUSED WERE PROPERLY CHARGED, TRIED AND CONVICTED FOR VIOLATION
OF SEC. 13, PD NO. 115 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 315 PARAGRAPH (I) (B)
NOTWITHSTANDING THE NOVATION OF THE SO-CALLED TRUST RECEIPT
CONVERTING THE TRUSTOR-TRUSTEE RELATIONSHIP TO CREDITOR-DEBTOR
SITUATION.
In its Comment of 22 January 1990, the Office of the Solicitor General urged us to deny the
petition for lack of merit.
On 28 February 1990 Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the case on the ground that they had
already fully paid PBC on 2 February 1990 the amount of P70,000 for the balance of the loan,
including interest and other charges, as evidenced by the different receipts issued by
PBC,24 and that the PBC executed an Affidavit of desistance.25
We required the Solicitor General to comment on the Motion to Dismiss.
In its Comment of 30 July 1990, the Solicitor General opined that payment of the loan was akin
to a voluntary surrender or plea of guilty which merely serves to mitigate Petitioners culpability,
but does not in any way extinguish their criminal liability.
In the Resolution of 13 August 1990, we gave due course to the Petition and required the
parties to file their respective memoranda.
The parties subsequently filed their respective memoranda.
It was only on 18 May 1999 when this case was assigned to the ponente. Thereafter, we
required the parties to move in the premises and for Petitioners to manifest if they are still
interested in the further prosecution of this case and inform us of their present whereabouts and
whether their bail bonds are still valid.
Petitioners submitted their Compliance.
The core issues raised in the petition are the denial by the Court of Appeals of Petitioners
Motion for New Trial and the true nature of the contract between Petitioners and the PBC. As to
the latter, Petitioners assert that it was an ordinary loan, not a trust receipt agreement under the
Trust Receipts Law.
The grant or denial of a motion for new trial rests upon the discretion of the judge. New trial may
be granted if: (1) errors of law or irregularities have been committed during the trial prejudicial to
the substantial rights of the accused; or (2) new and material evidence has been discovered
which the accused could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the
trial, and which, if introduced and admitted, would probably change the judgment.26
For newly discovered evidence to be a ground for new trial, such evidence must be (1)
discovered after trial; (2) could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the
exercise of reasonable diligence; and (3) material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or
impeaching, and of such weight that, if admitted, would probably change the judgment.27 It is
essential that the offering party exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate the evidence
before or during trial but nonetheless failed to secure it.28
We find no indication in the pleadings that the Disclosure Statement is a newly discovered
evidence.
Petitioners could not have been unaware that the two-page document exists. The Disclosure
Statement itself states, "NOTICE TO BORROWER: YOU ARE ENTITLED TO A COPY OF THIS
PAPER WHICH YOU SHALL SIGN."29Assuming Petitioners copy was then unavailable, they
could have compelled its production in court,30 which they never did. Petitioners have miserably
failed to establish the second requisite of the rule on newly discovered evidence.
Petitioners themselves admitted that "they searched again their voluminous records,
meticulously and patiently, until they discovered this new and material evidence" only upon
learning of the Court of Appeals decision and after they were "shocked by the penalty
imposed."31 Clearly, the alleged newly discovered evidence is mere forgotten evidence that
jurisprudence excludes as a ground for new trial.32
However, the second issue should be resolved in favor of Petitioners.
Section 4, P.D. No. 115, the Trust Receipts Law, defines a trust receipt transaction as any
transaction by and between a person referred to as the entruster, and another person referred
to as the entrustee, whereby the entruster who owns or holds absolute title or security interest
over certain specified goods, documents or instruments, releases the same to the possession of
the entrustee upon the latters execution and delivery to the entruster of a signed document
called a "trust receipt" wherein the entrustee binds himself to hold the designated goods,
documents or instruments with the obligation to turn over to the entruster the proceeds thereof
to the extent of the amount owing to the entruster or as appears in the trust receipt or the goods,
documents or instruments themselves if they are unsold or not otherwise disposed of, in
accordance with the terms and conditions specified in the trust receipt.
There are two possible situations in a trust receipt transaction. The first is covered by the
provision which refers tomoney received under the obligation involving the duty to deliver it
(entregarla) to the owner of the merchandise sold. The second is covered by the provision
which refers to merchandise received under the obligation to "return" it (devolvera) to the
owner.33
Failure of the entrustee to turn over the proceeds of the sale of the goods, covered by the trust
receipt to the entruster or to return said goods if they were not disposed of in accordance with
the terms of the trust receipt shall be punishable as estafa under Article 315 (1) of the Revised
Penal Code,34 without need of proving intent to defraud.
A thorough examination of the facts obtaining in the case at bar reveals that the transaction
intended by the parties was a simple loan, not a trust receipt agreement.
Petitioners received the merchandise from CM Builders Centre on 30 October 1979. On that
day, ownership over the merchandise was already transferred to Petitioners who were to use
the materials for their construction project. It was only a day later, 31 October 1979, that they
went to the bank to apply for a loan to pay for the merchandise.
This situation belies what normally obtains in a pure trust receipt transaction where goods are
owned by the bank and only released to the importer in trust subsequent to the grant of the
loan. The bank acquires a "security interest" in the goods as holder of a security title for the
advances it had made to the entrustee.35 The ownership of the merchandise continues to be
vested in the person who had advanced payment until he has been paid in full, or if the
merchandise has already been sold, the proceeds of the sale should be turned over to him by
the importer or by his representative or successor in interest.36 To secure that the bank shall be
paid, it takes full title to the goods at the very beginning and continues to hold that title as his
indispensable security until the goods are sold and the vendee is called upon to pay for them;
hence, the importer has never owned the goods and is not able to deliver possession.37 In a
certain manner, trust receipts partake of the nature of a conditional sale where the importer
becomes absolute owner of the imported merchandise as soon as he has paid its price.38
Trust receipt transactions are intended to aid in financing importers and retail dealers who do
not have sufficient funds or resources to finance the importation or purchase of merchandise,
and who may not be able to acquire credit except through utilization, as collateral, of the
merchandise imported or purchased.39
The antecedent acts in a trust receipt transaction consist of the application and approval of the
letter of credit, the making of the marginal deposit and the effective importation of goods through
the efforts of the importer.40
PBC attempted to cover up the true delivery date of the merchandise, yet the trial court took
notice even though it failed to attach any significance to such fact in the judgment. Despite the
Court of Appeals contrary view that the goods were delivered to Petitioners previous to the
execution of the letter of credit and trust receipt, we find that the records of the case speak
volubly and this fact remains uncontroverted. It is not uncommon for us to peruse through the
transcript of the stenographic notes of the proceedings to be satisfied that the records of the
case do support the conclusions of the trial court.41 After such perusal Grego Mutia, PBCs credit
investigator, admitted thus:
ATTY. CABANLET: (continuing)
Q Do you know if the goods subject matter of this letter of credit and trust receipt agreement
were received by the accused?
A Yes, sir
Q Do you have evidence to show that these goods subject matter of this letter of credit and trust
receipt were delivered to the accused?
A Yes, sir.
Q I am showing to you this charge invoice, are you referring to this document?
A Yes, sir.
xxx
Q What is the date of the charge invoice?
A October 31, 1979.
COURT:
Make it of record as appearing in Exhibit D, the zero in 30 has been superimposed with numeral
1.42
During the cross and re-direct examinations he also impliedly admitted that the transaction was
indeed a loan. Thus:
Q In short the amount stated in your Exhibit C, the trust receipt was a loan to the accused you
admit that?
A Because in the bank the loan is considered part of the loan.
xxx
RE-DIRECT BY ATTY. CABANLET:
ATTY. CABANLET (to the witness)
Q What do you understand by loan when you were asked?
A Loan is a promise of a borrower from the value received. The borrower will pay the bank on a
certain specified date with interest43
Such statement is akin to an admission against interest binding upon PBC.
Petitioner Velosos claim that they were made to believe that the transaction was a loan was
also not denied by PBC. He declared:
Q Testimony was given here that that was covered by trust receipt. In short it was a special kind
of loan.1wphi1 What can you say as to that?
A I dont think that would be a trust receipt because we were made to understand by the
manager who encouraged us to avail of their facilities that they will be granting us a loan44
PBC could have presented its former bank manager, Cayo Garcia Tuiza, who contracted with
Petitioners, to refute Velosos testimony, yet it only presented credit investigator Grego Mutia.
Nowhere from Mutias testimony can it be gleaned that PBC represented to Petitioners that the
transaction they were entering into was not a pure loan but had trust receipt implications.
The Trust Receipts Law does not seek to enforce payment of the loan, rather it punishes the
dishonesty and abuse of confidence in the handling of money or goods to the prejudice of
another regardless of whether the latter is the owner.45 Here, it is crystal clear that on the part of
Petitioners there was neither dishonesty nor abuse of confidence in the handling of money to
the prejudice of PBC. Petitioners continually endeavored to meet their obligations, as shown by
several receipts issued by PBC acknowledging payment of the loan.
The Information charges Petitioners with intent to defraud and misappropriating the money for
their personal use. The mala prohibita nature of the alleged offense notwithstanding, intent as a
state of mind was not proved to be present in Petitioners situation. Petitioners employed no
artifice in dealing with PBC and never did they evade payment of their obligation nor attempt to
abscond. Instead, Petitioners sought favorable terms precisely to meet their obligation.
Also noteworthy is the fact that Petitioners are not importers acquiring the goods for re-sale,
contrary to the express provision embodied in the trust receipt. They are contractors who
obtained the fungible goods for their construction project. At no time did title over the
construction materials pass to the bank, but directly to the Petitioners from CM Builders Centre.
This impresses upon the trust receipt in question vagueness and ambiguity, which should not be
the basis for criminal prosecution in the event of violation of its provisions.46
The practice of banks of making borrowers sign trust receipts to facilitate collection of loans and
place them under the threats of criminal prosecution should they be unable to pay it may be
unjust and inequitable, if not reprehensible. Such agreements are contracts of adhesion which
borrowers have no option but to sign lest their loan be disapproved. The resort to this scheme
leaves poor and hapless borrowers at the mercy of banks, and is prone to misinterpretation, as
had happened in this case. Eventually, PBC showed its true colors and admitted that it was only
after collection of the money, as manifested by its Affidavit of Desistance.
WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision of 6 March 1989 and the Resolution of 16 October
1989 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. No. 05408 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioners are hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged, i.e., for violation of P.D. No. 115 in
relation to Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., no part.
Ynares-Santiago, J., on leave.
Footnotes
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 113433. March 17, 2000]
LUISITO P. BASILIO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JESUS G.
BERSAMIRA, and FE ADVINCULA, respondents. Sc
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review[1] under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court which seeks to annul
and set aside the Decision[2]and Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals dated October 27, 1992
and January 5, 1994, respectively. The decision sustained the Order dated April 7, 1992 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 166, denying due course to petitioners appeal from
the Judgment in Criminal Case No. 70278 and allowing execution against the petitioner of the
subsidiary indemnity arising from the offense committed by his truck driver.
The relevant facts as gleaned from the records are as follows:
On July 23, 1987, Simplicio Pronebo was charged by the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal with the
crime of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with double homicide and double
physical injuries.[4] The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 70278.
The information against him reads: Scmis
"The undersigned Assistant Fiscal accused Simplicio Pronebo y Cruz of the
crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Double
Homicide and Double Physical Injuries, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 15th day of July, 1987 in the municipality of Marikina, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, being then the driver and person in charge of a dump truck with plate
no. NMW-609 owned and registered in the name of Luisito Basilio, without due
regard to traffic laws, rules and regulations and without taking the necessary care
and precaution to prevent damage to property and avoid injuries to persons, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive, manage and operate
said dump truck in a careless, reckless, negligent and imprudent manner as a
result of which said dump truck being then driven by him hit/bumped and
sideswiped the following vehicles, to wit: a) a motorized tricycle with plate no.
NF-2457 driven by Benedicto Abuel thereby causing damage in the amount of
P1,100.00; b) an automobile Toyota Corona with plate no. NAL -138 driven by
Virgilio Hipolito thereby causing damage in the amount of P2,190.50 c) a
motorized tricycle with plate no. NW-9018 driven by Ricardo Sese y Julian
thereby causing damage of an undetermined amount d) an automobile Mitsubishi
Lancer with plate no. PHE-283 driven by Angelito Carranto thereby causing
damage of an undetermined amount and 3) a Ford Econo Van with plate no.
NFR-898 driven by Ernesto Aseron thereby causing damage of an undetermined
amount; that due to the strong impact caused by the collision, the driver Ricardo
Sese y Julian and his 3 passengers including Danilo Advincula y Poblete were
hit/bumped which directly caused their death; while the other 2 passengers,
namely; Cirilo Bangot sustained serious physical injuries which required medical
attendance for a period of more than 30 days which incapacitated him from
performing his customary labor for the same period of time and Dominador
Legaspi Jr. sustained physical injuries which required medical attendance for a
period of less than nine days and incapacitated him from performing his
customary labor for the same period of time.
Contrary to law." Mis sc
After arraignment and trial, the court rendered its judgment dated February 4, 1991, which
reads:
"WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Simplicio Pronebo y Cruz guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Reckless Imrpudence resulting in the death of Danilo
Advincula and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2)
years and four (4) months, as minimum to six (6) years of prision correccional, as
maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of danilo Advincula P30,000.00 for the
latters death, P31,614.00, as actual and compensatory damages. P2,000,000.00
for the loss of his earning capacity. P150,000.00, as moral damages, and
P30,000.00 as attorneys fees, plus the costs of suit."[5]
Thereafter, the accused filed an application for probation, so that the above judgment became
final and executory.
Pertinently, the trial court also found that at the time of the vehicular accident accused Simplicio
Pronebo was employed as the driver of the dump truck owned by petitioner Luisito Basilio.
On March 27, 1991, petitioner Luisito Basilio filed with the trial court a "Special Appearance and
Motion for Reconsideration"[6] praying that the judgment dated February 4, 1991, be
reconsidered and set aside insofar as it affected him and subjected him to a subsidiary liability
for the civil aspect of the criminal case. The motion was denied for lack of merit on September
16, 1991.[7] Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal[8] on September 25, 1991. Mis spped
On September 23, 1991, private respondent filed a Motion for Execution of the subsidiary civil
liability[9] of petitioner Basilio.
On April 7, 1992, the trial court issued two separate Orders. One denied due course and
dismissed Basilios appeal for having been filed beyond the reglementary period.[10] The other
directed the issuance of a writ of execution against him for the enforcement and satisfaction of
the award of civil indemnity decreed in judgment on February 4, 1991.[11]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari[12] under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court
with the Court of Appeals, alleging that respondent judge acted without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion in issuing: (1) the Order dated September 16, 1991, denying the petitioners
motion for reconsideration of the judgment dated February 4, 1991 insofar as the subsidiary
liability of the petitioner was concerned, and (2) the Order dated April 7, 1992, directing the
issuance of a writ of execution against the petitioner. Before the appellate court, petitioner
claimed he was not afforded due process when he was found subsidiarily liable for the civil
liability of the accused Pronebo in the criminal case.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition in its Decision dated October 27, 1992, disposing
as follows: Spped
"ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction is DENIED DUE COURSE
and should be, as it is hereby, DISMISSED for lack of persuasive force and
effect."[13]
A motion for reconsideration[14] was filed by the petitioner on November 24, 1992. This was
denied in a Resolution[15] dated January 5, 1994. Hence this petition for review.
Now, petitioner, in his assignment of errors, avers that respondent Court of Appeals erred:
I. ... IN SUSTAINING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE
JUDGMENT OF 4 FEBRUARY 1991 HAD BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY
AS REGARDS BOTH THE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS WHEN THE
ACCUSED APPLIED FOR PROBATION AT THE PROMULGATION.
II. ... IN HOLDING THAT AS PETITIONER IS NEITHER AN ACCUSED OR A
PARTY IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 70278, HE IS NOT ENTITLED TO FILE A
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE JUDGMENT OF SUBSIDIARY
CIVIL LIABILITY AGAINST HIM.
III. ... IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF HIS DAY IN
COURT IN VIOLATION OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS. Jo spped
IV. ... IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT ENTITLED TO THE
AUXILIARY RELIEF OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION BECAUSE THE
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION "IS CONCLUSIVE UPON THE EMPLOYER".
V. IN RULING THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE DID NOT ACT IN ABUSE OF
AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.[16]
The issue before us is whether respondent Court of Appeals erred and committed grave abuse
of discretion in denying the special civil action under Rule 65 filed by petitioner against the trial
court. To resolve it, we must, however, also pass upon the following:
(1) Had the judgment of February 4, 1991 of the trial court become final and
executory when accused applied for probation at the promulgation?
(2) May the petitioner as employer file a Motion for Reconsideration concerning
civil liability decreed in the judgment if he is not a party to the criminal case?
(3) May petitioner, as employer, be granted relief by way of a writ of preliminary
injunction? Spped jo
Petitioner asserts that he was not given the opportunity to be heard by the trial court to prove
the absence of an employer-employee relationship between him and accused. Nor that,
alternatively, the accused was not lawfully discharging duties as an employee at the time of the
incident. While these assertions are not moved, we shall give them due consideration.
The statutory basis for an employers subsidiary liability is found in Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code.[17] This liability is enforceable in the same criminal proceeding where the award is
made.[18] However, before execution against an employer ensues, there must be a

determination, in a hearing set for the purpose of 1) the existence of an employer-employee
relationship; 2) that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry; 3) that the employee is
adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of
his duties (not necessarily any offense he commits "while" in the discharge of such duties; and
4) that said employee is insolvent.[19]
In Vda. De Paman vs. Seeris, 115 SCRA 709, 714 (1982), the Court observed that the
drawback in the enforcement of the subsidiary liability in the same criminal proceeding is that
the alleged employer is not afforded due process. Not being a party to the case, he is not heard
as to whether he is indeed the employer. Hence, we held: Miso
"To remedy the situation and thereby afford due process to the alleged employer,
this Court directed the court a quo in Pajarito vs. Seeris (supra) to hear and
decide in the same proceeding the subsidiary liability of the alleged owner and
operator of the passenger bus. It was explained therein that the proceeding for
the enforcement of the subsidiary liability may be considered as part of the
proceeding for the execution of the judgment. A case in which an execution has
been issued is regarded as still pending so that all proceedings on the execution
are proceedings in the suit."[20]
There are two instances when the existence of an employer-employee relationship of an
accused driver and the alleged vehicle owner may be determined. One during the criminal
proceeding, and the other, during the proceeding for the execution of the judgment. In both
instances, petitioner should be given the opportunity to be heard, which is the essence of due
process.[21]
Petitioner knew of the criminal case that was filed against accused because it was his truck that
was involved in the incident.[22] Further, it was the insurance company, with which his truck was
insured, that provided the counsel for the accused, pursuant to the stipulations in their contract.
[23]
Petitioner did not intervene in the criminal proceedings, despite knowledge, through counsel,
that the prosecution adduced evidence to show employer-employee relationship.[24] With the
convicts application for probation, the trial courts judgment became final and executory. All told,
it is our view that the lower court did not err when it found that petitioner was not denied due
process. He had all his chances to intervene in the criminal proceedings, and prove that he was
not the employer of the accused, but he chooses not to intervene at the appropriate time.Nex
old
Petitioner was also given the opportunity during the proceedings for the enforcement of
judgment. Even assuming that he was not properly notified of the hearing on the motion for
execution of subsidiary liability, he was asked by the trial court to make an opposition thereto,
which he did on October 17, 1991, where he properly alleged that there was no employeremployee relationship between him and accused and that the latter was not discharging any
function in relation to his work at the time of the incident.[25] In addition, counsel for private
respondent filed and duly served on December 3, 1991, and December 9, 1991, respectively, a
manifestation praying for the grant of the motion for execution.[26] This was set for hearing on
December 13, 1991. However, counsel for petitioner did not appear. Consequently, the court
ordered in open court that the matter be submitted for resolution. It was only on January 6,
1992, that the petitioners counsel filed a counter-manifestation[27]that belatedly attempted to
contest the move of the private prosecutor for the execution of the civil liability. Thus, on April 7,
1992, the trial court issued the Order granting the motion for execution of the subsidiary liability.
Given the foregoing circumstances, we cannot agree with petitioner that the trial court denied
him due process of law. Neither can we fault respondent appellant court for sustaining the
judgment and orders of the trial court. Mani kx
Accordingly, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated October 27, 1992, in CA-G.R. SP No. 27850 is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 125935
November 29, 2000
CARMELITA P. BASILIO, FRANCISCO P. BASILIO, EVELYN P. BASILIO, and the minor

GERALD P. BASILIO, represented by his mother, CARMELITA P. BASILIO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES SIMON ZABLAN, substituted by his heirs, SUSAN Z.
LOPEZ, CELINA ZABLAN, RUBEN ZABLAN, RELLY ZABLAN and EDWIN ZABLAN, and
SONIA MATIAS, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case under consideration is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals,1 which reversed that of the Regional Trial Court, Pampanga, Branch 55, Macabebe,
involving the genuineness of two deeds of sale.
In his lifetime, Dionisio Z. Basilio owned Lot Nos. 240 and 214, located in Barrio dela Paz, San
Simon, Pampanga, with an area of 14,903 square meters and 2,812 square meters,
respectively, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 32699-R and 32698R,2 respectively.
On August 5, 1988, Dionisio Z. Basilio died.

On November 12, 1990, Carmelita P. Basilio, widow of Dionisio Z. Basilio, together with her
children, Francisco P. Basilio, Evelyn P. Basilio, and Gerald P. Basilio filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Pampanga, Macabebe an action for annulment of the deed of sale dated April 26,
1979, involving Lot No. 240, and for its reconveyance to the heirs of Dionisio Z. Basilio, with
damages. Plaintiffs alleged that the deed of sale dated April 26, 1979, covering Lot No. 240 was
spurious, on the basis of which the title in the name of Dionisio Z. Basilio was cancelled and a
new title issued3 in the name of the spouses Simon Zablan and Sonia Matias.4
On January 2, 1991, spouses Simon Zablan and Sonia Matias filed an answer to the complaint,
denying any participation in or knowledge of the execution of the deed of absolute sale dated
April 26, 1979. However, they averred that Dionisio Z. Basilio sold to them Lot Nos. 240 and
214, evidenced by a deed of sale dated March 19, 1987.5
On February 25, 1991, with leave of court, plaintiffs filed with the trial court an amended
complaint6 alleging that the deed of sale dated March 19, 1987, conveying Lot Nos. 214 and
240 to Simon Zablan and Sonia Matias was also spurious and null and void.
After due trial, on January 25, 1994, the trial court rendered a decision7 declaring the signatures
of Dionisio Z. Basilio as forged and annulled the two deeds of sale. The decretal portion of the
decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and
against the defendants, and hereby declares null and void and of no legal force and effect the
two Deeds of Absolute Sale, respectively, dated April 26, 1979, and March 19, 1987, as well as
TCT No. 07965-R covering Lot 240 of the cadastral survey of San Simon, and whatever
certificate of title issued by the Register of Deeds of Pampanga covering Lot No. 214 on the
basis of the document denominated as Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 19, 1987; hereby
ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiffs by way of actual and
compensatory damages the sum of P25,000.00, Philippine Currency; and, the further sum of
P20,000.00 by way of exemplary damages, and to pay the costs of this proceeding.
"SO ORDERED."
In time, spouses Simon Zablan and Sonia Matias appealed to the Court of Appeals.8
After due proceedings, on August 7, 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated its
decision9 reversing that of the trial court. The appellate court declared that the deed of sale
dated March 19, 1987 was genuine, valid and binding but annulled the deed of sale dated April
26, 1979, after noting that defendants-appellants themselves denied the authenticity of that
deed of sale.
Hence, this appeal.10
At issue is whether the deed of sale dated March 19, 1987, was genuine, which, however, was
not the basis of the issuance of TCT No. 279651-R.
The trial court relied on the testimony of handwriting experts who concluded that the signatures
on the questioned documents were forged. The Court of Appeals, however, placed greater
weight on other evidence showing the genuineness of the document.
In light of the conflicting findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, we reviewed the
factual findings of the appellate court.11
The deed of sale dated March 19, 1987, was executed by Dionisio Z. Basilio in favor of spouses
Zablan, and notarized by Atty. Ruben Silvestre. Generally, a notarized document carries the
evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and documents
acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor the presumption of
regularity.12 However, the presumption is not absolute and may be rebutted by clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary.13 Furthermore, an allegation of forgery must be proved by
clear and convincing evidence, and whoever alleges it has the burden of proving the same.14
In this case, petitioners presented handwriting experts and other persons familiar with the
handwriting of Dionisio Z. Basilio in order to show that the signature contained in the questioned
deed of sale was forged.
According to the report of the handwriting experts of the National Bureau of Investigation, there
were "fundamental, significant differences in writing characteristics between the questioned and
the standard/sample specimen signatures," particularly, the "movement and manner of
execution strokes," "structural pattern of letters/elements," and "minute/inconspicuous
identifying details."15
Evelyn Basilio, daughter of Dionisio Z. Basilio, confirmed that the signature on the questioned
deed of sale was forged, stating that she knew the authentic signature of her father because he
used to sign her school report card periodically.16
Carmelita Basilio, wife of Dionisio Z. Basilio, stayed beside her husband from the time of his
illness until his death. She was certain that from the time of his illness in 1987 until his death in
1988, Dionisio did not have the strength to sign a document much less personally appear before
a notary public in the latters office to acknowledge the execution of a deed of sale.
Moreover, our own analytical study of the questioned document showed that the signature of
Dionisio Z. Basilio on the deed of sale dated March 19, 1987 was forged. We have examined
the signature of Dionisio Z. Basilio on the deed of sale dated March 19, 1987, compared with
other documents with his admittedly genuine signature. We find the signatures to be patently
dissimilar.
On the other hand, to bolster the authenticity and due execution of the questioned deed of sale,
respondents presented as witness the notary public that notarized the document and the
instrumental witnesses.
The notary public, Atty. Ruben Silvestre, testified that he was the one who notarized the
document and that Dionisio Z. Basilio appeared personally before him and signed the
instrument himself. However, he admitted that he did not know Dionisio Z. Basilio personally to
ascertain if the person who signed the document was actually Dionisio Z. Basilio himself, or
another person who stood in his place.17 He could not even recall whether the document had
been executed in his office or not.18
Thus, considering the testimonies of various witnesses and a comparison of the signature in
question with admittedly genuine signatures, the Court is convinced that Dionisio Z. Basilio did
not execute the questioned deed of sale. Although the questioned deed of sale was a public
document having in its favor the presumption of regularity,19 such presumption was adequately
refuted by competent witnesses showing its forgery20 and the Courts own visual analysis of the
document.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G. R. CV No. 45035. The Court revives and affirms the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Pampanga, Branch 55, Macabebe in Civil Case No. 90-0369 (M).
With costs against private respondents.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 160355
May 16, 2005
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HEIRS OF EDUARDO MANGAWANG and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
78149 affirming the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 743-C(93)
convicting the accused Ernesto Ancheta of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
The Antecedents
Ernesto Ancheta was employed by the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBLI) as driver of
one of its passenger buses. On July 23, 1993, an Information was filed with the RTC of Capas,
Tarlac, Branch 66, charging Ancheta with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The
inculpatory portion of the Information reads:
That on November 23, 1992 at around 11:50 oclock (sic) in the morning, at Brgy.
Dolores, Municipality of Capas, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then the driver and person-in-charge of
a Philippine Rabbit Bus bearing Plate No. CVE-707 with MVRR No. 63044987,
registered in the name of the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. of Tarlac, Tarlac, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with reckless imprudence and
managed the said Philippine Rabbit Bus at Brgy. Dolores, Capas, Tarlac, in a careless,
negligent and imprudent manner, without due regard to laws, regulations, ordinances
and traffic code and without taking the necessary precaution to prevent accident to
persons and damage to property and in violation of the Land Transportation Laws, said
bus driven by the accused while cruising the MacArthur Highway towards the south
direction, bumped the left rear side of a Toyota jeep with Plate No. TAB 929 with MVRR
No. 64284647 owned by Zenaida B. Dizon of 193 M. Santos St., Pasay City, Metro
Manila, and driven by Eduardo Mangawang towards the north direction, and as a result
thereof said Eduardo Mangawang ultimately died and the jeep he was then driving
sustained damages of an undetermined amount, to the damage and prejudice of the
deceased and the owner thereof.
Contrary to law.3
The accused was assisted by Atty. Crispiniano Lamorena, Jr., whom the PRBLI assigned as
counsel de parte. Atty. Andres Pangilinan entered his appearance as private prosecutor.
The trial court rendered judgment on November 12, 1999, convicting the accused of the crime
charged. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused,
ERNESTO ANCHETA, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to Homicide.
Accordingly, the said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional in its minimum
period as minimum to six (6) years ofprision correccional in its maximum period as
maximum.
For the civil liability of the accused, Ernesto Ancheta is hereby ordered to indemnify the
heirs of Eduardo Mangawang the amounts of P28,600.00 as actual or compensatory
damages and P1,436,466.30 representing loss of earning capacity. The accused is
similarly ordered to pay the amounts of P50,000.00 by way of indemnification for the
death of Eduardo Mangawang and another P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.4
The accused appealed the decision to the CA. On November 10, 2000, the appellate court
issued a Resolution dismissing the appeal due to Anchetas failure to file his brief as accusedappellant.5 The resolution of the CA dismissing the appeal became final and executory, thus,
entry of judgment was made of record on December 7, 2000. After the transmission of the
records to the RTC, it issued an Order on June 5, 2001 for the arrest of the accused.6
On June 29, 2001, the PRBLI, as Anchetas employer, filed a Notice of Appeal of the decision of
the RTC. On July 18, 2001, the RTC issued an Order denying due course to the notice of
appeal, on its finding that the notice was filed long after the judgment of the RTC had become
final and executory.7 The PRBLI filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order, claiming that
it was not served with a copy of the decision of the RTC convicting the accused of the crime
charged; hence, could not have appealed the same. On August 1, 2001, the trial court issued an
Order denying the said motion. The PRBLI filed an urgent motion, this time for clarification of the
said order, which the trial court denied in an Order dated August 31, 2001. Undaunted, the
PRBLI filed a manifestation with motion, citing the ruling of this Court in Ozoa v. Vda. de
Madula.8 On October 17, 2001, the trial court issued an Order, this time, granting the motion and
giving due course to the appeal of the PRBLI. The trial court, likewise, ordered the records to be
transmitted to the CA for the consideration of the appeal, where the latter made the following
assignment of errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN THE APPRECIATION OF THE FACTS
AND THE EVIDENCE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ATTRIBUTING SUPPOSED
NEGLIGENCE AND LACK OF FORESIGHT ON THE PART OF THE ACCUSED
ANCHETA.
III
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN SO GENEROUSLY AWARDING
UNCONSCIONABLE AMOUNTS IN SUPPOSED DAMAGES TO THE HEIRS OF
EDUARDO MANGAWANG.9
On October 10, 2003, the CA rendered judgment affirming with modification the decision of the
RTC. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated November 12, 1999 of the
Regional Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66, in Criminal Case No. 743-C(93) is
hereby AFFIRMED with the correction that the actual damages to be awarded should
only be P5,000.00. All other respects remain. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.10
The appellate court dismissed the appeal on the ground that the decision of the RTC had long
become final and executory when the PRBLI appealed the decision. It ruled that the PRBLI was
bound by the said decision against the accused therein.11 Nevertheless, the appellate court
resolved the appeal on its merits and affirmed the decision of the RTC, but with modification.12
The PRBLI forthwith filed the present petition for review on certiorari, assailing the decision of
the CA on the following grounds:
A.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CONVICTION OF THE
ACCUSED HAS ATTAINED FINALITY AS AGAINST PETITIONER.
B.
PETITIONER MUST BE AFFORDED THE STANDING AND THE OPPORTUNITY TO
QUESTION THE ACCUSEDS CONVICTION.13
The petitioner submits the ruling of this Court in Pajarito v. Seneris14 and Miranda v. Malate
Garage & Taxicab, Inc.,15 that "the decision of the trial court convicting the employee is binding
and conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the civil liability but also, with regard
to its amount," should not apply to it. It avers that unlike inPajarito and Miranda, the counsel of
the accused therein was given ample opportunity to defend the accused during the trial and on
appeal in the CA. The petitioner laments that in this case, the counsel it provided to defend the
accused was remiss in the performance of his duties and failed to notify it of the RTC decision,
the November 10, 2000 Resolution of the CA, as well as the June 5, 2001 Order of the RTC;
consequently, it was not apprised of its civil liability to the heirs of the deceased, thus depriving
the petitioner of its right to due process. It avers that it was only on account of its own diligence
that it discovered the decision of the RTC, the November 10, 2000 Resolution of the CA and the
June 5, 2001 Order of the RTC.
The petitioner further avers that it was not furnished with a copy of the said CA Resolution, and
of the Arrest Order of the RTC dated June 5, 2001. The petitioner posits that until it is furnished
with such copies, the period within which to assail the decision of the RTC on its civil liability to
the heirs of the deceased had not commenced to run.
The petitioner submits that it is unjust and unreasonable for the CA to deprive it of its right to
question its civil liability to the heirs of the deceased, considering the gross negligence of the
counsel that it had provided the accused.
By way of comment on the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the
decision of the RTC convicting Ancheta of the crime charged had become final and executory,
following the dismissal of his appeal before the CA. The decision of the RTC was conclusive on
the petitioner, not only with regard to its civil liability but also as to the amount thereof, absent
any collusion between the accused-employee and the private complainant. The petitioner was
not a direct party in the criminal case; hence, was not entitled to a copy of the decision of the
RTC or to appeal therefrom; it was, likewise, not entitled to be furnished a copy of the CA
Resolution dated November 10, 2000 and the Order of the RTC dated June 5, 2001. Hence,
according to the OSG, it cannot complain of denial of its right to due process. The OSG further
asserts that the petition at bar is premature, considering that no writ of execution has yet been
issued by the RTC, and cites the ruling of this Court in Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v.
People16 to buttress its stance.
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
The ruling of the CA dismissing the petitioners appeal of the RTC decision convicting Ancheta
of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide is correct. However, the Court of Appeals erred in
modifying the decision of the RTC.
The petitioner, as the employer of the said accused, had no right to appeal from the said
decision because, in the first place, it was not a party in the said case. While the subsidiary
liability provided for by Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code may render the
petitioner a party in substance and, in effect, it is not, for this reason, entitled to be furnished a
copy of the decision of the RTC, as well as the resolution and decision of the CA.
Indeed, the petitioner was entitled to protect its interest by taking actual participation in the
defense of its employee, Ancheta, by providing him with counsel. It cannot leave its employee to
his own fate because his failure is its failure.17 The petitioner, as the employer of the accused,
would thereby be apprised of the progress of the case and the outcome thereof from time to
time through the said counsel. The failure of such counsel to apprise the petitioner of the
progress of the case is thus not equivalent to lack of due process. The pronouncement of the
Court inMiranda v. Malate Garage & Taxicab, Inc. 18 is instructive on this score:
It is true that an employer, strictly speaking, is not a party to the criminal case instituted
against his employee but in substance and, in effect, he is considering the subsidiary
liability imposed upon him by law. It is his concern, as well as of his employee, to see to
it that his interest be protected in the criminal case by taking virtual participation in the
defense of his employee. He cannot leave him to his own fate because his failure is also
his. And if because of his indifference or inaction the employee is convicted and
damages are awarded against him, he cannot later be heard to complain, if brought to
court for the enforcement of his subsidiary liability, that he was not given his day in court.
It was not without purpose that this Court sounded the following stern warning:
"It is high time that the employer exercised the greatest care in selecting his
employees, taking real and deep interest in their welfare; intervening in any
criminal action brought against them by reason of or as a result of the

performance of their duties, if only in the way of giving them the benefit of
counsel; and, consequently, doing away with the practices of leaving them to
their fates. If these be done, the American rule requiring notice on the part of the
employer shall have been satisfied." (Martinez v. Barredo, supra.)19
In Ozoa v. Vda. de Madula,20 the Court explained the effect of a judgment of conviction against
the employee on the subsidiary liability of the employer, as follows:
To be sure, the correctness of the legal principles cited by the Court a quo cannot be
gainsaid. A person criminally liable is also civilly liable; and upon the institution of the
criminal action, the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the crime
is also impliedly instituted unless waived, or the filing of a separate action therefor is
reserved. The employer is subsidiarily answerable for the adjudicated civil liabilityex
delicto of his employee in the event of the latters insolvency; and the judgment in the
criminal action pronouncing the employee to be also civilly liable is conclusive on the
employer not only as to the actuality of that liability but also as to its amount.21
Since the petitioner was not a party in the RTC and in the CA on the appeal of its employee
(Ancheta), the petitioner cannot justifiably claim that it was deprived of its right to due process.
As explained by this Court in Martinez v. Barredo:22
The employer cannot be said to have been deprived of his day in court, because the
situation before us is not one wherein the employer is sued for a primary liability under
Article 1903 of the Civil Code, but one in which enforcement is sought of a subsidiary
civil liability incident to and dependent upon his drivers criminal negligence which is a
proper issue to be tried and decided only in a criminal action. In other words, the
employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon his drivers conviction and upon
proof of the latters insolvency, in the same way that acquittal wipes out not only the
employees primary civil liability but also his employers subsidiary liability for such
criminal negligence. (Almeida, et al. v. Abaroa, 8 Phil. 178, affirmed in 218 U.S. 476; 54
Law ed., 1116; Wise & Co. v. Larion, 45 Phil. 314, 320; Francisco v. Onrubia, 46 Phil.
327;Province of Ilocos Sur v. Tolentino, G.R. No. 34186, 56 Phil. 829; Moran, Comments
on the Rules of Court, Vol. II, p. 403.)23
Besides, as gleaned from the brief of the petitioner, as appellant in the CA, in CA-G.R. CV No.
78149, it sought the reversal of the decision of the RTC and the acquittal of its employee.
In Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. People,24 this Court held that such an appeal would be
impermissible for the following reasons:
An appeal from the sentence of the trial court implies a waiver of the constitutional
safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to a review by the
appellate court. The latter is then called upon to render judgment as law and justice
dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the appellant. This is the risk involved when
the accused decides to appeal a sentence of conviction. Indeed, appellate courts have
the power to reverse, affirm or modify the judgment of the lower court and to increase or
reduce the penalty it imposed.
If the present appeal is given [due] course, the whole case against the accusedemployee becomes open to review. It thus follows that a penalty higher than that which
has already been imposed by the trial court may be meted out to him. Petitioners appeal
would thus violate his right against double jeopardy, since the judgment against him
could become subject to modification without his consent.25
Indeed, to allow an employer to dispute its civil liability in the criminal case via an appeal from
the decision of the RTC would be to annul, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a
competent court.26
The Court cannot second guess whether Anchetas failure to file his brief as appellant in the CA
was through the negligence of his counsel or because of the belief that, indeed, he was guilty of
the crime charged and it was purposeless and futile for him to still file such brief.
We agree with the contention of the OSG that the right of the petitioner as the employer of the
accused to due process occurs during the hearing of the motion for the issuance of an alias writ
of execution, on the basis of the sheriffs return that the writ of execution issued by the court for
the enforcement of its decision on the civil liability of the accused was not satisfied because of
the latters insolvency, the sheriff being unable to locate any property in the name of the
accused. Such return is prima facie evidence of the insolvency of the accused.27
During the hearing of the motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution, the prosecution
must prove that (a) the petitioner PRBLI was the employer of the accused; (b) it was engaged in
some kind of industry; (c) the crime was committed by the employee in the discharge of his
duties; and (d) execution against the employee is unsatisfied.28 The prosecution may offer in
evidence the sheriffs return as prima facie evidence of the insolvency of the accused.
The petitioner, as the employer of the accused, may adduce evidence on questions which may
be involved in the execution since the trial court which rendered the decision has a general
supervisory control over the process of execution.29
From a ruling adverse to the employer, it may appeal by writ of error on questions of facts, or
mixed questions of facts and of law, or by certiorari on questions of jurisdiction or grave abuse
of discretion of the trial court, thus:
It goes without saying that the determination thus made as regards the employers
subsidiary civil liability is not conclusive in the sense of being non-reviewable by higher
judicial authority. It may be appealed to a higher court at the instance of the aggrieved
party either the offended party or the employer by writ of error seeking review of
questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law, or through a petition for review
oncertiorari, limited to a consideration only of questions of law. Or review may be sought
by the institution of a special civil action of certiorari, upon the theory that the
determination was made by the trial court without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion.30
Hence, the Court of Appeals erred in modifying the decision of the RTC which had long become
final and executory. A final and executory decision, even if erroneous, can no longer be
modified.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Resolution
of the Court of Appeals dismissing the appeal of the petitioner is AFFIRMED. However, that
portion of the Decision of the Court of Appeals modifying the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, dated November 12, 1999, is SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 84516 December 5, 1989
DIONISIO CARPIO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SERGIO DOROJA, (Presiding Judge, MTC, Branch IV, Zamboanga City) and EDWIN
RAMIREZ Y WEE,respondents.
PARAS, J.:
Before us is a petition to review by certiorari the decision of the Municipal Trial Court of
Zamboanga City, Branch IV, which denied petitioner's motion for subsidiary writ of execution
against the owner-operator of the vehicle which figured in the accident.
The facts of the case are undisputed.
Sometime on October 23, 1985, accused-respondent Edwin Ramirez, while driving a passenger
Fuso Jitney owned and operated by Eduardo Toribio, bumped Dionisio Carpio, a pedestrian
crossing the street, as a consequence of which the latter suffered from a fractured left clavicle
as reflected in the medico-legal certificate and sustained injuries which required medical
attention for a period of (3) three months.
An information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Serious Physical Injuries was filed against
Edwin Ramirez with the Municipal Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Branch IV. On January 14,
1987, the accused voluntarily pleaded guilty to a lesser offense and was accordingly convicted
for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Less Serious Physical Injuries under an amended
information punishable under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. The dispositive portion of
the decision handed down on May 27, 1987 reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused EDWIN RAMIREZ y WEE guilty as a principal beyond
reasonable doubt of the Amended Information to which he voluntarily pleaded guilty and
appreciating this mitigating circumstance in his favor, hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty
of One (1) month and One (1) day to Two (2) months of Arresto Mayor in its minimum period.
The accused is likewise ordered to indemnify the complainant Dionisio A. Carpio the amount of
P45.00 representing the value of the 1/2 can of tomatoes lost; the amount of P200.00 which
complainant paid to the Zamboanga General Hospital, to pay complainant the amount of
Pl,500.00 as attorney's fees and to pay the cost of this suit. SO ORDERED. (p. 7, Rollo)
Thereafter, the accused filed an application for probation.
At the early stage of the trial, the private prosecutor manifested his desire to present evidence to
establish the civil liability of either the accused driver or the owner-operator of the vehicle.
Accused's counsel moved that the court summon the owner of the vehicle to afford the latter a
day in court, on the ground that the accused is not only indigent but also jobless and thus
cannot answer any civil liability that may be imposed upon him by the court. The private
prosecutor, however, did not move for the appearance of Eduardo Toribio.
The civil aspect of the above-quoted decision was appealed by the private prosecutor to the
Regional Trial Court Branch XVI, appellant praying for moral damages in the amount of P
10,000.00, compensatory damages at P6,186.40, and attorney's fees of P 5,000.00. The
appellate court, on January 20, 1988, modified the trial court's decision, granting the appellant
moral damages in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P 5,000.00), while affirming all other
civil liabilities.
Thereafter, a writ of execution dated March 10, 1988 was duly served upon the accused but
was, however, returned unsatisfied due to the insolvency of the accused as shown by the
sheriffs return. Thus, complainant moved for a subsidiary writ of execution against the
subsidiary liability of the owner-operator of the vehicle. The same was denied by the trial court
on two grounds, namely, the decision of the appellate court made no mention of the subsidiary
liability of Eduardo Toribio, and the nature of the accident falls under "culpa-aquiliana" and not
culpa-contractual." A motion for reconsideration of the said order was disallowed for the reason
that complainant having failed to raise the matter of subsidiary liability with the appellate court,
said court rendered its decision which has become final and executory and the trial court has no
power to alter or modify such decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner relies heavily on the case of Pajarito v. Seneris, 87 SCRA 275, which enunciates that
"the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator is fixed by the judgment, because if a case were to
be filed against said operator, the court called upon to act thereto has no other function than to
render a decision based on the indemnity award in the criminal case without power to amend or
modify it even if in his opinion an error has been committed in the decision." Petitioner maintains
that the tenor of the aforesaid decision implies that the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator
may be enforced in the same proceeding and a separate action is no longer necessary in order
to avoid undue delay, notwithstanding the fact that said employer was not made a party in the
criminal action.
It is the theory of respondent that the owner-operator cannot be validly held subsidiarily liable for
the following reasons, namely: (a) the matter of subsidiary liability was not raised on appeal; (b)
contrary to the case of Pajarito v. Seneris, the injuries sustained by the complainant did not
arise from the so-called "culpa-contractual" but from "culpa-aquiliana"; (c) the judgments of
appellate courts may not be altered, modified, or changed by the court of origin; and (d) said
owner was never made a party to the criminal proceedings.
Thus, the underlying issue raised in this case is; whether or not the subsidiary liability of the
owner-operator may be enforced in the same criminal proceeding against the driver where the
award was given, or in a separate civil action.
The law involved in the instant case is Article 103 in relation to Article 100, both of the Revised
Penal Code, which reads thus:
Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability established in the next
preceding article shall apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any
kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or
employees in the discharge of their duties.
Respondent contends that the case of Pajarito v. Seneris cannot be applied to the present case,
the former being an action involving culpa-contractual, while the latter being one of culpaaquiliana. Such a declaration is erroneous. The subsidiary liability in Art. 103 should be
distinguished from the primary liability of employers, which is quasi-delictual in character as
provided in Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code. Under Art. 103, the liability emanated from a delict.
On the other hand, the liability under Art. 2180 is founded on culpa-aquiliana. The present case
is neither an action for culpa-contractual nor for culpa-aquiliana. This is basically an action to
enforce the civil liability arising from crime under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code. In no case
can this be regarded as a civil action for the primary liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of
the New Civil Code, i.e., action for culpa-aquiliana.
In order that an employer may be held subsidiarily liable for the employee's civil liability in the
criminal action, it should be shown (1) that the employer, etc. is engaged in any kind of industry,
(2) that the employee committed the offense in the discharge of his duties and (3) that he is
insolvent (Basa Marketing Corp. v. Bolinao, 117 SCRA 156). The subsidiary liability of the
employer, however, arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal action. All these
requisites present, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the employee's
conviction and upon proof of the latter's insolvency. Needless to say, the case at bar satisfies all
these requirements.
Furthermore, we are not convinced that the owner-operator has been deprived of his day in
court, because the case before us is not one wherein the operator is sued for a primary liability
under the Civil Code but one in which the subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon
his employee's criminal negligence is sought to be enforced. Considering the subsidiary liability
imposed upon the employer by law, he is in substance and in effect a party to the criminal case.
Ergo, the employer's subsidiary liability may be determined and enforced in the criminal case as
part of the execution proceedings against the employee. This Court held in the earlier case
of Pajarito v. Seneris, supra, that "The proceeding for the enforcement of the subsidiary civil
liability may be considered as part of the proceeding for the execution of the judgment. A case in
which an execution has been issued is regarded as still pending so that all proceedings on the
execution are proceedings in the suit. There is no question that the court which rendered the
judgment has a general supervisory control over its process of execution, and this power carries
with it the right to determine every question of fact and law which may be involved in the
execution."
The argument that the owner-operator cannot be held subsidiarily liable because the matter of
subsidiary liability was not raised on appeal and in like manner, the appellate court's decision
made no mention of such subsidiary liability is of no moment. As already discussed, the filing of
a separate complaint against the operator for recovery of subsidiary liability is not necessary
since his liability is clear from the decision against the accused. Such being the case, it is not
indispensable for the question of subsidiary liability to be passed upon by the appellate court.
Such subsidiary liability is already implied from the appellate court's decision. In the recent case
of Vda. de Paman v. Seneris, 115 SCRA 709, this Court reiterated the following pronouncement:
"A judgment of conviction sentencing a defendant employer to pay an indemnity in the absence
of any collusion between the defendant and the offended party, is conclusive upon the employer
in an action for the enforcement of the latter's subsidiary liability not only with regard to the civil
liability, but also with regard to its amount." This being the case, this Court stated in Rotea v.
Halili, 109 Phil. 495, "that the court has no other function than to render decision based upon
the indemnity awarded in the criminal case and has no power to amend or modify it even if in its
opinion an error has been committed in the decision. A separate and independent action is,
therefore, unnecessary and would only unduly prolong the agony of the heirs of the victim."
Finally, the position taken by the respondent appellate court that to grant the motion for
subsidiary writ of execution would in effect be to amend its decision which has already become
final and executory cannot be sustained. Compelling the owner-operator to pay on the basis of
his subsidiary liability does not constitute an amendment of the judgment because in an action
under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code, once all the requisites as earlier discussed are met,
the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable, without need of a separate action. Such
being the case, the subsidiary liability can be enforced in the same case where the award was
given, and this does not constitute an act of amending the decision. It becomes incumbent upon
the court to grant a motion for subsidiary writ of execution (but only after the employer has been
heard), upon conviction of the employee and after execution is returned unsatisfied due to the
employee's insolvency.
WHEREFORE, the order of respondent court disallowing the motion for subsidiary writ of
execution is hereby SET ASIDE. The Court a quo is directed to hear and decide in the same
proceeding the subsidiary liability of the alleged owner-operator of the passenger jitney. Costs
against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25913
February 29, 1969
HEIRS OF RAYMUNDO CASTRO, petitioners,

vs.
APOLONIO BUSTOS, respondent.
Sotto, Consengco and Dizon for petitioners.
Sipin, Abarcar and Baluyot for respondent.
BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the Court of Appeals.
Respondent Apolonio Bustos was charged in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga on
October 26, 1962 with the crime of murder for the killing of Raymundo Castro whose heirs are
now the petitioners. The trial court found Bustos guilty only of homicide and, crediting him with
two mitigating circumstances, namely, passion or obfuscation and voluntary surrender,
sentenced him to an indeterminate prison term of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum, and to indemnify
the petitioners, who were represented in the case by a private prosecutor, in the sum of six
thousand pesos (P6,000) "without prejudice to whatever the accused (respondent) is entitled
from the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for his services of around twenty-six
(26) years as a public school teacher, prior to October 20, 1962." Both respondent and
petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, respondent asking that appellate, court acquit him
and petitioners praying, on the other hand, that respondent be convicted of murder, that the
portion regarding what said respondent will receive from the GSIS be deleted and that he be
ordered to pay petitioners "the aggregate sum of P50,764.00 as indemnity and actual, moral,
temperate and exemplary damages." For the purposes of their appeal, petitioners even filed
unnecessarily a printed record on appeal. On October 18, 1965, the Court of Appeals rendered
judgment modifying that of the trial court insofar as it concerned (1) the amount of damages to
be awarded petitioners thus:
... Aside from the P6,000 indemnity awarded by the trial court, which we uphold, we feel
justified, in the exercise of our discretion, to award to the heirs of the deceased moral
damages in the amount of P6,000 plus P13,380.00 to compensate for the loss of earning
of the decedent at the annual salary of P2,676.00 ....
and (2) the mitigating circumstance of "obfuscation", appreciated as such by the trial court,
which was changed to "vindication of a grave offense", but affirming it in all other respects. Upon
motion, however, of respondent for the reconsideration of said decision, reiterating his plea for
acquittal, or, in the alternative, praying for the elimination of the award of moral and
compensatory damages, the Court of Appeals promulgated on November 13, 1965, an
amended decision, the pertinent portions of which are:
The arguments interposed by the appellant in his Motion for consideration to support the
complete reversal of the judgment appealed from, have been considered and passed
upon in our decision, and we see no reason to alter the same in so far as the appellant's
guilt of the crime is concerned. On the other hand, we agree with the appellant that in
the interest of justice and equity and in view of the presence of two mitigating
circumstances, without any aggravating one to offset them, the award of moral and
compensatory damages should be eliminated.
WHEREFORE, the decision promulgated October 18, 1965, is hereby amended by
eliminating therefrom the award of P6,000.00 representing moral damages, and of
P13,380.00 representing the decedent's loss of earnings.
From this amended decision, only petitioners have appealed to Us. The prayer in their petition
for certiorari asks for nothing more than that the amended decision of the Court of Appeals be
revoked and reversed, and its original decision be affirmed in toto insofar as the award of
indemnity and damages is concerned. Since We find the grounds of the appeal meritorious, We
grant fully the prayer in the petition.
This case affords this Court as appropriate an opportunity, as any other, to restate, in a more
comprehensive way, the law regarding the items of damages that are recoverable in cases of
death caused by a crime, whether the claim therefor is made in the criminal proceedings itself or
in a separate civil action. In the instant case, recovery of such damages is being sought in the
criminal proceedings but even if it were claimed otherwise, the indemnity and damages would
be the same, for generally, the items of damages are identical in both procedures, except with
respect to attorney's fees and expenses of litigation which can be awarded only when a
separate civil action is instituted. (Art. 2208, Civil Code) With the clarifications We are making
herein, at least the writer of this opinion expects that litigations regarding the aspects of the law
herein passed upon may be minimized.
As a start, it is to be noted that in the matter of damages, the original decision of the Court of
Appeals, while correct in making a particularization in the award of indemnity and damages,
nonetheless, still failed to comply strictly with the constitutional requirement that all decisions of
courts of record must state both the facts and the law on which they are based. (Sec. 12, Art.
VIII, Constitution) In said original decision, the Court of Appeals held:
Coming now to the damages asked by the heirs of the deceased: Aside from the
P6,000.00 indemnity awarded by the trial court which we uphold, we feel justified, in the
exercise of our discretion, to award to the heirs of the deceased moral damages in the
amount of P6,000 plus P13,380.00 to compensate for the loss of earning of the
decedent at the annual salary of P2,676.00 (Exh. V; p. 42 t.s.n. Vergara).
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is modified as above indicated in so far as it
concerns the amount of indemnity and damages to be awarded to the heirs of the
deceased, and the mitigating circumstance of vindication of a grave offense which takes
the place of the circumstance of obfuscation appreciated by the trial court; and affirmed
in all other respects. Costs against the appellant.
As can be seen, no legal or factual basis is stated therein for the award of indemnity and
damages to petitioners; worse, the impression is given that the said award is purely a matter of
discretion on the part of the court. Clearly, this is not in accordance with the law. Indeed, it must
have been this failure to refer to the pertinent legal provisions which induced the appellate court,
at the mere invocation by respondent of Art. 2204 of the Civil Code, to commit the error of
readily eliminating in the amended decision the items on moral damages and compensation for
loss of earning of the decedent which its original decision had correctly contained. Having held
that it had discretion in the premises, the court easily yielded to the argument that simply
because it had credited the respondent with two mitigating circumstances, it was already
justified in eliminating the items of damages already adverted to, presumably having in mind
said Art. 2204 which provides that:
In crimes, the damages to be adjudicated may be respectively increased or lessened
according to the aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
Of course, this was clear error, inasmuch as construed literally or otherwise, the quoted
provision does not warrant a complete deletion of said items of damages. In any event the court
evidently failed to take into account that several other provisions can come into play considering
the circumstances in this case.
When the commission of a crime results in death, the civil obligations arising therefrom are
governed by the penal laws, "... subject to the provisions of Art. 2177, and of the pertinent
provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title on Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of this Book
(Book IV) regulating damages." (Art. 1161, Civil Code)
Thus, "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civily liable." (Art. 100, Revised Penal
Code). This civil liability, in case the felony involves death, includes indemnification for
consequential damages (Art. 104, id.) and said consequential damages in turn include "... those
suffered by his family or by a third person by reason of the crime." (Art. 107, id.) Since these
provisions are subject, however, as above indicated, to certain provisions of the Civil Code, We
will now turn to said provisions.
The general rule in the Civil Code is that:
In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the
natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not
necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been
foreseen by the defendant. (Art. 2202)
When, however, the crime committed involves death, there is Art. 2206 which provides thus:
The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least
three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In
addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased,
and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every
case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of
permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at
the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of article 291,
the recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by law of testate or
intestate succession may demand support from the person causing the death, for a
period not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased
may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the
deceased.
The amount of P3,000 referred to in the above article has already been increased by this Court
first, to P6,000.00 inPeople v. Amansec, 80 Phil. 426, and lately to P12,000.00 in the case
of People v. Pantoja, G. R. No. L-18793, promulgated October 11, 1968, and it must be stressed
that this amount, as well as the amount of moral damages, may be adjudicated even without
proof of pecuniary loss, the assessment of the moral damages being "left to the discretion of the
court, according to the circumstances of each case." (Art. 2216)
Exemplary damages may also be imposed as a part of this civil liability when the crime has
been committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, such damages being "separate
and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party," (Art. 2230). Exemplary damages
cannot however be recovered as a matter of right; the court will decide whether or not they
should be given. (Art. 2233)
In any event, save as expressly provided in connection with the indemnity for the sole fact of
death (1st par., Art. 2206) and in cases wherein exemplary damages are awarded precisely
because of the attendance of aggravating circumstances, (Art. 2230) "... damages to be
adjudicated may be respectively increased or lessened according to the aggravating or
mitigating circumstances," (Art. 2204) but "the party suffering the loss or injury must exercise
the diligence of a good father of a family to minimize the damages resulting from the act or
omisson in question." (Art. 2203) "Interest as a part of the damages, may, in a proper case, be
adjudicated in the discretion of the Court." (Art. 2211) As to attorneys' fees and expenses of
litigation, the same may be recovered only when exemplary damages have been granted (Art.
2208, par. 1) or, as We have already stated, when there is a separate civil action.
Stated differently, when death occurs as a result of a crime, the heirs of the deceased are
entitled to the following items of damages:
1. As indemnity for the death of the victim of the offense P12,000.00, without the need
of any evidence or proof of damages, and even though there may have been mitigating
circumstances attending the commission of the offense.
2. As indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased an amount to be fixed by
the Court according to the circumstances of the deceased related to his actual income at
the time of death and his probable life expectancy, the said indemnity to be assessed
and awarded by the court as a matter of duty, unless the deceased had no earning
capacity at said time on account of permanent disability not caused by the accused. If
the deceased was obliged to give support, under Art. 291, Civil Code, the recipient who
is not an heir, may demand support from the accused for not more than five years, the
exact duration to be fixed by the court.
3. As moral damages for mental anguish, an amount to be fixed by the court. This
may be recovered even by the illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the
deceased.
4. As exemplary damages, when the crime is attended by one or more aggravating
circumstances, an amount to be fixed in the discretion of the court, the same to be
considered separate from fines.
5. As attorney's fees and expresses of litigation, the actual amount thereof, (but only
when a separate civil action to recover civil liability has been filed or when exemplary
damages are awarded).
6. Interests in the proper cases.
7. It must be emphasized that the indemnities for loss of earning capacity of the
deceased and for moral damages are recoverable separately from and in addition to the
fixed sum of P12,000.00 corresponding to the indemnity for the sole fact of death, and
that these damages may, however, be respectively increased or lessened according to
the mitigating or aggravating circumstances, except items 1 and 4 above, for obvious
reasons.
In the light of the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the Court of Appeals erred in eliminating in
its amended decision, the items of moral damages and compensation for loss of earning
capacity of the deceased. Indeed, as to the award of moral damages in case of death, this Court
has already held in Mercado v. Lira, etc., G. R. Nos. L-13328-29, September 29, 1961, that
once the heirs of the deceased claim moral damages and are able to prove they are entitled
thereto, it becomes the duty of the court to make the award. We held:
Art. 2206 states further that "In addition" to the amount of at least P3,000.00 to be
awarded for the death of a passenger, the spouse, legitimate and illegitimate
descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages as a
consequence of the death of their deceased kin, which simply means that once the
above-mentioned heirs of the deceased claim compensation for moral damages and are
able to prove that they are entitled to such award, it becomes the duty of the court to
award moral damages to the claimant in an amount commensurate with the mental
anguish suffered by them.
This doctrine was reiterated in Maranan v. Perez, G. R. No. L-22272, June 26, 1967:
In connection with the award of damages, the court a quo granted only P3,000 to
plaintiff-appellant. This is the minimum compensatory damages amount recoverable
under Art. 1764 in connection with Art. 2206 of the Civil Code when a breach of contract
results in the passenger's death. As has been the policy followed by this Court, this
minimal award should be increased to P6,000 .... Still, Art. 2206 and 1764 award moral
damages in addition to compensatory damages, to the parents of the passenger killed to
compensate for the mental anguish they suffered. A claim therefor, having been properly
made, it becomes the court's duty to award moral damages. Plaintiff demands P5,000 as
moral damages; however, in the circumstances, We consider P3,000 moral damages, in
addition to the P6,000 damages aforestated, as sufficient. Interest upon such damages
are also due to plaintiff-appellant.
Likewise, in the matter of the compensatory damages for the loss of earning capacity of the
deceased, We also held in the case of Daniel Bulante v. Chu Liante, G.R. Nos. L- 21583 and L21591-92, May 20, 1968 that:
The next item objected to refers to the damages awarded to the heirs of the deceased
passengers for loss of earning capacity, separately from the indemnities by reason of
death. The ground for the objection is that loss of earning capacity was not specifically
pleaded or claimed in the complaint. This item, however, may be considered included in
the prayer for "actual damages" and for other "just and equitable reliefs", especially if
taken in the light of Art. 2206, in connection with Art. 1764, of the Civil Code, which
allows, in addition to an indemnity of at least P3,000 by reason of death, recovery for
loss of earning capacity on the part of the deceased, the same to be paid to his heirs "in
every case ... unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not
caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death."
To be sure, these cases of Mercado v. Lira, Maranan v. Perez and Bulante v. Chu Liante from
which We have quoted, were actions based on contracts of common carriers. But the abovementioned doctrines are equally applicable to civil liability ex delicto because, after all, Art. 2206
of the Civil Code which was applied in said cases is precisely the provision pertinent to liability
arising from crimes (and quasi-delicts). No doubt, said Article must have been relied upon by the
court in the above cases only because Art. 1764 of the Civil Code provides that said "Art. 2206
shall also apply to the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract of a common
carrier." Accordingly, the interpretation given to said article in those cases are applicable to the
case at bar. In other words, this must be so because under the Civil Code, the same rules on
damages are generally to be observed, whether death results from a crime or a quasi-delict or a
breach of the contract of common carriage.
As to the amount of the indemnity for moral damages and loss of earning capacity of the
deceased in the present case, the original decision of the Court of Appeals awarding them, does
not afford sufficient basis for Us to increase the amounts fixed by said court, as prayed for by
appellants. As has already been stated, the said decision failed to follow the Constitution, not
only in not stating the law on which it is based but also in not making the necessary findings of
fact on which it based its discretion in fixing the respective amounts it awarded for moral and
compensatory damages. Legally, therefore, We can, if We wish to, return this case to that court
for it to supply these constitutional omissions. We opt however, to save time and further
difficulties for and damages to, the petitioners. Extant in the records before Us is the fact that
the respondent has never disputed that petitioners are the widow and seven children of the
deceased, three of whom were still minors at the time of his death, nor that the said deceased
was a public school teacher, 56 years old, and earning P2,276.00 a year. These facts appear to
have been repeatedly asserted in the briefs of petitioners in the Court of Appeals and in this
Court. No denial was ever made by the respondent. When respondent moved for the
reconsideration of the original decision of the Court of Appeals, (Annex E of Petition
for Certiorari) he only argued that in view of the mitigating circumstances credited to him by said
court, petitioners were not entitled to moral damages and to indemnity for loss of earning
capacity of the deceased; the amounts fixed therefor by said court he never questioned.
When petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration of the amended decision of the Court of
Appeals, these facts (relationship, earnings, etc.) were reiterated. (Annex G, id.) Respondent
did not file any answer to said motion despite the resolution requiring him to do so. (Par. 12,
Petition for Certiorari) Neither has respondent filed any brief in the present instance,
notwithstanding repeated requests on his part for extension to file the same, which, incidentally,
were all granted. Under these circumstances, We feel justified in brushing aside strict
technicalities of procedure in order to accomplish substantial justice more expeditiously.
Anyway, as We said at the outset, petitioners are asking Us, in the prayer of their petition
for certiorari, for nothing more than to affirm "in toto" the original decision of the Court of
Appeals, and in their lone assignment of error in the present instance, their only claim is that
"the Court of Appeals erred when it issued the amended decision eliminating the award of
P6,000 moral damages and the award of P13,380.00 loss of earnings of the deceased
Raymundo Castro." In these circumstances, even if We should award the amounts of damages
just mentioned, inspite of the absence of the pertinent findings of fact by the Court of Appeals,
We would not have to reach beyond amounts that are undisputed by the respondent.
We, therefore, overrule the prayer for additional damages in petitioners' brief and We hold that,
on the basis of the facts not questioned by respondent, they are entitled only to the P6,000.00
as moral damages and the P13,380.00 as compensatory damages for the loss of earning
capacity of the deceased awarded in the original decision of the Court of Appeals in addition, of
course, to the indemnity for death fixed also by said court at P6,000.00. This amount of
P6,000.00 We cannot increase to P12,000.00, as allowed in People v. Pantoja, supra, and the
subsequent cases, (People v. Mongaya G. R. No. L-23708, October 31, 1968, and People v.
Ramos, G. R. No. L-19143, November 29, 1968) because in the instant suit, neither party has
appealed in relation thereto. This case is now before Us on appeal by the offended party only as
to specific portions of the civil indemnity to be paid by the respondent. It would have been
different if the whole criminal case were up for our review because then, even without any
appeal on the part of the offended party, We could have still increased the said liability of the
accused, here-in respondent. (See Mercado v. Lira, supra.)
At this juncture, for the guidance of parties similarly situated as petitioners herein, and so that
there may be no useless expenses in appeals by offended parties in regard to the civil aspect of
a criminal case when no separate civil action has been filed by them, it should be made clear
that when there is no such separate civil action and the claim for civil indemnity is joined with
the criminal case, no record on appeal, whether printed, typewritten or mimeographed, is
necessary, except perhaps when formal pleading raising complicated questions are filed in
connection therewith, and still, this would be purely optional on the appellant because anyway
the whole original record of the case is elevated in appeals in criminal cases. It is already settled
that appeals relating to the civil aspects of a criminal case should follow the procedure for
appeal required by rules of criminal procedure. (People vs. Lorredo, 50 Phil. 209, 220-221;
People v. ViIlanueva, G.R. No. L-18769, May 27, 1966)lawphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, the amended decision of the Court of Appeals is modified as hereinabove
indicated, in so far as the civil liability of respondent is concerned, with costs against him in this
instance.
Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L. and Sanchez, JJ., concur in the result.
Castro, J., reserves his vote.
Separate Opinions
CAPISTRANO, J., concurring:

I concur, and take this opportunity to express my views on certain points not covered by the
majority opinion.
1. In the criminal action for death by crime, as murder, homicide, and homicide through
reckless imprudence it is the duty of the Fiscal, unless the heirs reserve their right to file
a separate civil action, to demand payment, for the benefit of the heirs of the deceased,
of the damages ordained in Article 2206 and 2230 of the Civil Code. This duty is
apparent from the following considerations: (a) A crime is an offense against both the
State and the offended party. This is so because before the State intervened in its
punishment, a crime was an offense purely against the injured party calling for private
vengeance. It was only after "the period of private vengeance" in the history of criminal
law that the State decided to intervene in the punishment of crime for reasons of social
defense. (b) The civil liability in crime is generally determined in the criminal action
pursuant to the basic principle that "every person criminally liable is civilly liable." Since
the Fiscal has full control of the criminal action, he is the only one who may demand
payment therein of the civil indemnity for the benefit of the heirs of the deceased. (c) In
case the Fiscal does not demand payment of the civil indemnity in the criminal action
and the judgment does not order its payment, said judgment will constitute a bar to a
future civil action to recover the civil indemnity. (d) Most of the injured parties in crime
are poor or ignorant. For this reason, the intervention of a private prosecutor, hired by
the heirs of the deceased, in the criminal action, is rare. (e) The trial court usually
awards only the amount of P12,000 as damages for the death unless the other items of
damages specified in Articles 2206 and 2230 of the Civil Code are demanded by the
Fiscal. The failure of the Fiscals throughout the country to make such demand in the
criminal actions has resulted in the law (Art. 2206, except par. 1, and Art. 2230) having
fallen into disuse for a period of more than 18 years (from 1950 when the New Civil
Code took effect, until now), contrary to the great expectations of the Code Commission
and the Legislature. Said failure has also resulted in great injustice to the countless heirs
of the victims of murder, homicide and homicide through reckless imprudence during
said period of 18 years.
2. Accordingly, unless the heirs reserve their right to file a separate civil action, the Fiscal
should also allege in the information all the items of damages recoverable for the benefit
of the heirs of the deceased as follows: (a) P12,000 for the death of the victim; (b) the
amount constituting loss of the earning capacity of the deceased; (e) the amount of
monthly support to be given by the accused for the period not exceeding five years in
case the deceased was obligated to give support under Article 291 of the Civil Code to a
recipient who is not an intestate heir of the deceased; (d) that moral damages are
demanded by and on behalf of the surviving spouse, legitimate and illegitimate
descendants, and ascendants of the deceased for mental anguish by reason of the
death of the deceased, the amount of award to each of them individually to be
determined in the discretion of the court on proof of mental anguish and the depth or
intensity of the same; and (e) exemplary damages in the amount to be determined by
the court to be paid to the heirs of the deceased in case of the presence of one or more
aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime.
3. Where a private prosecutor, hired by the heirs of the deceased, intervenes in the
criminal action, as in the case at bar, the heirs may also demand and recover reasonable
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. This is just. From the provision of Article
2208(9) of the Civil Code which allows recovery of attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation in case of a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime, it
does not follow that the converse is true. Whether the heirs recover the civil liability
through a private prosecutor in criminal action or through counsel in a separate civil
action, they are entitled to attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. What is important is
not in what action the civil liability is recovered, but the fact that in either action the heirs
have paid attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
4. Those heirs entitled to the civil indemnity are the intestate heirs of the deceased in the
order of intestate succession. The Fiscal should therefore give in the information the
names and personal circumstances of the heirs entitled to the civil indemnity in
accordance with the law of intestate succession so that the trial court may make the
award in their names. This will avoid further or subsequent litigation on who, among
several claimants, are really the heirs entitled to the civil indemnity. The practice of the
trial courts in awarding the civil indemnity to "the heirs of the deceased," does not satisfy
the law and should be abandoned.
Does the term "heirs" include testamentary heirs? An affirmative answer is proper.
According to Manresa "Donde la ley no distingue, no debemos distinguir." The heirs,
whether testate or intestate, are a continuation of the juridical personality of the
decedent. The law has a tender regard for the will of the testator expressed in his last
will and testament on the ground that any disposition made by the testator is better than
that which the law can make. For this reason, intestate succession is nothing more than
a disposition based upon the presumed will of the decedent.
5. The award of moral damages to the surviving spouse, legitimate and illegitimate
descendants, and ascendants of the deceased, should be made to each of them
individually and in varying amounts depending upon proof of mental anguish and the
depth or intensity of the same. Where it is shown that one or some did not suffer mental
anguish or could not have suffered the same, no award of moral damages should be
made to him or to them. For example: The evidence shows that the surviving widow,
who had a paramour, when informed of the death of her husband, said: "Mabuti nga.
Ngayon maaari na akong pakasal kay Pepe." Another example: The evidence shows
that the legitimate children (or grandchildren) were aged one, two and four at the time
their father was killed. In the very nature of things these children (or descendants) could
not have suffered mental anguish. In these examples there should be no award of moral
damages to the widow and the infant children.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994

vs.
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
ROMERO, J.:
In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y
Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a
decision penned by Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on
February 4, 1992 at
the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic
encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme
Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it
required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from
his commission of the offense charged.
In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant
did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. The
Solicitor General, relying on the case ofPeople v. Sendaydiego 1 insists that the appeal should
still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which the civil
liability is based.
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General
arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal
extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his position, said counsel invoked
the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia 2 which held that the civil
obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is
extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is rendered.
We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguish his civil liability?
In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, this issue was settled in the affirmative. This
same issue posed therein was phrased thus: Does the death of Alfredo Castillo affect both his
criminal responsibility and his civil liability as a consequence of the alleged crime?
It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition:
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. It reads, in part:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal
liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as
to the pecuniary penalties liability therefor is extinguished only
when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no question. The law is plain.
Statutory construction is unnecessary. Said liability is extinguished.
The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is extinguished only
when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. Saddled upon us is
the task of ascertaining the legal import of the term "final judgment." Is it final
judgment as contradistinguished from an interlocutory order? Or, is it a judgment
which is final and executory?
We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept contained in Article 89 of the
Revised Penal Code heretofore transcribed is lifted from Article 132 of the
Spanish El Codigo Penal de 1870 which, in part, recites:
La responsabilidad penal se extingue.
1. Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las penas personales
siempre, y respecto a las pecuniarias, solo cuando a su
fallecimiento no hubiere recaido sentencia firme.
xxx xxx xxx
The code of 1870 . . . it will be observed employs the term "sentencia firme."
What is "sentencia firme" under the old statute?
XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola, p. 473, furnishes the ready answer: It
says:
SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que adquiere la fuerza de las
definitivas por no haberse utilizado por las partes litigantes
recurso alguno contra ella dentro de los terminos y plazos legales
concedidos al efecto.
"Sentencia firme" really should be understood as one which is definite. Because,
it is only when judgment is such that, as Medina y Maranon puts it, the crime is
confirmed "en condena determinada;" or, in the words of Groizard, the guilt of
the accused becomes "una verdad legal." Prior thereto, should the accused
die, according to Viada, "no hay legalmente, en tal caso, ni reo, ni delito, ni
responsabilidad criminal de ninguna clase." And, as Judge Kapunan well
explained, when a defendant dies before judgment becomes executory, "there
cannot be any determination by final judgment whether or not the felony upon
which the civil action might arise exists," for the simple reason that "there is no
party defendant." (I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, p. 421. Senator
Francisco holds the same view. Francisco, Revised Penal Code, Book One, 2nd
ed., pp. 859-860)
The legal import of the term "final judgment" is similarly reflected in the Revised
Penal Code. Articles 72 and 78 of that legal body mention the term "final
judgment" in the sense that it is already enforceable. This also brings to mind
Section 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which states that a judgment in a
criminal case becomes final "after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal
or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the
defendant has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal."
By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here collected funnel down to
one positive conclusion: The term final judgment employed in the Revised Penal
Code means judgment beyond recall. Really, as long as a judgment has not
become executory, it cannot be truthfully said that defendant is definitely guilty of
the felony charged against him.
Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is without reason. For where,
as in this case, the right to institute a separate civil action is not reserved, the
decision to be rendered must, of necessity, cover "both the criminal and the civil
aspects of the case." People vs. Yusico (November 9, 1942), 2 O.G., No. 100, p.
964. See also: People vs. Moll, 68 Phil., 626, 634; Francisco, Criminal
Procedure, 1958 ed., Vol. I, pp. 234, 236. Correctly, Judge Kapunan observed
that as "the civil action is based solely on the felony committed and of which the
offender might be found guilty, the death of the offender extinguishes the civil
liability." I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, supra.
Here is the situation obtaining in the present case: Castillo's criminal liability is
out. His civil liability is sought to be enforced by reason of that criminal liability.
But then, if we dismiss, as we must, the criminal action and let the civil aspect
remain, we will be faced with the anomalous situation whereby we will be called
upon to clamp civil liability in a case where the source thereof criminal liability
does not exist. And, as was well stated in Bautista, et al. vs. Estrella, et al.,
CA-G.R.
No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, "no party can be found and held criminally
liable in a civil suit," which solely would remain if we are to divorce it from the
criminal proceeding."
This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case 3 was adopted by the Supreme Court in
the cases of People of the Philippines v. Bonifacio Alison, et al., 4 People of the Philippines
v. Jaime Jose, et al. 5 and People of the Philippines v.Satorre 6 by dismissing the appeal in view
of the death of the accused pending appeal of said cases.
As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in the Alison case:
The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having been established, and
considering that there is as yet no final judgment in view of the pendency of the
appeal, the criminal and civil liability of the said accused-appellant Alison was
extinguished by his death (Art. 89, Revised Penal Code; Reyes' Criminal Law,
1971 Rev. Ed., p. 717, citing People v. Castillo and Ofemia C.A., 56 O.G. 4045);
consequently, the case against him should be dismissed.
On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases of Buenaventura Belamala v. Marcelino
Polinar 7 andLamberto Torrijos v. The Honorable Court of Appeals 8 ruled differently. In the
former, the issue decided by this court was: Whether the civil liability of one accused of physical
injuries who died before final judgment is extinguished by his demise to the extent of barring any
claim therefore against his estate. It was the contention of the administrator-appellant therein
that the death of the accused prior to final judgment extinguished all criminal and civil liabilities
resulting from the offense, in view of Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.
However, this court ruled therein:
We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been extinguished, in view of
the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that
became operative eighteen years after the revised Penal Code. As pointed out by
the Court below, Article 33 of the Civil Code establishes a civil action for
damages on account of physical injuries, entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action.
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil

action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil action for
damages was to be considered instituted together with the criminal action still,
since both proceedings were terminated without final adjudication, the civil action
of the offended party under Article 33 may yet be enforced separately.
In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:
xxx xxx xxx
It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the extinction of the
criminal liability under Article 89, only when the civil liability arises from the
criminal act as its only basis. Stated differently, where the civil liability does not
exist independently of the criminal responsibility, the extinction of the latter by
death, ipso facto extinguishes the former, provided, of course, that death
supervenes before final judgment. The said principle does not apply in instant
case wherein the civil liability springs neither solely nor originally from the crime
itself but from a civil contract of purchase and sale. (Emphasis ours)
xxx xxx xxx
In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil liability of the accused who was
charged with estafa could likewise trace its genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil
Code since said accused had swindled the first and second vendees of the property
subject matter of the contract of sale. It therefore concluded: "Consequently, while the
death of the accused herein extinguished his criminal liability including fine, his civil
liability based on the laws of human relations remains."
Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil liability of the accused,
notwithstanding the extinction of his criminal liability due to his death pending appeal of his
conviction.
To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to survive, the court relied on the following
ratiocination: Since Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court 9 requires the dismissal of all
money claims against the defendant whose death occurred prior to the final judgment of the
Court of First Instance (CFI), then it can be inferred that actions for recovery of money may
continue to be heard on appeal, when the death of the defendant supervenes after the CFI had
rendered its judgment. In such case, explained this tribunal, "the name of the offended party
shall be included in the title of the case as plaintiff-appellee and the legal representative or the
heirs of the deceased-accused should be substituted as defendants-appellants."
It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to Torrijos, the rule established
was that the survival of the civil liability depends on whether the same can be predicated on
sources of obligations other than delict. Stated differently, the claim for civil liability is also
extinguished together with the criminal action if it were solely based thereon, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto.
However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et al. 10 departed from this longestablished principle of law. In this case, accused Sendaydiego was charged with and convicted
by the lower court of malversation thru falsification of public documents. Sendaydiego's death
supervened during the pendency of the appeal of his conviction.
This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss Sendaydiego's appeal but only to the
extent of his criminal liability. His civil liability was allowed to survive although it was clear that
such claim thereon was exclusively dependent on the criminal action already extinguished. The
legal import of such decision was for the court to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over
the entire appeal, passing upon the correctness of Sendaydiego's conviction despite dismissal
of the criminal action, for the purpose of determining if he is civilly liable. In doing so, this Court
issued a Resolution of July 8, 1977 stating thus:
The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability survived
Sendaydiego because his death occurred after final judgment was rendered by
the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which convicted him of three complex
crimes of malversation through falsification and ordered him to indemnify the
Province in the total sum of P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).
The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal
action in the absence of express waiver or its reservation in a separate action
(Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court). The civil action for the civil liability is
separate and distinct from the criminal action (People and Manuel vs. Coloma,
105 Phil. 1287; Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).
When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies before final
judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in
the manner especially provided in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3
of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been
rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It
may be continued on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-40336, October 24,
1975; 67 SCRA 394).
The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds improperly
disbursed although he has no criminal liability (U.S. vs. Elvina, 24 Phil. 230;
Philippine National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).
In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of the

deceased Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, the Court
Resolved to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over his possible civil
liability for the money claims of the Province of Pangasinan arising from the
alleged criminal acts complained of, as if no criminal case had been instituted
against him, thus making applicable, in determining his civil liability, Article 30 of
the Civil Code . . . and, for that purpose, his counsel is directed to inform this
Court within ten (10) days of the names and addresses of the decedent's heirs or
whether or not his estate is under administration and has a duly appointed
judicial administrator. Said heirs or administrator will be substituted for the
deceased insofar as the civil action for the civil liability is concerned (Secs. 16
and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court).
Succeeding cases 11 raising the identical issue have maintained adherence to our ruling
in Sendaydiego; in other words, they were a reaffirmance of our abandonment of the settled rule
that a civil liability solely anchored on the criminal (civil liability ex delicto) is extinguished upon
dismissal of the entire appeal due to the demise of the accused.
But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A re-examination of our decision
in Sendaydiego impels us to revert to the old ruling.
To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego: The resolution of the civil action
impliedly instituted in the criminal action can proceed irrespective of the latter's extinction due to
death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, pursuant to Article 30 of the Civil Code
and Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:
When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a
criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency
of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove
the act complained of.
Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend support to the ruling in Sendaydiego.
Nowhere in its text is there a grant of authority to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over
the accused's civil liability ex delicto when his death supervenes during appeal. What Article 30
recognizes is an alternative and separate civil action which may be brought to demand civil
liability arising from a criminal offense independently of any criminal action. In the event that no
criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of said civil case, the quantum of
evidence needed to prove the criminal act will have to be that which is compatible with civil
liability and that is, preponderance of evidence and not proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Citing or invoking Article 30 to justify the survival of the civil action despite extinction of the
criminal would in effect merely beg the question of whether civil liability ex delictosurvives upon
extinction of the criminal action due to death of the accused during appeal of his conviction. This
is because whether asserted in
the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by the
death of the accused while his conviction is on appeal. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is
clear on this matter:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender
occurs before final judgment;
xxx xxx xxx
However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed intent of Article 89. It allowed
claims for civil liability ex delicto to survive by ipso facto treating the civil action impliedly
instituted with the criminal, as one filed under Article 30, as though no criminal proceedings had
been filed but merely a separate civil action. This had the effect of converting such claims from
one which is dependent on the outcome of the criminal action to an entirely new and separate
one, the prosecution of which does not even necessitate the filing of criminal
proceedings. 12 One would be hard put to pinpoint the statutory authority for such a
transformation. It is to be borne in mind that in recovering civil liability ex delicto, the same has
perforce to be determined in the criminal action, rooted as it is in the court's pronouncement of
the guilt or innocence of the accused. This is but to render fealty to the intendment of Article 100
of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable." In such cases, extinction of the criminal action due to death of the accused
pending appeal inevitably signifies the concomitant extinction of the civil liability.Mors Omnia
Solvi. Death dissolves all things.
In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final determination of the
criminal liability is a condition precedent to the prosecution of the civil action, such that when the
criminal action is extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant pending appeal thereof, said
civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil liability springs out of and is dependent upon facts
which, if true, would constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an inevitable consequence of the
criminal liability and is to be declared and enforced in the criminal proceeding. This is to be
distinguished from that which is contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil Code which refers to
the institution of a separate civil action that does not draw its life from a criminal proceeding.
The Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977, however, failed to take note of this fundamental
distinction when it allowed the survival of the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex
delicto by treating the same as a separate civil action referred to under Article 30. Surely, it will
take more than just a summary judicial pronouncement to authorize the conversion of said civil
action to an independent one such as that contemplated under Article 30.
Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply Article 30, the resolution of
July 8, 1977 notwithstanding. Thus, it was held in the main decision:
Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his
criminal liability which is the basis of the civil liability for which his estate would be
liable. 13
In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability, concomitantly made a
determination on whether Sendaydiego, on the basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of committing the offense charged. Thus, it upheld Sendaydiego's
conviction and pronounced the same as the source of his civil liability. Consequently, although
Article 30 was not applied in the final determination of Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a
reopening of the criminal action already extinguished which served as basis for Sendaydiego's
civil liability. We reiterate: Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the
criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the
accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso
facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal.
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to serve as another basis for
the Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977. In citing Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the
Court made the inference that civil actions of the type involved in Sendaydiego consist of money
claims, the recovery of which may be continued on appeal if defendant dies pending appeal of
his conviction by holding his estate liable therefor. Hence, the Court's conclusion:
"When the action is for the recovery of money" "and the defendant dies before
final judgment in the court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be
prosecuted in the manner especially provided" in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court
(Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been
rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It
may be continued on appeal.
Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the standpoint of procedural law, this
course taken inSendaydiego cannot be sanctioned. As correctly observed by Justice Regalado:
xxx xxx xxx
I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in
both Torrijos and Sendaydiego which, relying on the provisions of Section 21,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, drew the strained implication therefrom that where
the civil liability instituted together with the criminal liabilities had already passed
beyond the judgment of the then Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial
Court), the Court of Appeals can continue to exercise appellate jurisdiction
thereover despite the extinguishment of the component criminal liability of the
deceased. This pronouncement, which has been followed in the Court's
judgments subsequent and consonant to Torrijos and Sendaydiego, should be
set aside and abandoned as being clearly erroneous and unjustifiable.
Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in ordinary civil actions.

There is neither authority nor justification for its application in criminal procedure
to civil actions instituted together with and as part of criminal actions. Nor is there
any authority in law for the summary conversion from the latter category of an
ordinary civil action upon the death of the offender. . . .
Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal proceeding for recovery of civil
liability ex delicto can hardly be categorized as an ordinary money claim such as that referred to
in Sec. 21, Rule 3 enforceable before the estate of the deceased accused.
Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be viewed in light of the
provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 involving claims against the estate, which in Sendaydiego was
held liable for Sendaydiego's civil liability. "What are contemplated in Section 21 of Rule 3, in
relation to Section 5 of Rule 86, 14 are contractual money claims while the claims involved in civil
liability ex delicto may include even the restitution of personal or real property." 15 Section 5,
Rule 86 provides an exclusive enumeration of what claims may be filed against the estate.
These are: funeral expenses, expenses for the last illness, judgments for money and claim
arising from contracts, expressed or implied. It is clear that money claims arising from delict do
not form part of this exclusive enumeration. Hence, there could be no legal basis in (1) treating
a civil action ex delicto as an ordinary contractual money claim referred to in Section 21, Rule 3
of the Rules of Court and (2) allowing it to survive by filing a claim therefor before the estate of
the deceased accused. Rather, it should be extinguished upon extinction of the criminal action
engendered by the death of the accused pending finality of his conviction.
Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability ex
delicto desires to recover damages from the same act or omission complained of, he must
subject to Section 1, Rule 111 16 (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a
separate civil action, this time predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other
sources of obligation. The source of obligation upon which the separate civil action is premised
determines against whom the same shall be enforced.
If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-delict or may, by provision of
law, result in an injury to person or property (real or personal), the separate civil action must be
filed against the executor or administrator17 of the estate of the accused pursuant to Sec. 1,
Rule 87 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or
administrator. No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or
interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; but
actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the
estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury
to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against him.
This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala 18 where we held that, in recovering damages
for injury to persons thru an independent civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, the
same must be filed against the executor or administrator of the estate of deceased accused and
not against the estate under Sec. 5, Rule 86 because this rule explicitly limits the claim to those
for funeral expenses, expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, judgment for money and
claims arising from contract, express or implied. Contractual money claims, we stressed, refers
only to purely personal obligations other than those which have their source in delict or tort.
Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises from contract, the separate
civil action must be filed against the estate of the accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court.
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as
well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the
death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the
same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. 19 Article 1157 of the
Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise
as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law 20
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery
therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section
1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action
may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused,
depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil
action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to
its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such
case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of
the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 21 of the Civil Code, that should
thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. 22
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas
extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e.,
rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is DISMISSED with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason,
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., is on leave.
#Footnotes
1 Nos. L-33252, L-33253 and L-33254, 81 SCRA 120.

2 No. 22211-R, November 4, 1959, 56 O.G. No. 23, p. 4045.
3 supra.
4 L-30612, April 27, 1972, 44 SCRA 523.
5 No. L-28397, June 17, 1976, 71 SCRA 273.
6 No. L-26282, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 439.
7 No. L-24098, November 18, 1967, 21 SCRA 970.
8 No. L-40336, October 24, 1975, 67 SCRA 394.
9 Sec. 21. Where claim does not survive. When the action is for recovery of
money, debt or interest thereon, and the defendant dies before final judgment in
the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner
especially provided in these rules.
10 Supra.
11 People v. Badeo, G.R. No. 72990, November 21, 1991, 204 SCRA 122;
Petralba v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 81337, August 16, 1991, 200 SCRA 644;
Dumlao v. Court of Appeals, No. L-51625, October 5, 1988, 166 SCRA 269; Rufo
Mauricio Construction v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-75357, November
27, 1987, 155 SCRA 712; People v. Salcedo, No. L-48642, June 22, 1987, 151
SCRA 220; People v. Pancho, No. L-32507, November 4, 1986, 145 SCRA 323;
People v. Navoa, No. L-67966, September 28, 1984, 132 SCRA 410; People v.
Asibar,
No. L-37255, October 23, 1982, 117 SCRA 856; People v. Tirol, No. L-30538,
January 31, 1981, 102 SCRA 558; and People v. Llamoso, No. L-24866, July 13,
1979, 91 SCRA 364.
12 Justice Barredo in his concurring opinion observed that:
. . . this provision contemplates prosecution of the civil liability arising from a
criminal offense without the need of any criminal proceeding to prove the
commission of the crime as such, that is without having to prove the criminal
liability of the defendant so long as his act causing damage or prejudice to the
offended party is proven by preponderance of evidence.
13 Supra, p. 134.
14 Sec. 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed,
barred; exceptions. All claims for money against the decedent, arising from
contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all
claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent,
and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time
limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may be
set forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator may
bring against the claimants. Where an executor or administrator commences an
action, or prosecutes an action already commenced by the deceased in his
lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the claims he has against the
decedent, instead of presenting them independently to the court as herein
provided, and mutual claims may be set off against each other in such action;
and if final judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the amount so
determined shall be considered the true balance against the estate, as though
the claim had been presented directly before the court in the administration
proceedings. Claims not yet due, or contingent, may be approved at their present
value.
15 As explained by J. Regalado in the deliberation of this case.
16 Sec. 1. Institute of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with
the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his
right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code,
and damages under Article 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or
the reservation of the right to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the
others.
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made
before the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances
affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the accused.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by
way of moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for such
civil action as provided in these Rules shall constitute a first lien on the judgment
except in an award for actual damages.
In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the
complaint or information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the
offended party upon the filing thereof in court for trial.
17 Justice Regalado cited the Court's ruling in Belamala that since the damages
sought, as a result of the felony committed amounts to injury to person or
property, real or personal, the civil liability to be recovered must be claimed
against the executor/administrator and not against the estate.
18 Ibid.
19 Justice Vitug who holds a similar view stated: "The civil liability may still be
pursued in a separate civil action but it must be predicated on a source of
obligation other than delict, except when by statutory provision an independent
civil action is authorized such as, to exemplify, in the instance enumerated in
Article 33 of the Civil Code." Justice Regalado stressed that:
Conversely, such civil liability is not extinguished and survives the deceased
offender where it also arises simultaneously from or exists as a consequence or
by reason of a contract, as in Torrijos; or from law, as stated in Torrijos and in the
concurring opinion in Sendaydiego, such as in reference to the Civil Code; or
from a quasi-contract; or is authorized by law to be pursued in an independent
civil action, as in Belamala. Indeed, without these exceptions, it would be unfair
and inequitable to deprive the victim of his property or recovery of damages
therefor, as would have been the fate of the second vendee in Torrijos or the
provincial government in Sendaydiego."
20 See Articles 19, 20, 21, 31, 32, 33, 34, 2176 of the Civil Code; see related
provisions of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, particularly Sec. 1,
Rule 111.
21 Art. 1155. The prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed before
the court, when there is a written extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and when
there is any written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.
22 As explained by J. Vitug in the deliberation of this case.

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